Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/100040 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 155
Verlag: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper analyzes the principal-agent relationship between a plaintiff and his or her lawyer when the lawyer's investment in discovery is private information. The plaintiff uses the level of the contingency fee and potentially also restrictions on settlements to guide the lawyer's decision-making. We show that the plaintiff can increase the lawyer's investment in discovery by disallowing a settlement in the event of unsuccessful discovery, thereby reducing the pair's joint surplus. We establish that such a restriction may indeed be privately optimal for the plaintiff but can cast doubt on the social desirability of the discovery process.
Schlagwörter: 
litigation
discovery
moral hazard
principal-agent relationship
JEL: 
K41
H23
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-154-0
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.83 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.