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Working Paper No. 633

**Immigrant Parents' Attributes versus Discrimination:
New Evidence in the Debate about the Creation
of Second Generation Educational Outcomes in Israel**

by

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ABSTRACT

There is much interest in explaining the persistent ethnic gaps in education among Israeli Jews; specifically, the much lower attainments of those from Asian and African countries compared to the rest – Mizrahim vs. Ashkenazim, respectively. Some explanations (especially early ones) have stressed premigration immigrant characteristics, particularly the relatively lower level of educational attainment among Mizrahim. More recent interpretations have tended to focus on discrimination of various sorts that took place after the immigrants arrived in Israel. Crucial evidence for the discriminatory effect was introduced by Yaakov Nahon (1987), who demonstrated a shift toward a Mizrahi-Ashkenazi dichotomy in educational attainment between birth cohorts of adult immigrants and birth cohorts of adults born in Israel. From this evidence, a wide range of scholars concluded that the premigration educational characteristics of immigrants could not explain Israeli educational patterns, and that, consequently, the explanation based on discrimination was thereby greatly strengthened.

In this paper, we use the 1961 Israel census public-use dataset to refine Nahon's analysis. Instead of using age cohorts as proxies for "fathers" and "children," we focus on actual fathers and their children. Our results vary substantially from Nahon's. In fact, we find that the educational attainment of immigrant fathers clusters quite closely around the Ashkenazi-Mizrahi dichotomy, and conclude that it is no longer reasonable to rule out the premigration hypothesis. This outcome leaves researchers with a more challenging explanatory task than before, because they are now faced with the notoriously difficult situation of having to determine the relative influence of premigration characteristics, on the one hand, and of discriminatory processes, on the other.

Keywords: Education; Immigration; Ethnicity; Mobility

JEL Classifications: I2, I28, J15

INTRODUCTION

There is much interest in understanding the sources of the educational gap between second-generation Ashkenazim and Mizrahim. In particular, to what extent was the gap a result of disparities that were already observable among the immigrant parents from different countries of origin, and to what extent was it a reality created in Israel, resulting from the discriminatory impact of the local institutions charged with immigrant absorption? It has become the conventional wisdom to fault the Ashkenazi elite of the State in the 1950s and 1960s for neglecting the cultural, educational, and economic needs of immigrants from North Africa and the Asian countries, the immigrants that would soon be labeled Mizrahim (e.g., Khazzoom 2008; Shenhav 2006).

There is plenty of evidence in the historical record that neglect (or worse) occurred (Segev 1986; Khazzoom 2008). However, the crucial question for social scientists is not whether discriminatory attitudes were prevalent but rather whether elite actions resulting from such attitudes were the crucial factor that created the Ashkenazi-Mizrahi gap found in second-generation educational attainments. The competing theoretical hypothesis has always been that a similar Ashkenazi-Mizrahi gap already existed among the immigrant-parent arrivals. More explicitly, the competing hypothesis is that in the pre-State generation, Jewish educational attainments varied across countries in a way that already followed the later Ashkenazi-Mizrahi divide—that is, much higher in the former than in the latter. According to this competing hypothesis, differences in parental educational attainments were reproduced among their second-generation children, for all the reasons that parents' and children's attainments are typically correlated—differential opportunities by parental social class (which is itself correlated with parental schooling), greater savvy about educational institutions among those who have more experience with them, and differences in outlook that may correlate with low and high educational attainments. A moment's reflection will show that these competing hypotheses—elite discrimination and parental premigration characteristics—are not mutually exclusive: both could have had an important influence on the second generation. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that in the early years of the state the hypothesis stressing parental premigration characteristics dominated social science discussion, while today the discrimination hypothesis dominates.

One crucial reason that the hypothesis stressing parental remigration characteristics today commands less attention is the widespread belief that Yaakov Nahon's *Patterns of Educational Expansion and the Structure of Occupational Opportunity—the Ethnic Dimension* (1987) elegantly demonstrated that the Ashkenazi-Mizrahi divide simply did not exist among the immigrant parents in the clear-cut way it appeared in the second generation. In particular, when Nahon studied immigrant men from five Mizrahi and four Ashkenazi groups, he found Mizrahi men in two of the groups averaged as much schooling as did Ashkenazi men from two others. No such overlap could be found among the second generation. Therefore, the much clearer ethnic dichotomy found in the second generation could not have been the product of premigration parental characteristics and must have been a creation of the social realities of the new State. In this paper we reconsider and refine Nahon's evidence; we conclude that it no longer demonstrates the sharp generational difference in the clarity of the ethnic dichotomy, and; indeed in our revision the ethnic dichotomy appears quite clearly in the data for both generations. Consequently premigration parental characteristics must form an important part of any explanation of the creation of the second-generation Ashkenazi-Mizrahi gap in attainment; such explanations cannot focus only or overwhelmingly on discrimination.

NAHON'S EVIDENCE AND ITS RECEPTION

Nahon focused on the largest immigrant groups that came to be called Ashkenazi or Mizrahi—those from Romania, Poland, the USSR, and Germany-Austria on the one hand and Yemen, Iran, Morocco, Iraq, and Egypt on the other.¹ Optimally, he would have compared the educational attainments of immigrant parents from various countries of origin with the attainment of their Israeli-educated children. Since no dataset provided such information, Nahon did the next-best thing: he compared the attainments of immigrant men 60-64 years of age in the 1983 census from various countries of origin with the attainments of Israeli-educated men 30-34 years of age in the same enumeration; the former he designated the “generation of the fathers,” the latter “the

¹ He treated Greece-Bulgaria as an anomalous group—like the Ashkenazi groups this was a European group but like the Mizrahi groups it was Sephardic in its Jewish communal traditions. But we need not concern ourselves with this last group. The focus of his argument and of our concern is the comparison among the other nine groups. In general, Nahon observes that in the Greece-Bulgaria group first and generation attainments both fall between the means for the Ashkenazi and Mizrahi categories.

generation of the sons.”² We have reproduced Nahon’s results for immigrants and the second generation in Table 1, in columns a and b. Among the “generation of the fathers” country-of-origin differences did *not* cluster into dichotomy as they would come to do later. True, the lowest attainments were found in Mizrahi groups and the highest in Ashkenazi groups; but there was also considerable diversity among immigrant men from the various countries of origin within each of the two broad categories, Mizrahi and Ashkenazi. And most striking, men from some numerically important Mizrahi groups nearly equaled or even exceeded the schooling attained by men from some of the numerically important Ashkenazi groups. In particular, Iraqi immigrant fathers lagged less than a year behind those from Romania; and the mean for Egyptian immigrant fathers actually exceeded the Romanian and equaled the Polish mean. And the Egyptians only comprised a small fraction of all Mizrahi immigrants Nahon studied, the Iraqis comprised nearly a third. And although these immigrant groups did not conform to an ethnic dichotomy, their offspring did. Column b of Table 1 shows that every second-generation Mizrahi group averaged at least 2.1 years less schooling than the mean in the lowest Ashkenazi group. Moreover, Nahon noted that differences *within* each dichotomous category had largely declined in the second generation and the remaining within-category differences did not much reflect the rank ordering of the immigrant groups. In sum, where there had been a multiplicity of country-of-origin groups in the first generation, an ethnic dichotomy was found in the second generation.

² He also compared cohorts of older and younger women, but we restrict attention to the much more dramatic findings for men.

Table 1. Two generations of educational attainments presented by Nahon: immigrants and the second generation for selected countries of origin

GROUPS: by ethnic dichotomy and country of origin	MEAN YEARS OF SCHOOLING	
	IMMIGRANTS	SECOND GENERATION
	"generation of the fathers": age 60-64 in 1983 a	"generation of the sons": age 30-34 in 1983 b
<i>Mizrahi groups</i>		
Yemen	4.0	11.0
Morocco	5.4	10.7
Iran	6.5	10.8
Iraq	8.5	10.8
Egypt	10.0	11.3
<i>Ashkenazi groups</i>		
Romania	9.4	13.4
Poland	10.0	13.9
USSR	10.6	14.0
Germany-Austria	11.4	14.0

SOURCE: Nahon (1987), Table 4.

* Includes those born in Israel or arriving before age 10; Nahon included the latter on the grounds that most of their education would have occurred in Israel.

We will refer to this contention as the *generational transition argument*—a transition in educational attainments had occurred from a first-generation multiplicity based on countries of origin to second-generation dichotomy based on the Ashkenazi-Mizrahi divide. This argument led to an obvious question: if the ethnic dichotomy did not exist in the immigrant generation, why was it dominant in the second generation? The implication was that something other than parental characteristics present at immigration had created the change, something in the dynamics of Israeli life. And this line of thinking in turn tended to strengthen the case for the role of discrimination in creating the ethnic dichotomy in second-generation outcomes, especially discrimination by the older Ashkenazi Israeli elites. We will refer to this idea as *the generational transition corollary*.

Scholars as different as Calvin Goldscheider and Aziza Khazzoom have drawn out the implications. Thus Goldscheider comments,

Analytically, these findings are consistent with the argument that ethnic differences among the second and later generations are not simply a carryover from places of origin but are the result of an Israeli-generated stratification system, reinforced by a complex combination of people and institutions—schools, teachers, family, and neighbors... The evidence available is clearly not consistent with the view that educational and other distinctions among ethnic groups are primarily the result of cultural distinctiveness and proximity to the cultures of places of origin (Goldscheider 1996, 136).

And Khazzoom notes,

The implication of Nahon's work is that Israel did not *receive* Mizrahim and Ashkenazim, but rather *created* them out of a diverse set of country groups. Since an obvious hypothesis is that gatekeepers imposed the new group boundaries, a logical question is which ethnic categories were in use at the time and by whom. (Khazzoom 2008, 48).

Nahon himself argued for the generational transition argument and he clearly meant to encourage a version of the generational transition corollary, stressing the relevance of various kinds of discrimination, by gatekeepers of one sort or another. Nevertheless, in the light of the emphasis on discrimination just noted, it is worth recalling that Nahon's purpose was first and foremost to stress the generational transition argument and the implication that the dichotomy was a product of later dynamics in Israel. However, when it came to explaining exactly what social processes in the new State had led to the dichotomy, he stressed that further study would be needed and that his own very brief formulation was tentative. Nor did that brief formulation rest exclusively upon discrimination. Indeed, it draws explicitly on pre-migration social and cultural attributes as well.

The question [i.e.: how the pattern described by the generational transition argument came about] deserves a study of its own, more detailed than can be

carried out with census data. Nevertheless, it may be possible to suggest a tentative (and partial) explanation. Possibly the explanation is linked to the social structural position into which most of the immigrants from Asia-Africa, including some of those who in terms of education (only one dimension of social standing [ha maamad havevrati]) resembled a large part of the immigrants from Europe. The process of “proletarianization” which they experienced upon immigration (a process that is described in the collective description of them as an inferior if not a “primitive” collectivity, through their absence of connections and being channeled to areas with a poor economic infrastructure, etc.) and on their part large family size considerably reduced economic resources available per capita (or for “the standard individual”) which were already fewer. *Moreover differential fertility patterns (many children being situated precisely among the Mizrahi families of low standing), “inflated” the generation of the young with members from lower social standing, and thus these became dominant among the members of their communities.* The connection between the social standing of the family and the educational attainment of the children indeed is quite striking in all the countries in which the subject has been studied, including in particular Israel (Nahon 1987, 34; italics added).

We will return at the end to Nahon’s careful formulations in this paragraph; however our major concern is with his celebrated evidence that the educational profiles of the immigrants did not cluster into the Ashkenazi-Mizrahi dichotomy, and that the second generation pattern must have been a product of Israeli social dynamics. It was this evidence, and not the list of causal factors in the paragraph just quoted that received the attention. In any case, Nahon actually devoted only a few pages to the generational transition argument and corollary; they are presented in one table (Nahon 1987, Chapter 1, Table 4), a supporting statistical analysis of the same data, and some two pages of related text.

His demonstration rests, as already mentioned, on the comparison of two five-year male birth cohorts: “the generation of the fathers”—immigrants 60-64 in 1983 and “the generation of the sons,” born 1949-53 (these latter born in Israel or brought there by age 9). In his brief discussion, Nahon always refers to the two cohorts as the “fathers” and “sons” (albeit in quotation marks). However, he was careful to warn that he is not comparing actual fathers and

sons. “It should be noted that the concept of ‘fathers’ and of ‘sons’ has a generational significance only; some of these ‘fathers’ probably had no children of age 30-34 and some of these sons did not have a father of age 60-64” (29).

It is precisely the question of how well his first generation cohort captures a “generational significance” that we will explore. We seek to identify more precisely the group of first-generation immigrant men who fathered the second-generation cohort that Nahon defined. Thus we accept Nahon’s definition of the second-generation cohort (born 1949-53, and either born in Israel or arriving there by age nine) and we seek to identify the actual fathers of that birth cohort. We cannot identify the actual fathers in the 1983 census data: by then the sons have left their fathers’ homes. But we can identify actual fathers in the 1961 census data because individuals 30-34 in 1983 (Nahon’s second-generation age cohort) had been 8-12 years of age in 1961. And at that age they were still very likely to be found with their fathers in the census.³ Of course we will not find the completed education of the sons in 1961 but that is not what we are after (we know enough about the completed education of the second generation from the 1983 data). We use the 1961 census data to identify the immigrant fathers of the second-generation birth cohort Nahon defined whereas Nahon himself had used a cohort of immigrant men of a certain age found in the 1983 census to represent the fathers of the second generation.⁴

DATA

In the 1961 Israel census public use dataset (20% of the full enumeration) we isolated the male household heads who were immigrants from the nine countries of origin Nahon had studied; if these household heads also had an Israeli-born child in the 8-12 age range (or a child who arrived by age 9) they were selected as part of the group of actual fathers of Nahon’s second generation group. Several other steps in our procedure merit mention. 1) We limit our analysis to immigrant

³ Recall that both the 1961 and 1983 Israeli census public use samples cover 20% of the population, not 100%. Thus more precisely stated, we will identify in the 1961 dataset *a 20% sample of* actual fathers of children born 1949-53, just as Nahon defined the second generation cohort as *a 20% sample* of that birth cohort comprising individuals born in Israel or brought there by age 9. We cannot link actual family members across the censuses.

⁴ It may be objected that our strategy will no longer involve a comparison of two age cohorts. True. But the reason for comparing the two age cohorts was to observe “the generation of the fathers” and “the generation of the sons.” The assumption was not that age cohorts reproduce educational patterns but rather that families do. To the extent that the older cohort resembles closely enough the cohort of the fathers, then comparing the two cohorts can substitute for comparing the group of actual fathers to their sons. The point of our exploration will be to show that in fact the older cohort is a poor substitute for the actual fathers.

men who (a) were *household heads* in 1961, because we need to determine whether they had children in the relevant age range, and we can only do that through the census question “relation to head of household.” Similarly (b) we can only identify those fathers whose second-generation children 8-12 years of age were living in the same household with them.⁵ 2) Since we are interested in the characteristics of the fathers, we chose to include the fathers of both boys and girls 8-12 years of age. However, it is hardly probable that the fathers of boys and girls 8-12 differ meaningfully in terms of educational attainment from the fathers of boys only in the same age range.⁶

ANALYSIS

In General

We will show that Nahon’s definition of the “generation of the fathers” as men in a certain birth cohort creates a misleading impression of the educational attainments among the actual fathers of his second-generation cohort. By a misleading impression we mean that the educational attainments of the actual fathers differ systematically from those in the cohort. Moreover, the educational attainments of the actual fathers compared to those of the birth cohort follow the Ashkenazi-Mizrahi dichotomy fairly closely. Thus the revision undercuts the generational transition argument and corollary. Table 2 provides a summary of the revision in column c.

⁵ The limitation of immigrant men to household heads of the relevant ages is inconsequential for our exploration (this will be clear to the reader from a comparison of the Appendix, columns b and c). Children not living with their father might have been living only with a mother or living in an institution (indeed the relevant father may have died).

⁶ There are also two other very small conceptual differences between our younger cohort and Nahon’s. 1) A few of those 8 and perhaps 9 years of age whom Nahon would later select from the 1983 data might not yet have arrived in Israel at the time of the 1961 enumeration (if they were brought to Israel at age 9). 2) A few of those in our cohort would have died by the time of the 1983 enumeration. Moreover, there is one other difference in the construction of the sample of children which is technical rather than conceptual. The 1961 dataset includes somewhat more corrupted records than do the later Israeli censuses—in particular households without a head listed, households with multiple heads. As a result we were obliged to exclude tiny proportions of the children.

**Table 2. A Comparison of Educational attainments among:
Nahon's "generation of the fathers" and "generation of the sons"
and the actual fathers (of his 2nd-generation cohort observed in 1961)**

GROUPS: by ethnic dichotomy and country of origin	MEAN YEARS OF SCHOOLING: SELECTED SUBGROUPS OF IMMIGRANT MEN		
	<i>Nahon's (1987) alternative measure</i> "the generation of the fathers":	<i>reanalysis:</i>	
	all men, age 35-44 in 1961 a	1961 household heads only	
		all male heads age 35-44 in 1961 b	<i>fathers</i> of 2nd gen. children (ages 8-12) any age c
<i>Mizrahi groups</i>			
Yemen	4.1	4.1	4.2
Morocco	4.8	4.8	4.7
Iran	5.5	5.5	4.6
Iraq	7.6	7.6	5.7
Egypt	9.3	9.3	8.6
<i>Ashkenazi groups</i>			
Romania	8.5	8.5	8.1
Poland	9.1	9.1	9.1
USSR	10	10.2	10.2
Germany-Austria	11	10.8	11.0

SOURCES. Column a from Nahon (1987) appendix table 12c. Columns b and c from Public Use Microdata Sample for the 1961 Census of Israel (from Israel Social Science Data Center, Hebrew University, Jerusalem).

* Nahon described the alternative measure (based on men 35-44 in 1961 rather than on those 30-34 in 1983) in his text (36), and presented the relevant table (12c) in his appendix. Note that unlike his text table, which included both frequency distributions and means, the appendix table included only frequency distributions. However, from the near-identity of the educational distributions of all men and those who were reported as heads of household (see Appendix columns b and c), it is clear that the means for the two columns must have been nearly identical as well. The means in Appendix column c are used for column b in this table.

Nahon actually offered two definitions for “the generation of the fathers,” one from the census of 1983 and the other from the census of 1961; and he believed (correctly) that they were substantively equivalent for his purposes. His better-known definition is the one shown in Table 1, column a, based on immigrant men 60-64 in the 1983 census. This is the definition which he discussed in his text. However, in his appendix Nahon also presented data on immigrant men found in the 1961 census, when they were 35-44 years of age. We reproduce this second set of figures in Table 2, column a. Nahon commented that using his second definition for the “generation of the fathers” “does not change the picture described [in the text] at all” (36). By this he meant that a transition from first-generation country-of-origin multiplicity to second-generation ethnic dichotomy is demonstrated using either column a or b for the immigrant generation.⁷ Since we will be relying on the 1961 census, we concentrate on Nahon’s figures from that year. Also, there are virtually no differences between the attainments of all men in the birth cohort and those of men in the birth cohort who were household heads (columns a and b).

However, when we shift attention from all male heads in the birth cohort to the male heads—of any age—who actually had children in the 8-12 age range (Table 1, column c), we find striking downward revisions in the means for three Mizrahi groups, the Iranians, Egyptians and most especially the Iraqis—for whom the mean falls from 7.6 to 5.7 years of schooling (column d, shaded columns). The revisions for the Ashkenazi countries are of much less consequence, the most important being the downward revision of the mean for Romanian fathers, from 8.5 to 8.1 years of schooling.

There are two reasons why the educational attainment of the birth cohort of immigrant men (35-44 years of age in 1961) shown in columns a and b differed so markedly from that of the actual fathers of Nahon’s second generation shown in column c. One reason has to do with the nature of the relationship between a father’s educational attainment and the number of his

⁷ We too have no interest in the cross-census differences for the reports of these men. We would only note in passing that the reasons for the differences (which are in some cases quite large) could be many. Some men may have received modest amounts of additional schooling between 1961 and 1983, or they may have tended to inflate their reported schooling over the years. Also, modest differential mortality might have reduced the prevalence of the less-well educated in the birth course over the two decades between 1961 and 1983. Finally in some groups (such as the Romanian) later immigration may have affected the results (Nahon did not limit his definition of first generation men by their year of immigration to Israel). The 1961 and 1983 definitions also differed in using ten and five-year age cohorts respectively; but this is not the source of the differences in reported attainments (see Appendix, columns c and d).

children; the second has to do with the wide range of ages among actual fathers. We consider each in turn.

Father's Educational Attainment and the Number of His Children

Suppose we begin with a birth cohort of male household heads and determine the mean educational attainment in the group. Next we select from within that same birth cohort only those who have children of a certain age (8-12), and we determine the mean educational attainment in this subgroup. Now, suppose too that in the birth cohort of men, those with less education have more children than those with more education. Then the more-educated will be less prevalent among the subgroup who are fathers than in the entire birth cohort, and the former's mean educational attainment will be higher than the latter's. If we use the former group to estimate the attainment of the latter the result will be biased upwards. For this bias to be large enough to matter substantively in our case, two conditions must be met by a particular immigrant group. First, the (negative) association between a man's education and the number of his children must be fairly strong; and second, there must be fairly large proportions of men with both low and high levels of schooling. In fact, these two conditions are found in only one of our nine immigrant groups: the Iraqis.

Table 3 deals with the association between fathers' educational attainment and number of children. Column a shows that the men are divided into four categories of length of schooling. Columns b and c present the number and proportion of men who attained each level of schooling. Column d shows the mean number of children in the 0 – 18 age range that the men at each level of education averaged. Readers who have considered the social factors that influence the number of children per family will be familiar with this measure that relies on the entire dependent age range for the young; we present it for that reason. However, in the present context the critical need is to isolate a narrower group, the fathers of the second generation that Nahon defined. That second generation does not include children in the entire 0-18 age range, but only the children who were 8-12 years of age in 1961 (30-34 in 1983). It is critical therefore to isolate the fathers of this narrower age range of children; we will be studying only those fathers. Of course far fewer children were found in the narrower compared to the full 0-18 age range, and indeed many fathers of the latter had no children in the former. Still, the two measures were highly correlated—because the higher the number of children 0-18 that a father had, the more

likely it was that at least one of them would fall in the 8-12 range. Column e shows the proportion of immigrant men 35-44 years of age who were in fact fathers of a child in the narrow 8-12 age range; only this proportion of all the men at each educational level (shown in column b) will be included when calculating the mean educational attainment for the crucial subgroup of fathers.

Finally the last two columns, f and g respectively show the mean educational attainments, first when all men in the cohort are included and then when only the subgroup of fathers with children 8-12 are included. The former mean (in column f) is arrived at by 1) determining the mean number of years of schooling attained by the men in each category of schooling shown in column a; 2) weighting this mean by the number of men at that educational level shown in column b; 3) summing these products and 4) dividing by the same product as in step 2 computed for all men in the immigrant group (total row). The computation of the latter mean (in column g) differs in one critical respect: in steps 2 and 4 the weighting is by the *product of* the number of men in column b *and* the proportion shown in column e who had a child in the 8-12 age range.

Table 3 shows large differences in the numbers of children between Ashkenazi and Mizrahi (see the total rows for each group); and much of this difference can even be found at any given level of education (although less so among the most-educated Iraqis and Egyptians). However, our concern is not with this familiar Ashkenazi-Mizrahi difference in family size nor even with the ethnic differences in resources available for each child that the ethnic difference in family size created (Nahon, 1987; Leslau et al, 1995). Rather, our concern is whether the ethnic differences in family size can make Nahon's birth cohort a biased substitute for the actual fathers of the next generation.

Table 3. Number of Children to Male heads of household, 35-44 years of age in 1961 : by head's country of origin and education							
country of origin	school years completed*	male heads by education		male heads by children with them		male heads, 35-44: mean years of schooling	
		N	%	mean N 0 - 18 yrs. of age	% with a child 8 - 12 yrs. of age	all shown in cols. a-b**	with a child 8 - 12 yrs. of age
	a	b	c	d	e	f	g
MIZRAHI GROUPS							
YEMEN	0	356	40	4.0	80		
	1 - 8	402	45	4.0	81		
	9 - 12	104	12	4.0	82		
	13+	25	3	3.8	72		
	<i>total</i>	<i>887</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>4.0</i>	<i>81</i>	<i>4.1</i>	<i>4.0</i>
MOROCCO	0	464	34	4.6	78		
	1 - 8	680	49	4.3	75		
	9 - 12	200	14	4.1	76		
	13+	39	3	4.3	72		
	<i>total</i>	<i>1383</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>4.3</i>	<i>76</i>	<i>4.8</i>	<i>4.7</i>
IRAN	0	101	22	4.3	80		
	1 - 8	267	59	3.9	75		
	9 - 12	82	18	3.3	72		
	13+	6	1	na	na		
	<i>total</i>	<i>456</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>3.9</i>	<i>75</i>	<i>5.5</i>	<i>5.5</i>
IRAQ	0	246	17	4.4	78		
	1 - 8	583	40	3.6	70		
	9 - 12	439	30	2.4	48		
	13+	183	13	1.9	37		
	<i>total</i>	<i>1451</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>3.2</i>	<i>61</i>	<i>7.6</i>	<i>6.5</i>
EGYPT	0	32	5	3.9	63		
	1 - 8	248	40	3.2	65		
	9 - 12	256	41	2.4	65		
	13+	81	13	2.2	56		
	<i>total</i>	<i>617</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>2.8</i>	<i>64</i>	<i>9.3</i>	<i>9.2</i>
ASHKENAZI GROUPS							
ROMANIA	1 - 8	1465	62	1.6	52		
	9 - 12	618	26	1.6	48		
	13 - 15	145	6	1.6	48		
	16+	135	6	1.4	35		
	<i>total</i>	<i>2363</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>1.6</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>8.5</i>	<i>8.6</i>
POLAND	1 - 8	2395	52	1.8	59		
	9 - 12	1706	37	1.9	60		
	13 - 15	278	6	1.8	56		
	16+	208	5	1.8	53		
	<i>total</i>	<i>4587</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>1.8</i>	<i>59</i>	<i>9.1</i>	<i>9.1</i>
USSR	1 - 8	556	36	2.0	63		
	9 - 12	687	44	1.9	59		
	13 - 15	171	11	1.8	52		
	16+	148	9	1.7	49		
	<i>total</i>	<i>1562</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>1.9</i>	<i>59</i>	<i>10.2</i>	<i>10.3</i>
GER-AUS	1 - 8	278	23	2.0	58		
	9 - 12	720	59	2.0	61		
	13 - 15	136	11	1.8	54		
	16+	90	7	1.8	49		
	<i>total</i>	<i>1224</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>1.9</i>	<i>59</i>	<i>10.8</i>	<i>10.7</i>
SOURCE: Public Use Microdata Sample for the 1961 Census of Israel (from Israel Social Science Data Center, Hebrew University, Jerusalem).							
* Note that years of schooling for Mizrahi groups isolate 0 as a separate category from 1-8 and for Ashkenazi groups isolate 16+ as a separate category from 13-15. This classification scheme is responsive to the distributions while still limiting attention to four levels.							
** These means also shown in Table 1, column c.							

We can detect some negative association between the level of father's education and the number of his children in most of the immigrant groups Nahon studied (Table 3, column d). However, male household heads in all the Ashkenazi groups averaged relatively few children (1.5-2.0), and the mean varied but little with educational attainment. Yemenite and Moroccan men, at the other end of the spectrum, averaged relatively many children (3.8-4.6) and there are only weak hints in the data that the mean might have begun declining among the best-educated. Only among the Iranians, Iraqis, and Egyptians was the negative association between head's educational attainment and number of children strong, and especially so among the Iraqis. The average number of children by educational level falls consistently across a range of 2.5 children. Among the Iranians and Egyptians the ranges are respectively only 1.0 and 1.7 children. Moreover, the Iraqis also meet the second condition mentioned earlier: a fairly large proportion of the men are found at low and high educational levels (column c). There are far fewer Iranians than Iraqis at the top levels. And there are fewer Egyptian than Iraqis at the lowest level, men who reported no schooling. The upshot is that the Iraqi mean declines by 1.1 years of schooling when we limit attention within Nahon's age cohort to the subgroup of men who actually had children in the 8-12 year age range (the sum of column b*column e at each educational level divided by the same for the group total). The means for the other groups hardly budge.

The Wide Range of Ages Among Actual Fathers

Nahon used five-year and ten-year birth cohorts to represent "the generation of the fathers" (immigrant men, 60-64 in 1983 and 35-44 in 1961). Table 4 shows that even if he had used the actual fathers rather than all men, limiting attention even to the larger ten-year cohort excludes more than half the fathers of his second generation in eight of the nine groups. If the educational attainments of the older or younger fathers differed systematically from those in the 35-44 age group, then the use of that age group to represent all fathers would be seriously biased. In fact, the impact of the age restriction varied dramatically across groups. Once again, for this distortion to matter substantively, two conditions had to be met in a particular immigrant group. First, excluded fathers had to have averaged considerably more or less schooling than the fathers 35-44 years of age; and second, the proportion of excluded fathers in the age group that met the first condition had to be reasonably large (i.e.: the proportion of all fathers who were older or younger

than the included cohort). In Table 4 the age subgroups that meet these conditions have been shaded (we use a mean difference .75 of a year of schooling as the criterion for the first condition and 10% of the fathers as the criterion for the second).

GROUPS: by ethnic dichotomy and country of origin										
FATHERS OF THE 2ND GENERATION BIRTH COHORT (children 8 - 12 in 1961): By age of father										
	age 35-44		age LT 35		age GT 44		all ages		N	
	percent of all fathers a	mean years of schooling* b	percent of all fathers c	mean years of schooling d	percent of all fathers e	mean years of schooling f	percent of all fathers g	mean years of schooling** h		i
<i>Mizrahi groups</i>										
Yemen	40	4.0	20	4.3	39	4.2	100	4.2	1784	
Morocco	45	4.7	23	5.3	32	4.1	100	4.7	2326	
Iran	38	5.5	19	4.6	42	3.9	100	4.6	895	
Iraq	34	6.5	19	4.9	46	5.4	100	5.7	2566	
Egypt	54	9.2	11	9.1	35	7.8	100	8.6	728	
<i>Ashkenazi groups</i>										
Romania	49	8.6	12	7.5	38	8.2	100	8.1	2383	
Poland	44	9.1	4	8.5	52	9.2	100	9.1	6126	
USSR	38	10.3	4	9	57	10.5	100	10.2	2389	
Germany-Austria	57	10.7	6	10.8	37	11.6	100	11.0	1264	
SOURCE: Public Use Microdata Sample for the 1961 Census of Israel (from Israel Social Science Data Center, Hebrew University, Jerusalem).										
* Also shown in Table 3, column f.										
** Also shown in Table 2, column c.										
Shaded columns highlight age groups Nahon excluded from the cohorts he studied that meet two conditions:										
a) mean years of schooling differed by .75 of a year or more from the mean years shown in column b for ages 35-44;										
b) the age group included at least 10% of all fathers.										

One such age subgroup was from Iran, and two each from Iraq and Egypt—and in all five cases, the excluded age groups had *lower* mean educational attainments than did the age group Nahon had selected. Consider the Iraqi case; the mean attainment of fathers 35-44 was 6.5 years of schooling, while the mean without regard to age was 5.7 years. Educational attainment had been rising for Iraqi Jewish men during some of the earlier decades; consequently men *older* than the 35-44 cohort tended to have fewer years of education than the selected cohort. At the same time the *younger* Iraqi male cohorts also fared less well than the 35-44 age group, probably because of dislocations related to a) World War II, b) the rising tensions for Iraqi Jews in the years just before the emigration, and c) the emigration itself. Some of the same factors no doubt caused the age differences in attainments in other immigrant groups. Indeed, they operated on Ashkenazi groups as well. Thus the younger cohorts in three of the four Ashkenazi groups had less schooling than did the 35-44 group. However, there were almost no relevant fathers in two

of these three groups, and only 12% in the third. Overall, excluding the age groups younger and older than 35-44 leads to upward biases of at least half a year of schooling in Nahon's table for four groups. In the revised figures (Table 4, column h), the mean for all fathers has been changed by -0.9 for Iran, -0.8 for Iraq, -0.6 for Egypt and -0.5 for Romania.

When the effect of the age bias is added to the effect of the bias due to the negative association between a father's education and the number of his children (in the Iraqi case only) we have the complete revision (Table 4, column h; also shown in table 2 column c). The revision in terms of a frequency distribution of attainments rather than a mean can be found in the Appendix (column d).⁸

We can now summarize the results for "the generation of the fathers." Nahon took his figures for their educational attainments from a cohort of all immigrant men. We replace these with figures for the group of all immigrant fathers who actually had a child with them from Nahon's second-generation cohort (8-12 years of age in 1961). The result is a downward correction in four groups, three of them Mizrahim. The revised figures are much more suggestive of an Ashkenazi-Mizrahi dichotomy than was the original evidence. The crucial difference between Nahon's figures and our revision is that in the former Iraqis and the Egyptians did not conform to the Ashkenazi-Mizrahi first generation dichotomy; in the revised figures only the Egyptians do not do so, since Iraqi first generation attainments have been decreased by 1.9 years of schooling. The shift of the Iraqis is of great consequence: they comprised 31% of the first-generation Mizrahi fathers, the Egyptians only 9%.

Second Generation Outcomes

In Table 5 we reproduce for convenience our revised first-generation means based on the relevant fathers in 1961 (column a) and Nahon's second-generation outcomes for the cohort of men 30-34 in 1983 (column b). We now add columns c and d, presenting respectively the *difference* between first and second generation means (column b less

⁸ Note that at no time have we counted a particular father more than once. It could be argued that we therefore *understate* somewhat the extent of our revision. In a status attainment model we would focus on each second-generation individual of the 1949-53 birth cohort and on each such individual's father. In such an analysis, when several second-generation individuals had the same father, we would be counting that father as many times as he had children in that cohort. Using this approach, the means for three groups would change modestly, all falling below the level shown in Table 5 column a: Yemenite to 4.1, Iraqis to 5.5, and Egyptians to 8.3 years of schooling.

column a), and the *ratio* of second to first generation means (column b/column a). Sons in all nine groups attained much more schooling than their fathers did. Moreover, the groups with the lowest levels of fathers' attainment increased the most across the generations. For example, Yemenite fathers had averaged 4.2 years of schooling and their sons gained 6.8 years over that starting level; by contrast German-Austrian fathers averaged 11.0 years of schooling and their sons gained only 3.0 years. As a result, second-generation gaps both within and between the dichotomous categories generally narrowed across the generations (the Egyptians are the exception).⁹ Scholars have differed in interpreting the decline *between* the Ashkenazi-Mizrahi dichotomous categories (Cohen and Haberfeld 1998; Friedlander et al. 2002; Rebhun 2009). But consider for the moment the decline in heterogeneity *within* each category of the Ashkenazi-Mizrahi dichotomy. In the Mizrahi category the range across four groups declined from 1.5 to 0.3 years of schooling, and if the Egyptians are included from 4.4 to 0.6 years. In the Ashkenazi category, the range declined from 2.9 to 0.6 years of schooling. Nahon (1987) had also noted the decline in within-dichotomous-category heterogeneity, and had mentioned it as further evidence that the dichotomy only came into being in the second generation. So it is worth stressing that while we still find a decline in heterogeneity in the revised figures, these also differ somewhat from those he found. First, the decline in the *Ashkenazi* range is actually somewhat greater in the revised figures (in Nahon's figures the decline can be seen in Table 2, column a and in Table 1 column b; for the Ashkenazim, it was from 2.3 to 0.6 years of schooling). By contrast, in the revised Mizrahi figures, the decline in the four-group range is much smaller (in Nahon's figures the decline was from 3.5 to 0.3 years of schooling) and smaller too in the five-group range that includes the Egyptians (in Nahon's figures the decline was from 5.2 to 0.6 years of schooling).

⁹ Other than the Egyptian case, the sole exception of any interest is that the Iraqi-Romanian gap increased slightly. Nevertheless, this increase is dwarfed by the gains in both groups across the generations.

Table 5. Immigrants and the second generation for selected countries of origin:
Educational attainment

GROUPS: by ethnic dichotomy and country of origin	MEAN YEARS OF SCHOOLING			RATIO OF MEANS: SONS' TO FATHERS'
	revised means for actual fathers of children 8-12 in 1961 a	"generation of the sons" (Israeli-schooled* men, 30-34 in 1983 b	inter-generational difference in means (col. a less col. b) c	(col. b /col. a)
<i>Mizrahi groups</i>				
Yemen	4.2	11.0	6.8	2.64
Morocco	4.7	10.7	6.0	2.30
Iran	4.6	10.8	6.2	2.36
Iraq	5.7	10.8	5.1	1.90
Egypt	8.6	11.3	2.7	1.31
<i>Ashkenazi groups</i>				
Romania	8.1	13.4	5.3	1.65
Poland	9.1	13.9	4.8	1.53
USSR	10.2	14.0	3.8	1.37
Germany-Austria	11.0	14.0	3.0	1.27

SOURCES: Column a from Public Use Microdata Sample for the 1961 Census of Israel (from Israel Social Science Data Center, Hebrew University, Jerusalem). Column b Nahon (1987) Table 4.

Several processes other than discrimination can explain an important part of the second generation outcomes and the decline in within-category heterogeneity in particular. These processes are (1) a general rise in educational attainments across the two generations, (2) parental transfer of characteristics that encourage or discourage educational attainment, (3) institutional mechanisms unrelated to discrimination.

First, a glance at columns c and d confirms that the average educational attainment in all the groups rose across the generations. Second, the parental transfer processes lead us to expect that the rank order of first and second generation attainments will be similar to each other, even as the average attainments in the younger generation increase in all ethnic groups. However, third, the magnitude of the gaps between groups is likely to change across the generations. One especially crucial institutional mechanism “pushes up the bottom groups”—the children of immigrant groups that came from environments in which extended schooling was not widespread. When such groups immigrate to a society in which universal schooling through the elementary grades is widespread and supported by compulsory school laws, such groups will typically

experience dramatic increases in educational attainments between first and second generations. Examples are Italians and Poles in the American context (Lieberson 1980; Perlmann 1988, 2005) and Yemenites and Moroccans in the Israeli context (Table 5).

The combination of these three factors produce much of the second generation outcomes in Table 5: higher means in all second compared to first-generation groups, continued (if reduced) differences between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim and smaller gaps within the dichotomous categories. Nevertheless, if only these three processes were operating we would still expect to observe some residual reflection of the parental-generation rank orderings in the second generation—not merely across the Ashkenazi-Mizrahi categories but also *within* each category. Of course some within category heterogeneity remains—creating the range of 0.3 among four Mizrahi groups and 0.6 among the Ashkenazi groups. However these ranges are small and they do not correlate terribly well with the first generation rank order (note especially patterns for Iraqis, Poles, and those from the USSR).

The interpretation most consistent with the discrimination hypothesis would concentrate on Mizrahi and dismisses as irrelevant Ashkenazi homogenization; the latter could be due to ceiling effects. Specifically, the highest attainments for any groups in Israeli society at the time involved majorities completing secondary school and notable minorities completing post-secondary institutions. Such a pattern of attainments produced maximum second-generation country-of-origin means of about 14.0 years of schooling. Three Ashkenazim groups reach or nearly reach this mean, and the Romanians, the least educated in the first generation, failed to reach this putative mean by only 0.6 of a year of schooling. By contrast, the discrimination hypothesis posits that Mizrahi groups would have progressed farther but for discrimination. This is particularly true for the Iraqi and Egyptian groups whose fathers averaged higher attainments than the other three groups.

The interpretation most consistent with the premigration parental characteristics hypothesis would stress the extent to which the gains in columns c and d in fact conform to the outcomes expected from the three processes mentioned (rise in grand mean, parental influence, raising the lowest to new-country levels), as well as the ceiling effects just mentioned. True, the Iraqi and Egyptian groups moved up less than expected in terms of the difference in means shown in column c; but note in connection with the key Iraqi

case that the difference in means ignores how low the starting point for the Iraqi fathers was compared to Romanians (whose sons gained slightly more than Iraqi sons in the second generation). For this reason, the *ratio* of sons' to fathers' means is useful (column d): it takes into account the starting level of the parental generation. And indeed, in ratio terms only the Egyptians stand out as an important exception to the claim that we can explain results by reference only to the processes mentioned earlier in this paragraph.

To repeat our major point, a formulation that ignored premigration immigrant characteristics as irrelevant to what needed explaining seems much less credible in the light of the revised than in Nahon's original data.

CONCLUSIONS

Two factors explain why Nahon's definition of "the generation of the fathers" leads to misunderstandings relevant to the generational transition argument. First, in the case of the Iraqis, the negative association between a father's education and the number of his children biased his figures upward. Second, in several groups, excluding fathers who were not in the 35-44 age range biased his figures upward again. Our various refinements have not deviated from the concept of a group of men who constitute "the generation of the fathers"; we have simply defined that group as the actual fathers. With the revised figures for first and second generation educational attainment, we find that only the smallest of Nahon's Mizrahi immigrant groups, the Egyptians, averaged as much schooling as did an Ashkenazi group. In Nahon's figures, the Iraqi immigrant averaged only 0.9 years less schooling than the Romanians; in the revised figures the gap is 2.4 years. Instead of 40% of Mizrahi immigrant fathers failing to conform to the dichotomy (Iraqis and Egyptians), 9% fail to do so. In the revision of Nahon's table, the figures tend to confirm the presence of a first-generation ethnic dichotomy much more than his table did. In his original table, the supposed disconfirmation of a first-generation dichotomy had been seen as providing a strong basis for believing that the second generation dichotomy could be explained without resort to premigration immigrant social characteristics. By contrast, the greater confirmation of an immigrant-generation dichotomy in the revised figures now suggest that premigration immigrant social characteristics cannot be ignored in the explanatory effort.

As we suggested at the outset, Nahon himself partially anticipated at least one of our two sources of revision, namely the larger number of children among less-education Mizrahim (he spoke of lower-social status Mizrahim; see the italicized section of the extended quote from his text, above). However, he may not have appreciated the extent to which this factor influenced the difference between his proxy for “the generation of the fathers” (i.e.: a birth cohort of immigrant men) and the actual immigrant fathers. And in general, if he did not have access to the 1961 public use sample when he wrote (as seems likely), he could not pursue such issues in published tabulations from the enumeration. Indeed, he may not have had access to the public use sample for the 1983 census either.

Nahon’s study stimulated research by Leslau et al. (1995) that, like our own study, concluded that premigration immigrant characteristics cannot be ignored in explaining the second-generation dichotomy. Leslau et al. focused on the Iraqis and Romanians; they did not revise Nahon’s own figures but stressed that figures for *mothers’* education did tend to confirm a first-generation Ashkenazi-Mizrahi divide. And surely mothers as well as fathers helped determine second-generation educational outcomes. Leslau et al. also stressed that there was nothing comparable in the Ashkenazi groups to the substantial number of Mizrahi immigrant *fathers* who had reported no schooling (Nahon had included these in the group receiving 0-8 years of schooling; see Table 3 for some relevant evidence).

We have concentrated in this paper on immigrant fathers’ attainments because that is where the key message from Nahon was to be found. We noted three conditions other than discrimination that operated to create the second-generation patterns: the rise in mean educational levels in all groups, parental influence upon children’s educational outcomes, and the especially high cross-generational increases in schooling for groups in which fathers immigrated with very low attainments (these groups now entered a society where the mean was much higher and the law compelled a certain minimum). Nevertheless, we also noted the homogeneous *within category* second-generation outcomes. We observed that the interpretation of these outcomes most consistent with the discrimination hypothesis would posit ceiling effects operating on the Ashkenazim and discrimination on the Mizrahim, or at least on the Iraqis and Egyptians. The interpretation most consistent with the premigration parental characteristics hypothesis would argue that sons improved relative to their fathers in the expected way, with the single exception of the Egyptians, the smallest Mizrahi group. Whatever explains the exception, this interpretation

would hold, there is no need to assume that additional factor was particularly consequential for the other Mizrahi groups.¹⁰

In sum, our revision of Nahon's table suggests that the educational attainments of immigrant fathers cluster fairly closely around the Ashkenazi-Mizrahi dichotomy—closely enough, at any rate, that we no longer find it reasonable to argue that the difference in the pattern across the two generations is so strong that the second-generation dichotomy did not have origins in first-generation premigration characteristics. Determining the balance between the influence of such premigration characteristics on the one hand and of discriminatory processes on the other will be hard to tease out, if it is even possible to do so. It would have been easier to explain second generation outcomes if we could indeed ignore as irrelevant one of these two competing hypotheses. But the revised evidence does not lead us to that simpler explanatory path.

A useful approach to the explanatory challenge, at least conceptually, may be to concentrate on Mizrahi fathers who had received extended schooling and on their sons. This focus also allows us to return to the exceptional case of the Egyptian immigrants. We found that their educational attainments still exceeded those of the Romanians and lagged only 0.5 years behind the Poles even after our revisions. At the same time we stressed that the Egyptians comprised but a small fraction of the Mizrahi immigrant fathers. However, were we able to get behind country-of-origin aggregates (immigrants from Egypt, Romania, etc.) our comparison of fathers and sons attainments could also focus on Mizrahi fathers of high educational attainment from other countries of origin. There were at least a few such fathers in every Mizrahi group; the distinction of the Egyptians is simply that the proportion of the more-educated was great enough among them to raise the group's mean attainment to that of some Ashkenazi groups. We should consider the Iraqis in particular when thinking about Mizrahim other than Egyptians who had relatively high educational attainments.¹¹ Among the Egyptians, 49% of immigrant fathers had at least some secondary schooling (Appendix, column h); among Iraqis the comparable figure was

¹⁰ This line of argument would note too that since the Egyptians were the smallest group, their second-generation school patterns may have been influenced by those of the other Mizrahi second generation, ten times their number. It is reasonable to suppose that ties of language and religious rite led to a certain degree of cohesion among Mizrahim from different countries of origin, quite apart from the action of any discriminatory processes.

¹¹ Many Iraqis had received no schooling but about as many had at least reached secondary school. Premigration parental characteristics by place within country of origin probably played a substantial role in creating this split. The better-educated are likely to have come disproportionately from the Baghdad community; the less-well educated may have come disproportionately from the Kurdish region. See Darvish (1987).

only 27%. Nevertheless, because the relative sizes of these two immigration streams, the actual number of Iraqis who had reached secondary school was nearly twice as large as the number of Egyptians who had done so. If we were not constrained to study intergenerational patterns of educational attainment in terms of country-of-origin aggregates, we could illuminate much more. In particular, were the second-generation Mizrahi educational outcomes lower than the outcomes of sons born to Ashkenazi fathers of comparably-extended schooling? It certainly seems so from the aggregate figures for the Egyptians. If so, can the explanations for the Egyptian outcome be extended to the other second-generation Mizrahim, those whose immigrant fathers had not received extended schooling? This way of putting the question amounts to asking why a reasonably clear Ashkenazi-Mizrahi dichotomy of educational attainments observed in the first generation was not more fully erased in the second generation—rather than why an ethnic dichotomy that did not exist in the first generation came into being in the second.

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Appendix . Means and distributions of educational attainment for selected groups of male immigrants

Mizrahi groups									
YEMEN					MOROCCO				
Education years of schooling	Nahon's (1987) figures: immigrant males by age in two censuses		revision: heads of household		Nahon's (1987) figures: immigrant males by age in two censuses		revision: heads of household		
	60 - 64	35 - 44	35-44	fathers of 2nd gen*	60 - 64	35 - 44	35-44	fathers of 2nd gen*	
	in 1983	in 1961	in 1961	any age, 1961	in 1983	in 1961	in 1961	any age, 1961	
	a	b	c	d	a	b	c	d	
mean	4.0	na	4.1	4.2	5.4	na	4.8	4.7	
0-8 years	87	85	85	84	78	82	83	84	
9-12 yrs	10	12	12	13	18	14	14	13	
13-15 yrs	3	3	2	3	3	2	2	2	
16+ yrs	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	
total		100	100			100	100		
N		985	887	1784		1564	1383	2326	
IRAN									
Education years of schooling	Nahon's (1987) figures: immigrant males by age in two censuses		revision: heads of household		Nahon's (1987) figures: immigrant males by age in two censuses		revision: heads of household		
	60 - 64	35 - 44	35-44	fathers of 2nd gen*	60 - 64	35 - 44	35-44	fathers of 2nd gen*	
	in 1983	in 1961	in 1961	any age, 1961	in 1983	in 1961	in 1961	any age, 1961	
	a	b	c	d	a	b	c	d	
mean	6.5	na	5.5	4.6	8.5	na	7.6	5.7	
0-8 years	77	81	81	87	50	56	57	73	
9-12 yrs	19	17	18	12	34	31	30	21	
13-15 yrs	3	1	1	0	12	9	9	4	
16+ yrs	2	0	0	1	5	4	4	2	
total		100	100			100	100		
N		515	456	895		1721	1451	2566	
EGYPT									
Education years of schooling	Nahon's (1987) figures: immigrant males by age in two censuses		revision: heads of household		Nahon's (1987) figures: immigrant males by age in two censuses		revision: heads of household		
	60 - 64	35 - 44	35-44	fathers of 2nd gen*	60 - 64	35 - 44	35-44	fathers of 2nd gen*	
	in 1983	in 1961	in 1961	any age, 1961	in 1983	in 1961	in 1961	any age, 1961	
	a	b	c	d	a	b	c	d	
mean	10.0	na	9.3	8.6					
0-8 years	40	46	45	51					
9-12 yrs	41	41	41	40					
13-15 yrs	16	9	9	7					
16+ yrs	4	4	4	2					
total		100	100						
N		725	617	728					

Appendix cont. Means and distributions of educational attainment for selected groups of male immigrants

Ashkenazi groups

	ROMANIA				POLAND			
Education years of schooling	<i>Nahon's (1987) figures:</i> immigrant males by age in two censuses		<i>revision:</i> heads of household		<i>Nahon's (1987) figures:</i> immigrant males by age in two censuses		<i>revision:</i> heads of household	
	60 - 64	35 - 44	35-44	<i>fathers of 2nd gen*</i>	60 - 64	35 - 44	35-44	<i>fathers of 2nd gen*</i>
	in 1983	in 1961	in 1961	any age, 1961	in 1983	in 1961	in 1961	any age, 1961
	a	b	c	d	a	b	c	d
mean	9.4	na	8.5	8.1	10.0	na	9.1	9.1
0-8 years	48	62	62	64	43	52	52	53
9-12 yrs	34	26	26	26	40	37	37	36
13-15 yrs	8	6	6	6	9	6	6	7
16+yrs	10	6	6	4	8	5	5	5
total		100	100			100	100	
N		2785	2363	2383		5200	4587	6126

	USSR				GERMANY-AUSTRIA ***			
Education years of schooling	<i>Nahon's (1987) figures:</i> immigrant males by age in two censuses		<i>revision:</i> heads of household		<i>Nahon's (1987) figures:</i> immigrant males by age in two censuses		<i>revision:</i> heads of household	
	60 - 64	35 - 44	35-44	<i>fathers of 2nd gen*</i>	60 - 64	35 - 44	35-44	<i>fathers of 2nd gen*</i>
	in 1983	in 1961	in 1961	any age, 1961	in 1983	in 1961	in 1961	any age, 1961
	a	b	c	d	a	b	c	d
mean	10.6	na	10.2	10.2	11.4	na	10.8	11.0
0-8 years	36	35	36	35	19	28	23	19
9-12 yrs	35	44	44	44	55	55	59	60
13-15 yrs	15	11	11	11	15	11.4	11	13
16+yrs	15	10	9	9	10	6	7	8
total		100	100			100	100	
N		1792	1562	2389		na**	1224	1264

SOURCES: Cols. a and b from Nahon (1987), Tables 4 and Appendix Table 12c respectively. Cols. c and d from Public Use Microdata Sample for the 1961 Census of Israel (from Israel Social Science Data Center, Hebrew University, Jerusalem).

*Heads for which educational data were missing have been omitted. These amount to fewer than .7 of 1% for eight groups and to 1.65% for Yemen. (N col. c)/(N col. b) was in the range .84-.90 for all groups.

** Using Nahon's definition for the second generation: Israeli born or arrived before age 10.

*** In the case of Germany-Austria, there appears to be a misprint in Nahon's text for the N in col. b.