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Unemployment and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in the European Union: A Statistical Analysis

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UNEMPLOYMENT AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS FOREIGNERS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT

This paper provides a statistical analysis of the attitudes towards foreigners displayed by European citizens. It is found that, holding other things constant, unemployed Europeans do not have more negative attitudes towards foreigners than the employed. On the other hand, an increased concentration of immigrants in local neighborhoods significantly increases the likelihood of negative attitudes towards foreigners, everything else the same. These results suggest that it is the increased visibility of immigrants in Europe, not the rise of unemployment rates per se, that has been associated with recent anti-foreigner sentiment in the region.

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UNEMPLOYMENT AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS FOREIGNERS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

1. Introduction

The population of foreigners in the countries of the European Union has risen sharply in recent years. In some countries, migration played a major role in population growth during the 1980s. In Austria, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Sweden and Switzerland, the share of the population change between 1980 and 1990 accounted for by net immigration exceeded that of natural population growth. This is reflected in the substantial portion of the population accounted for by the foreign-born and the children of the foreign-born in some European countries. Table 1 shows that, in 1990, foreigners constituted 27.5 percent of the population in Luxembourg, 16.3 percent of the population in Switzerland, 9.1 percent in Belgium, and 8.2 percent in Germany.¹ By comparison, the proportion of the foreign-born in the population of the United States, a country famed for its open immigration policy, was 8.5 percent in 1990.

¹ The OECD figure quoted here is for West Germany. The data for Europe do not generally distinguish between foreign- and native-born, and this fact must be borne in mind in analyzing the results of this paper and, indeed, all papers dealing with immigration into Europe. Rather, the distinction is between citizens and non-citizens (foreigners). The ability to acquire citizenship varies from country-to-country, and hence, a comparison of "the fraction of foreigners in the population" among nations may give a misleading idea about relative immigration rates in Europe. For example, in the German statistics, the definition of "foreigner" does not include those foreign-born persons who are ethnic Germans, or the foreign-born who have received a German passport. In addition to the inflow of "foreigners," there has been a large migration of ethnic Germans to West Germany since World War II (before 1950 the inflow was more than 12 million; between 1950 and 1988 it was 4.8 million; and between 1989 and 1990, it was 0.779 million. [See Schmidt (1994)]). Moreover, the children of the foreign-born are not citizens, but foreigners. Hence the actual number and share of immigrants in the population is difficult to properly discern.

The immigration flows in the European Union have been magnified by the rise of refugees and asylum-seekers in the late 1980s and 1990s. In 1983, approximately 30,000 people asked for asylum in the European Community countries. By 1992, the number was 680,000. In Germany, the number of asylum-seekers rose from 121,000 in 1989 to 438,000 in 1992. Although new laws to curb refugees and asylum-seekers have been passed in some countries, the ripples of the massive immigration flows remain today.

The rise of immigration in the 1990s was associated with increased anti-foreigner attitudes in some countries. In Great Britain, for example, the number of racially motivated incidents reported to the police grew from 4,383 in 1988 to 7,793 in 1992. In Germany, 6,336 attacks on foreigners were reported to the police in 1992, out of which 2,544 were violent crimes, including 17 people killed. In France, the killing of a 17-year old African immigrant in Marseilles in February 1995 led to a wide debate over the foreign-born population in the country, a controversy that spilled-over into the French presidential campaign at the time. Anti-foreigner violence has also been on the rise in other European Union countries.

Considerable hypothesizing about sources of anti-foreigner attitudes in Europe has taken place in recent years. A number of forces have been postulated by social scientists examining the issue. Economic variables, such as the presence of high unemployment, can play a role in generating anti-immigrant sentiments. Politicians and the public often blame foreigners for taking jobs away from domestic citizens or for lowering their wages. In the 1995 French presidential election, for example, candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen promised to deport 3 million immigrants, on the basis that the emigration would supply all the jobs necessary to employ the 3.3 million French citizens officially listed as jobless in 1995.

A second explanation for anti-foreigner attitudes has been linked to the greater bias associated with the presence of high proportions of immigrants in certain communities. The greater visibility of the immigrants, and the greater contact with the local population, makes them a greater target for discrimination and bias. Indeed, much of the violence against foreigners has arisen from individuals forming part of extremist rightist or nationalist organizations linked to racist propaganda. Less violent bias or discrimination can also be linked to ignorant stereotypes of immigrants, both by private citizens and government officials, such as the police. This is reflected in the following comments made by a young Turk student in Germany, as quoted in *The New York Times*: "Worse than the threat of being attacked, he said, is the discrimination he and others endure at the hands of the government...If you go to a police station to ask for something, they automatically think that you're some kind of criminal. You see the same thing when you go into a housing office or a welfare office. The way they treat you is completely different from the way they treat people they consider to be "real" Germans."²

Conjectures on the determinants of anti-immigrant sentiments has been based mostly on casual evidence [see, for instance, Alber (1994)]. In a recent paper, however, Krueger and Pischke (1996) have provided a multivariate statistical analysis of the various forces influencing crimes against foreigners in Germany. They find significant variation in the incidence and pattern of violence against foreigners on the basis of location. However, they also conclude that "economic strain, as measured by high unemployment or low wages, seems to contribute little to the incidence of violence once location is taken into account. We also

² Kinzer (1993).

find no relationship between the percentage of foreigners in a county and the number of attacks in west Germany."³

In this paper we examine attitudes towards foreigners on the part of European Union citizens and determine the relative role played by various forces in determining those attitudes. In particular, we seek to specify the influence that unemployment has on opinions about foreigners, and the role played by larger concentrations of foreigners on attitudes towards foreigners. Our analysis thus extends Krueger and Pischke's work, focusing on the determinants of general attitudes towards foreigners rather than the issue of crimes against foreigners, upon which Krueger and Pischke concentrated. In addition, our analysis uses data for the whole European Union, in contrast to Krueger and Pischke's focus on Germany. Within this context, this paper explores the determinants of the attitudes of European citizens towards non-European Union foreigners. Table 2 shows the decomposition of the population of foreigners in some European Union countries in 1988. The proportion of non-EEC countries in the contingent of foreigners varies from 17 percent in Luxembourg to 74 percent in the Netherlands.

As far as we can tell, this paper represents the first attempt to provide a multivariate analysis of attitudes towards foreigners in the European Union, and of the role played by economic variables in such attitudes. In the next section we offer some background on the Eurobarometer survey data set utilized in this paper, and the attitudes towards foreigners of the people studied by the survey. In Section III we provide an overview of the statistical methodology utilized to examine the determinants of attitudes towards foreigners. Section IV

³ Krueger and Pischke (1996), p. 2.

then presents the results of the statistical analysis, and Section V our conclusions.

II. EUROBAROMETER SURVEY AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS FOREIGNERS

The analysis in this paper uses the October/ November 1988 Eurobarometer Survey. The Eurobarometer surveys are unique data sets consisting of a single cross-section of a geographically distributed random sample of households across the twelve European Union countries [see Reif and Melich (1991) for a detailed description of the procedures followed in each country]. Launched in 1974, the surveys are conducted in the Spring and Fall of each year to monitor the social and political attitudes of the public in the twelve European Union nations. In addition to information on household economic and demographic behavior, the October/November 1988 Eurobarometer survey contains detailed questions on attitudes toward immigrants and foreigners. The data also contains information on whether the survey respondent was a citizen or not, as well as information on whether any immediate family member is of foreign-origin, or not of foreign-origin.

This study focuses on the attitudes of the citizens of European Union countries 16 years of age or older, not of foreign origin and not in the military. Respondents who did not answer questions as to their nationality, occupation, age or sex were removed from the sample. The remaining sample of citizens of the European Union was equal to 10,126, with 564 respondents from France, 989 for Belgium, 740 for the Netherlands, 858 for Germany, 1,005 for Italy, 282 for Luxembourg, 945 for Denmark, 893 for Ireland, 1031 for the U.K., 955 for Greece, 938 for Spain and 926 for Portugal.

The 1988 Eurobarometer survey asked the sample of European Union citizens to

answer the question: "Is the presence of (non-European Community) foreigners good or bad for the future of our country?," with the following choices: "bad, little bad, little good, good, and no opinion." Table 3 shows the distribution of answers to the survey item. A total of 11 percent of the sample declared that the presence of immigrants was "bad" for the future of their country, while 24 percent said the foreigners were a "little bad" for their country. On the other hand, 45 percent declared that the foreigners were "good or a little good," for the future of their country. The remaining 20 percent were uncertain or did not answer the question.

Attitudes towards foreigners vary according to many parameters, including gender, age, employment status, etc. Table 4 presents the percentage of European citizens who declared that foreigners "were bad or a little bad" for their country, disaggregated by employment status. The categories in Table 4 include employed, unemployed, students, retired persons, and other persons out of the labor force. In contrast to commonly-held perceptions, Table 4 suggests that the unemployed do not have a more strongly negative perception of the (non-European Union) foreign-born population than the average. Among the unemployed, 31 percent declared their view that foreigners "were bad or a little bad." On the other hand, 41 percent of retired persons declared that foreigners "were bad or a little bad." Students had the lowest proportion of negative attitudes towards foreigners, with 25 percent indicating that foreigners "were bad or a little bad."

The results in Table 4 suggest that economics may not be the key force behind negative attitudes towards foreigners. On the other hand, the relationship established by Table 4 may be spurious, a result of the influence of other variables. For instance, if younger workers have more positive attitudes towards immigrants, and if the unemployment rate

among the young is greater than for older workers, then the more positive attitude of the unemployed towards immigrants may just be the result of the fact that they are younger workers, with more positive attitudes towards immigrants.

In order to specify the partial, or marginal, impact of unemployment status on the probability that someone has negative attitudes towards foreigners then requires a multivariate analysis that includes a whole array of variables influencing attitudes. The next section presents the methodology for carrying out this exercise.

III. ANALYSIS OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS FOREIGNERS IN EUROPE

This paper examines how economic and demographic variables are related to the attitudes of European Community citizens towards non-EC foreigners. Attitudes towards foreigners are measured on the basis of the responses of citizens of European Union countries, as sampled by the 1988 Eurobarometer survey, to the question: "Is the presence of (non-European Community) foreigners good or bad for the future of our country?," with the choices being: bad, little bad, little good, good, and no opinion. A variable was constructed that was equal to one if the person declared that foreigners were "bad" or "a little bad" for the future of their country, and zero if the person declared foreigners to be a "little good", "good", or had no opinion. This qualitative variable was used as the dependent variable in a multivariate probit analysis, allowing us to determine how explanatory variables affect the probability of a person displaying negative attitudes towards foreigners.

The sets of explanatory variables included in the analysis are:

1. Employment status, as represented by two categories: employed workers and the unemployed. It is sometimes argued that foreigners take jobs away from citizens and that, therefore, they are associated with greater unemployment. On this basis, then, one would expect the unemployed to blame their woes on a greater influx of foreigners. Yet, the existing evidence on the impact of immigration on European labor markets is inconclusive, often finding small effects of immigration on unemployment.⁴ Indeed, economic theory warns us against hastily assuming that a flow of immigrants into an economy will raise the unemployment of non-immigrants. In a simple, one-sector, rigid-wage model where the labor market is homogeneous, increased immigration will augment labor supply and thus raise unemployment. However, in more complex models, the impact of immigration on unemployment in any given labor market is ambiguous. For instance, general equilibrium modeling suggests that immigrants can be absorbed by the economy with little or no negative impact on employment if the immigrants are employed in expanding, labor-intensive sectors of the economy.⁵ Furthermore, if non-immigrants are complements to immigrants, the foreign labor inflow increases the demand for non-immigrants, thus *raising* rather than lowering their employment.⁶ On this basis, there is no a-priori reason to assume that the unemployed will blame foreigners for their unemployment status.

In our empirical analysis a dummy variable, **UNEMPLOYED**, is included as an

⁴ See the survey paper by Zimmermann (1995), as well as Hunt (1992), DeNew and Zimmermann (1994), Muhleisen and Zimmermann (1994), Winter-Ebmer and Zweimueller (1994), and Winkelmann and Zimmermann (1993)].

⁵ See Card (1990) for empirical evidence on this issue relating to the Mariel immigrant flow.

⁶ For a discussion of the issue of complementarity between immigrant and native-born workers, see Gang and Rivera-Batiz (1994a).

explanatory variable, equal to one if the person was unemployed and zero otherwise.

Employed persons were considered to be the comparison group in the analysis.

2. Out of the labor force status, which includes students, retired persons, and other persons out of the labor force. These three groups may have different attitudes towards foreigners. Retired persons, in particular, who depend on family members for their sustenance, may be worried about the potentially negative impact of the immigrants on the labor market. The portion of the elderly who participate in social security programs may be concerned about the effects of the foreigners on social spending. The view that immigrants take more from the public coffers than they put in has been debated for a long time. Although the net contribution of immigrants to the public sector has been found to be positive in some studies,⁷ the focus of the press on this issue has often been on the opposite result, fueling negative attitudes towards immigrants. Retired persons may therefore react more negatively to foreigners than students or other persons out of the labor force.

In the probit equation, retired persons are represented by a dummy variable, **RETIRED**, equal to one if the person was retired and zero otherwise. Students are represented by a dummy variable, **STUDENT**, equal to one if the person was in school and zero otherwise. Other persons out of the labor force are characterized by the variable **OTHERNONLF**, equal to one if the person is out of the labor force but is not a student or retired, and zero otherwise.

⁷ See, for instance, Simon (1989).

3. Education, as measured by the years of schooling that the person has completed. Greater educational attainment may be expected to diminish negative attitudes towards foreigners, other things constant. For one, insofar as ignorance generates prejudice, greater schooling may act to reduce bias against foreigners. At an economic level, if the foreign inflow of workers is less-skilled than the average in the economy, and if skilled and unskilled workers are complements, then workers with greater amounts of human capital will benefit from having the foreigners enter the labor market.⁸ They are thus more likely to see foreigners in a positive light. People with lower levels of schooling, on the other hand, would be more likely to have negative attitudes toward foreigners.

In the empirical analysis, a variable, **EDUCATION**, was included, equal to the number of years of schooling received by the person.

4. Experience on-the-job, as measured by the number of years that the person has been in the labor market after completing schooling. Workers with more years of experience in the labor market tend to have greater skills than others, everything else the same. If skilled workers are complements with unskilled workers, and foreigners are less-skilled than the average, then experienced workers would benefit from having more immigrants in local labor markets, both through higher wages and lower unemployment. In this case, individuals with more experience would also have more positive attitudes towards foreigners.

In the probit analysis, a variable **EXPERIENCE**, equal to the age of the person minus

⁸ A number of labor market studies have found skilled and unskilled workers to be complementary; see Rivera-Batiz and Sechzer (1991) and Gang and Rivera-Batiz (1994).

the years of schooling completed minus six, was used as a proxy for experience.

5. Young children in the household, as measured by the number of children less than 15 years of age residing in the household. *As users of public services, immigrants profit greatly from public education. Being comparatively young, and with family sizes that exceed the average, immigrant families tend to have on average more children in public schools than the average. The impact of this on the budget of the public sector has not gone unnoticed. Both in Europe and in the United States, a controversy has raged in recent years about the impact of immigrants on social spending, including public education spending. The concern has been especially sharp in relation to the children of illegal immigrants. Indeed, legislation has been debated about whether the children of illegal immigrants can, or should, be excluded from access to public education. Given the publicity accorded to these issues, parents of young children, concerned with the impact of foreigners on social spending, may have more negative attitudes towards foreigners.*

In the empirical work, a variable **CHILDREN**, is introduced, equal to the number of children less than 15 years old living in the household where the person resides.

6. Concentration of foreigners in the neighborhood where the person resides. A greater concentration of foreigners in a particular location may heighten negative attitudes towards foreigners. Being more visible, larger concentrations of immigrants can be easier targets for the ethnocentric sentiments of prejudiced individuals. Indeed, in studies documenting the rise of racial segregation and housing discrimination in certain cities of the United States, the

growth in the concentration of black Americans in those cities has been one of the key explanatory forces. As Massey and Denton (1993, p. 10) point out: "...the black ghetto was constructed through a series of well-defined institutional practices, private behaviors, and public policies by which whites sought to contain growing urban black populations." A similar behavior may be faced by growing immigrant communities. This suggests that communities with larger concentrations of immigrants may also have a greater proportion of individuals with negative attitudes towards foreigners.

To quantify the concentration of foreigners in a neighborhood, this paper uses the Eurobarometer respondents' self-report of foreign presence, elicited in response to the question "are there many, a few or no people of another nationality who live in your neighborhood?". In the empirical analysis, two explanatory variables are utilized: one dummy variable, **MANYFOREIGNERS**, which is equal to one if the person responded that there were many foreigners in their neighborhood, and a second dummy variable, **FEWFOREIGNERS**, which is equal to one if the person stated that there were few foreigners in their neighborhood (the people who stated that there were no foreigners in their neighborhood were used as a comparison group in the analysis). Note that these variables, as a measure of the concentration of foreigners in local labor markets, are obviously influenced by the survey respondents' perceptions.⁹

7. Gender, Head of Household. On the one hand, since women have lower rates of labor force

⁹ On the other hand, this self-reported indicator may capture the local presence of foreigners better than other, aggregate, measures of immigrant concentration.

participation, they may not react as strongly as men to the potentially negative labor market impact of immigrants, as portrayed by the press and politicians. In this case, women would have more positive attitudes towards immigrants. This may be reversed, however, if women are heads of household and are more likely to be participating in the labor force. Indeed, if women compete more closely with immigrants in the labor market (if they occupy similar positions in the occupational ladder), then they may hold more negative attitudes towards foreigners.

In the probit equation, a dummy variable, **MALE**, is equal to one if the person is male, and zero otherwise, and a second dummy variable, **HOH**, is equal to one if the person is a head of household and zero otherwise.

These seven sets of variables influence attitudes towards foreigners. In our analysis, we utilize them as independent variables in a probit equation explaining the likelihood that a person has negative attitudes towards foreigners.

IV. RESULTS

The sub-sample of the population studied consists of European citizens, 16 years of age or older, not of foreign origin and not in the military. In addition, respondents who did not answer questions as to their nationality, occupation, age or sex were excluded. The overall sample of citizens of the European Union in the study was equal to 10,126. Table 5 presents a summary of the sample means of the major variables utilized in the analysis. About 50 percent of the sample was employed, 6 percent was unemployed, another 7 percent was attending school, 18 percent was retired, and 20 percent was out of the labor force (but not

retired or at school). The average educational attainment of the sample was 11.0 years, and the on-the-job experience was 27 years. About half of the sample (49 percent) consisted of men, 54 percent was a head of household, and the average number of children per household was 0.57.

The concentration of foreigners is measured by the answers of individuals sampled to the question of whether there were "many," "few," or "no" foreigners residing in their neighborhood. Half of the sample (50 percent) declared that there were no foreigners residing in their neighborhood, while 42 percent stated there were a few foreigners in their neighborhood, and 8 percent said that there were many foreigners.

Table 6 presents the estimated coefficients for the probit equation explaining the likelihood that a person displayed negative attitudes towards foreigners, i.e., declaring that foreigners were bad or a little bad for the future of their country. Table 6 also includes the marginal effects, computed at sample means, for the estimated probit equation. The equations were estimated using LIMDEP version 6.0 [Greene (1992)].

The first result obtained from the estimated coefficients in Table 6 is that being unemployed does not have a statistically significant impact on the likelihood that a person has negative attitudes towards foreigners, holding other things constant. In fact, the sign of the coefficient is negative, suggesting that, if anything, the unemployed may have less negative attitudes towards foreigners than the employed. Student status also is not statistically related to negative attitudes towards foreigners and, again, the coefficient in the probit equation is negative, suggesting that being a student increases the probability that the person has more favorable attitudes towards foreigners. On the other hand, the coefficient on the variable

representing retired persons is positive, indicating that belonging to this group increases the likelihood of having negative attitudes toward foreigners (although the variable is not statistically significant). Being out of the labor force (non-retired, non-student) has a negative effect on the probability that the person displays negative attitudes towards foreigners. This variable is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level.

A second conclusion obtained from the probit equation in Table 6 is that higher concentrations of foreigners are associated with a stronger probability that the person has negative attitudes towards foreigners. Recall that the variable MANYFOREIGNERS is equal to one when individuals declared that there were many foreigners in their neighborhood, and zero otherwise. The estimated coefficient on this variable is positive and statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. Similarly, the variable FEWFOREIGNERS, which is equal to one when persons stated that there were a few foreigners in their neighborhoods, has also a positive coefficient, statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. Both of these results point to an increasing concentration of foreigners as a key variable raising the likelihood of negative attitudes towards foreigners.

The remaining variables in the analysis are not statistically significant at a 95 percent confidence level except CHILDREN, which represents the number of children less than 15 years of age residing in the household. The coefficient on CHILDREN is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that persons residing in households with greater numbers of children under the age of 15 have more positive attitudes toward foreigners. *Concerns over the fiscal effects of immigrants and their impact on education spending may lie behind this result.*

Educational attainment is associated with a reduction in the probability of displaying negative attitudes towards foreigners, everything else held constant, but the variable is statistically insignificant. Similarly, males have lower likelihood of having negative attitudes towards foreigners, but the variable itself is not statistically significant. More experienced workers and persons who are heads of household both tend to have a greater likelihood of displaying negative attitudes towards foreigners, but the variables fail to have statistical significance at the 95 percent confidence level.

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This paper has sought to determine the comparative significance of some of the key forces that influence negative attitudes towards (non-European Union) foreigners among citizens of the European Union. Using attitudinal survey data from the Eurobarometer survey, the paper analyzed the role of employment status, concentration of foreigners, educational attainment, and a set of other variables that potentially determine attitudes towards immigrants. Estimating a probit equation of the likelihood that persons in the sample declared that foreigners are "bad" or "a little bad" for the future of their country (versus having no opinion or declaring that foreigners are "good" or "a little good" for the future of their country), the paper provided a multivariate analysis of the connections between an array of explanatory variables and negative attitudes towards (non-European Union) foreigners.

We do not find evidence that being unemployed increases the likelihood that a person has negative attitudes towards foreigners. On this regard, our results support those of Krueger

and Pischke (1996, p. 23), who, on the basis of an analysis of anti-foreigner violence in Germany, conclude: "...we find that the incidence of anti-foreigner crime is unrelated to the unemployment rate in an area." Since the theory and evidence on the impact of immigrants on the unemployment of other workers is ambiguous at best and, for some workers, it suggests that immigrants could actually reduce unemployment, it is not surprising that there is a lack of connection between unemployment and negative attitudes towards foreigners.

This does not mean that there is no connection between economic variables and negative attitudes towards foreigners. *Our findings tend to point out that the citizens of the European Union sampled in this study are more concerned about the consequences of immigrants on social expenditures and on the public sector's budget, than on labor market impacts. This would explain why persons residing in households with a greater number of children less than 15 years old also have a significantly higher probability of displaying negative attitudes towards foreigners. More worried about education and the potential impact of immigrants on educational expenditures, they may react more negatively towards foreigners.*

We do find strong evidence that a greater concentration of foreigners in the neighborhoods where citizens reside also raises the probability of a person displaying negative attitudes towards foreigners. This suggests that bias and discrimination may be the key force generating negative attitudes towards foreigners. Being more visible, larger concentrations of immigrants can set afire the ethnocentric sentiments of prejudiced individuals. This behavior has been found in other studies of racial and ethnic discrimination, as documented earlier. Communities with larger concentrations of immigrants may give rise to greater anti-immigrant

sentiment. Insofar as this is the case, the challenge to authorities in these areas is to battle the ignorance and the social environment that gives rise to prejudice and discrimination.

More generally, we found (in our other work) that completely interacting with country left location effects also insignificant. The culture of the country, then wipes away both economic and locational effects. Within a country, people have attitudes independent of where they live in the country or their economic status. All that perhaps changes over time is the strength with which they declare their pre-existing attitudes.

Also, above true when looked at labor force.

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TABLE 1

The Fraction of Foreigners in Population
(% of Population, By Country)

Country	1980	1990
Austria	3.7%	5.3%
Belgium	9.0	9.1
Denmark	2.0	3.1
Finland	0.3	0.5
France	--	6.4
Germany	7.2	8.2
Italy	0.5	1.4
Luxembourg	25.8	27.5
Netherlands	3.7	4.6
Norway	2.0	3.4
Sweden	5.1	5.6
Switzerland	14.1	16.3
United Kingdom	--	3.3

Source: OECD (1992).

**STOCKS OF FOREIGN POPULATION IN SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES,
BY NATIONALITY, 1988**

22

TABLE 3
ATTITUDES OF EUROPEAN RESIDENTS TOWARDS FOREIGNERS

Item Responses	Percentage of sample
Is the Presence of foreigners good or bad for the future of the country?	
Bad	11%
Little bad	24
Little good	34
Good	11
No answer/no opinion	20

Note: Country observations were weighted by country's sample size over total European sample size.
Source: Eurobarometer survey, 1988; author's calculations.

TABLE 4**EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS FOREIGNERS, BY EMPLOYMENT STATUS**

**Percentage indicating that the presence of foreigners
is "bad" or a "little bad" for the future of the country**

Employment category	Percentage of the category stating negative attitudes towards foreigners
Employed	35%
Unemployed	31
Students	26
Retired	41
Other persons out of the labor force	37
Overall	35

Note: Country observations were weighted by country's sample size over total European sample size.

Source: Eurobarometer survey, author's calculations.

TABLE 5
SAMPLE MEANS, EUROPE

Variable	Sample mean
EMPLOYED (Proportion of the labor force employed)	0.49
UNEMPLOYED (Proportion of the sample unemployed)	0.06
RETIRED (Proportion of the sample retired)	0.18
STUDENT (Proportion of the sample in school)	0.06
OTHERNONLF (Proportion of the sample out of the labor force, including only non-students and non-retired)	0.20
EDUCATION (Years of schooling completed)	10.98
EXPERIENCE (Age-Education-6)	26.53
CHILDREN (Number of children less than 15 years of age residing in the household)	0.57
MANYFOREIGNERS (Proportion of persons declaring there are many foreigners in their neighborhood)	0.08
FEWFOREIGNERS (Proportion of persons declaring there are a few foreigners in their neighborhood)	0.42
NOFOREIGNERS (Proportion of persons declaring there are no foreigners in their neighborhood)	0.50
HOH (Proportion of the sample who is a head of household)	0.54
MALE (Proportion of the sample who is male)	0.49
N (Number of observations)	10,126

Note: Country observations were weighted by country's sample size over total European sample size.
Source: Authors' calculations from the Eurobarometer data [Reif and Melich (1991)].

TABLE 6**PROBIT RESULTS ON PROBABILITY OF NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS FOREIGNERS**

(Dependent Variable equals 1 if person declared that non-European foreigners are "bad," or "a little bad" for the future of the country, and equals zero otherwise)

VARIABLE	ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS (Standard errors in parentheses)	MARGINAL COEFFICIENTS (Standard errors in parentheses)
CONSTANT	-0.4768* (0.0793)	-0.1698* (0.0281)
UNEMPLOYED	-0.0179 (0.0569)	-0.0064 (0.0203)
STUDENT	-0.0973 (0.0631)	-0.0346 (0.0225)
OTHERNONLF	-0.0987* (0.0423)	-0.0352* (0.0151)
RETIRED	0.0731 (0.0476)	0.0260 (0.0170)
EDUCATION	-0.0064 (0.0053)	-0.0023 (0.0019)
EXPERIENCE	0.0015 (0.0012)	0.0005 (0.0004)
CHILDREN	-0.0389* (0.0144)	-0.0138* (0.0051)
MANYFOREIGNERS	0.3474* (0.0499)	0.1237* (0.0171)
FEWFOREIGNERS	0.0807* (0.0277)	0.0287* (0.0099)
HOH	0.0203 (0.0347)	0.0072 (0.0124)
MALE	-0.0052 (0.0334)	-0.0019 (0.0119)
N	10,126	
Log-Likelihood	-6277.9	
Count R ²	0.68	

Statistical significance at the 95% confidence level is indicated by an asterisk (*).

Count R-Sq = (Number of correct predictions/Number of observations), as defined by Maddala (1988).