Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/101353 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 587
Verlag: 
The Johns Hopkins University, Department of Economics, Baltimore, MD
Zusammenfassung: 
In the context of an infinitely repeated Prisoners.Dilemma, we explore how cooperation is initiated when players signal and coordinate through their actions. There are two types of players - patient and impatient - and a player's type is private information. An impatient type is incapable of cooperative play, while if both players are patient types - and this is common knowledge - then they can cooperate with a grim trigger strategy. We find that the longer that players have gone without cooperating, the lower is the probability that they'll cooperate in the next period. While the probability of cooperation emerging is always positive, there is a positive probability that cooperation never occurs.
Schlagwörter: 
Cooperation
Tacit Collusion
JEL: 
C72
L13
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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