Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/103891 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 471
Verlag: 
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY), München
Zusammenfassung: 
I study intermediation in networked markets using a stochastic model of multilateral bargaining in which traders compete on different routes through the network. I characterize stationary equilibrium payoffs as the fixed point of a set of intuitive value function equations and study efficiency and the impact of network structure on payoffs. There is never too little trade but there may be an inefficiency through too much trade in states where delay would be efficient. With homogenous trade surplus the payoffs for players that are not essential to a trade opportunity go to zero as trade frictions vanish.
Schlagwörter: 
bargaining
financial networks
intermediation
matching
middlemen
networks
over-the-counter markets
stochastic games
JEL: 
C73
C78
L14
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.08 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.