Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/102230 
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 4863
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
When providing public goods through voluntary contributions, a donor may introduce unilateral matching in order to reduce underprovision of the public good and thus inefficiency. By itself, however, matching benefits the donor but harms the recipient. We apply Cornes and Hartley's aggregative game approach to provide a novel graphical explanation of this transfer paradox, and also show how it may be avoided by introducing a commitment device.
Subjects: 
voluntary public good provision
matching
commitment
JEL: 
H23
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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