EconStor Collection:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/54202
2024-03-24T15:57:33ZCompetition in the market for supplementary health insurance: The case of competing nonprofit sickness funds
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/74540
Title: Competition in the market for supplementary health insurance: The case of competing nonprofit sickness funds
Authors: Ellert, Alexander; Urmann, Oliver
Abstract: This paper examines the competition of nonprofit sickness funds in the market for supplementary health insurance. We investigate product quality strategies when quality is costly and the sickness funds are competing for customers. As long as the sickness funds choose the qualities for simultaneously, any equilibrium will be nondifferentiated. Only if total demand is increasing in quality, both sickness funds provide the maximum quality. For decreasing total demand the existence of an equilibrium depends on the consumers' sensitivity. If there is no equilibrium in the simultaneous competition, sequential quality competition leads to a differentiated equilibrium with a first mover advantage.2012-01-01T00:00:00ZSelf-insurance, self-protection, and increased risk aversion: An intertemporal reinvestigation
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/85324
Title: Self-insurance, self-protection, and increased risk aversion: An intertemporal reinvestigation
Authors: Hofmann, Annette; Peter, Richard
Abstract: This paper studies the effect of increased risk aversion on self-insurance and self-protection in a two-period framework. Here risk management incentives and consumption smoothing incentives are traded off, and the monotonic relationship between self-insurance and risk aversion may no longer hold as more risk-averse agents cannot always afford spending more on self-insurance. A very similar relationship holds for self-protection making self-insurance and self-protection much more alike in a two-period model. We also extend the model to a joint analysis of self-insurance/self-protection and saving decisions.2012-01-01T00:00:00ZEinfluss der Balanced-Scorecard-Werteparameter auf den Unternehmenswert in einem Regressionsmodell am Beispiel der Versicherungsbranche
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/54205
Title: Einfluss der Balanced-Scorecard-Werteparameter auf den Unternehmenswert in einem Regressionsmodell am Beispiel der Versicherungsbranche
Authors: Pohl, Philipp
Abstract: In dieser Arbeit wird ein Regressionsmodell vorgestellt, das den Einfluss der Balanced-Scorecard-Werteparameter auf den Unternehmenswert schätzt. Dadurch wird es möglich, die Bedeutung der unterschiedlichen Wertstellhebel für den wirtschaftlichen Erfolg des Unternehmens exakt zu quantifizieren und im Sinne der wertorientierten Steuerung optimal zu managen. Das verwendete Modell wird dabei allgemeingültig theoretisch fundiert und empirisch an die Daten eines Versicherungsunternehmens angepasst. Der Einfluss der den Unternehmenswert bestimmenden Werteparameter wird mittels einer Maximum-Likelihood-Schätzung berechnet. Die Bedeutung der einzelnen Werteparameter wird auf Basis ihrer statistischen Signifikanz beurteilt. Dabei werden sowohl klassische als auch verallgemeinerte lineare Regressionsmodelle verwendet. Als Ergebnis kann das Management des Unternehmens die entscheidenden Werteparameter der Balanced Scorecard erkennen und das Unternehmen gezielt nach diesen Wertstellhebeln steuern.2008-01-01T00:00:00ZThe impact of intermediary remuneration in differentiated insurance markets
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/54216
Title: The impact of intermediary remuneration in differentiated insurance markets
Authors: Hofmann, Annette; Nell, Martin
Abstract: This article deals with the impact of intermediaries on insurance market transparency and performance. In a market exhibiting product differentiation and coexistence of perfectly and imperfectly informed consumers, competition among insurers leads to non-existence of a pure-strategy market equilibrium. Consumers may become informed about product suitability by consulting an intermediary. We explicitly model two intermediary remuneration systems: commissions and fees. We find that social welfare under fees is first-best efficient but fees lead to lower expected profits of insurers and non-existence of a pure-strategy market equilibrium. Commissions, in contrast, cause 'overinformation' of consumers relative to minimal social cost, but yield a full-information equilibrium in pure strategies associated with higher expected profits of insurers. This might explain why intermediaries are generally compensated by insurers.2008-01-01T00:00:00Z