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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 5033
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider a bargaining model in which husband and wife decide on the allocation of time and disposable income. Since her bargaining power would go down otherwise more strongly, the wife agrees to have a child only if the husband also leaves the labor market for a while. The daddy months subsidy enables the couple to overcome a hold-up problem and thereby improves efficiency. However, the same ruling harms cooperative couples and may also reduce welfare in an endogenous taxation framework.
Schlagwörter: 
fertility
bargaining
family policy
labor supply
JEL: 
D13
H21
J13
J18
J22
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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