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


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Turkey, Migration and the EU: Potentials, Challenges and Opportunities

edited by Seçil Paçacı Elitok and Thomas Straubhaar

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Turkey, Migration and the EU: Potentials, Challenges and Opportunities



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Introduction

Seçil Paçacı Elitok and Thomas Straubhaar

Two things have inspired us to edit a volume on migration, Turkey and the European Union (EU).

Firstly, the year 2011 is the 50th anniversary of the bi-lateral agreement between Turkey and Germany on labor recruitment in 1961. In half a century, enormous political and economic changes took place both in Germany and Turkey. Thanks to the so-called “Guest-Workers” Programs, the labor shortage of Germany during the reconstruction and recovery period after World War II has been met by a migrant labor force. On the other hand, it suited very well the excess labor problem of Turkey. For Turkey, there were two main premises behind the bilateral agreements. First, migrants were expected to return with new skills, which would have had positive externalities on the labor market. Second, remittances of workers were expected to generate productive investment- and employment-creating activities. The history of Turkish emigration, which started more than half a century ago, has disappointed these expectations from the Turkish point of view in two ways. On the one hand, remittances of Turkish migrants did not render the hope for the economic impulse. They remained a tool for financing the balance of payments deficits but they did not turn into employment-creating investments. On the other hand, the transfer of the return of the migrants’ skills did not take place. On Germany’s side, from an economic point of view, labor market shortages were relaxed and the migrant labor force contributed to the economic boom tremendously. Yet, Germany ended up with an unintended permanent migration and no coherent integration policy. Initially, the agreement between Germany and Turkey meant a temporary migration, yet many migrants ended up being permanent residents. The agreement with Turkey came to an end in 1973 with an expectation that the guest-workers would return. However, after the 1970s, migration

trends to Germany and other European countries continued and took different forms such as family unification, asylum seeking, refugee movements and irregular migration.

Secondly, in order to increase the consistency of the individual contributions to the book, we organized an international workshop on “Migration Potentials from and to Turkey” at the Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI) on January 12, 2010. This workshop was supported by the EU Marie Curie Research Training Networks on the “Transnationality of Migrants” (TOM).¹ The idea of the workshop was to bring scholars from research centers, mainly specialized in migration research, to exchange ideas and share perspectives. Experts from various disciplines were invited to discuss the question of potential effects of Turkey’s accession to the EU on migration potentials from their specific point of view. During the workshop, we addressed the historical dimension and possible scenarios as well as challenges and opportunities arising from migration. Throughout the workshop, we sought to generate some more knowledge on the topic of “migration potentials” from several angles. To this end, we included issues such as labor market aspects, push and pull factors, volume/profile/regional distribution/pattern of migration potential, current migration panorama, future trends, demographic factors and policy aspects in the context of EU accession. The workshop was designed as a small conference with around 20 participants and there were four key presentations, which triggered extensive and lively discussions.²

Editing a volume on the entire migration experience of Turkey over the last half century and covering all the aspects of future potential migration in the context of EU-Turkey relations is probably an over-ambitious target. Nevertheless, this book touches upon at least some important aspects of the ongoing debate about the effects of Turkey’s accession to the EU upon the migration flows and sheds light on various dimensions of current panorama, addressing policy implications as well as future challenges and opportunities.

¹ The TOM Research Training Network was started in 2007 and continued until the end of 2010. It had 15 teams all across Europe investigating the contribution that foreign migrants make to the social and economic linkages between countries. In particular, the TOM project assessed how migration contributed to increasing trade, creating larger capital flows, increasing foreign direct investment and encouraging further migration.

² A majority of these presentations can be downloaded from <http://www.hwwi.org/themenfelder/demografie-migration-und-integration/projekte/migration-und-integration/tuerkei-und-migration.html>. A conference program is available at http://www.hwwi.org/fileadmin/hwwi/Veranstaltungen/Workshops/2010/2010-01-12_Workshop-Agenda.pdf and at the end of this volume, as well.

The “gradual realization of the free flow of workers” from Turkey into the European Economic Community was regarded as a significant and positive aspect of the 1963 Ankara Agreement, which was signed two years after the beginning of an intense migratory movement from Turkey into Europe. The Ankara Agreement had made Turkey an associate member of the Community. However, 42 years after this Agreement, in the Negotiating Framework of October 3, 2005, in the context of Turkey’s European Union (EU) membership process, it was stated that long transition periods and derogations, specific arrangements, or provisions of permanent protection might be effective to limit the free movement of people from Turkey. Although these new perspectives signaled a renewed emphasis on the migration between Turkey and the EU, they reframed the issue in a negative context. It is only natural that new perspectives on migration will emerge under changing circumstances. Undoubtedly, a dominant trend to emerge in recent years has been the politicization of migration in the EU climate. In the political arena, migration has essentially become an issue of “governance” requiring the participation of actors on national, international, transnational and civil-society levels. Ahmet İcduygu and Ayşem Biriz Karaçay, in Chapter 1, emphasize the demographic aspects of migration issues within the scope of EU-Turkey relations. They make general inferences on the qualitative and quantitative status of migration on the basis of current debates over Turkey’s EU membership. Throughout the chapter, they interpret migration as an issue of governance and policymaking. Within this framework, they outline three main issues in EU discussions on the issue of international migration in relation to Turkey, including: (a) whether an intense migratory wave towards the EU in case of a free movement will create serious economic, social and political adjustment problems; (b) whether Turkey’s demography and, as a consequence of this demography, the migration waves of Turkish origin, will have a complementary role in the demographic shrinkage process in the EU and (c) whether Turkey, in its position as a “receiving country” and “migration transit zone”, will be successful, and, if so, to what extent, in producing and implementing policies in compliance with the EU-centric international migration and asylum regimes. The chapter concludes with the tasks of the EU, Turkey and migrants in handling the issue of migration as a “political phenomenon that requires governance”. İcduygu and Karaçay argue that changing demographic processes will affect migratory movements that Turkey, Europe and other neighboring geographies might encounter, and the future status of inter-

national migration in the Euro-Turkish space should be considered together with its economic, social, political and demographic dimensions.

Throughout most of the 1990s and early 2000s, Turkey has been hit hard by the EU's claim that most of Turkey's policies were substandard and insufficient to be accepted as a member to the EU. In the realm of asylum and migration, the story was similar with Turkey being accused of violating the rights of refugees and asylum seekers, as well as being unable to control its borders. However, since 2002, the Turkish government and bureaucracy have engaged in a fascinating process of reforming their immigration policies. In Chapter 2, Juliette Tolay examines the role played by the EU in triggering these reforms, and how these reforms matched with Turkey's qualification as a "European country". Tolay argues that the rationale behind Turkey's reforms in the realm of immigration goes beyond a traditional process of "Europeanization", but rather is the result of what she calls "critical Europeanization" or the activation of Turkish pride and willingness to do "better than the Europeans", or be "more European than the Europeans".

Turkey has a long tradition of accepting refugees – a fact that is little known in the West. The Cold War years were characterized by asylum seekers from the Soviet world. Those recognized as refugees by North America were mainly resettled in North America. The composition and volume of asylum seekers into Turkey have changed considerably since the end of the Cold War as well as the policies of the government. Kemal Kirişçi, in Chapter 3, brings a critical approach to the evolution of Turkish asylum policy in the last two decades and assesses the role of "Europeanization" in the transformation of Turkey's policies. Kirişçi argues that the impact of the "EU" has been a mixed and contested one and that other factors such as the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees)'s long-standing engagement of Turkey, the rise of an effective civil society, the rulings of the ECHR (European Court of Human Rights) and the "logic of appropriateness" have also played an important role in this transformation.

Chapters 4 and 5 are devoted to irregular migration. Turkey was known as a "sending" country for a long time. However, it has started witnessing an ever-increasing migration flow of an irregular nature into the country since the 1990s due to political unrest and economic transformation in the region. The integration of the Turkish economy to the global markets with increasing informal employment opportunities attracted people from former socialist countries as migrant workers. In spite of this phenomenon, studies delineating

the position of irregular migrants participating clandestinely in the labor markets and tackling their employment conditions are rather few. Studies on domestic and care workers that make the main body of the existing research and the other few surveys on migrants employed in various branches of economic activity demonstrate that irregular immigrants live and work under very precarious conditions. In Chapter 4, Gülay Toksöz and Çağla Ünlütürk Ulutaş review and evaluate the existing labor migration literature from a gender perspective to highlight different levels of precarity that male and female migrant workers are confronted with to answer the question of feminization of migration in Turkey. Sema Erder and Selmin Kaşka, in Chapter 5, focus on the relative position of the foreigners in the Turkish labor market with special reference to the new immigration flows generating from the region. For this sake, the interaction of the informal labor market and irregular migration are examined. The current terminology on irregularity is critically analyzed in Erder's and Kaşka's article, which calls for the necessity of reconsidering/redefining the concept.

Giulia Bettin, Seçil Paçacı Elitok and Thomas Straubhaar analyze the reasons behind the sharp decrease after the year 1998 in the volume and the trend of the aggregate flows of remittances as well as its consequences for the Turkish economy in an historical context in Chapter 6. Remittance literature with respect to Turkey focuses on the determinants of remittances, both from a microeconomic and macroeconomic perspective, and their (anti)cyclical behavior. However, there is a gap in the literature for a study looking in depth at the causes and consequences of the fall in the post-1998 remittances trend. Against this background, this chapter also considers how remitting behavior is affected by economic downturns and specifically the focus here is on what happened to remittance flows to Turkey during and after the financial crises of 1994, 2000/1 and 2008. The findings show that the decline in remittances might be the consequence of several coexisting reasons. New generations of migrants have weaker ties with Turkey and they are progressively moving from the return idea to the willingness of settling permanently in the host country and investing in their own businesses there. At the same time, the contraction in remittance flows after the last two financial crises that hit Turkey in the 2000s shows that even if the investment motives could still play a role in determining remittance behavior, the instability of the Turkish economy and the consequent loss of trustworthiness probably played a key role in influencing migrants' attitude towards remittances negatively.

The geographical and political location is fundamental to Turkey's migration reality. Istanbul as a global city is a hotspot for various migration movements and one of the very few economic centers and global cities at the frontier of the EU. This location of Istanbul illustrates its high significance in the region as center of the global modern economy and its attraction for various migrant groups as it provides various spaces for transnational identities, life-styles and formal and informal organizations. In Chapter 7, Barbara Pusch analyses various forms of transnational migration to Istanbul. After a short overview on recent migration movements to Turkey and the clarification of the theoretical concepts used in the article, she focuses on Istanbul's attractiveness for regular migrants, irregular labor migrants, irregular transit migrants and asylum seekers and refugees as well as migrants with a Turkish background. She presents micro-level examples from her empirical work, which represent the experiences of migrants within the context of transnationality. In this context, she elaborates the relation of transnational migration and global cities using the example of Istanbul.

The potential for migration to Turkey of highly skilled migrants educated in Germany with a Turkish background is and will be significant, as well. In Chapter 8, Yaşar Aydın examines the migration of highly qualified Turks from Germany to Turkey, ones who went through the German education system (from primary school to the college degree). Aydın discusses on the ground of a transnationality framework whether this migration movement is a brain-drain process. Aydın postulates the reasons that motivate the highly qualified Turks for their migration decision. Among these reasons, the three most important ones are as follows. First, due to the recent developments in the German economy, such as privatization, unemployment and the shrinkage of social benefits, highly skilled migrants are under the risk of unemployment or underemployment. These economic determinants play the most important role among the pushing factors, yet they influence the confidence of highly skilled migrants with regards to the future of the German economy. Second, highly qualified migrants feel under the risk of being disadvantaged or even discriminated against. For instance, the unemployment rate among German academics is 4.4 %, whereas it is 12.5 % among the academics with an immigration background. Third, in line with the integration of the Turkish economy with the world economy, the Turkish labor market became quite attractive for the highly skilled German-Turks. The attractiveness of Istanbul, as it is in the center of the branches of many German firms and as it is preferred due to so-

cial networks and cultural closeness, also plays a role in the migration decision. German companies that have branches in Istanbul mostly prefer highly qualified German-Turks, who immigrated to Turkey, hold the blue-card (free to work and reside in both countries) and speak both languages.

The last contribution highlights immigration policies in Germany from the 1960s to today with a special emphasis on integration discussions. In Chapter 9, Mehmet Okyayuz highlights the immigration policies in Germany from the 1960s to today with a special emphasis on integration discussions. He critically analyzes the determinants of the migration and integration debate from a socio-historical point of view. He argues that, from the bilateral agreement between Germany and Turkey in 1961 until the recruitment stop of 1973, immigration policy was solely guided by the interests of the economic actors of the receiving country and was more or less equal to labor market policy. Starting from the mid-1970s, the social dimension of labor migration was emphasized in the sense that migrants themselves were integrated into debates concerning migration policies related to their living and working conditions. With the 1980s, a notion of integration emerged in which the migrants' strategies were no longer considered useful for developing a diverse, multicultural, tolerant and democratic society that respects human rights and freedoms. This chapter assesses perceptions of integration and participation of foreigners, along with perceptions of socio-political order and multiculturalism underlying and steering the flow of the debates, in order to show tendencies within the process of the relations between the foreigners and the political sphere (reflected in the wide scope of responsibility and action of the state) on the one hand, and the social sphere (reflected in the wide scope of action of social actors) on the other hand. A special emphasis is given to the structural dimension of immigration policies best seen within the context of their possible functionalization as a mechanism to solve social tensions.

Demography and Migration in Transition: Reflections on EU-Turkey Relations

Ahmet İcduygu and Ayşem Biriz Karaçay

Introduction

Public and scholarly discourses on the relationship between the European Union (EU) and Turkey in the 1990s were dominated by discussions of “democracy”. This was mostly due to the conditionality of the Copenhagen Criteria in the context of Turkey’s prospective EU membership, which was concerned with bringing the structures and procedures of Turkish democracy closer to European standards.¹ Interestingly, what seems to partly accompany this discourse in the 2000s is a discourse centered around another concept which also carries the prefix “demo”, that is “demography”, and together with it, one of its by-products, “migration”.² These discourses stress the question of the compatibility of demographic and migratory regimes between the EU and Turkey and largely focus on the related outcomes of observed or assumed incompatibility.³

Likewise, it is also not surprising to see that migration issues are debated in a period of membership negotiation between the EU and Turkey. Debates about migration involve a variety of issues. For instance many politicians in Europe frequently speak of the “invasion” of migrants from Turkey when they publicly debate Turkish EU membership.⁴ Moreover, the commonly accepted view that Turkish immigrants who are already in Europe face integration difficulties, together with intensifying Islamophobia on the continent, have made

¹ Çarkoğlu/Rubin (2003), Kramer (2000), Uğur (1999).

² Behar (2006, pp. 17–31), Erzan/Kuzubaş/Yıldız (2006, pp. 3–44), Coleman (2004), TFHPF (Turkish Family, Health and Planning Foundation) (2004), ICT (Independent Commission on Turkey) (2004).

³ İcduygu (2010, pp. 59–71).

⁴ Lagro (2008, pp. 58–78).

Turkey-related migration issues a topic of critical debate in European circles.⁵ However, proponents of Turkey's EU membership argue that Turkey's EU membership is in the Union's interest, because it would reduce demographic pressures on the labor market by bringing workers into the Union.⁶ As these examples demonstrate, migration-related issues in the context of Turkey's prospective EU membership have attained growing salience in public, policy, and academic debates in the EU because they have unique and multi-faceted implications for the economic, social, political and demographic structures and processes of the EU.

Against this background, the main purpose of this paper is to map out the demography related debate in the context of the EU-Turkey relationship.

Rethinking International Migration for the EU and Turkey

The early 1960s and the 1970s have witnessed the emigration of large numbers of Turkish nationals to Western European countries, particularly West Germany. These emigration flows continued until recent times through family reunification schemes and the asylum track. However, today Europe is not the only point of destination for the migration movement from Turkey to abroad. In addition to the neighboring Arab countries and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the geographical area to which migration of Turkish origin reaches includes countries such as the United States of America (USA), Australia and Canada.⁷ More recently, Turkey has also become a country of transit for irregular migrants from Asian countries, such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan, who are trying to reach the Western world and for refuge for asylum seekers coming from neighboring Middle East countries and beyond. Furthermore, Turkey is also becoming a destination country for EU professionals and retirees as well as regular and irregular migrants from former Soviet Bloc countries.⁸ Because Turkey possesses multiple identities within the context of international migration, the topic is inevitably of great importance in terms of the handling of migration issues within the relationship between the EU and Turkey.⁹

⁵ Erzan/Kirişçi (2009), Kaya/Kentel (2005).

⁶ Constantinos (2004, pp. 203–217), Behar (2006, pp. 17–31), Muenz (2006).

⁷ İçduygu (2004, pp. 88–99).

⁸ İçduygu/Kirişçi (2009), İçduygu/Toktaş (2003, pp. 25–54).

⁹ *Ibid.*

The Republic of Turkey, which will celebrate the centennial of its proclamation in 2023, is currently undergoing a very significant period of transformation at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Since Turkey has been experiencing an intense period of economic, social and political transformation based on democratic and liberal values – along with becoming increasingly integrated into the world economy due to globalization – it is inevitable that Turkey has been faced with new migratory movements. In this process, the neighboring polities, including Europe, are also expected to face new dynamics of migration. Because of this, it is certain that the demographic processes to be experienced in the upcoming years will have an impact on the migratory movements that Turkey, Europe and other neighboring regions might encounter. However, it is a fact that the “window of demographic opportunity”, which is expected to open when an “environment where labor supply, employment and the quality of the labor force constantly increases, leading to an increase in economic performance”, emerges due to the “significant increase in the rate of the working age population”, will reduce possible migration tendencies in Turkey in the prospective new era that the Turkish demography will enter.¹⁰ Therefore, the future status of international migration should be considered together with its economic, social, political and demographic dimensions.

The emergence and continuity of international migration can be explained, in general, by the balance between the receiving country’s or territory’s need for a migrant labor force and the concomitant need of the source country or territory to reduce the pressure of the unemployed labor force on the economy. From this point of view, it is clear that there is a strong potential for international migration within the geographical area that includes the European Union and Turkey within coming decades. The process initiated by rapidly decreasing fertility rates and an aging population creates a demographic gap that essentially calls for migration in order for the member states of the European Union to be able to reproduce themselves economically and socially. It is clear that in the EU’s immediate neighbors to the South and East, there is a large, geographically mobile labor force that cannot be absorbed by the economies of these countries and, hence, there exists the potential for migratory flows that could fill the aforementioned demographic gap within the European Union’s member states. However, one must recognize that international migration does not simply emerge on the basis of a “principle of compu-

¹⁰ Behar (2008), Muenz (2006).

tational fluid”.¹¹ In addition to the comparisons of economic “supply and demand” or “necessities and opportunities”, political and social “selectivity and choice” determines the emergence and continuity of migration, as well. It is precisely these social and political reflections that make the governance of migration difficult.

Inevitably, issues of international migration relating to Turkey shall be centered around the European Union, whether Turkey’s EU membership is realized or not.¹² In other words, whatever course Turkey’s accession to the EU takes, and whatever results it brings forth, it remains certain that any international migration debate regarding the EU will frequently include discussions focusing on Turkey. This is not merely due to the likelihood of intensive migration from Turkey into the European Union, but also because of the hundreds of thousands of immigrants of Turkish origin presently living in European Union member states. Furthermore, such issues are likely to remain on the agenda both because Turkey is a buffer zone between the EU and the source countries and territories that are the origin of migration towards the EU and because the economic, social, political and cultural bonds between Turkey and the EU are deep and profound. In this context, it is quite evident that a European Union including Turkey as a member state can oversee the issue of international migration in relation to Turkey more easily. Similarly, Turkey as a member state of the EU can handle the issue of international migration in relation to itself more easily. However, the key point to all remains constant: both the European Union and Turkey should realize that, through the policies they have drafted and will draft in the future, international migration is not a problem, but “a phenomenon that requires governance” through social transformation. Both polities must further realize that this governance is only possible through “sharing problems and liabilities” related to migration and that the current approaches adopted by both parties, such as “passing the buck to the other”, will not provide any solutions.

It is not surprising that the international migratory waves have been questioned both quantitatively and qualitatively in the countries of destination since the phenomenon began. In other words, the question of “who has arrived” in addition to “how many migrants have arrived” has been debated frequently and from various perspectives in the countries receiving migration. In

¹¹ İçduygu (2006, pp. 47–58).

¹² Erzan/Kirişçi (2008).

the context of Turkey-EU relations – particularly in the case of the free movement of labor – it is not surprising that the potential of Turkey for EU migration has created many quantitative and qualitative debates. However, what is surprising at this juncture is the extent that such debate has reached: for instance, Turkey’s accession to the EU has almost been entirely evaluated on the basis of the magnitude of possible migration from Turkey to the EU. While the assumptions on the magnitude of these migration waves are not actually based on particularly scholarly studies, another course of debate based on the assumption that a migration wave from Turkey will be a solution to the significant process of aging and demographic shrinkage process that the EU population has entered into. In short, issues of international migration have begun to constitute an increasingly politicized area within EU-Turkey relations.

Due to reasons such as the association of international migration issues with the European Union’s economic, social and political areas of integration in general, along with Turkey’s significant position as a “sending country”, “receiving country”, and “migration transit zone” (especially within Eurocentric international migration and asylum discourses), international migration debates have become central to Turkey-EU relations. Within this framework, one observes that there are three main issues in EU discussions on the issue of international migration in relation to Turkey, including: (a) whether an intense migratory wave towards the EU in case of free movement will create serious economic, social and political adjustment problems (especially in the case of Turkish migrants); (b) whether Turkey’s demography and, as a consequence of this demography, the migration waves of Turkish origin, will have a complementary role in the demographic shrinkage process (low fertility and intense aging population) in the EU and (c) whether Turkey, in its position as a “receiving country” and “migration transit zone”, will be successful, and, if so, to what extent, in producing and implementing policies in compliance with the EU-centric international migration and asylum regimes.

In regard to international migration, it is a fact that the aforementioned areas of debate will continue to persist regardless of the possible results of the course of Turkey’s EU membership accession process. In other words, whether Turkey becomes a member of the EU or not, discussions around the harmonization problems of Turkish-origin migrants currently living in the EU member states, along with the course of possible migratory waves from Turkey to these states (family reunification, marriage migration, irregular migration and asylum-seeker movements), will continue. Even if accession does not occur, the

question of whether Turkey's young population will have a complementary impact on the aging population of the EU, or whether this young population will create an intense migratory wave towards the EU, will remain a topic of intense debate. Even if the accession issue is removed from the agenda, the question of how Turkey will protect the South-eastern border of the EU from migration waves will remain of crucial import. From this perspective, the importance of thinking in terms of the issue of international migration within this relationship carries with it two distinct scenarios pertaining to Turkey's accession to the EU – that is, the scenario of the realization of such accession, and the scenario of the failure of such accession.

In the context of the emergence and continuity of international migration, differences in terms of development between countries or territories are frequently underlined as the most significant factors. Today, it is evident that Turkey's socio-economic and demographic indicators show significant differences in comparison to the indicators of the EU member states; these differences, in turn, are frequently quoted as a cause of potential migratory waves. For instance, in terms of the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, Turkey would be the poorest country in comparison to the EU member states.¹³ The average value in terms of the GDP-based Purchasing Power Standard (PPS) for the EU-27 member states is 100; this value is 105.5 for Italy, 48.7 for Poland and 30.5 for Bulgaria – yet, for Turkey, it is only 28.5.¹⁴ Demographic indicators also highlight striking differences between Turkey and the EU-27, and other candidate states. For example, the natural growth rate of the population in Turkey is approximately 13 times higher than the population growth rate of the EU-27 member states. In this regard, the direction and rate of change of these differences between countries are evidently among the key indicators that will highlight the intensity of the prospective migration waves. However, particularly in considering the rates of change in the socio-economic indicators of the past 20 years, Turkey seems to be rapidly making up the difference with the other countries of comparison in terms of modernization steps. The increase in Gross National Product (GNP) per capita from 1,200 USD in the 1980s to 6,000 USD in the 2000s along with an increase in life expectancy to 70 years during the 2000s (an increase of ten years since the 1980s) provide examples of such progress. In addition to these indicators, the Turkish economy has grown at a rate

¹³ İçduygu (2006).

¹⁴ These figures were taken from the website of EUROSTAT (2011).

of 6–9 % in recent years. It is evident that the direction of transformation and development that Turkey has been experiencing in recent years points to reducing the pressure of migration in Turkey in the long run. On the other hand, it is also clear that a Turkey as a member of the EU will make up the difference in terms of development with the EU in a much shorter time compared to a Turkey that is not a member of the EU.

Demographic Transition and Potential Migratory Flows from Turkey to the EU: Some Indicators and Scenarios

More important than the economic developmental difference, however, is the demographic difference that has been the key reason for intensive discussions of international migration within the context of Turkey's accession to the EU. This demographic difference is seen as the most important source of debate on the magnitude of potential migration from Turkey into the EU, especially in the event that Turkey becomes a full member of the EU. In this regard, some have emphasized low fertility and an aging population (in terms of the EU), and the relatively high rates of population growth and the high percentage of youth within the country's total population (in terms of Turkey) as the key reasons for potential migration from Turkey to the EU. In analyzing this point, it is important to examine the details of the projected demographic processes in the EU and Turkey for the coming years.

Demography, the Labor Market and Possible Trends in the EU

Low fertility rates and increasing average life spans are, in an important sense, changing the structure of the age pyramid in European countries, reducing the share of the young population within the overall population, increasing the percentage of the elderly population and resulting in an aging labor force. Considering the medium-scale natural changes in population and migration assumptions, the total population of the EU-27 member states will increase to 478 million in 2025 from 472 million in 2005 before entering a phase of decline. In the year 2050, the population of the EU-27 member states will decrease to 462 million. In the same period, in the event that they do not receive migration, the total population of the Western and Central European countries will begin

to decline after reaching a peak in 2010, decreasing to 460 million in 2025 and 415 million by 2050.¹⁵

The working population (ages 15–64) in the Western and Central European countries is expected to decline to 302 million in 2015, and to 261 million in 2025 from 317 million in the year 2005.¹⁶ The number of youth recruited in the labor market is gradually decreasing in many EU member states, a situation that will apply to the entire EU-27 member states in the coming 45 years. In contrast to this age group, the numbers of those in the 65 + bracket will reach 107 million in 2025 and 133 million in 2050 (from a total of 79 million as of 2005) due to an increasing average life span. Looking at the changes that have occurred in the median age as a measure reflecting the age structure of the population, the present figure for this data in these European countries is 38.5, a full 6.5 years older than it was during the 1960s – a time when fertility rates were significantly higher. This figure, meanwhile, is expected to reach as high as 48 by the year 2050, meaning that virtually half of the entire European population will be comprised of people aged 50 and above by that date.¹⁷

Demographic processes, together with trends in the labor market and labor force participation rates, determine the future size of the labor force. Currently, there are 227 million people in the labor market of the EU-27 member states. Of this number, 21 million (9 %) are of foreign origin. Based on the current labor force participation rates, it is clear that the aging population will cause a rapid decline in the size of the labor force, meaning that its estimated size will decline to 211 million (a 7 % decrease) by the year 2025, and to 183 million (a 19 % decrease) by 2050 in Western and Central European countries.¹⁸ In the event that these countries do not receive any migration, this rate of decline will be higher: the size of the labor force will be as low as 201 million in 2025, and 160 million in 2050. This means that unless a medium-scale migration occurs, the labor force in Europe will decline by 67 million by the year 2050. Together with the aging of the population, this process will undoubtedly have a negative impact on the social, economic and political order of Europe.

It seems that in terms of the EU, there are *three key options* for handling the issue of demographic aging and the consequent decrease in the share of

¹⁵ Muenz (2006).

¹⁶ İçduygu (2006).

¹⁷ *Ibid.* (p. 84).

¹⁸ Muenz (2006).

the local population participating in the labor force: increasing labor force participation rates, raising the retirement age and pursuing an active economic migration policy.¹⁹ In the event of a medium-scale migration, provided that the labor force participation rate in the EU-27 member states is equivalent to that of the three countries (Denmark, Iceland and Sweden) with the highest labor force participation rates, the size of the labor force in Western and Central European countries will reach 233 million in 2025 (an increase of six million over the figures for 2005) before beginning to decline to 222 million by the year 2050. In the event of no such migration taking place, the size of the labor force will decline to 195 million (year 2050) from 222 million (year 2025) even if labor force participation rates are increased. However, if the labor force participation rates for women (age groups 15 to 64) in all the EU member states are equivalent to the labor force participation rates for men, then the size of the labor force in Europe will remain at 224 million in the year 2025 before declining to 205 million by 2050. In the event that the retirement age in the EU member states is raised by five years by the year 2025, and then ten years by 2050, then the size of the labor force will increase, as well. However, unless the EU member states receive migration, a decline in the size of the labor force by 2050 is inevitable: the year 2025's projected number of workers of 218 million will decrease to 190 million by 2050. If the EU member states do not receive any migration, but, instead, choose to follow only the first and second options stated above, then it appears that the aging population will have no negative impact on the labor force. If these two options are implemented together to the extent that the labor force participation rates equal those of the Scandinavian countries, then, by the year 2050, the size of the labor force in the Western and Central European countries will be 228 million (this figure was 227 million in 2005, and is estimated to be 241 million in 2025). In short, any combination of these two options that does not meet the above levels will result in negative repercussions for the numbers active within the labor force.²⁰

Undoubtedly, the question of the magnitude of migration required to fill the demographic gap in Europe is of the utmost importance. Considering labor force participation rates, and assuming that there is no migration, the size of the labor force in Western and Central Europe will decline by 26 million in the period between 2005 and 2025 and then, approximately, by 66 million

¹⁹ İçduygu (2006, pp. 91–94).

²⁰ *Ibid.* (p. 92).

between 2005 and 2050. It is evident that labor force migration serves to fill this gap. In this respect, the EU-27 member states need to add 1.3 million migrants into their labor force pool each year between 2005 and 2025. Between 2025 and 2050, this figure will need to reach 1.6 million annually. If we consider that 70 % of the migrants heading towards Europe will be participating in the labor force, the annual net contribution to be obtained from migration will be around 1.9–2.0 million by 2025, and 2.3 million in the period until 2050. According to these estimations, 95 million migrants of ages 15–64 will be required between the years 2005 and 2050.²¹ These figures foresee much higher numbers of migrants moving to the Continent in comparison to the annual number of migrants that have been received by Europe in recent years, suggesting that there is nothing realistic about such estimation.

Demography, the Labor Market and Possible Trends in Turkey

Turkey completed its *demographic transformation* in the early 2000s in terms of the transition from a traditional social structure to a modern social structure. This transformation is also called a *demographic transition*. In one way, this is a transition from very high birth and mortality rates to lower birth and mortality rates, and, in another way, it means the closing of the gap between birth rates and mortality rates. From another angle, it also reflects a significant decline in the population growth rate: Turkey's annual population growth rate has been lower than 1.5 % in recent years.²² Life expectancy at birth has reached around 70 years of age. The total fertility rate is around 2.2 children and the child mortality rate is under 30/1000. Turkey's population is expected to increase at a constant rate corresponding to this level of growth rate in the coming years. It is estimated to reach 90 million by 2025 from 73 million in the year 2005 before hitting 100 million by 2050. However, it is also estimated that Turkey's population growth rate might stagnate at this level in the 2050s (or, indeed, even before reaching 100 million) before entering a period of decline.²³

The main assumption underlying these estimations is that the average expected number of children per woman will fall to 2.1 – the figure required for a basic reproduction rate – in 2010 and then remain constant at this level for

²¹ Muenz (2006).

²² İçduygu (2006, p. 95).

²³ Behar (2008, p. 16).

the following years. Estimations based on this assumption suggest that the ratio of the age group 0–15 will decrease to 28 % of the 2005 ratio and then to 22 % in 2025, before receding to 19 % by the year 2050. For the percentage share of the 15–64 age cleavage engaged in the labor force, 2005's figure of 67 % will rise to 68 % by 2025 before declining to 62 % in 2050. In the light of these developments, it is apparent that the population will enter a process of rapid aging. The share of the population of the 65 + age group, which was 6 % in 2005, will reach 10 % by 2025 before rapidly increasing by 18 % in the subsequent 25 years.²⁴

If we look at the status of the age group 15–64 within Turkey's overall population in terms of absolute figures, it is probable that this age group will continue growing until the year 2035. Considering that people constituting this age group belong to the generations that were born in periods when fertility rates were quite high, the reason for the high figures (which will continue in the coming years) in this age group becomes clear. While Turkey's population will grow by 30 % by the 2030s, the age group 15–64 will grow at a faster rate than the one predicted for the rest of the population. In this time period, the size of the age group 15–64 will increase from 42 million to 60 million, a growth rate of 40 %. Certainly, this growth will be translated into increases in the labor force and labor force supply and, if the labor force simultaneously gains productivity, mobility and flexibility parallel to this demographic development, there will be no reason not to term the outcome as a "window of demographic opportunity".²⁵ However, it should be noted that this window of demographic opportunity will gradually close after the year 2025 in proportion to the overall population in Turkey, due mainly to the increase in the 65 + age group and the corresponding decrease in the 15–64 age group. In this process of demographic transformation, the population entering a significant aging period is also inevitable. By 2050, it is estimated that while Turkey's population will increase by approximately 40 %, the ratio of the 65 + age group will also double. This transformation will take place especially in the period following the year 2025 following a decline in fertility rates and the aging of the current generations, being replaced by a relatively smaller population. In this context, forecasts estimate that the size of the 65 + age group, which was 3.6 million in the year 2000, will reach 17 million in 2050. It seems that after the year 2025,

²⁴ *Ibid.* (p. 17).

²⁵ *Ibid.* (pp. 17–19).

Turkey will no longer have a young population. In this, the most significant indicator is the increasing median age: estimates suggest that the median age will increase to 33 years by the year 2025 and to 39 years by 2050 from approximately 25 years in the year 2000.

If no migration occurs between 2005 and 2025, the population under 40 years of age (the active young population) will gradually become smaller, the 40–65 age group (the active middle-aged population) will remain constant, while the ratio of the 65 + age group (the retired population) to the entire population will increase in the EU-27 member states.²⁶ Because of this, the active young section (ages 20–40) will decline by 17 %, the active middle-aged section will remain the same, and the elderly section (ages 65 +) will reach over one third of the entire population (34 %). If Turkey were to join the EU today, the changes that would occur in the EU by 2025 would be as follows: the size of the active young section (ages 20–40) would decline by 12 %, the active middle-aged section (ages 40–60) would increase by 6 % and the elderly section (ages 65 +) would increase by 37 %. In light of the above comparison, it can be said that Turkey's accession to the European Union might slow down the decline in the numbers of the active young population within the entire EU population given the former's young population and growth rates that far outstrip those of the rest of the organization, yet it is evident that this will not completely resolve the issue of the EU's aging population.

When emphasizing the necessary and complementary impact of migration for Europe in demographic and economic terms, the question of “what kind of migration” is an issue that inevitably appears. In addition to the desire for “migration that will provide a qualified labor force that is more required”, the construction of “migration that will provide a labor force more in harmony with European societies in social and cultural terms” is also emphasized. However, an overly selective migratory approach with the aforementioned economic, social, political and ideological positioning is not very realistic considering the magnitude of the migration that is demographically required by the EU, especially if one considers the narrow migratory market that will provide the potential migrants. For instance, a study conducted by the United Nations and cited in this work states that the number of migrants required to eliminate the negative demographic tendency experienced in the EU-15 member states will vary according to the countries' objectives. The study discusses that,

²⁶ İçduygu (2006, pp. 86–89).

if the objective is to preserve the current magnitude of the working-age population, then the European Union will need 79 million people (1.5 million migrants each year) in the period between 2000–2050; however, if the objective is to preserve the “potential support ratio” (in other words, the ratio of the age group 15–64 to the age group 65 +), then 674 million people (14 million migrants each year) will be required.

It is evident that the number of migrants possibly required by the labor force market in the EU cannot be met even in the event of Turkey’s entire population migrating to Europe. As we have emphasized before, the demographic change experts anticipate in the population of Turkey for the period between 2005 and 2050 is as follows: the age group 15–64 will reach 63 million (31 %) in the year 2025 before slowing its growth rate to reach 67 million (40 %) by 2050 from 48 million in the year 2005; in the same time period, the size of the labor force in Turkey, which is 25 million today, will reach 47 million (32 %) in the year 2025 and 51 million (45 %) by 2050.

Magnitude of Possible Movements and Characteristics of the Potential Migrants

In the context of the EU-Turkey relationship, the discussions on international migration issues are grounded in two essential questions: (a) What will be the magnitude of the possible migratory movements towards the EU? and (b) What qualifications will potential Turkish migrant groups to the EU have? In a study²⁷ conducted in 2006 for the purpose of providing answers to these questions, people’s desire to migrate to the EU member states was examined at two different levels. Firstly, the study examined the general intention of the people in question and queried whether a general desire to migrate to the EU member states was extant. Secondly, the study investigated the level of specific intention in an effort to acquire more definite and detailed information in relation to the desire to migrate.

When these two indicators are evaluated, Turkey demonstrates an interesting picture. While Turkey has the largest number of people with a general intention to migrate among the 13 countries (the ten countries that became EU member states after the recent enlargement, plus the last new members Bulgaria and Romania, as well as candidate country Turkey) examined, it is also

²⁷ Krieger/Maitre (2006, pp. 45–66).

the country with the least number of people with a specific intention to migrate. In this respect, only 0.3 % of the population of Turkey has a specific intention to migrate in the following five years. When searching for an answer to the question, “How does this contradictory situation translate into possible migration from Turkey following the advent of free movement?”, it is possible to say the following: in 2003, the number of potential Turkish migrants was 48.9 million, and one can estimate that the potential size of the population with a general intention to migrate is 3.03 million. Yet, of these, only 150,000 have a specific intention to migrate. When the more fundamental intentions to migrate is examined, it is estimated that in the following five years, the possible size of migrants from Turkey to the EU–15 member states will be 400,000 people.²⁸

On the basis of the difference between the general intention and the specific intention to migrate explained above, the search for answers to the question regarding the characteristics of people with a general intention to migrate has also revealed interesting results. The possible migratory movement from Turkey is expected to include people from rural areas and a lower level of income. Meanwhile, mobility among the unemployed is expected to be relatively high. In relation to these three situations, it can be argued that the possible migration from Turkey of groups such as these will result in serious adjustment problems for the labor force markets of the countries receiving migrants. However, another important aspect regarding the prospective migrants within possible migratory movements from Turkey is the possibility of the majority of these migrants being university graduates or current students continuing their education. Considering this aspect, possible migratory movements from Turkey may not cause serious adjustment problems in economic terms.

The results from another study²⁹ that develop certain scenarios on possible migration from Turkey to the EU help us make the following two main inferences: first, the expected migration will not actually be in extreme volumes at all and, second, if Turkey’s accession to the EU, and consequently free movement, is not realized, then higher levels of migration will occur. Some crucial results of this study are as follows: if the scenario of freedom of movement is realized, then migration from Turkey to the EU member states will increase relatively less and reach a total of one million in the period between 2004 and 2030. The second scenario, which is based on the notion of guest-workers mov-

²⁸ İçduygu (2006, p. 113).

²⁹ Erzan/Kuzubaş/Yıldız (2008, pp. 29–40).

ing between countries (in contrast to the scenario of freedom of movement outlined in the first instance), estimates that there will be a significant increase in the magnitude of migration after 2015 and that the rate of migration will almost double. However, even this migration scenario limits the number of migrants from Turkey to the EU by the year 2030 with a total of 1.8 million in 45 years.

On the other hand, the first scenario yields the following results regarding migration under conditions of high rates of economic growth, achievement of full accession to the EU and thereby free movement by 2015: an approximate increase of 2.1 million in the immigrants of Turkish origin in Europe in the period between 2004 and 2030 and an annual approximate increase of 25,000 during 2004–2015, followed by an increase of 125,000 during 2015–2030. Another scenario option involves much higher volumes of migratory movements under the conditions of a low rate of economic growth in Turkey, failure to achieve EU membership and, thus, free movement. According to this scenario, by the year 2030, the total net migration from Turkey will exceed 2.7 million. In the period between 2004 and 2015, it is approximately estimated that over 70,000 people will arrive in Europe as new immigrants annually, and that in the period of 2015–2030, the annual average will be over 130,000.³⁰ In other words, if Turkey's membership is no longer on the agenda, then the EU will face a much more intense migratory wave.

In addition to the basic findings we have tried to summarize here, it will be helpful to remember some other key points while discussing the migration issue within EU-Turkey relations. First of all, it should be kept in mind that Europe is not the sole destination of the migratory waves originating from Turkey; traditional migration countries like Canada, the USA and Australia on the one hand, and newer migration countries like the Middle Eastern countries and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) provide employment opportunities for the hundreds of thousands of people emigrating from Turkey. Future migration estimates and assumptions should take into consideration that there will be other destination points for migratory movements from Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey has also acquired, especially in the last 20 years, the status of a "migrant receiving" and "migratory transit country" in addition to its identity as a "source country" within the international migration market. Considering that a similar process has been experienced by current EU mem-

³⁰ *Ibid.* (p. 38).

ber states such as Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece, it can be said that these new migratory processes can bring Turkey to a status that is parallel to those of such states in the European migration- and asylum-seeking regimes.³¹ It is clear that such a transformation will be reflected in a gradual change and decline in the pressure of migration from Turkey into the EU. Of course, the occurrence of such a process will only be possible if Turkey achieves a period of rapid economic growth and social development as the result of the prospect of eventual EU membership.

As already discussed in this study, even though the importance of the economic, social and demographic differences between countries are emphasized in regard to the formation of migratory movements, migration is certainly not a phenomenon to be assessed merely in a quantitative framework through simple arithmetic calculations such as “replacing negatives with positives” and “substituting one population with another population”. It is important to consider the formation and continuity of migration multi-dimensionally; that is, both from quantitative and qualitative perspectives. Even though migration is the movement of a labor force on the basis of “supply and demand” and “needs and opportunities” in economic terms, it also involves “selectivity” in political and social terms. Migratory movements expected to form due to economic and demographic reasons may be shaped differently due to political and social choices. One form of migration might be preferred to another or one migrant to another migrant. In short, international migration is “a political phenomenon that requires governance”. Moreover, the process of international migration is an area of politics – a politicized area – where internal actors (the migrant-receiving country, source country and the migrants themselves) constantly negotiate. Within this framework, issues regarding international migration within the context of EU-Turkey relations necessitate that the parties or actors consider this matter as “a political phenomenon that requires governance”.³²

³¹ İçduygu (2006, pp. 123–140).

³² İçduygu (2004, pp. 88–99).

Concluding Remarks

This study aims to underline that both the view of discrepancy based on demographic difference and the view of complementariness based on demographic difference are inadequate in explaining how potential international migratory movements will shape EU-Turkey relations in the future. These differences may imply a potential for migratory movements, yet a series of quite different processes are required for this potential to be realized. What is important here is to explain how this process of transformation might occur in the future. On the other hand, it is neither particularly realistic to emphasize the prospective positive impacts of the migratory movement from Turkey on the EU population solely based on the demographic complementariness thesis, nor to expect that these positive impacts will immediately occur as soon as Turkey becomes a member state. Population and migration are dynamic elements, and these dynamic elements become even more complex through economic, social and political processes. Within this framework and within a future in which Turkey's accession to the EU may be realized, the demographic process that populations in both the EU and in Turkey might undergo should also be examined. Of course, the transformation of the demographic difference between the EU and Turkey into one of complementariness will be related to the possible appearance of the "demographic demise" (the decline of fertility and an aging population) in the EU and the "window of demographic opportunity" (an environment of constant increase in the labor supply, employment and the quality of the labor force and, thus, in economic performance) in Turkey.

For positive results for each of the EU, Turkey and the migrants themselves to occur, each polity must accomplish a series of tasks in addition to handling the issue of migration as a "political phenomenon that requires governance". For Turkey, this requires rapidly completing membership negotiations, integrating with the EU and succeeding in complementing the "window of demographic opportunity" with "increasing the labor supply, the level of quality education, the rate of employment and maintaining a steady economic growth" in the next 20 years. For the EU, meanwhile, this requires rapidly completing membership negotiations, integrating with Turkey and succeeding in complementing its "demographic demise" with a "far-sighted migration policy based on economic rationality and diversity and free of xenophobia". Should both the EU and Turkey succeed in doing this, the impact of

migratory movements from Turkey to the EU should be beneficial to all concerned.

At the core of these demographic accounts lies a new aspect of migration debates between the EU and Turkey, which has emerged only recently, in the last 5–6 years: its politicization in the context of Turkey’s accession negotiations. For the EU, such debates, developed during the course of its relations with Turkey and during discussion of international migration, do not only mirror a pessimistic perspective over the capacity of the EU to manage migration flows for economic and social benefits, but also reflect the necessity of good governance of migration for the EU’s benefit. For Turkey, together with being part of both the conditionality and socialization principles of the EU accession process, these debates are largely indicators of her migration transition from a country of emigration to immigration, which requires new and complicated tools of management as part of integration into the global world system in general and into the EU in specific. More importantly, these debates also plainly show the strategic use of “migration diplomacy” as a bargaining tool over and during the membership negotiation process between the EU and Turkey.

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Turkey's "Critical Europeanization": Evidence from Turkey's Immigration Policies

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Introduction

Turkey's relationship with Europe has a long and complex history. It does not even start in 1959, when Turkey applied for an associate membership to the EU, but dates back from the Ottoman Empire interactions with European powers over the centuries, and the way subsequently this heritage has been memorized and interpreted. The Euro-Ottoman history in itself is ambivalent: it features a powerful and proud Ottoman Empire, well aware of military and technological superiority over backward late-Middle Age, European entities; it features an "equal among others" Ottoman Empire, engaging in warfare and alliances with the emerging European powers during the European Renaissance; and it features in the 19th century a weakened Ottoman Empire, threatened by European imperialist ambitions, but looking for its salvation in its Westernization, as a means to resist European powers.¹

The history of the Turkish republic is no different. In the Turkish psyche, Europe represents both a model which Turkish citizens look up to, as well as an imperialistic force, from which Turkey had to free and protect itself. It was particularly true during the foundational experience of creating Turkey as a modern nation-state, when Mustafa Kemal fought against European powers in Anatolia (mainly British, Greek and French troops), while putting into place a political system openly emulating European institutions and values. In Turkey, Europe is both admired and despised. It is still true today.

Such an ambivalent relationship uniquely impacts Turkey's bid to EU membership in the 21st century. The well-known story of Turkey's EU aspiration

¹ Goffman (2002), Faroqhi (2004).

is one of a twin process: the technical one, whereby Turkey, since 2001, engaged in a fast-paced and extensive reform movement of its laws and institutions in order to harmonize with the Copenhagen criteria first, and then the broader *acquis communautaire*, and the political one, whereby important political actors in the different European countries and in Turkey have expressed fluctuating enthusiasm and reluctance towards Turkey's EU membership. These two processes have been intertwined and interactive, as the extraordinary reforms done in the 2001–2004 period led to the opening of accession negotiations in 2005, and as the rise of strong voices against Turkey's membership in Europe, and the rise of skepticism in Turkey, have considerably slowed down the reform and negotiation process since 2006.²

One of the areas in which the EU is sharply influencing Turkey's policy is the field of asylum and migration. In the 1990s, Turkey used to have an outdated, incomplete and largely ad-hoc policy towards immigration into the country, including asylum, regular and irregular migration and border management. By 2011, the picture is quite different: in all domains, different reform packages have been passed recently, and a comprehensive new immigration policy has been drafted.

The overall timing and nature of these reforms indicate the essential role played by the EU. However, it is important to understand why and how exactly the EU influenced this process. Much has been written about "Europeanization", or the way in which the EU, intentionally or not, manages to transform member and candidate countries' policies, politics and identities so that they would better align with EU practices.³ The way Turkey in particular becomes Europeanized has also been extensively discussed.⁴ The literature shows that there are different levels of "Europeanization", with some reflecting an instrumental adoption of policies to gain particular advantages, while others denoting a deeper transformation and internalization of norms, characterizing a more genuine "Europeanization".⁵ From a European perspective, it is extremely important to understand how transformative and genuine Turkey's reforms in

² Although, such discourses and behaviors are themselves predicated on more structural, economic, institutional and political developments in Turkey and in the EU. See Tocci (2007).

³ Featherstone/Radaelli (2003), Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier (2005), Checkel (2007), Graziano/Vink (2007), Schimmelfennig (2009).

⁴ Diez/Agnantopoulos et al. (2005), Kale (2005), Kaya (2007), Oğuzlu/Ozpek (2008), Ulusoy (2009), Lagrand (2010).

⁵ Lavenex/Uçarer (2004), Diez/Agnantopoulos et al. (2005), Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier (2005), Bauer/Knill et al. (2007), Schimmelfennig (2009).

the field of asylum and migration are. Migration has become a particularly salient issue in Europe because it connects to existential issues such as human rights and individual freedoms, as well as concerns over societal and economic security. Knowing whether Turkey, its state and society, genuinely fall in line with the values and concerns of European countries is of crucial importance for many European actors.

As this chapter demonstrates, critical actors in Turkey are engaged in a genuine, non-instrumental process of reform in the field of asylum and migration. However, contrary to what the Europeanization literature indicates, it is not so much because they identified closely with Europeans, but rather because they *distanced themselves* from European practices. In many ways, Turkey has selectively adopted the values and concerns of Europe, and transformed into a truly "Turkish" approach to asylum and migration. This has activated a sense of pride among Turkish officials, with the feeling that they can do "better than the Europeans", or be "more European than the Europeans".⁶ This phenomenon that I call "critical Europeanization" is not a traditional form of Europeanization, yet one that fits particularly well Turkey's ambivalent historical perception of Europe.

To understand this process better, this chapter presents succinctly the reforms adopted in the field of migration, the different ways in which the EU has influenced the process and the critical reactions that it has triggered in Turkey.

Turkey's Immigration Policy Profile and Its Reforms

When one thinks of Turkey as a country of immigration, one often sees Turkey as a "new" country of immigration, devoid of any real immigration policy, and one which needs to catch up with Europe and adopt appropriate policies. This is only partly correct. Turkey is historically a country that has received important inflows of immigration, especially from the Balkans, all throughout the 20th century. But, this fact was overshadowed by the large influx of Turkish migrants into Europe starting in the 1960s, which, on the international migration scene, characterized Turkey as a country of emigration.⁷

⁶ Meeting with a police officer, October 2009, Van, Turkey, and with officials in charge of migration, October 2009, Ankara, Turkey.

⁷ Kirişçi (2007 b), Abadan-Unat (2011).

Similarly, Turkey had an immigration policy, articulated principally in the Law on Settlement of 1934, foreseeing the immigration of migrants of “Turkish culture or origin”, and the rights to which they would have access as they settled on Turkish territory.⁸ Turkey was also among the drafters and first signatories of the Geneva Convention in 1951, practically granting Turkey with an asylum policy.⁹

However, these existing policies came to a serious crisis by the end of the Cold War, when the sudden qualitative and quantitative change in migration flows in the region rendered existing regulations largely irrelevant and archaic. By the 1990s, a large majority of newcomers coming from Eastern Europe and the Middle East to Turkey were “foreigners”(i. e., “non-Turkish”), and could not be accepted in Turkey under the Law on Settlement. Likewise, most of the asylum seekers were coming from non-European countries (mainly Iran and Iraq) and therefore would not qualify as Convention refugees under the geographical limitation of the Geneva Convention that Turkey maintained.¹⁰ Hence, the impression that Turkey was a “new” country of immigration, and that it was “lacking” any immigration policy.

By the end of the Cold War, the Turkish state regulation of migration issues overall was incomplete and inconsistent. Pieces that made up Turkish immigration policy were to be found in various places such as in the Law of Resettlement,¹¹ the Law on Foreigners,¹² the Turkish Citizenship Law¹³ and in various institutions, mainly the Ministry of Interior (especially in the Foreigners Department within the General Directorate of Security) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as others.¹⁴ The new situation warranted new policies, and it is true that it took some time for Turkey to adapt its regulations. There have been several publications detailing the many reforms that took place in the last 20 years,¹⁵ but the main reforms could be summarized as follows:

⁸ Kirişçi (1996 a, p. 8).

⁹ Frelick (1997).

¹⁰ This option (recognizing as refugees only asylum seekers coming from Europe) is offered in Article 1B(1) of the 1951 Geneva Convention Related to the Status of Refugees. Most signatories of the Convention lifted the geographical limitation in 1967, but Turkey, to this day, retains the geographical limitation.

¹¹ İskan Kanunu.

¹² The Law on Movement and Residence of Foreigners in Turkey.

¹³ Türk Vatandaşlığı Kanunu.

¹⁴ The Gendarmerie, the Coastal Guard, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security are also involved in migration issues. See Kirişçi (2004, pp. 4–9).

¹⁵ Kale (2005), Kaya (2009 b), Lagrand (2010).

- *Early step: the 1994 Asylum Regulation.*¹⁶ The first serious step that was taken to reform Turkey's regulations regarding migration was in the realm of asylum and the adoption of an important regulation in 1994. Since 1951, Turkey has been party to the Geneva Convention Relative to the Status of Refugees, but kept the original geographical limitation. This meant that only asylum seekers coming from Europe could be recognized as refugees. By the early 1990s, there were no regulations governing the status of non-European refugees in Turkey. The 1994 Regulation remedied this in a compromise solution, by granting rights to non-European Refugees to apply for asylum in Turkey (both to Turkish authorities and the UNHCR), with the condition that, once recognized with a refugee status, they would have to be resettled in a third country. Far from ideal, this regulation (amended in 1999 and 2006 to accommodate more realistically the time within which asylum seekers had to apply for asylum) is the main framework on which Turkey's asylum system functioned up to 2011.¹⁷
- *First package of reforms: 2002–2005 reforms.* Overall, the period of 2002–2005 represented a time of earthquake reforms in the Turkish legal system. In order to ensure the opening of negotiations with the EU (eventually granted in 2005), Turkey engaged in a breath-taking large-scale revision of many of its regulations. This impacted the realm of asylum and migration, as well. Among other things, in 2003, the Law on Work Permits for Foreign Nationals was adopted, the Law on Citizenship was amended and the additional protocols against migrant smuggling and human trafficking of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime were adopted.¹⁸ 2002–2005 was also a period when Turkey was working hard on adjusting its visa system to the Schengen negative and positive lists, and took several steps in that direction.¹⁹
- *Further plans for comprehensive reforms: the 2005 National Action Plan for the Adoption of the EU Acquis in the Field of Asylum and Im-*

¹⁶ The official title is: The Regulation On The Procedures And the Principles Related to Population Movements and Aliens Arriving In Turkey Either As Individuals Or In Groups Wishing To Seek Asylum Either From Turkey Or Requesting Residence Permission In Order To Seek Asylum From Another Country.

¹⁷ Kirişçi (1996 b), Kaya (2009 a).

¹⁸ Çiçekli (2006), Kaya (2009 b).

¹⁹ Kirişçi (2005).

migration (NAP). Following the enforcement in 2003 of the Turkish National Program on the Adoption of the EU *Acquis Communautaire*, a systematic effort was undertaken by Turkish authorities to identify the areas of fit and misfit between the *acquis communautaire* and Turkish regulations. This effort resulted in the NAP,²⁰ identifying the necessary reforms and proposing a timeframe to undertake them. This document is important, as it seems to be the first effort in which Turkish authorities think comprehensively about their immigration policy.

- *Period of adjustments: 2005–2008.* Following the number of changes that occurred in the 2002–2005 period, a couple more important but limited reforms were achieved in the subsequent years. This includes the revision of the Law on Settlement in 2006 (which improved some of the outdated language coming from 1934, but without changing the main logic of the document), the circulation of the Implementation Circular from the General Directorate of Security in 2006 encouraging a better implementation of the asylum system, the adoption of a new Passport Law in 2007 and the amendment of the Land Registry Law in 2008 providing easier access to property to foreigners.²¹
- *Launch of comprehensive reforms: 2008.* In line with the principles adopted in the 2005 National Action Plan, a task force on migration and asylum was established in late 2008 (“Asylum and Migration Unit for the development and implementation of legislation and administrative capacities”).²² The main goal of this task force was to draft new legislation on asylum and foreigners in Turkey and delineate the new responsibilities of a new agency responsible for asylum and migration. This new step in the process of reforms of Turkey’s migration policies is extremely important for two reasons: first, it engages in the creation of a new comprehensive migration policy for Turkey, and second, it demonstrates a change in approach and mindset within Turkish bureaucracy regarding issues of asylum and migration. This team of bureaucrats constituting the task force is ex-

²⁰ Turkish National Action Plan for the Adoption of the EU *Acquis* in the Field of Asylum and Migration (2005).

²¹ Kaya (2009 b).

²² İltica ve Göç Mevzuatı ve İdari Kapasitesini Geliştirme ve Uygulama Bürosu. This office is attached to the undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior.

tremely open to change and new ideas, having been consulting systematically with academics, international organizations and NGOs (a quite unusual approach for Turkish bureaucracy). By mid-2011, they had an official draft of a new Law on Foreigners and International Protection ready to be submitted to the Parliament.²³ The activities undertaken by this task force also seem to have had a trickle-down effect on actual policies, especially on asylum, as new circulars have been put into place to address some of the blatant problems in the system, as highlighted by the team of the task force.²⁴

By 2011, the extraordinary reform journey undertaken by Turkey reflects a story of overall compliance to EU norms and regulations. As European actors expressed their concerns through official and unofficial channels, Turkish authorities reacted and initiated a process of reforms. This process was, however, never linear and progressive, but rather involved a lot of politics, resistance and unequal developments. There is even one area where compliance initially took place, but then got reversed: this is the case of visa policies.

The area of visa policy and border management was one of the issues included in the harmonization packages in the 2002–2003 period. The agreement reached at that point was that Turkey would gradually adopt the negative list of the Schengen agreement to align with the visa policy of the majority of EU member states. Turkey started to implement that policy, and by 2005, Turkey was only five countries short on the list to be fully aligned to the Schengen negative list (down from 13 countries in 2002).²⁵ However, this policy changed in 2005, at which point Turkey started to refrain from imposing new visa regulations on new countries. By 2009, Turkey started to actively reverse its policy by seeking to systematically remove visa requirements with almost every country it was entering in a political agreement. In 2009, in opposition to the Schengen practice, Turkey agreed to lift visa requirements with Syria, Libya, Jordan and Albania; it continued to do so in 2010 with Russia, Lebanon

²³ Meeting with members of the Asylum and Migration Unit, October, December 2009 and June 2010, Istanbul and Ankara, Turkey.

²⁴ In 2010 only, the following were put into place: a Circular on Irregular Migration by the Ministry of Interior in March, a Circular on Refugees and Asylum Seekers by the Ministry of Interior in March, a Circular on Asylum Seekers and Refugees by the Social Services and Child Protection Agency in March, a Circular on Procedures concerning Asylum Seekers and Refugees by the Social Services and Child Protection Agency in April, a Circular on Students of Foreign origin by the Ministry of Education in August and an update on the 2006 application directive on asylum by the Ministry of Interior.

²⁵ Kirişçi (2005), Kirişçi (2007 a).

and Serbia, and seems to pursue this policy further in 2011 with discussions with Qatar, Malaysia, Bahrain and Kyrgyzstan. In May 2011, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu declared that in the last eight years, Turkey reached visa-free agreements with no less than 50 countries.²⁶

Why do we observe this change of approach in Turkey's position on visa policy? Why is visa policy the area where compliance did not occur while all other areas ensured compliance or steps towards compliance? How did the EU react to such an unexpected move? These are all questions that will be answered in the following sections.

The Role Played by the EU: The Different Forms and Degrees of Europeanization

There is not much doubt regarding the central role played by the EU in this process of reforming Turkey's immigration policy. Except for the early changes in asylum policies in the mid-1990s,²⁷ all the other reforms were explicitly situated in the framework of the EU harmonization process.²⁸

As has often been highlighted in the Europeanization literature, the EU can impact candidate countries in a number of different ways, including directly with conditionality requirements and indirectly as it affects a candidate country through a third actor, such as the ECHR (European Court of Human Rights), or domestic actors. Evidence of both processes can be presented here. The direct influence of the EU is evident in some of the 2002–2005 reforms, which were adopted in order to satisfy the Copenhagen political criteria. Subsequently, the adoption of the National Action Plan (and the beginning of its application) is a clear outcome of the EU's conditionality and demands for harmonization. In this particular case, the EU was particularly efficient in ensuring that Turkish authorities plan in detail the reforms needed by using the tool of a "twinning project". In the period 2003–2004, no less than eight twinning projects were initiated on issues such as strengthening institutions in the fight against trafficking in human beings, visa police and practice, asylum, border

²⁶ Anadolu Ajansı (2011).

²⁷ Even these changes, however, were clearly reacting to the European wave of criticism regarding Turkey's approach to asylum in the early 1990s. Kirişçi (1996 b).

²⁸ Kirişçi (2003), Kale (2005), Çiçekli (2006), Kirişçi (2009), Lagrand (2010).

protection, law enforcement and migration issues.²⁹ Since 2010, there are at least two ongoing twinning projects in the field of asylum and migration: one on "supporting Turkey's capacity in combating irregular migration through the establishment of removal centers" and one on "establishing a system of reception, screening and accommodation for asylum seekers and refugees".³⁰ The EU is also funding "the establishment of reception centers in seven key locations in Turkey" and the "set-up of an asylum and country of origin information systems".

But the EU also instigated changes in Turkish asylum and migration policies through indirect means: through decisions taken by the ECHR and by the development of civil society. As a member of the Council of Europe, and party to the European Convention on Human Rights, Turkey has often been on trial in the ECHR, and has often lost the case. Even though the Council of Europe and the EU are two separate institutions, the EU is pressuring Turkey to take the decisions of the Court seriously. Four cases are particularly important in the field of asylum and migration: the case of *Jabari v. Turkey* in 2000,³¹ the case of *Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey* in 2005,³² the case of *Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey* in 2009³³ and the case of *Charahili v. Turkey* in 2010.³⁴ It is not the place of this article to go into the details of the cases,³⁵ but in each case, Turkey's practices condemned by the Court then triggered a higher awareness on the issue of asylum in Turkey and the shortcomings of the system, which then often prompted changes in the system. Recently, Turkish officials within the Task Force have admitted that they have been "hit hard" by the most recent 2010 decisions of the Court, and that they were determined to put into place a new asylum system that would eschew altogether any such condemnation from the Court in the future.³⁶

But another, more profound and long-term indirect way in which the EU contributed to the process of reforms in Turkey was through civil society. The EU played an important role in encouraging and financing projects upheld by

²⁹ Kirişçi (2007 a, p. 8).

³⁰ See The EU and Turkey Address the Common Challenges of Migration and Asylum (2010).

³¹ Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights (2000).

³² *Ibid.* (2005).

³³ *Ibid.* (2009).

³⁴ *Ibid.* (2010).

³⁵ Ekşi (2010).

³⁶ Meeting with members of the Migration and Asylum Unit, October 2009, Ankara, Turkey.

Turkish civil society. One of the most striking changes in the migration landscape in Turkey over the first decade of the 21st century has indeed been the creation and expansion of civil society organizations and actors. In 2000, there were very few organizations involved in the field of asylum and migration, and such institutions were almost exclusively engaged in first-hand relief activities. Today, the situation is very different, with a larger number of NGOs very active in the terrain and involved in wide range of activities, from first-hand relief to legal, social and psychological counseling activities, and from raising awareness campaigns to government lobbying activities.³⁷ Many of these NGOs have greatly benefited from the symbolical and financial support of the EU. Symbolically, both the field of asylum and migration and the strengthening of civil society actors has always been a priority for the EU. Financially, the EU has financed several NGO projects,³⁸ as well as large-capacity building projects for Turkish bureaucracy that always emphasizes the consultation and participation of NGOs working in this field.³⁹ Such an indirect means of Europeanization, whereby the EU enables and strengthens (if not creates) pro-EU values domestic actors, who in turn impact the policies decided by the government, are a documented way of Europeanization.⁴⁰

One should, however, not overstate the impact of Europeanization in the field of asylum and migration in Turkey. The process of Europeanization outlined above should not overshadow the fact that Europeanization is incomplete at two different levels. At the policy level, Turkey is still far from having applied all the different reforms envisioned in the National Action Plan necessary to complete the process of harmonization. The most critical items that remain on the to-do list include the lifting of the geographical limitation, the

³⁷ Several NGOs work exclusively on rights and assistance to refugees, asylum seekers and irregular migrants. These include ASAM (Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants), Mülteci-Der (Association for Solidarity with Refugees) and Mülteci-Net and GDA (the Solidarity Network for Migrants). Many other established NGOs have also created special migrant and refugee programs, such as the Turkish branch of the HCA (Helsinki Citizens' Assembly), MazlumDer (The Association for Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People), Amnesty International, Human Rights Association, IHH (The Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief), Deniz Feneri, etc.

³⁸ For instance, in 2009, the EU funded two projects. One with ASAM, called "Suspended Lives, Perceived Lives", aimed at raising awareness and training public authorities and civil society officers on asylum seekers. The second one was with the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey on the effective protection of the rights of refugees, asylum seekers and other persons in need of international protection.

³⁹ Meeting with official from EU delegation in Ankara, March 2011.

⁴⁰ Tocci (2005).

signing of the readmission agreement⁴¹ and the alignment to the Schengen visa system. And at the population level, the Turkish actors that have been socialized and accepted the norms of the EU represent a very limited segment of the broader Turkish population. These include a couple hundred civil society activists, academics and, more recently, officials of Turkish bureaucracy and some politicians. This is not to say that the rest of Turkish population opposes EU norms on asylum and migration, but rather that there is a lack of interest and public discourse on these issues, which makes it difficult to know how the rest of the population truly positions itself. At best, one can therefore only talk of a partial Europeanization.

A more important question regarding the means and types of Europeanization of the issue of asylum and migration in Turkey is the extent to which the observed Europeanization is sincere and genuine, or whether it is simply a tactical move from Turkish counterparts in order to gain particular advantages, the most central one of which is gaining EU membership. Europeanization scholars have framed this question with different terms, such as "policy-Europeanization" vs. "societal-Europeanization",⁴² or Europeanization driven by the "logic of consequences" (according to rational interests) or the "logic of appropriateness" (as actors truly adopt the EU values and believe them to be normatively the most appropriate values).⁴³

In the case of Turkey and migration, one can clearly see the works of the logic of consequences: there is no doubt that Turkish counterparts are using this process of reforms along EU guidance as a means to negotiate particular advantages. This is particularly obvious in the case of the signature of the readmission agreement between Turkey and the EU. In the last six years of negotiations over the readmission agreement, Turkey has used it as a leverage to obtain other readmission agreements with countries sending migrants into Turkey, as well as to negotiate the liberalization of visa requirements for Turkish nationals in the Schengen area.⁴⁴ The case of the lifting of the geographical limitation in Turkey's asylum system is another point in case: in the National Action Plan, this lift has been clearly conditioned on Turkey's entry into the EU, indicating that Turkey does not consider the lift as a goal that could be materi-

⁴¹ Over the course of 2010, negotiations over the readmission agreement had resumed, but they collapsed in early 2011.

⁴² Diez/Agnantopoulos et al. (2005).

⁴³ March/Olsen (1989), Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier (2005).

⁴⁴ İçduygu (2010).

alized absent of the EU carrot.⁴⁵ But more broadly, one can see how over the years Turkish officials have gained a better understanding of the workings of the EU, and hence have become more skillful and tougher negotiators in the process. From a Turkish perspective, this is only fair, to say the least, as they see their relation with the EU as being strongly imbalanced in favor of the EU, with the EU being able to gain more advantage from the relation than Turkey does. Furthermore, such an approach is not incompatible with a deeper and more genuine form of Europeanization.

In general, it is much more difficult to measure or prove the workings of the logic of appropriateness. In the case of the Europeanization of the issue of migration in Turkey, one can however point at a couple of issues that hinge on a more profound correspondence of so-called “EU” norms and “Turkish” norms (whether it was compatible or was the result of a transformation). The first one is discursive evidence, looking at the ways Turkish actors talk about the issue of migration.⁴⁶ It is very clear from the discourse developed by civil society actors, and a cursory look at the literature that they have developed can easily identify the correspondence between the values upheld in the reports and the ones upheld by the EU. For instance, the website of the NGO Mülteci-Der⁴⁷ is regularly uploaded with European news, court decisions, European NGO reports, etc., alongside with domestic reports and news regarding asylum. Interestingly enough, not only the secular NGOs sisters in form and content to the European NGOs, but also the so-called “Islamic” NGOs would employ, among others, concepts of rights and freedoms that clearly refer to the European norms: “[T]he inhuman conditions of the centers where foreigners are held, the need they have to resort to the administrative court, or even the ECHR because of the hardship they face, etc. are proofs that the legal problems faced by these people need to be solved. What refugees in Turkey need the most is legal assistance. Accordingly, important responsibilities befall on bar associations and NGOs”.⁴⁸

This discursive adoption of European norms and standards can also be noted to some extent with high-ranking officials and bureaucrats in charge of

⁴⁵ Kirişçi (2007 a).

⁴⁶ Beyond the Turkish migration, there have been numerous statements by high-level officials evidencing the genuine adoption (or at least the intent to genuinely adopt) of EU norms. See, for instance, The New Anatolian (2005).

⁴⁷ Mültecilerle Dayanışma Derneği.

⁴⁸ [My translation]. This sentence was said by a lawyer, member of the NGO Mazlumder, during a conference in 2008 organized by İHH. Both Mazlumder and İHH are known for being so-called “Islamic” NGOs. Quote can be found in Düşünce Gündem (2008).

migration in the Turkish political system. It is particularly true of officials who have received some form of training in Europe, and who, on some particular issues only, report their admiration and desire to apply these same standards in Turkey. They tend to appreciate the fact that, in the EU, there is an existing official framework, a clear and intentional immigration policy and allocated means that allows for a more comprehensive and consistent state policy towards migration.⁴⁹

The other piece of evidence that Turkish actors have internalized EU norms on migration is the timing of reforms. Most of the reforms happening after 2005, and especially the current drafting of new legislation, is happening at a time when the EU membership process is stalled, and as chapter 24 (on Justice and Home Affairs, where issues of asylum and migration are mostly contained) is not open to negotiations yet. There is therefore a certain disconnect between the EU membership process and the reforms at stake, which seems to indicate that Turkey is ready to adopt these reforms whatever the outcome of the EU accession process is.

As it is highlighted from the paragraphs above, the existing Europeanization literature and concepts offer a lot of room for a differentiated, nuanced analysis of a complex political process. Turkey, in the field of asylum and migration, is not simply Europeanized or not Europeanized, but rather demonstrates different traits in which a process is ongoing, overall highlighting Europeanization, but also showing areas of resistance and room for future changes. But, this Europeanization story does not tell the whole picture: indeed, it does not explain why some reforms have been unproblematic and why some others are very much problematic. There are indeed some grey zones in the process of reform of migration policies, which cannot easily be grasped and understood from a European perspective using the tools of the Europeanization literature.

The major shortcoming of this literature is that it envisions only non-compliance, slow compliance and fast compliance. It does not envision a case of reversed compliance, or "de-Europeanization". Hence, it can hardly shed any light on the reasons why Turkey, after an initial period of compliance in the field of visa regulation, then changed its mind and reversed its policy of applying the Schengen visa system to Turkey. Another related and more subtle shortcoming of the Europeanization literature relates to its underlying as-

⁴⁹ Meeting with members of the Migration and Asylum Unit, October 2009, Ankara, Turkey.

sumption that the body of values, rules, regulations and practices embodied in the EU legal system is coherent. Therefore, according to this logic, the only conflict that can occur during the “Europeanization” process is one between domestic rules and the EU. What the analysis of Turkey’s immigration policy reform demonstrates is that the EU system is in itself internally inconsistent and conflictual, which creates both problems and opportunities for domestic actors engaged in Europeanization. Very early on, Turkish officials have been aware of the contradictions inherent in the EU legal system in the realm of asylum and migration.⁵⁰

Turkey’s Critical Reading of EU Migration Policies

Europeanization is rarely a neat and consensual political process, which rallies the unanimous efforts of the different segments of the population. In almost every case, Europeanization challenges the existing balance of interests and forces within a particular political system, enabling some actors while disabling some others, hence creating supporters and opponents to this Europeanization. In the case of asylum and migration in Turkey, however, it seems that, from the beginning, Europeanization has triggered a particularly high level of frustration, anger and feelings of unfairness. Whatever the reasons behind this situation (whether the situation is objectively unfair or whether Turkish actors are more prone to be critical of the EU), this has created a situation where, for the last 20 years, EU migration policies and practices have been read through a particularly critical lens in Turkey.

These critical arguments articulated in Turkey can be summarized as follows. The first level of critique is about the *cost of change* and is a rather straightforward and superficial critique, emphasizing the high-level costs implied by some reforms of the system. This is particularly the case for policies that require either Turkey to accept and better receive migrants (mainly asylum seekers and refugees), or to have a more active policy for controlling migration, especially at the borders. The argument goes that this requires extensive investment in an area that may not be a priority for Turkey, even though it is a priority for the EU: “We agree to cooperate, but to put into place detention centers, we need financial support from the EU.”⁵¹

⁵⁰ See, for instance, the early writings of Kirişçi (1996 c), Kirişçi (1996 b), Kirişçi (2000).

⁵¹ [My translation.] Meeting with a member of the Asylum and Migration Unit, October 2009, Istanbul, Turkey.

The second level of critique is focusing on the process of EU accession, and the fact that there is an *imbalance of power* between the EU and Turkey. "Accession negotiations" is a poor term to reflect a process whereby Turkey has little to negotiate except the timing of reforms, given that the ultimate content of the reforms to be adopted are already pre-determined (the EU *acquis*).⁵² Consequently, Turkey has no leverage over the process and is doomed to accept whatever demands the EU has, even if inappropriate. It is obvious, for instance, that Turkish counterparts are not comfortable and very critical about the EU visa policy scheme, but, in the long term, it does not seem that Turkey will have any alternative options, unless it is willing to jeopardize its EU membership.⁵³

A third level of critique, again a process-oriented critique, relates to the *contradictory demands* and mixed signals sent to Turkey by the EU. There is indeed a keen sense of frustration and powerlessness from Turkish officials on the fact that the EU seems to be asking Turkey to simultaneously be "nicer on asylum seekers" and "tougher on irregular migrants" when in reality the distinction between the two is very blurred. This led to a situation where whatever Turkish authorities do, they will end up being harshly criticized by some EU actors. For instance, the rise in the number of apprehensions of irregular migrants by Turkish police forces in 2000 and 2001 was correlated with an increase in criticism on Turkey over its violation of migrants and asylum seekers' rights.

A fourth level of critique is content-oriented and rests on the perceived securitization of the issue of migration in Europe, and the fact that these policies are *unfair to migrants*. Not all Turkish actors have raised such a voice, as some actors have readily accepted the securitized understanding of migration.⁵⁴ But, some have been extremely vocal against often invoking the "cool-bloodedness and materialism" of Europeans contrasting to the "empathy and emotionalism" of Turks. The argument goes that seeing migrants from a security perspective dehumanizes migrants, and that it is not appropriate for Europe to ask Turkey to apply securitized policies.⁵⁵

⁵² Tolay (2009).

⁵³ Meeting with a high-ranking official in the Prime Minister's office, October 2009, Istanbul, Turkey.

⁵⁴ Biehl (2009).

⁵⁵ [My translations.] "If Turkey initiates the writing of a comprehensive asylum policy, for sure it will be more humanistic than the European approach. In Europe, the approach to migration is more materialist, i. e., the main question in their mind is 'how much will I gain from migrants' labor?' In Turkey, the culture is different, our approach is more social and human-

A fifth content-oriented level of critique is one that emphasizes how EU demands are *unfair to Turkey*. This relates to the deeply imprinted impression in Turkey that the EU migration policies and demands on Turkey are designed to use Turkey as a buffer zone and dumping ground of migrants in the process of building “Fortress Europe”. It also ties to the perception that Europe is trying to shift the burden of migration onto Turkey (as opposed to sharing the burden) and that the EU is instrumentally using the accession process as a tool to “make good use” of Turkey.⁵⁶

Finally, the sixth content-oriented critique, inter-related with the two previous ones, points out the *faultiness of certain EU migration policy*. This is especially the case with the Schengen visa policy, about which Turkish counterparts emphasize the hypocrisy. The EU puts a strong emphasis on the benefits of a visa-free regime for the creation of a zone of stability and prosperity, as the EU did internally in the earlier years of the Community. However, it excludes third neighboring countries (including candidate countries) from this zone of stability and prosperity with a restrictive external visa policy.⁵⁷ Turkish citizens are particularly frustrated and vocal about the unfairness of the strict visa regime that the EU applied to them.⁵⁸ It is therefore unsurprising that Turkey would be reluctant to adopt a similar policy, hence partly explaining the “visa-openings” in which Turkey is involved. The fact that Turkey is positioned on the other side of the fence on this issue makes it particularly easy and convenient to identify the faultiness and critique EU policies.

Understanding these critiques helps us understand the scope, extent and limits of some of the reforms undertaken in Turkey in the realm of asylum and immigration. In particular, it explains why many reforms were undertaken,

istic”. Meeting with members of the Migration and Asylum Unit, October 2009, Ankara, Turkey. “Turkey sees the visa as a tool of soft power, as a way to reduce illegal migration. The EU, on the other hand, sees it as a security issue”. Meeting with an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 2009, Ankara, Turkey.

⁵⁶ [My translations.] “It is conditional that the EU eventually shares the financial burden with Turkey. But even so, the police here is reluctant and feeling that we are going to become the ‘refugee garbage of the EU’”. Meeting with a civil society activist, October 2009, Izmir, Turkey. “Now the EU is simply dumping people to Turkey”. Meeting with an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 2009, Ankara, Turkey. See also Kirişçi (2009).

⁵⁷ Even though, with the ENP, the EU signaled its intention to facilitate and/or liberalize visa requirements with neighboring countries, but without much success so far.

⁵⁸ See in particular the reports published by IKV (Economic Development Foundation) as one illustration of the amount of frustration and activism developed in regards to EU visa requirements towards Turkish citizens. IKV-228 “Visa Hotline Project” – Background Paper: Turkish Citizens’ Rights in the EU. IKV-231: “Visa Hotline Project” Project Report. IKV-232: Visa Policy of Member States and the EU Towards Turkish Nationals After Soysal. IKV-233: “Visa Hotline Project” – Survey Report.

while signing the readmission agreement and applying the Schengen visa system were resisted (because they present securitized approach to migration) and so is the lifting of the geographical limitation (because of the cost it would entail for Turkey).

But it also tells a particularly interesting story regarding the extent of Europeanization in Turkey. On one hand, it demonstrates a certain distance put between Turkey and Europe. Partly as a reaction to the perceived "othering" done by the Europeans, Turkish counterparts also perceive Europeans as "them" and are able to distinguish their practice and their norms from "ours" (Turkish ones). But on the other hand, it also demonstrates a deep appropriation of EU norms (regarding migrants' rights and the virtuous effects of open borders and integration), strong enough that Turkish counterparts are able to identify and criticize when European partners do not live up to their own standards. In that sense, and at least in the realm of migration policy, Turkish citizenship can claim the intent to "become more European than the Europeans".⁵⁹

This statement, "be more European than the Europeans", which can be heard repetitively in Turkey in many different contexts, is very ambivalent and should be understood in the framework of this ambivalence. It is indeed often associated with an acute sense of national pride, which seems contradictory since it does not affirm that "Turks are better than the Europeans" but links the proud feeling of being Turkish with Europeaness. It should also be understood as a "sweet avenging" against Europeans, as they have always upheld Turkish people as "inferiors". This statement is also rooted in a new feeling of confidence born out of Turkey's recent economic expansion and pro-active foreign policy, at a time when Europe seems to be confounded in a succession of crises. But more fundamentally, this statement is grounded in the late-19th/early-20th century association of Europe with the "standards of civilization", an evidently European discourse that also took root in the late Ottoman Empire and in the young Turkey. Later in the 20th century this association between Europe and the standards of civilization was transformed into the as-

⁵⁹ Meeting, Ministry of Interior, October 2009. See also: [My translations.] "There was a UNHCR program in Poland in 1998. Poland had no previous experience with asylum. We will not do like Poland, we are very experienced, and we will put into place a policy that is suitable to our country. We can do better than Poland. Already, what we put into place between 2003 and 2007 was done, even before the deadline was set. We internalized the norms and acted fast". Meeting with an official from the police department, October 2009, Ankara, Turkey. "The EU is making transactions with people, and thinks of migration at a political level. Our policy will be done according to our own standards, and the EU will see us as an example". Meeting with a police official, October 2009, Van, Turkey.

sociation of Europe (or the West) and democracy, to the extent that for many the term “Europeanization” equaled the meaning of “democratization”. In many ways, Turkey in the 21st century engaged in the process of decoupling these two terms, hence addressing a problem of cognitive dissonance that has plagued Turkish history whereby Turkey would both praise Europe for what it achieved, and despise Europe at the same time for what it had done to Turkey. Such a decoupling is not an easy process, however, hence it is characterized by contradictions and ambiguities.

This particular process in itself should be good news to Europe. Not because it means that Turkey will become a docile partner in negotiations – on the contrary, evidence seems to show that Turkey’s character will continue to be felt strongly at all stages of negotiations – but because, in the field of asylum and migration, Turkey is truly adhering to the positive norms defended by the EU. In many ways, Turkey is demonstrating that they are becoming “good but demanding Europeans”. The positive aspect of this is that this “critical Europeanization” of Turkey is working as a strong source of motivation for further reforms in Turkey. This comes at a time when Turkey feels rejected by the EU, and contrary to what had happened in a similar situation in the late 1990s, the rejection is not directly negatively impacting the process of reforms (at least in this area) – reforms can be undertaken even despite the ill-will of the EU.⁶⁰ Secondly, it is also good news for the EU, as Turkey can help the EU be more aware of some problematic policies, or play as a laboratory for new policies (as is the case with the visa policy now). This can explain why, for instance, the EU has so far refrained from openly criticizing Ankara’s visa policy even though it openly contradicts its EU bid European partners are curious to see how viable and replicable in less stable regions an open visa policy is. As for future reversals of the implementation of the Schengen visa system, high-ranking officials are not saying that they gave up on the Schengen visa system, but rather that it can be applied later, at which point there will, in principle, be a change in the visa-free agreements with most Middle Eastern countries. Some officials even believe that by then Turkey will have succeeded in convincing their European partners that a liberal external visa policy would also be beneficial to EU.⁶¹

⁶⁰ [My translation.] “Why the reforms now? Everything should be done in time, we became aware of the issue, and we created a new public opinion on the issue of migration. The timing of the EU does not matter so much anymore”. Meeting with members of the Migration and Asylum Unit, October 2009, Ankara, Turkey.

Nevertheless, this analysis should not overshadow the rest of the story. The phenomenon of "critical Europeanization" that has been identified here is a nascent phenomenon, a particularly interesting one that should be closely observed, but not a very broad and representative one. We have found evidence of this among a small segment of the population, and regarding a very particular issue (asylum and migration). The more general story seems to be one of a combination of traditional Europeanization with trends of resistance, which could be a source of concerns. However, given the background and interesting ambivalent relationship that Turkey has entertained with Europe, it might be that "critical Europeanization" is potentially a broader phenomenon that could explain and predict much more of Turkish behaviors in the future.

Conclusion

This chapter has identified the existence, in the field of asylum and migration, of a non-traditional form of Europeanization, referred to as "Critical Europeanization". On asylum and migration, Turkey has engaged in a formidable process of reform, testifying to its willingness to harmonize its regulation to the EU *acquis*. However, the rationale behind these reforms are rooted both in the acceptance of the desirability of many of the norms and policies and in the critique addressed to many EU policies towards immigration. On that note, the form of Europeanization that Turkey has engaged in is one that adopts the norms, internalizes them, and is able to use them confidently as standards to which they can uphold EU policies and demands towards Turkey, hence developing an openly critical voice towards the EU. It is a very reassuring phenomenon for the EU, who gained, admittedly, a difficult partner, but also one that can truly contribute to the EU construction. The fact that some segments of Turkish bureaucracy have internalized the idea of having a more systematic and rule-based policy toward migration will ease the path of reform in the future by decreasing the fear that EU demands will go against Turkish interests. But, the road will remain bumpy.

⁶¹ [My translation.] "Our visa policy is in contradiction to the EU policy? So what? When we get into the EU, then we will change our position. This is not at all a problem". Meeting with a high-ranking official in the Prime Minister's office, October 2008, Istanbul, Turkey.

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Turkey's New Draft Law on Asylum: What to Make of It?

Kemal Kirişçi

Introduction

As Turkey becomes increasingly recognized as an immigration and transit country for irregular migrants,¹ Turkey's asylum policies are receiving growing attention from the public as well as the international community. Recently, two conferences organized by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in January 2011 and International Organization for Migration (IOM) in May 2011 with local partners attracted a large attendance composed of academics, civil society representatives, diplomats, and most importantly, officials. This interest is partly triggered by the release, in January 2011, of Turkey's first draft asylum law.² This draft law is the product of an unusually transparent process of law-making by Turkish standards that started back in late 2008. If the law is indeed adopted by the Parliament, Turkey will finally have a legal framework extending protection to asylum seekers and refugees together with an accompanying physical as well as administrative infrastructure. This will constitute a major break from past practice. This development also occurs at a time when Turkey's accession negotiations are fast approaching a dead end. Yet, the head of the team that prepared the draft law acknowledges the role of the European Union (EU) and especially notes that the law is a step in the direction of meeting Turkey's promises in its *National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis* (NAAP) as well as the *Action Plan on Asylum and Migration*. The importance of preparing for accession negotiations on Chapter 24 that covers EU acquis in this area is also cited as a reason for the preparation of the draft law.

¹ Tolay (forthcoming), Paçacı Elitok/Straubhaar (2011), İçduygu/Kirişçi (2009), Kirişçi (2007 a).

² Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu Tasarısı Taslağı.

The draft law brings a significant number of improvements to current Turkish practice and would clearly ensure a better-quality protection for asylum seekers in Turkey. However, strikingly the law stops short of lifting the geographical limitation with which Turkey has been a party to the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Accordingly, Turkey is not obliged to extend refugee status to asylum seekers coming to Turkey as a result of “events occurring outside Europe”. The lifting of the limitation is one if not the major condition that Turkey has to fulfill for EU membership. The EU has enjoyed considerable influence on the transformation of Turkish policy on a wide range of issues with respect to domestic politics and foreign policy. Turkey introduced dramatic reforms to meet the Copenhagen political criteria and transformed its foreign policy on Cyprus by supporting the United Nations Plan to reunite the island to be able to start accession negotiations. Since then reforms in relation to a range of chapters that are being negotiated and have yet to be opened continues. Hence, against the background of these reforms it becomes puzzling as to why the draft law stops short of meeting a major condition of the EU. The EU, through consecutive *Accession Partnerships*, *Strategy Papers* and *Progress Reports*, has unequivocally made it clear to the Turkish side that for the completion of the harmonization process the geographical limitation would have to be lifted. This paper will argue that as much as the EU has impacted the process of the preparation of the new draft law on asylum, this has been a partial one and that the role of European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the UNHCR need to be taken into account, too. The UNHCR has had a very long-standing relationship with the Turkish government and then also with Turkish civil society. This relationship has contributed to a slow but sure process of socialization of Turkey into the norms and rules of an international refugee regime. Against this background of socialization, the rulings of the ECtHR especially in the course of the last couple of years have played a critical role in creating a climate of urgency to reform Turkey’s asylum policy and practice. The paper is divided into three sections. The first section offers a brief description of the Turkish asylum system and its evolution. The second section discusses the relative roles of the EU, the ECtHR and the UNHCR in this reform process and the adoption of the draft law. The paper concludes by suggesting that, as much as the draft law is welcomed and is especially promising, as it suggests an important transformation in hearts and minds of Turkish officials, the acid test will only come if the draft law is indeed adopted and starts to be implemented. Even then it will be difficult to ascertain the role of the EU, as

the principal demand of the EU, the “lifting of the geographical limitation”, will remain unmet and is likely to stay unmet as long as Turkey's prospects of membership remains grim.

Turkey's Asylum Policy and Practice

In the West, Turkey is traditionally known as a country of emigration. Yet, Turkey, like its predecessor the Ottoman Empire, has long been a country of immigration especially for Muslim ethnic groups, ranging from Bosnians to Pomaks and Tatars, as well as Turks from the Balkans and to a lesser extent from the Caucasus and Central Asia. Between 1923 and 1997, more than 1.6 million immigrants came and settled in Turkey.³ Furthermore, after the Nazi takeover in Germany and then during the Second World War, there were many Jews who fled to Turkey and then resettled in Palestine. There were also many who fled the German-occupied Balkans for Turkey and returned to their homelands after the war had ended. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey has also become a country receiving an increasing number of irregular workers and immigrants from Balkan countries and former Soviet Republics as well as Iran, Northern Iraq and Africa. These often include people that overstay their visa and work illegally. Turkey has also been a country of asylum, and is among the original signatories of the 1951 Geneva Convention. However, Turkey is today among a very small number of countries that still maintains a geographical limitation to the agreement's applicability as defined in Article 1, b(1)(a) of the Convention.⁴ Accordingly, Turkey does not grant refugee status to asylum seekers coming from outside Europe but has to extend temporary protection, and hence maintains a two-tiered asylum policy.

The first tier of this policy is centered on Europe and is deeply rooted in Turkey's role as a Western ally neighboring the Soviet Union during the Cold War. During that period, in close cooperation with the UNHCR, Turkey received refugees from the Communist Bloc countries in Europe, including the Soviet Union. Such refugees, during their stay in Turkey, enjoyed all the rights provided for in the 1951 Convention. However, only a very small number were allowed to stay in Turkey, often as a result of marriages with Turkish nationals.

³ For details, see Kirişçi (1996 a).

⁴ Monaco, Congo and Madagascar are the only remaining countries signatory to the Convention that continue to maintain a “geographical limitation”, Joanne (2005).

Current Turkish legislation limits immigration a full-fledged refugee status with the integration option only to persons of “Turkish descent or culture”. Hence, the overwhelming majority of the refugees were resettled out of Turkey. Although it is very difficult to obtain accurate statistics on their numbers, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) has indicated that some 13,500 asylum seekers benefited from the protection of the 1951 Convention between 1970 and 1996. Statistics for previous years are not available. In addition, approximately 20,000 Bosnians were granted temporary asylum in Turkey during hostilities in the former Yugoslavia between 1992 and 1995. Some of the refugees were housed in a refugee camp near the Bulgarian border, while many went on to stay with relatives in large cities such as Istanbul and Bursa. Since the signing of the Dayton Peace Plan in 1995, many of these refugees have been steadily returning to Bosnia. In 1998 and 1999, approximately 17,000 Kosovars came to Turkey to seek protection from the strife in their ancestral homeland. The majority has returned. There are also an undetermined number of Chechens residing in Turkey in a somewhat a legally grey zone. Most importantly, in 1989 more than 310,000 Bulgarian nationals of Pomak and Turkish origin fled to Turkey en masse. More than 240,000 of them were naturalized. However, the regime change in Bulgaria and membership to the EU culminated with many of the refugees returning or taking up dual nationality. Beyond these major mass movements of refugees Turkey has received only small numbers of applications from individuals coming from Europe. Their numbers from 1995 to 2010 add up only to 289 applications out of which just 30 have received a long-term residence permit (*daimi ikamet*). However, there are a greater number of asylum seekers such as Chechens from the Russian Federation and some Central Asian republics who have been discouraged from formally applying for asylum and instead been allowed to stay on in Turkey sometimes under precarious conditions.

The second tier of Turkey’s asylum policy deals with persons from outside Europe. The new policy emerged in 1980s in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution, and subsequent instability in the Middle East, Africa and Southeast Asia. Upheaval in these areas led to a steady increase in the number of asylum seekers coming from outside Europe. For a long time, the government allowed the UNHCR considerable leeway to temporarily shelter these asylum seekers with the tacit understanding that they would be resettled out of Turkey if the UNHCR recognized them as refugees, and that those whose claims were rejected would be deported. However, the growth in the number of illegal entries

into Turkey and in the number of rejected asylum seekers stranded in Turkey strained this practice. The situation was also aggravated by the 1988 and 1991 mass influxes of Kurdish refugees amounting to almost half a million. Officials were also concerned that among these asylum seekers were militants of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan – PKK) trying to enter Turkey from Northern Iraq.

It was against such a background that the government introduced a decree, the Asylum Regulation, in November 1994.⁵ The Regulation became the first piece of legislation at the national level and ambitiously aimed to bring status determination under the control of the Turkish government. It was primarily drafted with national security concerns and hence introduced strict regulations governing access to asylum procedures with little regard for the rights of asylum seekers and refugees.⁶ It is not surprising that the practice that evolved in the first few years of the application of the Regulation attracted serious and concerted criticism from Western governments, as well as major international human rights advocacy groups.⁷ Critics argued that Turkey was undermining the rights of asylum seekers and refugees by denying them access to asylum procedures or failing to provide them adequate protection by violating the principle of *non-refoulement*. The Regulation had introduced the requirement that asylum applications be filed within maximum five days of entry into Turkey. The rule was often interpreted strictly and applications were refused on the grounds of being late. Such refusals were often followed by deportations. There were also cases of *bona fide* refugees recognized by the UNHCR being deported on the grounds that these persons had never actually filed applications with Turkish authorities and were in violation of the regulation. This led to frequent conflicts between Turkish authorities and the UNHCR that continued to receive applications and assess them on their merits independently of the provisions of the Asylum Regulation.

However, the situation began somewhat to improve by the late 1990s. Interestingly, a good part of these improvements began to occur before the EU actually engaged Turkey as a candidate country for membership and where primarily encouraged by the UNHCR. There were a number of reforms. Most importantly, in 1997 the way to judicial appeal was opened when two local ad-

⁵ See Official Gazette (1994).

⁶ Kirişçi (1996 b), Kirişçi (2007 b, pp. 170–183), Frelick (1997 a), Zieck (2010).

⁷ For example, see the U. S. Department of State: Turkey Country Report on Human Rights for 1996 and Frelick (1997 b).

ministrative courts ruled against the deportation orders on two Iranian refugees recognized by the UNHCR. These refugees had originally entered the country illegally and had not filed in their applications with the Turkish authorities in time. The Ministry of Interior (MOI) had ruled for their deportation under the provisions of the 1994 Asylum Regulation. The MOI's appeal to a higher court against the decision of the lower courts was struck out, too. The UNHCR played an important role in encouraging and supporting the asylum seekers to approach the courts and try the judicial appeal process. This was also accompanied by an ECtHR ruling (*Jabari v Turkey*)⁸ against the deportation of an asylum seeker on the grounds of the provisions of the 1994 Regulation and that, if this order was carried out, this would constitute a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights. These judicial developments played a central role in getting the government to amend the Regulation in 1999 by initially extending the time limit to ten days.⁹

Another indirect reform of the Turkish asylum policy came through the introduction of training seminars initially for the Foreigners Department of the Police. The first of these took place in September 1998 and involved officials that directly dealt with asylum seekers and refugees. These early seminars organized by the UNHCR were the first of their kind. A steady stream of officials went through these seminars assisting the gradual accumulation of expertise accompanied with a process of socialization. This process significantly improved the officials' understanding of the issues involved and helped them become familiar with international standards. These seminars also contributed to a significant change in the attitudes of many of these officials towards asylum seekers and refugees. The training programs were gradually expanded to include other officials such as judges, prosecutors and gendarmes, as well. Gendarmes are often the very first people that asylum seekers would encounter in border areas. Awareness programs to differentiate between illegal immigrants and asylum seekers were introduced to the training of the Gendarmerie. Programs were also held with the Bar Associations for prosecutors and judges focusing on refugee law. The police and gendarmes normally have to report immigrants or foreigners illegally present in Turkey to the local courts. Hence, prosecutors and judges play a critical role in whether such persons are deported or not. The seminars in these respects were critical in raising

⁸ Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights (2000).

⁹ Official Gazette (1999).


awareness of a body of law and practice to help distinguish between illegal immigrants and asylum seekers and Turkey's legal obligations under international law.

A parallel development was the growing cooperation between non-governmental organizations and the government. An increasing number of non-governmental organizations ranging from the Turkish branch of Amnesty International to the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) began to cooperate with the government in organizing and running some of the above training programs for officials but also seminars for lawyers and human rights activists. The UNHCR branch office in Ankara actually took the initiative to encourage the establishment of the first Turkish Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), the Association of Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants, in 1995 dealing solely with refugee-related issues. The UNHCR also instituted the practice of organizing seminars with first human rights associations and then began to include also NGOs focusing on social issues such as women's and children's rights as well as local NGOs extending humanitarian assistance to asylum seekers and refugees. Bar Associations in big cities such as Ankara, Istanbul and İzmir, as well as some border towns, also developed various support programs geared to providing legal assistance for asylum seekers as well as training programs on asylum law and human rights of asylum seekers to their members. More recently, a group of NGOs interested especially in the human-rights dimension of asylum formed the Platform of Refugee Rights (Mülteci Hakları Koordinasyonu). In due course, some of these NGOs also developed an expertise in filing complaints with local courts as well as the ECtHR. Actually, they did not hesitate to instrumentalize the ECtHR to put pressure on the government for reform.

More importantly and in a most fascinating manner the close cooperation between the UNHCR and the Turkish authorities culminated in a situation where the UNHCR came to perform *de facto* refugee status determination on behalf of Turkey. Even though the Asylum Regulation identified the MOI as the body responsible for status determination, MOI officials came to rely increasingly on the judgment of the UNHCR. They were quite content to go along with UNHCR decisions as long as the asylum seekers were also registered with them and eventually those who were recognized as refugees did get resettled out of Turkey. The occasional differences were usually sorted out through informal consultations. Training seminars and close cooperation also enabled the UNHCR to gain access to groups of irregular migrants that got appre-

hended by the Turkish authorities, particularly in border regions of Turkey. According to Turkish government statistics there were approximately 3,500 to 4,000 asylum applicants filed a year between 1995 and December 2008 while for the last three years the average has gone up to about 9,000 (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Asylum Application in Turkey (1995–2010)



The figures include asylum seekers from Europe * and outside Europe **.

* Includes Albania, Belgium, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Germany, Georgia, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Romania, Switzerland, Ukraine and Yugoslavia.

** Includes Algeria, Bangladesh, Birmania (Myanmar), Burma, Burundi, China, Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Malaysia, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United States of America, Yemen and Zaire.

Source: Data obtained from the Foreigners Department of MOI. Data current as of 10.1.2011.

An overwhelming majority of the asylum seekers are from Iran and Iraq. During this period there were a total of more than almost 77,400 asylum applications and just above 39,000 of them were recognized as refugees (see Table 1).

Table 1: Applications under 1994 Regulation in Turkey (1995–2010)

Country	Applications	Accepted	Rejected	Pending	Undetermined Status
		cases	cases	cases	
Iraq	30,342	15,647	5,368	6,720	2,607
Iran	35,468	21,784	3,723	7,434	2,527
Russia	99	15	52	14	18
Afghanistan	5,947	571	368	4,912	96
Uzbekistan	402	96	75	189	42
Azerbaijan	55	3	25	16	11
Other*	144	58	64	11	11
Other**	4,973	994	477	3,248	254
Total	77,430	39,168	10,152	22,544	5,566

* Includes Albania, Armenia, Belgium, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Germany, Georgia, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Switzerland, Ukraine and Yugoslavia.

** Includes Angola, Algeria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Birmania (Myanmar), Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, China, Congo, Cuba, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mongolia, Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Somalia, Stateless, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United States of America, West Sahara, Yemen and Zaire.

Source: Data obtained from the Foreigners Department of MOI. Data current as of 10.1.2011.

The overwhelming majority of the recognized refugees were resettled out of Turkey mostly to the United States and Canada but also a number of EU countries (Table 2).¹⁰

¹⁰ The figure of refugees and resettled refugees has to be interpreted cautiously, as the grand figures included refugees with applications pre-dating 1995.

Table 2: Resettlement out of Turkey by Country of Origin and Country of Settlement

Country of Origin	Country of Settlement						
	Canada	USA	Oceania	Other Europe	Scandinavia	Others	Total
Afghanistan	192	258	3	17	89		559
Iran	4,841	10,061	2,921	269	3,667	12	21,771
Iraq	1,043	10,335	1,788	689	1,732	33	15,620
Africa	436	326	1	7	55		825
North Africa	15				1		16
Asia		34			13		145
Middle East	74	4	10	7	6	1	102
Bosnia Herzegovina		45		1			46
Total	6,699	21,063	4,723	990	5,563	46	39,084

Africa:	Angola, Burundi, Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan
North Africa:	Guinea, Mauritania, Morocco, Libya, Tunisia
Asia:	Burma, China, India, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Sri Lanka
Middle East:	Jordan, Palestine, Syria, Egypt, Yemen
Oceania:	Australia, New Zealand
Other Europe:	Austria, Britain, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, Ukraine, Greece, Poland, Czech Republic, Belgium
Scandinavia:	Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden
Others:	Azerbaijan, Bosnia Herzegovina, Dubai, Indonesia, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates

Source: Data obtained from the Foreigners Department of MOI. Data current as of 10.1.2011.

EU Rule Adoption and Transforming the Turkish Asylum System

It is extremely difficult to judge the impact and the timing of the EU's role in this process of transformation. This is the case because the EU came on to the scene at a time when a "paradigmatic shift" was occurring among Turkish officials, primarily a product of the UNHCR's long and patient engagement of Tur-

key. This was a shift from a paradigm that framed the issue of asylum policy from a primarily “national security” perspective to one that increasingly emphasized human rights and international refugee law. The role of the EU has been more visible in respect to the setting of a formal agenda and a time-table for eventual “rule adoption” for Turkish policy. In this respect, the consecutive *Accession Partnership* documents of 2001 and subsequent ones clearly induced Turkish officials to recognize that at some point the lifting of the geographical limitation would have to take place and that Turkey would have to adopt structural and institutional as well as legislative reforms. In 2002 the government formed a Task Force that brought together officials from various agencies, possibly for the first time in their history, to actually discuss what needed to be done to meet the conditions set by these documents. These documents also broadened the scope of the ongoing informal debate between officials directly dealing with asylum on the one hand and academics and experts as well as representatives of non-governmental organizations and the UNHCR on the other.

The EU's High Level Working Group (HLWG) on Turkey did also make funds and experts available for training seminars specifically on asylum.¹¹ These seminars were critical in the words of a UNHCR official in helping to develop a “common language” between Turkish officials and their EU counterparts.¹² Furthermore, the adoption of the NAAP was also critical given its acceptance to lift the geographical limitation despite the conditions it set. However, more important in this respect was the “twinning project” that the British and Danish governments supported. This project not only enabled Turkish officials possibly for the first time in their careers to work for months on a daily basis with their EU counterparts but the exercise also helped Turkish authorities to prepare the *Action Plan on Asylum and Migration* that was subsequently adopted by the government in March 2005.¹³ This document in great detail identified both national legislation and the EU *acquis* on asylum and migration. It also laid out in broad outlines the tasks and time-table that Turkey intended to follow to prepare Turkey for the development of a fully fledged national status-determination system, lift the geographical limitation and adopt EU directives on asylum and migration in general.

¹¹ For a detailed analysis of the HLWG of the EU, see Selm (2002).

¹² Exchange of email messages with a UNHCR official in Ankara.

¹³ The Turkish National Action Plan for the Adoption of the EU *Acquis* in the Field of Asylum and Migration was officially adopted by the Turkish government on March 25, 2005.

The renewed *Accession Partnership* adopted in January 2006 subsequent to the beginning of accession talks with Turkey in October 2005 set a medium period (the end of 2009) as the deadline for the completion of the “rule adoption” exercise and the lifting of the geographical limitation. The document also expected Turkey, in the area of asylum, to make visible progress in setting up reception centers for asylum seekers, to develop a country of origin information system, to introduce national asylum legislation and to set up a specialized administrative unit to deal with asylum and status determination. In the meantime, the screening process concerning Chapter 24 dealing with asylum was completed in 2007. The report of the Commission concerning the outcome of the screening process highlighted the gaps in the area of asylum and considers Turkey not to be compliant with the EU *acquis*.¹⁴ However, the report to this day has still not been formally adopted as Cyprus and France continue to block the opening of accession negotiations on Chapter 24. Naturally, these developments aggravate doubts about the EU’s credibility and deeply influence Turkish public policy makers’ cost calculation.

Turkish decision-makers have been fully aware that previous candidate countries had to go through a similar “rule-adoption” process. They are also aware that there were a number of countries that had to lift their geographical limitations such as Hungary, Latvia and Malta and that the first two countries did so well before their accession negotiations started.¹⁵ They also realize that they have to follow suit. However, they have faced a major dilemma provoked by their mistrust of the EU’s credibility in respect to the ultimate “reward” of membership. The greatest nightmare scenario for them is one in which they would find themselves lifting the geographical limitation without Turkey’s membership being taken seriously by the EU. Turkish officials are also conscious and deeply affected by the European public resistance to Turkish membership. They also have firsthand knowledge of the experience of their counterparts in some of the new member countries against which they can compare their own dilemmas and “cost-benefit” calculation matrices. They are deeply aware that their counterparts, when making a critical decision, were pretty much confident that eventually membership would take place. A high-level MOI official involved in asylum issues for almost a decade and an advocate of the reform of the Turkish asylum system put his deep concerns pretty

¹⁴ European Commission Enlargement (2010).

¹⁵ These countries maintained their “geographical limitation” until 1998, 1997 and 2002 respectively.

bluntly. This official during a visit to Hungary to learn about the Hungarian experience of lifting their geographical limitation and putting into place a fully fledged asylum system had actually asked his Hungarian counterpart how they were able to take on financially and politically very costly decisions. The Turkish official reflected on how “his heart sank” when his Hungarian counterpart simply said that this was never a major concern for them because they were always sure that they would become a member of the EU at the end.¹⁶

Another issue that marks the cost calculation of Turkish officials is burden-sharing. Owing to its geographical location, Turkish officials are conscious that Turkey risks becoming a buffer zone or a dumping ground for the EU's unwanted asylum seekers and refugees. The adoption of the current *acquis* would make Turkey a typical “first country of asylum” responsible for status determination with membership and a “safe third country of first asylum” before then.¹⁷ This raises considerable concerns among officials in terms of the economic, social and political implications. Turkish officials will expect to see burden-sharing mechanisms that would go beyond what the current Refugee Fund can offer.¹⁸ Traditionally, refugees have been resettled out of Turkey. Turkish officials want to see an arrangement that would allow this practice to continue for some transitional period. However, the current *acquis* does not allow for such a practice.¹⁹ This fear of becoming a buffer zone is also aggravated by Turkish officials' perception of a growing EU tendency to externalize its asylum policies and its efforts to create a “fortress Europe”. Ironically, these officials learn about the details of these policies from the very experts and representatives of non-governmental organizations that they encounter during training seminars and conferences. In other words, a Europe that tries to complicate if not deny access to asylum seekers to reach the EU is not setting a good example for Turkey in terms of harmonization and credibility.

Nevertheless, the impact of the transformation that has been going on in the area of asylum over the last decade had been nudging Turkey towards a position that is closer to the one that is more in parallel with EU demands. In June

¹⁶ The visit took place between May 22–26, 2006 as a part of a project supported by the British government and the International Catholic Migration Commission.

¹⁷ Council of the European Union (2003).

¹⁸ Commission of the European Communities Commission (1999), Council of the European Union (2000).

¹⁹ The issue of burden-sharing has been one of the difficult challenges that member states faced in developing a common asylum policy; see Thielemann (2003, pp. 253–273), Thielemann (2005, pp. 807–824). This challenge has been greater in the case of candidate countries; see Byrne (2003, pp. 336–358).

2006 the Department, responsible for asylum matters, circulated an internal regulation²⁰ (Genelge) that, according to a high-ranking UNHCR official, “pleasantly surprised them”.²¹ The document basically sends instructions to the police in general to speed and facilitate the implementation of tasks laid out in the *Action Plan*. In its introduction, it recognizes that the regulation aims to meet the standards mentioned in the 1951 Geneva Convention and the EU *acquis*. It introduces very specific measures that aim to improve access to the asylum system and ensure continuity for the trained personnel in their current position rather than to risk being moved to other irrelevant tasks as part of the standard rotation system. It lays out for the first time rules concerning the process of identity-determination of asylum seekers as well as clearly states that asylum seekers may well enter the country without identity and that this cannot be held against them.²² Furthermore, this internal regulation also identifies the procedures to be followed to determine the outcome of an asylum application and appeal procedures for rejected cases. It also incorporates elements from current EU directives concerning country of origin information, provision of translation facilities and a positive interview environment. Lastly, it also underlines that refugees and asylum seekers having a valid residence permit would be entitled to a work permit, too, and it provides for the granting of “secondary” or “subsidiary” protection short of full refugee status. A close reading of the Regulation reveals that the authors of the Regulation benefitted closely from the EU’s “Qualifications” Directive, betraying one of the most conspicuous manifestations of “rule adoption” thus far.

However, this Regulation did not bring a major improvement in the situation of asylum seekers in Turkey. At least two reasons played a role in this outcome. Firstly, the enthusiasm to reform and adapt Turkish practice and policy to EU norms reflected in the NAAP and the *Action Plan* fizzled out as EU-Turkish relations began to deteriorate from late 2006 onwards.

The mood to resist “conditionality” and “rule adoption” was captured in a very telling manner by a high-ranking Turkish diplomat at a meeting in September 2007 with UNHCR officials. He made references to the Negotiation Framework and noted that “if the EU aims to keep the negotiations open-

²⁰ İçişleri Bakanlığı (2006).

²¹ Interview with a high-ranking UNHCR official.

²² This is extremely fascinating because the principle that asylum seekers cannot be denied access to asylum procedures on the ground of false papers or no identity papers was a point that would come up regularly in the context of the discussion of the 1951 Geneva Convention.

ended so we shall also keep developments open-ended". He added the importance that Turkey attributes to "reciprocity" and noted that during the pre-accession period Turkey would adopt those rules and regulations that are deemed to benefit Turkey. Turkey on the other hand would keep an "open-ended" approach to the adoption of policies that do not offer mutual benefit. He gave the lifting of the geographical limitation as an example of an area where Turkey would be reluctant to adopt EU *acquis* as long as uncertainty over Turkish membership prevails.²³

A second reason stemmed from the situation deteriorating in Iraq and also in Somali resulting in a sudden and significant increase in the number of asylum seekers coming to Turkey. This led to the security-oriented approach in Turkey to make itself felt again. One important consequence of this was an increase in cases of *refoulement* as well as a growth in complaints about access to asylum procedures. A growing number of non-governmental organizations, including the Turkish branch of Helsinki Citizens' Assembly, as well as the Human Rights Watch (HRW), became critical of government policies and published reports that attracted considerable public attention.²⁴ This was also followed in 2009 by a Council of Europe report prepared by Thomas Hammerberg raising very specific criticisms ranging from the practice of obliging asylum seekers to pay residence permit fees to inhumane conditions in detention centers. Most importantly, in 2009 the ECtHR in its decision *Abdolkhani and Karimnia* found Turkey in violation of a number of articles of European Human Rights Convention (EHRC) resulting from attempts to deport two Iranian refugees to Iran and for denying them access to contest deportation decisions. The ECtHR also sentenced Turkey to pay a substantial sum of reparations to the complainants. Furthermore, the Court concluded that Turkey failed to provide effective remedy opening the way for accepting applications without seeing the exhaustion of domestic paths to remedy. This decision became a turning point. During the period from 1991 to 2008 there had been 13 cases that were taken to the Court and only one had led to a conviction against Turkey. However, the case of *Abdolkhani and Karimnia* was followed by twelve additional cases culminating in rulings of convictions and most accompanied with demands for compensation to be paid to the complainants.

²³ Information obtained from the diplomat and third parties present at the meeting.

²⁴ Helsinki Yurttaşlar Derneği (2007), Human Rights Watch (2008).

The growing criticisms and the rulings of the ECtHR had very visible effects. Firstly, the Minister of the Interior, Beşir Atalay, soon after the appearance of the HRW report, appointed in November 2008 two special inspectors to investigate the allegations in this report and also why commitments made to the EU in the context of the harmonization process were not being met. The investigation culminated in a major personnel change in the Department of Foreigners within the police while a new office, the Migration Unit tasked to prepare a draft law on asylum, was set up within the MOI. The office in an effort to address some of the more immediate practical complaints and criticisms initiated the adoption of a series of new regulations. The first of these regulations introduced the possibility to waive resident permit fees for asylum seekers and refugees as well as measures to improve access to asylum procedures and social services.²⁵ This was followed by two additional regulations introduced by the Social Services and Child Protection Agency as well as the Ministry of Education extending their services to asylum seekers and refugees.²⁶ Officials also recognized that ECtHR rulings were “raining on Turkey” and that “the current situation is becoming untenable”.²⁷ Turkey did not have any other choice but to reform its asylum policies.

It is against such a background that a draft law was prepared and sent to the Prime Minister’s Office in January 2011. This is a law that addresses practically all the issues raised in the most recent *Accession Partnership* of 2008²⁸ as well as the “informal” screening report mentioned above short of lifting the geographical limitation. It incorporates the current EU *acquis* and foresees the setting up of a separate authority to deal with asylum and other migration-related issues including provisions to improve the integration of refugees. Nevertheless, there is a consensus shared by academics, experts and UNHCR officials that the draft law and the manner in which this draft has been prepared signify a major transformation in Turkey’s asylum policy. It is not surprising that the

²⁵ İçişleri Bakanlığı (2010).

²⁶ Sosyal Hizmetler ve Çocuk Esirgeme Kurumu (2010).

²⁷ Remarks shared with the author on a number of occasions, in particular during the MiReKoç conference on “Critical Reflections in Migration Research: Views from the South and the East”, October 7–9, 2009, Koç University, Istanbul.

²⁸ The Accession Partnership calls for making “progress in the preparations for the adoption of a comprehensive asylum law in line with the *acquis* including the establishment of an asylum authority” (Council of the European Union [2008, p. 13]) under “short term priorities” and for continuing “with alignment with the *acquis* in the field of asylum, in particular through the lifting of the geographical limitation to the Geneva Convention and through strengthening protection, social support and integration measures for refugees” (Ibid, [p. 17]), under “Medium Term Priorities”.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres became the first ever High Commissioner to visit Turkey in November 2010. He used the occasion both to praise the government for an open consultation process it adopted in preparing the law and for drafting a law that enlarges the protection space for asylum seekers.²⁹ The UNHCR representative in Ankara stressed the similar remarks during the opening of a conference on the “Tradition of Asylum in Turkey”. Furthermore, the draft law offers provisions to prevent the danger of deportation of any person to countries where their life may be in danger or where they risk being tortured as well as provisions that aim to ensure the improvement of detention conditions and access to judicial review.

Hence, the adoption of this draft law needs to be seen as a function of as much the socialization effect of the UNHCR and ECtHR on Turkey as harmonization with EU *acquis*. This was strikingly evident when the head of the Migration Unit but also the permanent secretary of the MOI during a UNHCR organized local conference in Ankara in January 2011 emphasized in their speeches the importance in addressing the human rights of asylum seekers. Both officials argued that the draft law represented a shift in mentality away from a purely security- (asayiş) driven approach to one where the focus would be on human rights. They also added that the law also reflected a desire “to do things for ourselves (kendimiz için yaptık) because that it is only such a law that would live up (yakışır) to a Turkey that has become the 16th largest economy in the world”. Undoubtedly, these are words that do represent political considerations and a desire to curry favor with the public and international community. The conference was after all organized by the UNHCR, was attended by the diplomatic corps in Ankara and was held just before the first-ever visit of a United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to Turkey. However, this kind of language was absent in the discourse of high-level officials previously and it is also highly unusual that Turkish bureaucrats will speak, even implicitly, critically of a previous practice in front of a public audience attended by foreign officials. For someone who has observed the asylum scene in Turkey since 1989, I believe this transformation in language can at least partly be attributed to a greater sense of associating oneself with the broader international community dealing with asylum issues.

²⁹ Today's Zaman (2010).

Conclusion

This paper focused on the adoption of a draft law on asylum that aims to reform Turkey's asylum policy and practice. The law would open the way to Turkey meeting most of the requirements set by the EU short of the lifting of the geographical limitation to the 1951 Geneva Convention. This is a stark reminder of the limits of EU "conditionality". Otherwise a strong inducer of reform, in the case of Turkey it is problematic. EU-Turkish relations have reached a point where on the Turkish side the expectation of eventual membership occurring is low. Asylum actually belongs to a chapter that is currently blocked from being opened by the vetoes of a number of member states. Hence, the paper argued that at least part of the explanation for reform lies in the influence that the UNHCR and the ECtHR have enjoyed. In the case of the UNHCR, this influence has been spread across almost two decades during which the UNHCR contributed to the socialization of Turkish officials and civil-society representations to the norms of international refugee law. In the case of ECtHR, the influence is much more recent and more of a direct one. The authors of the draft law openly acknowledge this influence by referring to the rulings of the Court against Turkey and the need to respond to it. It will actually be interesting to follow the fate of this draft law and see what happens when the legislative process starts. The ultimate test of where the balance among these three institutions as inducers of reform lie will surely become much clearer once the law becomes operational and starts to be implemented. The ultimate test, however, will still depend on the lifting of the geographical limitation and that seems unlikely to happen unless the prospects of EU membership for Turkey become credible.

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Is Migration Feminized?

A Gender- and Ethnicity-Based Review of the Literature on
Irregular Migration to Turkey

Gülay Toksöz and Çağla Ünlütürk Ulutaş

Turkey today is both a sending and a receiving country in migration. In the 1960s and 1970s, there were flows of mass migration from Turkey to various European countries, including Germany in the first place, to cover the labor shortage then existing in these countries. When the countries of Western Europe stopped receiving migrant workers, the direction of migrant workers from Turkey shifted to oil-rich Middle Eastern countries and, starting from the 1990s, to the Commonwealth of Independent States including the Russian Federation. Meanwhile, Turkey encountered the immigration of ethnic Turks from Bulgaria in the late 1980s as a result of political pressures there and irregular migration inflows swelled from various countries nearby in the period after 1990. While some irregular migrants traveling and/or staying without satisfying specific requirements related to migration eventually target Western countries after temporary stays in Turkey, there are others who come to find jobs to work specifically in Turkey.

There are three fundamental patterns of development that trigger irregular migration. The first is the radical transformation that the Eastern Bloc countries underwent in the 1990s, which led to the collapse of hitherto existing economic, political and social regimes. It was followed by a transition to a market economy, accompanied by unemployment and poverty as major drivers of migration. Rigid migration regulations introduced by the EU countries closed the doors to new migrants, redirected people to look for other countries where they can find jobs and consequently Turkey became a center of attraction for these

people with her employment opportunities in a rather large, informal economy. The second is the fact that irregular migrants originating from various Asian and African countries who have no chance of being legally accepted as migrants by EU countries use Turkey as a transit country while they wait for opportunities to move ahead to Europe. Migrants in this group as well move to informal sectors for subsistence during their stay in Turkey. The same also holds true for the third group of migrants who flee from some oppressive regimes in the Middle East and reach Turkey for seeking asylum.¹ While their motives for arrival may differ, the common characteristic of all irregular migrants is their participation in informal labor markets either for short or longer term. Migrants' participation in labor markets that are structured on the basis of gender and ethnicity certainly takes different forms in regard to sex, and migrants encounter different working conditions as well as different forms of exploitation and exclusion depending on their countries of origin.

By focusing on the state of migrants coming to Turkey for employment and within the framework of existing literature on migration, the purpose of this paper is to seek an answer to the question of the extent to which the global phenomenon of migration is feminized. The increasing share of female migrants is true for Turkey, and, while seeking an answer, we hope to shed light on the comparative employment status of males and females from different ethnic origins. Though remaining scarce for some time, studies on labor migration in Turkey and working conditions of migrants as actors in this process of migration have recently been increasing. What is interesting to note at this point is that these studies mostly focus on migrant women in domestic and care services.

Labor Migration to Turkey

Leaving aside a tiny minority with legal permission to stay and work in Turkey, migrants in Turkey largely consist of those who work illicitly without any official permission. The status of those staying and working legally in Turkey is provided for by the Law No. 4817 (2003) of Permission of Employment Granted to Foreigners. According to the provisions of this law, the Ministry of labor and Social Security (MoLSS) examines applications and, considering the needs of labor market, grants permission to the employment of expatriates given that domestic laborers cannot be found for any particular area of employment. Ac-

¹ İçduygu (2006, p. 2).

According to information available in regard to those employed on the basis of permission, newly granted and extended permissions increased in the period 2003–2009, jumping from 7,302 in 2004 to 14,023 in 2009.² Of the countries of origin of these migrants with work permission, China leads the list with 18.4 %, followed by the Russian Federation (11.2 %). The combined share of EU countries in total is 20 %. Looking at the distribution of work permits granted in 2009 by fields of employment, we see that those from China constitute the largest group as private company employees. It is known that Chinese firms engaged in mining in particular bring along their employees. This is further confirmed by the fact that Zonguldak is among the top five provinces in terms of the number of work permits granted to migrants. Migrants from the Russian Federation and Ukraine, on the other hand, make up the bulk of permits granted in the context of tourism. As for those coming from the EU countries, they mostly enjoy permits granted for academic purposes. As for gender distribution of work permits, males constitute the majority with 61.6 % while the share of females is 38.4 %.³

Since the legislation in effect envisages the granting of work permits to expatriates only in case domestic laborers are not available, the number of permits granted is extremely limited. A large part of migrants employed in Turkey work informally for unqualified jobs that can be taken up by domestic laborers. Though origin countries of irregular migrant workers may change in the course of time, these are mainly the republics of the former Soviet Union or Eastern Bloc countries. These include Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Migrants arriving without the need to get tourist visa or by getting their visas issued at the border find jobs in an informal economy and turn out to be illicit when they remain after the expiration of their visas. According to data provided by the General Directorate of Security, there were over 700,000 persons in the period 1999–2009 identified while illicitly entering the country or leaving after delay. It can be said that the second category mainly consists of migrant laborers.⁴ These persons stay in the country legally with tourist status; some maintain this legal status by leaving and re-entering depending upon their visa periods and others continue to stay in Turkey illicitly. Those who exceed

² MoLSS (2011).

³ Ministry of Interior, GDS, cited by IOM (2010, pp. 37–40). An absence of studies on migrants with legal permission is the reason why our assessment in regard to such migrants is limited to statistics.

⁴ IOM (2010, pp. 15–16).

their visa periods have to pay a fine at the border and they are not allowed to re-enter Turkey unless staying in their home countries for a period of time calculated on the basis of the period they stayed in Turkey in excess of their visa.⁵ Consequently, some migrants continuously postpone return and the penalty mentioned produces an impact, which extends the period of stay in the country rather than dissuading irregular migration. Making money in temporary jobs found in Turkey, and returning back to the country of origin after some time and re-entering Turkey when there is need for jobs, constitute the common characteristics of these migrants, and the process is defined as circular or shuttle migration.⁶ The point in choosing Turkey as a place to work and save money is related to some factors. These include a flexible visa system, geographical proximity, ease in access, existence of networks formed by family members and acquaintances already working in Turkey and possibilities of finding jobs in informal economy.⁷

For a labor supply to be functional there must be demand for it. An extensive informal economy and employment, a shortfall of institutional care services and a demand for informal labor in Turkey are determining factors for the emergence of a migrant labor supply. In this respect, Turkey resembles the countries of Southern Europe, which are the destination points for irregular migration. In countries such as Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal, gaps left by rudimentary welfare states in the delivery of care services as well as the existence of a wide informal economy based on small enterprises create demand for cheap labor mainly in the sectors of services, agriculture and construction, and the part of this demand not responded to by domestic labor is covered by migrant workers. In Turkey, the dominant character of the labor market is surplus labor, which manifests itself in high rates of unemployment and underemployment. There is demand for migrant workers in spite of the existence of such a labor surplus.⁸ This demand emerged following the partial improvement in real wages in the period 1989–93 which came after falling wages in the 1980s and historically coincided with the period during which people from the countries of the former Eastern Bloc used their newly gained freedom to travel and to start migrating for employment. While a transition to out-

⁵ *Ibid.* (p. 29).

⁶ İçduygu (2008, p. 4), Erder (2007, p. 43).

⁷ İçduygu (2004, pp. 48–49).

⁸ Toksöz (2007).

sourcing and sub-contracting facilitated informal employment, irregular migrant workers were phased in as a reserve labor force in the face of rising wages for domestic laborers.⁹ Migrant workers are employed in labor-intensive and low-paid sectors, the manufacturing industry including garments and food, construction, agriculture, tourism, entertainment and commercial sex and domestic and care services. With the exception of construction sector, it can be assumed that females outnumber males in all sectors. Female labor dominates particularly such sectors as domestic and care services, entertainment and commercial sex, and garment production while both male and female migrants are employed in other sectors including food-restaurants, various sub-sectors of tourism and, particularly in the Black Sea region, agriculture. In the garments, tourism and construction sectors, the subsistence of small enterprises depends upon the employment of cheap labor provided by migrants.¹⁰ While legislation envisages heavy fines for the employment of illicit migrants, they are not dissuading people from it due to insufficient inspection. Or, in cases where inspection is conducted, bribes paid to officials are attractive enough to let cases go “unnoticed”.¹¹ A relatively higher level of education and better work discipline on the part of migrant workers, their laboring without posing any problems to their employers, an absence of social rights and benefits and any tendency to get unionized make migrant workers preferable for employers.¹² Here the major factor that brings along the absence of any protection is the fact that migrants reside illicitly in Turkey and that, even in cases where their stay is legal, they work without working permits. The principal fear common to all migrants is the fear of being spotted and deported. While migrant workers may accept working longer hours than domestic laborers and being paid less than others, what they consider to be a gross injustice and a case of desperation is when they are not paid at all, a situation against which they have no place to apply.¹³ In addition to these, female migrant workers also mention such risks as sexual harassment and, for those in commercial sex, getting infected.¹⁴

⁹ Akpınar (2010).

¹⁰ İçduygu (2004, pp. 45–48), İçduygu (2006, pp. 6–7).

¹¹ İçduygu (2004, pp. 54–55), Dedeoğlu (2011), Akpınar (2010).

¹² Erder (2007, pp. 65–66).

¹³ Dedeoğlu (2011), Toksöz/Akpınar (2009).

¹⁴ İçduygu (2006, p. 9).

Feminization of Migration in the Context of the Gap in Care Services in Turkey

In the countries of Southern Europe that have some common socio-economic characteristics with Turkey, child, elderly and sick care services are mostly regarded as matters of family responsibility, and the delivery of public services in these areas have remained weaker relative to Northern European countries. With the further weakening of welfare regimes in the process of neoliberal restructuring, public care services have gradually disappeared. Moreover, the weakening of family ties, which once maintained home care, and higher rates of labor force participation on the part of women, who have traditionally assumed the burden of care, led to the emergence of a rather striking problem of a “care gap”. As female citizens who used to be employed in domestic and care services find other opportunities of employment and refuse to undertake “low status” domestic and care services as there emerged a rising demand for female migrants who could fill the gap. Consequently, the burden of domestic and care services for women, which is the outcome of a gender-based division of labor, shifted from upper-middle class women in a given country to lower-class migrant women.¹⁵ In European countries, those who covered the gap are women mostly from the former Eastern Bloc countries. Since gender-based power relations had remained intact in these countries where wage-work used to be a norm for women during the period of state socialism, it was women who, in the face of upheaval, brought along with them the transition to a market economy. These women decided to migrate, bearing the responsibility to protect their families and in particular to meet the needs of their children. It is often in domestic and care services that these women found jobs and work. Since their goal was to save money while working in other countries and to return back home afterwards, their traffic between two countries is defined as “settlement in mobility”.¹⁶

While the employment of migrant women in domestic and care services in Turkey has some characteristics similar to the case in developed countries, there are differences as well. In many countries of the world, the rise in demand for migrant domestic labor is explained by women’s increasing participation in the labor force.¹⁷ As women increasingly take part in the labor force,

¹⁵ Campani (1993), Kofman et al. (2000), Lazaridis (2007).

¹⁶ Morokvasic (2004).

¹⁷ Parrenas (2001).

it is observed that women shift their traditionally given domestic roles to waged migrant labor. However, contrary to the worldwide trend, Turkey faces a situation where women's participation in the labor force is falling. In the 2000s, the women's labor force participation rate was around 26 % and this rate falls short of explaining the rise in demand for migrant labor. However, the share of women in professional occupations is around 37 %, which is close to that in developed countries, and it can thus be asserted that it is the factor that determines the demand for migrant laborers.¹⁸ As a matter of fact it is upper-middle class women in professional occupations, regarded as employers, that tend to hire migrant women laborers in Turkey.¹⁹

The "care gap" that invites migrant labor is not a recently emerging problem in Turkey, where care-related welfare state policies have never developed and become institutionalized, but a long-standing and deep-rooted one. As a result of the absence of state intervention in this area and a consequent weakness of institutional care facilities, care for the elderly, the disabled and children turned out to be unpaid family service shared by female members of families. Under the given circumstances, only women in professional jobs, enjoying relatively higher incomes, can afford to use institutional care services provided by the private sector or hire persons for home-based care. Among those available for such services, the number of migrant women has been rising steadily in recent years. "Migrant female labor in Turkey emerges not as a remedy for the withdrawal of a well advanced system of welfare state but as elements of labor that provides for the welfare of only a part of families within a welfare regime where family plays a central role".²⁰

In Turkey, women in professional occupations can take part and make a career in working life on equal footing with men only by purchasing domestic and care services while, on the other hand, migrant women working for them say they move out of their countries for ensuring the well-being of their children in particular, covering their costs of education and providing for family subsistence.²¹ The mobility of women to provide for their basic needs started in the early 1990s with the enjoyment of the right to travel in the Eastern Bloc countries. The heroines of the "luggage trade", experienced in the early 1990s

¹⁸ Ecevit et al. (2008).

¹⁹ Kümbetoğlu (2005), Kaşka (2006), Keough (2006), Akalın (2007).

²⁰ Gökbayrak (2009, p. 76).

²¹ İçduygu (2004, p. 44), Kaşka (2006, p. 46).

and considered as the harbinger of irregular migration movements, were mainly women from this bloc, who were engaged in such activity for mere subsistence. In a study shedding light upon this issue, Yüksekler (2003) draws attention to the fact that the Soviet women who developed skills in providing for daily subsistence needs maintained these skills, upon the collapse of the system, by engaging in small-scale trade activities. The luggage trade that provided significant foreign currency inflow to the Turkish economy throughout the 1990s and early 2000s later lost its importance as the former Eastern Bloc countries, including Russia in the first place, integrated with the world economy as the scale of the trade expanded and was institutionalized. Nevertheless, small-scale trade activities still persist with actors from the poorer countries.²² In this process, women kept moving to Turkey to work and make money in various sectors. Of their engagements, the sector of entertainment and commercial sex of course had wider media coverage and was of wide public interest. Our priority topic here, however, is domestic and care services in which we can assume many more women are employed.

Migrant Women in the Sector of Domestic and Care Services

Since the majority of migrants in Turkey working in domestic and care services are women from the former Eastern Bloc countries, almost all literature in this field is on women moving in from these countries, including Moldova in the first place, with the exception of Weyland's (1994) study on migrants from the Philippines and Danış's (2007) study on Christian migrants from Iraq. However, changes in visa regimes together with bilateral agreements between Turkey and other countries bring along a striking impact on the national composition of migrants employed in domestic and care services. According to Atatimur,²³ for example, while the labor force profile of agencies in 2007 was composed of women from Moldova, Romania and Turkmenistan, others from Caucasian countries, including Georgia in the first place, gained weight starting from 2008. This change can be explained by the duration of visa agreements acted with the countries concerned as well as ease in getting visas issued.

²² Erder (2007, pp. 49–55).

²³ Atatimur (2008, p. 121).

While in European countries the demand for low-status and low-paid domestic services not preferred by nationals is met by a migrant labor force, in Turkey these services are shared by live-in migrants and daily paid local people. Due to the given conservative environment and their role of reproduction in their own families, Turkish citizens usually do not prefer to work in the sector of live-in care. Hence, the gap in boarded and flexible labor mostly needed by employers working long hours in professional jobs is covered by migrant laborers. In other words, migrant laborers are left not only with low-paid jobs but also those that are not preferred by nationals for various reasons. Migrant women, on their part, prefer being live-in workers without paying any rent or for daily accommodation.²⁴

Another important factor, which boosts demand for migrant domestic workers, is that it has the function of consolidating the identity and life-style images of middle-class families in Turkey. Indeed, many employees explain their preference for migrants over nationals by the “European” and “more civilized” characteristics of the former while considering the latter as uneducated and of a rural origin. There are also other reasons for this preference, including the more disciplined nature of migrants in fulfilling their tasks and complying with rules set by their employers and the possibility of constant checking since they live and work in the same space.²⁵

The Migration Journey and the Employment Processes of Migrants in Domestic Services

As stated earlier, women migrating to work in the sector of domestic and care services in Turkey enter and leave the country with short-term tourist visas and are thus engaged in a circular (shuttle) form of migration. After their stay in Turkey, they return to their home countries to renew their visas, to help their families in agricultural works and to check the situation of children they have left behind. But there are others who keep staying in Turkey over their visa periods.²⁶ This second group of people, who are penalized for violating visa rules and denied re-entry, find ways of convincing border-gate authorities, including bribes or resorting to counter-strategies, such as divorcing or using a

²⁴ Akalın (2007, pp. 214–215).

²⁵ Demirdirek (2007, p. 17), Atatimur (2008, p. 140).

²⁶ Demirdirek (2007), Kaşka (2006), Keough (2006), Akalın (2010).

maiden name for getting a new passport and tourist visa.²⁷ The Gagauz region in Moldova is the leading one with its migrant workers going to Turkey and this preference for Turkey derives from region's native tongue, which is Turkish. The migration of women in Moldova has also become a life strategy transferred from generation to generation. Some nurses who used to work in care services in Turkey say they worked in Turkey to raise their children and now it is their daughters' turn to do the same to raise their own. This situation, coined as "settlement in mobility" by Morokvasic, reflects the necessity of migrating out in order to have a better life in their countries later.

It is observed that migrant women arriving in Turkey finance their travel and visa costs in four ways: with their own savings, receiving pre-payment from their prospective employers, borrowing from relatives or usurers and through employment agencies that they apply to. Employment agencies may provide for travel and they mostly bill employers as their clients for the cost of travel and other necessary documents. Following the agreement, employers pay a commission fee of 500 USD, which is a kind of guarantee for the agreement acted.²⁸ Women, whose first travel is through employment agencies, may later arrange for their travel after finding good employment opportunities and learning about the route, fees and the working of the system.²⁹ When travel is arranged by employment agencies, intermediaries visit villages to announce the date of departure and migrants complete their exit procedures within a month. Then, when the time of departure comes, migrant women are collected from various stations and transported to Turkey by bus or plane. The migration literature assumes that the poorest cannot migrate for not having enough finances to do so; however, with the phasing in of employment agencies, even the poorest can take part in the process of migration.³⁰

Agreements with agencies involve no written contract and these organizations seize the passports of migrant women as long as they are employed. According to the manager of an employment agency, this practice of seizing passports is not only a guarantee for them but also a protective one for migrant women preventing their shift to other sectors. The manager draws attention to the importance of trust between the firm and the client and stresses

²⁷ Ozinian (2009).

²⁸ Atatimur (2008, pp. 113–114).

²⁹ Keough (2006, p. 441).

³⁰ Atatimur (2008, pp. 115–118).

that an agency alleged to be involved in commercial sex has lost all its clients. It is also stated that there are hundreds of such agencies active in Turkey.³¹ As put by Kaşka (2006), the sole basis of this relationship devoid of any formal contract and taking place illicitly is trust. In a sense, agencies regulate this chaotic area with their “unwritten” rules. The absence of any state regulation on this irregular labor migration, which has been on the rise for about two decades, invited too many informal structures to fill the gap. These informal structures include, for example, “transporters” who convey goods and remittances of migrant women back to their families, employment agencies that conduct their activities as “consulting firms” and more experienced migrant women who make money as intermediaries by arranging jobs for new migrants.³²

Besides employment agencies, networks of relatives and friends also play a role in the process through which migrant women find jobs. It is a common practice that returnees leave their jobs in Turkey to their relatives/friends or seek jobs for them through their employers. Indeed, according to a study conducted by Erdem and Şahin,³³ 54.7 % of migrant women covered in their study found their jobs through employment agencies while 37.7 % had jobs thanks to their friends. While ethnic ties play an important role in providing jobs to Armenian migrants in domestic services, both ethnic and religious ties come to the fore in the case of Christians from Iraq who moved to Turkey after war for reasons of unemployment and insecurity. The study conducted by Danış (2007) revealed that Christian women from Iraq who moved to Istanbul or planned to move forward to European countries via Istanbul could find jobs as domestic workers for families belonging to Syriac and Armenian communities in Istanbul.

Working Conditions of Women Employed in Domestic and Care Services in Turkey

Domestic and care labor as a form socially dis-valued and traditionally undertaken by women maintained its low status and gender-based character even after its commoditization and transformation into wage labor. Consequently, in the determination of the working conditions of migrant women in domestic services, consideration of domestic labor as “valueless” and “invisible” on the

³¹ *Ibid.* (pp. 122–124).

³² Kümbetoğlu (2005, p. 19).

³³ Erdem/Şahin (2009, p. 306).

one side and the status of being “migrant” and “woman” on the other are interacting factors. The other two factors that shape the working conditions of migrant domestic workers are the facts that work is done “at home” and employment is “informal”.

Coinciding living and working environments of migrant women and the fact that these environments are those of the upper-middle classes in receiving countries make the distinction between public and private spheres ambiguous. The women-specific nature of the home space as well as production in this space creates a relation of employment whose parties are women.³⁴ As a matter of fact, the term “employer” in the literature on migrant domestic laborers is used for describing not the employing family but the woman concerned. The study by Atatimur shows that married employers as well as single parent employers pay migrant women out of their personal incomes and this situation confirms that this employment relation in Turkey is in fact between women.³⁵

Wages paid to migrant domestic workers vary from 300 to 800 USD. For care services, employers make their preference between new migrants who do not speak Turkish but are ready to work for lower wages and higher-paid migrant women who have some experience in working for middle-class Turkish households. Those who can use weekly days off are given stipends of 7–13 USD on those days. Payment of wages on a monthly basis enables the employer to extract more services from the employee in return for wages and also transfers all responsibilities of reproduction to boarding migrant workers who can use their working time in extremely flexible ways.³⁶

Kümbetoğlu³⁷ summarizes the negative impacts of “informality” prevailing in working and living conditions of migrant women in domestic services as follows: dying hair black to look Turkish, rare meetings with friends in order not to be spotted by security, preference of private homes rather than public places in such meetings, feeling of loneliness, missing children back home, abstinence in order to save as much as possible, and undertaking even the most disrespected work in spite of a good educational background. Preconceived ideas fueled by the presence of women from the former Eastern Bloc countries in commercial sex led to the stigmatization of migrants in domestic services as

³⁴ Ünlütürk Ulutaş (2010, p. 288).

³⁵ Atatimur (2008, p. 141).

³⁶ Kaşka (2006), Özinan (2009), Akalın (2010).

³⁷ Kümbetoğlu (2005, p. 21).

“Natashas”, as well as to their harassment when out of their working places.³⁸ Political considerations too may determine some negative attitudes towards migrants. For example, when political strife between Turkey and Armenia intensifies upon such issues as bills related to Armenian genocide or Karabağ, migrants from Armenia feel themselves more threatened by possible deportation.³⁹

Unfavorable working and living conditions leave migrants to face the problems of chronic stress. While not being able to go out freely for the fear of getting spotted and deported aggravates the psychological problems of migrant women, those who can more frequently return to their countries through shuttle migration and get together with their friends on their days off are in much better condition. When migrant women (who permanently remain in home environments mostly alone with the child, the elderly or the sick person under their care) have to spend their leave days too in the same environment, their potential for renewal and comfort is also seriously compromised.⁴⁰ Since migrants in Turkey other than refugees or asylum seekers cannot benefit from any health insurance scheme, migrant women in domestic services either use medicine they brought along or wait for their next return to the home country for medical treatment. It is only in very serious cases that they can use private health facilities. Since a frequent emergence of health problems may cause the loss of a job, they often tend to hide such problems from their employers.⁴¹

In upper-middle class homes, migrant women abide by high norms of work discipline in favorable conditions in some cases and with a rather heavy work burden in others. Women conceive of work as an essential part of life and express their attitude towards work by saying “it is better if there is work to do, otherwise we start worrying about ourselves and our children”. These women are saddened and disturbed in conscience not by their own circumstances but by the situation of their children back home who may feel abandoned.⁴² Nevertheless, it is also the case that they may face humiliating attitudes in their working environments. A woman states that she once faced following type of

³⁸ Keough (2006).

³⁹ Özinian (2009, p. 26).

⁴⁰ Lordoğlu and Etiler (2010, p. 109).

⁴¹ *Ibid.* (pp. 103–108).

⁴² Kümbetoğlu (2005, p. 17).

questions in her apply for a job: “Do your feet stink?”, “Do you wash out well after defecating?”, “Do you have a boyfriend and do you think about bringing him here if there is?” and “Do you eat much?”.⁴³

In studies on migration, while excessive exploitation and unfavorable working conditions exemplified above are focal points, it is necessary to carefully analyze the relations between the migrant woman worker and her employer and not to assume that it is a one-way relation emerging in a single form.⁴⁴ In other words, the relation in between must be analyzed by taking due account of the dimension of mutual dependence.

Employer-Employee Relations: Intensive Exploitation or Mutual Dependence?

The “fictive ties of kinship” with migrant workers and the fact that the living environment of the employer is also that of the migrant worker create a relation of employment where migrants do their jobs not only as a result of a necessity but their willingness to do so. The rhetoric of kinship ensures the assimilation of the worker in the family of the employer and consequently the latter’s approach to professional work as a natural responsibility. Just like mothers/spouses who cannot be “off” household work, any boarded servant/caregiver, too, cannot. The migrant worker is expected to leave aside the fact that she is employed professionally and instead turn into a housewife by accepting the home environment of the employer as her own.⁴⁵ When care services are concerned, the relationship between the worker and employer assumes an even more complex character. This relationship between the caregiver and her employer can be constructed both in a form that yields “mutual benefits” and in another form that is based on the exploitation of the workers. The form of relationship is determined by multiple economic and socio-cultural variables. Care labor which is otherwise devalued by the patriarchal system and structural dynamics of the market becomes “valuable” through the social meaning attributed to care responsibility as well as the emotional dimension of the service delivered. This system of clashing values determined on the one

⁴³ *Ibid.* (p. 21).

⁴⁴ Akalın (2007, p. 221).

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* (p. 220).

side by wage and status of work and on the basis of human relations on the other shape the working conditions of migrants who deliver care services.⁴⁶

The emotional dimension of care services enables migrant women to have control over what they do while encouraging them to feel themselves as a part of the families they work for; but at the same time this position forces them to be “loyal caregivers”, always patient and understanding. For example, migrant worker Maria with her four children back in Moldova could not stop her teardrops when she saw her employer returning home cheerfully with her children. Her employer, on the other hand, scolded her for her sullenness instead of asking whether there was any problem.⁴⁷

Care labor necessitates close surveillance as well as physical and emotional care. Particularly in cases of childcare, the relationship between the caregiver and children is one where various ideas and experiences of the caregiver are transferred to children and basic life skills as well as cultural norms and values are taught.⁴⁸ In the case of elderly care, on the other hand, the caregiver takes over the responsibility for ensuring the physical and emotional well-being of the elderly person while, at the same time, accompanies as a friend the elderly person who is isolated and whose physical mobility is restricted. This situation makes the employer dependent on the caregiver who spends more time with her child or household member in need of care. However, common ideas about affection, family and child-rearing mask different power dynamics and inequalities inherent in waged care labor. The contradiction between motherhood and commoditized care labor makes lines of demarcation as to which duties are to be transferred from the mother to the caregiver ambiguous.⁴⁹ Thus, the existence of co-habitation in the same home with the employer, constructed with the rhetoric of kinship, may create both advantageous and disadvantageous outcomes for women in domestic services. Women employed in closed home environment and facing the threat of deportation are vulnerable to almost all forms of exploitation and abuse. Nevertheless, such factors as the employer’s sharing of her home and family with the migrant worker and the establishment of an affection-based relationship with the child or elderly person when care services are concerned may also create relatively favorable

⁴⁶ Uttal (1999, p. 759).

⁴⁷ Demirdirek (2007, p. 18).

⁴⁸ Uttal (1999, p. 762).

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* (p. 759).

working environments in which migrant workers may put their employers in the place of their own families back at home. Since the cessation of the care relationship (which is tightly connected with the caregiver due to its emotional dimension) may create adverse outcomes from the point of view of the employer, the relation between the employer and worker may in some cases be founded upon mutual dependence. Such a relation of dependence cannot be observed in other sectors where migrants are employed.

Migrant Women in Entertainment and Commercial Sex Sectors

When the concepts of pleasure and desire gained a transnational character with globalization, the demand for sex services increased and more and more women started to work in the sectors of entertainment and commercial sex. Along with the rise in demand, services offered diversified and sector workers from various countries and ethnic origins became accessible. The development of communication technologies and the feminization of migration led to the global expansion of the sector, which is rather based on the commoditization of woman's body. Upon the collapse of the Soviet System, which was followed by the inflow of women from the former Eastern Bloc and their participation in commercial sex in Turkey, there emerged a diversification in the sector and a rising demand for expatriate women.⁵⁰ After domestic and care services, commercial sex is the sector where demand for migrant women is the highest. Contrary to such sectors as the manufacturing industry, tourism, agriculture and construction, in which there is competition with a domestic labor force, in domestic services, entertainment and commercial sex, domestic labor and migrant workers constitute two distinct groups responding to different demands by employers/clients.

Migrant women in the sector of entertainment and commercial sex can be addressed in three different groups in respect to their entry into the sector and their working conditions. The first group comprises those employed as persons granted permission to work in the entertainment sector. The second group consists of those entering Turkey with a tourist visa and working in commercial sex either as free-lance or by paying to intermediaries. Persons in this second group have either migrated directly for the purpose of working in this specific sector or shifted to it after having worked for some time in the

⁵⁰ Ünlütürk Ulutaş/Kalfa (2009, p.16).

luggage trade, tourism and domestic services. The third group is composed of the victims of human trafficking who have been deceived by promises of employment in other sectors and then forced to take part in commercial sex. This third group differs from the first two since a process of exploitation is forcefully imposed and will not be addressed here as a distinct topic of study. Unlike the sector of domestic services, studies and statistical data relating to migrant women in the sectors of entertainment and commercial sex are scarce, naturally leading to very limited information on their living and working conditions.⁵¹

In the entertainment sector where mostly women from Ukraine and Russia are employed, formal employment is more common than others sectors where migrant workers are also employed. According to data provided by the MoLSS, work permits granted to those from these two countries are mostly for the entertainment sector and enterprises in this are considered a part of the tourism sector. The procedure is firstly to reach show groups to be employed in entertainment facilities over agencies in origin countries and then to apply to the MoLSS for work permit.⁵² The protection of migrants working in this sector is ensured through the employment contracts of migrants in their native languages as well and informing them about their rights emanating from the Labor Code.⁵³ Legal and formal employment facilitate the access of women in this sector to health and security services and make it possible for them to work in more favorable conditions than other irregular female migrants.

While some migrant women in commercial sex move to Turkey specifically to work in this sector, there are also others who shift to the same sector as a result of such reasons as not being able to find other jobs, low wages offered and others. A study by Kalfa (2008) reveals both sexual violence encountered by women in domestic services and a transition from domestic services to commercial sex. In whichever sector they are employed, the perceived status of women from the former Soviet countries as sex workers and their stigmatization as “Natashas” may lead to their harassment in other sectors as well an eventual drift to commercial sex.⁵⁴ The wide presence of migrants in commer-

⁵¹ As the most accessible of all, data from the General Directorate of Security reveal the criminal dimensions of the issue; however, even these statistics fall short of enabling us to gather information regarding the motives and processes of migration and conditions that women encounter.

⁵² Erder/Kaşka (2003, p. 66).

⁵³ Dedeoğlu/Gökmen (2010, p. 54).

⁵⁴ Gülçür/Ilkcaracan (2002, p. 414).

cial sex is so pronounced that even when they go back to their own countries there emerges a preconception that all migrant women to Turkey are motivated by commercial sex. This is the reason why migrant women in all sectors may be disrespected and made objects of harassment in both Turkey and in their home countries.⁵⁵

The motives of women migrating to work in the sector of commercial sex largely overlap with the motives of others migrating for employment in other sectors. However, considering the working conditions of women in this sector, it is possible to infer that commercial sex which is extremely vulnerable to sexual, physical and psychological violence, accompanied by illegality and being foreigner, will generate much more adverse conditions. Sexuality, which is directly about a person's self and body, is an area that is extremely conducive to direct violence against woman's body.⁵⁶ Meanwhile, their illicit residence and working status deprive these women of all means of access to and claiming of their rights. Forcible employment by intermediaries, long working hours, non-payment of their earnings and the withholding of passports are problems frequently observed in commercial sex. Women lack the means of resorting to legal procedures when they suffer harassment or violence in their daily lives, too. The fear of being deported prevents their application official authorities in case of any violation of their rights while the shame they feel because of their engagement keeps them from applying to their own consulates as well.⁵⁷ Other than clients, intermediaries and police may also be the actors of violence that women suffer.⁵⁸ In their study Gülçür and Ilkcaracan reveal that migrant women who are working in commercial sex sector are detained by the police frequently and upon threats of deportation must bribe officers for release.⁵⁹

⁵⁵ Kalfa (2008), Keough (2006).

⁵⁶ Ünlütürk Ulutaş/Kalfa (2009, p. 23).

⁵⁷ Gülçür/Ilkcaracan (2002), Kaşka/Erder (2003), İçduygu (2004), Kalfa (2008), Üstübcı (2010).

⁵⁸ Ünlütürk/Kalfa (2009, p.16).

⁵⁹ Gülçür/ Ilkcaracan (2002, p. 416).

Ethnicity-Based Participation in the Labor Market: Those Who Are Close and Distant from “Us”

In such feminized sectors as domestic and care services and entertainment and commercial sex, ethnicity is an important factor in determining who will be involved in which. In other sectors too, ethnicity in addition to gender is an important factor in shaping the preferences of employers. Even though it may change depending on the region and nature of work, employers mostly prefer Muslim migrants who can speak Turkish. It is also stated that the police too are more lenient to those akin to “us” in its approach to irregular migrants. This state of affairs is particularly relevant when it comes to Turks from Bulgaria, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan.⁶⁰ However, whatever the ethnic origin of migrants may be, what makes them preferable for employers is their lack of protection due to illicit status and openness to all kinds of exploitation.

Migrant Women in Garment Workshops

Going out of households, garment workshops are common production units employing migrant women. A study conducted in Istanbul points out that poor families especially from the Nahcevan region of Azerbaijan come to Turkey for employment, male members work in construction or remain jobless while females are employed in garment workshops as a cheap source of labor. While informal employment is common to all laborers in these workshops, women from Azerbaijan are paid lower than nationals doing the same work, work longer hours and sometimes they are not paid at all. They have no means of standing up against injustice they suffer. What is striking here is that children accompany their mothers to workshops and work there with them. Since they cannot have their children enrolled in school because of their illicit status, it seems to mothers better to have children with them while working. Children who are deprived of their chances for education are destined to spend their adult lives as unskilled workers. Because of the similar culture, common language and religion, people from Azerbaijan are not “aliens”, but “the other”. The submission of “untainted” Azeri women, acceding solemnly and silently to all kinds of work that may be assigned, shows how functional patriarchal cultural norms can be in creating a docile worker profile for employers. In her work,

⁶⁰ Daniş et al. (2009), Akpınar (2009), Erder (2007).

Dedeoğlu (2011) draws attention to the fact that the process of migration makes women the major actors in household subsistence, bearing the potential of strengthening the status of women in their families though it may not bring along any serious change in a gender-based division of labor.

Migrants in Trade and Tourism

Besides their objective characteristics, some subjective characteristics attributed to migrants are influential in determining where they are employed. At the centers in Istanbul where luggage trade is intensive, such service personnel as salesmen, interpreters and receptionists who can speak Russian and Serbian are commonly employed in communicating with foreign traders. Likewise, for complying with product standards and demand from the former Eastern Bloc countries, there is need for and thus employment of qualified workers such as models and stylists.⁶¹ However while Muslim- and Turkish-origin migrants from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are employed in textile and garment workshops even when they can speak Russian, men or women from Moldova, Ukraine and Russia are preferred as sales personnel in shops.⁶² Influential in this preference is the subjective cultural characteristics such as “better educated”, “cleaner” and “more disciplined” attributed to the second group. In fact, these cultural attributions are used as instruments of making use of bodily performance of migrant women. The “sexy” and “fantasy” nature of women’s dresses sold by some stores and acceptance by migrant women employed in these stores to serve as models exhibiting these dresses means “bringing down two birds by throwing a single stone” by employers. It is observed that some migrants performing well in sales are able to negotiate wages with their employers. As to migrants who work as unqualified laborers in cargo shops and workshops, they can react to unfavorable working conditions only by changing their jobs or they just remain silent.

There are some migrant women who legally stay in Turkey upon their marriage with Turkish citizens and obtainment of Turkish citizenship, having a work permit. In spite of this favorable status, they are still employed informally. According to a survey conducted in a touristic settlement, these women, almost all of whom are university graduates with experience in their profes-

⁶¹ Erder (2007, p. 67).

⁶² Dağdelen (2008).

sions, face problems in confirming the equivalence of their diplomas and are consequently employed in the tourism sector as tourist agents, massagers, guides, tour operators, animators or saleswomen despite their qualification.⁶³ There are also cases where these women are employed in jobs that are not preferred by nationals for low wages offered or paid lower than others. Since seasonal employment is the distinguishing character of the tourism sector, these women work only half of the year and they explain this lack of any social protection by their origin. The problem of non-payment, which is frequently experienced by illicit migrants, emerges to a limited extent when it comes to migrants with legal status. Among problems they face as women they cite verbal or physical sexual harassment at their workplaces.

Migrants in Construction Sector

A very interesting study revealing how employers can functionalize ethnicity for raising the level of exploitation is the one by Akpınar (2009) on the employment of migrant workers in the sector of construction. Extremely informal as a result of widely practiced sub-contracting, the construction sector is a point of entry to Turkish labor market for male migrants. Migrants are employed as the lowest status of unqualified workers in building construction/ restoration, road and bridge construction/restoration and in the restoration and preservation of historical properties which change many hands in the chain of sub-contracting. They are employed for long hours at very low wages and in some cases they are dismissed without the payment of wages due. A field study conducted in Istanbul shows that mostly migrants from Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan and Georgia are employed in construction; migrants from countries other than Georgia identify themselves as Muslim-Turks, a ground upon which they are recruited by employers who then seek from them a kind of loyalty and gratitude. While not of Turkish stock, Georgians are recruited with an emphasis on their friendship and kinship ties with the people of Eastern Black Sea region. Migrants are preferred over Kurdish people as national source of labor in construction works. Behind what seems as nationalistic sentiment against Kurds, there is the fact that, unlike Kurds, migrants have no means to claim their rights and they can be more readily exploited than others. The same state of affairs is observed in industrial enterprises in the region

⁶³ Gökmen (2011).

of Thrace. In the 1990s and early 2000s, it was the primary preference of employers to recruit industrial laborers from among Turks from Bulgaria. When it was observed that unqualified Kurdish workers from South-Eastern Anatolia had a tendency to get unionized and as the number of migrants incoming from Romania and Bulgaria decreased, employers preferred to bring in workers from Istanbul. It is further observed that in Bursa, which is the most preferred place of settlement for Turks coming from Bulgaria, they are considered as “cognates” and not “aliens”, and their status in the labor market is not disadvantaged relative to the long-settled inhabitants of Bursa and they are received much more warmly than Kurds recently migrating to Bursa.⁶⁴

Refugees and migrants from Africa who have a small share in irregular migrants are completely different in terms of their culture, language and religion. Even when they are Muslims, their different skin color prevents them to be close to “us”. Their participation in the labor market is much more limited than other migrant groups. According to a study conducted in Istanbul focusing on the enmeshing of migrant and refugee groups, in case their appeal for refugee status is rejected, refugees switch to the status of irregular migrants and start seeking jobs in the informal sector to subsist and save some money while waiting to be transported to EU countries by human smugglers. These migrants, who are subsisting in worn-out buildings in the depressed areas of the city-state, point to difficulties in finding a job and working as the biggest problem. Some of these people work in small garment or illumination workshops, some sell goods in marketplaces and some women visit houses for cleaning works. Among them, there are also those engaged in the luggage trade, depending on their countries of origin. Their wages are even lower than legal minimum wage, if it is paid at all. The Roma people and Kurds from South-Eastern Anatolia inhabiting the same depressed areas live and work under similar conditions.⁶⁵ In the labor market hierarchy, black migrants have the lowest status while sharing the same fate with those excluded categories of the domestic labor force, mostly subsist on scavenging.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Erder 2007 (p.65–72).

⁶⁵ Yökseker/Brewer (2010).

⁶⁶ Saltan/Yardımcı (2007).

Conclusion

A large number of studies on irregular migrants living and working in Turkey cover migrant women employed in domestic and care services and provide detailed information as to their state and working conditions. This can be explained by a mostly upper-middle-class origin of researchers that facilitates their access to the employers of migrant women or by the fact that their relatives or close acquaintances are employers. As to other areas of employment, the negative attitude of employers towards researchers as well as the fear of migrants from being spotted and deported makes related studies much more difficult to conduct. In spite of the difficulties of conducting surveys and collecting data, research focusing on migrant women shows us that the question posed as “Is migration feminized?” can be answered positively.

The point common to all studies examined is that they expose the unprotected status and vulnerability of migrants. No matter in which sector or job they are employed, irregular migrants are employed in much more unfavorable conditions, for longer hours and also paid lower than nationals and they have no channels to claim their rights in cases of non-payment. From the point of view of migrant women, additional risks include sexual harassment and, in the case of working in commercial sex, sexual violence and sexually transmitted diseases.

The transformation of the demographic structure and the growing share of the elderly in the total population increase the need for care services in Turkey. Parallel to this development, more women graduating from universities start to work in professional jobs. And yet, the state withdraws from the provision of institutional care services, adopts social policies that reinforce the familial supply of care services along traditional lines and few private companies offering care services demand high prices for their work. Under these circumstances, it is quite predictable that the demand for female migrant workers in middle and upper class families will increase. In the entertainment and commercial sex sectors, the prevailing interest in the young and blonde “other” will perpetuate the demand for migrant women from former Eastern Bloc countries. In the tourism sector, the increasing number of tourists coming from Russia and their expanding share in tourism revenues will raise the demand for Russian-speaking employees who are mainly migrants from former Eastern Bloc countries. In all of these service sector sub-branches, where the competition with native workers is weak, it is important to take measures for the

legalization of migrant workers. As long as the demand for migrant labor remains and Turkey accepts the pressures for the alignment of her migration policy with that of EU, it would not be an exaggeration to say that migrants' efforts to reach Turkey will take place under more dangerous and risky conditions.

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Turkey in the New Migration Era: Migrants between Regularity and Irregularity

Sema Erder and Selmin Kaşka

A Troublesome Concept: “Irregularity” and “Irregular” Migration

Since the 1990s, Turkey has been facing new population flows, namely “irregular” migration movements, whose features have been markedly different from former experiences. These new population movements, both in and out, mostly are the unexpected consequences of various political and economic developments going on at the regional level, and not the direct choice of Turkey. The arrival of all kinds of migrants, such as asylum seekers, transit migrants and especially those who are willing to seek out their fortunes in Turkey, was an unexpected event, as Turkey had considered herself as a “sending” country. Nowadays, “irregular migration” from the regional countries has become a new challenge to both researchers and policy-makers in Turkey as for other countries around the globe. In this article, we will analyze the new migration flows to Turkey and then we will focus on the implicit position of new migrants in the Turkish informal labor market.

To begin with, we have to point out that “irregular” migration is a troublesome concept, one that is hard to tackle. In general, we consider the current massive migration movements to be a response of ordinary people to the globalization process. “Irregularity” in a way is repercussion of the failure of the current policies in dealing with this new global challenge. Restrictive migration policies and criminalization of entry, stay and employment accelerate the inter-country movements, which are realized without full compliance with national laws and regulations.¹

¹ Ghosh (1998), Castles/Miller (2003), Düvell (2006).

Current terminology used by the academics and policy makers is divergent and includes terms such as “undocumented migration”, “illegal migration”, “clandestine migration”, “unauthorized migration” and “irregular migration”. In social sciences, “irregular migration” or “undocumented migration” are terms usually used to prevent criminalization and stigmatization of migrants, whereas the term “illegal migration” is mostly used within the legal system and political discourse. In general, we claim that fair rules for trade and capital flows need to be complemented by fair rules for border-crossing movements; new rules for settlement and working would eliminate “irregular” migration and, moreover, exploitative practices of migrants.

As it is well known, declining costs of transportation and intensive communication on the one hand and economic and political collapse and unrest on the other hand resulted in the potential for considerable population movements around the globe. Thus, in some cases, this migration may hide in temporary tourism movements, while, in other cases, it may lead to seeking a safe place for permanent settlement. Thus, irregularity in population movements may occur at various stages and in various forms. In other words, irregularity depends on chance and circumstances a migrant may experience. When viewed from the perspective of a state, it here refers to regularity vis-à-vis the law rather than the migrants’ experience. Here we can also define irregularity in terms of migrants’ ability to access labor markets and other social services.

A full understanding of contemporary migratory movements will not be achieved by relying on existing tools and concepts. The complex and multi-faced nature of “irregular migration” requires a more interdisciplinary, comparative work that incorporates a variety of perspectives. The existing literature on “irregular” migration mostly reflects the experiences and perspectives of the West, where regulations both on the labor market and on migration are comprehensive and strict.² In this context, it is meaningful to discuss to what extent the term “irregular migration” is relevant in non-Western societies.

As we know, in Southern and Eastern countries, such as Turkey, where regulations on the labor market and migration are either lacking or loose, types of irregularity and thus, the meaning of irregularity within social life, may differ. Therefore, an articulation of irregular migrants within society may reflect different experiences. Thanks to the recent interest on the region where Turkey is located, the peculiarity of the migration patterns in this part of the

² Jordan/Düvell (2002), Düvell (2006), Düvell/Vollmer (2009), Jagersen et al. (2010).

world has been noticed by both Turkish and European researchers.³ In the first part of the article, we will attempt to give an overall insight into the general features of irregular migration in Turkey and then, in the second part, we will appraise existing research on the articulation of the irregular migrants within the labor market.

Turkey and New Population Flows: Tourism, Circular Migrants and Irregularity

Turkey's relatively liberal border policy, vast informal sector, extensive communal networks, unregulated migration regime and restrictive rules for foreigners for longer staying may be considered as the peculiarities of the Turkish case.

As far as migration policies are concerned, it would be accurate to say that "conventional" Turkish migration policy has, for the most part, been shaped by "ad hoc" rules and practices, influenced by changing daily political or economic concerns. Thus, we may claim that a comprehensive migration policy has never been developed.

Conventional migration policy is mainly based on two major institutions, which reflect the Turkish migration history. The first one was established at 1930s, during a nation-building period, to allow admission only for the Turkish and Muslim communities who steadily fled to Turkey from Balkans and to control immigration from other countries. The second one was established during 1960s for "exporting labor" to Europe, which was mitigated the restricted border policy.

We may state that Turkey was (and is still, in terms of rules and regulations) a relatively closed society, not only in accepting immigrants, but also for allowing long-term residence or work permits to foreigners. Thus, we have to

³ Zeybekoğlu/Johansson (2003), Berggen et al. (2007), Erder/Yükseker (2009). Being participants of the IMILCO network (International Migration, Informal Labor and Community in Europe: Swedish-Turkish Initiative for Research and Policy), we have to state that the Turkish-Swedish research initiative, which was active during 2001–2006, also stimulated comparative research among a wider circle of experts working on this issue. IMILCO organized four workshops and conferences in Istanbul and several workshops in Stockholm with the participation of researchers from across Europe. These two publications referred to above are products of this network.

The conference "The Critical Reflections in Migration Research", organized by Koç University in October 2009, was also another attempt to develop a dialog among researchers working on the peripheral countries. A paper presented by Erder and Yüksek reviewed migration research from a critical perspective (Erder/Yükseker 2009).

mention that the tourism policy, which was developed in the 1960s, has encouraged the opening up the borders to foreigners only for short periods.⁴ That was the beginning of the so-called “liberal border policy” for short-term arrivals.

After the 1990s, Turkey became a stage for new diversified types of population entries, such as shuttle traders and circular migrants from Eastern Europe, asylum seekers from the region and transit migrants from countries as far away as Afghanistan, Pakistan and Sub-Saharan Africa. The dissolution of Iron Curtain on the one hand and formation of Fortress Europe on the other had formed two different border regimes; rules for inward mobility are relatively liberal from all directions, however rules for outward mobility are strict for the Western border. Ironically, Fortress Europe, which was an abstract term, is becoming a concrete phenomenon, not only by the application of the Schengen regime but also by the construction of a Turkish-Greek border wall which will be guarded by Frontex. The “gatekeeper” position has loaded a heavy burden on Turkey by pressing it to function as a “waiting room” for the transit migrants.

Table 1 illustrates the overall change in the “legal” entries of foreigners to Turkey during 1988–2009. As one may easily observe, the share of arrivals from neighboring countries increased, whereas the share of EU countries decreased in this period. As we mentioned before, a “liberal” visa regime provided a convenient milieu for legal entries not only from the region but also from other countries. Citizens from regional countries can easily obtain a “touristic” visa on arrival and can stay in the country from one to three months legally, whereas a visa is not applied for some of the neighboring countries, such as Syria.

The most striking change is the growth in the arrivals from the “ex-Soviet” countries, where all relations had been interrupted since the Soviet Revolution. More than five million arrivals were reported in 2009, compared to only 4,5 thousand in 1988. Even though the “ex-Soviet” countries differ among themselves in terms of their economic, cultural, social and historical backgrounds, their migration patterns have some similarities, being short-term and circular.

⁴ Erder (2003).

Table 1: Arrival of Foreigners in Turkey (ooo)⁵

	1988	1988	2000	2000	2009	2009
	Numbers	Percentage	Numbers	Percentage	Numbers	Percentage
Balkans	708.8	20.3	1,180,6	11.3	2,781,2	10.3
Middle East	314.0	9.0	524.0	5.0	2,178,2	8.0
(F)USSR	4.5	0.1	1,403,8	13.5	5,634,5	20.8
Sub-total	1,027,4	29.4	3,108,4	29.8	10,593,8	39.1
EU 4	1,955.3	55.9	5,537	53.1	12,801,5	47.3
Other	515.3	14.7	1,782,8	17.1	3,681,8	13.4
TOTAL	3,497,9	100.0	1,0428,2	100.0	27,077,1	100.0

Source: Calculated from the data provided by the General Directorate of Security. Unpublished data provided by the GDS (1988), Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu (2000, 2009).

In general, we have to state that it is a really hard task to estimate the amount or the share of irregular migrants within these arrivals, even though research and observations indicate that there are “many”. The arrival of circular migrants, either for trading or for working from the regional countries, has become a social reality in daily life, even though these migrants are registered as “touristic” arrivals. In order to make a rough estimation, we are representing the results of periodic research conducted by the State Institute of Statistics, which is designed to follow the developments in the “tourism” sector in the Table 2.

⁵ Balkans: Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, (F)Yugoslavia; Middle East: Iran, Iraq, Syria; (F)USSR: for comparison, members of USSR are recalculated; EU4: for comparison, Greece, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Latvia and Romania are excluded as they are calculated in other categories.

Table 2: Reasons for the Arrival of Foreigners in Turkey (ooo)

	2001	2001	2009	2009
	Numbers	Percentage	Numbers	Percentage
Excursion, travel, etc.	6,276,3	55.7	15,680,3	57.4
Visiting relatives	794.7	7.1	2,826	10.4
Business, shopping, etc.	2,072,6	18.4	2,539,8	9.3
Other	2133	18.8	6,268,1	22.9
Total	11,276,5	100.0	27,314,2	100.0

Source: Calculated from the data collected from "Survey on Foreigners" conducted at borders during departures. Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu (2001, 2009).

According to this survey, nearly 40 % of the entries were made for non-touristic purposes. Unfortunately, we do not have the data on a country basis. But still, we may claim that a liberal visa regime is providing not only touristic or cultural interactions but also other social and economic ones within the regional countries.

As we mentioned before, in spite of Turkish "liberal" border policy, legislation for foreigners for longer staying (and thus for having access residence or work permits) is very restrictive and reflects the characteristics of a "closed" society.⁶ Moreover, as Turkey is applying the original geographical limitation of the 1951 Refugee Convention, refugees from non-European countries cannot obtain refugee status, even though they can wait in Turkey until the UNHCR's final decision.⁷ Thus, for a foreigner, even though to enter is relatively liberal, to settle and/or to enter the working life through formal ways is not an easy task. Within these conditions, "irregularity" for some of the foreigners, mostly for circular migrants, is a common situation they will face after arrival.

The amount of foreigners living in Turkey within "formal" regulations is presented in Table 3. According to the official records, there are nearly 175,000 registered immigrants, whereas only 11 % are staying with working permit, 16 % are students and 73 % are falling into "various" categories including fam-

⁶ Erder (2007), Güzel/Bayram (2007). For a more detailed analysis, see the report on the research project (UGİNAR- International Migration, Labor Force and Population Movement) sponsored by Marmara University, which investigated the conditions of foreigners in the formal and the informal labor market in 2000–2001 (Arı [2007]).

⁷ Kirişçi (2002).

ily members (spouses and children) and asylum seekers waiting for the UN-HCR's final decision.

Table 3: Foreigners Living with a Residence Permit

	2000	2008
Work permits	24,198	18,900
Students	24,574	28,597
Other	119,275	127,429
Total	168,047	174,926

Source: General Directorate of Security, unpublished data (2000), Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü (2008).

State authorities consider a foreigner who breaches migration legislation (passport, visa, residence and work permit) to be an “illegal migrant”. However, there is no information or systematic estimation on the number of “illegal migrants”, apart from the statistics on the total number of migrants apprehended. Those “illegal migrants” are mostly arrested for violating either passport legislation or entered into or exited from the country illegally. As it is known, enforcement operations for the violation of residence or work permits are not strictly applied, unless they are related with “criminal” activities.

Table 4: Total Number of Illegal Migrants and Human Smugglers Apprehended in Turkey

Year	Illegal Migrants	Human Smugglers
2003	56,219	937
2004	61,228	957
2005	57,428	834
2006	51,983	951
2007	64,290	1,242

Source: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı (2010).

According to the official data, more than 50,000 migrants are apprehended yearly in Turkey and more than 700,000 migrants were apprehended during 1995–2007. Table 4 outlines yearly apprehension numbers of the “illegal” mi-

grants and human smugglers in Turkey. Since 2003, Turkey has considered human smuggling and human trafficking activities as “organized crime” and has started to apply an active policy for combating these activities.⁸

In general, it is obvious that there is no methodologically reliable estimation on the real volume of “irregular” migrants. However, some statements frequently appearing in the media, reflecting the rough guesses of experts or bureaucrats and/or media myths, are within the range of from 150 thousand to two million. In general, these figures, besides the “rumors”, stigmas and other media-generated prejudices, reflect the contradictory reactions to the arrival of foreigners in the Turkish labor market. Mostly, trade unions and employee organizations have anti-immigrant tendencies, and they are very effective in the formation of the rules of the formal labor market as being organized by pressure groups. Trade unions consider foreign “irregular” workers as “rivals” to native workers, as they are weakening the struggle against the “informal” economy and sustaining the subsistence of insecure working conditions. Employee organizations are also against “irregular” foreign workers, as they are enlarging the “informal” job market and creating a milieu for the continuation of unfair competition by exploiting “cheap” labor. In a way, some of the exaggerated estimations are used for lobbying to force government and for taking severe measures against their employment,⁹ whereas some of them are reflecting the xenophobic tendencies.

In general, we may claim that the irregular migrants from regional countries are finding their way in the “informal” labor market, which is quite large and vivid in Turkey. Table 5 outlines some major indicators of the Turkish labor market. As may be seen from this table, the Turkish labor market consists of a young and male-dominated population working mostly in the non-agricultural sectors. More than 40 % of the employment is informal. In general, we may argue that the informal economy and the informal labor market are some of the major characteristics of the Turkish economy which reflect the structural difference from the West.

In this article, we are not going to discuss the reasons or the impacts of the informal economy in Turkey. We only want to point to this difference, which will help us to understand the relative position of the irregular foreign

⁸ Erder/Kaşka (2003).

⁹ For example, in a recent article published in the journal of an employer organization (TUSIAD-Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği), the total number of “illegal” foreign workers is estimated as two million, which is the topmost (Karaarslan [2011]).

migrants in Turkey. In the following part of this paper, we will describe the major areas of employment of migrant labor by reviewing the findings of the research.

Table 5: Some Indicators on the Turkish Labor Market (ooo) (2009)

Population Age + 15	51,686
Participation Rate	% 47.9
Male	% 70.5
Female	% 26.0
Employment	21,277
Agriculture	5,254
Non Agriculture	16,023
Rate of Unemployment	% 14.0
Agriculture	% 1.8
Non-agriculture	% 17.4
Undocumented Employment	% 43.8

Source: TÜİK Household Survey from Annual Report of Central Bank of Turkey (2009).

The Position of New Migrants in the Turkish Labor Markets

The existing information on the new migratory movements shows that apart from regular migrants, there are two different categories of irregular migrants directed to Turkey. The first category consists of transit migrants, who violate the rules when crossing the borders. They aim to obtain refugee or asylum-seeker status in Turkey or in other countries. The second includes circular migrants, who aim to work in Turkey by keeping their ties close with their home countries. It is clear that these two categories are different from each other in terms of origin, migration pattern and access to the labor market in Turkey.

The Limits and Potentials of Legal Framework

As it is pointed out above, in terms of the institutional and legal framework, Turkey was caught somewhat unawares by the new migration flows. In other words, the legal framework did not foresee the sudden and massive influx of people. In this context, immigrants try to find a place by using Turkey's "liberal border policy", the informal labor market and its incoherent migration regime.

With regards to irregular migration, until 2003, the lack of a proper and systematic legal framework had been an important point repeatedly raised by the authorities, and it was this necessity that stimulated the attempts to develop new laws and regulations in parallel with the ongoing migratory flows.

Although the migration regime of Turkey has been and will be changed, though slightly, according to the ongoing developments (for instance the new bilateral visa regulations for Syrians, Russians, etc.), there are two main pieces of legislation that may have significant effects on irregular migrants.

Firstly, in 2003, the Turkish Parliament introduced some changes to the Turkish Citizenship Law. As we mentioned before, the acquisition of Turkish citizenship for a foreigner particularly with a non-Turkish origin is a hard assignment. Before being amended, the Turkish Citizenship Law played an important role in the sharp increase of acquisition of citizenship through marriage. The amendment has made it more difficult for a foreigner to acquire Turkish citizenship through marriage by imposing a three-year waiting period before a foreign spouse may obtain Turkish nationality. Therefore to become a "regular" migrant through marriage has become more difficult. Nevertheless, marriage may still seem to be an option in "regularizing" a migrant's status.

Secondly, in the same year, the Parliament enacted the Law Concerning Work Permits for Foreigners. This law provides for a system of work permits and the related rules that will make it easier for foreigners to work in Turkey. (Please see Table 3, which gives information on the total number of foreigners with residence and working permits). While earlier various ministries and government institutions could grant work permits, this law designates the Ministry of Labor and Social Security as the main responsible official institution for issuing work permits. On the other hand, this law opened up an opportunity for some of the irregular migrants to be formally employed, which was not possible before. However, the impact of this law is quite limited considering the fact that only a small portion of migrants with resident permits hold work permits, for instance in domestic work. Therefore, we should emphasize

that this institution issues work permits predominantly for highly qualified laborers who are employed by local and global companies.

The Possibility of Becoming Regular or Irregular: Migrants in a Spectrum

As we have noted above, since the beginning of 1990s, Turkey has become a receiving country for migrants with different characteristics in terms of origin, ethnicity, gender, skill and expectations.

We have to state that even though Turkey is considering herself to be a country of “migration”, migration studies is a relatively neglected area in the social sciences. Recently, after the experience of “new” migration flows, migration studies has started to be a challenging area. Nowadays, the literature on migration to Turkey is increasing; researchers from different methodological backgrounds have started to focus on certain aspects of migration. However, some of them are descriptive and for some areas no data is available. Besides, we have to rely on rough estimations since official statistics are either lacking or not easily accessible for researchers. In this part of the article, we try to draw a picture of the relative position of migrants in the labor market, from the most advantageous to the most vulnerable ones, within the limits of the available data.

A “Special” Group of Migrants: Migrants with a Permit

As one may follow from the earlier arguments, formal channels for migrants are rather restrictive and thus, an overwhelming majority is pushed to remain “irregular” in one way or another. Thus, it is no exaggeration to define the group of migrants with residence and/or work permits as a “special” group. The available literature on migration is mostly concentrated with “irregular” migrants in Turkey. Luckily, there are few exceptions, which describe the origins, experiences and expectations of a “special” group of migrants.

According to Ulukan’s calculation, EU citizens and citizens of the neighboring countries, such as the Middle East and the Commonwealth of the Independent States, formed a majority of those applying for work permits.¹⁰

¹⁰ Ulukan (2007).

We have to admit that the most advantageous and therefore “special” group consists of EU citizens. Kaiser’s research on EU citizens to date has been one of the few studies conducted on this “special” group.¹¹ Kaiser estimates that between 100,000 and 120,000 EU citizens live in Turkey, in which Germans constitute the largest group, amounting to approximately 60,000.¹²

Apart from the EU nationals in Turkey, migrants who work in some specific sectors, like tourism and domestic work, can obtain a “regular” status according to the 2003 Law we mentioned above. We still do not have evidence to measure the impact of the law on the tourism industry.

As it is known, tourism is one of the most important sectors in Turkey in terms of its contribution to the national income and employment. Like domestic work, the tourism industry is one of the most popular sectors for women migrants in Turkey. It is also a sector where migrant women are not in an open competition with Turkish workers. In these two sectors, the supply of local labor is limited. A migrant woman might work as a masseuse or as an animator, jobs which are not preferred by the Turkish women.

According to Dedeoğlu’s and Gökmen’s research findings, most of the migrant women interviewed in Marmaris, a popular holiday site, have formal jobs. They interviewed women from Russia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Chechnya who have formal jobs, as they attained Turkish citizenship through marriage.¹³ Apart from that “special” group, we are certainly aware that there is quite a large number of women employed in the tourism sector without a permit. However, it is almost impossible to know their exact number.

¹¹ Kaiser (2003).

¹² Kaiser classifies the EU citizens in Turkey as follows:

- (1) EU spouses of Turkish citizens, most of whom are women (more than 95 %).
- (2) Descendants of EU spouses of Turkish citizens, most of whom have double citizenship.
- (3) Retired EU citizens particularly living on the Southern coast of Turkey.
- (4) Alternative life-style seekers.
- (5) EU citizens of Turkish origin, most of whom are “pink card” holders.
- (6) Descendants of Western European immigrants to the Ottoman Empire.
- (7) Posted personnel whose majority is male and often accompanied by their spouses and children.

¹³ Dedeoğlu/Gökmen (2010).

Migrants in the Informal Labor Market

As mentioned before, despite the restrictions for foreigners to have work permit, the large and vivid informal labor market and liberal visa regime provide them opportunities to participate in the labor market through informal relations. The intention to employ foreigners in the Turkish labor market is a new debate among social scientists in Turkey. The most common argument follows the lines of “exploitation of cheap labor” and “competition with native labor”. However, some of the research points out that they actually fill gaps in the labor market. In certain sectors of the labor market, they fill gaps deserted by natives, either due to the lack of necessary qualifications or due to cultural thresholds. Thus, we may claim that, in some sectors, there is almost no room for competition, while in other sectors there certainly is.

Even though it is a necessity to undertake further research, we may claim that there is a division of labor among migrants by origin, by gender and by purpose of stay. The migrants are not placed in the labor market haphazardly. At the first glance, we observe that irregular migrants mostly occupy certain areas of the informal labor market, such as agriculture, construction, small industry, domestic work and informal trading.

However, irregular migrants do not form a homogenous group. Circular migrants from regional countries, for instance, have relatively better positions in the labor market compared to transit migrants. Circular migrants do have possibility to construct trust relations with their employers, one that is crucial for survival in informality. In the following, we will try to describe these variations.

In a society in which informality is extensive, one of the niches that migrant women discover in the labor market is domestic work. Global care-givers (made up of women from the neighboring countries in the Turkish context, particularly the Moldovans) is the group whose migration and work patterns are well-known not only by the researchers but also by the public.¹⁴

Domestic work is absolutely one of the most common job opportunities for unskilled native women in Turkey and it constitutes an important and gendered part of informal labor market. Therefore, it is not possible to estimate an exact number. However, if one considers the fact that to employ a “servant” has always been a common practice in Turkey in middle-class houses, it is pos-

¹⁴ Akalin (2009), Kaşka (2009).

sible to predict its significance. The novelty in this area is the attempt to formalize this area only by including a small portion of domestic workers performing their jobs in cleaning companies. Therefore, it is not surprising that the total of registered local domestic workers was 3204 in 2010.¹⁵

Since the 1990s, migrant women have been employed in middle- and upper-middle-class houses for cleaning, cooking and caring. Like the tourism sector, it is impossible to estimate their number. However, it can be easily predicted that their number will increase owing to trends in changing demographic patterns and the Turkish welfare regime, which depends on informal institutions like family. Women from different countries (like Moldova, Bulgaria, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and the Philippines) work informally in domestic works.

The 2003 Law has made it possible to obtain a work permit for domestic workers. Nevertheless, since this date, the total number of work permits issued has been negligible, namely 48 in 2005.¹⁶ Therefore, it is obvious that domestic work is informal both for locals and migrants. However, as Akalin (2009) points out, migrant domestic workers are “shuttling regularly between documentedness and undocumentedness” in being shuttle or circular migrants.

The construction sector, like domestic work, offers informal jobs to unskilled men, both to rural migrants and migrants from the neighborhood countries. Akpınar’s research provides information on male migrants in Turkey working in the construction sector. He interviewed migrants from Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan. Migrants from Afghanistan are transit migrants, who have to wait in Turkey during their search for finding a channel to enter European countries. We have to state that the degree of irregularity differs among migrant groups; whereas migrants from neighboring countries shuttle with a tourist visa, most of the Afghan migrants enter illegally. Therefore, transit migrants are working in the waiting room.¹⁷

The textile sector, like tourism, is another important industry in Turkey in terms of its share in the national income and employment. The sector mainly depends on small-scale workplaces and it offers informal jobs in the cities particularly to male, female and child migrants from rural Turkey. Now this sector also offers informal jobs to the migrants from neighboring countries.

¹⁵ Karadeniz (2011, p. 111).

¹⁶ Kaşka (2009).

¹⁷ Akpınar (2009).

Dedeoğlu's and Gökmen's research (2010) gives some information on migrants working in the textile industry in Turkey. The research is conducted in Istanbul and focus on a specific migrant group: Azeris. This research clearly shows that Azeris are working, particularly in small-scale workshops, which is the main feature of the Turkish textile industry. Not only Azeri women but also their children work in the textile ateliers in the periphery of Istanbul.

The migration pattern of Azeris seems to be determined by gender. Dedeoğlu and Gökmen emphasize that Azeri women stay in Turkey after their tourist visa is expired but Azeri men fit in to the pattern of circular migration. Dedeoğlu and Gökmen explain this by looking at their position in the labor market: if women migrants have relatively permanent jobs, they stay in Turkey irregularly. But, men work in marginal and temporary jobs while they are in Turkey.

Although there is only limited knowledge on the migrants working in agriculture, their existence particularly in the Northern part of Turkey is visible. In the Black Sea region of Turkey, seasonal jobs in agriculture have been becoming common in the last decade since the labor force remained insufficient. According to Pelek's recent research, most of the seasonal workers are coming from the Eastern and Southern Eastern Anatolia, whereas Georgians are also becoming new-comers to this area. Pelek observed that Georgians living in the neighborhood are circulating through tourist visas and working as seasonal workers, just like ethnic Kurds. Pelek observed a hierarchy among the seasonal workers: at the bottom are women and children who are ethnically Kurdish, then come male workers of Kurdish origin, Georgians and local workers subsequently. For Pelek, employers prefer Georgians, since they are evaluated as more hard-working employees and because of cultural similarities.¹⁸

Migrants in Informal Trade: An Umbrella Activity for Circulars

A complete novelty brought by the new migratory flows represents itself in another area: informal trade.

Since the 1990s, thousands of migrants from the Eastern European and former Soviet Union countries have begun to come to Turkey for trade activities. This activity is called in Turkey "suitcase/luggage trade", which implies both its small-scale nature and the vague legal status of the transactions.

¹⁸ Pelek (2010).

Although the term implies small-scale trade activities, it consists of a considerable amount of foreign trade income for the Turkish economy.¹⁹ Although its volume is fluctuating, “suitcase trade” is a very important aspect of migration. This activity also represents the peculiarity of the Turkish case as a product of a liberal visa regime and an informal labor market.

Yükseker’s innovative research gives very detailed information on this trading activity.²⁰ In this research, Yüksekser explores the complexity of trading activities, serving as an umbrella also for those who are employed in different sections of the labor market, including sex work.

Yükseker indicates that undocumentedness is the most important aspect of the shuttle trade: production, transportation and sales are mainly unregistered. A district in Istanbul, Laleli, is the most visible site of this activity. Migrants from the former Soviet Union and rural migrants from East Anatolia have developed interactions socially, economically and personally in this district.

The Dark Side of Irregular Migration: Trafficking and Sex Workers

As we repeatedly argue in this article, the new migration movements have been experienced for more than 20 years in Turkey in an overwhelmingly informal context. Informality with its many aspects may provide some benefits for some migrant groups. It is that reason that this flow continues in an accelerated manner. However, informality may have harmful, risky and threatening consequences for some other migrant groups. In other words, trafficking in human beings appears as the dark side of irregular migration. Irregular migration, by nature, contains in itself exploitation, deception, insecurity and threats from official institutions, mostly fear of police, for all groups of migrants and for both women and men. However, those who are working in the sex industry are particularly the most vulnerable migrants.

The serious attempts and activities of the International Organization of Migration (IOM) in Turkey have brought this issue into the official institutions’ agenda, and into public opinion. Moreover, it stimulated and supported research activities.²¹

¹⁹ About ten million USD in the 1990s, while the official export income amounts to 25 million USD.

²⁰ Yüksekser (2003).

²¹ Erder/Kaşka (2003), Ayata et al. (2008).

According to Turkish legal regulations, although licensed sex work is not a crime in Turkey, it is prohibited for foreigners. However, our research confirmed the growing importance of the sex industry in Turkey and the involvement of foreign women. The activities related to “trafficking in women” between Turkey and the Eastern European countries are intermingled with massive irregular migration movements and are concealed in tourist activities, entries for irregular work, the sex trade, regular and irregular trade and migration with the intention to settle.

Conclusion

The Turkish migration experience reflects the interaction of a vivid and large informal labor market and a liberal visa regime. In this context, some “irregular” migrants have learned about the specific rules of informality and created relatively “regular” trust relations. These are crucial for surviving in the informal labor market, not only for foreigners but also for the natives. For some of the employers, the legal situation of migrants vis-à-vis the state authorities do not have much importance, as they are more interested in the rules of the informality. Thus, the term “irregular”, in Turkey, like for the other peripheral countries, does not refer to the same feature observed in societies, where informality is negligible.

We have to note that the “informal” labor market has also stratifications, conflicts and competitions within it, just like other markets. Thus, irregular migrants find themselves in different positions according to gender, origin and legal status in this market. Circular migrants, who are involved in the trading activities, may have a better position in the informal labor market compared to the transit migrants struggling to survive in the “waiting room” or trafficked women as the most vulnerable ones. It should be noted, however, that the welfare system is too far to reach all irregular migrants.

The Turkish liberal border policy provides rich examples of the effects of circular migration, on migrants and countries on both sides of the borders. However, some trade unions, industrialists and xenophobic circles have some reservations and reactions to this policy. But still, Turkish authorities consider this policy as a “win-win” policy and do not take measures to discourage the entries from regional countries. Meanwhile, as we know, the Schengen visa regime will not allow the continuation of this “flexible” border regime.

For future prospects, we may predict that if Turkey will be a part of Schengen regime, the relative position of Turkey in the global migratory flows will change dramatically. Turkey will continue to be a hub for refugees and asylum seekers coming from regional countries; however, for circular migrants it will lose its attractiveness and will not be a convenient destination anymore.

If it happens without fundamental reforms in the welfare regime, migration policy and burden-sharing implementations with European countries, the situation of the transit migrants will be worsened. And, moreover, if it happens, the term “irregular” may have the same content as it has in the European countries.

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Causes and Consequences of the Downturn in Financial Remittances to Turkey: A Descriptive Approach

Giulia Bettin, Seçil Paçacı Elitok and Thomas Straubhaar

Introduction

For decades, migrant remittances have been a fundamental external source of capital for the Turkish economy. Between 1960 and 1981, remittances covered about 80 % of the Turkish trade deficit and about 60 % of the current account deficit. In these earlier times, Turkey has been one of the top remittance recipients among all countries.¹ Due to the fact that remittances did not lead to an inverse outflow of capital by interest payments or other kinds of repayments, their impact on the balance of payments was more positive than it was with other monetary inflows (such as foreign direct investments [FDI] or loans), which would have the same effect in purely accounting terms.

Since the late 1990s, remittances to Turkey have declined sharply. This article evaluates the causes and consequences of the poor performance of aggregate remittances flows to Turkey in the post-1998 era. It presents an overview of relations between the changes in remitting behavior since the late 1990s to today and the dynamics of Turkish migration from an economic point of view and in its historical context. The paper also analyzes the trends in workers' remittances in the financial crises of 1994, 2000/1 and 2008 and questions the transformation of motives behind remitting decisions in the pre- and post-crises periods.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief overview about the changes of remittances to Turkey in the last decades. Section 3 discusses the determinants and the effects of remittances and Section 4

¹ İçduygu (2005 a).

goes into the reasons behind the declining trend in the remittance flows to Turkey after the year 1998. Section 5 concludes.


Remittances to Turkey

It is very well known that a large share of private money transfers is conducted via informal channels. This is the case for Turkey as well.² Consequently, the overall dimension of the phenomenon might be underestimated, if only official data are considered. Nevertheless, since estimations of informal remittances are extremely hard to provide, this is a common drawback affecting all empirical studies on aggregate remittance flows.³ In the case of Turkey, one of the most important data deficiencies is the lack of availability of remittance data disaggregated by country of origin. This might increase our understanding of the phenomenon, and be particularly useful to discern, if the fall in remittances is attributable to a different geographic pattern of Turkish emigration in the last decade compared to the previous ones.

Figure 1 presents the amount of remittances flows to Turkey from 1974 to today. The impact of consecutive devaluations in the Turkish economy following the oil crisis of 1974 upon the remittances trend in the 1970s is quite visible in Figure 1. Two factors played a role in the 1980s, namely liberalization in trade/finance following the military coup of 1980 and encouragement programs of Western Europe to promote return migration. The 1999 earthquake in Turkey and the financial crisis after the mid-1990s had remarkable effects on the remittances trend of 1990s and 2000s. Overall, it is sufficient to argue that between 1974 and 1988, with some tiny exceptions, the volume of aggregate remittances increased; whereas, there occurred a dramatic decline after 1998.

² Officially recorded remittances were greatly surpassed by the "luggage trade" made by migrants to Turkey. Non-recorded remittances may have reached six billion USD, surpassing by far the recorded remittances of about 1.2 billion USD; see İçduygu (2008).

³ Freund/Spatafora (2008).

Figure 1: Remittances to Turkey, 1974–2009, Million USD

Source: World Bank staff estimates based on the IMF Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook.


Remittances from citizens living abroad sent to support families and relatives back home have been a very important source of capital accumulation for Turkey. Before the recent decade, they played an important role in feeding the Turkish economy with capital. At that time, the level of remittances was about four to six times higher than the level of FDI (see Figure 2). Today, remittances still are a significant source for the accumulation of capital; however, due to a dramatic increase of FDI, remittances have lost their overall significance and reached only one sixth of the level of FDI in the last six years.⁴

Recently, also remittance outflows from Turkey to the neighborhood have become more important. An increasing number of workers from the Black Sea area and the Middle East have come to Turkey to get a job that is better paid

⁴ While in the times of the “Gastarbeiter” system most of the remittances were either consumed (for buying a car, apartment or house) or invested in trade (bazaar shops) or transportation facilities (taxis), more recently remittances have more and more been used to build up construction sites, farms or small manufacturing enterprises. This is especially true for the use of Anatolian capital. Companies in Anatolia, such as Kombassan, Büyük Anadolu Holding, Yimpaş, Endüstri, Sayha, İttifak and Jet-Pa, were founded primarily with the savings sent by workers abroad (see Ömer, Acar and Toprak, *Anatolian Tigers*). Some of the Anatolian Tigers went through legal investigation and it is legally proven that these companies used workers’ remittances outside of its collection purposes. It is also very well known that some of these firms have strong links with Islamic foundations, media and press. Most of these firms, also named as Islamic capital or green capital, bankrupted and were accused of cheating migrants. It is also important to keep in mind that there are also some successful examples among Anatolian firms who functioned very efficiently and had no Islamic ties.

than at home. They remit parts of their income to their family members left behind in their region of origin. These economic activities have come to be known as the “suitcase trade”, due to the fact that not only money but also goods of all kinds have been sent back home. Along with the remittances sent home from Turkey, a growing number of joint ventures and Turkish FDI into the neighborhood have appeared.⁵

Figure 2: Remittances and FDI to Turkey, 1988–2008, Billion USD



Source: World Bank: Quick Query Database.⁶

The Determinants and the Effects of Migrants' Remittances

The level of remittance flows depends on both the migrants' ability (income and the savings from income) and the motivation they have to remit savings back to the home country. The propensity to remit depends also on the duration of migration (whether it is temporary or permanent), the family situation of migrants (the partner, children) and the connections they have in the home

⁵ Kirişçi/Tocci/Walker (2010, p. 19).

⁶ “Remittances (R) compared to FDI” means: if value =1, then R = FDI, if >1, then R > FDI; if < 1, then R < FDI.

(whether migrants move alone or with other family members, and whether they keep attachments to those left behind).⁷

Why Do Migrants Remit? Some Theoretical Expectations

When looking at the motives that migrants have to remit, no general theory of remittances exists, as Stark (1991) highlights. The studies that analyze this topic provide descriptive evidence and empirical results that are limited to a certain geographical, socio-cultural and temporal context. The literature usually distinguishes between pure altruism, pure self-interest and informal agreements with family members left in the home country and portfolio management decisions. Pure altruism refers to the fact that migrants care about relatives left behind and derive utility from the welfare of his/her relatives. The altruistic model predicts that the amount of remittances should increase with the migrant's income⁸ and decrease with the domestic income of the family. Remittances should also decrease over time: the attachment to the family gradually weakens and migrants may decide to settle permanently in the host country followed by their family members.⁹

The second motive for remitting money may be pure self-interest. Migrants may remit money to their parents driven by the aspiration to inherit, if it is assumed that bequests are conditioned by behavior. Moreover, remittances could ensure migrants that relatives left behind take care of the assets they still own there.¹⁰ The intention to return home may further promote remittances for different types of investment (real estate, financial assets, public assets, social capital): migrants that experience a "return illusion" are shown to remit more than those experiencing a "permanent settlement syndrome".¹¹

A more eclectic model labelled "tempered altruism" and "enlightened self-interest" by Lucas and Stark (1985) sets remittances in a family framework of decision-making, as a component that is endogenous to the migration process. At the household level, to allocate certain members as migrants might well represent a Pareto-superior strategy, and remittances represent the mechanism for redistributing the gains in terms of both risk-spreading ("implicit co-

⁷ Munshi (2003).

⁸ Lucas/Stark (1985).

⁹ Lowell/de la Garza (2000).

¹⁰ Brown (1997).

¹¹ Glytsos (1988, 1997).

insurance agreement”) and investment in the education of young family members (“implicit family loan agreement”).

In the implicit co-insurance model, at the beginning the migrant plays the role of the insured while the insurer bears the initial costs of the migration project. The potential migrant is hardly expected to be able to cover all the expenses alone. Later on, he might become an insurer for the family members back home when he finds secure employment, and has high enough earnings to remit.¹² By receiving remittances, the family will then have the opportunity to improve its consumption, to undertake investment projects including much more risk and thus reach a higher level of utility. In the loan agreement model, remittances are assumed to be the repayment of an informal and implicit loan contracted by the migrant for investment in education and migration costs. In a second stage, remittances become loans made by migrants to young relatives in order to finance their education until they are themselves ready to migrate. Finally, in the third stage, before returning to the country of origin, migrants use remittances to invest in assets at home. Later, the next generation of emigrants repay the loan to the former emigrant lenders, who may have retired in the home country. Given the nature of the loan, remittances cannot consequently be reduced over time – as the co-insurance or altruistic theories predict – and are mainly used for consumption purposes.

Migrants could also have a saving target; thus, they want to return home with a certain amount of savings. Remittances are part of a bargaining process between the migrant and the family left at home. The claim of the family on a migrants’ income can be considered as the demand side and the ability of the migrant to remit (income and savings) represents the supply side for remittances. The migrant wants to reach the saving target and to minimize the drain from his income, be it in the form of consumption expenses in the host country or remittances to the family. The family, on the other hand, wants its income to be larger than that of the neighbors in order to justify the decision to send some family members abroad. In this set-up, the amount of money remitted depends on the migrant’s income, the per capita income in the home country and the bargaining power of the two sides. The remittance behavior might be different whether migrants move for permanent settlement or just temporarily. Incentives to remit could be higher for temporary migrants¹³ since

¹² Lucas/Stark (1985).

¹³ Galor/Stark (1990).

the attachment to the home country declines over time.¹⁴ On the other hand, the longer the time spent in the host country, the higher the wages, so in principle migrants could have the chance to remit more, if interested. Lucas points out that remittances may initially rise, and then decline with duration of stay, which “would suggest an optimal length of stay to maximize remittance flows, balancing greater earning power against diminishing attachment”.¹⁵

All the models mentioned so far refer to the individual motives to remit rather than to macroeconomic dynamics of these flows, which certainly reflect individual decisions at an aggregate level. Anyway, there might be some macroeconomic factors, both in the host and home country, which may significantly affect the size of remittances. Part of migrants’ savings may be remitted for reasons of relative profitability of savings/investing in the home country, and can be explained in the framework of a portfolio management choice where relative macroeconomic factors in the host and home country play a key role: among the others, interest rates, exchange rates, inflation and relative rates of return on different financial and real assets.

Taking this into account, governments of migrant-sending countries used to implement incentives schemes (i. e., premium exchange rates, foreign exchange deposits with higher returns, etc.) in order to attract remittances, but they were not really successful. As far as Turkey is considered, empirical analyses for the period 1963–1982 show that neither variations in exchange rates (reflecting the will to attract remittances by premium exchange rates), nor changes in the real interest rates (reflecting the intention to attract remittances by foreign exchange deposits with higher interest rates) seemed to significantly affect the size of remittance flows. Remittances towards Turkey were much more affected by the prospect of political stability rather than actual economic returns.¹⁶

It should be rather clear that these different hypotheses concerning remittance behavior are not mutually exclusive since some or all of them could work at the same time and the predominant element might change between periods and individuals. A universal framework therefore is the challenging task to be reached.¹⁷

¹⁴ Merkle/Zimmermann (1992).

¹⁵ Lucas (2004, p. 13).

¹⁶ Straubhaar (1986).

¹⁷ El-Sakka/McNabb (1999).

The different hypotheses attempting to explain remittance motivations – pure altruism, pure self-interest, implicit family agreements, the migrant's saving target and portfolio management decisions – complement each other. Some or all of these motives together may simultaneously drive remittances, each one explaining a part of the amount remitted or a period of remitting practice. One motive can predominate over the other for a period or for a sample of migrants with the same characteristics, and their roles can be interchanged. This illustrates that the remittance phenomenon is a very complex one, and explains the difficulty in developing a universal theory of remittance determination. A very important recent assumption regarding the contribution of remittances in compensating the human capital loss of migrant-sending countries is that migrants' propensity to remit diminishes with education. There is little empirical work regarding this issue (an exception is Faini [2002]), but if confirmed by future research, the results would be outstanding. It would imply that high-skilled workers do not compensate (or compensate less) for the loss they induce to the economy they are leaving.

Which Effects from Remittance Inflows?

The literature about the impact of remittances in receiving countries is recent, but it has grown rapidly in the last years. Most of the analyses focus on three main issues. The *first* topic discussed is the direct impact of remittances on income distribution, poverty alleviation and individual welfare.

Migrant remittances unquestionably produce welfare effects in developing countries such as poverty alleviation, education and health improvements. At the national level, several studies¹⁸ show that even if the impact on poverty incidence is small, the reduction in the severity of poverty, measured by the poverty gap, is substantial. Many families that receive remittances are still below the poverty line, but their income level is much closer to the threshold than what it would be otherwise. Remittances contribute to increase households' disposable income, relaxing liquidity constraints; this can sort positive effects on educational choices for children. Yang (2008) considers the increase in remittance flows received by Philippine households after the appreciation of foreign currencies against the Philippine peso due to the 1997 Asian financial crisis. These positive income shocks enhance human capital accumulation, raising schooling enrollment rates and reducing therefore child labor. Cox, Ed-

¹⁸ See Adams (2004) for Guatemala and Taylor et al. (2005) for Mexico.

wards and Ureta (2003) find that remittances have a significant impact on school retention while other studies on the Mexican case¹⁹ document that remittances are associated with substantial health improvements, namely reduction in infant mortality and increase in birth weight.

Empirical contributions on the income distribution effects of remittances mainly use the Gini index and results are mixed. Although some scholars²⁰ found confirmation that remittances have an equalizing effect on income distribution, other studies show that remittances increase inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient.²¹ As a matter of fact, wealthier families, being more able to pay for the costs associated with international migration, may also be those who benefit the most from migrants' remittances. By means of a dynamic model of rural income distribution in two Mexican villages, Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki (1986, 1988) similarly found that the distribution effect of remittances depends ultimately on the migration history, and on the degree to which migration opportunities are distributed across households. When the migration process begins, information about destinations and employment possibilities is still limited and only wealthier households can afford to send migrants abroad. Consequently, wealthier families are the first to benefit from remittances, causing income inequality to rise. Later, as the chance to migrate spreads over a greater range of income classes, poorer households can benefit from remittances, too, and there is an equalizing effect on income distribution.

Clearly, to evaluate the overall effect of remittances on income distribution there are some factors to be taken into account: the level of initial inequality can vary according to the different environments, and disparities in results may be caused by differences in the empirical methods applied.²²

The *second* part of the literature discusses the effects of remittances on the economy as a whole, and specifically the impact on employment, productivity and growth. While there is little doubt concerning the positive microeconomic effects deriving from remittances, the mechanisms behind the macroeconomic consequences for the receiving countries are more complex. The magnitude of the development impact of remittances was assumed by

¹⁹ Hildebrandt/McKenzie (2005), Duryea et al. (2005), Lopez Cordova (2005).

²⁰ Taylor/Wyatt (1996), Taylor (1999).

²¹ Adams (1991), Rodriguez (1998), Adams (1998).

²² Rapoport/Docquier (2005).

many scholars to crucially depend on how this money was spent: consumption, housing, purchasing of land, financial saving or productive investment.

To the extent that remittances are channelled into investments, they can directly affect employment and growth on a long-term basis. Inflows of workers' remittances add to domestic sources of income to finance capital accumulation and, at the same time, they can contribute to lowering the cost of capital in developing economies via an improvement of the creditworthiness of domestic investors (collateral function). Glytsos (2002) for example shows that investments rise thanks to remittances in six out of the seven Mediterranean countries in his sample. In the same line, Leon-Ledesma and Piracha (2001) find a positive effect of remittances (through investments again) on productivity and employment for eleven transition economies in the period 1990–1999.²³

When remittances are used to fund consumption expenditures, short-run effects on economic output depend on different factors: purchased goods might be produced in the country, but also imported from abroad; moreover, an unexploited national productive capacity is needed to fulfill the increase in the internal demand of goods deriving from a higher household purchasing power.²⁴ One remittance dollar spent on basic needs may stimulate retail sales, which stimulate further demand for goods and services, which then stimulates output and employment.²⁵ In this line of reasoning, remittances might represent a possible offset to the decline in output as a result of emigration.²⁶ In the case of Central and Eastern European countries, Straubhaar and Wolburg (1999) showed that remittances do not compensate the welfare loss due to the emigration of the high-skilled workers to Germany.

The short-run impact of remittances on aggregate output has been estimated through a simple Keynesian multiplier effect. Glytsos (1993) calculates a remittance multiplier of around 1.77 in gross output for Greece,²⁷ while the es-

²³ See also Drinkwater et al. (2003).

²⁴ When the demand deriving from remittances falls on non-tradable goods, and the economy cannot meet this demand, remittances may generate an inflationary effect. The price for agricultural land in Egypt rose by 600 % between 1980 and 1986 due to remittances (Adams [1991]).

²⁵ Lowell/de la Garza (2000).

²⁶ Quibria (1997) shows that if low-skilled migrants emigrate, and remittances are in excess of the domestic income loss, then the welfare of the source country rises. If, on the other hand, migrants are high-skilled workers and/or if emigration is accompanied by capital, remittances have a welfare-increasing effect for the non-migrants only when the capital/labor ratio remains unchanged or rises in the country of origin. If the capital/labor ratio falls, the welfare effect is indeterminate or even negative.

timated value is around 3.2 for Mexico.²⁸ Ratha (2003) estimates that every remittance dollar spent in Mexico increased GNP by 2.69 USD in the case of urban households and by 3.17 USD in the case of rural households.

A further channel through which remittances may affect growth is the labor force participation of recipient households. Chami et al. (2005) underline that remittances take place in a context of asymmetric information due to the long distances between migrants and recipients. Therefore, remitters do not have the chance to monitor the final use remittances are destined to and moral hazard problems could induce recipients to decrease either their labor effort or the participation in the labor force, diverting additional income to the consumption of leisure.²⁹ Using panel methods on a sample of 113 countries, they show that a change in the remittance/GDP ratio is negatively related to economic growth confirming that the moral hazard problems in the use of remittances are severe. Clearly, in this context higher growth rates in developing countries might stimulate more conspicuous remittance flows. Therefore, the endogeneity of remittances needs to be addressed and the subsequent literature dealt with this problem showing contrasting results.

In two cross-section studies conducted by the IMF (2005) and Faini (2006) the coefficient on the remittance-to-GDP ratio in the growth regressions was positive but statistically insignificant. Acosta et al. (2008) instead analyzed a panel of 67 countries in the period 1991–2005 and found that remittances have a positive albeit modest influence on economic growth. These positive results were also confirmed through the studies on Latin American and Caribbean countries by Ramirez and Sharma (2008) and Mundaca (2009).

Other studies showed that, on average, remittances have either no significant influence on growth or, when significant, their effects are positive but very limited in magnitude.³⁰ However, things change when remittances are considered together with other determinants of economic growth: if interacted with a measure for financial development³¹ or with indicators for the qual-

²⁷ It is interesting to highlight the result that spending on consumption and investment produced similar multipliers of respectively, 1.8 and 1.9 in Greece. And contrary to common opinion, expenditure on housing was found to be very productive, with a multiplier of 2.

²⁸ Adelman/Taylor (1990).

²⁹ Gapen et al. (2006) using a dynamic general equilibrium model with remittances show that these flows reduce labor supply and lead to greater output volatility.

³⁰ Giuliano/Ruiz Arranz (2009), Catrinescu et al. (2009).

³¹ Giuliano/Ruiz Arranz (2009), Mundaca (2009).

ity of institutions³² in the second one, remittances prove to contribute significantly and positively to economic growth.

The *third* part deals with the contribution of remittances to the balance of payments. If remittances are a further income for the receiving household at a microeconomic level, they also represent an addition to the receipt side of the balance of payments at an aggregate level, giving a substantial contribute to ease crucial restraints imposed on the economic growth of developing countries. Remittances might help to offset chronic deficits by reducing the shortage of foreign exchange. When compared to other monetary inflows, i. e., financial aids, direct investments or loans, they show numerous positive aspects because their use is not linked to specific investment projects with high-import content, they bear no interest and do not have to be repaid. In addition, remittances are more stable than other private capital flows as a source of foreign exchange and empirically it has been proven that in some specific cases they exhibit an anti-cyclical behavior.³³

However, as mentioned before, this positive effect on the balance of payments may also come together with additional imports (and/or adverse inflation effects), if the additional demand induced by remittances cannot be met by expanding domestic output. Thus, a “boomerang effect” might occur in the case that remittances induce an increase of imports and trade balance deficits in the receiving country. Evidence shows that in Southern European countries the effect was small and remittance-induced imports between 1960 and 1981 accounted for 1 % in Spain and Italy, 4.9 % in Greece and 6.2 % in Portugal.³⁴

The demand for imported tradable goods stimulated by remittances can also lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate. This latter aspect is linked to the so-called “Dutch Disease” effect. A large inflow of capital, be it in the form of foreign aid or remittances, might cause an appreciation of the real exchange rate, with negative consequences for the tradable sector in terms of international competitiveness (exports on foreign markets become more expensive while imports on the domestic market become cheaper).³⁵ Rajan and Subramanian (2005), however, give evidence that private-to-private flows (hence remittances), unlike aid inflows, do not have systematic adverse effects

³² Catrinescu et al. (2009), Calderón et al. (2008).

³³ Straubhaar (1988), Buch et al. (2002), Buch/Kuckulenz (2004).

³⁴ Glytsos (1993), Straubhaar (1988).

³⁵ Amuedo-Dorantes/Pozo (2004), Lopez et al. (2007), Lartey et al. (2008).

on external competitiveness and empirical evidence from Egypt, Portugal and Turkey, although supporting such fears showed that the “Dutch Disease” effect remained marginal in most of the cases.³⁶

Some Empirical Evidence for Turkey

The existing empirical evidence for the determinants of migrants’ remittances to Turkey can be categorized into two groups.

The *first group* of studies is focused on macroeconomic and microeconomic determinants of remittances to Turkey. Van Delan et al. (2005) empirically examine the micro determinants of remittances and the effect of remittances on emigration intentions in a multi-country study including Turkey, Morocco and Egypt. It is shown in this 2005 study that, in all three countries, family ties and the net earnings potential of emigrants have stronger effects in the receipt of remittances than net earnings potential of households in the country of origin. They also conclude that the receipt of remittances has a positive effect on emigration intentions of household members living in the country of origin. With reference to the motives behind remittances, this study states that altruism and self-interest play equally crucial roles as driving forces. Analyzing the determinants of emigrants’ remittances from Germany to Turkey over the period 1963–1982, Straubhaar (1986) showed that flows of remittances towards Turkey have been attracted by the emigrants’ confidence in the stability of the Turkish government much more than by governmental incentives to attract remittances. It is argued that remittances towards Turkey are determined by the wage level in Germany and by the confidence the Turkish emigrants felt in the safety and liquidity of their investments in the country of origin. According to this study, neither interest rate nor exchange rate differentials between the host and home countries have an effect on remittances. Examining the macroeconomic determinants of remittances to Turkey by using time-series methods over the period 1992–2003, Alper (2005) shows that interest rate, price level, income and exchange rate are the main macroeconomic variables behind remitting behavior. It is also presented in the same study that, in the long run, investment motive is effective whereas consumption smoothing plays a role in the short run with respect to workers’ remitting behavior. Aydaş et al. (2004) assess the macroeconomic determinants of remittances in the case of Turkey using an OLS estimate for two periods, 1965–1993

³⁶ McCormick/Wahba (2004), Straubhaar (1988).

and 1979–1993, and conclude that black market premium, interest rate differential, inflation rate, growth, both home and host country incomes and periods of military regime significantly affect remittance flows. Köksal (2006) underlines the importance of Turkish commercial banks and the Central Bank of Republic of Turkey (CBRT) in attracting the remittances to Turkey in her paper analyzing the significance of financial infrastructure, which is rarely touched upon in the literature focusing on Turkey, as one of macro determinants of remittance behavior. Akkoyunlu and Siliverstovs (2007) analyze the influence that workers' remittances might exert on migration decisions via co-integration analysis for the 1964–2004 period. Their study shows the significance of remittances in explaining migration in the short and long run. In his work analyzing the determinants of return migration of Turkish immigrants in Germany, Kirdar (2005) finds that immigrants with a higher savings potential are more likely to return.

The *second group* of studies is centered on the cyclical characteristics of remittances. Sayan (2004) evaluates the business cycle properties of Turkish workers' remittances. Based on the official data set provided by the CBRT, Sayan (2004) constructs a data set based on several assumptions and weights and concludes that remittances are procyclical with the GDP in Turkey and acyclical with the German GNI (Gross National Income). In a related paper, Erdem-Yiğit (2005) presents that the cycles of the Turkish workers' remittances are procyclical against Turkish business cycles and acyclical against German business cycles. Sayan (2006) analyzes the behavior of workers' remittances flows over their respective business cycles. His study covers twelve developing countries over the period 1976–2003 and results for Turkey show acyclical behavior of aggregate inflows of remittances. When looking specifically at the remittances from Turkish workers in Germany, Sayan (2006) claims that remittances are countercyclical from 1987 to 1994 and then they become procyclical. This change in the author's view is mainly due to the financial crisis that has negatively affected the level of migrants' confidence in the home country. In the work of Sayan and Tekin-Koru (2007), it is shown again that remittances sent from Germany appear to be procyclical with the Turkish output. They follow the business cycle in Turkey by a lag of one quarter. Remittances then amplify business cycle fluctuations rather than smoothing them. No significant correlation is found between remittances and German output. Using Deutsche Bundesbank data for the period 1962–2004, Akkoyunlu and Khodolin (2006) provide contrasting results and state that the remittances of Turkish workers

in Germany positively respond to the changes in the German output and do not react at all to the changes in Turkish output.

It can be said that remittances did not turn into employment-creating investments yet failed to create positive externalities in terms of productivity. The strong desire to do self-employed work and to become a kind of an independent economic actor caused a considerable proportion of savings to be invested in small enterprises in the service sector in Turkey. Opening a small trading or service business, or buying a van or taxi, was expected to lay the foundation for an independent livelihood. The new service firms and workshops therefore began to compete with those already in existence, but this did not lead to a structural improvement in the sense of driving out inefficient firms. On the contrary, it fostered a kind of “bazaar capitalism” of barely viable, marginal firms condemned in the long run to incur debt or to go under.

Investment by workers’ societies was an exception. In 1966 Turks working in Germany had formed workers’ societies so that they could invest their savings jointly in industrialization projects rather than individually in the service sector. As they were not motivated solely by expectations of short-term profits but looked more to the maximization of benefits over the long term (such as ensuring permanent jobs for their members upon their return to their native region), these societies invested their funds mainly in underdeveloped industries and regions (such as Central and Eastern Anatolia, where more than half of the societies invested). Their overall contribution to industrial development was minor. The small plants producing only for regional needs were of limited potential and their orientation towards the local structural set-up ruled out any expansion in their activities from the very outset.

Thus, the effects in terms of economic development remained rather limited. Instead, remittances financed Turkey’s current account deficit to a certain extent, while increasing the import capacity. Hence, most of the studies discuss these limited effects and prove the non-productive aspects of remittance flows. Karagöz (2006) applies a time series regression in order to empirically prove the negative impact of remittance flows on economic growth over the period 1970–2005. Köksal (2006) highlights the inflationary effects and the negative influence of remittances on the exchange rate of the Turkish Lira in line with macroeconomic studies that analyze the so-called Dutch disease effect deriving from remittances.³⁷ Among the incentives that the Turkish Gov-

³⁷ Amuedo-Dorantes/Pozo (2004), Lopez et al. (2007), Lartey et al. (2008).

ernment used to channel remittances to productive economic activities, one can list special import privileges, premium exchange rates and high interest rates for foreign currency accounts in the CBRT. Additionally, in the late 1960s, three development projects took place so as to channel remittances towards investment and employment, the village-development co-operatives, workers' joint stock companies and the State Bank for Industry and Migrant Investment (DESIYAB). All of these attempts failed to be successful in the long term due to various reasons, which were deeply discussed in the literature.³⁸

However, one contribution departs from this dominant pessimistic view concerning economic consequences deriving from remittances. Koç and Onan (2004) in their study on international migrants' remittances and the welfare status of the left-behind families in Turkey, based on a 1996 Turkish International Migration Survey (TIMS-96), show that remittances are mainly used by households in order to improve their standard of living and to therefore contribute to reduce poverty and inequality. This approach is along the same lines as de Haas (2005), who underlines the inaccuracy of the idea that remittances are predominantly spent on excessive consumption and criticizes the inclination to denote expenditure on housing, health care, food and schooling as unproductive and non-developmental. De Haas (2005) argues that the impact of migration tends to be highly differentiated across time and space.

Finally, the ECORYS (2006) report on improving the efficiency of workers' remittances devotes one of its sections to the transfers from Germany to Turkey. According to this report, the falling trend of remittances to Turkey can be explained by two factors: the declining number of Turkish migrants (the declining number of remitters) and the weaker attachment of third- and fourth-generation migrants to the homeland. For İçduygu (2005 b), the declining trend of remittances in the first years of the 2000s can be explained through the economic downturn in host countries like Germany that has led to unemployment among Turkish emigrants and settlement of Turkish emigrants in the host countries, which means they send less money home. According to Karagöz (2006), a decrease in the workers' remittance flow since the early 2000s can be explained through the demographic change in Turkish emigrants' sociological structure and their entrepreneurial skills (which cause the drop in investment-oriented remittances). Aydaş (2005) also analyzes the drop in the remittance flow in 1999 (the year of the earthquake) and sees it as evi-

³⁸ See Yüksel (1982), Köksal (2006), Güven (1977), Tatar et al. (1989), Ersun et al. (1997), Martin (1991).

dence showing the dominance of the investment motive (rather than the altruism motive) as the possible reason behind remitting. According to Avcı and Kirişçi (2008), falling emigration and the permanent settlement of migrants are the main reasons behind the shrinking amount of remittances. Erzan (2009) in his paper estimating the direction and magnitude of the global economic crisis on remittances (including Turkey), concludes that the EU slowdown, which will reduce the financial capacity of immigrants, will dominate over the increased need for funds at home, curtailing the remittances received by developing countries. Erzan (2009) argues that the magnitude of this decline may differ considerably across countries due to the fact that the impact of growth at home and in the host country on remittances had been changing over time.

The Dramatic Drop of Remittances to Turkey in the Post-1998 Era

Permanent Residency in the Host Country and Loss of "Return" Idea

The change in the demographical structure in the Turkish population in Europe is one of the most important determinants of declining remittance flows to Turkey, according to ECORYS (2006) and Avcı and Kirişçi (2008). The relatively declining pattern of a migrant population of Turkish origin may be explained by the increasing legal restrictions on migration flows generally considered, and specifically on flows from Turkey in some cases, i. e., Germany. These restrictions could force migrants to abandon their plans for temporary migration and to stay on a long-term basis because of the increasing difficulties in being readmitted in the host country. It is possible to observe that long-term migrants with a Turkish background gradually lose the dream of returning eventually to their homeland. This automatically translates into weaker ties of the second and third generation of migrants with the country of origin. The link between the intention to return and the amount of money sent home is rather obvious. When planning to go back, migrants consider their home country as the center of their economic interests and are inclined to remit instead of investing money in the host country. In our case, the remitting behavior of first-generation migrants backed up with the "return to Turkey with the family" dream has lately dissolved and has not been pursued by the new generations that are progressively turning into permanent residents (and

in some case, citizens) of their host country. Reform in the German Nationality Law in 1999 (which came into force in 2000) also played an important role in the amount of remittances to Turkey due to the naturalization of Turkish migrants. The new law, to a certain extent, made it easier for migrants residing in Germany on a long-term basis (eight years with permanent residence) and also for the children of migrants to acquire German citizenship.

Change in Socio-economic Status: the Second and Third Generations as Entrepreneurs Investing in Their Own Business

As migrant entrepreneurship literature showed us, the majority of Turkish migrants are self-employed, and instead of remitting in Turkey, their savings are channeled towards local business in the host country. According to Micro-census 2007, among the self-employed persons with a migration background in Germany the largest group of the entrepreneurs is represented by Turks. In early 2000s, only in Germany, there were more than 50,000 businessmen of Turkish origin providing jobs to over 250,000 persons.

Invisible/Informal Channels: Islamic Foundations and the Corruption of Money Invested by Turkish Migrants

The 1990s were a scene of organizational grouping of Turkish migrants under various Islamic groups some of which with extreme religious tendencies. Differently from the first two decades of Turkish migration to Europe, religion as a founding element of migrant identity became politicized for the first time. This religious uprising was in parallel with the internal political developments of Turkey and most of these organized foundations were representatives or foreign branches of already-existing Turkish head offices. By the late 2000s, both German and Turkish governments increased supervision measures not only on the political activities of these foundations but also on their budgets. Due to the lack of data on the amount of money siphoned away from the Muslim community in Europe, it is difficult to judge its role in the general dropping tendency of post-1998 remittances behavior. However, it is acknowledged that some parts of Muslim migrants' savings were used and corrupted under the name of "donation" via these foundations. Hence, migrants who voluntarily supported these unions financially spared some percent of their money for "mutual aids/solidarity funds" instead of remitting. However, it is

important to keep in mind that these religious oriented migrant networks explain only some part of informal channeling.

Change in Calculations

Some parts of the decline in remittances, especially the sharp declines in the early 2000s, are due to the change in the calculation/classification of remittances by the CBRT. Before 2003, workers' remittances included three main items; namely, foreign exchange remittances converted into Turkish Lira, Turkish Lira conversion from foreign exchange accounts of Turkish citizens living abroad and money they spent during their visit in Turkey. In 2003, the CBRT introduced a new method and reclassified the last two items of workers' remittances under tourism revenues. However, under the new classification, these data do not allow us to see these two items separately under the tourism revenues item. Hence, it is impossible to distinguish the real impact of the new calculation method in the drop of remittances.

In the case of Turkey, in which tourism is one of the leading economic sectors, receiving the tourism incentives from state is very crucial for entrepreneurs. This new method of classification artificially shows a tourism hump, so that the political environment for lobbying for incentive-receiving for tourism activities is eased. In 1992, remittances data became monthly.

Drop in Interest Rate and Rise in Tax

Turkish commercial banks and the CBRT have been playing a crucial role for attracting the remittances to Turkey.


There exist two types of foreign currency bank accounts in which Turkish workers living abroad can open with the CBRT so as to deposit their savings, namely the foreign currency deposit account with credit letter (FXA) and the super foreign currency account (SFXA).³⁹ The crucial aspect of these accounts (introduced in 2011) for the scope of this study is the interest rate that is paid

³⁹ Individuals eligible for opening Foreign Currency Deposit Accounts with a Credit Letter and Super FX Accounts are real persons over eighteen years of age having residence or working permits abroad or the right thereto as Citizens of The Republic of Turkey (possessing The Republic of Turkey Identity Card/passports) or possessing "Certificates Regarding the Use of Rights Under the Law No. 5203". Persons authorized to work abroad for a long term by the public agencies and those employed at the representative offices and bureaus abroad of the public and private sector organizations are also entitled to open these accounts. Citizens having a Credit Letter and Super FX Accounts may continue their accounts under the prevailing legislation also after their final return to Turkey. Please visit <http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/yeni/eng/> for detailed information on these accounts.

by the CBRT and the amount of tax that is deducted from the overall interest rate payment. Figure 3 presents three indicators; namely, the interest rate on FXA as a percentage, the interest rate in SFXA as a percentage and the amount of tax deducted from the interest payment on FXA and SFXA in total in million euro terms (one-year time deposit account).

As it is presented in Figure 3, there is a declining trend in the interest rate and an increasing trend in the volume of tax. These two opposing trends give us a hint about the dramatic drop of aggregate remittance flows by the end of 1990s. With respect to FXA, the main drop in the interest rate after a steady state since 1994 is in 2001, the year of the global financial crises. Following years witness a drop of almost 1 % each year. A similar trend is applied to the SFXA over the period 2001–2004, when the interest rate fell from 9 % to 3 %.

Figure 3: Interest Rate (%) and Tax (Million Euro) for FXA and SFX⁴⁰




Source: Central Bank of Republic of Turkey, CBRT.

Thus, Turkish migrant workers gradually faced lower interest rates and higher tax ratios, which contributed to the decrease in remittances.

⁴⁰ The reason behind the reaching of the blue line (Tax on FXA and SFX in million Euro) is the lack of data after 2005.

Figure 4: Tax Applied to Remittances, 1987–2004, Percentage Change




Source: Central Bank of Republic of Turkey, CBRT.

These noticeable declines were not the sole determinants strengthening the negative incentive of workers' remitting behavior. As it is clearly shown in Figure 4, the pattern of tax volume that is deducted from the total interest payments both to FX and SFX accounts has been an increasing trend since the early 1990s. The distinct vault right after the year 1998 is worth mentioning.

At this juncture, it is also crucial to ask whether the Turkish workers' remittances have shifted away from the accounts in the CBRT to German or related European financial institutions. In order to shed light on this question, Figure 5 compares the interest rates of the CBRT, Turkish banks, German government bonds, LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) and EURIBOR (Euro Interbank Offered Rate) – (one-year time deposit account). It can be easily followed from Figure 5 that the CBRT interest rate on FXA and SFXA is above the other Turkish banks, German government bonds, LIBOR and EURIBOR in all periods. Hence, there was no interest rate advantage for workers to remit their savings into better paying options, neither in Germany nor in the rest of Europe. Yet, remittances still did fall and possibly shifted to non-financial instruments.⁴¹

⁴¹ It is crucial to underline the importance of the double taxation issue of Turkish workers' remittances in the case of Germany. Since the interest rate is considered as an income, at the end of fiscal year, migrants are obliged to declare the amount of income that they received due to remitting in Turkey and taxed according to German laws.

Figure 5: Comparison of Interest Rates Applied to Remittances, Percentage



Source: Central Bank of Republic of Turkey, CBRT.

Shift to the Euro in the EU and Crisis in Europe


By 2002, the shift of EU to the common currency, the Euro, had both positive and negative impacts on various macroeconomic indicators. It is agreed upon in the literature that for most of the cases, the impact of the new currency on the consumers' purchasing power, especially of migrants as the most vulnerable group, was negative. Particularly in the transition period (1999–2002), the impact on the cost of living was unbearable and this had a negative impact on the savings of migrants, which caused a decline in the remittances potential. This negative effect has been even more aggravated by the economic downturn in Germany and crisis in the EU area in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

Crises in 1994, 2000/1 and 2008/09

The crises that took place in 1994 and 2000/1 were deeply different from the one in 2008 due to their causes and characteristics. These differences are obvious and normal when one takes into account the different economic conjunctures of time periods. The 1994 and 2000/1 crises were financial in nature, whereas the 2008 crisis hit the non-financial sector the most.

The 1994 crisis was a result of a high-risk premium of private banks under a lack of enough supervision of the financial sector. Yet, due to the high fragility of the banking system, Turkish economy ended up with a liquidity and foreign exchange bottleneck.

Figure 6: Remitting Behavior in Crisis Periods, 1992–2009, Monthly Million USD



Source: Central Bank of Republic of Turkey, CBRT.

The 2000/1 crisis were the financial crises that originated from the fragile structure of the Turkish banking system. In November 2000, the crisis damaged state banks most due to the increasing size of “duty loss” accumulation and the necessity to finance them by short-term domestic bank liabilities. In February 2001, private banks were hit hardest because of their sensitivity to exchange rate risk.

In the post-2003 period, the Turkish economy followed a “high interest rate-low exchange rate-cheap import-high external indebtedness” policy. This policy carried the Turkish economy to a real economy crisis in 2008. Another major distinction between the 2008 crises and the previous two is about the duration of them. The 1994 and 2000/1 crises were one-time speculative collapses (temporary) whereas in 2008, the crises are defined as long-term stagnation (permanent).

In managing these three crises, the aim was to exploit remittances as a remedy to cushion the negative effects of the crisis on the Turkish economy but this consideration did not translate effectively enough into policies.

Comparing the patterns of remittance flows in the post-crisis eras gives us hints about the changing motivations of workers in remitting their savings in Turkey.

Figure 6 marks the three periods of consecutive crises from 1992 to 2009. In the post-1994 period, it is possible to observe a distinct increasing trend in the amount of remittance flows to Turkey. However, this trend is dramatically changing after the 2000–2001 crisis. The declining trend, which has already been observable since 1998, has become even stronger and reached its lowest level by the end of 2002. It is difficult to make observations about the post-2008 crisis period, since it is very recent and its effects are still not completely over. However, for the year 2009, we can at least argue that the Turkish economy did not experience any significant increase in the volume of remittances.

Reasons behind this dramatic change in trends are various. Firstly, it can be partly explained by the level of migrants' trust in the future of the Turkish economy. Each crisis made the investment motives weaker due to the instability and fragility of both banking and real sectors. Secondly, this pattern might be further strengthened by a more general shift in the motives to remit from altruism to strategic behavior, concerning the second and third generations of migrants investing in their own businesses in the host country. In the 1990s, Turkish migrants still showed strong family ties with their relatives left in the home country and used to increase the scope of their family support during times of economic downturns. Yet in the 2000s, strategic motives seem to prevail over the altruistic ones and since remittances are used to finance investments, the interest in investing in such an unstable country like Turkey declined.

Conclusion

The results of this paper are not only of academic interest but also carry crucial policy implications. Looking at the early migration history of Turkey, it is possible to conclude that Turkey's approach to the migration issues in the 1960s and 1970s were quite positive. In those years, migration had been considered as an opportunity and there was a common belief that development targets

might be achieved thanks to labor migration to Europe via an efficient use of workers' remittances. However, there occurred an imbalance between the wills and targets and the actual migration policies. Martin (1991) argues that it was not until the 1970s that the Turkish state recognized the importance of migration and began to implement policies about it. However, this recognition coincided with the halting of the recruitment of foreign workers (in Germany) from outside of Europe in 1973. In 1983, the "Voluntary Repatriation Encouragement Act" was introduced through which migrants were provided with financial incentives to return home. Later on, labor migration was accused of failing to have positive effects on the Turkish economy. However, the role of the Turkish state in this failure is rarely touched upon in the literature. Taking lessons from the past, Turkey ought to implement several policy measures in order to pull the amount of remittance flows back to its early 1990s levels. Among them, sound economic stability has the priority since, together with a stable political atmosphere, it would encourage Turkish workers abroad to invest in their home country and plan to return there in the future. Maximization of gains from remittances should stand at the core of policy decisions. Maintaining and advancing these gains will be the main policy challenge in the near future. A necessity for a shift in perceiving remittances as an external finance for the Turkish economy is urgent.

Put together, our analysis suggests that the decline in remittances might be due to different coexisting reasons. New generations of migrants have weaker ties with Turkey and they are progressively moving from the return idea to the willingness of settling permanently in the host country and investing in their own businesses there. At the same time, the contraction in remittance flows after the last two financial crises that hit Turkey in the 2000s shows that even if the investment motives could still play a role in determining remittance behavior, the instability of the Turkish economy and the consequent loss of trustworthiness probably played a key role in negatively influencing migrants' attitude towards remittances.

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Bordering the EU: Istanbul as a Hotspot for Transnational Migration

Barbara Pusch

Due to the large-scale migration from Turkey to Europe in general, and to Germany in particular, since the 1960s, Turkey has primarily been regarded as a migrant-sending country. This image of Turkey characterizes, however, only one aspect of the reality of Turkish migration. From a very general perspective, we can distinguish two phases in Turkish migration history: migration into the Ottoman Empire and the young Turkish Republic, and current global migration movements to Turkey.

In this context, it has to be stated firstly that Turkey received over 1,445,000 migrants of the Muslim religion and/or Turkish descent between 1870 and 1920. In addition to this, 836,826 migrants from the Balkans alone settled in Turkey in the first years of the Republic.¹ This migration flow included the population exchange with Greece and Bulgaria and was used as a tool for the homogenization of the population in the young Republic during the nation-building process. Parallel to the settlement of migrants of Turkish descent, we can also observe resettlement, displacement and annihilation of non-Muslims in Turkey.

Since the 1980s, the nature of migration flows to Turkey has changed dramatically. From the 1980s onwards, estimates put the numbers at up to 1 million (transit-) migrants from Iran, hundreds of thousands of Iraqi (transit-) migrants and refugees, three hundred thousand Turks from Bulgaria, suitcase traders, circular migrants and clandestine workers from Eastern European countries and the former USSR, transit migrants and refugees from the Middle East and Africa as well as an increasing number of mainly regular migrants

¹ Kirişçi (1998, p. 63).

from the Western world.² All in all, we can say that the migration flows towards Turkey have become much more diverse compared to their earlier counterparts. We can characterize Turkey today as a migration-sending, receiving and transit state.

At the crossroads of Asia, Africa and the European Union (EU), Turkey delineates the global rich from the global poor at the frontier of the EU. In migratory terms, the line between the global rich and global poor is visualized by strict EU migration regulations, spoken of literally as “Fortress Europe”. The geographical and political location of Turkey in general and Istanbul in particular is fundamental to Turkey’s migration reality.³

Istanbul as a global city is a hotspot for all the migration movements mentioned above.⁴ Istanbul is listed as an alpha-global city by the GaWC (Globalization and World Cities) research group: a glance at the world map of GaWC shows Istanbul as one of the very few economic centers and global cities at the frontier of the EU. This location of Istanbul illustrates its great importance in the region as center of the global modern economy and its attraction for various migrant groups.⁵

Figure 1: Map of Global Cities According to GaWC 2008



Source: Globalization and World Cities (GaWC) Research Network (2008).

² İçduygu/Kirişçi (2009, pp. 1–179).

³ İçduygu (2008), Kirişçi (2008).

⁴ İçduygu (2004 a, 2006), Lordoğlu (2008).

⁵ In my article, “Vom Tellerwäscher zum Millionär: Arbeitsmarktpartizipation von AusländerInnen in der Türkei”, I focus on the attractiveness of Istanbul for formal and informal labor migrants (Pusch 2010 a, pp. 119–138).

In this article, I want to analyze various forms of transnational migration to Istanbul. After a short overview of recent migration movements to Turkey and clarification of the theoretical concepts used in the article, I will focus on Istanbul, which is currently a rising global city. Istanbul's special location at the frontier of the EU has boosted this transformation process, which has also led to the construction of transnational social spaces in the city. Therefore, as a third step, I will focus on this transformation and analyze Istanbul as a hotspot for transnational migration movements. My expositions will basically be based on my own empirical research (Cultural Capital During Migration 2005–2008)⁶ and the analysis of other studies published recently by various scholars.

Migration Movements to Turkey/Istanbul

Migration to Turkey as such, as mentioned above, is not a new phenomenon.⁷ The enormous variety of migrants coming to the country, however, is a relatively new trend. According to Ahmet İçduygu and Kristen Biehl,⁸ we can state four main groups of foreign migrants in Turkey: *regular migrants*, *irregular labor migrants*, *irregular transit migrants* and *asylum seekers and refugees*.

Regular migrants represent only a small minority within the large variety of migrant types in Turkey. In 2008, only 174,926 foreigners – which is only 0.25 % of the whole population in the country – obtained a residence permit. As we see in Table 1, residence permits are awarded for work, study or other reasons such as marriage or parentage.

⁶ For the general outline of this project, see <http://www.cultural-capital.net>. For research results on the Turkish case, see Pusch (2010 a, 2010 b) and Weiß et al. (2010).

⁷ For a comparison between “old” and “new” migrants in Turkey, see Erder (2003). For the legal changes regarding foreigners in Turkey, see Pusch (2008).

⁸ İçduygu/Biehl (2009, pp. 8–20).

Table 1: Residence Permits in Turkey (2000–2008)

Residence Permits	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Total	168,100	161,254	157,670	152,203	155,500	131,594	186,586	183,757	174,926
For work	24,200	22,414	22,556	21,650	27,500	22,130	22,805	25,475	18,900
For study	24,600	23,946	21,548	21,810	15,000	25,240	24,258	22,197	28,597
For other reasons	119,300	114,894	113,566	108,743	113,000	84,224	139,523	135,365	127,429

Source: İçduygu/Biehl (2009, p. 10).

Students mainly come from countries such as Albania, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Iraq, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Kosovo, Macedonia, Mongolia, Moldova, Romania, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.⁹ Residence and work permit holders are however in general highly qualified professionals in prestige jobs and do not primarily come from the main countries of origin of migrants in Turkey but partly from the global North and other countries with transition economies. These migrants mainly represent the economic elite in Turkey. Turkey opens up its doors to this elite in the hope of profiting from their knowledge and/or their direct investments. The main regulations in the new Law on Foreigners' Work Permits from 2003 and its amendment¹⁰ are aimed at simplifying the bureaucratic procedure for obtaining working permits for these highly qualified short-term professionals. Thus, in all official documents phrases such as "giving highly qualified foreigners the possibility to work" are used.¹¹

*Irregular labor migrants*¹² can be mentioned as the second migrant group in Turkey. Their estimated number is much higher than the above-cited number of regular migrants with work permits and varies, according to different

⁹ *Ibid.* (p. 13).

¹⁰ See Law No. 4817 (Yabancıların Çalışma İzinini Hakkında Kanun) and Law No. 5665 (Yabancıların Çalışma İzinleri Hakkında Kanun ile Bazı Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılmasına İlişkin Kanun).

¹¹ Pusch (2010 a).

¹² For more detailed information on irregular labor migrants in Turkey, see İçduygu (2006, 2004).

researchers, between several hundred thousand and one million.¹³ This means that a share of up to 4.3 % of the active population in Turkey consists of a foreign work-force. Their exact number is, however, not known. Estimations are based on entry statistics for foreigners and statistics on apprehended irregular migrants. Irregular labor migrants mainly come from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, the Russian Federation and Ukraine.¹⁴ In general, they enter Turkey legally with tourist visas. However, they become irregular by taking up work without work permit and/or overstaying their tourist visas or without prolonging their visas. The share of female migrants is much higher in this group than in other migrant groups in Turkey. Irregular labor migrants are often the subject of circular migration and repeatedly move between their home country and Turkey. Sectors such as domestic work, sex and entertainment,¹⁵ textiles, construction and some service sectors provide these migrants temporary jobs.¹⁶ In this context, it has to be stated that they do not plan to settle in Turkey but want to make some money to improve their lives in the country of origin. However, during their stay in Turkey they also set up various types of transnational spaces between Turkey and their country of origin.

According to the financial aims of irregular labor migrants, the reasons for participating in the Turkish labor market differ enormously between them and the officially registered foreigners. While highly skilled professionals are generally sent by their global acting companies abroad, Turkey has become an attractive country for clandestine immigrant workers of the former Soviet Bloc. This rising attractiveness is inter alia related to Turkey's relatively liberal visa policy for this group compared to the strict regulations in the EU and the fact that the Turkish economy offers more job possibilities and better wages than their countries of origin.¹⁷

The third group of migrants in Turkey involves *irregular transit migrants*¹⁸ who come to Turkey mainly from the Middle East (Iran and Iraq) and from

¹³ İçduygu/Kirişçi (2009, p. 11).

¹⁴ *Ibid.* (p. 15).

¹⁵ In this context, it has to be mentioned that many women are trafficked. For a detailed report on this issue, see Erder/Kaşka (2003).

¹⁶ İçduygu (2004 a, 2006).

¹⁷ Pusch (2010 a).

¹⁸ First studies on transit migrants were conducted by Ahmet İçduygu (1995, 2003). For a comparison of these two studies, see İçduygu/Biehl (2009).

Asia and Africa. Many of them are smuggled into Turkey.¹⁹ Others arrive legally with tourist visas but drift into illegality by overstaying in Turkey without extending their visa or trying to enter a third country without proper papers. Unlike the informal labor migrants, these transit migrants use Turkey as a hub for further migration. In order to earn the money necessary for the onward migration, which, due to its clandestine nature, is often very expensive, transit migrants also participate in various niches of the Turkish labor market. They primarily work in the construction, textile and agriculture sectors, as day or seasonal workers.²⁰

The fourth group of migrants are *asylum seekers and refugees*. Until 2000, most asylum seekers were from Iran and Iraq. Although the majority of asylum seekers in Turkey are still from these two countries, the countries of origin of asylum seekers in Turkey today have much diversified. As Table 2 indicates, the number of asylum seekers was about 4,000 between 2000 and 2006 and has tripled in the last years.

Table 2: Asylum Applications in Turkey (1997–2008)

Year	Iranians		Iraqis		Other		Total	
	Cases	Persons	Cases	Persons	Cases	Persons	Cases	Persons
1997	746	1,392	1,275	2,939	83	117	2,104	4,448
1998	1,169	1,979	2,350	4,672	124	187	3,643	6,838
1999	2,069	3,843	1,148	2,472	184	290	3,401	6,605
2000	2,125	3,926	791	1,671	108	180	3,024	5,777
2001	1,841	3,485	497	998	372	709	2,710	5,177
2002	1,456	2,505	402	974	219	315	2,077	3,794
2003	1,715	3,092	159	342	373	514	2,247	3,948
2004	1,225	2,030	472	956	540	912	2,237	3,898
2005	1,021	1,716	490	1,047	753	1,151	2,264	3,914
2006	1,343	2,297	364	722	1,094	1,534	2,801	4,553
2007	1,024	1,668	1,738	3,470	1,651	2,502	4,413	7,640
2008		2,116		6,904		3,960		12,980
Total	15,734	27,933	9,732	20,265	5,501	8,414	30,921	56,561

Source: UNHCR Ankara Office, cited in İçduygu/Biehl (2009, p. 46).

¹⁹ İçduygu (2004 b).

²⁰ İçduygu (2004 a, 2006).

Turkey has signed the 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol and thus has to grant asylum, protection and rights to refugees on its territory. Nevertheless, Turkey is one of the few countries left that sticks to the “geographical limitation” clause. This means that Turkey provides asylum only to European refugees, whereas non-European refugees are only allowed to stay in Turkey temporarily. They are provided protection under the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) extended mandate. Due to the geographical limitations, non-European refugees can apply for asylum at the UNHCR and are resettled to a third country if they are recognized as having a right of asylum by the UNHCR. When their application for asylum is rejected, most of them try informal ways to reach the West. Therefore, it can be argued that Turkey is for most of the non-European asylum seekers – like for transit migrants – a stop-over. Only very few rejected asylum seekers return to their country of origin and only some remain in Turkey irregularly.²¹

During the procedure for gaining the right of asylum, non-Europeans are placed under control in 30 satellite cities in Turkey, where local authorities and humanitarian associations are assigned to provide a minimum of their economic needs.²² However, as this assistance is very limited, social networks are lacking and informal working opportunities are rare in these cities, asylum seekers often leave these cities for Istanbul and thereby fall into irregularity even during the formal waiting process.

Apart from the above-mentioned examples, we can also state *migrants with “Turkish backgrounds” from abroad*. This heterogeneous group of migrants consists on the one hand of ethnic Turks such as members of the Turkish minority from Bulgaria, who fled to Turkey in 1989 and have obtained the Turkish citizenship easily after settling in Turkey due to specific regulations.²³ On the other hand, so-called return-migrants or (grand-)children of return-migrants from Europe have to be mentioned in this category. While some of these returnees are Turkish citizens, others obtain a double-citizenship or are in possession of a foreign citizenship. Both of these groups are generally not reflected in the typology of migrants in Turkey because of their Turkish

²¹ Kirişçi (2002, 2005), Daniş et al. (2009).

²² Özgür-Baklacioğlu (2011).

²³ For the regulations, see the Citizenship Laws (Law No. 403 [Vatandaşlık Kanunu] and its amendment Law No. 5901 [Türk Vatandaşlığı Kanunu]) and the Settlement Laws (Law No. 2510 [İskan Kanunu] and its amendment Law No. 5543 [İskan Kanunu]). The practice of neutralization has, however, changed in the last years. The legislative authority progressively refrains from the positive discrimination of migrants with a Turkish background (Parla 2007, Daniş/Parla 2009).

background and their legal (Turkish citizenship or *mavi kart*) status.²⁴ In this context, it has to be stated that “Turkish background” refers to “Turkish citizenship” for the second group and points out “Turkish ethnicity” for the first group. However, as I will show later both of these groups that have to be taken into consideration within an article on transnational social spaces in Turkey.

The short overview above shows that the four groups of migrants are not mutually exclusive and the lines between the different types of migrants are blurred as the legal status of migrants can easily change within their migration biographies. Regular migrants, for instance, can fall into irregularity if they cannot renew their permits. Or asylum seekers can become irregular transit migrants if their application is rejected and they do not intend to return to their country of origin but stay in Turkey for a while and then try to enter a EU-country illegally.

In addition, it has to be stated that irregularity of residence and/or working status characterizes the life of the vast majority of migrants in Turkey.²⁵ Contrary to migrants in the EU, however, irregularity does not only mark the life of migrants in precarious and poor working and living conditions but also migrants in relatively well-paid and prestigious jobs and fairly stable circumstances. In my empirical work, I exemplify this with three impressive examples: a German business woman, who set up a textile business and employed up to 300 workers while having no work permit herself; an Austrian academic, who was employed and paid by a Turkish state university for more than a year without having legal working papers and a biologist with EU-citizenship who had a good position in a Turkish pharmaceutical/chemical company.²⁶ Thus, we can regard irregularity in the words of Fragues (2009) as normality among migrants in Turkey.

Since ambivalent relationships to the country of origin and the country of migration, sequential or ambivalent time frames for migration and religious, political, economic or organizational reasons for migration are for Pries²⁷ the main characteristics of transnational migrants, we can include transnational

²⁴ The *mavi kart* is a Turkish ID-card, which guarantees holders all the rights of Turkish citizens except the right to active and passive voting. Thus, they do not face the juridical limitations foreigners face and they do not need any work or residence permits.

²⁵ Pusch (2010 a, 2011).

²⁶ Pusch (2010 b, 2011).

²⁷ Pries (2010, p. 59).

migrants in all the above-mentioned groups.²⁸ As a result of their ambiguous view-points and practices, the above-mentioned migrants groups in Istanbul can be included socially and spatially in various ways.

Last but not least, it has to be stated that Istanbul has become the hot spot of all these various migration movements. While Istanbul provides the exclusive cultural, economic and social infrastructure for the formal migrants who mainly belong to the socio-economic global elite, it also offers a variety of informal networks and working possibilities for their informal counterparts. Other areas and cities such as the Black Sea region, Antalya or the South Coast of Turkey are characterized as primarily seasonal centers of migration in the specific literature.

Istanbul: A Global City at the Frontier of the EU

Global cities are important urban nodes in the global economic system. According to Sassen,²⁹ global cities function in four ways: “as highly concentrated command points in organization of the world economy; ... as key locations for finance and for special service firms, which have replaced manufacturing as the leading economic sectors; ... as sites of production, including the production of innovations, in these leading industries; and ... as markets for products and innovations produced”.

For the integration of a city into the global world economy, however, competitiveness is of high importance. According to Eraydın (2008), the competitiveness of a city lies in the intersection of different types of global networks, global command functions, capital accumulation and concentration of specialized producer services. In particular, these main aspects of competitiveness are the increasing attraction of cities due to increasing global functions, the increasing knowledge and innovation and production for external markets, the technological capabilities and innovation in high-tech activities, the integration in the global economy by mixed strategies (both traditional and new/high-technology economic activities). In this context, Eraydın connects competitiveness with the cheap labor resources to the labor market. She argues that the competitiveness of a city leads to massive migration and employ-

²⁸ For a general classification of various migrant types, see the chapter “Istanbul as Hot Spot for Transnational Migration” in this article.

²⁹ Sassen (2001, pp. 3–4).

ment opportunities for both skilled and unskilled workers. Parallel to this development, she states that both the increasing opportunities for skilled manpower and people with talents in formal work positions and various employment opportunities in low-wage and informal work, leads to social pluralization and ethnic segregation, as well as increasing flexibility of the available work-force.³⁰ Sassen (1988) also observes a close connection between the expansion of the global economy and the expanding number of international labor migrants and stresses the often precarious legal and socio-economic status of migrants, which pulls them towards low-status, labor-intensive and often informal jobs. According to her, many of these international labor migrants serve as an “auxiliary army” and buffer the economic situation within the modern global economy, which, among other factors, is based on the flexibility of labor. As such, she sees immigrant workers as an essential element of the modern global economy.

A glance at the development of Istanbul indicates very well that Istanbul has become a global competitive city: with its 13.2 million³¹ inhabitants and its fast-growing economy, Istanbul is listed as a global city by the GaWC research group today. Although Istanbul has been the center of the national Turkish economy for most of its history, the global economic functions have increased enormously during the last years. This phenomenon can be explained by the increasing service sector as well as the import and export shares: in 2006, for instance, 56.4 % of the people in Istanbul were employed in the service sector, which is a very high share compared to Turkey’s average of 48.2 %;³² and the export volume of Istanbul grew from 8,000 million USD in 1994 to 35,042 in 2006.³³ This increase is also reflected in the international ranking of Istanbul. The city Istanbul alone would be the 17th highest on the list of export incomes of all EU-countries³⁴ and was considered as the 34th richest city in the world in 2005.³⁵ According to the forecast of Price Waterhouse Coopers, Istanbul will even become the 27th richest city in the world in 2020.³⁶

³⁰ Eraydin (2008, pp. 1668–1691).

³¹ These are the official numbers published by the Turkish Statistical Institute recently.

³² IDO (2008, p. 46).

³³ *Ibid.* (p. 52).


³⁴ ITO (2008 b, p. 40).

³⁵ *Ibid.* (p. 45).

³⁶ *Ibid.* (p. 44).

In addition, Istanbul's unique location and the huge hinterland extending from Eastern Europe to the Black Sea region and from the Middle East to Central Asia has to be mentioned, as it provides Istanbul a large market. Proximity to the EU is, however, not only important in terms of an easily reachable hot spot for goods and producer services but also in terms of an attractive location for foreign direct investment and an out-sourcing location for production, since the work-force is cheaper and environmental rules are less strictly implemented than in the EU.

Figure 2: Foreign Direct Investments in Turkey in Million USD (1995–2009)



Source: T. C. Başbakanlık Hazine Müsteşarlığı (2010, p. 12).

Particularly, since Turkey and the EU started full membership negotiations in 2005, we can state an enormous increase in foreign direct investments. While there were 8,192 foreign direct investments set up between 1954 and 2004 the number of all foreign direct investments in Turkey grew up to 23,620 in the year 2009.³⁷ More than half (55 %) of all these foreign direct investments are located in Istanbul today.³⁸ Anyhow, a glance at the newly set up foreign direct investments in the year 2009 emphasizes the growing importance of Istanbul even more: 89,58 % of all new foreign direct investments in Turkey were set up

³⁷ T. C. Başbakanlık Hazine Müsteşarlığı (2010, p. 24).

³⁸ *Ibid.* (p. 35).

in Istanbul in 2009.³⁹ As illustrated in Figure 2, there was also an enormous increase in foreign capital until the global crises. While the foreign direct investment was only 1,082 million USD in 2002 it rose to 22,047 million USD at its peak in 2007. Although these figures are still low compared to the amount of investments in the top-tier global cities, the enormous increase in foreign direct investments must be noted. This increase points out Istanbul's new attractiveness for the global economy and indicates its potential for further development.

Over recent decades, Istanbul's population has exploded from 5.8 million in 1985⁴⁰ to 13.2 million in 2010. Although this population increase is mainly related to internal migration movements in Turkey, the high share of foreign migrants in Istanbul should not be ignored either. All these newcomers contribute to the global labor market in Istanbul, which is marked by the demand of the all-embracing labor flexibility, cost reduction and informalization.⁴¹

The fact that about 45 % of the whole and 30 % of the non-agrarian workforce in Turkey is informal (TUIK 2009) indicates the cheap and flexible labor. In this context, Ahmet İçduygu⁴² argues that "the informalization of labor has flourished and has been adopted by many small and medium-sized enterprises as a survival strategy to cope with economic crisis, fierce competition and heavy tax burdens on employers. The insertion of irregular foreign labor into the informal economy is neither entirely hidden nor entirely in line with the legal requirements of a formal economy, but an integral part of the Turkish economy". Nevertheless, according to Ahmet İçduygu,⁴³ migrants do not create the informal conditions but they come into this picture after these conditions are created. They do less desirable jobs generated by informalization, and this leads to a decline in the costs of production of formal industries. In doing so, they facilitate informal production and engage in the distribution of certain activities.

³⁹ *Ibid.* (p. 22).

⁴⁰ ITO (2008, p. 13).

⁴¹ The new Labour Law (Law No. 4857) from 2003 and its recent amendments within the "Torba Yasası" (literally: "Bag Law") illustrates that increasing flexibility is also demanded in formal working conditions. For the liberal developments in Turkey in general, see Mültevelioğlu and Sönmez (2009); for the impacts of the liberal developments on the Turkish labor market, see Mültevelioğlu and Işık (2009); for the effects of Turkish neo-liberalism on the foreign work-force, see Toksöz (2007).

⁴² İçduygu (2006, p. 13).

⁴³ *Ibid.* (p. 11).

The global economy does not only demand flexible workers but also cheap skilled and unskilled labor. While the majority of the internal migrants from the rural areas compose, in general, the unskilled local masses, big cities like Istanbul also have a skilled workforce with foreign language skills available.⁴⁴ In addition to this, international migrants (often with higher skills than their Turkish counterparts) from different countries of origin are seeking work opportunities in Istanbul.⁴⁵ So-called “highly skilled return-migrants” from the EU, especially Germany, can be mentioned as a rising transnational labor potential. As they do not need work permits due to their Turkish descent, they occupy a special place in the international labor migration to Istanbul.⁴⁶

Last but not least, Istanbul’s changing image from an oriental to a “cool” city⁴⁷ offers the global elites an attractive place to live, where they can fulfill their often quite sophisticated cultural and social ambitions. For the bottom of the local and foreign workforce, Istanbul – like all other global cities – offers various opportunities for informal lives such as informal jobs, networking and housing possibilities.

Istanbul as Hotspot for Transnational Migration

Global cities are the centers of the global economy and accommodate the whole range of actors in the global modern economy from the very top to the very bottom. They are therefore places of extremes and encompass not only various groups of natives but also of migrants.⁴⁸ Within this setting global cities are not only centers of the global economy but also provide various spaces for transnational identities, life-styles and formal and informal organizations. Istanbul is the center of the global economy in Turkey. Thus, transnational social spaces in Turkey are predominantly set up in Istanbul.

Transnational migration is defined as a “process by which immigrants forge and sustain simultaneous multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement”.⁴⁹ Accordingly, “transnational

⁴⁴ Eraydın (2008, p. 1672).

⁴⁵ Tokgöz (2007).

⁴⁶ Aydın/Pusch (forthcoming).

⁴⁷ Özkan (2011).

⁴⁸ Sassen (2001).

⁴⁹ Schiller et al. (1997, p. 121).

migration emphasizes the on-going and continuing ways in which current-day immigrants construct and reconstitute their simultaneous embeddedness in more than one society".⁵⁰ By doing so they set up pluri-local and cross-border practices, which are referred to as "transnational social spaces". As a result, transnational social spaces differ from national container-space concepts, which are based on the assumption that social and territorial spaces overlap. Although transnational spaces are strongly determined by national structures, they are not constructed by them, but by economically, politically and culturally acting people – it is thus also labelled as "transnationalism from below".⁵¹

However, over recent years the term "transnational" has become very popular. For this reason, Ludger Pries points out that this term has become a trendy catch-all.⁵² In order to overcome this pitfall of popularity, he suggests a conceptual precision and more explicit empirical research. Yet, transnational social spaces are not simply set up by people's frequent border crossing but also by relatively immobile persons who, for instance, use modern communication technologies to contract their families abroad or send remittances to their country of origin.⁵³ Correspondingly Ludger Pries⁵⁴ differentiates between transnational relations (e.g., internet-based music communities), transnational networks (e.g., internet-based alumni networks or transnational women's organizations) and transnational social spaces (e.g., periodic contact through visits of transnational families) according to the density of contacts. In other words, we can say that transnational social spaces differ from transnational relations and networks in their denseness and durability.

Furthermore, Ludger Pries (2010) notes three ideal types of social spaces for transnational studies: everyday life, organizations and institutions. In this context, he remarks that everyday life focuses on the micro-level, organizations on the meso-level and institutions on the macro-level of transnational social spaces. In his explorations, he enumerates, for example, transnational families and aging in transnational networks for the micro-level, border-crossing migrants' organizations for the meso-level and transnational labor markets and transnational institutions for the macro-level.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ Pries (2008), Smith/Guarnizo (1999).

⁵² Pries (2007, p. 2010).

⁵³ Faist (2000, pp. 9–56).

⁵⁴ Pries (2010, pp. 29–31).

Pries also distinguishes four types of migration (emigration/immigration, return migration, diaspora-migration and transit-migration) in his typology of migration. These four types, which are essential for the following evaluation of transnational social spaces in Istanbul, are based on the following four dimensions: relation to the country/region of origin, relation to the country/region of settlement, typical migration context and time frame of migration. Table 3 illustrates these dimensions for each type of migration very clearly.

Table 3: Four Ideal Types of Migration

Ideal Type	Relation to region of origin	Relation region of settlement	Typical context of migration	Time frame of migration
Emigration/immigration	Association/ valediction	Integration/new home-land	Economical/socio-cultural	Unlimited/long-term
Return-migration	Constant relation/identification	Difference/host country	Economical	Limited/short-term
Diaspora-migration	Constant relation to "holy land"	Difference/space of suffering	Religious, political/posting organization	Short-term/ medium-term
Transit-migration	Ambiguous	Ambiguous	Religious, political, economic/organization	Unclear/ sequential

Source: Pries (2010, p. 59).

Along with Sema Erder and Deniz Yüksek (2009) a lack of theoretical debate has to be stated in studies about in-migration to Turkey. In accordance with this, a general lack of transnational phenomena has also been highlighted only casually. Due to this shortage of specific studies, I will exemplify some transnational social spaces in Istanbul according to various indicators of their existence among the four ideal types of migrant groups (regular and irregular labor and transit migrants as well as refugees and asylum seekers) mentioned above.

Aspects of Regular Migrants' Transnationality in Istanbul

Although regular transnational migrants constitute the clear minority of foreigners in Turkey or Istanbul respectively, the category of regular migrants consists of a huge range of different foreigners. Foreigners, who live with legal residence (and work) permits in Turkey, consist of various groups such as dip-

lomats, posted personnel and foreign spouses of Turkish citizens, etc. However, as many of those foreigners can be considered as diaspora-migrants,⁵⁵ the number of regular transit migrants is even smaller. To the group of regular transnational migrants belong, for example, foreign spouses of Turkish citizens, labor migrants and businessmen with official working papers who have come to Turkey individually and were not posted by international firms, etc. However, despite the small number of transnational migrants in Turkey, we can observe that they have set up various transnational everyday lives, organizations and institutions.

The studies on EU-citizens in Turkey⁵⁶ in general and German citizens in particular indicate this phenomenon very well.⁵⁷ Their transnational everyday lives are mainly dominated by their transnational families and/or their jobs. In this context, for instance, visits to and from their family of origin, support of and from the family of origin in exceptional circumstances (illness, birth, etc.) for transnational family networking, transnational working conditions or transnational-acting small businesses can exemplify transnational labor aspects for this group. On the meso-level, organizations such as the Network of Foreign Spouses, the IWI (International Women of Istanbul) and the association Die Brücke can be mentioned. For the lives of regular transnational German migrants in Istanbul, the association Die Brücke can be cited as most important organization⁵⁸ since this association not only networks between different German-speaking groups (preliminary women) in Turkey and Germany and lobbies for better legal status of Germans in Turkey, but was also one of the main initiators of a transnational institution – the Avrupa Koleji – Europa Kolleg.⁵⁹ The Avrupa Koleji specifically aims to enroll children from bi-national Turkish and German speaking families as well as re-migrant Turkish families in Istanbul and wants to facilitate access to both the German and the Turkish cultures and societies. Thus, we may conclude, in line with Pries, that

⁵⁵ Pries (2007, 2010).

⁵⁶ Kaiser (2001, p. 2003).

⁵⁷ Erbaş (2006), Kaiser (2003, 2004, 2008), Saksak (2003), Radt (2006), Özbek (2008), Pusch (2006).

⁵⁸ Die Brücke (2011). For analysis of this association, see in particular Radt (2006) and Kaiser (2003).

⁵⁹ Avrupa Koleji – Europa Kolleg (2011). For a short analysis of the school, see also Kaiser (2004). Interestingly, the two German schools in Istanbul, the Botschaftsschule and the Deutsches Gymnasium, reject these growing target groups of re-migrants and bi-national families, which is leading to various conflicts in the German community in Istanbul in general and the schools in particular (for an insight in this problematic see, Pusch [forthcoming b]).

this school is one of the few transnational German-Turkish institutions in Istanbul.

Another example of a transnational set-up by regular migrants resident in Turkey is the newspaper *Tur Press Panorama*, which was formally established in 2004 by a Ukrainian engineer in Istanbul. This paper provides an interesting example of such organizations because, although its founder is a regular migrant, its readership is primarily informal labor migrants from the former USSR as well as Turkish citizens interested in those countries. The paper is published bilingually in Turkish and Russian and provides its readers with a wide range of different information and advertisements. In this publication, one can access travel information to various countries of the former USSR, missing person's reports, news on changing laws for foreigners as well as "lonely heart" advertisements. As the owner of the paper puts it: "The paper is an independent medium with close ties to all embassies [of the countries of the former USSR; BP] and various small and big businessmen ...". The paper addresses all Russian-speaking people in Turkey and is distributed free of charge in embassies, airplanes and various places in Turkey and the countries of the former USSR. Although the owner does not describe his newspaper as transnational, we can clearly define it as such since it primarily distributes information to people operating in transnational circumstances.

Characteristics of Irregular Labor Migrants' Transnationality

As mentioned above, irregular labor migrants in Turkey are mainly female. They come primarily from the countries of the former USSR and Central Asia and work in sectors such as domestic work, sex and entertainment. The scientific literature, however, predominantly focuses on women in the domestic sector.⁶⁰ Although the authors discuss various transnational dimensions in their lives and family, they do not label them as transnational.

In my empirical work on the usage of cultural capital during migration, I also interviewed a domestic worker, who was working as a care nurse for the elderly in a private upper-middle class household in Istanbul. She came to Istanbul approximately six years ago. The reason for her decision to come Turkey was related to her bad financial situation in her country of origin: Ukraine. After the death of her husband, she had to care for her two daughters alone.

⁶⁰ Güler (2011), Kaşka (2006, 2007), Akalın (2007, 2008), Eder (2007), Kümbetoğlu (2005).

Due to the economic situation in Ukraine, she was not able to find a job where she could earn enough money to finance her daughters' education in her home country and thus decided to take up a job as domestic worker abroad. Since it was too difficult to go to the EU because of the strict visa regulations, she came to Turkey/Istanbul. In Istanbul, she has been working as domestic worker without any work permit or social insurance. Her residence status is irregular, as well, since she always overstays her two-month tourist visa. Because the travel costs and the fines she has to pay for overstaying when she leaves the country are, compared to her earnings, rather high, she travels to Ukraine only sporadically to see her daughters. Thus, we may conclude that the main bonds to her daughters are based on her sense of responsibility, which she expresses materially with the remittances. Although this woman has to be characterized as return-migrant in terms of Ludger Pries, her family relations are clearly transnational.

Biographies of other irregular labor migrants feature, however, even more transnational aspects. A Bulgarian engineer, interviewed by the author during the above-mentioned research project, can be cited in this context. This man came to Istanbul in order to work in a small-scale manufacturing company. Unlike many other Bulgarian migrants in Turkey, he is not of Turkish descent and thus did not interpret his step to Turkey as "return to the motherland". Unemployment, economic crisis and lack of hope for economic improvement were the reasons for him coming to Turkey 14 years ago. His family (his wife, son and daughter) stayed in his home town in Bulgaria, which is about 480 km away from his work place in Istanbul. In order to see his family and provide them with money, he has been driving to his hometown approximately once a month. The subsequent migration of his family was never a serious issue of discussion since his wife has had a less-paid but permanent teacher position and would not be able to find a comparable job in Turkey. In addition, my interviewee wanted his children to have a Bulgarian education. Now, many years after coming to Turkey, the children are nearly finishing school and the Bulgarian economy has improved – but he is not thinking of going back. He explains this temporary decision to stay with arguments such as "I have gotten used to my working environment in Turkey", "when I go back to Bulgaria, I may find a similar paid job, but again I will not be able to stay with my family because in our region there is no productive industry" and "it is not so far to visit my family". In addition to this, he wants his son to come to Istanbul for a university education. His answer to my question about future plans was am-

biguous. He likes Istanbul, although he is not able to participate in the cultural life there, but wants to give his son the taste of city air. On the other hand, he also likes his home in Bulgaria. However, he can imagine neither going back to Bulgaria permanently, nor setting up a life with his family in Istanbul. During the whole interview, he seemed to feel no pressure to make a decision yet and seemed to be happy to have rational reasons for delaying a decision and continuing his life in his transnational Bulgarian-Turkish space.

Although we can observe transnational social spaces of irregular labor migrants mainly on the family level, there are also examples at the organizational and institutional level. The Armenian “school” in the Kumkapı district of Istanbul may be mentioned in this context. In addition to the long-established Armenian minority with Turkish citizenship in Turkey, Armenian migrants from Armenia have come to Istanbul in the last decades. Similar to their counterparts from other countries, they generally enter Turkey with a one-month tourist visa. By overstaying their visas and taking up employment in the informal sector, their status becomes, however, irregular.⁶¹ Many Armenian informal workers have come to Istanbul with their children, or their children were born in Turkey. Thus, their children also have an irregular residence status in Turkey, which prevents them from participating in the formal school system. In order to guarantee these children some primary education as well as provide for childcare and care for the children while their mothers are working, a former teacher from Armenia began to informally teach seven children in the basement of a Protestant Church. Today, seven teachers instruct 70 pupils from grade one to five. Since this “school” is neither officially recognized in Turkey nor in Armenia, the children do not receive any certificates.⁶² In general terms, this “school” can be described as an informal educational establishment for Armenian children with informal residence status in Turkey. However, a closer look at this informal institution shows us that it is a transnational organization. While the Turkish language is the *lingua franca* among Armenian children in Istanbul, one of the general aims of this initiative is to prepare the children for a possible return to Armenia. In other words, this “school” does not clearly prepare the children for a permanent residency in Turkey, but for a possible (re-) migration and (re-) integration into Armenia. In this context, this “school” reflects not simply the irregularity of its pupils, but also their ambiguo-

⁶¹ Rutishauser (2008), Salamoni (2010).

⁶² For an interview with the teacher, who sets up this “school”, see Ozinian (2011).

ous relation with Armenia and Turkey and the unclear time frame of their duration in Turkey. This characteristic distinguishes this “school” from other educational establishments, such as the German Embassy School in Istanbul for diaspora-migrants or the above-mentioned *Avrupa Koleji*.

Transnational Social Spaces for Transit Migrants and Asylum Seekers in Istanbul?

As I have already pointed out above, the lines between regular migrants, irregular labor migrants, transit migrants and asylum seekers in Turkey are generally fluid. However, since not all refugees apply in a regular way for asylum, and many rejected asylum seekers do not return to their home countries but try to enter a EU-country irregularly, the distinction between transit migrants and asylum seekers is even more complex. This difficulty is also indirectly reflected in various empirical works, in which asylum seekers and transit migrants are often represented in one sample.⁶³

Furthermore, a glimpse at the available studies also shows that the transnational social spaces of transit migrants and asylum seekers have not been researched in Turkey yet. As Turkey is for most of them simply a “waiting room” for further migration, this lack of research might not be surprising. On the other hand, transit migrants and asylum seekers often stay in Turkey longer than they initially have planned, leading to, out of necessity, a variety of survival strategies and practices, including the creation of extensive socio-economic networks. In this context, Didem Daniş states for her research group:⁶⁴ “The networks that Iranians mobilize in Istanbul are mostly familial and ethnic-religious ones. Familial ties provide a crucial resource for Iranians, as for other migrant groups. They utilize and mobilize contacts with family members, who are in Istanbul or relatives abroad and at home. Relatives furnish social, mental, as well as economic assistance that relieve some extent migrants’ vulnerability and thus facilitate their survival in Istanbul”. The importance of tight family ties is also reflected in other studies: for instance, Ahmet İcduygu underlines the importance of relatives in Iranian and Iraqi migrants’ motiva-

⁶³ Yükseler/Brewer (2009, pp. 637–718), Daniş et al. (2009, pp. 443–636), İcduygu (2003).

⁶⁴ Daniş (2009, p. 620).

tion to come to Istanbul.⁶⁵ In another study,⁶⁶ he points out that 10 % of interviewed transit migrants were sending money to their families and relatives in their home country, 30 % were receiving money from family members abroad and 20 % from their families or relatives in their home country. However, a simple stroll through districts like Kumkapı or Tarlabası in Istanbul, which are densely inhabited by irregular migrants, will turn the visitor's attention towards the enormous number of internet-cafes and call-shops with special telephone-fees for the main country of origin of irregular migrants.

These tight family ties of transit migrants and asylum seekers can be exemplified by an Iranian woman doctor, whom I interviewed during the research project "Cultural Capital Migration". This young woman fled Iran with her daughter because of spousal abuse and the lack of resources in Iran. In Turkey, she applied for asylum at the UNHCR. During the time of my interview with her, she had been in Turkey for one and a half years, but her application for asylum was pending. Since she did not receive enough financial support from the UNHCR and foreign doctors are not allowed to work in Turkey, her family sent her 500 USD every month. Besides financial support she received much-needed emotional support from her parents who were concerned about their daughters' well-being abroad. Once, when my interviewee had a mental break-down, her mother even travelled to Istanbul to care for her daughter and grand-daughter. Visits like that are certainly rather unusual among transit migrants and asylum seekers. In this case, it was only possible because of the financial means of the interviewee's family and because of the liberal entry regulations between Turkey and Iran. However, this example illustrates very well the functionality of transnational families: transnational families not only manage to stay in contact with one another, but they also cultivate their relationships at an intimate level. The geographical distance between them poses no obstacle for participating in each others' lives and for providing financial and emotional support.

This and all the other examples in this section indicate intensive contact between the transit migrants and asylum seekers in Istanbul and their family members who are being left behind. Hence, we may conclude that there is a lot of transnational evidence on the micro-level for transit migrants and asylum

⁶⁵ İçduygu (2003, p. 33).

⁶⁶ İçduygu (1995, p. 30).

seekers in Istanbul. Further research, however, has to be conducted in order to specify their transnational social space in more detail.

Transnational Social Spaces of Migrants with a Turkish Background in Istanbul

Migrants with Turkish backgrounds have also set up transnational social spaces in Istanbul. On the micro-level, transnational family structures of migrants with Turkish backgrounds are remarkably similar to those migrants being mentioned above. Remittances, regular visits and close emotional relationships mutual support when needed should be mentioned in this context. However, as a result of their legal inclusion in Turkey as well as in their former country of residence, they have various possibilities to act and live transnationally. This is illustrated best in their professional lives and their ambivalent plans for the future. In my research on international labor migration to Turkey, I interviewed a woman of Turkish origin from Bulgaria who came with her husband and sons to Turkey in 1989. Although she never considered going back to Bulgaria after settling in Istanbul, she ended up working for her son's transnational Turkish-Bulgarian business.⁶⁷ Another example of ambivalent future plans characteristic of transnational migrants are my highly qualified "German-Turk" interviewees. For example, a Turkish-German man came to Istanbul because the internationally acting company he was working for promised him career advancement within a new position in Istanbul. He accepted the offer and came to Istanbul with his wife and two children approximately four years ago. After a year of working in this position, he found a better job in another company. Although he originally planned to stay in Istanbul for only two years, he continued to prolong/expand his stay. When I asked him about his future plans and his attitude about going back to Germany he answered ironically: "Of course, we often talk about that [re-migration to Germany; B. P.], but we do not have a time frame ... We do not say anymore, in two years we will go back. I guess we have become like our parents. They also always said: 'We will go back'. But they have been in Germany for 40 years now. I guess it will be the same with us".

However, typical of transnational migrants, he remains ambivalent about living in Turkey or Germany. Migrants like him express rational pro and cons

⁶⁷ For a detailed analysis of her case, see Pusch (forthcoming a).

for staying or leaving for a certain period in their life. As a result, they never come to a final decision but constantly have to re-evaluate their situation, which leads to periodical decision-making. Their legal inclusion in both societies allows them to base their decisions purely on their perception of their current situation without regarding any legal constraints.

Conclusions: Global Istanbul as Hotspot for Transnational Migrants

Although there are very few scientific analyses focusing on transnationality in Istanbul, a glance at the available studies on international migration movements to Turkey in general and Istanbul in particular indicates the emergence of transnational lives and practices very clearly. However, the analysis above shows very evidently that global Istanbul provides its inhabitants various possibilities for transnational lives and set-ups. In conjunction with the current state of research, we can maintain that transnationality is predominantly set up on the micro-level. The comparatively lower intensity of transnationality on the meso- and macro-level may be related to the fact that transnational migration to Turkey is a relatively new phenomenon and the establishment of organizations and institutions is, in comparison with the development of everyday life routines, more time-consuming.

The high share of informal migrants in Istanbul is another reason for the relatively poor transnationality on the meso-level and the macro-level. As informal migrants avoid attracting attention to their illegal status, this low visibility on the meso- and macro-level is easy to comprehend.

Finally, it should be mentioned that the above-mentioned examples have an important similarity: all migrants live and work in global Istanbul. Thus, we may conclude that global Istanbul provides a range of transnational lives and social spaces for various migrant groups. Istanbul's nearby border with the EU – albeit for very different reasons – makes Istanbul attractive for most migrants.

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Emigration of Highly Qualified Turks

A Critical Review of the Societal Discourses and Social Scientific Research

Yaşar Aydın

Introduction: Background and Relevance of the Problem

The emigration of in Germany educated highly qualified Turks¹ from Germany to Turkey has attracted the attention of the media, politics and social sciences, and triggered controversial debates on a possible “*brain drain*”.² In this discussion, not only economic and scientific considerations, but also political concerns such as the involvement of highly qualified Turks in the social system and their identification with the cultural value system in Germany were included.

Three recent developments initiate to deal with the emigration of highly qualified Turks from Germany to Turkey.³ Firstly, trade associations, experts and political actors have been complaining since at least the late 1990s that more and more top-executives, academics and other highly qualified persons emigrate from Germany.⁴ This can also be verified by existing statistical data.

¹ Initially, it needs to be emphasized that the term “Turk” does not refer to ethnicity, but to the territory of the Turkish Republic. In this contribution, the term “Turk” refers to a person who is (a) either a citizen of the Turkish Republic, (b) was once a Turkish citizen, but then has been naturalized and became a German citizen or (c) who is a natural-born German citizen with Turkish parent/s.


² See Jacobsen (2009), Flocke (2008).

³ Here it needs to be emphasized that this contribution is not a final work, but a work in progress. It is part of a more comprehensive research project which is currently carried out at the HWWI (Hamburg Institute of International Economics) on behalf of the foundation Hans Böckler Stiftung. This research project aims at investigating empirically the causes and reasons of migration intentions and the actual migration of highly qualified Turks from Germany to Turkey. It focuses mainly on two questions: Are these highly qualified Turks “participating in two societies”? Does the emigration of highly qualified Turks mean “brain drain” (“waste of resources”) or “failure of integration”? For this purpose, semi-structured interviews are conducted. In this contribution, however, the focus is rather on the existing social scientific literature and the available data.

⁴ Kinast et al. (2007), Heise-Online (2007).


The number of the emigrants from Germany has almost increased three-fold in the first decade of the 21st century compared to the 1970s (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Emigration of Germans from Germany



Source: Migrationsbericht 2007 and 2008.

Figure 2: Emigration of Medical Doctors from Germany



Source: Migrationsbericht 2008.

Today, more and more Germans are willing to live and work abroad. The available data show that German emigrants are a well-educated and a positively se-

lected group compared to the total population. Besides, in recent years there has also been a slight increase in the proportion of highly qualified emigrants. Highly qualified persons are indeed not the biggest group among German emigrants, but they make an over proportional amount. A comparison of the years between 1990 and 2000 shows that the percentage of the highly qualified emigrants has increased by 10 % in these ten years.⁵ The emigration of doctors of medicine is also on the increase (Figure 2).

In business and politics, this development is regarded as problematic for two reasons. On the one hand, it is suggested in the social scientific literature that technical revolutions and economic developments benefit from *immigration movements* notably of highly qualified persons or specialists, while *mass emigration* of highly qualified persons and specialists results quite often in economic downfalls. On the other hand, in media discourses this increasing emigration is interpreted as an indication for the fact that Germany does not benefit enough from the international competition for highly qualified persons respectively specialists.⁶

Secondly, experts, employers' associations and trade unions predict that, in some sectors in the medium term and in other sectors even in the short term, there will be a growing shortage of skilled workers. Due to the rapid aging population and the growing importance of a knowledge-based economy, the qualified or skilled labor shortage will worsen notably in the sectors like health and engineering as well as in various service sectors.⁷

Finally, the emigration of highly qualified Turks is also interpreted as an indication for a mental "*turning away*" of this group from the host society and for a "*failure of integration*".⁸ It is frequently suggested that in the light of demographic trends, shortages of skilled workers and the lack of success in the recruitment of highly qualified professionals from abroad, it would be critical

⁵ Sauer/Ette (2000, p. 70).

⁶ Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (2009, Editorial). This volume refers to the aging of the population and the "considerable shortage of skilled labor" and projects that Germany could lose "the international competition for the 'best minds'", APuZ (2009, p. 2).

⁷ Heise-Online (2007), Fellmer/Kolb (2009). The shortage of skilled labor and the need for skilled immigration is also declared in the International Migration Outlook: SOPEMI 2009 of the OECD. In this survey, it is argued that the "economic downturn did not change the necessity of managing labor migration in general". According to this survey, it is likely that in the wake of economic recovery "a stronger migration flow" will resume (SOPEMI [2009, p. 3]). It is also predicted that in 2015 in OECD countries "the number of retiring from the labor force will exceed the number those who will enter the labor market" and that this development "will continue over many years" (*ibid.* [p. 1]).

⁸ Leibold (2006).

from economic and political points of view if Germany still had to give up on a highly qualified workforce being trained in Germany.

In view of these developments and considerations, this book contribution focuses on the push factors that lead highly qualified Turks to emigrate from Germany as well as on the pull factors that lead them to migrate to Turkey. Thus, it aims at elucidating the reasons and causes of this emigration movement on the basis of existing research findings and statistical data. In the first part of this contribution, firstly classical and then more recent explanations on the migration of highly qualified workers will be presented systematically and discussed critically. In the second part, then, the extent and the causes of emigration of highly qualified Turks will be addressed.

Theoretical Explanations for the Highly Qualified Migration

Since the end of World War II, the emigration of highly qualified workers, interpreted as “*brain drain*”, and their motives for emigration have attracted the attention not only of social scientists, but also of economists and politicians. The debate was triggered by a study conducted in Great Britain, which raised a public awareness for the weaknesses of the British education and academic system. The study called for an increase in funding.⁹

In the following discussions about the emigration of highly qualified persons, developing countries have been problematized as the main sending countries. At that time, the most important receiving country was the U.S., followed by Canada and Great Britain. Sending countries were India and other Asian, African and South American countries. Subsequently, the phenomenon was taken up also by development studies, problematized as “*brain drain*” and used for explaining the problem of underdevelopment. Having said that, now the question is: what is meant by “*brain drain*”?

Brain Drain and High Qualification

Literally, “*brain drain*” means emigration of intelligentsia. In economic discourses, the term refers to economic losses caused by the emigration of trained, skilled and especially highly qualified workers, specialists or other talented people such as academics from a country or a region to another country

⁹ Great Britain 1968, Hillmann/Rudolph (1996, p. 2).

or region. In scientific literature, there is no exact definition for highly qualified persons. It mostly remains unclear whether the term “*high qualification*” means the formal qualification or the present professional activity. In this contribution, the adjective “*highly qualified*” is based on the definition, which is found in the Law on Residence, Employment and the Integration of Foreigners in Germany.¹⁰ According to Article 19(2) of this law, highly qualified people are

- Scientists with special professional knowledge,
- Teaching personnel and research assistants in high positions, and
- Specialists or executive personnel with special professional knowledge who get a salary at least more than the income threshold of the general pension system.¹¹

Among the negative consequences or socioeconomic losses of “*brain drain*”, a number of historic examples could be given. In the first place, the migration of academics from the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) to the German Federal Republic (West Germany) should be mentioned. This situation turned out to be an economical and political problem for the German Democratic Republic. Previous examples consisted of, for example, the forced migration of Huguenots from France to Prussia, which brought many disadvantages for France and advantages for Prussia. The omission of Jewish bankers, which was caused by the expulsions during the high Middle Ages and early modern period, cost Spain its position as Great Power in the 16th century. Germany and Austria lost many prominent scientists and entrepreneurs with Jewish origin due to the expulsion, extermination and forced emigration of Jews and Nazi opponents in the 1930s and 1940s under Nazism.

In a nutshell, “*brain drain*” can be considered as either a voluntary or a forced permanent emigration of highly qualified persons. “*Brain exchange*” on the contrary refers to the mutual flow of highly qualified workers between a sending and a receiving country. “*Brain circulation*” again refers to a process of circulation like this: studying abroad – gaining professional work experience – returning to the home country.¹²

¹⁰ Gesetz über den Aufenthalt, die Erwerbstätigkeit und die Integration von Ausländern im Bundesgebiet (AufenthG).

¹¹ This presently amounts approximately 64,800 EUR per year.

¹² Diehl (2005, p. 1), Ladame (1970). The French migration researcher has criticized definitive assessments of migrations as a “*brain drain*” and pointed out the possibilities and benefits of the mobility of highly qualified elites. He argued that one day these people would return and that the “*brain drain*” would turn out to be a “*brain gain*”. To conceptualize this theoretically and describe it empirically he proposed the concept “*circulation of the elite*”. This term was received with great attention in social scientific discourse and is used by migration researchers with a slight modification as “*brain circulation*” (Hunger [2003, p. 14]).

Theories on the Mobility of Highly Qualified Workers

In social research, the mobility of highly qualified workers was initially explained by two opposite *grand theories*. Representatives of the *dependence theory*, on the one hand, explained the mobility of highly qualified workers by the global market structures and assessed it as a form of exploitation. Representatives of the *modernization theory*, on the other hand, assessed the mobility of highly qualified workers more positively from the perspective of a “free” global labor market.

The dependency theorists argued that the “Western” dominated world market structures are responsible for the underdevelopment because they keep the poor developing countries in the position of economic and political dependence.¹³ In this regard, the active “recruiting” of qualified professionals from developing countries by the rich industrialized countries was taken as the evidence of the poor “South’s” exploitation by the rich “North”. Industrialized countries would take advantage of the skilled labor pool of poor countries without making a contribution to the training costs. They argued that the loss of “the brightest minds” would produce and reproduce a vicious circle of underdevelopment and poverty. As a consequence, supporters of dependency theory called for an international regulation of the mobility of highly qualified workers and for, at least, an enforcement of financial compensation for sending countries.¹⁴ The Indian economist Bhagwati proposed a *brain drain tax*, which should be paid either by receiving host countries to the sending developing countries or by the highly qualified immigrants themselves, once they are capable of payment.¹⁵

Modernization theorists evaluated the emigration of the elites rather positively. On the basis of the neoclassical theory, they assumed that the migration of intellectuals and technical elites should be seen more in terms of a free global labor market, which follows the law of supply and demand. People should use their different skills and abilities where they are used most efficiently and where they find the best competition.¹⁶ In this sense, the emigration of elites from developing to industrialized countries is logical and would create not only negative results. Government interventions like regulating of

¹³ Senghaas (1974).

¹⁴ Ghosh (1982), Thirwani (1989), Galeano (1988).

¹⁵ Bhagwati (1976 a/1983 b).

¹⁶ Ethier (1987).

the mobility of highly qualified workers and financial compensation for sending countries would, according to the supporters of modernization theory, produce distortions in international competition and thus global welfare losses.¹⁷

In contrast to the representatives of dependency theory, the emigration of highly qualified workers was by the supporters of modernization theory not explained by the politics of receiving or respectively recruiting countries, but rather by the conditions in sending countries. From the perspective of modernization theory, the emigration of the highly qualified workers turned out to be a consequence of the lack of operational and developmental opportunities in their country of origin. Firstly, in developing countries the job opportunities were not sufficient for the trained workforce. Second, the migration of the highly qualified workforce was also a result of the overproduction of especially scientific elites. In order to support the second thesis, India is cited.¹⁸

In both *grand theories*, namely in the modernization and dependence theory, large imbalances in wage levels, vast differences in living standards and specific attracting factors such as immigration programs as well as political circumstances in sending countries were considered responsible for the migration of highly qualified people. Subjective motives such as the desire for self-realization, broadening one's own horizon, emancipation from traditional constraints and gaining individual autonomy were hardly regarded in these two grand theories. Beside a *brain drain tax* and *emigration control bans*, no useful strategies were developed.

Discussing the mobility of the highly qualified persons only in terms of "brain drain" deserves criticism because of different reasons. Firstly, it deserves criticism because the focus is mainly on the economic aspects. The focal point of these considerations was the benefits and disadvantages that arise from the mobility of highly qualified people for the economy of a country or a region. This meant that political and sociological aspects are obscured. Secondly, in such considerations both the "society" and "national economies" are understood as "close entities" in the sense of the "container model" of the society. This includes the risk of succumbing to "methodological nationalism".¹⁹ Thirdly, the

¹⁷ Körner (1999).

¹⁸ Mount/Ford (1997).

¹⁹ Ulrich Beck describes the idea of the society as a cohesive, coherent and clear-cut unity as "container theory of society" (1997, p. 49). Following Smith (1979, p. 191), Beck characterizes the "understanding of society of the first modernity as methodological nationalism". One characteristic for this perspective is the assumption of a "congruency between the society and the nation-state" (Beck [1997, p. 115]).

term “brain drain” is often an expression of fears of not being able to benefit from the international competition of highly qualified persons. *Fourth*, in those discussions on the mobility of highly qualified persons in terms of “brain drain”, emancipatory potentials and socio-economic advantages for the emigrants which arise from voluntary emigration were absent. Furthermore, in such theoretical approaches and discourses, migration is understood as a unidirectional change of residence.

These aspects and issues raised in last two points are addressed systematically in research on *transnationality* in which a new form of migration is stated and termed as “*transnational migration*”. Recent migration research based on the “*transnationalism*” perspective substantiate empirically that, today, international migration does not occur as a single unidirectional change of residence, but rather as a permanent mobility and as a new *reality of life* for a growing number of people. Transnational migration results in “*transnational spaces*” characterized as a “*hybrid product combining identificatory and socio-structural elements of the region of origin and the region of arrival*”.²⁰ Based on this perspective, international processes of *detritorialization* can be interpreted as a major driving force of the mobility of highly qualified persons. Between Germany and Turkey, similar transnational social spaces may be presumed, but until now this has not been studied systematically. The concept and research approach of transnational social spaces stated that through current migration movements something new, namely a “*third space*”, emerges: interrelation of social life and activities which are characterized by a “*here-and-there*” and a “*both ... and*”. Between the “*clear-structured*” world of national, cultural and religious boundaries, “*social landscapes*”²¹ are emerging which connect and change regions of origin and regions of arrival. The question to what extent the emigration of highly qualified Turks gives rise to similar “*social landscapes*” or “*transnational spaces*” between Germany and Turkey has been left open in the contemporary migration research.²²

Since the 1990s, following the migration researcher Ladame (1970) a third strand has been increased alongside the modernization and dependency theories which considers the positive effects of migration of highly qualified work-

²⁰ Pries (1998, p. 136).

²¹ Albrow (1998).

²² Although the transnational aspects of the Turkish migrants in Germany are highlighted in recent contributions and Thomas Faist (2000) edited a book on transnational social spaces between Germany and Turkey, empirical analysis which focus on highly qualified Turks and transnational social spaces in Turkey are still rare.

ers for both the sending and the receiving countries. Contemporary research, for example, points out the emergence of diaspora-like networks,²³ the return of migrants or the combination of both phenomena, from which many possibilities and innovations result.²⁴

Other studies deal with networks of scientists that were built by emigrated scientists who bring positive effects for the sending and receiving countries.²⁵ Further publications deal with corporate networks, which emerge as a consequence of globalization. These include, for example, the development of internal labor markets which are of great importance for the mobility of highly qualified workers. The importance of these internal labor markets varies depending on profession and the existing competitive situation in the respective international labor markets.²⁶

In this respect, the following question is of great interest for this contribution as well as for migration research in general: does the emigration of highly qualified Turks from Germany mean a “*failure of integration*” as it is frequently stated, or does it mean rather “*participating in two societies*”?

Mobility of Highly Qualified Persons with Turkish Origin

In the second half of the 1980s, the topic of the mobility of highly qualified persons in the migration research enjoyed a worldwide renaissance. The focus was directed on the emigration of highly qualified persons from developing countries or from one industrialized to another industrialized country. In recent years, another group attracts the interest of the media, social sciences and economics: in Germany, educated and highly qualified Turks emigrate from Germany to Turkey, namely from a highly developed industrial society to a prospering industrial society. Questions that interest the scientific community and the public focus on the causes of the mobility of this group as well as on possible indications for a return tendency among them. In such debates, the focus is on concerns and fears about a possible “*waste of human resources*”²⁷ and “*failure of integration*” which is frequently insinuated especially by conser-

²³ Meyer (2001), Meyer et al. (2001).

²⁴ Iredale (2001).

²⁵ Brown (2000).

²⁶ Beaverstock (1991), Straubhaar/Wolter (1997). For the role of international personnel consultancies, see Gould (1988), Findlay (1993).

vative politicians and the media. Prior to a further discussion of these, it is useful to present some key data on the life situation of highly qualified Turks in Germany.

Basic Data for Life Situation of Highly Qualified Turks in Germany

Available data on highly qualified Turks in Germany is due to two reasons inadequate. On the one hand, in social scientific debates the term “*highly qualified person*” is used in a different way so that it is not always clear whether it refers to the formal qualification or to present professional activity. On the other hand, the existing statistical data are often imperfect due to several reasons: the statistics of the Bundesagentur für Arbeit (federal employment agency), for example, do not consider the “*migration background*” so that we are not able to find out the number of active Turkish employees who are subject to social security insurance.²⁸ Nevertheless, from available empirical data and research results,²⁹ we can extract a general view about the *life situation* and the *degree of integration* of and *return tendencies* among highly qualified Turks with a permanent residence in Germany.

To begin with, it was to be mentioned that 10 % of the 1.74 million Turkish citizens were in 2006 in possession of an academic diploma. Altogether, 15 % of the immigrants with a Turkish background were employed as medial and upper white-collar professionals or even as officials.³⁰ However, we cannot determine exactly how many of these medial and upper white-collar professionals could be categorized as highly qualified.

According to a study, carried out within the European Migration Network (Europäisches Migrationsnetzwerk), a total of 23,908 highly qualified Turkish citizens were residing in Germany (on June 30, 2005). In relation to the total number of Turkish employees subject to social security insurance (458,243), it makes 5.21 %, while in relation to total number of all highly qualified employees subject to social security insurance (5,579,752), it makes only 0.41 %. The major-

²⁷ “*Waste of resources*” is also an issue of migration from non-OECD countries. Qualifications and work experiences of immigrants are frequently regarded by employers as inferior which leads to waste of resources as well as to frustrations by the immigrants (SOPEMI 2009).

²⁸ See Straubhaar (2006) on the problem of the reliability of statistics.

²⁹ There are only a few studies which give information on the socio-economic background, motivations for migration and return intentions of highly qualified Turks. To be mentioned are the TASD-survey and the studies of Heß (2009), Jahr et al. (2001) and Enders/Bormann (2001).

³⁰ Tucci (2008, p. 202, 204).

ity of highly qualified Turkish employees were occupied in the health sector (11,197), followed by technicians (3,496), entrepreneurs, businessmen and systems analysts accountants (1,932) and engineers (1,709).³¹

However, this study does not give information about the proportion of those who were educated in Germany (*Bildungsinländer*)³² or abroad. Moreover, these figures refer not to formal education, but to present professional activity. It can be expected that the number of highly qualified persons in terms of formal education is possibly higher than in terms of current professionally activities. In the TASD-survey, the number of Turkish academics was estimated between 45,000 and 70,000 persons.³³ It should also be mentioned that we also do not have exact figures on the unemployment of highly qualified persons with Turkish backgrounds. According to an OECD-survey (2007), the proportion of unemployed highly qualified persons with a migration background amounts to 12.5 %, while the unemployment rate of highly qualified persons without a migration background amounts to 4.4 %. In short, the unemployment rate of highly qualified persons without a migration background is approximately three times lower than by highly qualified persons with a migration background.


Migration of Turks

Prior to an overview about migration movements between Germany and Turkey, some basic data on migration in general should be presented. It is worth pointing out that from 1991 to 2006 approximately 15.1 people moved in to Germany. In the same period 10.9 million people migrated from Germany. This makes a net immigration of 4.2 million. However, since the beginning of the 21st century the migration movements are on the decrease. In 2005 the lowest immigration (707,352) since the year 1987 was registered. In 2006 immigration to Germany dropped to 661,855 (558,467 of them were persons with foreign citizenship). In contrast to that, the number of emigrants rose by 1.7 % (to 639,064; 483,774 of them were foreigners) in comparison with the previous year. In recent years, the net migration balance was on the decrease, too; in 2008 there was a negative net migration balance (Figure 3).


³¹ Heß/Sauer (2006, p. 46).

³² "Bildungsinländer" are students or persons with foreign citizenship who have the same university entrance conditions as nationals because they completed their education in Germany.

³³ Sezer/Dağlar (2008).

Figure 3: Net Migration from Germany

Source: Migrationsbericht 2008.

Figure 4: Immigration from Germany to Turkey


Source: Migrationsbericht 2007 and 2008.

It needs also to be emphasized that the immigration from Turkey to Germany has been reduced since 1991 by more than half. In 1991, 82,818 persons emigrated from Turkey to Germany, while in 2006 there were only 31,449 immigrants from Turkey. A great part of the emigration from Turkey to Germany

was due to spousal *immigration or family unions* as well as to *asylum applications*, which are for couple of years on the decrease, too. The migration from Germany to Turkey, in contrast, does not increase dramatically, as data for the years from 1991 to 2006 show, but remains relatively constant (Figure 4).

Nevertheless, it must be taken into account that, from these data the proportion of immigrants with a Turkish background or citizenship or German *expatriates*, who immigrate to Turkey for the short term, is not apparent. The Migrationsbericht 2007 (migration survey of 2007) breaks down migration outflows according to citizenship, so that we can gain a general overview about the extent of emigration of Turks. According to this, there are no dramatic developments: the figure of the emigrants with Turkish citizenship remained between 1991 and 2006 constant, too. However, it must be taken into account that the citizenship of an emigrant need not coincide with the destination. That is to say, we cannot suggest that, for example, a person with Turkish citizenship who leaves Germany immigrates necessarily to Turkey. It remains therefore unclear whether these emigrants with Turkish citizenship migrate to Turkey or to another country when they leave Germany. Besides, the extent of highly qualified Turks in proportion to the total number of immigrants to Turkey is not apparent, too.

Figure 5: Emigration of Turkish Citizens from Germany



Source: Migrationsbericht 2007 and 2008.

It is possible that a great part of those who immigrate to Turkey has German citizenship. The readiness to emigrate from Germany could be higher by highly qualified persons with German Citizenship since they can return to Germany

whenever they want without any difficulties. Furthermore, German citizens with a Turkish background can make use of all rights in Turkey except the active and passive right to vote. This is guaranteed by the blue card (*mavi kart*).

According to the official statistics in Turkey, in 2000 all in all 73,736 persons migrated from Germany to Turkey (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu). Noticeable is first of all a big deviation between the number of Turkish official statistics and the data of the German official migration survey.³⁴ According to the German migration survey in 2007, migration from Germany to Turkey amounted 40,369 in the year 2000. A possible explanation for this deviation is the fact that a part of the emigration from Germany to Turkey is not registered as such by German authorities for various reasons. It is possible that many emigrants with Turkish citizenship remain registered in Germany even when they live in Turkey because they do not want to affect their insurance rights (claims) or pension entitlements. However, this is an issue that requires systematic research.

Relevant statistical data are also insufficient because they do not reflect the citizenship of those who migrate from Germany to Turkey. The extent of the highly qualified person in relation to the total number of emigrants is not calculated, too. In summary, the existing data on migration movements between Germany and Turkey do not provide clear statements on the emigration of highly qualified persons with a Turkish background from Germany to Turkey.

Research About the Mobility of Highly Qualified People of Turkish Origin

The interest of scientists, business organizations and the public in statistical data and other empirical scientific insights on the residence of highly qualified people in Germany and on the immigration of them to Germany have increased considerably. The study “Migration of Highly Skilled Workers from Third Countries to Germany”³⁵ conducted by the Research Group of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge) provided important insights. In this research, highly qualified individuals who possess a residence permit according to Article 19 of the Law on Residence, Employment and the Integration of Foreigners in Germany (AufenthG) are inter-

³⁴ Migrationsbericht (2007).

³⁵ Hess (2009).

viewed.³⁶ The study attempted to gather information about the socio-economic background, the motives for migration and intentions of return-emigration of highly qualified migrants in Germany. 959 highly qualified individuals (statistical population), recruited via the Central Foreigners Register (Ausländerzentralregister), are from different countries: 51 people are from Turkey, 193 from the USA, 161 from the Russian Federation and 55 from China.

However, it has to be argued against this study critically that the results for the question about the satisfaction with Germany, the income and the job situation, as well as the reasons for leaving the country of origin (*push factors*) or for deciding in favor of Germany as a destination (*pull factors*), are not broken down by country of origin. Regarding the future prospects of highly qualified workers from Turkey, the study states that 73.3 % of them plan to stay for more than ten years or forever in Germany.³⁷ However, since this study surveys newly arrived, high-skilled workers, the articulated intentions of remaining in Germany can hardly be transmitted to the rest of high-skilled workers of Turkish origin in Germany. Questions about the factors and causes of migration intentions and the actual emigration of Turkish origin are not addressed in this study.

“*Return intentions*” of Turkish migrants have engaged migration research for a long time. In the 1970s or even in the 1980s, many migrants have expressed their return intention during several interviews, which was evaluated as an indication of “*lack of desire for integration*”. Such results led to the conclusion that the stay of Turkish migrants has a temporary character and, thus, those comprehensive efforts for their socio-political integration would be unnecessary. Only gradually, has migration research come to the conclusion that the declaration of return intentions could rather be interpreted as a psycho-social strategy, on which migrants rely in order to undermine the experienced discrimination respectively to compensate it.³⁸

³⁶ It is about a clearly defined group (as defined in Article 19 AufenthG), i.e. “about scientists with special technical knowledge, teaching individuals with exceptional capabilities as well as specialists or managers, whose residence is in a special economic and social interest” (Hess [2009, p. 22]). For this survey, those people were interviewed who possessed a permanent residence permit according to Article 19 AufenthG on 30.6.2007. The interviewees were determined from the Central Aliens’ Register (AZR). “These are new immigrants who entered after 2005 and who immediately received a residence permit according to § 19 AufenthG as well as people who previously have lived with another type of residence permit in Germany” (*Ibid.*).

³⁷ *Ibid.* (p. 72).

³⁸ The central thesis of Pagenstecher, which addressed this paradox, is: “Even the return orientation will not be realised it has important social, cultural and psychological functions” (1996, p. 167). He interprets the articulation of return intentions

In these discussions on the “*return intentions*”, the “*failure of integration*” or the degree of integration of Turkish migrants, the focus was initially put on people with lower skills, lower education and poor language skills. Today, the media cares about the “return” intentions of highly qualified people. However, there is a lack of systematic study on the living conditions, attitudes, “return”, or to be more precise, migration intentions and self-assessment of highly qualified Turks.³⁹

However, the TASD study, which has explored the issues just mentioned through online interviews, can be seen as an exception.⁴⁰ The main objective of this study was to determine the extent to which *Turkish academics and students in Germany* (hereafter TASD) identify themselves with Germany or how strongly they feel connected emotionally to Germany – the return intention served here as an indicator. The study comes to the conclusion that the vast majority of Turkish academics – men were clearly in the majority – want to leave Germany.⁴¹ Nevertheless, the study restrictively underlines that the declared return intention would rather display the discontent of the TASD with the professional world and everyday life in Germany than determine the readiness to emigrate. The TASD study states that the strong will to emigrate and the “*Turkey-orientation*” among Turkish academics and students can be explained by the failures of the German integration policy.⁴²

Factors of Mobility of Highly Qualified Turkish Origin

What are the main factors which motivate highly qualified Turks to emigrate from Germany? In social scientific discourse three factors are discussed.

(1) *Disadvantageous career prospects*: the TASD study arrived at the conclusion that a significant proportion of Turkish university graduates and the majority of Turkish students want to migrate from Germany to Turkey due to

not only as a “defensive strategy and uncertainty” but also as a “statement of loyalty to the own minority group and to the country of origin” (*ibid.* [p. 168]).

³⁹ For the state of integration of the Turks in Germany, see Goldberg (2000) and Tucci (2008).

⁴⁰ The TASD study is considered as the “most comprehensive social study” carried out until now, which for the first time examines the attitudes, habits and return intentions of the Turkish “educational elite” in Germany. However, this is not a representative study, because there are hardly any data about the total population of Turkish academics and students in Germany. This is also admitted self-critically by Kamuran Sezer, who worked on this study with the organization “future.org” (see Focus-Online [2008]).

⁴¹ Sezer/Dağlar (2009).

⁴² *Ibid.* (p. 8).

“*professional reasons*”.⁴³ “*Disadvantageous professional perspectives*” is also highlighted as a central motive by highly skilled Turkish migrants who already moved to Turkey.⁴⁴ The respondents referred to their own negative experiences during their searches for job or in job interviews.⁴⁵ High unemployment among academics with a migration background (12.5 %, almost three times higher than among academics without migration background, 4.4 %) could be read as a clear evidence for this interpretation (see OECD study, 2007). In addition, the T ASD study found out that migration-readiness by academics and students, who estimate their personal and the general economic situation of Germany as unfavorable and who are correspondingly more pessimistic about their future is higher in comparison to those who have a more optimistic assessment. In this sense, “*bad economic situation*” and “*pessimistic estimate*” of the own economic prospects can be considered as two important push factors.⁴⁶

(2) *Lack of feeling at home or lack of identification*: an additional finding of the T ASD study is that a lack of “*feeling at home*” or “*reluctance*” to identify oneself with Germany is a major factor related to the return intentions as well as to the actual return. To the question “*Because of what reasons do you intend to move to Turkey*”, 41.3 % of the online respondents answered with “*lack of feeling at home*”.⁴⁷ The T ASDs who express their return intention, rather see Turkey as their true home country than Germany. Among those who perceive Germany as their homeland, the extent of migration intention is correspondingly low. Crucial in regard to return intentions are also family ties: with an increasing intensity of family or other social ties, the readiness to return decreases.⁴⁸ However, this finding of the T ASD study is worthy of criticism for three reasons. Firstly, it is not representative, since there are hardly any reliable figures about German-Turkish high-qualified workers for a representative sample. Secondly, the survey questionnaire (“*Do you intend to move to Turkey in the future?*”) is not precise enough. Thirdly, the diagnoses “*lack of feeling at home*” and “*lack of identification*” are still in dispute among social scientists. Another study about attitudes of Turks towards the state and the society comes to the conclusion that Turkish migrants see the German social system as “*very posi-*

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ Pusch/Aydin (2011), Aydin/Pusch (2011).

⁴⁵ Jacobsen (2009), Flake (2008), Ludwig (2009), Kaas/Manger (2010).

⁴⁶ Sezer/Dağlar (2009, p. 23).

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* (p. 17).

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* (p. 7).

tive” and believe “to live in a righteous or partially just society”.⁴⁹ 49 % of the respondents would show a stronger relationship with Germany and a “high proportion” has “built up stable emotional bonds with Germany”.⁵⁰ In another study conducted by Martina Sauer, 60 % of Turkish migrants answered the question of whether they have any return intentions with “No”. Only 33 % of the respondents imagine a return to Turkey.⁵¹

(3) *Disadvantage and discrimination*: previously “unfavourable job prospects” were referred to as a key motivation for both the return, or, to be more precise, emigration intentions, as well as the actual emigration. It can be stated that a large proportion of highly qualified Turks see their own professional perspective as “unfavorable” due to the restrictions caused by discrimination on the German labor market and the structural disadvantages in many areas of society. 73 % of the respondents of a study have experienced discrimination in everyday life and in the professional world.⁵² A face-to-face survey conducted by Ulrich Wilamowitz-Moellendorf showed that the majority (60 %) of the Turkish respondents claim “to have experienced often the feeling of discrimination as a foreigner”.⁵³ There are other research findings according to which a large part of discrimination against immigrants goes back to negative attitudes of employers and to discrimination during the recruitment period. Andrea Janßen and Ayça Polat⁵⁴ referred to *gatekeepers (decision-makers)*, who would decide during the employment-mediation period at the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) as well as during the interview period for companies according to non-functional criteria such as by ethnicity or “*cultural characteristics*”. They wrote in this regard that “*the selectivity of the stereotypes by gatekeepers about Turks*” is often more crucial than professional criteria.⁵⁵ Michael Blohm and Martina Wasmer pointed out in their contribution

⁴⁹ Wilamowitz-Moellendorf (2001, p. 7).

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* (p. 16).

⁵¹ Sauer (2007); see also Kaya (2005).

⁵² Sauer (2007 f, p. 139).

⁵³ Wilamowitz-Moellendorf (2001, p. 9).

⁵⁴ Janßen/Polat (2005).

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* (p. 2001). For a study on discrimination against migrants in general as well as against Turks in particular, see also Aydın (2009), Granato/Kalter (2001). The study by Leo Kaas and Christian Manger (2010) can be seen as an exemplary case in this context. They send 528 applications of the fictional, equally well-qualified students with the names Serkan Sezer, Fatih Yıldız, Tobias Hartmann and Dennis Langer. The internship-applications with German names achieved a higher response rate as well as much more positive responses. The results of the study showed that even if a job applicant has nearly perfect references s/he is discriminated against during the job-search period if the employer suspects a Turkish origin.

about attitudes and contacts towards foreigners that “*the social distance towards Turks*” is far greater than the social distance towards other immigrant groups.⁵⁶ However, it must be noted here that experiences of discrimination or the subjective perception of a conflict as a rejection on the ground of ethnicity may not always have to match with objectively verifiable circumstances or experiences, but can also be influenced by expectations as well as general and individual moods.

What are the key factors that lead to the emigration of high-skilled Turks to Turkey? These can be broadly summarized into two points.

(4) *Social networks*: the social networks, which cover family bonds as well as the circle of acquaintance and other dense relations, are largely neglected in the research literature as possible factors of migration. Many highly skilled Turks living in Germany maintain relationships with various organizations and friends in Turkey, whereby they receive information about possible internal job postings. In addition to exchange programs and the friendship networks, family relationships and partnerships count as key factors, which have a relevant influence on mobility decisions and experiences. As demonstrated in many other studies on migration, the family influences the mobility of scientists significantly because family and kinship networks provide emotional support and necessary assistance in everyday life (eg., child care or other supports).

(5) *High economic growth*: during the recent years, Turkey has succeeded in achieving a sustainable economic growth averaging around 7 %. As a result, the Turkish economy was able to overcome serious consequences of the economic crisis of 2001; besides, the high inflation rate could significantly be reduced, as well. In 2001, the average inflation rate was still 68.5 %; however, in September 2009, the rate could be lowered to 5.3 %. Moreover, once the new direct investment law was passed (June 17, 2003), the number of newly established foreign companies increased significantly. At the end of 2007, the cumulative number of foreign companies reached around 18,308. The number of foreign company formations, participations and subsidiaries increases with a growing tendency. The number of German companies in Turkey is strongly growing, too (cp. SWR International 2009), which in turn promotes the immigration of highly qualified Turks to Turkey. German companies in Turkey, for example, increasingly fill in key positions with young, German-Turkish academics. They have an advantage over their German competitors due to their

⁵⁶ Blohm/Wasmer (2008, p. 210).

bicultural background and bilingual skills. In addition to this, German citizens of Turkish origin possess the *Blue Card (mavi kart)*, and thus avoid the restrictive Turkish residence and work law.⁵⁷

Summary and Outlook

The aim of this contribution was approaching the emigration of highly qualified Turks and identifying the push-factors, which lead them to emigrate from Germany as well as the pull-factors, which lead them to immigrate to Turkey. Another important question was whether or to what extent there is a current emigration tendency among the highly qualified Turks living in Germany. In contrast to conventional *grand theories (dependency and modernization theory)*, this contribution arrived at the conclusion that it is highly problematic to explain the mobility of highly qualified people only in terms of “*brain drain*”. Regarding highly qualified Turks in Germany we can talk of “*brain drain*” or “*waste of human resources*” only insofar that a part of the émigrés decide for emigration due to the experience of disadvantage and subjective perception of discrimination. However, for a significant part of the émigrés the immigration into Turkey meant *personal autonomy, upgrading of personal freedom and social status advancement*. However, we know such examples only from the media; scientific analyses (studies) have not existed hitherto. There is an extensive scientific literature, which highlights a number of positive effects of the emigration of highly qualified Turks from Germany to Turkey. There are studies, which describe how the emigration of highly qualified people leads to “*transnational social spaces*”, but they take other countries and other national groups as examples. A consideration of the emigration of highly qualified Turks in terms of “*brain drain*” implicates the risk of losing sight of the positive aspects of this process.

It must be pointed out that the question about the *emigration intentions* of highly qualified Turks cannot be answered exactly on the ground of existing statistical data or scientific insights. *First*, the number of the highly qualified Turks residing in Germany cannot be determined because statistical surveys meanwhile cover the immigration background, but they do not consider the country of origin, ethnic or national background. Data about the highly qualified Turks do not distinguish between those who possess the German citizen-

⁵⁷ Ludwig (2009, p. 43).

ship from Turkish citizens. *Second*, available statistics do not show the profession and education level of Turkish persons who emigrate from Germany, so that the proportion of highly qualified persons is not detectable. *Third*, there are no systematic studies about the *life conditions, attitudes and emigration tendencies* of highly qualified Turks in Germany. Therefore, the question of emigration intentions refers to a desideratum in current research and data.

Further questions which also have to be left open are these: To what extent is the *emigration* of highly qualified Turks from Germany a result of a “*failure of integration*” or a “*lack of integration*”? Are we dealing here with “*participation in two societies*”, with the emergence of “*transnational social spaces*” or “*transnational lifestyles*”? These questions cannot be answered exactly on the ground of existing research and statistical data. For this purpose, relevant qualitative empirical studies such as interviews and group discussions are needed. These interviews then ought to be interpreted systematically from a multidisciplinary perspective and with the means of *depth-hermeneutics* in order to understand them in their latent significance.

In conclusion, mobility of highly qualified Turks cannot only be considered from an economic perspective; caution has to be exercised particularly on account of the subjective point of views of the émigrés. Three questions would be crucial for a critical review from a subject perspective: (1) Are we dealing with a voluntary mobility? (2) Is the emigration possibly due to social discrimination or juridical political marginalization? (3) Does it result in waste of human resources?

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Continuity and Change: Immigration Policies in Germany from the Sixties to the Present

Mehmet Okyayuz

Preliminary Remarks

The following text is not by far intended to provide a detailed political and legal analysis of developments and priority shifts of immigration policies in Germany since the recruitment period of the 1960s. Rather than that, special attention will be given to the historic-social context (e.g., in the sense of attitudes of official political actors towards the “foreigner question”) in whose framework debates concerning migration/migrants have been (or are still) ongoing. Hereby perceptions of integration and participation of foreigners, together with perceptions of socio-political order and multiculturalism underlying and steering the flow of the debates will be of interest. Formulated in an ideology-critical way, it shall be read “between” the lines of written and oral statements in order to show tendencies within the process of the relation(s) between the foreigners and the political sphere (reflected in the wide scope of responsibility and action of the bourgeois state) on the one hand, and the social sphere (reflected in the wide scope of action of social actors) on the other hand. A special emphasis shall be hereby given to the structural dimension of immigration policies best seen within the context of their possible functionalization as a mechanism to solve social tensions. The topic of this article is by no way specific for Germany because an important aspect of the above-mentioned structural dimension is the increasingly promoted global cross-linkage of politics and policy-making. Immigration policies, especially in their form as asylum procedures and practices, are currently carried on as part of Europe-wide coordination activities including countries at the periphery of Europe. A concrete example for this development is an attempt to build up at least seven

refugee reception and removal centers in Turkey within the framework of measures for the EU integration process. Despite this global dimension of immigration policies in a narrow sense and migration movements in a broader sense, there are still some important historic-social and theoretical reasons remaining for employing the “German case”, as it is done in this text.

Firstly, the experience of organized mass labor migration having started in the midst of the 1950s of the last century to the industrialized Western European countries was factually a Turkish-German one. The number of Turkish citizens and/or people having a Turkish background living and working in Germany is higher than in all other Western European receiving countries together. Besides this quantitative dimension, we can state ongoing controversial debates on integration, identity, multiculturalism, freedom and security hard to find elsewhere in such an intensity. Starting with the German reunification in 1991, a lot of political actors saw the necessity to (re-) construct a new (or a new-old) German identity thought to be “lost” within the framework of developments after World War II having resulted in the establishment of two “Germanies”. For those actors the migrants are somehow the counter-image of such a “new” identity.¹

Secondly, the mass recruitment of a foreign labor force on the basis of bilateral agreements was a relatively new experience for Germany. This migration movement resulted in social dynamics (such as family reunification), which should be “conducted” via political and legal means. Hereby, the long tradition of thought emphasizing the uniqueness of the state as an idealized sphere of distributing justice and balancing out social conflicts, as we can see it in the conservative attitude of Adam Müller’s “political romanticism” of the early 19th century, and in the extensive philosophical and theoretical research on state law² finding its most comprehensive expression by Hegel in his *Philosophy of Law*, and under German fascism in Carl Schmitt’s relocation of the state as the main agent of the political, enabled a very fast establishment of political and legal regulations later being incorporated into the Immigration Law of 1965, which was the first systematically formulated and in itself closed legal framework in Germany regulating the relation between the foreigner and the bourgeois state. Having mentioned above historico-social experience

¹ Penitsch (2003, p. 17).

² Jann (1989, p. 39).

and the tradition of state law, it seems plausible to evaluate Germany as one, if not the main actor, of Europe-wide coordinated immigration policies.³

The Recruitment Period of the 1960s: Immigration Policies in the Form of Labor Market Policies

After its integration into the political-institutional framework of a “free” Europe evaluated as the “antithesis” of the Eastern European socialist states under the leadership of the Soviet Union, Federal Germany’s primary aim was to rebuild its traditional industrial sectors. Until the mid-1950s, this aim could be realized to a broad extent by employing a labor force from its former Eastern territories and from those coming from Eastern Germany. The canalizing of this “national” labor force mentioned above, industrial sectors were accompanied by an extensive capital and technology transfer from the USA to the Western European countries,⁴ altogether resulting in an increase of consumptive needs enabling the establishment of new industrial sectors. Thus, in the mid-1950s, the demand for a labor force could no longer be supplied via the mentioned labor markets. A short-term solution could be provided by transferring the labor force from the agricultural to the industrial sector due to the relatively higher wages in the industrial sector compared to agricultural production.⁵ This time a lack of labor force occurred in the agricultural sector and consequently demands for a stately organized recruitment and employment of foreign labor force – concretely “the temporary employment of Italian agricultural workers”⁶ – were articulated for the first time in 1955 by parts of the professional organization of the *Farmers’ Union of Baden-Württemberg Province* (Bauernverband Baden-Württemberg).

In addition to the above-mentioned, economic preconditions for opening the labor market and providing access to a foreign labor force with the recruitment and employment of Italian workers in the agricultural sector, demographic changes such as the increase of the older population (of an age of 65

³ Niblett (2005, p. 43).

⁴ According to Mandel (1982, p. 11), this transfer of resources increased from approximately 72 billion USD to an amount of 60 billion USD in 1967.

⁵ Dohse (1981, p. 148).

⁶ Meier-Braun (1979, p. 18).

and above)⁷ and the decrease of the working population (of an age between 15 and 65) as a result of World War II, and furthermore social and political changes such as the reduction of the weekly working time to 45 hours in 1956⁸ and the re-organization of a Federal German army in the mid-1950s⁹ paved the way for the later bi-lateral recruitment agreements between Germany and countries like Italy (1955), Spain (1960), Greece (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and (the former) Yugoslavia (1968).¹⁰

The foundations of the first legal regulations in the field of immigration policies were laid under above-mentioned conditions, which were to a great extent (if not solely) determined by the economic needs of a “new” Germany trying to compete with the other traditional industrialized countries such as Great Britain and France. In the mid-1950s, the wide-spread term “economic miracle” did reflect Federal Germany’s attempt to organize its economy in a framework of free competitive market mechanisms under the guidance of Ludwig Ehrhard, who started his career as Minister of Economics in the Bavarian cabinet, later in the federal government in the same position, and who finally became Chancellor between the years 1963 and 1966.

Despite the mentioned liberal economic priorities of the economic structuring of Germany, favoring the state remained important for “conservative” politicians like Ehrhard. In this context, the emphasis on a “Social Market Economy” accentuating differences from a “pure” competitive economy may be understandable. The orientation towards a market economy was one of the steps that Germany did undergo to break with the past having culminated into fascist dictatorship. But, improvements on the level of living and working con-

⁷ The estimations concerning the number of people having been killed during World War II is – on the lowest level – around 30 million. According to Borrie, the regional distribution is as follows: Western Europe – 7.8 million, Eastern Europe (without the consideration of the Soviet Union) – 5.6 million and the Soviet Union – 17 million. Not included is the number of persons killed in the concentration camps of the German fascist dictatorship. Borrie (1970), Spanier (1969, pp. 93–94).

⁸ Hammer (1976, p. 14).

⁹ The re-organization of the army (Bundeswehr) cannot be underestimated in terms of partially draining out the labor market. Thus, the number of persons being employed there increased from 125,000 in 1957 to 450,000 in 1965. So, having this precondition for the opening of the German labor market in mind (among others), it is in no sense coincidental that, in the time period of the early 1960s up to the recruitment stop in 1973, recruitment of a foreign labor force determined by the needs of the entrepreneurs was very fast and without any decisive “disturbance” coming from possible interventions from social actors such as labor unions.

¹⁰ In the short-lasting recession period of 1966/67, the number of foreign laborers surpassed one million, reaching a climax of 2.6 million in 1973, the year when a recruitment stop was planned and executed. (Spies 1982, pp. 6–7), O’Brien (1988, p. 115).

ditions for the native population, which honestly have to be stated, went not parallel with developments concerning legal regulations determining the relation between the foreigners and the state. Here, a radical “break” with the past, as it was often articulated in the public and expressed in the Basic Law of Germany formulating basic and individual rights against an overwhelming powerful state cannot be stated.

Rather than being an extension of individual rights the legal regulations in the early 1950s until the passing of the first systematic Aliens’ Law of 1965 did inherit continuities both on an administrative and political level, which can be moderately named “authoritarian” in the sense of prioritizing the interests of the main political actor (which is the state) and the economic actors by – at the same time – evaluating the interests of the foreigners as secondary. Thus, the social aspects of migration, such as integration, is factually not a topic of these recruitment years. The power of bureaucracy continued in the form of delegating extensive responsibilities to the Immigration Bureaus, which can be most clearly seen in the field of residence permits. According to the regulatory contents of the *Foreigner Police Decree* of August 8, 1938, which continued to be valid until 1965, foreigners who applied for a residence permit had to prove that they were “worthy of the hospitality shown them”. Later, in the Aliens’ Law of 1965, this term was replaced by the formulation of the “interests of the Federal Republic of Germany”.¹¹ This change which can be evaluated as a (little) step in disfavor towards an idealized organic state conceptualization was nevertheless not a step in favor of the foreigner in the sense of a qualitative improvement of a relocation of the relation between the foreigner and the state.

Thus, the Aliens’ Law of 1965 did continue to prioritize the interests of the state in accordance with the economic needs formulated by the entrepreneurs. The rotation principle was the key word for a temporary and economically determined functionalization of immigration policies during the 1960s. Foreign workers should be employed and sent back according to the necessities of the labor market. This was clearly stated as the backbone of recruitment policies in a meeting organized by the *Federal National Association of German Employers* (Bundesvereinigung Deutscher Arbeitgeberverbände) in 1966.¹² In the center of such an economically determined approach the temporary character of im-

¹¹ Franz (1984, p. 82).

¹² Okyayuz (1999, p. 32).

migration policies was emphasized, and the contents of the bilateral agreements did also not include any social notions, because both receiving and sending countries evaluated the employment of the recruited labor force as a sort of developmental model aiming at wiping out socio-economical differences between developing and developed countries. The workers should be ideally skilled in the receiving countries and after their return they should function as “human capital” in the sense of contributing innovatively to their home economies. The precondition of such a developmental approach to labor migration would have been a consequent handling of the above-mentioned rotation model in addition to possibilities provided for the foreign laborers in order to improve professional skills. None of these preconditions were realized in practice; what happened was the emergence of social dynamics such as family reunification starting to a great extent during the mid- and late 1960s. Thus, the basis for implementing social immigration policies was already prepared during these times, but the contents of immigration policies in this recruitment period (which was in fact no longer a pure recruitment period) did remain economically determined.

The most important obstacle in implementing a social immigration policy was the insistence on the rotation model and the unwillingness to accept that more and more labor migrants began to see Germany as their country of residence, that they had begun to become settlers. Thus, the right of family reunification, maybe the most important factor of integration during this period, being under the protection of the Basic Law,¹³ was handled in such a bureaucratic manner that it was difficult to provide a feeling to the foreigners that they were accepted by the German state and society. In 1966, Ulrich Freiherr von Gienanth, the chairman of a working group called *Foreign Workers* organized under the umbrella of the *Union of German Employers* (Bund Deutscher Arbeitgeber) formulated the wide-spread understanding of integration (in a broader sense) and family reunification (in a narrow sense) in the context of immigration policies with these words: “The great advantage of employing foreigners lies in the fact that they constitute a highly mobile labor force potential. It can have very dangerous results to limit this mobility through an extensive settlement policy” (Der Arbeitgeber 1966). The political-legal foundations for such an understanding were laid in the formulations

¹³ This can be derived from two parts of the Basic Law. In a general sense from Article 20c, Clause 1, where Germany is defined via its social state principle, and concretely from Article 6, where the marriage institution and the protection of the family is mentioned.

of the *Principles Concerning Foreigners Policy* (Grundsätze zur Ausländerpolitik), whose aim was to “prevent the harmful impacts of an increasing number of family relatives of foreign workers moving in an disorganized way to Germany”.¹⁴ With the speech of “harmful impacts”, the possible increasing amount of expenditures of the local institutions for the foreigners resulting from demands for bigger housing facilities, for more kindergarden and school locations and expanded health and transportation opportunities were meant.¹⁵ The “social costs” of foreign labor force employment was something which was not foreseen during the 1960s, and consequently political actors on all levels had difficulties to adapt their immigration-theoretical conceptualizations to this factual situation resulting from uncontrollable social dynamics.

The political-legal framework and the surrounding “official” discourse on immigration and integration was mainly carried out by political and economic actors locating immigration policies around the possibility of functionalizing them in the sense of solving internal problems and providing the best possible efficiency for the economic sphere. Social actors (such as labor unions) remained in general outside these processes of policy-making until the 1970s. It is not astonishing that under these circumstances the opinions and strategies of the foreigners themselves were not considered as worthwhile to constitute guidelines within the process of establishing policy contents, or to be sincerely discussed in public. The fact that there was no need for any legitimation of political decision due to the exclusion of foreigners from public participation played another important role besides above-mentioned economic priorities for the lack of social notions during these years. Until the beginning of the 1970s – setting political elections on local, regional and federal levels aside – foreigners were even excluded from elections to labor union committees.¹⁶

Another point significant for enabling/disabling and/or easing/hardening processes of integration is the educational aspect. Rather than providing support based on the different socio-cultural backgrounds of the school children, which was later tried to be done through the establishment of research areas such as *Migrantenpädagogik*, a fast absorption “of foreigners into normal German classes as quickly as possible” was demanded by the *Standing Conference of State Ministers of Educations* (Ständige Bildungsministerkonferenz) in

¹⁴ AstA-Auslandsreferat der Universität und Evangelische Studentengemeinde Stuttgart (1972, p. 141).

¹⁵ Bech/Faust (1981, pp. 112–113).

¹⁶ Geiger (1982, pp. 169–189).

1964. Under these circumstances, it does not astonish that the failure rate of foreign pupils until and throughout the 1970s was very high compared to those of the German children.¹⁷ The highly selective German school system, which could and can be observed in general for the whole generation of school children, became one of the most significant integrational barriers for migrant children in the past and continues to be one in the present.

Germany's attempt to make a radical break with its past based on the trauma of the socio-historical experience with fascism may be considered successful for a lot of spheres of state and society. The expansion of basic rights formulations within legal texts, a continuing transparency within the relation of the citizen and the state, the democratization (that means the de-hierarchization) of the universities as a result of critical approaches coming in particular from the students, the consideration of social rights ... this list of developments within the framework of a "new" Germany can be without doubt continued. However, developments in the sense of a positive legalization and in the sense of an increasing importance of a civil understanding of state and society constituting a qualitative break from an authoritarian past did not include the foreigners during this period. They remained part of continuing traditions most significantly expressed in the above-mentioned prioritization of the interests of the state in accordance with the economic needs of the economic actors.

Emphasis on the Social Dimension in the 1970s

Starting with the mid-1970s, one can state demands for a step-by-step return to the rotation policies of the 1960s, whose realization would have factually meant nothing else than "immigration policies in the form of labor market policies".¹⁸ In this context the *Memorandum of the State Government of Baden-Wuerttemberg* (Denkschrift der Baden-Württembergischen Landesregierung), published at the beginning of 1975, should be mentioned, in which – among others – policies aiming at promoting the return of foreigners to their native countries through purposeful material, legal and ideal measures, and the limitation of the duration of stay of foreigners planned to be prospectively recruited to a maximum of five years was demanded. Thus, the catchphrase of the "guest-worker" (Gastarbeiter) being used a long time in the immigra-

¹⁷ Boos-Nünning et al. (1976).

¹⁸ Okyayuz (1993, pp. 119–121).

tion-political debate, which can be taken as the reflection of the rotation policies of the 1960s were somehow backed politically. It was not earlier than in the beginning of the 1990s that a turning away from this term took place; it was then replaced with the commonly used term “persons with migration background”.

Despite above-mentioned demands for a rigid practice concerning the treatment of foreigners, the 1970s do nevertheless mark a period after World War II in which for the first time the social dimension of (labor) migration was openly debated in public. The living and working conditions of the (labor) migrants were – maybe for the first time in such an intensity – debated in public. Thus, the important and unique thing was the inclusion of the future perspectives of the migrants themselves. The discourse “about” the foreigner was gradually replaced through the debate “with” him.¹⁹ In these years, the problem of integration made its appearance as a non-preventable social dynamic because of the far-reaching influx of family members to their relatives abroad; rather than being seen in a very limited sense as the “problem” of specific social groups, it was increasingly perceived and evaluated within the framework of the whole society.

The relatively high organizational grade of the foreigners in the labor unions is one of the most significant manifestations of the mentioned/underlined social dimension of those years. In 1974, 25 % of all foreign laborers were organized in the labor unions, whereby this share increased to 33.6 % by 1981. The share in the total organizational grade was 8.1 %.²⁰ These data can be interpreted as the “material” reflection of this socialization process within the framework of the problem of integration.

Another significant indication for the social dimension is the “intervention” of the “second generation” migrants in debates concerning their own future perspectives, which have been increasingly observed since the mid-1970s. This generation developed a sense for their own environment that the generation of their mothers and fathers was still not able to do because of structural reasons (such as missing knowledge of the language and the socio-cultural and political conditions of the receiving countries). This development, which took place parallel to and in union with the situation in the labor unions, forced the policy actors to react. One of the gains of these developments was the mul-

¹⁹ Barth (2007).

²⁰ Frey (1982, p. 393).

ti-layered use of the term “integration”, nowadays being often interpreted solely in its cultural and ethnic dimension. The problem of integration touched upon in the preliminary remark is hereby part of such a mono-factorial perception of what integration might be.

Finally, the debates about possibilities of social and political participation of the foreign population at local and regional level should be pointed out. Even if the conditions of such a participation are currently realized to a limited extent solely in a few countries, the debates in the 1970s nevertheless had severe impacts on the establishment of political and legal instruments such as immigrants’ councils (*Ausländerbeiräte*) starting to work in the beginning of the 1980s. The importance of these councils does not consist of their mere existence due to the fact that they are and always have been “powerless and marginal” and are in no way “institutionalized channels of access to the political process”.²¹ But, they are (or may hopefully be) initial instruments of a process leading to social participation forms independent from a formal citizenship status enabling the foreigners to be the determining parts of political decision-making processes in matters of their own concern. The focus hereby should be on processuality rather than on stating certain time periods and/or “events” as negative or positive, the more so because Germany’s effort is not only to implement “new” immigration policies as a sort of political-technical practice but also to overcome deep-rooted approaches as mentioned in the part of this text dealing with Germany’s conceptualization of the “state”.

The last point refers to the interactive relationship between social commitment and politics, which was expressed by the content of the memorandum of the Federal Official in charge of Immigrants, Heinz Kühn, published in September 1979. In this text the social dimension of (im)migration reflected in all above-mentioned forms with the special emphasis on the integration topic was taken into account for the first time at an official level. This can be clearly seen through the demands for the acknowledgement of a factual immigration process having taken place since the late 1960s within the context of family reunification, for the naturalization option of foreigners and for giving (active) electoral rights on local level.²² The basic essence of these demands consisted in dismantling the state’s disposition over the foreigners resulting from the contents of the Aliens’ Law by accepting them as a minority actively

²¹ Koopmans/Statham (1999, p. 666).

²² Kühn (1979).

participating in the social life of the host countries. Furthermore, for the first time in the German post-war period, the “instrument” of double citizenship, which is currently (again) not part of the official immigration-political agenda, was introduced as an important integral part of immigration policies in the debates on legal policy.²³ The demands of the Kühn-Memorandum were also articulated by social actors such as the mentioned labor unions; but also churches, certain groups within political parties, the German Lawyers Association, student groups, initiatives, platforms and discussion groups “discovered” the issue of migration and migrants. Refugees having fled from conservative-military dictatorships such as the one in Chile played an important role in this process of social mobilization, attempting to promote public debates concerning the underlying reasons forcing people to leave their home countries. The “socialization” of the issue was somehow completed by “historizing” it, whereby both aspects draw attention from the “political” to the “social” sphere. In concrete terms – before and after the contents of the Kühn-Memorandum were published – these social actors raised the voice for concrete integration programs instead of assimilation “which works toward making foreign workers and their families into Germans”.²⁴ “[C]harging that the recruitment policy to date has been structured nearly exclusively according to the political criteria of the labor market”,²⁵ for programs promoting the living together of foreigners and Germans rather than living side-by-side, for the acknowledgement of different national identities and finally for a sort of “positive discrimination” in favor of the foreigners in order to secure social equality.²⁶

Since the Memorandum is one of the most important cornerstones and points of contentions of current developments in the sphere of immigration policies with special emphasis on integration, some remarks will be made in the following chapters of this text.

Despite all these developments, which can be evaluated as quite positive for the integration process of the foreigners in the long run, the immigration law as the fundament of immigration policies remained still valid in the form of an “exceptional legal framework system”. If one measures its criteria with the standards of classical liberal legal norms, it is not possible to speak of a leg-

²³ Okyayuz (1993, p. 200).

²⁴ Christlich-Demokratische Union (1977, p. 3).

²⁵ Arbeiterwohlfahrt (1973, p. 8), O'Brien (1988, p. 123).

²⁶ Arbeiterwohlfahrt (1973, p. 13).

alization process in favor of the migrants within the sphere concerning the relation between foreigner and the bourgeois state. The three central categories of law and the administration of justice – legitimacy, commitment to norms and legal compliance – are essentially not present in the contents of immigration laws.²⁷ In none of the legal regulations having emerged since the ratification of the “first” post-war immigration law of 1965, we can state qualitative improvements concerning these categories; at best, partial quantitative corrections (such as the extension of legal compliance for the migrants or – formulated the other way round – the narrowing of the broad disposition permission of the immigration bureaus over the foreigners) were made from time to time.²⁸ But, nevertheless, besides all above-mentioned critical points, these corrections should be indeed annotated positively to draw a preferably differentiated picture of the situation. The 1970s might be characterized as a period of continuity and change, in which we can state a parallel of two (categorically different) conflicting dynamics.

On the one hand, we can state the continuity of an understanding concerning the relation between the “foreigner” and the state emphasizing and prioritizing issues such as the stabilization of the “system”, the preservation of “structures” and an understanding of policy-making as an autonomous “sphere in itself” that is quasi-untouchable by social actors. One of the main reasons for this continuing rigidity in implementing immigration policies was the fear of disorder resulting from “a wave of wild cat strikes” led in large part by foreigners²⁹; Turkish workers in particular played an important role during the strikes taking place in the Ford factory in Cologne.³⁰ These events of the early 1970s are – among others – are indicators of the fact that the image of the foreigners as obedient and quiescent did not match the realities.³¹ But rather than trying to handle this reality in the sense of embedding it into solution mechanisms aiming at evaluating the foreigners as an active part of the totality of the “social”, measurements such as a recruitment stop for foreign workers from non-EC countries in 1973 only weeks after the above mentioned strikes,³² the “disclosure of illegal employment of foreigners” because of their blocking

²⁷ Okyayuz (1993, pp. 90–91).

²⁸ *Ibid.* (pp. 150–152).

²⁹ O'Brien (1988, p. 118).

³⁰ Hildebrandt and Olle (1975).

³¹ Tsiakalos (1983, pp. 79–91).

³² O'Brien (1988, p. 118).

of the jobs for Germans,³³ the deportation of foreigners “who had fallen back on unemployment compensation or social welfare” even if they possessed work and residence permits³⁴ or the reduction of “the maximum age at which children of foreigners could enter Germany from 20 to 17” in 1978 were undertaken.³⁵

On the other hand, demands for a comprehensive social integration of labor migrants could no longer be excluded from the immigration-political agenda; and parts of this agenda were reflected in the sense of attempting to establish improvements within the sphere of aliens’ rights as reflected most concretely in the Kühn-Memorandum. But the increasing impacts of such demands only represent one aspect in shaping immigration policies in the sense of introducing for the first time issues such as social integration. The other aspect, which should be taken into consideration, and which exceeds the limits of the responsibilities of the nation-state after World War II, was Germany’s integration into a network of international relations, emphasizing – among others – the importance of human rights. The rigid treatment of foreigners did basically not suit this context. Reminiscences of a fascist past could easily harm or even destroy Germany’s new-gained reputation among the Western allies. The sensitivity of the issue can be most clearly “read” from the words of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt reproaching “the cynical exploitation of certain latent hostilities toward foreigners” as irresponsible.³⁶ It might be not too exaggerated to state that the roots of an in-togetherness of internal and external factors, and additionally – after the 1990s – the in-togetherness of migration movements and globalization,³⁷ which are currently significantly shaping migration flows in general and immigration policies in particular, were laid in these years.

³³ Dohse (1981, p. 321).

³⁴ *Ibid.* (pp. 336–341).

³⁵ Bundesministerium für Arbeit (1977).

³⁶ Thränhardt (1984, p. 124).

³⁷ Okyayuz (2005, p. 241).

The Turn of the 1980s: Limitation of Immigrant Influx and Return Promotion Instead of Integration?

Starting with the 1980s the social dimension of migration, e.g., migration in its specificity as an expression of social dynamics, was increasingly embedded into the framework of a debate on the “foreigner problem”. Perceptions and conceptions in the field of immigration policies brought into the debate from now on encompassed policy-steering instruments such as the prohibition of the moving in from children to their mothers or fathers living solitarily in Germany, and the implementation of a compulsory residence permit even for children younger than 16 years.³⁸

Hereby, the fundamental position of such concepts was the “efficient” limitation of the further immigration of foreigners to Germany and the promotion of their willingness to return to the countries of their origin.³⁹ Parallel to this, an improvement of the economic and social integration of the foreigners having lived for years in Germany was also part of the debate.⁴⁰

But even before, starting with the mid-1970s up to the early 1980s, the policy-steering instrument of influx suspensions to certain regions, cities and city quarters was enforced. The reasoning (of the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Order in 1976) underlying this policy proceeded on the assumption that the number of foreigners exceeding a predefined percentage within the total population would put a strain on the “social infrastructure”.⁴¹ Obviously, as early as in those years, parts of the official political actors began to assume that the integration process had failed. In this context, solutions were sought at the administrative-political level. In the 1990s, we will again meet a similar understanding, which will be evaluated throughout this text.

The above-mentioned developments in conjunction with a steadily increasing use of terms such as “foreigner control” and “immigration control”⁴² in the public migration debate show priority shifts within the sphere of the socio-

³⁸ Staatsministerium Baden-Württemberg (1981).

³⁹ With the Programme for Financial Return Aids (Programm für finanzielle Rückkehrhilfen) from 1.12.1983, which found its expression in the “Law for the Promotion of the Return Willingness of Foreigners (“Gesetz zur Förderung der Rückkehrbereitschaft von Ausländern”), the willingness to return started to be sanctioned institutionally (BT [Bundestags]-Drucksache X/351).

⁴⁰ Bundesministerium des Innern (1982, p. 73).

⁴¹ Rist (1980, p. 83).

⁴² Bojadzijev/Mulot/Tsianos (2007).

political perception of migration/migrants and the implementation of immigration policies. The migrants having begun to actively participate in planning strategies concerning social and immigration policies since the 1970s, or – at least – having shown the will to do so, were somehow downgraded to “objects of policies”. Parallel to this development, one can state a Europe-wide development of institutionalized migration/migrant research. What took place was a “scientification” of the “foreigner problem”. Of course, research based on an objective-scientific basis is to be appreciated by all means. The migration centers having been built up since the 1980s have currently been doing research in fields such as migrants’ pedagogics or multilingual education; and as such they account for a diversification of migration and the migrant population and finally for the social dimension of migration mentioned above. Nevertheless it should be noticed that the point of departure of this development, which can be evaluated as quite positive from the standpoint of the migrants themselves, is located within the framework of the above-mentioned premises of the immigration-political approaches of the 1980s. Since the migrant population is bound to the immigration law, whose standards are not or only partially subject to “normal” legal state norms, their living and working condition are always “exceptional”. Thus, a legalization process, of which the results are normally positive for the native population, can mean the contrary for the migrants. In this context, also a “scientification” in the field of migration research can have these negative results for the migrants. These remarks should be interpreted as an example for the “reading between the lines” as mentioned above.

The immigration-political priority shifts having taken place in the 1980s did find their expression also at the level of political statements. Thus, the former Prime Minister of Berlin, Richard von Weizsäcker, proclaimed the following commentary in June of 1981: “Either return to the home country ... or stay in Berlin; this has to include the decision to become German on the long run. [...] Berlin must stand the wall. But our city cannot stand fences we build up by ourselves”.⁴³

These words depict a drifting away from the option of naturalization (and thus from the option of double citizenship), having been formulated in the Kühn Memorandum from 1979. They set the preference in favor of an integration model, where the foreigners are accepted as building stones of social-

⁴³ Gesemann (2009, p. 315).

structure formation and development solely under exclusion of their own identity.

Quite a few statements corresponding to that of von Weizsäcker from the point of meaning can be stated in that decade. Thus, in a statement to the press in November 11, 1981, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt said that there is agreement on the point “that Germany is not an immigration country and shall not be so”.⁴⁴ Following up these words, the Federal government decided on its immigration-political tenets dated February 1982, that “only by means of a consequent and efficient policy of migration influx limitation [...] an indispensable acceptance of the German population concerning the integration of foreigners” could be ensured. And continuing: “This is of absolute necessity for the preservation of social harmony”.⁴⁵ In such a manner the leitmotif of a non-immigration country “had been already established at the end of Helmut Schmidt’s chancellorship [...] and can be identified as the basic principle of Federal German immigration policies until the late nineties”.⁴⁶ Until now, altogether with the problem of double citizenship, the question of immigration (migrants’ influx) is the controversially conducted central topic of immigration policies in Germany.

By reading the following inventory of developments starting with the 1990s, the fact shall be taken into consideration that meanwhile a third and even forth migrant generation is growing up in Germany, one made up of people who hardly know anything about their home countries, and the majority of whom are even in possession of the German citizenship. Even if Germany factually has become an immigration country, the mainstream conceptualization consisting of a denial of this fact is still determining the guiding principles of immigration policies today. First attempts to change this situation (after the hopeful Kühn Memorandum) can be seen in the contents of the first draft of the actual Immigration Law of 2005, which was formulated in 2002. The principles formulated under the overall control of Rita Süßmuth (Süßmuth Commission) allowed for the acknowledgement of the thesis of Germany being an immigration country and for the possibility of double citizenship.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Bundesministerium des Innern (1998, p. 10).

⁴⁵ Bundesregierung (1982, p. 7).

⁴⁶ Hell (2005, p. 81).

⁴⁷ This is the most far-reaching attempt to date to change immigration-political perceptions and concepts valid until now. So far, it is the last attempt in a series of similar ventures. For example, in March 1992, the former Federal Official in charge of Immigrants, Cornelia Schmalz-Jacobsen, raised demands “whereupon children of labor migrants born in Germany

At this point, it might be useful to make some remarks within the European context. Some countries such the United Kingdom have been accepting the instrument of double citizenship for a long time by evaluating it as a necessity for living together; additionally, their colonialist past had practical impacts in establishing forms of “multiculturalism” without necessarily using this term.⁴⁸ Germany, on the other hand, together with countries like Austria and Luxemburg, “has taken a more restrictive view of dual nationality, especially when it arises during the naturalization of non-nationals”.⁴⁹ Germany’s negative approach is in general located around four arguments, whereby certain continuities concerning the prioritization of the political over the social can be stated as the driving force. Firstly, a loyalty conflict between the individual and his belongings to different countries is mentioned. Accordingly, this is claimed to be hardening a successful integration process of the foreigners. Secondly, legal uncertainties are mentioned concerning issues such as inheritance law. Thirdly, an unequal situation between “normal” and naturalized citizens are claimed to have arisen. Fourthly, international regulations, which Germany did sign in the past (such as the 1963 Council of Europe Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality), are claimed to build up legal mechanisms against double or multiple citizenship.⁵⁰

Germany represents an “ethnocultural exclusionist citizenship regime”. As a result, a big number of the German-born people with a migration background have still the status of foreigners lacking full political rights whereas countries such as Great Britain and Sweden offer a much easier access to “full social and political rights”.⁵¹

Germany’s argumentative patterns are mainly politically motivated, but there are some sociological “facts” which could be used as counter-arguments. Nowadays, at least one fifth of the non-national population is born in Germany, and if speaking of issues such as loyalty to the country of nationality, it would be a mere hypothetical construction to start from such a loyalty conflict. The reality is that the big majority of these people would have no problems carrying two or more passports. Loyalty is not a theoretical issue but a result of

should automatically receive the German citizenship without having to give up the own one” (Okuyuz [1993, p. 15]). For the detailed content of these demands, see *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (1992, p. 2).

⁴⁸ Hansen (2002).

⁴⁹ Green (2005, p. 921).

⁵⁰ Green (2005, p. 922).

⁵¹ Koopmans/Statham (1999, p. 661).

concrete living and working conditions, which are centered in concreteness around Germany as the factual new home for future life. In current years, these aspects of an ongoing social reality going beyond political statements has increasingly become part of scientific research mostly supporting the idea that double citizenship would cause no danger for the interests of the state by – at the same time – being aware of the limits of such instruments. The debates on citizenship, naturalization and integration do more and more (and again) include debates on double citizenship as one of the possible instruments not to enable but to ease integration.⁵²

The fact that some important central citizenship rights, such as social rights, are – by all the critiques throughout this text – more or less factually available for all inhabitants of Germany independent from the issue of citizenship/nationality has led to formulations such as “post-national” citizenship, seeming to underestimate formal citizenship.⁵³ But, the rights in the social state’s framework should be completed through the political and legal rights. Only within this totality can a real re-shift to the social be seen as a potential. A “re-socialization” of immigration policies through an active social participation of the foreigners themselves, touched upon in the previous chapter, can only be achieved by including legal rights. The discourse of a “post-national” citizenship should be enriched through/with the help of a political and legal framework giving the foreigners a secure status to be not only named as part of the society but to be it factually.

The above-mentioned claim of the importance and significance of formal citizenship preferably in the form of double/multiple citizenship can be concretized by emphasizing the fact that it is a precondition for gaining certain rights. Having access to full voting rights and to civil servant positions as a *Beamter* (a special state employment status being somehow a prerequisite for middle- and high-ranking positions) are only some of the issues enabling a person to become “part” of the society. Evaluated from this standpoint, citizenship/double citizenship is strongly related to the issue of integration. But rather than evaluating it as a step towards integration, by the political authorities it was seen as a final point of a successful integration process.

Shortly after the passing of the law at the beginning of 2003, the Constitutional Court nullified it in December of the same year. Finally, on January 1,

⁵² For a detailed view see, among others, Faist (2004), Hagedorn (2001), Koslowski (2000).

⁵³ Soysal (1994), Joppke (1999).

2005, the current Immigration Law came into effect though no longer containing the integration-political suggestions of the Süßmuth Commission. The concrete contents will be gone into below.

The discourse of a possible “foreigner and immigration control” does mark conceptualities, which refer to a process moving away from the social level to a political-administrative one. The reduction of the influx age from 18 to 16 years concerning adolescents aiming at joining their parents is one example for such a shift. Since the beginning of the controversies on the actual Immigration Law, there have been (and are still) also demands for a further reduction from 16 to ten years.⁵⁴ One of the most important reasons why family (re-) unification has always played an important role in all immigration-political debates since the beginning of foreign labor recruitment policies in the mid-1950s consists of the fact that it was one of the social dynamics which – from the very beginning until now – could not be administered. The more it had been tried, countermeasures were taken against this dynamic since the end of the 1970s/the beginning of the 1980s by means of using nearly all legal and political instruments.

Consequently, not only, Europe or worldwide economic crisis symptoms of whom first signs can be detected in the context of the petrol crisis in 1973 and of whom the preliminary culmination point of those years was reached at the beginning of the 1980s, but also can similar developments be stated in most of the other Western European receiving countries such as Austria, Belgium or Switzerland.

These developments towards a more restrictive practice of legal regulations concerning migrants were based on three premises, which are, to a big extent, still valid until now:

- The first of these premises started from the point that (and this is even more the case nowadays) the integration of the “foreign fellow citizens” has failed to a big extent.⁵⁵ The above-mentioned multilayered approach of the 1970s attempting to anticipate a holistic perception of integration was replaced by a one-sidedly cultural- and ethnical-defined integration debate. It seemed (and seems) to be forgotten in the flow of this debate that integration always means disintegration at the same time. Disintegration in the sense that only somehow “integ-

⁵⁴ Welt-Online (2003).

⁵⁵ In this context the sensational heading of the weekly journal *Der Spiegel* (1997) shall be remembered: “Dangerously Alien, The Failure of the Multicultural Society (Gefährlich fremd, Das Scheitern der multikulturellen Gesellschaft)”.

rated” persons can understand the society in which they live to the extent that they again can disintegrate themselves. The first migrant generation was, evaluated from such a point of view, neither integrated nor disintegrated. They “solely” lived and worked.

- The second premise was based on the more or less openly articulated hypothesis that the receiving countries were still “not prepared” enough to cope with social tensions and conflicts resulting from the influx of new immigrants.
- The third hypothesis was based on a discourse of identity and culture as factors of difference, not unity. As a result of this premise (altogether with changes in the global agenda such as the renaissance of new conservatism, of nationalism, of the decline of the Soviet Union and furthermore of the shifting away from egalitarian social policies to neoliberal policy conceptualizations) the migrants were increasingly functionalized as a means for constructing something like a European identity. The counter model of such a European identity was located especially among the Muslim migrant community, independent from the fact of how these migrants themselves would define their own identity.

From the 1990s to the Present:

Political-Administrative Approaches to “Manage” the “Foreigner Problem”

Since the beginning of the 1990s, we can state attempts to “solve” the “foreigner problem” at a political and administrative level. Legal debates on citizenship, on the social and political participation of migrants and on regulations concerning residence and work permits were held in order to solve the problems of persons evaluated as not capable of or willing to integrate themselves into the host societies. Whether with them or against them does not hereby play a significant role within the flow of the current debates.⁵⁶

Concerning the case of Germany lately, the main focus is on the Turkish migrant population being “registered” as non-European since the assault on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York and their destruction in September 11, 2001. This situation may be reflected the best within the framework of the process of Turkey’s EU access negotiations, and the hereby invoked debate on European basic values and cornerstones that Turkey, and as

⁵⁶ Barbieri (1998).

such Turkey's rooted population abroad, are accused of having nothing in common with.

In such a manner the former SPD Member of the Federal Parliament, Martin Neuffer, evaluated Turkey's rooted population in Germany in 1986 as a group of persons who could not be integrated: "The boat is full and he answered the question, whether Germany was an immigration country or not".⁵⁷ But even before, since the end of the 1970s, representatives – again of the SPD – had been articulating similar slogans.⁵⁸

Starting with the beginning of the 1990s this sort (and similar sorts) of political conceptualizations concerning social order founded the headstone for the institutionalization and legalization of social dynamics of migration. The latest developments, such as the fact that persons from the former socialist countries after their decline immigrated to the Western European countries in general, those Russians of German ethnical origin (Aussiedler) immigrated to Germany in particular and furthermore the emerging debate on asylum policies (having found first results in the latest regulations of the Refugee Law of 1993), altogether with attempts to differentiate between political and economic asylum seekers and to predefine which countries could be stated as "secure" and which could not, were added to the migration agenda.

Despite initiating a sincere and differentiated debate on the new (old) "global migration" issue, meaning the reasons for the emergence and the development of a phenomenon, which actually is one of the determining factors within international relations, we have to state priority shifts towards a management of migration by means of political and legal instruments since the 1970s. Nevertheless, from the point of view of the official policy actors there are in fact important reasons for such shifts. The most important ones can be listed as follows:

- Economic and demographic changes resulting in an increased demand for qualified labor force;
- The inability of existing mechanisms and instruments (such as the former Immigration Law from 1991) to promote the integration process of the migrants;
- Demands for an easing of naturalization;
- The fight against illegal (im)migration;

⁵⁷ For a comment of Neuffer from 1982 with similar meaning, see Neuffer (1982).

⁵⁸ Fakten Fiktionen (2009).

- Demands for a re-organization of the administrative responsibilities of the Immigration Bureaus;
- Demands for a harmonization of immigration policies at the European level;
- Demands for a redefinition and reclassification of the different migrants groups according to their political and legal status.

At this point, we have to note honestly that at the beginning of the period, where the above-mentioned priority shifts took place, legal improvements for the migrants were also demanded to be realized. Throughout the acting period of the Federal Government composed of social democrats and members of the “green” party from 1998 to 2005, the focus of prospective immigration policies was laid on the integration of the migrants living in Germany for a long time on the basis of extended political and legal rights. The beginning of this coalition marks a – indeed short-lasting – renaissance to “socialize” the “foreigner problem” again rather than to “manage” or “solve” it solely on an administrative level. Important evidence for this claim can be seen in the fact that the topic of double citizenship was also thrown into the debate again.

But actually, after the failure of all these “social” attempts in the sense that the suggestions and demands of the Süßmuth Commission and later the contents of the law in 2003 were thrown out by the Constitutional Court, once more the priorities have changed meaning that the strand of the 1980s was renewed. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the composition of the actors as well as the focus on basic questions have changed. Additionally, new actors have “entered” the debate and are significantly determining the flow of the debates. Institutes claiming academic standards such as the “Institute for Economic Research” in Berlin, as well as representatives of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry, are drawing the main attention of their immigration-political perceptions and conceptions to demographic and economic points, and to the prevention of the immigration of a new unqualified foreign labor force manifesting itself, for example, in the – still unfinished – “green card” debate. “Foreigner control” was replaced by the term “controlled” immigration, meaning lastly the extension of the disposition competence of the immigration bureaus over the migrants.

Throughout the publicly led debate on migration and integration, which is meanwhile dominated by the actors mentioned above, it seems not to be difficult to assess xenophobic and even racist notions focussing on the point that

persons of non-European origin are – first and foremost – a threat for the European countries and societies, and as such have the duty to prove their suitability for these locations.⁵⁹ This seems to be also reflected in the new Immigration Law (together with its latest modifications dated from July 2007). If all its contents would be practiced, Germany would become, according to a statement of Pro Asyl, “less attractive, colder and hostile to integration”.⁶⁰

With regard to this “coldness” raised by Pro Asyl, the fact that it is used to try to “solve” the issue of integration at the level of administrative measures is of determining significance. Obligatory language courses and the introduction of a points system measuring qualification are only a few of these measures.⁶¹ We have to admit that the knowledge of the language of the society where people live is undoubtedly of great – more than this: of existential – importance for successful integration. Integration, however, is on the other hand a complex social process whose “realization” is determined by a multitude of factors. A reduction of this multitude to the administrative level is not by far enough to accommodate this complexity.

Conclusion: Changing Priorities and the Continuing Debate on Multiculturality and Integration

The course of the above-mentioned framework-conditions and their contentual priority shifts since the 1970s in unity with a socio-political atmosphere of intolerance and a bad conjunctural situation established a political and ideological context, in which nearly all attempts to “socialize” the “foreigner problem” have failed. The thesis of a “failed integration” brought into debate in Germany in the 1990s, widespread by the media, seems to be actually also accepted in most of the other Western European receiving countries. Even in – evaluated from the point of immigration-political framework-conditions and their practice – “liberal” countries such as the Netherlands or in countries such as the United Kingdom, where practiced “multiculturality” seems to be part of the social reality until now, voices demanding more restrictive policies can be heard louder and more affirmative from day to day.

⁵⁹ Müller (2005).

⁶⁰ ProAsyl (2007, p. 1).

⁶¹ Müller (2005).

The (im)migrants themselves are criticizing these priority shifts. Hakkı Keskin from the Turkish Community in Hamburg is summarizing this critique under four main points:⁶²

- The actual regulations of the Immigration Law and their repressive practical character are cementing the Immigration Law in the form of a defensive law (directed towards the migrants).
- The priorities of the contents of the Immigration Law are determined in favor of the economic interests of the German entrepreneurs.
- The migrants are classified as “good”, “useful” or “less useful”. In this context for the migrants classified as “less useful” it will be more difficult from day to day to secure their residential status.⁶³
- Factually, it will be more difficult to get an unlimited/residence permit or German citizenship. Formerly, a “basic knowledge of the German language” was sufficient for getting citizenship; whereas nowadays an “adequate” one is demanded.

But not solely the living and working conditions of the “long-established” labor migrants will have worth according to this critique; also the conditions of the qualified ones which are planned to be recruited will be similarly bad as a result of the unequal relation between migrants and the bourgeois state based on the broad disposition competence of the immigration bureaus over the foreigners. They will continue to miss equal rights as compared to the German population. Their stay will continue to be temporary. Furthermore, the fact that a possible “green card” procedure is only planned to temporarily crack the recruitment stop of 1973 rather than having stringency in itself can be evaluated in the sense that a principally new immigration policy is not on the agenda. Thus, the cornerstones of a “guest-worker policy” of the 1960s based on a rotational system with timely limited working contracts did not change in principle.

The discourse about an aspired “multicultural society”, having been proclaimed in the 1970s by social scientists, pedagogues, representatives of social institutions, as well as by parts of the political elite in order to constitute an integration process of the whole society, is nowadays mainly done at the level of the self-identity building of specific social groups. In this context, we can speak of an ethnification of structural problems, finally resulting in similar coun-

⁶² Keskin (2003).

⁶³ In times where the “green card” debate, dealing with a highly qualified foreign labor force, is ongoing, one can state that these “less useful” groups of persons will consist mainly of “classical” labor migrants having lived for years in Germany.

ter-reactions from the migrants themselves; a vicious circle disabling real integration.⁶⁴

Since the 1980s, a time period in which the social dimension of migration was neglected step-by-step in favor of administrative legal measures, the main focus within the context of immigration-political debates was on the integration of the migrants into the host countries. Hereby, integration was more and more evaluated in the sense of being a predefined and static category by emphasizing a one-sided active and willful orientation of the migrants towards the host countries in the sense of a total acceptance of these host countries' norms and values. As a precondition for such an acceptance, the knowledge of culture and language of the host countries is seen to be essential. Undoubtedly, such knowledge – as mentioned above – is necessary for the social and political participation of the migrants, as well as for their possible success in economic affairs. On the other hand, one should consider that such knowledge does not “automatically” create something like sympathy or empathy of the migrants for the host countries, or even something like a social “nearness” of German citizens with a migration background with their new home countries. That means, this knowledge can ease social integration and political identification, and maybe it can even create such things to a certain extent; but it can never deliver a “guarantee” for this.

However, integration being understood in a holistic sense should not be limited to demands directed toward the foreigners to learn certain languages, to be useful in economic life, to act socially peaceful and to live according to legal norms.

The migrants, who – despite all structural difficulties – begin to develop their own integration strategies, accept this one-sided debate on integration less and less. They demand changes in the perception and attitudes of receiving countries towards migration and migrants. Not least their calls for a new debate on integration are growing ever louder.

The portrayed priority shifts of immigration-political contents since the 1970s found their results in a paradigmatic change from a critical perception and conceptualization of integration (with associated debates concerning the question of what culture is or might even be) to an administrative-technical one. Until now, questions on the preconditions and methodological practice for, and the social carriers of, “right” integration are not answered. These and

⁶⁴ Bienfait (2006).

other – similar – questions, which can be solely answered within the framework and in due consideration of historico-social processes, are currently pressed into the context of administrative-legal procedures. This approach does in no way encourage the migrants to put their own experiences in the center of everyday living and working conditions. And the other way round; they will not be encouraged to perceive their factual living and working conditions as such from the point of view of their consciousness. But, this is the only way “real” integration can work.

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Conclusion

Seçil Paçacı Elitok and Thomas Straubhaar

Turkey is an important actor in terms of migratory regimes and migration management, as it stands at the junctions of Europe, Asia and Africa. Due to its geopolitical significance and closeness both to the EU Area and MENA (Middle East and North Africa), Turkey became the nexus of emigration, immigration and transit migration. Turkey has been a country of emigration for the last fifty years since World War II. The movement of Turkish guest-workers to Western Europe and especially to Germany has been in the focus of interest. However, other countries of destination have become more important, as Turkish firms have expanded their activities in the neighboring countries. In recent times, another phenomenon has become apparent. More and more, Turkey has also become a country of immigration. Especially migrants from MENA have moved to Turkey with its improving standard of living (in comparison to the region) and the increasing chances of getting a job (especially in informal sectors). Furthermore, however, some of the immigrants see Turkey as a transit country of their long journey to (Western) Europe. This is of special importance for the EU, since the transit movement via Turkey directly affects the immigration control system from Turkey to the EU due to the common Turkish-EU border.

In the context of Turkey's accession to the EU, the issue of "potential migration" from Turkey and its impact upon European labor markets became one of the concerns of the EU, considering Turkey's growing population and young labor force. In the light of the discussion about the deepening of the EU instead of enlargement, the relations between Turkey and the EU followed a stagnating pattern in the post-Lisbon Treaty period. Since the second half of 2008, under the influence of conservative leaders of Europe, such as Merkel and Sarkozy, relations between Turkey and the EU almost came to a standstill. Cur-

rently, privileged partnership as an alternative form to Turkey's membership is among the most controversial issues in the current agenda of EU.

Fears

Among the fears of the EU with regard to Turkey's membership, three points, which are elaborated below, play the most significant role. Firstly, due to the demographics of Turkey, the numbers of seats at the European Parliament will decrease, which is not for the sake of current members. Secondly, in terms of living standard and GDP per capita, Turkey is below the European average and considered as an outlier not fitting into the economic standards. Finally, due to the Muslim identity of Turkey, there are concerns about the disharmony between the Christian values of Europe and cultural impacts of Islam.

Too many

The EU's demographic trend is characterized by low fertility rates and longevity. Thus, in demographic terms, Europe is facing the problems of an aging and shrinking population in addition to the low labor force participation rates. Demographic trends show that West Europe will mostly rely on the foreign labor force in the future. Münz et al. (2007)¹ underline the logical necessity of migration and postulate that on average a net flow of slightly less than one and half million labor migrants per year would be required to keep Europe's economically active population at constant levels.


With regard to the future migration potential from Turkey to Germany, the demographic development might become crucial. In the mid-2000s, the size of the population was 82 million in Germany and 70 million in Turkey. In the last decade, the population grew by 0.1 in Germany and by 1.5 in Turkey. In the mid-2000s, 20 % of the total population in Germany was over 65 years of age. In Turkey, this ratio remained only at 6 %. Consequently, the population development might lead to an excess supply of labor in Turkey, while in Germany it might lead to an excess demand for labor. Taken together that will stimulate incentives to migrate from Turkey to Germany. In comparison to Germany, Turkey's population is increasing; however, this trend will be stabilized as well in the long run.

¹ Münz/Straubhaar/Vadean, F./Vadean, N. (2007).

*Too Poor*²

Another crucial factor in determining the causes of migration is the contrast in the average standard of living among different countries. The choice of individuals to emigrate based on their increased income earning potentials does not follow a linear function, but instead a logarithmic one. This means that there is a stronger propensity for an individual to choose to migrate in the case of larger income gaps, which becomes weaker in the case of smaller income gaps. The propensity for an individual to emigrate may occur long before income generation between the host country and the country of origin have equalized because of a saturation point of migration. Thus, the speed of change is important. It makes a big difference whether the income gap is declining rapidly or not.

Figure 1: Per Capita GDP (in Purchasing Power Parities USD)* in Turkey and Germany, 1980 to 2008



* In this figure, Purchasing Power Parities USD have been used to reflect the standard of living and its difference between Turkey and Germany.


Source: World Bank: World Development Indicators.

Figure 1 shows the rather wide gap in the average standard of living between Turkey and Germany by comparing the per capita GDP measured in purchasing power parities USD. The gap has declined. In 1980, the GDP per capita in Turkey reached about 20 % of the German GDP per capita. Today, it reaches about 37 %.

² Paçacı Elitok/Straubhaar (2011, pp. 116–118).

To illustrate how long it may take to catch up, Figure 2 reflects a simple simulation exercise. It is assumed that in the next decades Turkey's GDP will grow faster than Germany's GDP. (In the mid-2000s, the GDP per capita was around 30,000 USD in Germany and 10,000 USD in Turkey).

Figure 2: Simulation of the Gap in Per Capita GDP (in Purchasing Power Parities USD)* between Turkey and Germany, 2008 to 2050, under the Assumption of Different Annual Growth Rates for the GDP



* In this figure, Purchasing Power Parities USD have been used to reflect the standard of living and its difference between Turkey and Germany.

Source: World Bank: World Development Indicators.

The simulation shows that under this assumption, the German GDP grows with a constant rate of 2 % per year while the Turkish GDP has to grow by 3 % per year to keep the existing gap of the GDP per capita vis-à-vis Germany stable. Turkey requires a more rapid growth of its GDP to compensate for its more rapid population growth. If the Turkish economy grows by 4 % per year and the German GDP stays at 2 % per year, the Turkish GDP per capita will reach half the size of the German GDP per capita by 2040. If it grows by 5 % per year, the 2:1 gap is reached by 2025. The simulation exercise is a simple esti-

mate to illustrate how long the substantial gap of the average standard of living will persist between Germany and Turkey. This would be the case even if the Turkish economy grows (much) faster than the German one.

Too Muslim

Within the last fifty years of Turkish migration to Western Europe, one dimension became gradually dominant in defining the image of “Turks” in Europe: religion. Turkish migrants increasingly are defined and perceived as being “Muslim” in the first place, in addition to all their specific characteristics. There are several reasons behind this shift. One is unarguably the events of September 11, which somehow increased fears of Muslim communities and contributed to the rise of Islamophobia. The second reason is the pattern within the Turkish diaspora towards conservatism, which reflects itself in the increasing number of ethnic and religious associations, in which Turkish migrants are organized. The internal politics in Turkey is in line with the religious tendencies of Turkish community in Europe. This brings the long-standing question under discussion one more time: the contradiction between the secular identity of Europe and the Islamic tradition of Turkey. The AKP (Justice and Development Party)’s victory in the latest political elections makes this question even more meaningful and it is worth discussing the challenges that Turkey will face in the near future in terms of religion, being the sole Muslim candidate of the union.

Too many fears?

Regarding the population developments in Turkey and in the EU – with a fast-growing population in Turkey and a declining and aging population in the EU – and taking into account the gap in the average standard of living, there is a potential for migration flows from Turkey to the EU indeed. This is one (and probably the most important) reason why some EU countries (especially Germany) are concerned about applying the right of free movement in the case of Turkish workers.³ Are these fears justified by theoretical expectations or empirical evidence? Several studies have attempted to answer these questions; however, “migration intention” is a complicated concept whose measurement is fairly complex.⁴

³ Paçacı Elitok/Straubhaar (2010 a, p. 8).

⁴ For a detailed review, see Paçacı Elitok (2010).

The main methodological difficulty for most of these studies lies in the fundamental political and institutional change that goes along with a Turkish accession to the EU. Turkey becoming a member of the EU and being granted the right of free movement for Turkish workers means doubtlessly a unique experience with no historical blue-print at all. Thus, if there is a case where the famous Lucas-critique⁵ is well applied, it comes with the changes an EU membership for Turkey would generate. The methodological key questions are: how far can we (1) use experiences in the past to learn something for the future and (2) speculate about the migration potential from Turkey to the EU after such a fundamental change from strong to no restrictions has taken place? Briefly, summarizing the existing empirical evidence⁶ from all the different studies, one thing becomes very clear: the estimations present broadly varying numbers. Figures with respect to the volume of potential Turkish migrants from Turkey to the EU range between 0.5 to 4.4 million. It is sufficient to say that the literature lacks an agreement on a reasonable interval with a minimum and a maximum value. The wideness of the range is rather large and quite sensitive to the data sets and methodologies that are applied, which brings the reliability of numbers into discussion. Forecasting the approximate volume of potential migration is quite necessary, especially for policy makers; however, one should be cautious when approaching the estimation literature, since the range is rather wide and the quality of the data is poor and the methodologies are unclear and inconsistent. Moreover, the focus of the debate should rather shift to the profile, the structure, the dynamics, the regional distribution, trends and mechanisms of potential migration flows and to the motivation of migrants to come to Europe.

Actually, the question is not so much: how many Turkish workers would take use of the right to move freely? The right question is: how many more (or

⁵ The Lucas-critique is "that any change in policy will systematically alter the structure of econometric models. ... [This conclusion] is fundamental; for it implies that comparisons of the effects of alternative policy rules using current macro econometric models are invalid regardless of the performance of these models over the sample period or in ex ante short-term forecasting" (Lucas [1976, p. 41]). The Lucas-critique refers to the level of consistency and invariance over time and space. It is about the correctness of an extrapolation from past migration patterns to expected migration behavior and it is about the possibilities of applying empirical migration experiences from one area to another. Some scholars try to overcome this fundamental methodological problem by the inclusion of so-called country-specific effects. In most econometric forecasts the country-specific aspects are captured by a country-specific intercept, which remains constant over time. However, it remains more than crucial how the country-specific intercept is defined and applied to Turkey that has had no historical experience of free migration to Europe.

⁶ Paçacı Elitok (2010).

even less) would move compared to a situation with no right of free movement? Erzan et al. (2006)⁷ show that if Turkey's membership process is endangered and high growth cannot be sustained, 2.7 million people may be penetrating the EU-15 despite the restrictions on the labor mobility. This is more than in a scenario with a Turkish EU membership and free movement for Turkish workers. Thus, it is not unrealistic to expect, that under the lack of full EU membership and free movement of labor, Turkish migration flows towards the EU will be even at higher levels. The migration experience after the Eastern enlargement has shown that the actual migration flows are fairly below the expected levels, following the accession. It might be that something like a migration hump will be the most realistic scenario. There will be an increase of migration flows firstly, just after the right of free movement is granted. But after a while, it will decrease.⁸

Potentials⁹

Migration flows from the EU to Turkey will be determined by various factors (income differentials, unemployment, migrant networks, migration policies, religion, culture, etc.) in the future. European retirees will keep migrating to Turkey, particularly to the Aegean and Mediterranean Area, for their retirement life. The return of people with a Turkish background and also the return of retiring Turkish migrants (e.g., first-generation German-Turks) will also be an increasing part of potential migration flows from the EU to Turkey. Yet, due to the entry requirement to the host country every six months, their movements will be categorized under circular migration. As Istanbul becomes more and more attractive for international business, headquarters of multinational corporations will keep setting up there, which will motivate expatriate workers and professionals to migrate to Turkey for work-related purposes. In addition to foreign professionals, the potential migration to Turkey of highly skilled migrants with a Turkish background who are educated in Germany is and will be significant.

Istanbul will keep and even increase its attractiveness for migrants, especially highly skilled ones. Considering its development, Istanbul will be com-

⁷ Refik/Kuzubas/Yildiz (2006, pp. 33–34).

⁸ Paçacı Elitok/Straubhaar (2011, pp. 107–128).

⁹ *Ibid.* (pp. 122–123).

peting with other global cities in attracting international migration flows. Student migration will play a crucial role, as well. Due to the lack of cultural and language barriers, students from Turkish-speaking countries like Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, etc., will prefer Turkey for educational purposes. This temporary future potential of students may turn into permanent migration depending on the work opportunities.

One can observe heterogeneity to a great extent within the Black Sea Area and the Middle East. Economic forecasts on the future of the Turkish economy and Turkey's neighborhood postulate that this heterogeneous structure will continue and become even more intensified since the dynamics of each economy are quite diverse. The discrepancies among the countries in the region can be considered as a sign for a future divergent pattern. The probability of these countries to converge is fairly low. Moreover, the heterogeneity of the Turkish neighborhood has implications in terms of distribution of gains from trade as well as the migration potential.¹⁰ Due to the gaps among countries with respect to their main macroeconomic indicators, Turkey's role in managing the migration flows from Middle East and ex-Soviet Union countries is of considerable importance. Under this framework, it is possible to foresee that migration from the Middle East will keep its importance in the near future and may even increase due to the latest developments in the visa policy of Turkey. Male migrants will be motivated by the job opportunities in construction, tourism and entertainment, whereas female migrants will be preferred for domestic services. Current migration forms, such as contract-dependent labor migration and marriage migration, will be persistent in the near future, where asylum seeking (in accordance with the possible solution of Kurdish dispute) may have a declining trend with the full membership to the EU.

The migration potential from Turkey to the Middle Eastern countries is relatively weak due to the tendencies in the region to employ their own citizens and encourage the young generation to work in the country.

Challenges and Opportunities

Push and pull factors behind the potential migration are of great importance. With the possible membership to the EU, Turkey should consider revising these factors in their historical context so as to find policy solutions for eliminating the pushing factors and improving the pulling ones. Considering the

¹⁰ Paçacı Elitok/Straubhaar (2010 b).

low wages and high unemployment as the main pushing factors behind the potential for labor migration, Turkey can develop policy measures to deal with these issues. This, inevitably, requires structural and institutional reforms that stabilize the Turkish economy. Better living standards, which are closer to the EU average, would decrease the motivation of Turks to migrate towards Europe. EU membership helps to reach this goal. What we have learnt from the EU experience in the past is that if labor has the legal right to move freely, this makes people (especially in border areas) more mobile internationally, but it does not induce mass migration in itself from one country to another. People's social and cultural ties with their local environment are an important obstacle for migration, and this factor has commonly been underestimated from the perspective of theoretical economics. Furthermore, it has not been taken into account seriously enough in light of the structural migration (forecasting) models. Therefore, EU membership might provoke not more but rather less migration from Turkey to the EU.

The EU intends to control migration, to select migrants on a skill-basis, to avoid illegal migration and to sign bilateral agreements so as to correspond to the need for immigrating labor force. Turkey, a country, which has waited long for EU membership, alters its foreign policy and migration management in a manner that improves its relations with its neighbors, especially in the Middle East. With respect to visa restrictions, Turkey has been following a liberal visa policy since 2005. Several visa-free agreements were signed with neighboring countries including Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Russia. The main motivation of Turkey was mainly economic gains from more integration in the region, yet its liberal visa regime brought the "construction of a new Schengen area in the Middle East" under discussion. This alteration stands both as a challenge and an opportunity for Turkey and its future perspectives on migration. On the one hand, it can be read as a "political message" to the EU, which lately initiated the privileged membership as an alternative for Turkey, revealing that there are other options for Turkey in its neighborhood for various integration possibilities and unions. On the other hand, within the EU, Turkey's liberal visa policy increased the concerns about the security issues in relation to border management, since the free entrance of immigrants both from Middle East and from Russia facilitates the potential for illegal and transit migration to Europe via Turkey.¹¹

¹¹ *Ibid.* (p.126).

One of the most crucial challenges for Turkey in its relations with the EU is illegal migration. Due to its geographical location, Turkey will be under the risk of increasing irregular migration pressure. Potentials for irregular migration to Turkey (from the Middle East and from ex- Soviet Union countries) and the significance of female migration within this flow will continue to be of considerable importance. Kirişçi (2008)¹² emphasizes the increasing importance of managing illegal migration, both as a challenge and as an opportunity, for Turkey in the near future, as it has become a transit country. Yet, he postulates that the manner in which “migration” has become securitized by the EU has adversely affected the EU-Turkish relations and generated “mistrust” on both sides. According to Kirişçi, the EU feels that Turkey is not doing enough to combat and prevent illegal transit migration and suspects that Turkey has allowed illegal migrants to use its territory to transit to the EU; and there is fear on the Turkish side that the EU intends to use Turkey as a buffer zone for irregular migrants in line with the EU regulations. Currently, Turkey altered its approach with respect to migration policy, namely: asylum law, visa regulations, illegal migration and human trafficking. In terms of asylum, the two main legislations that are under consideration are the 1994 Asylum Regulation and the 2006 Circular stipulating asylum procedure and the rights and obligations of refugees and asylum seekers. Even if Turkey is party to the UN Refugees Convention of 1951, it has still not lifted the geographical limitation, namely, non-Europeans are not granted refugee status. If it is well managed, the challenge of illegal migration can turn into an opportunity for Turkey so as to freshen the negotiations with the EU. Cooperation and dialogue between Turkey and the EU with respect to illegal migration would be beneficial for the security of both sides.¹³

Turkey is under criticism because of its migration policies being weak, unsystematic and temporary. Taking the past as a reference point for the future based on the lessons from migration history, Turkey has to re-evaluate its own interests and build up policy tools dismissing push factors, particularly in transition period, so as to transform migration from being a challenge to being an opportunity. There are risks and challenges for Turkey waiting at the gate of Europe. It is crucial to recognize the importance of policy-oriented questions regarding the push and pull factors and how they changed throughout history

¹² Kirişçi (2008).

¹³ *Ibid.* (p. 126).

and how they influenced migration decisions. Turkey ought to conduct reforms on expected emigration and immigration flows as a structural grounding of legislations and institutions in addition to the economic measures discarding the pushing factors, such as low wages, economic instability, unemployment and inadequate working conditions. Yet, Turkey must recognize the importance of migration as a development tool for its own sake (with or without EU membership), and should get prepared for short- and long-term effects of expected migration. It is better for Turkey to realize the importance of immigration factors during the EU negotiations and restructure its position according to its potential benefits from migration flows. The approach of Turkey in the 1960s, namely, considering migration as a remedy for unemployment and remittances as a source of foreign currency, should be replaced by a more realistic and contemporary future projection so as not to repeat the same mistakes. Turkey should seek routes for a transformation from a labor exporter country to a labor importer country.

The EU is being criticized due to the lack of common binding frame. Even if several steps have been taken so far, Europe is still lacking a common immigration policy and is under criticism due to the lack of consistency among European members. The former policies were criticized because of being inflexible, non-adaptive, top-down, bureaucratic, too specific and designed for the local needs. It is among the targets of the Lisbon Agenda for the post-2010 period to create employment opportunities for the unemployed low skilled migrants, to promote the integration of available migrants and to implement a shift to a more selective migration policy. Consequently, migration will keep its key role in relations of Turkey with the EU – not necessarily for the next fifty years but certainly for the next decade.

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List of Abbreviations

AKP	Justice and Development Party
ASAM	Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants
AZR	Central Aliens' Register
CBRT	Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
DESIYAB	State Bank for Industry and Migrant Investment
ECHR	European Court of Human Rights
EHRC	European Human Rights Convention
ENP	European Neighborhood Policy
EU	European Union
EURIBOR	Euro Interbank Offered Rate
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GaWC	Globalization and World Cities
GDA	The Solidarity Network for Migrants
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GDS	General Directorate of Secretary
GNI	Gross National Income
GNP	Gross National Product
HCA	Helsinki Citizens' Assembly
HLWG	The EU's High Level Working Group
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICMC	International Catholic Migration Commission
ICT	Independent Commission on Turkey
IHH	The Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief
IKV	Economic Development Foundation
IMF	International Monetary Fund

IMILCO Network	International Migration, Informal Labour and Community in Europe: Swedish-Turkish Initiative for Research and Policy
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ITO	Istanbul Chamber of Commerce
LIBOR	London Interbank Offered Rate
MazlumDer	The Association for Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MOI	Ministry of Interior
MoLSS	Ministry of Labour and Social Security
Mülteci-Der	Association for Solidarity with Refugees
MURCIR	Marmara University Research Centre for International Relations
NAAP	National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis
NAP	National Action Plan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OECD	Organization for Economic and Co-operation Development
UNCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
PKK	The Kurdistan Worker's Party – Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan
TIMS	Turkish International Migration Survey
TÜİK	Turkish Statistical Institute
TÜSİAD	Turkish Industry and Business Association
UGINAR	International Migration, Labour Force and Population Movement
USA	The United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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CEPR Centre for Economic Policy Research

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TEZ TurkeiEuropaZentrum

Transatlantic Academy

Monday, January 11, 2010

19.00 Opening reception/Welcoming Dinner

Tuesday, January 12, 2010

9.00 – 9.30 Thomas Straubhaar (HWWI and Transatlantic Academy, Washington D. C.).

Welcome and Opening Remarks

9.30 – 10.30 Ahmet İçduygu (Migration Research Program [MiReKoc] and Department of International Relations, Koc University, Istanbul)

Keynote speech: The Politics of International Migration: A Debate over the EU-Turkey Relations

10:30 – 11.00 *Coffee Break*

11.00 – 12.00 Herbert Brücker (Institute for Employment Research [IAB]), Nuremberg)

EU Enlargement and Migration Potentials: CEE versus Turkey

- 12.00 – 13.00 Refik Erzan (Department of Economics and Center for Economics and Econometrics [CEE], Bogazici University, Istanbul)
Migration Scenarios, Turkey – EU
- 14.00 – 14.00 *Lunch Break*
- 14.00 – 15.00 Gülay Toksöz (Political Science Department and Women's Studies Center, Ankara University, Ankara)
On the Crossroads of Migration: Turkey as a Sending and Receiving Country – Analysis of Labor Markets from a Gender Perspective
- 15.00 – 16.00 Ahmet Evin (Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences Department, Sabanci University/Istanbul Policy Center, Istanbul, and currently at the Transatlantic Academy, Washington D. C.)
Eastern Enlargement and Turkey's contradictions
- 16.00 – 16.30 *Coffee Break*
- 16:30 – 18.00 *Discussions and Concluding Remarks*

Contributors

Thomas Straubhaar (Editor)

Prof. Dr. Thomas Straubhaar was born in Switzerland in 1957. He studied Economics at the University of Berne, Switzerland, where he received his Master's degree in Economics in 1981 and earned a Ph. D. in Economics in 1983. Afterwards, he worked as a Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of California Berkeley, USA. In 1987, he obtained his habilitation at the University of Berne for a thesis on "The Economics of International Labor Migration". His professional career started at the universities in Konstanz, Bern, Freiburg and Hamburg. Since 1999, Thomas Straubhaar has been working as Professor of Economics at the University of Hamburg. Furthermore, he has been Director of the Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI) since 2005. In 2009, Professor Straubhaar was awarded the Helmut Schmidt Fellowship of the ZEIT Foundation at the Transatlantic Academy in Washington, D. C. His research interests are especially in the fields of economic policies, regulatory policy, welfare and social policies.

Seçil Paçacı Elitok (Editor)

In 2008, Dr. Seçil Paçacı Elitok received her Ph. D. in economics from the University of Utah (USA), where she specialized in economic growth, development economics and international trade. She worked as an instructor throughout her graduate studies in the Economics Department of the University of Utah before joining the Maltepe University, Istanbul (Turkey), in which she had the opportunity to participate in research projects on migration and coordinate the Erasmus program as well as enriching her teaching portfolio. She received the Higher Education Teaching Specialist (HETS) designation from the University of Utah in December 2006. She joined the Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI) in June 2009 as a Marie Curie research fellow in the context of the EU Marie Curie Research Training Network TOM (Transnationality of Migrants) and worked as a senior researcher in the Migration Research Group (MRG). Her main research interests are international migration with a specific focus on migration from and to Turkey as well as high-skilled migra-

tion and remittances. She is currently a post-doctoral research fellow at the University of Hamburg.

Şebnem Tuğçe Pala (Assistant Editor)

Şebnem Tuğçe Pala received her B. A. in English Language and Literature at Ege University in Izmir, Turkey, in 2009, and later received her Associate Degree in Public Relations and Publicity at Anadolu University in Turkey in 2010. She studied in the Department of European Cultures and Languages at the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia through the Erasmus Exchange Program, in Modena, Italy, in 2007, and she got a DAAD Summer School Scholarship for Advanced Level of German and she studied at Ludwig Maximilians University in Munich, Germany, in 2008. Afterwards, she completed her M. A. in International Political Economy at the University of Warwick in Coventry, United Kingdom, in January 2011. Her dissertation was on the critical review of the financial crisis with reference to political and economic impacts on Turkey. After completing her M. A. program, she worked as a Research and Marketing Intern at the International Centre for Parliamentary Studies for two months in London in 2011. She is currently studying for her second M. A. in Development Studies at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva for the next two years as a full scholarship holder. Her particular research interests are migration, development and democratization.

Ahmet İçduygu

Ahmet İçduygu is Professor of International Relations and the Director of the Migration Research Program at Koc University, Istanbul, Turkey. He currently serves as the national correspondent of Turkey to the SOPEMI-OECD, Paris, and as a member of the International Advisory Board of Mediterranean Migratory Observatory, Athens. He has conducted research for international organizations such as IOM, UNHCR and ILO. He teaches on the theories and practices of citizenship, international organizations, civil society, nationalism and ethnicity, migration and research methods. In addition to his numerous articles in scholarly journals, he has published a recent a book, *Migration and Transformation: Multi-Level Analysis of Migrant Transnationalism*, co-edited with Pirkko Pitkänen and Deniz Sert (Springer 2011).

Ayşem Biriz Karaçay

Dr. Ayşem Biriz Karaçay has recently received her Ph. D. degree in Political Science and International Relations from the Social Science Institute of Marmara University. Her dissertation focused on the flows and general characteristics of project-tied migration between Turkey and Russia. She is currently the Administrator of Migration Research Centre at Koç University (MiReKoc). Her interest areas include labor migration, irregular migration, human smuggling/trafficking, border management and practices of citizenship.

Juliette Tolay

Juliette Tolay is a Ph. D. doctoral candidate in political science and international relations at the University of Delaware. Her dissertation particularly focuses on Turkish approaches to immigration and she studies the historical and cultural sources of these complex attitudes and policies. She is a former fellow at the Transatlantic Academy, where she conducted research on Turkish foreign policy and co-authored the book: *Turkey and Its Neighbors: Foreign Relation in Transition* (Lynne Rienner, 2011). She has also authored a number of articles on Turkey, asylum, migration and Turkey-EU relationships. A French and Turkish national, Juliette Tolay has also studied at Sciences Po in Paris, from which she has received her B. A. and her M. A. She is the 2010 recipient of the first prize of the Sakip Sabanci International Research Award for a paper on multiculturalism in Turkey. In January 2012, Juliette Tolay will be an assistant professor in the Department of International Relations at Bucknell University in Pennsylvania.

Kemal Kirişçi

Kemal Kirişçi is a Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Boğaziçi University, Istanbul. He holds a Jean Monnet Chair in European Integration and was also the director of the Center for European Studies at the university between 2002 and 2008. He received his Ph. D. at City University in London in 1986. His areas of research interest include European integration, asylum and immigration issues in the European Union, EU-Turkish relations, Turkish foreign policy, ethnic conflicts, and refugee movements. He has previously taught at universities in Britain, Canada, Switzerland and the

United States. His books include *Land of Diverse Migrations: Challenges of Emigration and Immigration in Turkey* (co-edited with A. İçduygu) (Istanbul: Bilgi University Press, 2009), *Turkish Immigrants in the European Union: Determinants of Immigration and Integration* (co-edited book with R. Erzan) (Routledge, London, 2007), *Turkey In World Politics: An Emerging Multi-Regional Power* (co-edited with B. Rubin) (Lynne Reinner, Boulder, 2001), *The Political Economy of Cooperation in the Middle East* (co-authored) (Routledge, London, 1998), *Turkey and the Kurdish Question: An Example of a Trans-State Ethnic Conflict* (co-authored) (Frank Cass, London, 1997) and *The PLO and World Politics*, (Frances Pinters, London, 1986). Kirişçi is the co-editor of the special issue of *New Perspectives on Turkey* on the transformation of Turkish foreign policy. The issue was published in May 2009. Kirişçi has written numerous reports on immigration issues in EU-Turkish relations that can be accessed from www.carim.org. He completed a fellowship at the Transatlantic Academy in Washington, D. C., in June 2010 and contributed to the report entitled *Getting to Zero: Turkey, Its Neighbors and the West*. In June 2011, he received the first prize of the Sakıp Sabancı International Research Award.

Gülay Toksöz

Gülay Toksöz is Professor at Ankara University, in the Department of Labor Economics and Industrial Relations. She received her B. Sc. and M. Sc. in the Department of Economics and Statistics at the Middle East Technical University and Ph. D. in the Department of Political Sciences at the Free University Berlin. Her interest areas are gender issues in labor markets, development, female labor and international labor migration. She has various articles and books on these topics. She is a member of the group Feminist Researchers on Female Labor (*KEFA-KEİG*).

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Çağla Ünlütürk Ulutaş is research assistant at University of Pamukkale in the Department of Labor Economics and Industrial Relations. She received her B. Sc., M. Sc. and Ph. D. in the Department of Labor Economics and Industrial Relations at Ankara University. Her main research interests are social policy, labor sociology and sociology of health. She has several articles on female

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Sema Erder

Sema Erder is Professor in Urban studies and she teaches at Bahçeşehir University, Istanbul. Her current research interests focus on irregular migration and its consequences and migration policy. She has published various books, as well as articles, with a special emphasis on internal migration, informal housing and informal labor markets and local politics in Istanbul. She has been involved in research networks in the Middle East and Europe, such as GURI, MeaWards, and IMILCO and is engaged in collaborative activities. Dr. Erder and Dr. Kaşka conducted research on “irregular migration and trafficking in women” for IOM, collaboratively.

Selmin Kaşka

Dr. Selmin Kaşka has been working as an assistant professor in Department of Labor Economics and Industrial Relations at Marmara University. She received her Master's degree in Politics and Social Sciences from Marmara University and a second M. A. in Social Sciences from the University of Warwick, Comparative Labor Studies Program. She obtained a Ph. D. in Politics and Social Sciences in 2000 at Marmara University. Since then, she has been working in the field of gender and migration. She is the co-author, with Prof. Dr Sema Erder, of an International Organization for Migration (IOM) research report, *Irregular Migration and Trafficking in Women: The Case of Turkey*, published in 2003. She was a research fellow at the Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations (CRER) at the University of Warwick between April 2006 and October 2007, where she conducted a research project on “Gender and Migration, Globalization of Domestic Work: the Moldovan Case in Turkey”, supported by Marie Curie Intra-European Fellowships within the Sixth European Community Framework Program.

Giulia Bettin

Giulia Bettin was born in Monselice (Padua, Italy) in 1980. She graduated from the University of Ferrara in 2004 with a B. A. in Economics. She holds a M. A. and a Ph. D. in Economics (2006 and 2009, respectively) from the Polytechnic

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Barbara Pusch

Barbara Pusch studied Sociology, Turkology, Philosophy and Ethnology at the University of Vienna from 1986 to 1991. In 1996, she completed her Ph. D. thesis on the Green movement in Turkey. The Austrian Fonds zur Förderung wissenschaftlicher Forschung financed her post-doctoral project on Muslim women in Turkey. From 1998 to 2000, she collaborated on various international research projects in Turkey and Germany. From 2000 to 2001, she taught at Istanbul Technical University. From 2001 to 2009, she served as Research Assistant to the Director at the Orient-Institut Istanbul. Additionally, she also lectured part-time at the University of Vienna and collaborated on the project *Cultural Capital During Migration*. Since September 2009, she has been holding a research fellowship at the Orient-Institut Istanbul. Her current work focuses on various aspects of international migration to Turkey.

Yaşar Aydın

Yaşar Aydın has been working as postdoctoral research fellow since August 2009 at the Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI) and is assistant lecturer at the University of Hamburg (M. A. International Business Administration – MiBA). He studied from 1996 to 2001 sociology and economics at the University of Hamburg and took subsequently in September 2002 a Masters Degree in sociology at the University of Lancaster (England). He completed in 2009 his Ph. D. at the University of Hamburg with a doctoral thesis on *The Topoi of the Stranger: An Analysis and Critique of a Social Construct* (UVK Verlag, Konstanz 2009). Yaşar Aydın has given lectures in sociology and published diverse articles in scientific journals on migration politics, the problem of stranger-hood, theories of modernity and the problem of exclusion. His research interests include socio-political and economic effects of migration,

politics of immigration, sociology of social problems (inclusion/exclusion, politics of welfare-state) and nationalism. Currently, Yaşar Aydın is working on the research project “Mobility of the Highly-Qualified – Emigration of Highly-Qualified Persons with Turkish Origin from Germany into Turkey” which is supported by the Hans Böckler Stiftung.

Mehmet Okyayuz

Mehmet Okyayuz is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at Middle East Technical University in Ankara, Turkey. He studied Political Science, Philosophy and Sociology at the universities of Paris, Berlin, Heidelberg and Marburg. He completed his M. A. at the University of Heidelberg and his Ph. D. at the University of Marburg. Some of his areas of research and education are labor migration along with Political Theory/Thought, Social Policy and Ideology Research. At present, he is teaching “Immigration Policies in Europe” and “Public Participation of Turkish Labor Migrants in Western Europe”. In addition, he is conducting research projects on “Return Migration from Germany to Turkey” and “Media Behavior of Turkish Migrants in Germany”. He is working as the Chairman and Member of the Executive Board of the NGO Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants (ASAM). He published texts (among others) concerning the issues of European and Turkish asylum systems, return migration, global migration and immigration policies.

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In the context of Turkey's accession to the EU, the issue of potential migration from Turkey and its impact upon European labor markets became one of the concerns of the EU, considering Turkey's growing population and young labor force. In 2011, half a century after the bi-lateral agreement between Turkey and Germany on labor recruitment in 1961, migration plays a key role in relations of Turkey with the EU and will even increase its significance – not necessarily for the next fifty years but certainly for the next decade. This book touches upon various aspects of the ongoing debate about the effects of Turkey's accession to the EU upon the migration flows and sheds light on various dimensions of current panorama, addresses policy implications as well as future challenges and opportunities.