Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/108251 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers No. MT-DP - 2012/3
Verlag: 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Budapest
Zusammenfassung: 
We study a family of models of tax evasion, where a flat-rate tax finances only the provision of public goods, neglecting audits and wage differences. We focus on the comparison of two modeling approaches. The first is based on optimizing agents, who are endowed with social preferences, their utility being the sum of private consumption and moral utility. The second approach involves agents acting according to simple heuristics. We find that while we encounter the traditionally shaped Laffer-curve in the optimizing model, the heuristics models exhibit (linearly) increasing Laffer-curves. This difference is related to a peculiar type of behavior emerging within the heuristics based approach: a number of agents lurk in a moral state of limbo, alternating between altruism and selfishness.
Schlagwörter: 
tax evasion
tax morale
agent-based simulation
JEL: 
H26
ISBN: 
978-615-5024-94-8
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
260.98 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.