Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/107913 
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
SFB 649 Discussion Paper No. 2014-070
Publisher: 
Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk, Berlin
Abstract: 
We analyze the profitability of government-owned banks' lending to their owners, using a unique data set of relatively homogeneous government-owned banks; the banks are all owned by similarly structured local governments in a single country. Making use of a natural experiment that altered the regulatory and competitive environment, we find evidence that such lending was used to transfer revenues from the banks to the governments. Some of the evidence is particularly pronounced in localities where the incumbent politicians face significant competition for reelection.
Subjects: 
politics and finance
bank regulation
related lending
JEL: 
G21
G38
L32
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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