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Political boundary making toward Poland: Social identities and interest-formation in German elite reasoning

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**‘Political Boundary Making’ toward Poland:
Social Identities and Interest-Formation
in German Elite Reasoning**

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Zusammenfassung

Mit Hilfe von Umfragedaten aus der "Deutsch-Polnischen Elitestudie" geht das discussion paper der Frage nach, wie die deutsche "Positionselite" über den Wandel der Grenze zwischen Deutschen und Polen denkt. Drei Dimensionen aktueller „politischer Grenzziehungen“ werden diskutiert: Restriktionen des grenzüberschreitenden Verkehrs an Oder und Neisse sowie die Integration Polens in die Europäische Union und die NATO. Es wird unter anderem gezeigt, daß zwar „transnationale“ Verbundenheit zwischen deutschen und polnischen Eliten positive Einstellungen gegenüber einer politischen Integration Polens begünstigt, Gefühle nationaler Identität jedoch immer noch einer „Entgrenzung“ entgegenstehen. Allerdings: Interessen tragen – obgleich selbst abhängig von sozialen Identitäten – immer noch erheblich zum Verständnis von „Grenzziehungen“ bei. Was die Erweiterungen anbetrifft, scheint die deutsche Elite bereit, die Grenze zu Polen weitgehend aufzugeben; allerdings eher im Sinne einer ‚europäischen Gesellschaft‘, die sich auf funktionale Regime wie EU oder NATO gründet, als einer ‚europäischen Gemeinschaft‘ im soziologischen Sinne. Im Hinblick auf Grenzkontrollen: mögen Grenzen auch ihre militärische Bedeutung als ‚hard shells‘ (John Herz) verloren haben, als Instrument gegen Kriminalität scheint die deutsch-polnische Grenze nach wie vor als notwendig betrachtet zu werden, wenn auch mit einem Hauch von verlorener Schlacht, was ihre Effektivität anbetrifft.

Abstract

Using data from the 'German-Polish Elite Study', the paper presents findings as to how the German 'positional elite' thinks about the changing political significance of the border between Germans and Poles. Three dimensions of current 'political boundary making' are considered: Restrictions on cross-border traffic at Oder and Neisse and the two enlargements of the European Union and NATO respectively. As can be shown, while 'transnational' identity ties between German and Polish elite members foster support for political integration, national identification is in some ways still an obstacle to 'debordering'. Nevertheless, interests – although themselves depending on social identities – are still (more) important variables for understanding how boundaries are drawn. With respect to enlargements, the German elites support a reduction in the political significance of the German-Polish border; albeit more in terms of a European 'society' based on functional regimes like EU and NATO than a European 'community' in the sociological meaning. With respect to controls: while borders may vanish as military 'hard shells' (John Herz), the German-Polish state border is still seen as a necessary instrument against crime, although with the 'odour of a lost battle' in terms of efficacy.

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Introduction

Born in a world of social communities, people draw boundaries around them, some inherited and socialised, others actively constructed, all to be maintained or changed by co-operation or brute force.¹ As individuals possessing societal power, elites draw boundaries² for entire societies: in terms of state control, citizenship, identity construction or distribution of education, wealth and life chances. The following paper presents findings on how German elite members ('elites' in the rest of the paper) reason about changing boundaries between Germans and Poles. Three dimensions of current 'political boundary making' will be considered: Restrictions on transborder traffic due to controls at the state border, 'pooling' sovereignty by EU integration and security by enlarging NATO.

My research question is first of all a descriptive one: How much do German elites support changes of political boundaries between them and Poles? I will try to explain attitudes on these changes, using information on social identities and interests. As can be shown, while 'transnational' identity ties between Germans and Poles foster political integration, national identities are in some ways still an obstacle to 'de-bordering', due to the social-psychological relevance of the German-Polish border as a national 'identity markers' (Anderson 1997). Nevertheless, while social identities are of some explanatory power, interests – although itself depending on social identities – are still (more) impor-

¹ A first draft of this paper was presented at the Third Pan-European International Relations Conference and Joint Meeting with the International Studies Association, in Vienna, September 16-19, 1998; panel on 'Identity and Territorial Borders'.

² More or less in line with political geography (Prescott 1987; Taylor 1989) "boundaries", in the way I use the term, delineate social spheres (leaving the system-theoretical distinction between system-system and system-environment relationships aside here, see Luhmann 1988 or Kratochwil 1986). "Political" boundaries are special cases, were these spheres are political entities (i.e. states). Different to political geographers who make no use of the term, "state border" will denote the fact of state control applied at a certain boundary. By processes of political integration (disintegration), state functions applied to the border will be reduced (employed) and the border will vanish (raised). Political boundaries are valid descriptions as long as state territories are not amalgamated; i.e. the German Länder have boundaries but no borders as they have no 'material' demarcations, according to this terminology.

tant variables for understanding how boundaries are drawn, warranting current ‘constructivism’ in International Relation Theory to take a rather simplistic social-psychology of ‘social identity’ for granted.

The analysis is structured in two parts: First of all, the role of social identities for political boundary making is considered, leading to a short discussion of how boundaries and social identities may be related to elites and their role in the political process. Then, hypotheses on how German elites reason on boundaries between Germany and Poland with respect to social identities and interests. The second part of the paper presents empirical findings about the current reasoning of the German elite on the political boundary at stake by means of multivariate analysis. For this task I use survey data, gathered in 1998 by our comparative research project, the ‘German-Polish Elite Study’ (Ecker 1998, Eberwein/Reiter 1999, Eberwein/Ecker forthcoming). The analysis of this paper is based on the 439 questionnaires of German ‘positional’ elites, all of them key decision-makers in major organisations of all sectors of German society (politics, business, media, culture, etc.).³ As a matter of convenience I will start with models that treat identities and interests as additive factors, leading to a more complex account on how identities might have an impact as intervening variables in a process of interest formation and political consensus.

1 Theory

1.1 International community formation and de-bordering

Social identities have been described as the driving force behind various forms of political boundary making (Wendt 1994, 1999, Albert/Brock 1995, Weller 1997). But state borders and functional bounds by EU or NATO are rather distinct phenomena, related to different levels of abstraction and real-life experiences (has everybody ever seen a

³ cf. Ecker 1998 for details of sampling and an analyses of sampling bias due non-responses.

NATO-check point at an external border?). What makes it reasonable to analyse them jointly is the possibility of a common rationale behind such processes, social identification.

One of the first to be aware of this issue was undoubtedly K. W. Deutsch (et al. 1957). By denying an axiomatic relationship between anarchy and war he formulated a 'revolutionary paradigm' according to Lijphart (1981, Eberwein 1998). For Deutsch, social integration of elites is a key factor for regional peace. Integration does not necessarily has to lead to supranational arrangements of pooled sovereignties ('amalgamation' in his terminology); at a first stage he suggests mutual expectations of 'peaceful change' to be a sufficient fundament for peace and the defining characteristic of a 'pluralistic security community'.

Following the logic of what Deutsch treats as important factors for building a security community, sociological theories on the basic modes of social integration come to mind: community formation (*Vergemeinschaftung*) and society formation (*Vergesellschaftung*) (Weber 1984).⁴ For the international level, Deutsch (et al. 1957) defined his 'pluralistic security communities' in fact as 'transnational societies of elites' as they rest on expectations of reciprocity by 'the political relevant strata', based on the compatibility of basic values and norms. What makes a supranational 'amalgamation' a viable political construction according to Deutsch, is an even deeper social integration in terms of strong communication, common norms and values, as well as a mutual feeling of identity ('we-ness'), say: by forming a 'transnational elite community'.

What makes Deutsch of interest here, is the fact that national and transnational communities seem to foster boundaries as an underlying principle separating 'Us' from 'Others', while societies are open systems which show a tendency to transcend bounda-

⁴ The clearest institution of what Weber means by "Vergesellschaftung" is the market (Weber 1984: 70). Sharing norms of reciprocity - the famous *do ut des* from private law - actors and agencies compete for gains and market shares. While societies are based on interlocking roles and functional ties, communities are bound together by affective ties and common symbols which lead to mutual feeling of belonging between members. A process of community formation is called "Vergemeinschaftung" in Weber's terminology.

ries by functional ties and interdependence (Weller 1997: 5). In a similar vein, the terminology of society- and community-formation has been used by several authors in the recent debate to describe changes of the international system toward globalization and fragmentation (Wendt 1992, 1994, Buzan 1993, Albert/Brock 1995, Risse-Kappen 1996, Weller 1997, Adler 1997).

1.2 Explaining community formation at the micro level

What is missing in Deutsch's theory and similar approaches in the International Relations field is a 'foundation at the micro level' (Puchala 1981) of how communities are formed. To get international theory work at the micro level, Weller (1997) suggests to combine the sociological notion of community formation with the social-psychological perspective of Social Identity Theory (SIT) (Tajfel 1986, Hogg/Abrams 1988, Abrams 1992, Hogg 1992). As this paper frames on elite attitudes, such a micro theory seems necessary to test the explanatory power of the identity-argument.

According to Symbolic Interactionism and 'cognitive' derivatives like SIT, social identities are mental categories individuals bear in mind and ascribe themselves to as an act of a reflexive reasoning of what their 'Me' is. As a basic assumption they do so to impose a cognitive order to the chaos that surrounds them on the one hand, and to maintain a positive self-image on the other (Tajfel 1986, Hogg/Abrams 1988: 26-29). Social identities are formed according to perceived differences of social objects. As a special type of cognitive category social identities are constructed by drawing bounds around Self and similar social objects and demarcating an 'in-group' from other objects (a kind of 'implicit cluster algorithm'). It is assumed that people tend to act and think in different ways, depending on how they perceive their adversary: If treated as a member of a social group, social stereotypes are more involved (de-individuated 'social interaction') than in 'personal interaction'. In this way, social identities foster affective ties between in-group members: As the perception of similarity leads to mutual attraction, "depersonalised liking [is] based upon prototypicality and generated by self-categorisation. It is actually attraction to the group as that group is embodied by specific group members"

(Hogg 1992: 100). Moreover, as a theory of social integration it is stated, that mutual attractiveness of group members strengthens social cohesion and conformity of values, norms and behaviour by social learning and tendencies to accentuate in-group similarity and out-group differences ('referent informational influence'). In practice, "social consensus or agreement, then, is an intrinsic property of the social group" (Hogg/Abrams 1988: 173).

In International Relations research, several authors have tried to explain the 'democratic peace'-phenomenon by the notion of a common democratic identity: "Nonaggression within the liberal democratic community may result from the fact that these leaders and publics identify countries that classify themselves as democracies as part of their in-group" (Hermann/Kegley 1995: 517, cf. Druckman 1994, Starr 1997, Wendt 1999). While perceptions of common democratic norms might be a good starting point for studying international society formation, the analysis of community formation might require a more comprehensive conceptualisation of perceptions regarding cultural similarity⁵.

Moreover, the identity issue has attracted much interest as an intervening variable between structure and interests. What could be at stake here, might be the fact that "identities presuppose interests" (Wendt 1992: 398, cf. Wendt 1994, 1999: 224-233, Powell 1994), thus marking an indirect way as to how elite reasoning on political boundaries might be influenced by community formation. While I reject the unitary-actor-perspective of Wendt (1989, 1992, 1994, 1999, Katzenstein 1996), the underlying notion of a causal role of social identities in interest-formation seems instructive (cf. Weller 1997).

⁵ cf. Hogg (1992: 96-101) for an overview on related literature in the social-psychological field, Deutsch (1966: 173-177) for the argument on nation-building and cultural distinctiveness.

1.3 Elite attitudes and political boundary making

As community formation is ascribed to the individual level – ‘in the individual’ as Tajfel might have said – it needs individual actors to gain explanatory power. While individuals draw boundaries for themselves, elites draw boundaries for the whole society. But this assumption still lacks clarification. Elites are – by definition in the German-Polish elite study and contemporary ‘national’ elite research in general (Hoffmann-Lange 1992, Etzioni-Halevy 1993, Bürklin/Rebenstorf et al. 1997) – those who have power to influence decisions of major importance for the entire society. Using a ‘positional’ approach, they do so by occupying key positions in several sub-systems of society like the media, political system, business or culture.

First of all, elites take part in each stage of the domestic political process of formulating, deciding and implementing political decisions on state border policy and integration. With respect to integration as a function of foreign policy it can be argued, that the ‘national elite’ is a major domestic constraint to foreign-policy decision making (Evans et al. 1993). But at present, integration has become not only a matter of ‘high politics’, but of all societal actors in the advanced integration process in the EU (Jachtenfuchs/Kohler-Koch 1996, Risse-Kappen 1996). Taking the transnational aspect seriously, elites as incumbents of powerful positions in major organisations are important, because they have the big share of resources for transitional activities. By strengthening functional ties, elites foster the formation of international societies. As far as the social construction of national and ‘transnational’ identities is concerned, elites are even powerful actors as gate-keepers in the media and cultural subsystem (bottom-up argument) as by shaping information flows between specialised discourses and the public (top-down argument) (Deutsch 1968, Wessels 1995). In this way, elites are key actors in constructing identities, formulating policies, generating support via several arenas of public discourse and decision-making.

Elite attitudes on border policy, Poland's entry into the EU and NATO-enlargement will be linked to the issue of international community formation as three processes of ‘political boundary making’ at the German-Polish border in the next section. But it would be far too simple to account for social identities alone, as borders, EU and NATO

are political institutions fulfil certain functions. Interests will be considered as alternative variables to validate the current impact of social identities on they way changes in boundaries between Germany and Poland are supported by German elites.

1.4 'Political boundary making' at the German-Polish border

The German and Polish border as it exists today, is a product of the Second World War, as are most borders in Eastern Europe. The war caused a fundamental change in the political geography of both countries by moving Poland westward, 'superimposing' a new German-Polish border over the former German territory. The Oder-Neisse line cut areas of Pommerania, Brandenburg and the whole of Silesia which had belonged to the German Empire since medieval times. What had remained from the pre-war social structure was fundamentally changed, in order to make the Oder-Neisse line a kind of 'consequent' boundary (according to Hartshorne's terminology) by the expulsion of more than 5 million Germans all over East-Central Europe, and the 'transfer' of more than 2 million Poles ('Repatriates') from the former Polish territories in the East to the former German areas. (Not to forget the one million members of the Ukrainian minority, which were 'pacified' by a forced resettlement all over Poland and its new western territory).

Social cohesion was a key issue in the new western territories of post-war Poland though, making transborder social contacts and co-operation between Germans and Poles an obstacle to sovereignty in the eyes of the Polish leadership.⁶ As the German Democratic Republic and Poland fostered central planning, the economy as a motor of a

⁶ The 1970s brought a short opening of the border in terms of free movement of citizens of both countries, but as the new flow of cheap Polish goods to Germany put stress on local economies on the German side these new freedoms were abolished at once.

transborder regional development was of no relevance before both sides became part of market economies after 1989 (Gruchman/Walk 1997).⁷

German Unification and the end of the Cold War led to a consolidation of the boundary in terms of international law. The German-Polish treaty of 1990 fixed the Oder-Neisse line as the definite boundary. The subsequent treaty of 1991 formulated a more comprehensive project of 'good neighbourhood and friendly relations' and a 'community of interests' between Poland and Germany. A German-Polish Intergovernmental Commission was set up and designed to foster transborder development and cooperation (Gruchman/Walk 1997). Following the example of existing Euroregions, four of these were founded in 1992 and 1993 at the German-Polish border, one of them with Czech participation. But both sides still have to cope with serious problems to make the idea of border regions work. Due to the long grown social significance of the boundary in terms of stereotypes, weak social ties, few bilinguals and cross-points, a transnational climate of German-Polish 'community formation' seems a project of a small but enthusiastic minority.

What makes the state border itself an interesting issue for an analysis of community formation is its territorial function. In contrast to functional ties of economic integration or a military alliance, territorial borders are still 'national' institutions by definition. Focusing on the external dimension, modern state borders attain political relevance in political thinking as *security institutions*, protecting state and society against military invasions, crime and economic competition.⁸ But this 'modern mode' of thinking about territorial borders seems to be challenged (Sack 1986, Kratochwil 1986, Ruggie 1993, Thomson 1995, Biersteker/Weber 1996, Bigo 1997).

⁷ In fact this is a rather simplistic summary: On the German side, the emerging German Democratic Republic, new industrial complexes were build right at the border (Eisenhüttenstadt, Schwedt, Guben) to compensate broken economic ties to the West and as a matter of integration into the new RGW (Barjak/Naujokat 1997).

⁸ Internally, they guarantee authority by hindering subjects to escape state sanctions and making them inefficient and illegitimate in the longer run.

In terms of military security, John Herz (1957) was probably the first who argued that borders were losing their military relevance as 'hard shells' after the nuclear umbrella had been established globally. While this early 'demise of the territorial state' was probably premature (Hoffman 1966, Herz 1968), present trends towards 'globalization' seem to alter the social ground of the modern state rule altogether. As a "compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole" (Robertson 1992: 8), 'globalization' threatens the sovereignty of modern states as such basic aspects as citizenship and identities are involved and 'relativized' (Robertson 1992: 26-32). Again, as states still determine major circumstances of social life and as their strength is an important covariate of transnational action by non-state actors (Evans 1997: 70)⁹ this almost simplistic diagnosis of an 'end of nation state' (Ohmae 1993) has been criticized (Evans 1997).

What might be true though, is the waning relevance of state borders as security institutions. In times of a transnational, 'globalized' world, there seems no use for border controls as they still hinder border-crossing traffic and trade to some unwanted extent without preventing 'negative' influences of pollution, information diffusion, capital flows, crime or illegal immigration efficiently (Mills 1996, Bigo 1997, Anderson 1997, Clement 1997). Perceptions of a rapid decline in efficiency should cause a fading legitimacy of borders as political institutions accordingly.

While the social environment of state action changes, borderlands seem to lose their stigma as peripheral zones and economic niches for few specialised businesses of a 'border economy' (Clement 1997, Barjak/Naujokat 1997, see Luhmann 1982 and 1988 for a system-theoretical account). As European integration progresses and local projects as 'Euroregions' spread all over Europe, borders might "cease to act as separators" and "change from transit-zones into spaces of economic cooperation, political-cum-

⁹ Moreover, the diagnosis seems to be a part of the problem, because "[p]reoccupation with eclipse cripples consideration of positive possibilities for working to increase states' capacity so that they can more effectively meet the new demands that confront them" (Evans 1997: 64).

institutional innovation, and transnational communication" in the near future (Albert/Brock 1995: 21, cf. Strassoldo 1982, Ganster et al. 1997).

Summing up this line of reasoning, at least two preliminary hypotheses on the legitimacy and changing role of the German-Polish border in elite reasoning can be formulated. First, the German-Polish border should have lost its relevance as a military 'hard shell'. Perceptions of military threats should not raise the legitimacy of the border, thereof. Second, as border controls are losing their efficiency in preventing illegal activities (crime, illegal immigration), this should cause a decline of support for these measures, and lead to a redefinition of the border from a 'barrier' to 'junction' between Germans and Poles.

But security interests are but one side of the coin. State borders are *territorial markers* (Prescott 1987, Taylor 1989); this rather technical point of political geography gets a quite social-psychological appeal when applied to borders as '*identity markers*': "[Borders] in this sense, are part of political beliefs and myths about the unity of the people, and sometimes myths about the natural unity of the territory" (Anderson 1997: 29). Thinking of territoriality in a Europe of modern nation states, identity seems basically an issue of national identity as "nations and nationalism are both explicitly territorial in nature" (Taylor 1989: 171, Smith 1991: 14). As they delineate territorial claims of nations, state borders as 'identity markers' seem to attain a certain amount of social significance and legitimacy by delineating 'imagined communities' (Anderson 1988, Hettlage 1997). For the European context, ethnicity was highlighted by several authors as a still important variable in contemporary political reasoning quite recently (Macdonald 1993, Rex/Mason 1986, Hettlage et al. 1997, Smith 1992). In this way, it was argued to open the boundary to alleviate minority problems with respect to the still existing Germans minority in Poland (Upper Silesia and other areas) (Gerner 1997). Moreover, 'relativised' identities (Robertson) by globalisation might give new social relevance to territorial borders as 'identity marker' (Hettlage 1997, Weller 1997). In the same vein, borders might receive legitimacy by protecting the identity of the 'ins' against the outer cultural threats, i.e. by cultural influence of migration (Mills 1996, Rex

1996, Cesarani/Fulbrook 1996)¹⁰. According to this second line of reasoning on borders as ‘identity markers’ it can be expected to find (1) a high level of national identification positively related with support for demarcating facilities at the German-Polish border, e.g. controls employed at cross-points, while (2) border-crossing ‘transnational’ identity ties and perceptions of cultural similarity should undermine the legitimacy of the border in this respect.

In fact, both enlargements are politically related to the new ‘internal’ border. The border itself makes social and economic exchange tedious and expensive, leaving the region at both sides of the demarcation in its peripheral dilemma of low attractiveness to all sorts of social life and depending on aids from the national centres or supranational funds (INTERREG II, PHARE, see Gruchman/Walk 1997 for an overview). With respect to EU-enlargement, the border as a security institutions will open to an extent defined by the Schengen process and the European internal market. By shifting the boundary of NATO, the internal border changes in terms of military security. Given a low relevance of current state borders as military institutions in general, a significant change on what is at stake at the national borders involved is rather unlikely. Hence, a support for international integration between Germany and Poland should be related at least in the case of EU to a low support for border controls.

But both enlargements imply ‘boundary-making’ on a higher level, which can not be reduced to the mere ‘physical’ aspect of borders, e.g. fences, cross-points or the way border-crossing traffic is controlled. In the case of EU, an enlargement implies a ‘pooling’ of sovereignty rights of the members (Marks et al. 1997, cf. Sedelmeier/Wallace 1996, Mayes 1998). As a result of NATO-enlargement in 1999, old and new members have already been bound in a new relationship where security issues have to be solved co-operatively (Brauch 1992). According to the theories outlined above, elites are expected to vary in their support for enlargement as a matter of ‘drawing boundaries around social communities’, according to different social identities and perceptions on cultural difference. First of all, transnational identity ties should foster de-bordering

¹⁰ see Prescott (1987: 9) for a review of arguments on this point in German political geography

between Germany and Poland in the EU and NATO-framework. Second, according to the logic of identity formation, perceptions of cultural similarity should strengthen an 'in-group' perception, weaken the cognitive saliency of an 'out-group' categorisation and lead to support for de-bordering via identity formation.

However, if a shift in boundaries of EU and NATO is perceived as a de-bordering of the 'national boundary' (although it is in fact a international one in these processes), national identity should raise the legitimacy of the current demarcation and lead to low support of enlargement. Moreover, as an intervening variable, related to the German identity more 'by content' than as a pure question of 'Us' and 'Them' (Katzenstein 1996), I expect both enlargements to be perceived as rule-based acts of a moral duty and reconciliation, respectively.¹¹

Again, identity can hardly be seen as a sufficient factor in explaining preferences pro and contra integration, as expectations on gains and losses ('interests') have been consensually described as important variables in the European integration process (Schmitter 1971, Jachtenfuchs/Kohler-Koch 1996, Moravcsik 1999). Nevertheless, as gains and losses of enlargement will be unevenly distributed between Germany and Poland, an impact of identity ties on the definition of 'own' gains and losses in this process seems likely. Wendt's model on how identities relates to interests in terms of security systems seems to be a good starting point to address the issue of interest-formation empirically (Wendt 1992: 400, cf. 1999: 224-313).

Summing up the whole argument, two lines of reasoning on 'political boundary making' were pursued, treating boundaries as an issue of social identity on the one hand, and interests and security on the other. Social identity ties between Germans and Poles should undermine the legitimacy of the territorial border altogether, while national identities should foster the 'national' border only to an extent boundaries between the area of NATO or EU and Poland are perceived as 'national boundaries'. According

¹¹ This sounds like a simple 'ad hoc' argument on 'moral reasoning' here, but its theoretical implications are beyond the scope of this paper, for similar perspectives on identity see March/Olson (1989, 1998, cf. Eberwein/Ecker forthcoming).

to the rather distinct phenomena under consideration, alternative hypotheses on interests were formulated, which may account for a further share of variance in support for these boundaries. With respect to the state border, a change in meaning from a territorial marker to a 'junction' between Germany and Poland was asserted. The enlargements should be supported according to expectations on gains and losses, although these might be influenced by identities via processes of interest-formation. The following sections try to falsify these hypotheses using data on German elite attitudes from the 'German-Polish Elite Study' in 1998. I will start with a short discussion of the measures used and some descriptive results of interest here, leading to a first multivariate analysis on identity ties, interests and de-bordering.

2 Analyses

2.1 Measures and descriptive results

For further analysis the preliminary terms and hypotheses has to be translated into empirical valid concepts. With respect to the two *enlargements* at stake, we asked our respondents whether they support the Polish EU and NATO membership. While these questions seems plausible indicators for the evaluation of de-bordering in terms of political integration, the notion of 'legitimacy' of the state border seems still vague. Anderson (1997) distinguishes four dimensions of state borders ('frontiers' in his terminology) as parts of the political process: as 'instruments of state policy', with respect to 'varying degrees of facto control', as 'identity marker', and as a 'term of discourse' with different meanings. While at least the first three dimensions were touched upon by the previous discussion, the border as a term of discourse will be left aside due to restrictions in space and the internal logic of the argument.¹²

¹² "Location" as a possible fifth dimension not mentioned by Anderson was left aside as a too "critical" issue for a mailed survey. In fact there was no hope to get real answers by those who do not support the current location, but a high probability of respondents feeling offended by such a question and a low response rate accordingly.

For the following analysis I choose an item on support for *border controls* as a key reference to how state policy is practiced today at the German-Polish border (see table 1a for the complete wording). In terms of illegal border crossing, this variable seems quite at the core of the security issue. With respect to the military function, it is obviously not (although military relevance at a border might usually go hand in hand with ‘civil’ controls today). Moreover, the ‘identity marker’-argument seems theoretically underdeveloped. As Anderson (1997) refers to territoriality and ‘myths about the unity of the people’ he stresses symbolic actions of social demarcation for which questions on border controls should be valid correlates.

With respect to these three variables of ‘political boundary making’, our German respondents show quite different support of ‘de-bordering’ the Germans and Poles (table 1a). While a clear majority of 85% and 83,6% fosters a strengthening of political ties by enlarging EU and NATO, only 34,2% support a lessening of border controls at the joint state border. While these differences are already a substantial result they should be explained in terms of identities and interests. At least with respect to the argument on the ‘changing role of state borders’ the preliminary hypothesis seems already falsified in the case of the German-Polish border.

Social identities: The concept of ‘identity’ will be operationalized with items on ‘attachment’ to various political categories, especially with reference to the two nations involved. In the case of the German elite, the border is of high significance as an ‘identity marker’. Compared to national and European attachments, the bilateral ‘transnational’ ties with Poles and Poland seem rather weak (table 1b).

Table 1 – descriptives

a	<i>%agree</i>
To what extent do you support Poland's efforts to join the EU? ('EU-enlargement')	85,0
How do you, in person, support Poland's endeavours for entry into NATO? (NATO-enlargement)	83,6
Border controls should be lessened to ease border-crossing traffic ('lessen controls')	34,2
b	
If you consider 'identity' as a feeling of attachment to certain groups or communities: How much would you say, that you feel attached to...?	<i>%agree</i>
	Germans and Germany 67,7
	Europeans and Europe 66,4
	French and France 40,9
	Poles and Poland 21,8
c	
N of strong or rather strong attachment, considering 'Germans and Germany', 'Poles and Poland' and 'French and France'	<i>%</i>
	no attachment 26,1
	one attachment 35,2
	two attachments 21,4
	three attachments 17,4
	total 100,0
d	
Where in your opinion does the eastern frontier of Europe as a common culture run? Please choose one of the possibilities below:	<i>%</i>
	... on the Oder-Neisse line 1,4
	... on the Bug river line 24,1
	... on the Ural Mountains 74,5
	... other location 0,0
	total 100

How weak these ties are, becomes clear when contrasted with the 'French and France' rated higher in the German 'order of attachment' at the aggregate level. In fact the German elite shows a rather 'medieval' patchwork of multiple identities (Bull 1977). As can be shown by counting strong or rather strong attachments with the three national categories given, the 'pure', uncontested national identity is a minority

phenomenon in the contemporary German elite (Table 1c). But a ‘relativization’ of identities (Robertson 1992) seems to work in both directions: While 35,2% of our respondents claim one attachment only, the rest splits to ‘individualists’ with no attachment and ‘bi-’ or even ‘tri-transnationals’ with two or three attachments with a rather equal share. From the 21,9% who feel attached to the Poles and Poland, 20% are ‘bi-’ or ‘tri-transnationals’ according to this terminology, indicating that measuring an attachment with Poles really means a transnational identity structure in terms of German-Polish relations. As a matter of convenience, ‘transnational identity’ will refer to an attachment with Poles and Poland in the rest of the paper.

Cultural difference: Perceptions of cultural difference will be analysed, as they seem basic to both community and society formation, hence with varying extent and scope (Abrams 1992, Hogg 1992, Calhoun 1994). At a rather basic level, we asked our respondents to choose options on the ‘border of European culture in the East’. Indeed, Europe has a long tradition in defining itself as ‘not Russia’ as Gerner points out (1997), treating Eastern and Western Christianity as still marking a cultural ‘macro-region’ in contemporary Europe.¹³ The result leaves no doubts, Poland is seen as part of Europe (table 7a). But, even the Western part of Russia, gets its ‘Europeanness’ certified by at least three-quarter of our respondents. The role of a ‘common other’ (Wendt 1994) Russia might have played for decades in Cold War times (Wendt 1994, Weller 1997), did obviously not lead to a shift of the fundamental cultural map of Europe.

But, apart from the basic question whether Poland is really seen as culturally similar or equal, does this make the concept of ‘cultural difference’ useless for explaining ‘political boundary making’? For the multivariate analysis, perceptions of cultural dissimilarity of Self and Poles will be estimated. Two sorts of information will be used, first the position of respondents on certain dimensions of social-political values, second information of how respondents estimated the value-positions of ‘typical members of

¹³ Despite the rather simplistic wording, the options given seem to fit well to what our elites had in mind on this point, as a low usage of an open field for alternative descriptions suggests.

Table 2 – descriptives

a	
All in all, do you think Poland and Germany are successful in detecting and preventing the following illegal activities at their common border? (Yes, all in all, successful; No, rather unsuccessful; No, completely unsuccessful)	
	<i>%successful</i>
... illegal immigration	27,1
... smuggling of ordinary goods like cars or cigarettes	11,6
... smuggling of weapons and other military material	30,1
... border-crossing criminals which act in the foreign country	18,3
b	
	<i>%agree</i>
Do you think that today, after the conclusion of Cold War, a serious armed conflict is likely to break out in Europe?	34,7
The Germans did a lot of wrong to Poland in the past, thus they should support Poland's endeavours for entry to the EU and NATO as a measure of reconciliation	73,9

the Polish elite'. An index sums up the differences in estimated values of Polish elites and value position of Self.

Security interests at the border: To assess the relevance of the state border as a security institution, five variables will be used: First, the likelihood of war in Europe today, and second four items on the efficiency of controls to prevent illegal activities like (illegal) migration, smuggling and border-crossing criminals. With respect to the notion of a changing role of borders in terms of efficiency our hypotheses is strongly supported. As can be seen in table 2a, only a minority of respondents perceive the existing controls as successful. The German state may indeed be "fighting a losing battle, in attempting to control their borders and access to membership" (Mills 1996: 79) at least in the eyes of the German elite. The four items of efficiency are summed up in an additive index on 'border-efficiency' (see appendix for details and Eberwein/Ecker forthcoming).

Interests of Enlargements: Questions on German and Polish gains were measured in some detail in our questionnaire. Four different indicators on 'Interests' were computed by summarizing expectations of our respondents on gains and losses for Germany

and Poland by a Polish membership in the EU and NATO respectively (see appendix for details and Eberwein/Ecker forthcoming).

Two additional variables account for the varying support for the EU and NATO as such, measured by support for the *German membership*. To introduce these variables seems necessary for at least two reasons: First, German integration into EU and NATO is a logical precondition for making the current enlargements a ‘de-bordering’ between Germany and Poland. Moreover, even elites should be ‘cognitive misers’, using social psychological heuristics for substituting missing informations (Sniderman et al. 1991). In this way, a general attitude on EU-integration can always be expected as a cognitive short-cut in reasoning on more specific attitudes. Finally, the ‘*moral duty*’ argument as perception of a German collective debt toward Poland is introduced as a statement on support for enlargement as a ‘measure of reconciliation’ (see table 2b for wording).

2.2 Explaining de-bordering: three additive models

Multivariate regression analysis (OLS) is used, to test the relevance of identities and interests in terms of statistical significance (Griffith et al. 1993). Three additive models were estimated, assuming interests and identities as additive factors, ignoring indirect effects due to interest-formation by identities at this stage of analysis. With respect to ‘NATO-enlargement’, 67% of variance in support can be explained, whereas the two models on ‘EU-enlargement’ and ‘lessen controls’ are significant but with lower explanatory power in terms of statistical fit (table 3). As a matter of convenience I will start with the interpretation of estimated effects on interests before going to the core issue of identities.

In case of support for a lessening of *border controls* the security function of the border seems of varying relevance in contemporary elite reasoning: Although still a measurable amount of respondents see a serious armed conflict as likely or rather likely to break out in Europe there is no significant increase in support for border controls by perceived likelihood of an armed conflict. Moreover, as the efficiency of border controls with respect to illegal activities like (illegal) migration, smuggling and border-

Table 3 – three additive models

multivariate regression	lessen controls	EU-enlargement	NATO-enlargement
National Identification	-,085**	not sig.	not sig.
Norm of 'moral duty'	-	,137**	,114**
Transnational Identification	,089**	,168**	not sig.
Cultural differences	not sig.	-,126*	not sig.
Border-efficiency	,169**	-	-
likelihood of serious armed conflict	not sig.	-	-
EU-enlargement	,157*	-	-
NATO-enlargement	-,148*	-	-
Polish gains and losses	-	not sig.	,204**
German gains and losses	-	,261**	,161**
Support for German membership	-	,209**	,522**
R ²	,178	,292	,666
F	8,629**	17,282**	83,005**
N	286	305	312

*multivariate regression using OLS, entries are standardized coefficients * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01*

crossing criminals was evaluated badly, a support for the lessening of controls due to a positive feed-back from performance to legitimacy is expected. But when related to support of controls, we get a somehow surprising picture: Despite the fact that the border seems to perform badly, perceptions of a low efficiency are related with low support for open borders.

A plausible (but ex-post) explanation is as follows: If 'efficiency' is understood by our respondents as a composite variable, calculated by taking control capabilities and the quantity of illegal activities as a question of 'threat saliency' into account, these results should be confounded with this saliency-perception. But, if we measure nothing else then saliency asking for efficiency we can conclude at least two things: First of all, with respect to perceptions of illegal activities, we find saliency of external threats related with the support of borders. Moreover, border controls are still of high legitimacy

for German elites as they evaluate state borders as irreplaceable even if they perform badly.

Further, it was expected to find enlargement related to support for a lessening in border controls due to the political logic of EU on the one hand, but not in the case of NATO on the other if a military functions is not observed. With respect to the EU this hypotheses is supported, enlargement and lessening of border controls is positively related. In the case of NATO-enlargement the hypothesis does not hold, as the relationship is negative and slightly significant. Keeping the other variables constant, respondents who tend to support NATO-enlargement does not want a lessening of border controls toward the new member, a somewhat surprising result and even hard to interpret ex-post.

The estimated effects of the two *models on support for enlargements* indicate considerable relationships with interests. Keeping other evaluations constant, German interests are of high relevance in elite reasoning. With respect to support for the German membership, it was argued that support for enlargement should be related to the support for the entire integration process almost by definition as the latter presupposes the other from the German viewpoint. Indeed, both effects on the enlargement-variables are strong and significant. Before interpreted in terms of statistical strength, it is important to realise, that support for the EU and NATO might not at least be a thing of different variances – 98,4% support rather or strongly the German EU-membership, 91,5% the NATO-membership. Still, it was also argued in favour of a more substantial interpretation, that elite might not apply a complex way of reasoning on the enlargements, but just use their overall support as a short-cut on what ‘the whole thing might mean’ to them. In this way, it seems somewhat plausible to find such cognitive ‘makeshifts’ more relevant in the case of NATO then EU, were a ‘pooling’ of sovereignty is at stake.

While German interests seems important in elite reasoning with respect to both enlargements, the Polish are not. Interests might form according to different ‘grounds of comparison’ (Onuf 1989), which is already at the core of the identity-issue. With respect to our data it can be shown, that German elites evaluate a de-bordering between Germany and Poland using expectations of Polish gains and losses in the case of NATO, but not in the case of EU. Using Wendt's notion of ‘co-operative’, ‘individualis-

tic' and 'competitive security system' (see above), these results might indicate a 'co-operative' reasoning in the case of NATO, and a reasoning of the 'individualistic' type with respect to EU-enlargement. Again, the explanation of these differences is straightforward: While the enlargement might mean much in the case of EU it might mean less in the case of NATO, making the Polish gains less relevant in the case of EU.

In terms of identities, the social relevance of political boundaries may derive from the quality of delineating nationally defined communities with a high level of internal identification and a relatively low level of mutual identity ties running between them. But again, our respondents show no consistent line of reasoning in terms of identities. The estimated parameters indicate social identity ties having a different impact on support for de-bordering.

First, support for an enlargement of NATO shows no relationship with transnational identity at all in this additive models. While Polish gains seem to indicate a kind of co-operative reasoning on this issue, NATO enlargement seems not involved with what was called 'international community formation'. With respect to 'national identification', the de-bordering of 'old NATO' towards Poland is not an issue either although the notion of a 'moral duty' of a German vote pro enlargement is somewhat supported by our respondents. With respect to strength of 'national identification' and 'moral duty' the same holds for the EU. But here transnational ties and perceptions of cultural difference are significantly related to support for enlargement, indicating that in this case international community formation fosters de-bordering. Important to keep in mind with respect to the cultural influence observed is that the hypothesis suggested above only postulates an *indirect* relationship via identity-formation on de-bordering. Even though identity has been introduced as an alternative variable, perceptions of cultural similarity/difference turns out to be an important variable in the case of EU-integration, supporting the explanatory power of the cultural argument in integration research.

The estimates on support for the lessening of border controls show a rather different picture: Transnational ties seem to weaken the legitimacy of the border as the positive effect suggests. Yet, the 'identity marker'-argument with its territorial connotation is strongly supported. National community formation seems to be no issue with respect to enlargement but a main obstacle to de-bordering with respect to the German-Polish

state border as expected. Still, national identity might have further impacts on de-bordering by ways of identity-formation. This possibility will be advanced in the next section. While identities are of relevance, culture is not. The border seems not to be evaluated as a 'cultural security institution', at least with respect to Polish influence.

2.3 The identity-issue in reverse: identities and interest-formation

As identities were analysed in some detail in the former section, the notion of identity as basic to interests seems worth of elaboration. Exploring the actual importance of identity in elite reasoning two aspects will be considered: Different modes of reasoning according to Wendt's model of 'co-operative' versus 'individualistic' and 'competitive security systems' (Wendt 1992, cf. 1999) on the one hand, leading to the issue of political consensus on 'national' or 'transnational' interests on the aggregate level on the other.

Wendt distinguishes three types of security systems which differ on the level of identification with other actors in the international system: a 'competitive' one in case of low or even negative identity ties, a 'co-operative' one if mutual ties are strong and positive, and an 'individualistic' one if identity is of no relevance. Relating interests to identity, Wendt ascribes reasoning in terms of 'absolute gains' (Powell 1994) to actors in 'individualistic' systems, whereas 'relative gains' matter in 'competitive' systems. In case of co-operation, gains are attributed to the collectivity of actors, forming a real 'community of interests' as Deutsch might have called it. The latter could be expected for the German-Polish case, as this is exactly what has been emphasised politically in the German-Polish Treaty of 1991. Contrasting these positive expectations on the declaratoric level of interstate relations it was argued, that interests are replacing identities as the main mode of reasoning, due to rising interdependence and processes of 'World Society' formation (cf. Albert/Brock 1995 for a full discussion of this argument). In Wendt's terms, this would imply a process from a world of 'competitive' relations between internally 'co-operative systems' towards an 'individualistic' world, where interests of actors are formulated in terms of absolute gains and national identities are of low

impact on the formulation of interests. The basic research question to be addressed here is: "To what extent does the 'self' incorporate relevant aspects of the 'other' in its calculations of gains and losses?" (Katzenstein 1996: 15).

As was already shown in previous section, Polish gains have a significant positive impact on support for NATO-enlargement, indicating some 'co-operative' reasoning of the German elite. On the other hand, in the case of the EU-enlargement the 'individualistic' reasoning seems to hold. But as Wendt's model treats interests as *depending* on identity, the former equations are in fact not adequate to validate the notion of 'identity are prior to interests'. To test this dependency, different models for high and low identified respondents are estimated. Specified in this way, interests depend on identities as formulated in the model (table 4). While the effects of German gains remain stable, the effects of Polish gains vary, especially in the case of NATO: Here a strong national identity reduces the relevance of Polish gains in elite reasoning significantly. Transnational identity on the other hand correlates with the effect of Polish gains in such a way that these gains are of less relevance if identity ties are weak. With respect to overall support for a German membership we find effects on support for a Polish membership decreasing if transnational ties are strong. As this could be further attributed to a the notion of 'co-operative' reasoning relative to the Polish membership, the notion of 'identities as prior to interests' is strongly supported by our data.

As it could be shown, social identities are important variables in interest-formation. The follow up question arises, how might this influence political processes? Due to the given restrictions in space and theoretical coherence, I suggest a rather simple model of 'national interest formation', defining 'national interests' as those political positions, where national (elite) communities show a high consensus (cf. Organski 1968). In fact the concept of 'national interests' was called blurred and inadequate, as "individual positions on specific issues usually reflect values that are the consequences of loyalties to something other than 'the state'" (Ferguson/Mansbach 1991: 374). Nevertheless, while elites are influential by definition (see above) they are social beings themselves, involved in complex processes of political discourse and social learning (cf. Waever 1994, Weldes 1996). In this way it can be argued, that group loyalties are important in fostering social conformity and consensus as "an intrinsic property of the social group"

Table 4 – models on identities interacting with interests

dependent: EU-enlargement				
	Subgroups by national ID		Subgroups by transnational ID	
	low/moderate (N = 137)	high (N = 287)	low/moderate (N = 333)	high (N = 93)
Polish gains	,153 (n.s.)	,137 (n.s.)	,064 (n.s.)	,328**
German gains	,533**	,578**	,555**	,540**
Support for German membership	,503**	,561**	,581**	-,025 (n.s.)
constant	-,064	-,146	-,110	,359
R ²	,243	,216	,221	,280
F	12,74**	24,67**	28,99**	10,61**

dependent: NATO-enlargement				
	Subgroups by national ID		Subgroups by transnational ID	
	low/moderate (N = 137)	high (N = 287)	low/moderate (N = 333)	high (N = 93)
Polish gains	<u>,544**</u>	<u>,334**</u>	,306**	,640**
German gains	,410**	,370**	,422**	,327*
Support for German membership	,578**	,463**	,642**	,387**
constant	-,329	-,049	-,238	-,169
R ²	,689	,311	,600	,524
F	89,18**	40,58**	154,24**	31,20**

*multivariate regression, using OLS, entries are unstandardized coefficients to make results comparable across sub-samples (cf. Friedrich 1982), all variables are recoded to range from 0 to 1; significant group differences in estimated coefficients are underlined (using interaction terms with uncategorized identity-variables). 5-point scales on 'identification' ranging from 'feel not at all' to 'feel very much belongingness' were recorded as follows: the lower three categories into 'low/moderate', the highest two categories into 'high'. *p < 0.05 **p < 0.01*

(Hogg/Abrams 1988: 173). For International Relations theory, Bloom (1990) argued in a similar vein that "individuals who share the same identification will tend to act in concert in order to protect or enhance their shared identity" (Bloom 1990: 53). In fact it is this basic assumption, that leads him to argue that, "states compete with each other for prestige, not because it is inherent in the nature of the international system to do so, but because it is an outcome of the domestic internal political competition to control and appropriate the national identity dynamic" (Bloom 1990: 84).

To shed light on how consensus might be related to national identification, standard deviations by different levels of national and transnational identification and Levene

Table 5 – ‘identity dynamics’ and elite consensus (standard deviations)

	Transnational ID low/mod.			Transnational ID high		
	national ID low/mod.	national ID high	Levene***	national ID low/mod.	national ID high	Levene***
Germ. EU-memb.	,16	,07	53,83**	(,20)	,04	64,33**
Germ. NATO-memb.	,31	,09	113,19**	(,35)	,09	42,31**
EU-enlargement	,25	,21	3,62	(,12)	,14	,42
NATO-enlargement	,34	,19	63,38**	(,30)	,22	2,82
lessen controls	,32	,30	,24	(,25)	,34	3,68
N	126-128	197-202		6-8	79-84	

	national ID low/mod.			national ID high		
	trans. ID low/mod.	trans. ID high	Levene***	trans. ID low/mod.	trans. ID high	Levene***
Germ. EU-memb.	,16	(,20)	,953	,07	,04	12,17**
Germ. NATO-memb.	,31	(,35)	,178	,09	,09	2,26
EU-enlargement	,25	(,12)	4,750*	,21	,14	20,63**
NATO-enlargement	,34	(,30)	,323	,19	,22	,29
lessen controls	,32	(,25)	3,008	,30	,34	2,33
	126-128	6-8		197-202	79-84	

entries are standard deviations by levels of national and transnational identification, 5-point scales on ‘identification’ ranging from ‘feel not at all’ to ‘feel very much belongingness’ were recorded as follows: the lower three categories into ‘low/moderate’, the highest two categories into ‘high’.

* $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ ***Levene statistic testing differences in variance by groups of respondents

statistics were calculated, testing differences in variance by groups of respondents. To account for opposing impacts at the individual level, four groups of respondents per variable are compared, keeping one of the identity variables almost constant.

What we find is: ‘loyalties matter’. In most cases respondents with strong national identification show a significantly higher consensus (measured as a smaller standard deviation, see table 5), than those with a weak identification. Keeping transnational identity ties constant, consensus on the German membership in EU and NATO relates positively to national identity, and – in case of low transnational identity – to support for NATO-enlargement. Due to weak ties at the aggregate level, the impact of transnational identity on consensus is smaller, but still present: Keeping national identity constant, consensus on EU enlargement relates positively to transnational identity, and – in case of high national identification – to support for the German EU-membership.

Two things seem worth mentioning. First of all, while national identity fosters consensus on enlarging NATO it does not with respect to enlarging EU. Transnational identity, however, fosters consensus on EU-enlargement, but not with respect to NATO-enlargement. While the first seems difficult to explain from the previous results, the varying relevance for interests formation in the case of transnational ties and NATO has already been found at the individual level. Further, consensus on a lessening of border controls is neither related to national nor transnational identity. But as was shown in the previous analysis, this might be due to the fact that national and transnational ties operate in opposing directions here. As long as national identities do not gain relevance, a consensus in case of a further community formation seems likely in the longer run.

3 Conclusion

According to the now widely used notion of 'identity' as an important variable in international relations, it was argued that processes of 'political boundary making' have something in common: A common social-psychology of drawing boundaries around communities. German elites were assumed to reason on border-controls and enlargements of EU and NATO according to their social identity as a fundamental perception of 'Us' and 'Them'. However, with respect to these changes of the German-Polish boundary in terms of political significance, such a common logic can hardly be detected in elite's attitudes. As critics of a methodologically far too 'egocentric' constructivism already expected (cf. Moravcsik 1999): controlling for alternative explanations, social identities seem to vary substantially in impact: while of high relevance in the case of border controls, the two enlargements are not directly related to national identity. Transnational ties seem to weaken the support for boundaries in the case of the EU-enlargement and the state border, while this does not hold in the case of NATO. On the other hand, by shaping interests, transnational identities (in the case of NATO national, too) are influential for these two processes of interest formation.

In fact, as states (Germany), supranational entities (EU) and military organizations (NATO) imply different forms of political organisation, the underlying notion of reciprocal action in terms of the 'community' type varies in relevance. In the case of the state border, the function 'identity marker'-argument was strongly supported by our data, validating the common notion of national identities as territorial rather by (social-psychological) definition (Taylor 1989). With respect to specific interests: may borders vanish as 'hard shells' in terms of war and peace, the German-Polish state border is still seen as a necessary means against crime, although with an 'odour of a lost battle' in terms of efficiency (Mills 1996). These results are bad for those at the German-Polish border who expected the German elite to reason in terms of the 'junction'-metaphor.

But with respect to both enlargements, the German elite seems to vote for an abandoning of political significance at the German-Polish border, hence – keeping weak identity ties with Poles and Poland in mind – still more in terms of a European 'society' where mutual interests can be fostered by a functional regime like EU and NATO than a European 'community' in the sociological meaning. But, as social identities show no 'zero-sum'-relationship, pure international 'society' – where identities are of no relevance in interest-formation – seems unlikely in the German-Polish case. This will not be an issue as long as gains will be distributed on either side, for the case of severe losses, the functional ties of 'German-Polish society' will not guarantee support for 'redistributive' measures that are violating perceptions of German interests. Such support can only be expected from a 'international community', where gains and losses for Germans and Poles will ascribed to a common 'Us', according to the point made here. With respect to the German-Polish relationship the good news is: the German-Polish 'community of values and interests' seems at least an *emerging* phenomenon at the elite level.

4 Appendix

Index¹⁴ on cultural difference

Difference-indexes were calculated by taking the absolute differences between values of original value-indexes (see below) of the value stands of respondents and their estimations of value stand of a 'typical member of the Polish elite'.

Value-indexes were constructed by adding items and recoded to a range from 0 to 1:

Left-Right Materialism combining "Social inequalities should be alleviated even at the cost of those who are now better off"; "The state should always take responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for"; "the state should keep control over some strategic areas, such as power industry, transport, telecommunication".

Authoritarianism combining "it is most important that children learn obedience and good manners"; "At work people should follow instructions of their superiors even when they does not fully agree with them"; Environmentalism measured by "For an intact environment, lower economical prosperity should be accepted".

Secularism/Laizism measured by "As religion is a private thing, the Church should not interfere with politics".

Socialism measured by "The idea of socialism was good, but it was distorted by the leaders"; Universal Suffrage measured by "Only those who are fully informed on the issue should be able to vote".

Minority Rights measured by "The rights of minorities are so important that the majority should be limited in what it can do".

Subsidiarity measured by "National authorities should not interfere in political issues that can be handled also by local or regional authorities alone".

Religion measured by "To what extent religion is important to you? would you describe yourself as" [5-point scale from "not at all religious" to "very religious"].

Postmaterialism combining answers according to the 4-item scale of Inglehart: "If you consider the following four alternatives: Which should be the two main political goals in Germany in the next years?" ["Maintaining order in the nation"; "Giving people more say in important government decisions"; "Fighting rising prices"; "Protecting freedom

¹⁴All indexes were recoded to range from a 0 to 1.

of speech"; Tolerance measured by "Do you think homosexuals should be allowed to work as teachers?".

Border-efficiency Index

Index was constructed adding values of "Do you think Poland and Germany are successful in detecting and preventing the following illegal activities at their common border? ... illegal immigration"; "... smuggling of ordinary goods like cars or cigarettes"; "... smuggling of weapons and other military material"; "... border-crossing criminals which act in the foreign country" [Yes, all in all, successful; No, rather unsuccessful; No, totally unsuccessful].

Gain and losses-indexes

"Polish gains minus losses"-index was constructed:

In case of *"EU-enlargement"* by adding values of "By joining EU, Poland will be fully recognized as part of Europe"; "... receive strong financial support by EU-fonds"; "... bring their Polish culture into the EU"; "... gain security from Russian interference"; "... experience a prompt improvement of its living standard"; subtracting value of "The costs of enlargement are too high for new members"

In the case of *"NATO-enlargement"* by adding values of "By joining NATO, Poland will stabilize its democracy and market economy"; "... be fully recognized as part of modern Europe"; "... gain security from Russian interference"; subtracting values of "The costs of enlargement for new members are too high";

"German gains minus losses"-index was constructed:

In the case of *"EU-enlargement"* by adding values of "By a Polish EU-membership, Germans would gain new markets"; "... security at their Eastern border"; "... political influence in Eastern Europe"; subtracting "The opening of the border between Germany and Poland will aggravate the unemployment issue in Germany" and "The costs of enlargement are too high for the present members"

In the case of *"NATO-enlargement"* by adding values of "By Poland's integration into NATO, Germany would gain security at their eastern border"; "... political influence in Eastern Europe"; subtracting values of "The costs of enlargement for present members are too high"

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