EconStor Community: Center for Analytical Economics (CAE), Cornell University
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/64624
Center for Analytical Economics (CAE), Cornell University2016-10-27T13:26:15ZStrategic analysis of influence peddling
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70449
Title: Strategic analysis of influence peddling
Authors: Majumdar, Mukul; Yoo, Seung Han
Abstract: This paper analyzes Influence Peddling with interaction between human capital transfer and collusion-building aspects in a model, in which each government official regulates multiple firms simultaneously. We show that (i) there exists an optimal division rule for collusion between a sequence of qualified regulators and a firm; (ii) as the regulators increasingly benefit from the collusion, they strictly decrease regulation rates for the firm under collusion while strictly increasing regulation rates for a firm not under collusion; and (iii) post-government-employment restrictions are not effective policies, and an alternative policy can be suggested.2011-01-01T00:00:00ZThe nature of risk preferences: Evidence from insurance choices
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70469
Title: The nature of risk preferences: Evidence from insurance choices
Authors: Barseghyan, Levon; Molinari, Francesca; O'Donoghue, Ted; Teitelbaum, Joshua
Abstract: We use data on households' deductible choices in auto and home insurance to estimate a structural model of risky choice that incorporates standard risk aversion (concave utility over final wealth), loss aversion, and nonlinear probability weighting. Our estimates indicate that nonlinear probability weighting plays the most important role in explaining the data. More specifically, we find that standard risk aversion is small, loss aversion is nonexistent, and nonlinear probability weighting is large. When we estimate restricted models, we find that nonlinear probability weighting alone can better explain the data than standard risk aversion alone, loss aversion alone, and standard risk aversion and loss aversion combined. Our main findings are robust to a variety of modeling assumptions.2011-01-01T00:00:00ZFailure of a credit system: Implications of the large deviation theory
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70461
Title: Failure of a credit system: Implications of the large deviation theory
Authors: Bhattacharya, Rabi; Majumdar, Mukul2011-01-01T00:00:00ZEfficient Ramsey equilibria
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70447
Title: Efficient Ramsey equilibria
Authors: Becker, Robert A.; Mitra, Tapan
Abstract: Ramsey equilibrium models with heterogeneous agents and borrowing constraints are shown to yield efficient equilibrium sequences of aggregate capital and consumption. The proof of this result is based on verifying that equilibrium sequences of prices satisfy the Malinvaud criterion for efficiency.2011-01-01T00:00:00Z