EconStor Collection:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/277
2024-03-24T16:07:12ZMediated truth
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/197767
Title: Mediated truth
Authors: Strulovici, Bruno
Abstract: Many facts are learned through the intermediation of individuals with special access to information, such as law enforcement officers, employees with a security clearance, or experts with specific knowledge. This paper considers whether societies can learn about such facts when information is costly to acquire, cheap to manipulate, and produced sequentially. The answer is negative under an "asymptotic scarcity" condition pertaining to the amount of evidence available which distinguishes, for example, between reproducible scientific evidence and the evidence generated by a crime.2017-01-01T00:00:00ZA universal bound on probabilistic influence
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/197766
Title: A universal bound on probabilistic influence
Authors: Strulovici, Bruno2016-01-01T00:00:00ZOn the existence of monotone pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium in games with complementarities
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/146987
Title: On the existence of monotone pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium in games with complementarities
Authors: Mensch, Jeffrey
Abstract: Many important economic situations can be modelled as dynamic games of incomplete information with strategic complementarities of actions and types. Of special interest is the question of the existence of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which actions are monotonic in types. In this paper, we extend the results of Athey (2001) and Reny (2011) from static Bayesian games to dynamic environments, providing conditions that guarantee the existence of monotone equilibria. Specifically, we define a belief mapping which pins down beliefs over types at any subgame, thereby allowing for the translation of the dynamic game into a static one and an extension of previous results. Difficulties arise when attempting to extend to a continuum of actions due to belief entanglement, which does not occur in the static environment, making extensions to a continuum of actions possible only under stronger conditions. We also provide conditions which guarantee that there will exist monotone best-replies to monotone strategies of one's opponents in a dynamic environment. Applications are given to signalling games and stopping games such as auctions.2015-01-01T00:00:00ZOn the design of criminal trials: The benefits of a three-verdict system
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/119414
Title: On the design of criminal trials: The benefits of a three-verdict system
Authors: Siegel, Ron; Strulovici, Bruno2015-01-01T00:00:00Z