Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/108666 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 1501
Verlag: 
Koç University-TÜSİAD Economic Research Forum (ERF), Istanbul
Zusammenfassung: 
We investigate efficiency properties of sealed-bid second-price auctions with costly participation and resale. Each bidder chooses to participate in the auction if her valuation is higher than her optimally chosen participation cutoff. If resale is not allowed and the bidder valuations are drawn from a strictly convex distribution function, the symmetric equilibrium (where all bidders use the same cutoff) is less efficient than a class of two-cutoff asymmetric equilibria. Existence of these equilibria without resale is sufficient for existence of similarly constructed two-cutoff equilibria with resale. Moreover, these equilibria with resale are ?more asymmetric? and (under a sufficient condition) more efficient than the corresponding equilibria without resale.
Schlagwörter: 
Second-price auctions
resale
participation cost
endogenous entry
endogenous valuations
JEL: 
C72
D44
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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