Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/104171 
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Munich Discussion Paper No. 2005-13
Publisher: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, München
Abstract: 
We use a simple framework where firms in two countries serve their respective domestic markets and a world market to analyze under which conditions cost-reducing mergers will be beneficial for the merging firms, the home country, and the world as a whole. For a national merger, the policies enacted by a national merger authority tend to be overly restrictive from a global efficiency perspective. In contrast, all international mergers that benefit the merging firms will be cleared by either a national or a regional regulator, and this laissez-faire approach is also globally efficient. Finally, we derive the properties of the endogenous merger equilibrium.
Subjects: 
merger policy
international trade
JEL: 
L41
F13
H77
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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