Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/106476 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics No. 60-2014
Verlag: 
Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Marburg
Zusammenfassung: 
This article provides a model of two risk-neutral firms that may cooperate to achieve a goal that is potentially illegal. The model assumes enforcement risk and firms that are imperfectly informed about antitrust law enforcement. It is shown that compliance training, which educates the agents about law enforcement, may prevent hardcore cartels. Compliance training programs may also promote forms of cooperation that are beneficial for customers. The article shows that a competition authority can sometimes spur the implementation of compliance programs by imposing lower sanctions on wrongdoers.
JEL: 
K21
K42
L41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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