Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/104173 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Munich Discussion Paper No. 2005-21
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, München
Zusammenfassung: 
We report on several experiments on the optimal allocation of ownership rights. The experiments confirm the property rights approach by showing that the ownership structure affects relationship-specific investments and that subjects attain the most efficient ownership allocation despite starting from different initial conditions. However, in contrast to the property rights approach, the most efficient ownership structure is joint ownership. These results are neither consistent with the self-interest model nor with models that assume that all people behave fairly, but they can be explained by the theory of inequity aversion that focuses on the interaction between selfish and fair players.
Schlagwörter: 
Ownership Rights
Double Moral Hazard
Fairness
Reciprocity
Incomplete Contracts
JEL: 
C7
C9
J3
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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