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# Arbeitspapiere/ Working Papers

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Heinrich W. Ursprung

The Impact of Globalization  
on the Composition of Government  
Expenditures: Evidence from Panel Data



# The impact of globalization on the composition of government expenditures: Evidence from panel data

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## Abstract

According to the disciplining hypothesis, globalization restrains governments by inducing increased budgetary pressure. As a consequence, governments shift their expenditures in favour of transfers and subsidies and away from capital expenditures. This expenditure shift is potentially enhanced by citizens' preferences to be compensated for the risks of globalization ("compensation hypothesis"). Employing two different datasets and various measures of globalization, we analyze whether globalization has indeed influenced the composition of government expenditures. For a sample of 108 countries, we examine the development of four broad expenditure categories for the period 1970-2001: capital expenditures; expenditures for goods and services; interest payments; and subsidies and other current transfers. A second dataset provides a much more detailed classification: public expenditures, expenditures for defence, order, economic environment, housing, health, recreation, education, and social expenditures. However, this second data set is only available since 1990 – and only for the OECD countries. Our results show that globalization did not influence the composition of government expenditures.

**Keywords:** globalization, economic policy, government expenditure composition, tax competition

**JEL-Codes:** H7, H87, C23

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## 1. Introduction

The number of scholarly investigations of the nexus between globalization and the welfare state is impressive and the literature is still growing at a rapid pace. The scientific community contributing to this literature is by no means restricted to the economics profession; political scientists, in particular, but also sociologists and other social scientists have been strongly involved in this ongoing academic endeavour. Even though there can be no doubt that one of the driving forces behind this research activity is intellectual curiosity regarding the essential consequences of one of the arguably most important economic phenomena of our time, it appears that many social scientists are also attracted to the subject because of the public debate that the globalization issue has aroused. Since globalization has far reaching effects on so many important aspects of everyday life, it is a topic well suited for political entrepreneurs to rig the public political discourse and to mobilize political support. The political agents who have used the globalization issue as a vehicle to advance their agendas range from well-meaning public figures concerned about the globalization induced social dynamic, to political demagogues and street rioters.

The worries of the well-meaning objectors to global economic integration originate in the conviction that globalization will bring about a loss of power of the nation states in general, and a reduction in welfare state activities, in particular. The reasoning behind these fears runs as follows: trade liberalization and liberalization of factor mobility, via indirect factor price equalization and direct arbitrage effects, erode the developed countries' income and capital tax bases and will eventually give rise to a global tax race to the bottom which, in turn, results in the nation states' fading ability to finance welfare state activities. This downward pressure on the supply side of public welfare programs, depending on the viewpoint of the observer, reduces the efficiency of *benevolent governments* (cf. Sinn, 2003) and/or disciplines *egoistic governments* who transform discretionary power into benefits for their clientele (cf. Breton and Ursprung, 2002). The so-called "efficiency" or "discipline" effect of globalization thus reduces the range and size of government welfare programs.

By focusing on the efficiency effect of globalization, the opponents of global economic integration and unchecked systems competition neglect, however, the demand side of the political market. The demand-side effects of globalization derive from the governments' political support maximization motives that direct the political process towards a redistribution of the globalization induced economic gains, i.e. losers from globalization are to some extent compensated via an increase of social welfare programs. The so-called "compensation" effect of globalization thus undermines the "efficiency" effect, implying that

from a theoretical point of view the total effect of globalization on the extent of national welfare programs remains ambiguous.

The basic rationale of this argument is summarized in Figure 1. The government balances the political benefits and costs of its social welfare activities. On the demand side, the marginal benefit (in terms of political support) of the activities decreases as the activities are increased, whereas on the supply side the marginal cost increases. Political support is maximized at the activity level associated with the intersection of the MB and the MC-curves. A deepening or widening of economic integration now increases the marginal cost of supplying social welfare programs as well as the marginal benefit via the demand effect thereby shifting the two curves upwards ( $MC_0$  to  $MC_1$  and  $MB_0$  to  $MB_1$ ). Whether the *efficiency effect* of globalization dominates the *compensation effect* or vice versa is a matter to be resolved by empirical research.

[Insert Figure 1 about here]

Given the theoretical ambiguity of the nexus between globalization and national welfare policies, it is not surprising that much of the respective literature is empirical. However, as the literature review in the next section shows, a robust impact of globalization on government expenditures does not appear to exist. The reason might be that compensation and disciplining effects neutralize each other. It is possible, however, that the impact of these two effects depends on the type of expenditure. Therefore, any true test investigating the impact of globalization on expenditures has to focus upon shifts in the relevant expenditure shares. It is this link between globalization and expenditure shares that our paper deals with. We follow the strategy of using disaggregated data and superior econometric techniques that characterize the second-generation studies on the globalization-welfare state nexus. In contrast to the existing literature we do, however, not estimate the impact of globalization on *individual* policy dimensions, but acknowledge that all policy measures are to some extent substitutes or complements vis-à-vis each other, implying that *indirect* globalization effects, working through changes in related welfare-state activities, may play an important role. Mutual interdependence is clearly an issue if one focuses, as we do, on disaggregated government *spending* since all categories of government spending are connected via the

overall budget policy.<sup>1</sup> While previous studies investigated the impact of globalization on a range of individual expenditure shares in GDP (see the literature review below) none of them took indirect effects into account. Applying our research strategy, we might be able to uncover globalization effects that remain otherwise hidden.

In terms of Figure 1 our research strategy can be illustrated as follows. So far we have only considered *direct* effects of globalization on a particular type of government program in Figure 1. If globalization also affects other programs which may have an influence on the considered program, these indirect (mutual) effects may cause the MB and MC-curves to shift more or less upwards as compared to a situation in which the considered policy shift is analyzed in isolation. The dashed lines portray *indirect* interaction effects that are in our example assumed to further increase marginal cost ( $MC_1$  to  $MC_2$ ) and to diminish marginal benefit ( $MB_1$  to  $MB_2$ ) thereby giving rise to a positive total effect (including interaction related influences). Figure 1 indicates that the *total effect of the globalization* shock is, in general, composed of a *direct effect* (consisting of the *efficiency* and the *compensation effect*) and an *interaction effect*. Our empirical method is designed to account for these hitherto neglected interaction effects.

We thus estimate whole systems of equations, analyzing to what extent the relative importance of specific expenditure categories is influenced by globalization. According to the compensation hypothesis some categories may become more important even if the overall level of government expenditures remains unchanged. This particularly applies for social expenditures. The disciplining effect of globalization, on the other hand, will most likely affect expenditure categories whose benefits are not immediately visible, as, for example, expenditures on capital.

In the remainder of this paper we analyze whether and to what extent globalization influences the composition of government expenditures. For that purpose we will use two different datasets focusing upon different countries, periods and decompositions of government expenditures. To further ensure robustness of our results, different measures of economic globalization will be used. Overall, we do not find evidence that any of our expenditure categories has been significantly affected by any of our globalization indicators. In our view, this implies that either the hitherto neglected interaction effects blur the two direct effects to a rather large extent, or governments throughout the world have not rearranged their expenditure shares as a result of globalization.

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<sup>1</sup> Interaction effects may, however, also emanate from policies that are not primarily fiscal in nature, such as macroeconomic or environmental policies. For globalization induced effects on these policy fields, see, for

The next section summarizes the mainly empirical literature on the effect of globalization on government programs. Subsequently, we will describe our data and method of estimation. Section 4 contains the estimation results. Section 5 concludes.

## 2. Literature overview

The earlier literature on the globalization-welfare state nexus (for a survey, see Schulze and Ursprung, 1999) mainly dealt with three issues, the first one being the structural tax-competition effect. Economic reasoning suggests that the tax burden is shifted away from the increasingly mobile factors, i.e. in particular capital, when a country becomes progressively more integrated in the world economy. Notable contributions are Garrett (1995), Quinn (1997), Rodrik (1997) and Swank (1997). The second issue directly addresses the question whether globalization has a positive or negative effect on welfare state activities as measured by the relative size of the government sector. The third avenue of investigation takes a more differentiated approach to measuring welfare state activities by focusing not on the *level* of government spending but on the *structure* thereof, i.e. on specific categories such as social security and welfare expenditures. Notable contributions to these two lines of inquiry are Hicks and Swank (1992), Huber et al. (1993), Garrett (1995), Cusack (1997), Garrett and Mitchell (1997), Quinn (1997), Garrett (1998a, 1998b), Swank (1997), and Rodrik (1998).

After having surveyed the early literature, Schulze and Ursprung (1999) arrive at the following conclusion (pp. 345-347):

“The general picture drawn by the few econometric studies available thus far does not lend any support to any alarmist view. At an aggregate level, many of these studies find no negative relationship between globalization and the nation states’ ability to conduct independent fiscal policies. ... Viewing the income and expenditure side of government budgets separately, a cautious interpretation of the empirical evidence suggests that ... it cannot be rejected out of hand that the tax structure may have been influenced by the globalization process – the observed decline in effective average CIT (corporate income tax) rates and the convergence of CIT rates across countries is certainly compatible with such an interpretation. ... Given the small corporate income tax base and the fact that no shift of the tax burden from capital to labour has taken place, it is not surprising that, on the expenditure side, no strong evidence points to a significant globalization-induced change of the level of public spending. But also accustomed expenditure patterns do not appear to have changed in

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example, Tytell (2004) and Schulze and Ursprung (2001), respectively.



the course of globalization. This may be due, however, to a lack of studies using strongly disaggregated public expenditure data.”

Many contributions to the more recent globalization literature have indeed taken up this implicit challenge and have used disaggregated data in order to focus on specific welfare-state programs; others have focused on specific groups of countries or have refined the empirical methods. We briefly run through some of these studies in turn.

In a reconsideration of their earlier unpublished study of 1997, Garrett and Mitchell (2001) arrive at conclusions that seem to contradict the received wisdom as summarized above. Kittel and Winner (2005) and Plümper, Manow and Troeger (2005) show, however, that the results obtained by Garrett and Mitchell (2001) cannot be reproduced if the econometric model is properly specified. Both follow-up studies rather come to the conclusion that government spending is primarily driven by the state of the domestic economy and thus independent of international economic openness, implying not only the absence of significant efficiency effects but also the absence of compensatory measures. This result is in line with the study by Iversen and Cusack (2000) who do not find any relationship between globalization and the level of labour-market risks (in terms of employment and wages), whereas uncertainty and dislocations caused by deindustrialization appear to have spurred electoral demands for welfare state compensation and risk sharing. Demand for welfare state activities thus appear to be home made and not to be induced by labour market risks related to international trade. Dreher and Gaston (2005) find that globalization gave rise to deunionization. However, in delving further into the issue, they find that it is social integration, rather than economic integration, that has been the main contributor to the decline in union membership. Bretschger and Hettich (2002), use an ingenious novel measure of openness which corrects for country size and find that globalization has a negative and significant impact on corporate income taxes and tends to raise labour taxes. On the other hand they also find that globalization increases social expenditures. As a consequence, efficiency has an impact on the tax-mix, whereas compensation is provided through increased social expenditures. Dreher (2006a), finally, investigates the impact of various dimensions of globalization on the tax mix and government expenditures. Regarding overall and social expenditures, none of the three dimensions of globalization (economic, political, and social) appears to have a significant impact. The same is true for average effective tax rates on consumption and labour. When it comes to tax rates on capital, however, the result depends on how the tax burden is measured. While a globalization-induced increase in implicit tax rates on capital is compatible with the data when the average effective tax rates constructed by

Carey and Rabesona (2002) are employed, the opposite conclusion can be drawn when one uses the legislation-based data by Devereux and Griffith (2003).

Studies focusing on specific groups of countries usually examine the impact of global economic integration on developing countries. Rudra (2002), for example, observes that defending welfare benefits under the pressures of globalization is much easier in OECD countries than in LDCs where workers are not as well organized and therefore cannot overcome their collective action problems. This result points to the crucial role of the political regime in accommodating the demand side of the political market. Analyzing Latin American countries, Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001) and Avelino, Brown and Hunter (2005) therefore control for the influence of the political regime. The empirical evidence uncovered by Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo favours the *efficiency* hypothesis and suggests that democracies may be more responsive to compensation demands than other regimes, at least when it comes to social spending on health and education.<sup>2</sup> Avelino, Brown and Hunter also find that education is positively associated with openness (as do Rudra, 2004, and Ansell, 2004), but Avelino et al. obtain a more robust impact of democratic regimes and their estimates are generally supportive of the *compensation* hypothesis; their overall results are quite in line with those obtained by Adsera and Boix (2002) who used a more encompassing sample of countries.

Apart from responding to globalization pressures in different ways, political regimes may also be linked to globalization in a causal relationship. On the one hand, Richards, Gelleny and Sacko (2001) discover systematic evidence that both foreign direct investment and portfolio investment are reliably associated with increased government respect for human rights. This finding is corroborated by Rudra (2005) who finds that globalization in general strengthens democracy in the developing world if social safety nets are used to provide stability and to build political support.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, quite a few studies show that civil and political freedom in turn attract foreign direct investments (see, for example, Harms and Ursprung, 2002; Bengoa and Sanches-Robles, 2003; Busse, 2004), thus giving rise to a virtuous globalization-democratization cycle.

This literature review indicates that there is no robust impact of globalization on government expenditures. The reason might be that the compensation, disciplining and interaction effects as described in the introduction neutralize each other. It is likely, however, that the compensation and disciplining effects vary in size across the various types of

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<sup>2</sup> Globalization has also an effect on education via migration. This aspect has up to now mainly been analyzed from a theoretical point of view; see, for example, Ansell (2003) and Gersbach and Schmutzler (2005).

government expenditure. Therefore, the true test for any investigation of the impact of globalization on government expenditures has to focus on shifts in the relevant expenditure *shares*.<sup>4</sup> It is this link between globalization and expenditure shares that the remainder of our paper deals with.

### 3. Data and Method

In order to test whether and to what extent globalization affects the composition of government expenditures, we estimate combined cross-section time-series (panel) regressions with yearly data. To check for robustness over time, across countries and especially with respect to the number of expenditure categories, we employ two datasets. The first data set is taken from the World Bank's (2004) World Development Indicators. It contains data for up to 108 countries covering the period 1970-2001. Data are classified according to four broad expenditure categories: capital expenditures, expenditures for goods and services, interest payments, and subsidies and other current transfers. This data is available as a share of total expenditures. Figure 2 shows the development of the average expenditure shares over time for the largest sample possible. The most prevalent feature of the graph is the increase in interest payments over time (from 5 percent to 11.5 percent). The share of subsidies increased from 28.5 percent to 32.5 percent over the sample period, while the share of expenditures on goods decreased from 46.1 percent to 40.3 percent, and the share of capital expenditures from 20.4 to 15.7 percent. There is thus no obvious erosion in subsidies over time.<sup>5</sup>

[Insert Figure 2 about here]

The second dataset has been developed by the OECD. The OECD Public Expenditure Database (2004) provides a much more detailed classification of government expenditures. However, this data is only available since 1990 – and only for up to 15 OECD countries. For this smaller sample, the following ten expenditure categories are available: expenditures on public services, defence, public order and safety, economic affairs, environment protection; housing and community amenities, health, recreation, culture and religion; education, and social expenditures. Figure 3 shows that the largest increases in shares have occurred for social expenditures (+4.2 percentage-points) and health expenditures (+3.2 percentage-

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<sup>3</sup> The results obtained by Li and Reuveny (2003) are, however, much less supportive of this general hypothesis.

<sup>4</sup> See also the recent model in Exbrayat, Gaigné and Riou (2006), who show how trade integration might affect the pattern of public spending.

points); for public services, defence and economic affairs shares have decreased by 5.2, 3.0 and 2.1 percentage points, respectively.

[Insert Figure 3 about here]

Our dependent variables are the respective expenditure categories as a (percentage) share of total expenditures. Since some of the data are not available for all countries or years, the panel is unbalanced and the number of observations depends on the choice of explanatory variables. For ease of comparison, we keep the sample fixed (to those countries and years for which all variables are available). Furthermore, we select our sample to only include those observations for which these four or ten categories do indeed sum up to total government expenditures (i.e. 100 percent). This results in a world sample of 624 observations containing 60 countries over the period 1971-2001. When we restrict this dataset to cover only OECD countries, we have 255 observations for 18 countries over the years 1971-2001. In both cases most observations stem from the 1980s and 1990s. Using the OECD dataset, i.e. focusing on ten expenditure categories, leaves us with 64 observations for only 10 countries covering the years 1991-2001. We found significant fixed country effects in all specifications. However, the coefficients of the country dummies are not reported in the tables. All standard errors are estimated robustly. All variables, their precise definitions and data sources are listed in Appendix II.

To measure globalization, we employ various proxies that have been suggested in the literature. The first is openness to trade measured as the sum of imports and exports as a share of GDP. The second indicator of globalization is the sum of the absolute values of inflows and outflows of foreign direct investment (as a share of GDP)<sup>6</sup> and the third refers to restrictions on the capital account. The indicator of capital account restrictions is constructed with binary data from the International Monetary Fund's annual report *Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions*. We focus on four types of restrictions:

- restrictions on payments for capital account transactions,
- separate exchange rate(s) for some or all capital transactions and/or some or all invisibles,

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<sup>5</sup> This pattern also emerges for balanced samples, and for OECD countries only. The largest balanced sample we were able to construct consists of 46 countries covering the 1975-1995 period.

<sup>6</sup> Ideally, we would like to have the stocks of FDI instead of their flows as a measure of globalization. However, fdi stocks are neither available over the entire period under study nor for all countries included.

- surrender requirements for proceeds from exports and/or invisible transactions and
- restrictions for payments on current transactions.

While the first three types of restrictions can broadly be interpreted as some kind of controls on capital flows, the third restriction has been included because current transactions can be used to circumvent restrictions on the capital account (Milesi-Ferretti, 1998: 225).<sup>7</sup> The respective data has been collected by Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) and Dreher and Siemers (2005).

Our index of restrictions aggregates the four measures. The index takes the value of 1 for fully restricted capital accounts, and 0, if no restrictions are in place.<sup>8</sup> As an obvious shortcoming of this approach is that it neither measures the intensity nor the effectiveness of controls. One would also like to distinguish between controls on inflows and outflows of capital. We do, however, neither have the data to adequately control for intensity and effectiveness,<sup>9</sup> nor the data that would allow an analysis of inflows and outflows.

Clearly, globalization is a broad concept that cannot be captured completely by the three indicators discussed above. We therefore employ the KOF Index of Globalization developed in Dreher (2006c) as additional measure of globalization.<sup>10</sup> The index captures the three main dimensions of globalization – economic integration, political integration and social

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<sup>7</sup> In 1997 the IMF changed the format of its survey. Following Glick and Hutchison (2000) and Dreher and Siemers (2005) we coded “restrictions on payments for capital account restrictions” to be unity if controls were in place in 5 or more of the sub-categories of capital account restrictions, and “financial credit” was one of the categories restricted.

<sup>8</sup> A similar procedure has been employed, among others, by Gruben, McLeod (2001), Bai and Wei (2001) and Dreher and Siemers (2005).

<sup>9</sup> To proxy the intensity or effectiveness of capital controls, black market premiums, onshore-offshore interest differentials and deviations from covered interest parity have been employed (e.g. Giavazzi and Pagano, 1988; Dooley and Isard, 1980). However, those variables measure other aspects as well. We focus on the existence rather than the degree of controls and do not use them.

<sup>10</sup> The index has recently been used to analyze the impact of globalization on various economic, political and social outcomes. For example, Ekman (2003) studies the impact of globalization on health, Dreher (2006a) studies the impact on the size of government, Dreher (2006b, 2006c) focuses on economic growth, Tsai (2005) examines human well-being, Dreher and Gaston (2005) examine the impact on trade union membership, Bjørnskov (2006) studies the effects on institutional quality, Bergh (2006) analyzes the impact of globalization

integration. It is based on a large number of variables that relate to the three main dimensions of globalization. These variables have been combined to form six groups: actual flows of trade and investment, restrictions of international transactions, variables measuring the degree of political integration, variables quantifying the extent of personal contacts with people living in foreign countries, variables measuring trans-border flows of information, and a proxy for cultural integration. These six groups are combined to form the three sub-indices and one overall index of globalization with the help of an objective statistical method – the same method that has been applied by Gwartney and Lawson (2001) in constructing their well-known economic freedom index. We employ the overall index and the three sub-indices here in addition to the more conventional proxies of globalization.

[Insert Figure 4 about here]

[Insert Figure 5 about here]

Figure 4 reports the world averages of the traditional measures of globalization, while Figure 5 reports those of the KOF-index of globalization and its sub-components. As can be seen, globalization increased over the sample period of about 30 years: The volume of trade and foreign direct investments markedly increased, while capital account restrictions became less prevalent. Also, the KOF globalization index and its sub-components increased substantially over this period.

Table 1 reports the correlation among our globalization measures. All correlations have the expected sign (except for political and social integration where theory is ambiguous). However, the absolute degree of correlation varies between 1 and 96 percent. This clearly indicates the difficulties associated with measuring a concept like globalization.

Instead of (or in addition to) being affected by globalization, the expenditure composition in a particular country might also depend directly on the composition in other countries. Following Devereux et al. (2002), a country's policy reaction function can be written as

$$y_{i,t} = R_i(y_{-i,t-1}, X_{i,t}), \quad (1)$$

with  $y_{i,t}$  being the respective expenditure category,  $y_{-i,t-1}$  being the vector of expenditure shares in all other countries at time  $t-1$ , and  $X$  being a vector of control variables.

Clearly, this equation cannot be estimated given available degrees of freedom. Following the earlier literature, Devereux et al. (2002) therefore suggest replacing the vector  $y_{-i,t-1}$  by the weighted average  $A_{i,t} = \sum_{j \neq i} \omega_{ij} y_{jt}$ . Since countries are more likely to respond to countries in their immediate neighbourhood and less so to more distant ones, we employ the inverse of the distance between the capital cities of the countries to arrive at the weights  $\omega_{ij}$ .

The system of equations to be estimated is

$$y_{it} = \alpha + \beta y_{it-1} + \gamma_1' G_{it} + \gamma_2 A_{it-1} + \eta' X_{it} + \eta_i + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (2)$$

where  $G$  represents our measures of globalization,  $\eta_i$  is a country fixed effect,  $\varepsilon_{it}$  is an error term and  $i$  either ranges from 1 to 4 (WB-dataset) or from 1 to 10 (OECD-dataset).<sup>11</sup>

The lagged dependent variable is included because the composition of government expenditures changes only slowly over time. The reason for this inertia might be costs of adjustment on the part of the private sector or constraints imposed by interest groups (Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano 2002: 4). We cannot include fixed period effects, since they are already present in the weighted average and the lagged dependent variable (see Devereux et al., 2002, for details). Note that the weighted average enters the regressions with a lag. From a theoretical perspective this is preferable, since it takes time for a country to respond to changes in other countries' policies. Econometrically, this allows estimation without instrumenting the potentially endogenous contemporaneous average policy variables (Devereux et al. 2002).<sup>12</sup>

A general problem in empirical research when there is no accepted theoretical model is the appropriate choice of covariates, i.e. variables entering our  $X$ -vector. We opt for a list of seven variables to enter our model: real economic growth, age dependency ratio, government expenditures, government debt, lending rate and inflation rate. Before including our globalization measures, we use a general-to-specific methodology to select only variables significant at the five percent level into our baseline specification.

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<sup>11</sup> Note that our measures of globalization enter the regressions with their contemporaneous values. Lagging these variables by one year does not qualitatively change the results.

<sup>12</sup> Dreher (2006a) applies the same methodology to test for the impact of globalization on the size of public overall and social spending and effective tax rates on labour, consumption and capital.

The first variable – the growth rate of real GDP – accounts for the business cycle. Arguably, one may expect subsidies to rise in recessions, while public investments are likely to be reduced. According to Aubin et al. (1988), public capital spending is likely to decrease when inflation accelerates and to increase with increasing unemployment. As Dreher (2006a) shows, social spending is significantly lower in periods of low growth.

The second variable we include in our basic regressions is the share of under 15-year and over 64-year old people relative to total population (“age dependency ratio”). The dependency ratio controls for demographic factors. It is expected to vary positively with subsidies and negatively with capital outlays.<sup>13</sup>

Our third variable is the total amount of public expenditures (in percent of GDP) since there is good reason to believe that the composition of government expenditures also depends on its level. In countries with smaller state sectors we expect social expenditures to be relatively low, while government consumption is likely to be higher than in countries with large state sectors.

Government debt and the lending rate are included since they directly affect the governments’ expenditure behavior. The rate of inflation finally reduces the real value of tax revenues which renders expenditure increases less likely.

Since the individual expenditure categories are not independent of each other – if measured correctly, they sum up to 100 percent of total expenditures – and the inclusion of the lagged dependent variables implies that each equation has a different set of regressors, we estimate our equations using Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR). The SUR model permits nonzero covariance between the error terms of the expenditure share equations, allowing for an improvement in efficiency of SUR relative to the classical OLS estimator.

There are additional methodological problems. Given the inclusion of the lagged endogenous variable and fixed country effects, the OLS estimator is biased and inconsistent in a short panel. Especially for the OECD data which are available for only 10 years we have to check whether the bias significantly affects our results. To deal with this problem, we employ the GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) in addition to the SUR estimates. The GMM estimator first-differences the estimating equation and uses lags of the dependent variable from at least two periods earlier as well as lags of the right-hand side variables as instruments. Since there are more instruments than right-hand side variables, the equations are over-identified and instruments need to be weighted in an appropriate manner.

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<sup>13</sup> Overall, however, government total and social expenditure levels are not robustly related to the age dependency ratio (Dreher 2006a).



We only present results from the Arellano-Bond one-step estimator, which uses the identity matrix as a weighting matrix. The two-step estimator weighs the instruments asymptotically efficiently using the one-step estimates. However, in small samples like the one used here, standard errors tend to be under-estimated by the two-step estimator (Arellano and Bond 1991: 291).

#### 4. Results

We start with analyzing the four-category dataset. Table 2 shows the overall significance of the independent variables in our four-equation system when using our balanced sample of 60 countries covering the 1971-2001 period. In each block one of our globalization variables is included. The reported F-statistics test whether a particular variable can be excluded from all four expenditure-share equations. Table 3 shows the results for the sample of OECD countries only. In Table 4 we include either all three conventional globalization variables or all sub-indices of the KOF index. With respect to the variables selected in the baseline model, the only difference is that the age dependency ratio is included when analyzing the encompassing (world) sample, i.e. this variable is highly significant in the system; its explanatory power for the OECD sample, however, becomes insignificant and is therefore dropped from this specification. None of the globalization variables turns out to be significant in any of the specifications.<sup>14</sup>

[Insert Table 2, Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5 about here]

Turning now to the individual impact of the control and globalization variables, Table 5 reports the individual coefficients and significance levels underlying the results presented in Table 4. First, note that the estimated coefficients of the lagged dependent variables are almost identical; only when showing the third digits, small differences do emerge. For the interpretation of the remaining coefficients, this similarity implies that the sum of the coefficients of a particular variable across the equations should (and actually do) sum up to zero. Given the identical speed of adjustment across all four categories, it must be the case that a positive impact on one expenditure share is neutralized by a negative impact on some other expenditure shares.

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<sup>14</sup> We also included the overall index of globalization instead of its three sub-dimensions, leading to the same results.

For the “world” sample, goods expenditures significantly increase with an increasing age dependency ratio, while subsidies significantly decrease.<sup>15</sup> Goods expenditures are significantly lower in countries with a big state sector while interest payments are significantly higher. This rather intuitive result transpires from the world as well as from the OECD sample. Welfare states to a large extent rely on debt financing which implies relatively high interest payments. In the world sample, inflation and interest payment shares are positively correlated. Since this finding does not hold in the OECD sample, this appears to be suggestive for the thesis that especially developing countries’ governments inflate their debt positions away by money creation. Note that the inflation rate clearly outperforms the lending rate in our sample covering the 1970-2001 period. Inflation and goods expenditure shares are negatively correlated.

Turning to the globalization variables, our results reveal a clear picture. In none of the specifications we tested any of our measures of globalization turned out to have a significant impact. A potential reason for this result might be the high level of aggregation; the efficiency and compensation effects neutralize each other in the rather large categories of expenditures, or the effects are blurred by potential indirect effects between the four categories. The only solution in such a case is to further disaggregate the different categories of expenditures. In a next step we therefore repeat the above analysis using our OECD database which allows us to distinguish between ten different expenditure classes.

[Insert Tables 6a and 6b about here]

As can be seen from Tables 6a and 6b, two out of three former baseline variables are replaced by others. Besides the age dependency ratio – which was already significant in the world sample – the expenditure share in neighbouring countries and the lending rate now turn out to be significant in the OECD sample.

The lagged endogenous variable is positive and significant (at least at the ten percent level) in all reported regressions. As compared to the world sample, the coefficients in this sample substantially differ across equations. Whereas the lagged dependent variable in the housing equation has a coefficient of only 0.06 – implying a very high speed of adjustment –

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<sup>15</sup> Unless otherwise mentioned, we refer to the five percent level of significance.

its coefficient in the education equation has a coefficient of 0.78 which indicates a rather slow adjustment over time.<sup>16</sup>

Just as in the more encompassing sample, the percentage of the dependent variable explained by the regressors is reasonably high. The only exception appears to be the regression on economic affairs expenditures, with an  $R^2$  of only 0.42. The impact of the weighted average of the neighbouring countries' respective expenditure shares is significant in the public order (+), and recreation (-) equations.

Our measures of globalization are completely insignificant in almost all specifications, the only exception being the expenditure share on recreation which decreases with increasing globalization (as measured by restrictions on the capital account), the impact being significant at the one percent level. The share of health expenditures appears to increase with increasing *social* globalization, and the share of education expenditures with increasing *political* globalization (at the five and one percent level of significance, respectively). However, the three globalization variables are all jointly insignificant in the system of equations. We therefore conclude that globalization did not affect the composition of government expenditures.

In Appendix I the analysis is replicated employing the consistent Arellano-Bond GMM estimator treating all the covariates as strictly exogenous. Again we only report results for the full models, including all three proxies of globalization. Applying the Arellano-Bond estimator leads to a dramatic loss of observations, since information from two periods is discarded by differencing and instrumenting. This loss usually results in lower t-statistics. Surprisingly, the estimated coefficients of the lagged dependent variable are in most regressions smaller than in the within groups estimations, although econometric theory suggests that this coefficient should be biased negatively in the fixed effects specification. This unusual finding could be interpreted as evidence that the bias described by Nickell (1981) is not present in the dynamic within groups specification and that the results displayed above are valid. We employed a Sargan test to check whether the instruments are not correlated with the error term, and the Arellano-Bond test for second-order autocorrelation in the first difference residuals (because the estimator would not be consistent in the presence of second-order correlation). In line with the bulk of literature those tests are based on the two-step estimator. As can be seen, both tests accept the instruments.

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<sup>16</sup> Note that this implies that the coefficients of a given variable no longer add up to zero across the ten equations.

## 5. Summary

In this paper, we examined the *composition* of public expenditures rather than the overall level. Economic theory suggests different kinds of government expenditures to react differently to globalization. According to the disciplining hypothesis, globalization restrains governments by inducing increased budgetary pressure. As a consequence, governments shift their expenditures in favour of transfers and subsidies and away from capital expenditures. The efficiency/disciplining effect is thus expected to reduce the share of capital expenditures.

The compensation effect, on the other hand, is expected to give rise to a higher share of social expenditures. The expenditure shift potentially induced by the disciplining effect might therefore be enhanced by citizens' preferences to be compensated for the risks of globalization.

We employed two different datasets and various measures of globalization to analyze whether globalization has influenced the composition of government expenditures. For a sample of 108 countries, we examined the development of four broad expenditure categories for the period 1970-2001: capital expenditures; expenditures for goods and services; interest payments; and subsidies and other current transfers. For the OECD countries in the post 1990 period, we examined a dataset providing a much more detailed classification: public expenditures, expenditures for defence, order, economic environment, housing, health, recreation, education, and social expenditures.

Simple correlation analysis already showed that the evidence is at best weak. More thorough econometric analyses did not find any significant effects. We therefore conclude that globalization has not affected the composition of government expenditures. There are three explanations for this result. First, the efficiency and compensation effects might neutralize each other. Second, the effects of globalization might be blurred by potential indirect effects between different expenditure categories. And third, the effects of globalization might be exaggerated in the popular discussion and might simply not exist.

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
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


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Figure 1: Effects of globalization on social welfare activities.




**Figure 2: Development of average expenditure shares for a sample of 108 countries.**




Source: World Development Indicators (2004). Data ordered with respect to shares.

**Figure 3: Development of average expenditure shares for a sample of 15 OECD countries.**




Source: OECD Public Expenditure Database (2004). Data ordered with respect to changes over the sample; bottom series have largest positive change, upper series have largest negative change.

**Figure 4: Average development of the globalization indicators for up to 190 countries.**



Source: World Bank (2004), Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995), Dreher and Siemers (2005).

**Figure 5: Average development of the KOF globalization indicators for up to 123 countries.**



Source: Dreher (2006c), <http://www.kof.ethz.ch/globalization>

**Table 1: Correlation matrices globalization indicators.**

| Obs\Cor         | Trade                                  | FDI | Cap.Acc.Restr. | Index of Glob. | Economic Glob. | Social Glob. | Political Glob. | Trade                                  | FDI  | Cap.Acc.Restr. | Index of Glob. | Economic Glob. | Social Glob. | Political Glob. |
|-----------------|--|-----|----------------|----------------|----------------|--------------|-----------------|--|------|----------------|----------------|----------------|--------------|-----------------|
|                 | Estimation sample, World               |     |                |                |                |              |                 | corrected for country-specific effects |      |                |                |                |              |                 |
| Trade           | 624                                    | 40% | -10%           | 8%             | 36%            | 12%          | -27%            | 20%                                    | -11% | 29%            | 32%            | 15%            | 23%          |                 |
| FDI             | 624                                    | 624 | -35%           | 40%            | 50%            | 40%          | 10%             |  | -22% | 46%            | 34%            | 48%            | 21%          |                 |
| Cap.Acc.Restr.  | 624                                    | 624 | 624            | -70%           | -67%           | -62%         | -43%            |  |      | -48%           | -62%           | -36%           | -12%         |                 |
| Index of Glob.  | 624                                    | 624 | 624            | 624            | 81%            | 90%          | 75%             |  |      |                | 76%            | 87%            | 68%          |                 |
| Economic Glob.  | 624                                    | 624 | 624            | 624            | 624            | 66%          | 34%             |  |      |                |                | 51%            | 26%          |                 |
| Social Glob.    | 624                                    | 624 | 624            | 624            | 624            | 624          | 51%             |  |      |                |                |                | 40%          |                 |
| Political Glob. | 624                                    | 624 | 624            | 624            | 624            | 624          | 624             |  |      |                |                |                |              |                 |
|                 | Estimation sample, OECD                |     |                |                |                |              |                 | corrected for country-specific effects |      |                |                |                |              |                 |
| Trade           | 255                                    | 24% | -1%            | 19%            | 66%            | -17%         | 19%             | 35%                                    | -10% | 54%            | 34%            | 52%            | 47%          |                 |
| FDI             | 255                                    | 255 | -32%           | 40%            | 46%            | 32%          | 14%             |  | -26% | 52%            | 43%            | 53%            | 30%          |                 |
| Cap.Acc.Restr.  | 255                                    | 255 | 255            | -65%           | -49%           | -46%         | -47%            |  |      | -57%           | -75%           | -46%           | -27%         |                 |
| Index of Glob.  | 255                                    | 255 | 255            | 255            | 58%            | 79%          | 73%             |  |      |                | 80%            | 94%            | 75%          |                 |
| Economic Glob.  | 255                                    | 255 | 255            | 255            | 255            | 23%          | 29%             |  |      |                |                | 70%            | 37%          |                 |
| Social Glob.    | 255                                    | 255 | 255            | 255            | 255            | 255          | 26%             |  |      |                |                |                | 56%          |                 |
| Political Glob. | 255                                    | 255 | 255            | 255            | 255            | 255          | 255             |  |      |                |                |                |              |                 |
|                 | Estimation sample, OECD, 10 categories |     |                |                |                |              |                 | corrected for country-specific effects |      |                |                |                |              |                 |
| Trade           | 65                                     | 23% | -15%           | -9%            | 77%            | -41%         | 4%              | 34%                                    | -7%  | 67%            | 68%            | 64%            | 50%          |                 |
| FDI             | 65                                     | 65  | -21%           | 8%             | 32%            | 1%           | 2%              |  | -7%  | 39%            | 28%            | 40%            | 32%          |                 |
| Cap.Acc.Restr.  | 65                                     | 65  | 65             | -53%           | -39%           | -35%         | -58%            |  |      | -40%           | -23%           | -40%           | -38%         |                 |
| Index of Glob.  | 65                                     | 65  | 65             | 65             | 38%            | 91%          | 88%             |  |      |                | 71%            | 96%            | 91%          |                 |
| Economic Glob.  | 65                                     | 65  | 65             | 65             | 65             | 10%          | 30%             |  |      |                |                | 55%            | 58%          |                 |
| Social Glob.    | 65                                     | 65  | 65             | 65             | 65             | 65           | 66%             |  |      |                |                |                | 78%          |                 |
| Political Glob. | 65                                     | 65  | 65             | 65             | 65             | 65           | 65              |  |      |                |                |                |              |                 |

**Table 2: Significance of variables in system regressions, 4 expenditure categories and 60 countries.**

|                | World - Trade |          | World - FDI |          | World - Cap.Rst. |          |
|----------------|---------------|----------|-------------|----------|------------------|----------|
|                | F-test        | p-value  | F-test      | p-value  | F-test           | p-value  |
| Exp.share (-1) | 1,035.03      | 0.00 *** | 1,031.58    | 0.00 *** | 1,025.36         | 0.00 *** |
| Age Dep.       | 5.86          | 0.02 **  | 4.66        | 0.03 **  | 4.53             | 0.03 **  |
| CG Exp.        | 21.84         | 0.00 *** | 19.85       | 0.00 *** | 20.88            | 0.00 *** |
| Inflation      | 21.63         | 0.00 *** | 19.35       | 0.00 *** | 16.12            | 0.00 *** |
| Trade          | 2.08          | 0.15     |             |          |                  |          |
| FDI            |               |          | 0.48        | 0.49     |                  |          |
| Cap.Acc.Restr. |               |          |             |          | 0.26             | 0.61     |
| # Obs., # Cnt  | 624 , 60      |          | 624 , 60    |          | 624 , 60         |          |
| Start-End      | 1971 - 2001   |          | 1971 - 2001 |          | 1971 - 2001      |          |

|                | World - Trade |          | World - FDI |          | World - Cap.Rst. |          | World - Cap.Rst. |          |
|----------------|---------------|----------|-------------|----------|------------------|----------|------------------|----------|
|                | F-test        | p-value  | F-test      | p-value  | F-test           | p-value  | F-test           | p-value  |
| Exp.share (-1) | 1,085.03      | 0.00 *** | 1,068.36    | 0.00 *** | 1,090.89         | 0.00 *** | 1,074.35         | 0.00 *** |
| Age Dep.       | 5.03          | 0.025 ** | 7.06        | 0.01 *** | 5.41             | 0.02 **  | 5.26             | 0.02 **  |
| CG Exp.        | 28.67         | 0.00 *** | 29.29       | 0.00 *** | 28.44            | 0.00 *** | 29.04            | 0.00 *** |
| Inflation      | 18.43         | 0.00 *** | 14.53       | 0.00 *** | 18.48            | 0.00 *** | 18.52            | 0.00 *** |
| Index of Glob. | 0.01          | 0.92     |             |          |                  |          |                  |          |
| Econ. Glob.    |               |          | 1.65        | 0.20     |                  |          |                  |          |
| Social Glob.   |               |          |             |          | 0.01             | 0.93     |                  |          |
| Polit. Glob.   |               |          |             |          |                  |          | 0.44             | 0.51     |
| # Obs., # Cnt  | 655 , 60      |          | 655 , 60    |          | 655 , 60         |          | 655 , 60         |          |
| Start-End      | 1971 - 2001   |          | 1971 - 2001 |          | 1971 - 2001      |          | 1971 - 2001      |          |

Notes: Test for joint significance of the respective variable in the system of equations. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* means significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

**Table 3: Significance of variables in system regressions, 4 expenditure categories and 18 OECD countries.**

|                | OECD - Trade |          | OECD - FDI  |          | OECD - Cap.Rst. |          |
|----------------|--------------|----------|-------------|----------|-----------------|----------|
|                | F-test       | p-value  | F-test      | p-value  | F-test          | p-value  |
| Exp.share (-1) | 555.97       | 0.00 *** | 585.32      | 0.00 *** | 584.57          | 0.00 *** |
| CG Exp.        | 12.79        | 0.00 *** | 11.59       | 0.00 *** | 12.03           | 0.00 *** |
| Inflation      | 24.65        | 0.00 *** | 22.35       | 0.00 *** | 14.24           | 0.00 *** |
| Trade          | 1.27         | 0.26     |             |          |                 |          |
| FDI            |              |          | 0.01        | 0.91     |                 |          |
| Cap.Acc.Restr. |              |          |             |          | 0.35            | 0.56     |
| # Obs., # Cnt  | 255 , 18     |          | 255 , 18    |          | 255 , 18        |          |
| Start-End      | 1971 - 2001  |          | 1971 - 2001 |          | 1971 - 2001     |          |

|                | World - Trade |          | World - FDI |          | World - Cap.Rst. |          | World - Cap.Rst. |          |
|----------------|---------------|----------|-------------|----------|------------------|----------|------------------|----------|
|                | F-test        | p-value  | F-test      | p-value  | F-test           | p-value  | F-test           | p-value  |
| Exp.share (-1) | 570.22        | 0.00 *** | 575.41      | 0.00 *** | 563.42           | 0.00 *** | 569.38           | 0.00 *** |
| CG Exp.        | 12.24         | 0.00 *** | 12.65       | 0.00 *** | 11.91            | 0.00 *** | 13.22            | 0.00 *** |
| Inflation      | 20.14         | 0.00 *** | 13.83       | 0.00 *** | 18.96            | 0.00 *** | 25.02            | 0.00 *** |
| Index of Glob. | 0.02          | 0.90     |             |          |                  |          |                  |          |
| Econ. Glob.    |               |          | 0.73        | 0.39     |                  |          |                  |          |
| Social Glob.   |               |          |             |          | 0.01             | 0.93     |                  |          |
| Polit. Glob.   |               |          |             |          |                  |          | 1.17             | 0.28     |
| # Obs., # Cnt  | 255 , 18      |          | 255 , 18    |          | 255 , 18         |          | 255 , 18         |          |
| Start-End      | 1971 - 2001   |          | 1971 - 2001 |          | 1971 - 2001      |          | 1971 - 2001      |          |

Notes: Test for joint significance of the respective variable in the system of equations. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* means significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.



**Table 4: Significance of variables in system regressions including all globalization indicators, 4 expenditure categories.**

|                | World sample |          | World sample |          | OECD sample |          | OECD sample |          |
|----------------|--------------|----------|--------------|----------|-------------|----------|-------------|----------|
|                | F-test       | p-value  | F-test       | p-value  | F-test      | p-value  | F-test      | p-value  |
| Exp.share (-1) | 1,027.34     | 0.00 *** | 1,034.24     | 0.00 *** | 537.52      | 0.00 *** | 521.06      | 0.00 *** |
| Age Dep.       | 5.98         | 0.01 **  | 7.89         | 0.00 *** |             |          |             |          |
| CG Exp.        | 21.05        | 0.00 *** | 29.80        | 0.00 *** | 12.76       | 0.00 *** | 14.77       | 0.00 *** |
| Inflation      | 17.07        | 0.00 *** | 12.79        | 0.00 *** | 14.92       | 0.00 *** | 11.63       | 0.00 *** |
| Trade          | 1.78         | 0.18     |              |          | 1.58        | 0.21     |             |          |
| FDI            | 0.15         | 0.70     |              |          | 0.19        | 0.67     |             |          |
| Cap.Acc.Restr. | 0.15         | 0.70     |              |          | 0.34        | 0.56     |             |          |
| Econ. Glob.    |              |          | 2.57         | 0.11     |             |          | 1.55        | 0.21     |
| Social Glob.   |              |          | 0.14         | 0.71     |             |          | 0.03        | 0.86     |
| Polit. Glob.   |              |          | 0.83         | 0.36     |             |          | 2.59        | 0.11     |
| # Obs., # Cnt  | 624 , 60     |          | 655 , 60     |          | 255 , 18    |          | 255 , 18    |          |
| Start-End      | 1971 - 2001  |          | 1971 - 2001  |          | 1971 - 2001 |          | 1971 - 2001 |          |

Notes: Test for joint significance of the respective variable in the system of equations. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* means significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

**Table 5: Detailed results including all globalization indicators, 4 expenditure categories, SUR.**

|                | World sample       |                    |                    |                    | World sample       |                    |                    |                    | OECD sample        |                    |                    |                    | OECD sample        |                    |                    |                    |
|----------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
|                | Goods              | Subsidies          | Capital            | Interest           | Goods              | Subsidies          | Capital            | Interest           | Goods              | Subsidies          | Capital            | Interest           | Goods              | Subsidies          | Capital            | Interest           |
| Exp.share (-1) | 0.71<br>(31.84***) | 0.71<br>(31.75***) | 0.71<br>(31.43***) | 0.71<br>(31.64***) | 0.70<br>(31.87***) | 0.70<br>(31.82***) | 0.70<br>(31.49***) | 0.70<br>(31.68***) | 0.75<br>(23.04***) | 0.75<br>(22.84***) | 0.75<br>(21.59***) | 0.75<br>(22.36***) | 0.74<br>(22.60***) | 0.74<br>(22.48***) | 0.74<br>(20.80***) | 0.74<br>(21.86***) |
| Age Dep.       | 0.39<br>(2.44**)   | -0.43<br>(2.86***) | 0.18<br>(1.30)     | -0.14<br>(1.15)    | 0.50<br>(2.81***)  | -0.46<br>(2.83***) | 0.05<br>(0.36)     | -0.09<br>(0.68)    |                    |                    |                    |                    |                    |                    |                    |                    |
| CG Exp.        | -0.29<br>(4.59***) | 0.08<br>(1.32)     | 0.11<br>(2.10**)   | 0.10<br>(2.05**)   | -0.31<br>(5.46***) | 0.06<br>(1.21)     | 0.13<br>(2.67***)  | 0.12<br>(2.76***)  | -0.18<br>(3.57***) | 0.07<br>(1.28)     | -0.04<br>(1.08)    | 0.15<br>(2.55**)   | -0.21<br>(3.84***) | 0.12<br>(1.96*)    | -0.05<br>(1.42)    | 0.14<br>(2.31**)   |
| Inflation      | -0.13<br>(4.13***) | 0.02<br>(0.62)     | 0.02<br>(0.69)     | 0.09<br>(3.88***)  | -0.11<br>(3.58***) | 0.01<br>(0.29)     | 0.01<br>(0.21)     | 0.09<br>(4.15***)  | -0.16<br>(3.86***) | 0.11<br>(2.44**)   | 0.02<br>(0.65)     | 0.03<br>(0.68)     | -0.14<br>(3.41***) | 0.10<br>(2.11**)   | 0.01<br>(0.53)     | 0.03<br>(0.64)     |
| Trade          | 0.03<br>(1.34)     | -0.01<br>(0.71)    | -0.01<br>(0.31)    | -0.01<br>(0.53)    |                    |                    |                    |                    | -0.03<br>(1.26)    | 0.02<br>(0.58)     | -0.01<br>(0.62)    | 0.03<br>(0.88)     |                    |                    |                    |                    |
| FDI            | 0.02<br>(0.39)     | -0.04<br>(0.80)    | 0.00<br>(0.04)     | 0.02<br>(0.54)     |                    |                    |                    |                    | 0.02<br>(0.43)     | -0.02<br>(0.47)    | 0.00<br>(0.11)     | 0.00<br>(0.02)     |                    |                    |                    |                    |
| Cap.Acc.Restr. | -0.47<br>(0.39)    | 0.61<br>(0.54)     | -0.16<br>(0.15)    | 0.01<br>(0.01)     |                    |                    |                    |                    | -0.54<br>(0.58)    | 0.07<br>(0.07)     | 0.16<br>(0.25)     | 0.31<br>(0.28)     |                    |                    |                    |                    |
| Econ. Glob.    |                    |                    |                    |                    | 1.43<br>(1.60)     | -0.75<br>(0.92)    | -0.72<br>(0.93)    | 0.05<br>(0.07)     |                    |                    |                    |                    | 0.98<br>(1.24)     | -1.07<br>(1.21)    | 0.23<br>(0.42)     | -0.15<br>(0.16)    |
| Social Glob.   |                    |                    |                    |                    | -0.22<br>(0.38)    | -0.09<br>(0.17)    | 0.07<br>(0.15)     | 0.23<br>(0.54)     |                    |                    |                    |                    | 0.09<br>(0.18)     | 0.15<br>(0.27)     | -0.30<br>(0.89)    | 0.06<br>(0.11)     |
| Polit. Glob.   |                    |                    |                    |                    | -0.53<br>(0.91)    | 1.04<br>(1.96*)    | 0.19<br>(0.38)     | -0.71<br>(1.65)    |                    |                    |                    |                    | -0.73<br>(1.61)    | 1.07<br>(2.15**)   | -0.15<br>(0.51)    | -0.18<br>(0.34)    |
| R <sup>2</sup> | 0.86               | 0.83               | 0.87               | 0.86               | 0.85               | 0.83               | 0.87               | 0.85               | 0.84               | 0.79               | 0.78               | 0.77               | 0.85               | 0.80               | 0.78               | 0.77               |

Notes: (absolute) t-statistics in parentheses: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

**Table 6a: Detailed results including all globalization indicators, 10 expenditure categories and 10 OECD countries, SUR.**

|  | F-test                 | p-value  | Public services   | Defence           | Public order       | Economic affair   | Environment       | Housing         | Health             | Recreation         | Education         | Social            |
|--|------------------------|----------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-----------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Exp.share (-1)                             | 304.36                 | 0.00 *** | 0.63<br>(7.69***) | 0.56<br>(7.60***) | 0.69<br>(10.46***) | 0.32<br>(4.07***) | 0.70<br>(6.14***) | 0.08<br>(1.64)  | 0.54<br>(7.76***)  | 0.47<br>(6.90***)  | 0.78<br>(8.97***) | 0.35<br>(3.49***) |
| A_exp.share (-1)                           | 28.12                  | 0.00 *** | -0.33<br>(1.54)   | 0.13<br>(0.68)    | 0.63<br>(2.55**)   | 0.27<br>(0.95)    | -0.16<br>(0.74)   | -0.18<br>(1.29) | -0.22<br>(1.32)    | -0.33<br>(2.64***) | 0.14<br>(0.67)    | 0.00<br>(0.01)    |
| Age Dep.                                   | 9.88                   | 0.00 *** | 4.48<br>(3.14***) | 1.84<br>(2.92***) | -0.13<br>(0.57)    | -2.37<br>(1.70*)  | -0.22<br>(1.61)   | 0.16<br>(0.50)  | -2.08<br>(3.35***) | -0.21<br>(2.07**)  | -0.20<br>(0.60)   | -0.99<br>(0.92)   |
| Lending rate                               | 7.26                   | 0.01 *** | 0.51<br>(2.70***) | 0.20<br>(2.18**)  | -0.05<br>(1.55)    | -0.14<br>(0.76)   | -0.04<br>(1.79*)  | -0.02<br>(0.44) | -0.23<br>(2.83***) | -0.02<br>(1.83*)   | -0.05<br>(1.21)   | -0.33<br>(2.13**) |
| Trade                                      | 0.62                   | 0.43     | 0.05<br>(0.79)    | 0.02<br>(0.78)    | -0.01<br>(1.19)    | -0.05<br>(0.73)   | 0.00<br>(0.65)    | -0.01<br>(0.46) | 0.01<br>(0.45)     | 0.00<br>(0.66)     | 0.01<br>(0.67)    | -0.03<br>(0.61)   |
| FDI  | 0.10                   | 0.76     | 0.01<br>(0.31)    | 0.02<br>(1.11)    | 0.00<br>(0.07)     | -0.01<br>(0.27)   | 0.00<br>(0.42)    | 0.00<br>(0.58)  | -0.01<br>(0.42)    | 0.00<br>(0.00)     | -0.01<br>(0.71)   | -0.02<br>(0.64)   |
| Cap.Acc.Restr.                             | 0.30                   | 0.58     | -1.72<br>(0.55)   | -2.05<br>(1.44)   | 0.01<br>(0.01)     | 2.49<br>(0.79)    | 0.16<br>(0.52)    | -0.20<br>(0.28) | -0.59<br>(0.44)    | 0.58<br>(2.67***)  | 0.02<br>(0.03)    | 1.57<br>(0.63)    |
| # Obs., # Cnt<br>Start-End, R <sup>2</sup> | 64 , 10<br>1991 - 2001 |          | 0.81              | 0.73              | 0.75               | 0.42              | 0.84              | 0.90            | 0.86               | 0.90               | 0.84              | 0.73              |

Notes: Test for joint significance of the respective variable in the system of equations. (absolute) t-statistics in parentheses: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

**Table 6b: Detailed results including all globalization indicators, 10 expenditure categories and 10 OECD countries, SUR.**

|  | F-test                 | p-value  | Public services   | Defence           | Public order       | Economic affai    | Environment       | Housing         | Health             | Recreation        | Education         | Social            |
|--|------------------------|----------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Exp.share (-1)                             | 224.77                 | 0.00 *** | 0.58<br>(6.82***) | 0.48<br>(6.22***) | 0.71<br>(10.47***) | 0.25<br>(3.21***) | 0.64<br>(5.70***) | 0.09<br>(1.81*) | 0.47<br>(6.92***)  | 0.48<br>(6.64***) | 0.58<br>(5.78***) | 0.32<br>(3.28***) |
| A_exp.share (-1)                           | 32.69                  | 0.00 *** | -0.61<br>(2.09**) | 0.12<br>(0.44)    | 0.46<br>(1.88*)    | -0.03<br>(0.08)   | -0.11<br>(0.49)   | -0.12<br>(0.89) | -0.80<br>(3.72***) | -0.33<br>(2.39**) | 0.16<br>(0.93)    | 0.06<br>(0.28)    |
| Age Dep.                                   | 9.36                   | 0.00 *** | 4.38<br>(3.06***) | 1.74<br>(2.66***) | -0.21<br>(0.89)    | -1.76<br>(1.32)   | -0.25<br>(1.82*)  | 0.11<br>(0.36)  | -2.38<br>(3.99***) | -0.11<br>(1.09)   | -0.53<br>(1.92*)  | -1.32<br>(1.21)   |
| Lending rate                               | 7.80                   | 0.01 *** | 0.42<br>(2.79***) | 0.07<br>(0.92)    | -0.02<br>(0.86)    | -0.03<br>(0.19)   | -0.02<br>(1.31)   | 0.00<br>(0.09)  | -0.23<br>(3.80***) | 0.01<br>(0.65)    | -0.03<br>(1.16)   | -0.25<br>(1.90*)  |
| Econ. Glob.                                | 0.11                   | 0.74     | -0.66<br>(0.33)   | -0.02<br>(0.02)   | 0.02<br>(0.07)     | 2.22<br>(1.20)    | 0.09<br>(0.46)    | 0.47<br>(1.05)  | -0.91<br>(1.13)    | 0.22<br>(1.51)    | -0.96<br>(2.01**) | -0.14<br>(0.09)   |
| Social Glob.                               | 0.20                   | 0.65     | -0.44<br>(0.45)   | 0.05<br>(0.11)    | -0.02<br>(0.12)    | -0.09<br>(0.11)   | -0.11<br>(1.21)   | -0.18<br>(0.93) | 1.13<br>(2.45**)   | -0.02<br>(0.35)   | -0.09<br>(0.45)   | -1.02<br>(1.26)   |
| Polit. Glob.                               | 0.13                   | 0.72     | 0.39<br>(0.36)    | -0.43<br>(0.85)   | 0.12<br>(0.66)     | -2.30<br>(2.24**) | 0.13<br>(1.21)    | 0.03<br>(0.10)  | 0.57<br>(1.27)     | 0.05<br>(0.60)    | 0.95<br>(4.74***) | 0.83<br>(1.02)    |
| # Obs., # Cnt<br>Start-End, R <sup>2</sup> | 64 , 10<br>1991 - 2001 |          | 0.81              | 0.72              | 0.75               | 0.49              | 0.84              | 0.90            | 0.87               | 0.89              | 0.89              | 0.74              |

Notes: Test for joint significance of the respective variable in the system of equations. (absolute) t-statistics in parentheses: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

## Appendix I: GMM results

**Table I-1a: Detailed results including all globalization indicators, 4 expenditure categories, GMM**

|                              | World Sample        |                    |                    |                    | OECD Sample         |                  |                     |                     |
|------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
|                              | Goods               | Subsidies          | Capital            | Interest           | Goods               | Subsidies        | Capital             | Interest            |
| Expenditure Share (t-1)      | 0.183<br>(2.25**)   | 0.363<br>(2.65***) | 0.548<br>(9.31***) | 0.714<br>(8.82***) | 0.016<br>(0.15)     | 0.145<br>(1.66*) | 0.693<br>(10.07***) | 0.839<br>(19.77***) |
| Age Dependency Ratio         | 0.049<br>(0.29)     | 0.168<br>(0.82)    | 0.186<br>(1.4)     | -0.010<br>(0.12)   |                     |                  |                     |                     |
| Government Expenditure       | -0.396<br>(3.24***) | 0.078<br>(0.89)    | 0.216<br>(2.08**)  | 0.072<br>(0.87)    | -0.358<br>(2.88***) | 0.145<br>(1.44)  | -0.053<br>(1.00)    | 0.169<br>(4.4***)   |
| Inflation                    | -0.002<br>(0.36)    | 0.002<br>(0.23)    | 0.004<br>(0.76)    | -0.008<br>(1.98**) | 0.003<br>(0.61)     | 0.008<br>(1.71*) | 0.001<br>(0.72)     | -0.009<br>(3.96***) |
| Trade                        | 0.013<br>(0.36)     | -0.052<br>(1.37)   | 0.022<br>(0.66)    | -0.020<br>(0.69)   | -0.075<br>(1.80*)   | 0.035<br>(0.86)  | -0.012<br>(0.99)    | 0.036<br>(4.27***)  |
| FDI                          | 0.017<br>(0.31)     | 0.002<br>(0.03)    | 0.027<br>(0.66)    | -0.003<br>(0.11)   | 0.041<br>(1.34)     | -0.020<br>(0.47) | 0.002<br>(0.15)     | 0.004<br>(0.16)     |
| Capital Account Restrictions | -0.687<br>(0.35)    | -1.241<br>(0.73)   | -0.314<br>(0.23)   | -0.195<br>(0.34)   | 0.658<br>(0.41)     | 0.462<br>(0.21)  | 0.483<br>(0.77)     | -0.894<br>(1.10)    |
| Number of countries          | 57                  | 57                 | 57                 | 57                 | 18                  | 18               | 18                  | 18                  |
| Number of observations       | 590                 | 590                | 590                | 590                | 249                 | 249              | 249                 | 249                 |
| Sargan test (prob>chi2)      | 0.99                | 0.99               | 0.99               | 0.99               | 0.99                | 0.99             | 0.99                | 0.99                |
| Arellano Bond test (pr>z)    | 0.34                | 0.04               | 0.63               | 0.19               | 0.69                | 0.62             | 0.40                | 0.56                |

Notes: (absolute) t-statistics in parentheses: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

**Table I-1b: Detailed results including all globalization indicators, 4 expenditure categories, GMM**

|                           | World Sample        |                    |                     |                    | OECD Sample         |                  |                    |                     |
|---------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
|                           | Goods               | Subsidies          | Capital             | Interest           | Goods               | Subsidies        | Capital            | Interest            |
| Expenditure Share (t-1)   | 0.160<br>(2.19**)   | 0.367<br>(2.85***) | 0.560<br>(10.13***) | 0.680<br>(7.44***) | -0.005<br>(0.05)    | 0.158<br>(1.95*) | 0.662<br>(8.94***) | 0.841<br>(13.81***) |
| Age Dependency Ratio      | 0.085<br>(0.41)     | 0.121<br>(0.49)    | 0.204<br>(1.43)     | -0.022<br>(0.27)   |                     |                  |                    |                     |
| Government Expenditure    | -0.434<br>(3.34***) | 0.152<br>(1.57)    | 0.238<br>(2.17**)   | 0.047<br>(0.63)    | -0.279<br>(3.85***) | 0.202<br>(2.4**) | -0.070<br>(1.39)   | 0.136<br>(3.59***)  |
| Inflation                 | -0.001<br>(0.10)    | -0.001<br>(0.15)   | 0.008<br>(1.02)     | -0.006<br>(1.50)   | 0.007<br>(1.94*)    | 0.004<br>(0.83)  | 0.000<br>(0.03)    | -0.006<br>(2.61***) |
| Economic Globalization    | 1.683<br>(1.18)     | 0.253<br>(0.14)    | 1.207<br>(0.94)     | -1.932<br>(1.91*)  | 2.022<br>(1.50)     | -2.527<br>(1.30) | -0.187<br>(0.42)   | 0.193<br>(0.32)     |
| Social Globalization      | 0.797<br>(0.75)     | 0.612<br>(0.87)    | 0.276<br>(0.37)     | -0.435<br>(0.67)   | 2.409<br>(1.87*)    | 0.691<br>(0.74)  | -0.736<br>(2.29**) | -0.079<br>(0.18)    |
| Political Globalization   | -0.436<br>(0.73)    | 1.094<br>(1.28)    | 0.203<br>(0.32)     | -0.974<br>(2.49**) | -0.282<br>(0.59)    | 0.961<br>(1.70*) | 0.053<br>(0.24)    | -0.451<br>(1.21)    |
| Number of countries       | 59                  | 59                 | 59                  | 59                 | 18                  | 18               | 18                 | 18                  |
| Number of observations    | 610                 | 610                | 610                 | 610                | 250                 | 250              | 250                | 250                 |
| Sargan test (prob>chi2)   | 0.99                | 0.99               | 0.99                | 0.99               | 0.99                | 0.99             | 0.99               | 0.99                |
| Arellano Bond test (pr>z) | 0.50                | 0.45               | 0.48                | 0.18               | 0.31                | 0.23             | 0.02               | 0.64                |

Notes: (absolute) t-statistics in parentheses: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

**Table I-2a: Detailed results including all globalization indicators, 10 expenditure categories, GMM**

|                                  | Public Services    | Defence           | Public Order     | Economic Affairs    | Environment        | Housing          | Health           | Recreation       | Education           | Social             |
|----------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|------------------|---------------------|--------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| Expenditure Share (t-1)          | 0.575<br>(8.07***) | 0.020<br>(0.14)   | 0.522<br>(4.87)  | -0.221<br>(2.90***) | 0.744<br>(8.34***) | 0.061<br>(1.22)  | -0.024<br>(0.11) | 0.339<br>(1.42)  | -0.130<br>(1.15)    | -0.059<br>(0.26)   |
| Expenditure Share, Average (t-1) | -0.321<br>(1.49)   | 0.190<br>(0.62)   | -0.425<br>(1.61) | -1.768<br>(1.42)    | 0.096<br>(0.31)    | -0.066<br>(0.59) | 0.464<br>(0.93)  | -0.085<br>(0.34) | 0.321<br>(1.65*)    | -0.939<br>(2.40**) |
| Age Dependency Ratio             | 1.679<br>(2.17**)  | 0.606<br>(1.00)   | -0.280<br>(1.37) | -1.159<br>(2.44**)  | -0.092<br>(1.11)   | 0.074<br>(0.97)  | -0.493<br>(0.73) | -0.156<br>(1.46) | -0.765<br>(3.94***) | 2.336<br>(2.27**)  |
| Lending Rate                     | 0.361<br>(1.39)    | 0.155<br>(0.97)   | -0.014<br>(0.30) | -0.161<br>(1.38)    | -0.030<br>(1.44)   | -0.008<br>(0.32) | -0.249<br>(1.51) | -0.006<br>(0.43) | -0.033<br>(0.74)    | -0.412<br>(1.95*)  |
| Trade                            | -0.002<br>(0.03)   | 0.047<br>(2.37**) | -0.008<br>(1.23) | -0.039<br>(0.43)    | -0.003<br>(0.58)   | 0.004<br>(0.69)  | -0.022<br>(0.43) | -0.001<br>(0.13) | -0.002<br>(0.11)    | 0.019<br>(0.51)    |
| FDI                              | 0.033<br>(1.03)    | 0.026<br>(1.19)   | 0.003<br>(0.75)  | -0.003<br>(0.20)    | -0.002<br>(1.38)   | 0.000<br>(0.07)  | -0.011<br>(0.86) | 0.000<br>(0.13)  | -0.003<br>(0.42)    | 0.002<br>(0.13)    |
| Capital Account Restrictions     | -0.173<br>(0.10)   | -0.842<br>(1.75*) | -0.139<br>(0.30) | -1.607<br>(2.50**)  | 0.403<br>(1.25)    | -0.038<br>(0.29) | 0.211<br>(0.26)  | -0.342<br>(1.36) | 0.158<br>(0.27)     | 0.721<br>(0.34)    |
| Number of countries              | 11                 | 11                | 11               | 11                  | 11                 | 11               | 11               | 11               | 11                  | 11                 |
| Number of observations           | 55                 | 55                | 55               | 55                  | 55                 | 55               | 55               | 55               | 55                  | 55                 |
| Sargan test (prob>chi2)          | 0.99               | 0.99              | 0.99             | 0.99                | 0.99               | 0.99             | 0.99             | 0.99             | 0.99                | 0.99               |
| Arellano Bond test (pr>z)        | 0.30               | 0.20              | 0.90             | 0.21                | 0.76               | 0.15             | 0.20             | 0.16             | 0.89                | 0.80               |

Notes: (absolute) t-statistics in parentheses: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

**Table I-2b: Detailed results including all globalization indicators, 10 expenditure categories, GMM**

|                                  | Public Services    | Defence            | Public Order       | Economic Affairs    | Environment        | Housing          | Health             | Recreation          | Education           | Social              |
|----------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Expenditure Share (t-1)          | 0.566<br>(4.85***) | 0.112<br>(0.79)    | 0.510<br>(3.83***) | -0.139<br>(3.51***) | 0.708<br>(5.55***) | 0.078<br>(1.74*) | -0.152<br>(0.73)   | 0.283<br>(1.40)     | -0.004<br>(0.05)    | 0.044<br>(0.28)     |
| Expenditure Share, Average (t-1) | -0.239<br>(1.11)   | 0.448<br>(3.78***) | -0.411<br>(1.27)   | -0.993<br>(1.52)    | 0.145<br>(0.47)    | -0.090<br>(0.83) | 0.047<br>(0.10)    | 0.035<br>(0.19)     | 0.367<br>(2.01**)   | -1.020<br>(2.64***) |
| Age Dependency Ratio             | 1.265<br>(2.64***) | 0.534<br>(1.12)    | -0.260<br>(1.74*)  | -1.021<br>(2.74***) | -0.110<br>(1.54)   | 0.113<br>(1.48)  | -0.283<br>(0.56)   | -0.110<br>(1.74*)   | -0.624<br>(4.31***) | 2.277<br>(2.51**)   |
| Lending Rate                     | 0.400<br>(1.66*)   | 0.119<br>(0.69)    | -0.051<br>(1.19)   | -0.201<br>(1.28)    | -0.015<br>(0.63)   | -0.013<br>(0.69) | -0.335<br>(2.05**) | -0.035<br>(2.63***) | -0.026<br>(0.88)    | -0.403<br>(2.31**)  |
| Economic Globalization           | -2.421<br>(1.26)   | 1.076<br>(0.89)    | -0.567<br>(1.04)   | 1.389<br>(0.83)     | 0.240<br>(1.37)    | 0.441<br>(1.57)  | -1.122<br>(0.45)   | -0.163<br>(0.43)    | -1.461<br>(2.21**)  | -0.717<br>(0.57)    |
| Social Globalization             | -1.404<br>(0.86)   | -0.524<br>(0.34)   | 0.481<br>(1.69*)   | -0.904<br>(0.59)    | 0.073<br>(0.32)    | 0.287<br>(1.71*) | 2.574<br>(1.57)    | 0.451<br>(2.72***)  | 0.054<br>(0.15)     | 0.029<br>(0.02)     |
| Political Globalization          | 1.082<br>(1.26)    | 0.050<br>(0.11)    | 0.058<br>(0.34)    | -2.829<br>(1.16)    | 0.063<br>(0.78)    | 0.084<br>(0.75)  | 0.231<br>(0.37)    | 0.058<br>(0.72)     | 0.893<br>(3.64***)  | 1.081<br>(0.94)     |
| Number of countries              | 11                 | 11                 | 11                 | 11                  | 11                 | 11               | 11                 | 11                  | 11                  | 11                  |
| Number of observations           | 55                 | 55                 | 55                 | 55                  | 55                 | 55               | 55                 | 55                  | 55                  | 55                  |
| Sargan test (prob>chi2)          | 0.99               | 0.99               | 0.99               | 0.99                | 0.99               | 0.99             | 0.99               | 0.99                | 0.99                | 0.99                |
| Arellano Bond test (pr>z)        | 0.45               | 0.19               | 0.93               | 0.16                | 0.56               | 0.69             | 0.38               | 0.22                | 0.38                | 0.80                |

Notes: (absolute) t-statistics in parentheses: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.



## Appendix II: Data description and sources

| Variable                              | Description   | Source            |
|---------------------------------------|---|-------------------|
| Capital expenditure                   | Capital expenditure is spending to acquire fixed capital assets, land, intangible assets, government stocks, and nonmilitary, nonfinancial assets. Also included are capital grants. Data are shown for central government only and are shown in percent of total expenditure.  | World Bank (2004) |
| Goods and services expenditure        | Goods and services include all government payments in exchange for goods and services, whether in the form of wages and salaries to employees or other purchases of goods and services. Data are shown for central government only and are shown in percent of total expenditure.   | World Bank (2004) |
| Interest payments                     | Interest payments are payments made to domestic sectors and to nonresidents for the use of borrowed money. (Repayment of principal is shown as a financing item, and commission charges are shown as purchases of services.) Interest payments do not include payments by government as guarantor or surety of interest on the defaulted debts of others, which are classified as government lending. Data are shown for central government only and are shown in percent of total expenditure. | World Bank (2004) |
| Subsidies and other current transfers | Subsidies and other current transfers include all unrequited, nonrepayable transfers on current account to private and public enterprises, and the cost of covering the cash operating deficits of departmental enterprise sales to the public by departmental enterprises. Data are shown for central government only and in percent of total expenditure.   | World Bank (2004) |
| Public Services                       | Expenditures on general public services. Data are shown for central government only and are in percent of total expenditure.  | OECD (2004)       |
| Defence                               | Expenditures on defence. Data are shown for central government only and are in percent of total expenditure.  | OECD (2004)       |
| Public Order                          | Expenditures on public order and safety. Data are shown for central government only and are in percent of total expenditure.  | OECD (2004)       |
| Economic Affairs                      | Expenditures on economic affairs. Data are shown for central government only and are in percent of total expenditure.   | OECD (2004)       |
| Environment                           | Expenditures on environment protection. Data are shown for central government only and are in percent of total expenditure.   | OECD (2004)       |
| Housing                               | Expenditures on housing and community amenities. Data are shown for central government only and are in percent of total expenditure.  | OECD (2004)       |

## Appendix II (continued)

| Variable                       | Description  | Source   |
|--------------------------------|--|--|
| Health                         | Expenditures on health. Data are shown for central government only and are in percent of total expenditure.  | OECD (2004)  |
| Recreation                     | Expenditures on recreation, culture and religion. Data are shown for central government only and are in percent of total expenditure.  | OECD (2004)  |
| Education                      | Expenditures on education. Data are shown for central government only and are in percent of total expenditure.   | OECD (2004)  |
| Social                         | Social expenditures. Data are shown for central government only and are in percent of total expenditure.   | OECD (2004)  |
| FDI                            | Gross foreign direct investment is the sum of the absolute values of inflows and outflows of foreign direct investment recorded in the balance of payments financial account. It includes equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital. This indicator differs from the standard measure of foreign direct investment, which captures only inward investment. Data are in percent of GDP.                     | World Bank (2004)  |
| Trade                          | Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic product.   | World Bank (2004)  |
| Capital Account Restrictions   | See text.  | Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995), Dreher and Siemers (2005) |
| Globalization, index           | Index constructed with Principal Components Analysis comprising 23 variables measuring globalization.  | Dreher (2006c)   |
| Economic globalization, index  | Sub-index comprising measures of actual economic flows and restrictions, on a range from 1 to 10, with higher values representing more globalization.  | Dreher (2006c)   |
| Social globalization, index    | Sub-index comprising data on political engagement, on a range from 1 to 10, with higher values representing more globalization.  | Dreher (2006c)   |
| Political globalization, index | Sub-index comprising data on personal contacts, information flows, and cultural proximity, on a range from 1 to 10, with higher values representing more globalization.  | Dreher (2006c)   |
| Age Dependency Ratio           | Age dependency ratio is the ratio of dependents--people younger than 15 and older than 64--to the working-age population--those ages 15-64. For example, 0.7 means there are 7 dependents for every 10 working-age people.   | World Bank (2004)  |
| GDP growth                     | Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 1995 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. | World Bank (2004)  |
| Government Expenditure         | Total expenditure includes both current and capital expenditures. It does not include government lending or repayments to the government or government acquisition of equity for public purposes. Data are shown for central government only and are in percent of GDP.  | World Bank (2004)  |

**Appendix II (continued)**

| Variable        | Description   | Source            |
|-----------------|---|-------------------|
| Government Debt | Total debt is the entire stock of direct, government, fixed term contractual obligations to others outstanding at a particular date. It includes domestic debt (such as debt held by monetary authorities, deposit money banks, nonfinancial public enterprises, and households) and foreign debt (such as debt to international development institutions and foreign governments). It is the gross amount of government liabilities not reduced by the amount of government claims against others. Because debt is a stock rather than a flow, it is measured as of a given date, usually the last day of the fiscal year. Data are shown for central government only and are in percent of GDP. | World Bank (2004) |
| Lending Rate    | Lending interest rate is the rate charged by banks on loans to prime customers.   | World Bank (2004) |
| Inflation       | Inflation, GDP deflator,<br>(Inflation)/(1+Inflation)   | World Bank (2004) |