EconStor Community:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43752
2017-02-19T09:32:49ZR&D investments under endogenous cluster formation
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/149012
Title: R&D investments under endogenous cluster formation
Authors: Dawid, Herbert; Hellmann, Tim
Abstract: We study investments in R&D and the formation of R&D clusters of firms which are competitors in the market. In a three stage game, firms first decide on long-term R&D investment, then form research clusters according to the unanimity game introduced in Bloch(1995), and finally compete in quantities. For some range of investment costs, equilibria with no-investment co-exist with equilibria where a large fraction of firms invest in R&D. Because of the effects of R&D investment on cluster membership, firms tend to over-invest compared to a scenario where research clusters are ex-ante fixed and also compared to the welfare optimum.2016-01-01T00:00:00ZCognitive empathy in conflict situations
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/149008
Title: Cognitive empathy in conflict situations
Authors: Gauer, Florian; Kuzmics, Christoph
Abstract: Two individuals are involved in a conflict situation in which preferences are ex ante uncertain. While they eventually learn their own preferences, they have to pay a small cost if they want to learn their opponent's preferences. We show that, for sufficiently small positive costs of information acquisition, in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the resulting game of incomplete information the probability of getting informed about the opponent's preferences is bounded away from zero and one.2016-01-01T00:00:00ZConvex vNM–Stable Sets for a Semi Orthogonal Game. Part V: All Games have vNM–Stable Sets
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/149009
Title: Convex vNM–Stable Sets for a Semi Orthogonal Game. Part V: All Games have vNM–Stable Sets
Authors: Rosenmüller, Joachim
Abstract: Within this paper we conclude the treatise of vNM-Stable Sets for (cooperative) linear production games with a continuum of players. The paper resumes a series of presentations of this topic, for Part I, II, III, IV, see IMW 483, IMW 498, IMW 500, IMW 534. The framework has been outlined previously. The coalitional function is generated by r+1 "production factors'' (non atomic measures). r factors are given by orthogonal probabilities ("cornered'' production factors) establishing the core of the game. Factor r+1 (the "central'' production factor) is represented by a nonantomic measure with carrier "across the corners'' of the market. I.e., this factor is available in excess and the representing measure is no element of the core of the game. Generalizing our set-up, we assume now that the "central'' production factor is represented by an arbitrary measure not necessarily of step function character. Then the existence theorem is achieved by an approximation procedure. Again it turns out that there is a (not necessarily unique) imputation outside of the core which, together with the core generates the vNM-Stable Set as the convex hull. Significantly, this additional imputation can be seen as a truncation of the "central'' distribution, i.e., the r+1st production factor. Hence, there is a remarkable similarity mutatis mutandis regarding the Characterization Theorem that holds true for the "purely orthogonal case'' Rosenmüller and Shitoviz (2000). This justifies to use the term "Standard vNM-Stable Set'' in the presence of a central production factor.2016-01-01T00:00:00ZNash equilibria of threshold type for two-player nonzero-sum games of stopping
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/149020
Title: Nash equilibria of threshold type for two-player nonzero-sum games of stopping
Authors: De Angelis, Tiziano; Ferrari, Giorgio; Moriarty, John
Abstract: This paper analyses two-player nonzero-sum games of optimal stopping on a class of regular diffusions with singular boundary behaviour (in the sense of Itô and McKean (1974) [19], p. 108). We prove that Nash equilibria are realised by stopping the diffusion at the first exit time from suitable intervals whose boundaries solve a system of algebraic equations. Under mild additional assumptions we also prove uniqueness of the equilibrium.2016-01-01T00:00:00Z