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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Papers in Economics and Statistics No. 2013-13
Verlag: 
University of Innsbruck, Research Platform Empirical and Experimental Economics (eeecon), Innsbruck
Zusammenfassung: 
Arad and Rubinstein (2012a) have designed a novel game to study level-k reasoning experimentally. Just like them, we find that the depth of reasoning is very limited and clearly different from equilibrium play. We show that such behavior is even robust to repetitions, hence there is, at best, little learning. However, under time pressure, behavior is, perhaps coincidentally, closer to equilibrium play. We argue that time pressure evokes intuitive reasoning and reduces the focal attraction of choosing higher (and per se more profitable) numbers in the game.
Schlagwörter: 
Level-k reasoning
Time pressure
Repetition
Experiment
JEL: 
C91
C72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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