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Working Paper

Towards a transnational civil society: Actors and concepts in Europe from the late eighteenth to the twentieth century

WZB Discussion Paper, No. SP IV 2010-401

Provided in Cooperation with:

WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Suggested Citation: Bauerkämper, Arnd; Gumb, Christoph (2010) : Towards a transnational civil society: Actors and concepts in Europe from the late eighteenth to the twentieth century, WZB Discussion Paper, No. SP IV 2010-401, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Berlin

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Arnd Bauerkämper und Christoph Gumb

**Towards a Transnational Civil
Society :**

Actors and Concepts in Europe from the
Late Eighteenth to the Twentieth Century

Discussion Paper Nr. SP IV 2010-401

ISSN 1860-4315

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Zitierweise:

Bauerkämper, Arnd; Gumb, Christoph, 2010

Towards a Transnational Civil Society : Actors in Europe and Concepts from the Late Eighteenth to the Twentieth Century

Discussion Paper SP IV 2010-401

Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)

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Towards a Transnational Civil Society:
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Century

Abstract

Since late eighteenth-century Enlightenment, the concept of civil society has increasingly assumed a transnational dimension that has given rise to political debates and attracted scholarly interest. This paper provides a research report and a historical overview of the emergence and transformation of civil society organizations that have transcended national borders and cultural boundaries, especially International Non-Governmental Organizations. Based on deliberations about the definition and conceptualization of 'transnational civil society', the investigation concentrates on the abolitionists, the workers' organizations as well as on peace and on women's movements. The authors suggest that further historical studies of transnational civil society should relate its groups and activists to specific contexts and conditions. They also argue that further research should pay particular attention to the actors of transnational civil society, their performance and representations. Overall, static conceptions of transnational civil society have ignored its flexibility and changeability over the course of the last two centuries.

Auf dem Weg zu einer transnationalen Zivilgesellschaft:
Akteure und Konzepte in Europa seit dem späten 18. bis zum 20. Jahrhundert

Zusammenfassung

Seit der Aufklärung im späten 18. Jahrhundert hat der Begriff Zivilgesellschaft eine zunehmend transnationale Dimension erreicht, die insbesondere politische Diskussionen und wissenschaftliches Interesse auslöste. Das vorliegende Diskussionspapier lässt sich als Forschungsbericht verstehen, der einen historischen Überblick über Auftreten und Transformation zivilgesellschaftlicher Organisationen gibt, die insbesondere national und kulturell grenzüberschreitend institutionalisiert sind, wie beispielsweise internationale Nichtregierungsorganisationen. Auf der Grundlage einer sorgfältigen Analyse von Definition und Konzeption 'transnationaler Zivilgesellschaft', konzentriert sich die Untersuchung vor allem auf die Gegner der Todesstrafe, aber auch Gewerkschaften sowie Friedens- und Frauenbewegungen. Beide Autoren plädieren für eine Auseinandersetzung mit der Thematik

aus historischer Perspektive, um insbesondere bestimmte Gruppen und Aktivisten in direkten Bezug zu ihrem historischen Kontext und Vorbedingungen zu stellen. Darüber hinaus heben sie hervor, dass daran anknüpfende Studien gerade den Akteuren, ihrem Auftreten und ihrer Präsentation gewidmet werden sollen. Im Gesamtzusammenhang lässt sich festhalten, dass die bisher eher statisch geprägten Untersuchungen zum Forschungsschwerpunkt ‚transnationale Zivilgesellschaft‘ insbesondere die Flexibilität und Unbeständigkeit derselbigen in den letzten beiden Jahrhunderten nicht berücksichtigten.

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Towards a Transnational Civil Society: Actors and Concepts in Europe from the Late Eighteenth to the Twentieth Century

1. Introduction*

CIVIL SOCIETY HAS RE-ENTERED THE STAGE of academia as an object of historical analysis. In recent debates on ‘globalization’ as well as in discussions about the more specific topics of ‘global governance’ and ‘global civil society’ the historical perspective has increasingly received attention. In particular, it has been emphasized that elements of civil society which transcend both, geographical and social boundaries are not entirely new. John KEANE, for example, has suggested that networks between the local communities of the expanding medieval towns in Europe contained seeds of an interconnected civil society free from political rule by the territorial authorities.¹ More commonly, the emergence of a transnational civil society has been traced to the literary circles and Masonic Lodges of the European Enlightenment.² These groups were encouraged by promises of universal citizenship, and the shared conception of basic human law led their networking to establishing links between them. Several decades later, the goals of the offspring of these philanthropic societies were narrower and focused on particular issues. In order to mobilize support for their specific concerns they agreed on cross-border cooperation. These processes of concentration and cooperation, it is argued, ultimately led to the emergence of International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs). The *British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society*, which was founded in 1839 and deeply rooted in the European Enlightenment and the culture of Quakerism, is widely seen as the first organization of this type. According to the established narrative, this event triggered the development towards a global civil society. As awareness for economic and social problems rose, international solidarity and the formation of cross-border networks of civil society gained momentum. Simultaneously, the formation of modern nation-states and the emer-

* Christoph Gumb is grateful to Benedikt Vogeler, Laura Elias, Dmitri Razumov, Leonid Sokolov, Alina Enzensberg, Sandra Grether und Mareike Mischke for their support in preparing this paper. Arnd Bauerkämper would like to thank Devlin Scofield for language corrections. Both authors are indebted to Alice Marie Hailperin and Henriette Müller for their invaluable contributions to editorial work.

¹ John Keane, “A New Cosmology”, Helmut Anheier / M. Gladius / M. Caldor (eds.), *Global Civil Society* 2001 (Oxford 2002), 23-47, 27f.

² For an excellent bibliography, see S.-L. Hoffmann, *Geselligkeit und Demokratie: Vereine und zivile Gesellschaft im transnationalen Vergleich, 1750-1914* (Göttingen 2003).

gence of territorially-bound political governments also furthered activities by actors of civil society across political borders.

Thus, the number of registered NGOs increased from 32 in 1874 to as many as 1,083 in 1914.³ It was only after the Second World War, however, when the number of INGOs under the umbrella of the *Union of International Organizations* (established in 1909) exploded. In the period from 1960 to 1988 this growth amounted to 230 percent. And the number of INGOs grew even more in the 1990s. As many as one quarter of the 13,000 INGOs registered in 2000 had been founded in the preceding decade. This development went hand in hand with the emergence of new fields of INGO activity. Whereas demands for female suffrage and temperance, for instance, are – at least in Europe – no longer viable issues, the concern for human and citizens’ rights, disarmament, and the problems of environmental damage, the enduring poverty of the “Third World”, and migration have increasingly received political attention. These issues triggered the formation of new INGOs from the 1950s onwards. Moreover, organizational structures as well as strategies of social and political mobilization have changed considerably in the last few decades. Instead of formal and hierarchically structured institutions, loosely organized cross-border social alliances and networks have allowed a flexible adaptation to rapidly changing needs. New forms of activities have emerged. Apart from meetings, demonstrations, resolutions and appeals, INGOs have increasingly been engaged in political lobbying and in monitoring official policies. As political and academic interest in current issues of transnational civil society has markedly grown since the 1980s, its actors – individual and collective – have also received increased attention.⁴

* * *

This paper is a *research report* and a *historical overview*. On the one hand, it deals with problems and interpretations of recent research on transnational civil society in Europe. In particular, it highlights the impact of different definitions and approaches to the history of civil society on historians’ agendas. Furthermore, we will deal with some major methodological shortcomings.

³ J. Keane, *Global Civil Society?* (Cambridge 2003), 44-50; Anheier / Gladus / Kaldor, “Introducing Civil Society”, 4.

⁴ For a concise overview, see M. Herren, *Internationale Organisationen seit 1865. Eine Globalgeschichte der internationalen Ordnung* (Darmstadt 2009).

Although an impressive array of studies on the topic of transnational civil society has been published, more attention must be paid to the normative foundations of civil society. The values and norms as well as the practices of cross-border civil society in Europe, however, have not been stable since the eighteenth century, but have been influenced by different historical contexts and are therefore contingent. In short, the meanings of ‘civil society’, both as a term and concept, have considerably changed in the course of the last 250 years. Apart from cultural contexts, different uses have led to divergent definitions based on specific categories.⁵

On the other hand, without any claims of being exhaustive, this contribution aims at providing an overview of the development and transformation of cross-border civil societies in Europe. A social history of the gradual emergence of self-organization beyond the borders of territorial nation-states integrates the perspectives of specific groups and actors. Thus, one can detect sharp differences in the usage of the term ‘civil society’ by late-eighteenth century *hommes de lettres* and members of contemporary anti-globalization movements like *Attac* or, for example, diplomats in international organizations. However, they have been tied together by the overriding goal of establishing a civil society beyond the (nation-) state. Further historical investigations of cross-border civil society must, therefore, reconstruct the meanings of ‘civil society’, not at least in order to grasp its features and explain its impact.

In describing *historical settings* of transnational civil society in Europe, attention must also be paid to factors such as the changing geographical scope of social action, the actors’ motives for their engagement and their focus on specific issues. In a similar vein, representations of civil society have always been shaped by the differing backgrounds of its observers. According to an approach that focuses on representations of civil society, it can be conceived as a prism through which one can describe how actors have ‘come to terms’ with a world that was rapidly becoming global. This insight hints at another problem which has been underestimated so far: civil society’s inclusive and exclusive functions. Historical settings of civil society have been based on institutional frameworks, which in turn have been shaped according to the individual actors’ normative and moral preferences. Unfortunately, we know little about the views of civil society on the part of actors who were excluded from it. By taking its restrictions into account

⁵ This paper was a contribution to the conference “Resources and Dynamics of European Civil Society. Strategies, Actors and Organizations”, which was held in the Hungarian Academy of Science in Budapest from 26 to 28 February 2004. The conference was organized by the Network of Excellence “Towards a European Civil Society” that the European Commission funded from 2002 to 2005. The text has been updated and extended for the purpose of publication as a WZB Discussion Paper.

historians and social scientists can ultimately help to assess the values and practices of civil society and the specific impact which cross-border activities have had in Europe in the last 250 years.

As with every institution, civil society's moral foundations and cores had to be visible and firmly entrenched in the minds of the actors in order to be credible, viable, and thus become historically relevant.⁶ Future research must, therefore, trace how civil society has been visualized and perceived.

Presenting the ever-increasing literature on transnational civil society, this research report deals with the following questions:

- To what extent and how have changes in international politics (e.g. the emergence of nation-states, the rise of the mass media and extension of public spheres, the increase in the cross-border communication, and policies) led to the extension of values, structures, and practices of civil society across borders?
- What meanings has transnational civil society assumed in Europe? How has it been perceived since the eighteenth century?
- What have been the conceptual and structural elements of civil society?

Before these questions are tackled in detail, different conceptual schemes ranging from theories of international relations to literary studies will be spelt out. A detailed investigation into individual and collective actors in the *third chapter* will be followed by a chronological analysis of major actors of cross-border civil society. Their impact will be assessed on the basis of theoretical considerations spelt out in the *fourth chapter*. The conclusion will draw the attention to some future possibilities for research on the actors of transnational civil society in Europe.

⁶ André Brodocz, "Behaupten und Bestreiten. Genese, Verstetigung und Verlust von Macht in institutionellen Ordnungen", André Brodocz et al. (eds.), *Institutionelle Macht. Genese — Verstetigung — Verlust* (Cologne / Weimar / Vienna 2005), 13-36; Karl-Siegbert Rehberg, "Institutionen als symbolische Ordnungen. Leitfragen und Grundkategorien zur Theorie und Analyse institutioneller Mechanismen", Gerhard Göhler (ed.), *Die Eigenart der Institutionen. Zum Profil politischer Institutionentheorie* (Baden-Baden 1994), 47-84. These processes can be extremely well demonstrated in highly heterogeneous cultural contexts such as the Russian Empire. See Jörg Baberowski / David Feest / Christoph Gumb (eds.), *Imperiale Herrschaft in der Provinz. Repräsentation und politische Herrschaft im späten Zarenreich* (Frankfurt / New York 2008).

Although the recent debate has focused on INGOs, preceding associations had started to establish cross-border relations as early as the late eighteenth century. As absolutist rule gradually eroded and cores of a (largely literary but still restricted) public sphere emerged in Europe, agents of civil society became visible. They also became objects of supervision as well as scholarly interest.⁷ Masonic Lodges, in particular, engaged in a regular exchange beyond the confines of the territorial states in order to pursue their common goals. Although they were elitist and excluded the majority of the populace, such as women and the underprivileged from membership, lodges have been an important platform of social self-organization from the eighteenth century onwards. They have served as a model for similar associations which have become important pillars of civil society in the last two centuries. Therefore, associations and INGOs will be dealt with separately in this article. This two-pronged approach will also shed light on the transformation of the actors of cross-border civil society in Europe over the course of the last 250 years.

The discussion of published literature concentrates on the nineteenth century but also includes an overview of developmental trends in the twentieth century. Similarly, this paper does not aim to provide an all-encompassing overview of transnational actors of civil society. In fact, it is restricted to the groups and movements which have assumed a path-breaking role in their cross-border cooperation. In particular, the abolitionist movement as well as workers' organizations and groups which campaigned for the furtherance of peace and women's rights will be analyzed in more detail.

2. Conceptual Framework

Transnational civil society is usually conceived as encompassing a wide range of diverse non-state actors ranging from Christopher Columbus, the Communist International, to the Catholic Church. However, this view encapsulates a number of methodological problems. *First*, these actors differ in norms and aims. Thus, it seems appropriate to include the concept of "international norms" into research on this topic as an influential study has argued with regard to

⁷ S.M. Buechler, *Social Movements in Advanced Capitalism. The political economy and cultural construction of social activism* (New York 2000).

the field of International Relations.⁸ *Second*, transnational actors of civil society are embedded in different organizational structures. ECOSOC, the United Nations' Economical and Social Council, is doubtlessly an important pillar of the legislative architecture of transnational civil society. For instance, the ECOSOC is dissimilar to Amnesty International. In relation to influential INGOs of the nineteenth century, even more organizational differences emerge.

We will, therefore, start with some considerations about the concept of *transnationalism* and 'civil society.' As has already been argued, a distinction can be drawn between 'civil society' as a category of scientific analysis and as a historically contingent semantic structure. As will be shown in the following *first section*, "transnationalism" also includes both a normative and analytical dimension.

The *second section* of this chapter focuses on *actors* of transnational civil society. It argues that the changing nature of International Relations after the Second World War has profoundly altered understandings of political agency. Political scientist Robert O. KEOHANE, for example, has demanded to "seek to invigorate transnational society in the form of networks of individuals *and* nongovernmental organizations."⁹ Consequently, collective actors like "epistemic communities"¹⁰ and "advocacy networks"¹¹ have gained in importance. Following Manuel CASTELLS' influential definition of networks as "open structures, able to expand without limits, integrating new codes as long as they are able to communicate with the network, namely as long as they share the same communication codes (for example, values or performance goals),"¹² the rise of a network-based transnational civil society is closely intertwined with the transformation of the means of communication and exchange.

Several points follow from this consideration for our conceptual framework: *First*, as Castells has also emphasized, the "communication codes" and the "values or performance goals"

⁸ S. Khagram, et al., "From Santiago to Seattle: Transnational Advocacy Groups Restructuring World Politics", S. Khagram, et al. (eds.), *Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms* (Minneapolis / London 2002), 3-23; J. van Horn Melton, *The Rise of the Public in Enlightenment Europe* (Cambridge 2001).

⁹ R.O. Keohane, "International Institutions: can interdependence work?", idem (ed.), *Power and Governance in a Globalized World* (London 1998), 27-38, 36 [italics added].

¹⁰ Peter Haas has defined an "epistemic community" as "a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area". Cf. P. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination", *International Organization* 46 (1992), 1-36, 3. Also see Herren, *Internationale Organisationen*, p. 10.

¹¹ Keck / Sikkink (ed.), *Activists Beyond Borders*.

¹² M. Castells, *The Rise of Network Society* (Malden 1999), 470. For a concise definition, also see Herren, *Internationale Organisationen*, p. 9.

have to be analyzed. *Secondly*, as Fred HALLIDAY has reminded us, the critical re-examination of non-state actors has to consider, above all, the multiple normative origins and definitions of ‘civil society.’¹³ And finally, as has already been mentioned, investigations into transnational actors of civil society also have to consider the specificity of historical contexts, the actors’ contingent normative orientations, influential ideas and ideologies, their goals, visions and utopias, as they have drastically changed over time. It seems appropriate and useful to prefer methodological approaches that emphasize the impact of actors’ norms and values on the development of civil societies.¹⁴

2.1 ‘Civil Society’

Historians conceptualize civil society in general by emphasizing three dimensions. *First*, ‘civil society’ is seen as a *project* and a *vision*, which encompasses a strong normative dimension.¹⁵ According to this perspective, ‘civil society’ remains a goal to be achieved. As such, the concept can always be used as a yardstick, as it contains an inbuilt critical potential. *Second*, ‘civil society’ designates *specific pockets of society*, a dynamic ensemble of non-governmental institutions that tends to be non-violent, self-organizing, self-reflexive and cultivates values like civility, tolerance and mutual respect. They are permanently in tension with governmental institutions that both restrict and enable their activities. Thus, ‘civil society’ has been conceived as a social sphere and as a specific type of social action characterized by self-organization, plurality of institutions, a culture of civility, and the freedom to associate. *Third*, ‘civil society’ is seen as a *process*. It is by no means a static and geographically bound concept, but has expanded

¹³ F. Halliday, “The Romance of Non-State Actors”, D. Josselin / W. Wallace (ed.), *Non-state Actors in World Politics* (Basingstoke 2001), 21-37.

¹⁴ For a seminal elaboration of this position in International Relations Theory, see A. Wendt, “Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics”, *International Organization* 46 (1992), 391-426. Also see M. Finnemore, *National Interests in International Security* (Ithaca 1996); M. Finnemore / K. Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”, P.J. Katzenstein, et al. (ed.), *Explorations and Contestation in the Study of World Politics* (Cambridge 1999); J. Goldstein / R.O. Keohane, “Ideas and Foreign Policy: an Analytical Framework”, J. Goldstein / R.O. Keohane (eds.), *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change* (Ithaca 1993); F.V. Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs* (Cambridge 1989); D. Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations* (Princeton 2001); T. Risse et al. (eds.), *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change* (Cambridge 1999); A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge 1999).

¹⁵ This is even more obvious in recent attempts at defining a so-called “progressive transnational civil society.” See, for example Srilatah Batliwala, “Why Transnational Civil Society Matters”, idem (eds.), *Transnational Civil Society. An Introduction* (Bloomfield, CT 2006), 1-15, esp. 3.

in the course of its development. Moreover, its meaning has undergone profound change. Civil society rose in the European Enlightenment, before the concept markedly declined in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Yet the global expansion of modern industrial and financial capitalism as well as the demise and collapse of the communist dictatorships in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have revived the debate surrounding it.

Altogether, ‘civil society’ encompasses two analytical dimensions. It is a sphere separate from the family, the state, and the economy and it designates a type of social action based on specific values: respect for individual independence, allowance for and encouragement of collective self-representation, recognition of plurality, difference and conflict, strife for goals beyond vested interests, and individual gain. These *modes of action* are assumed to be related to the *sphere* of civil society.

Yet these definitional approaches raise some problems. To begin with, it is obvious and unavoidable that normative and analytical dimensions overlap in definitions of ‘civil society’. *Second*, the relationship between civil society and the state needs further clarification. For instance, the impact of certain types of government and governance on the evolution and transformation of civil societies has to be studied systematically. *Third*, definitions of ‘civil society’ as a space or sphere on the one hand, and a mode of social action on the other, largely co-exist and may enrich or even influence one another. *Fourth*, recent investigations have demonstrated that civil society needs the resources of the family and the protection of the state. On the other hand, scholars have convincingly argued that civil society should be analytically separated from these spheres.¹⁶ The distinction between civil society and the economy or the market has been even more contested. On the one hand, market exchange and interaction in civil societies (conceived as cores or pockets of entire societies) are based on similar values, particularly civility. On the other hand, the quest for individual gain and the pursuit of vested interests are constitutive of economic exchange. The ambivalent status and potential of social inequality vis-à-vis civil society exemplifies the ambivalent relationship between the economy and civil society (as certain types of social action, respectively). Markets create inequality and make actors pursue individual gains instead of common interests. *Fifth*, ‘civil society’ cannot be restricted to some specific space, as it has shown a considerable mobility and flexibility. The

¹⁶ K. Hagemann et al. (eds.), *Civil Society and Gender Justice. Historical and Comparative Perspectives* (New York 2008); G.-F. Budde, “Das Öffentliche des Privaten. Die Familie als zivilgesellschaftliche Kerninstitution”, Arnd Bauerkämper (ed.), *Die Praxis der Zivilgesellschaft. Akteure, Handeln und Strukturen im internationalen Vergleich* (Frankfurt am Main 2003), 57-75.

concept did not originate in the Enlightenment, although it was obviously taken up by its proponents. On the contrary, the idea of civil society is deeply rooted in antiquity, particularly in Aristotelian philosophy. More recently, the concept of ‘civil society’ has been taken up in the debates about the ‘public sphere’ as well as by the Marxists of the 1960s. This expansion, which has demonstrated the ‘travelling potential’ of civil society, has been due to specific demands and needs. In short, the emergence and transformation of ‘civil society’ in different contexts have been influenced by the available resources which its structures require. Not least, the evolution of civil society and the debate about it has been shaped for certain purposes. For instance, the concept has been used as glue in order to establish political and social coalitions. Adaptations of the concept have been flexible, even fluid. These processes of expansion, transformation and adaptation require far more detailed research and necessitate comprehensive studies of the history of civil society. It has also become clear that it is extremely difficult to follow the paths that the concept of ‘civil society’ has taken, as they have been continuously interwoven and consequently have transcended geographical, cultural and national barriers, and borders. Undoubtedly, ‘civil society’ emerged in Europe. Yet some of its norms, values and structures have taken root in non-European spaces. Thus, scholars can at least trace and investigate functional equivalents of civil society. Moreover, the social and political groups which have taken up the concept of civil society have interacted in flexible spaces created by adaptations of civil society as an idea, concept, and vision. This insight justifies the assumption that Europeans have created a specific, identifiable space for a transnational civil society. However, it has not been identical to the geographical or political boundaries of Europe.

As we argue in this paper, the conception of civil society as a mode of action is analytically more convincing than its definition as a specific social sphere. This *functional* approach highlights modes of action amenable to and supportive of civil society. It enables researchers to take changing roles, even of individual actors, into account. Moreover, this conceptualization promises a clear identification of the boundaries and normative foundations of civil society. Thus, families are part of civil society if and when they fulfill specific functions supportive of the values and structures of civil society, as well as modes of actions amenable to the furtherance of civility. Not least, this perspective opens up new research on functional equivalents of civil society, especially in non-European regions.

2.2 “World Civil Society”

The terms “world civil society,” “international society,” “global civil society,” and “transnational civil society” all refer to cross-national relations established by actors following the ideal of civil society. Advocates of the designations “world” and “international” like Ralf DAHRENDORF adhere to Neo-Kantian ideals of a universal civil society.¹⁷ These concepts, however, are largely state-centered and stress the capacity for international government. As critics have pointed out, the strong emphasis on “governmentality” does not grasp the non-governmental sphere extending beyond the confines of the nation-states.¹⁸

Global civil society, on the other hand, refers to the “sphere of ideas, values, institutions, organizations, networks, and individuals located *between* the family, the state, and the market and operating *beyond* the confines of national societies, polities, and economies.”¹⁹ This exclusion of the economy from “global civil society”, however, has not remained uncontested. John KEANE, in particular, has proposed that economic interaction within markets has generated crucial capacities and abilities needed for a civil society. According to his definition, *global civil society* refers to the “contemporary thickening and stretching of networks of socio-economic institutions across borders to all four corners of the earth, such as the peaceful or ‘civil’ effects of these non-governmental networks are felt everywhere, here and there, far and wide, to and from local areas, through wider regions to the planetary level itself.”²⁰

But other drawbacks of the concept of *global civil society* are equally obvious. *First* and most important, no uniform concept of civil society has been discernible in the world over the last two centuries. Even at present, manifold variants of civil society can be observed, although they share some basic features like self-organization against or beyond the state. *Secondly*, the idea of *civil society* has not spread evenly around the globe, but instead has been heavily concentrated in northwestern Europe. Only in recent decades, have INGOs also been extended to Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. *Thirdly*, these organizations have primarily attracted individuals with high incomes. These groups represent a disproportionately high share of the membership. *Fourthly*, the rise of a “pan-European civil society” preceded the emergence of global networks. After pan-European ideas had thrived in the 1920s, the most prolific opposition groups in the

¹⁷ R. Dahrendorf, *The Modern Social Conflict: An Essay on the Politics of Liberty* (London 1988), 189.

¹⁸ Keane, “A New Cosmology”, 26.

¹⁹ Anheier / Glasius / Kaldor, “Introducing Global Civil Society”, 17.

²⁰ Keane, “A New Cosmology”, 23.

“Third Reich,” as well as dissidents in the communist dictatorships established after the Second World War, appealed to European solidarity. They also aimed at a renewal of Europe by claiming a “parallel polis,” the “power of the powerless,” and “living in truth,” as well as by insisting on “anti-politics.”²¹

Altogether, “global civil society” has serious analytical drawbacks. Despite some serious objections, it is therefore we intend to use the designation *transnational civil society* in a more open way. Like civil society, “transnationalism” is a multidimensional, complex category. Consequently, its meaning has continuously been a subject of debates in politics and academia.²² It is commonly accepted that the word was first used during the First World War.²³ But, as Pierre-Yves Saunier has reminded us, the term dates back to 1862, when the German linguist Georg Curtius pondered the existence of a forgotten universal language. In the field of Political Science, “transnational” was taken up as late as the 1960s. The recent demand in “transnationalism” is, consequently, at least the third in a whole series of transnational turns in the last 50 years.²⁴ In his seminal study of transnational politics, German political scientist Karl KAISER, for instance, recommended “transnationalism” as an analytical tool in the arsenal of theoreticians of International Relations. Concepts of “transnationalism” aim at grasping processes *above* the nation-state. They are needed for investigations into “processes of interactions, which run across nation-states boundaries.”²⁵ “Transnationalism” thus emerged as a strictly analytical term, aiming at a new quality of international politics. Nevertheless, it has to be pointed out that the point of departure for all concepts of “transnationalism” was the modern nation-state as it emerged in the course of the nineteenth century. The paradigm is closely intertwined with a profound change of the notion of actors in theories of international relations. Both “transnationalism” and “internationalism” have been propelled by the emergence of non-state actors in international politics. It is the inclusion of the above mentioned actors, besides or beyond the nation-state,

²¹ V. Benda et al., “Parallel Polis, or an independent society in Central and Eastern Europe: An Inquiry”, *Social Research* 55 (1988), 1-2, Part 2, 212-246; J. Keane, *Václav Havel: A Political Tragedy in Six Acts* (London 1999). Also see H. Fehr, “Eliten und Zivilgesellschaft in Ostmitteleuropa. Polen und die Tschechische Republik (1968-2003)”, *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B 5-6/2004, 2 February 2004, 48-54; Anheier, “Introducing Global Civil Society”, 14.

²² For an overview see the entry on “Transnational” by Pierre-Yves Saunier in A. Irye/P.-Y. Saunier (eds.), *Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History* (London / New York).

²³ By R. Bourne, “Trans-National America”, *Atlantic Monthly* 188 (1916), 86-97.

²⁴ See the witty overview in Pierre-Yves Saunier, “Learning by Doing: Notes about the Making of The Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History”, *Journal of Modern European History*, 6 (2008), 159-180, esp. 165.

²⁵ See K. Kaiser, “Transnationale Politik. Zu einer Theorie der multinationalen Politik”, *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, 10 (1969), 80-109, 88 (“... Interaktionsprozesse [...], die die nationalstaatlichen Grenzen überschreiten.“).

which distinguishes “transnationalism” from “internationalism”.²⁶ According to an influential definition, transnational processes virtually “run through” the nation-state.²⁷ Consequently, “transnationalism” still refers to the nation-state, which it supposedly supersedes or succeeds. It is therefore ahistorical and absurd to diagnose “transnationalism” in pre-national eras.

Current academic debates about “transnationalism” are shaped by different analytical usages. Above all, two of them can be spelled out by developing the concept of transnationalism, *International Relations* intended to identify and analyze processes *beyond* the state and *separate* from it.²⁸ Consequently, the term “transnationalism” has been used as an analytical and descriptive tool, which has been mainly applied to new actors in the international arena like international nongovernmental organizations²⁹ (including non-state actors)³⁰, as well as the growing number of “transnational social movements.”³¹ The sections of this chapter will deal with these two types of organizations.

A different usage emerged after the Second World War. The fall of the colonial empires – which ultimately gave rise to the new paradigm of “postcolonial” history,” the end of the Cold War, and the growth of critical literature on globalization inspired scholars to study “transnational” developments. Focusing on how members of the formerly excluded and underprivileged strata of the population in the “Third World” were mobilized in order to gain influence, a new normative notion of “transnationalism” entered academic discourse. In detailed studies of migration, for example, this shift in the analytical perspective made scholars stress the

²⁶ “The first type of relationships – those not exclusively involving activities between governments only – are known as transnational relations”. Cf. Archer, *International Organizations*, 1. Keonah and Nye have defined transnational relations as “the movement of tangible or intangible items across state boundaries when at least one actor is not an agent of a government or an international [sic!] organization”. See R.O. Keohane / J.S. Nye, *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge, MA 1971), xii.

²⁷ Meyers, “Grundbegriffe und theoretische Perspektiven”, 334 (“Im Unterschied zur zwischenstaatlichen, internationalen Politik sind die Prozesse der transnationalen Politik zwischengesellschaftlichen Ursprungs, sie ziehen sich gleichsam durch mehrere nationalstaatliche Systeme hindurch ...”).

²⁸ For a short introduction, see R. Meyers, “Grundbegriffe und theoretische Perspektiven der Internationalen Beziehungen”, T. Stammen, et al. (eds.), *Grundwissen Politik* (Frankfurt am Main 1997), 313-434, 332 ff.

²⁹ C. Archer, *International Organizations* (London 1983); W. Feld / R.S. Jordan, *International Organizations. A Comparative Approach* (Westport / Conn. 1994). New approaches are discussed in: P.F. Diehl (ed.), *The Politics of Global Governance. International Organizations in an Interdependent World* (London 1997).

³⁰ S. Krasner (ed.), *International Regimes* (Ithaca 1983).

³¹ Recent literature in this field include D. della Porta et al. (eds.), *Social Movements in a Globalizing World* (Chippinham 1999); S. Khagram et al. (eds.), *Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks and Norms* 2002); J. Smith (ed.), *Globalization and Resistance. Transnational Dimensions of Social Movements* (Lanham u. a. 2002), Srilatha Batliwala/L. David Brown (eds.), *Transnational Civil Society. An Introduction* (Bloomfield 2006).

new qualities and realities of a transnational system,³² which is based on migrants' identities across and beyond national borders. These increasingly dense cross-border networks have occasionally even allowed migrants to negotiate with national governments about their legal status. Reading these authors' texts one cannot but sense a certain intellectual contempt regarding everything national which is considered backward and thus inferior. On the other hand, inhabitants of "Third World" states accepted and subverted the hegemonic West European and North American political culture in processes of hybridization and diffusion. In short, this process underpins the subversive, normative aspects of the emerging transnational culture.³³ This perspective, therefore, seems to portray the emergence of a transnational society as an antidote to a globalized economy. Thus transnationalism is used as a normative concept. In the face of the obvious democratic deficits of the interstate system, it seems as though they have rediscovered Immanuel Kant's influential works on world society. In a world in which nation-states are increasingly losing control over global actors like Transnational Cooperations (TNCs), organized crime, terrorism, and threats like environmental pollution and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, only a "transnational society" seems nowadays capable of solving these problems.³⁴

³² This transformation has been analysed by L. Pries, "Neue Migration im transnationalen Raum", idem (ed.), *Transnationale Migration*. (Baden-Baden 1997), 15-44.

³³ These works include S. Castles / M. J. Miller, "Die Formung der modernen Welt durch Migration. Eine Geschichte der Wanderungsbewegungen bis 1945", L. Pries (ed.), *Transnationale Migration* (Baden-Baden 1997), 47-62; J. Clifford, "Diasporas", S. Vertovec / R. Cohen (eds.), *Migration, Diasporas and Nationalism* (Cheltenham 1999), 215-251; J. Fawcett, "Networks, Linkages, and Migration Systems", S. Vertovec and R. Cohen (eds.), *Migration, Diasporas and Transnationalism* (Cheltenham 1999), 16-25; N. Glick-Schiller et al. (eds.), *Towards a Transnational Perspective on Migration* (New York 1993); N. Glick-Schiller et al., "Transnationalism: A New Analytic Framework for Understanding Migration", N. Glick-Schiller et al. (ed.), *Towards a Transnational Perspective on Migration* (New York 1993), 1-24; N. Glick-Schiller et al., "From Immigrant to Transmigrants: Theorizing Transnational Migration", *Anthropological Quarterly* 68 (1996), 48-63; A. Gupta, "The Song of the Nonaligned World: Transnational Identities and the Reinscription of Space in Late Capitalism", *Cultural Anthropology*, 7 (1992), 63-79; A. Gupta / J. Ferguson, "Beyond 'Culture': Space, Identity, and the Politics of Difference", *Cultural Anthropology*, 7 (1992), 6-23; K.F. Olwig / N.N. Sorensen, "Mobile livelihoods: Making a living in the world", K.F. Olwig/N.N. Sorensen (eds.), *Work and Migration. Life and livelihoods in a globalizing world* (New York 2002), 1-19; N.N. Sorensen / K.F. Olwig (eds.), *Work and Migration. Life and livelihood in a globalizing world* (London 2002).

³⁴ Some of the classical works on globalisation include M. Albrow, *Abschied vom Nationalstaat* (Frankfurt am Main 1998); M. Albrow, *The Global Age. State and Society Beyond Modernity* (Cambridge 1996); A. Appadurai, *Modernity at Large. Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis 1998); M. Castells, *The Power of Identity* (Oxford 1997); M. Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society* (Malden 1999); K. Ohmae, *The End of the Nation State. The Rise of Regional Economies* (New York 1995); K. Robins, "What in the World's Going On?", P. Du Gay (ed.), *Proction of Culture / Cultures of Production* (London 1997), 11-66; J.G. Ruggie, *Constructing the World Policy* (London 1998); S. Sassen, *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization* (New York 1996); S. Sassen, "The State and the New Geography of Power", D. Kalb (ed.), *The End of Globalization. Bringing Society Back* (Lanham 2000), 49-66 The critical aspects of globalization and transnationalization are stressed, for example, by G. Boxberger / H. Klimenta, *Die zehn Globalisierungslügen. Alternativen zur Allmacht des Marktes* (München 1998); R.D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy. How scarcity, crime, overpopulation, tribalism, and disease are rapidly

Like civil society “transnationalism,” too, as a panacea for almost all global problems has assumed almost utopian qualities, especially in the late 1990s. It serves as a catch-all-phrase for answers to a new political reality.³⁵

In *historiography*, the term “transnationalism” has only been adopted in the last few decades. Historians simply have missed the turn, as Pierre-Yves Saunier has ironically pointed out.³⁶ Kiran PATEL has observed that American historians took up the concept in the 1960s in order to challenge the paradigm of the nation-state.³⁷ While this concept has been successfully applied by historians from the US, their European colleagues have been more reluctant to take it up. In Germany, for instance, the debate about its analytical potential and drawbacks for historical studies has begun only in the late 1990s, but since then has made an impressive career.³⁸ As in political science, “transnationalism” has been used in historiography as an extension of the national framework. It is therefore explicitly directed against notions of narrow, exclusively nationally defined cultures.

However, different concepts of “transnationalism” have been proposed by historians. The notion of “transterritoriality,”³⁹ approaches of transnational social spaces,⁴⁰ and some other new

destroying the social fabric of our planet”, *Atlantic Monthly* 2 (1994), 44-76; L. Sklair, “Social Movements for Global Capitalism: the transnational capital class in action.”, *Review of International Political Economy* 4 (1997), 514-528; D. Yergin / J. Stanislaw, *The Commanding Heights. The Battle Between Government and the Marketplace That is Remaking the Modern World* (New York 1998).

³⁵ This is evident in works like U. Beck (ed.), *Politik der Globalisierung* (Frankfurt am Main 1998); U. Beck, *Was ist Globalisierung? Irrtümer der Globalismus – Antworten auf Globalisierung* (Frankfurt am Main 1998); D. Held, *Democracy and the Global Order. From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (Cambridge 1995); D. Messner (ed.), *Die Zukunft des Staates und der Politik. Möglichkeiten und Grenzen politischer Steuerung in der Weltgesellschaft* (Bonn 1998); M. Zürn, *Regieren jenseits des Nationalstaates. Globalisierung und Denationalisierung als Chance* (Frankfurt am Main 1998).

³⁶ Pierre-Yves Saunier, “Learning by Doing: Notes about the Making of The Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History,” *Journal of Modern European History* 6 (2008), 159-180, 161.

³⁷ K.K. Patel, “Transatlantische Perspektiven transnationaler Geschichte”, *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 29 (2003), 625-647, 626f.

³⁸ See various contributions to the journal *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, especially J. Osterhammel, “Transnationale Gesellschaftsgeschichte: Erweiterung oder Alternative?”, *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 27 (2001), pp. 464-479; Albert Wirz, “Für eine transnationale Gesellschaftsgeschichte”, *ibid.*, 489-498; Patel, “Transatlantische Perspektiven transnationaler Geschichte” and: Sebastian Conrad, *Das Kaiserreich transnational. Deutschland in der Welt 1871-1914* (Göttingen 2004); Gunilla Budde / Sebastian Conrad / Oliver Janz (eds.), *Transnationale Geschichte. Themen, Tendenzen, Theorien* (Göttingen 2006); Christoph Conrad (ed.), *Sozialpolitik transnational* (Göttingen 2006).

³⁹ S.-S. Spiliotis, “Das Konzept der Transterritorialität oder Wo findet Gesellschaft statt?” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 27 (2001), 480-488; S.-S. Spiliotis, *Transterritorialität und Abgrenzung. Konstitutionsprozesse in der griechischen Gesellschaft und Ansätze ihrer faschistoiden Transformation, 1922/24-1941* (München 1998).

⁴⁰ Pries, “Neue Migration”; L. Pries (ed.), *New Transnational Social Spaces. International migration and Transnational companies in the early 21st century* (London 2001). See also E. Morawska, *The New-Old Transmigrants, Their Transnational Lives, and Ethnization: A Comparison of 19th/20th and 20th/21 C. Situations*

concepts of space⁴¹ have triggered innovative research on the transfer of human beings, goods, ideas, and institutions across national and cultural boundaries. The concept of *transfert culturel*, which has been proposed by French literary historians, has concentrated on the contexts and constellations, and on processes or the mediators of transfers. Although the relationship between historical comparison as a proven and widely-applied method and transfer analysis is subject to a continuing debate, the majority of historians have opted for a combination of these approaches without fusing them.⁴² In particular, the concept of transnational transfer has especially been applied in historical studies of cultural exchange, migration, communication, and public spheres.⁴³ With regard to civil society, investigations into the problems of democratic transitions have dealt with processes of transnational transfers.⁴⁴

Altogether, political scientists as well as historians have developed and utilized theoretical and methodological considerations on “transnationalism,” which have in common the fusion of analytical and normative usages of this concept.

(Badia Fiesolana 1999); idem, *Structuring Migration in a Historical Perspective: The Case of Travelling East Europeans* (Badia Fiesolana 1998).

⁴¹ J. Osterhammel, “Die Wiederkehr des Raumes: Geopolitik, Geohistorie und historische Geographie”, *Neue Politische Literatur* 43 (1998), 374-397; F.B. Schenk, “Mental Maps. Die Konstruktion von geographischen Räumen in Europa seit der Aufklärung”, *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 28 (2002), 493-514 .

⁴² M. Espagne / Michael Werner, “Deutsch-französischer Kulturtransfer im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert. Zu einem neuen interdisziplinären Forschungsprogramm des C.N.R.S.”, *Francia* 13 (1985), 502-510; M. Espagne / M. Middell (eds.), *Von der Elbe bis an die Seine. Kulturtransfer zwischen Sachsen und Frankreich im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert* (Leipzig 1993). Also see the contributions to Hartmut Kaelble / Jürgen Schriewer (eds.), *Vergleich und Transfer. Komparatistik in den Sozial-, Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften* (Frankfurt am Main 2003). For an overview, see Jürgen Kocka, “Comparison and Beyond”, *History and Theory* 42 (2003), 39-44; Chris Lorenz, “Comparative Historiography: Problems and Perspectives”, *History and Theory* 38 (1999), 25-39.

⁴³ E. Morawska, *The New-Old Transmigrants, Their Transnational Lives, and Ethnicization: A Comparison of 19th/20th and 20th/21st C. Situations* (Badia Fiesolana 1999); J. Requate / M. Schulze Wessel (eds.), *Europäische Öffentlichkeit. Transnationale Kommunikation seit dem 18. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt am Main 2002); M. Werner / B. Zimmermann, “Beyond Comparison: Histoire Croisée and the Challenge of Reflexivity”, *History and Theory* 45 (2006), 30-50; M. Werner / B. Zimmermann, “Vergleich, Transfer, Verflechtung. Der Ansatz der Histoire croisée und die Herausforderung des Transnationalen”, *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 28 (2002), 607-636.

⁴⁴ See, in particular, T.L. Karl / P.C. Schmitter, “Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe”, *International Social Science Journal* 128 (1991), 269-284; S. Mainwaring et al. (eds.), *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective* (Notre Dame 1992); J. Linz / A. Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (Baltimore 1996); G. O’Donnell, “Delegative Democracy”, *Journal of Democracy* 5 (1994), 55-69. Also see the contributions to N. Bermeo / P. Nord (eds.), *Civil Society Before Democracy. Lessons from Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Lanham 2000).

2.3 “Actors” of Transnational Civil Society

The emergence of “transnationalism” has led to a profound transformation in the study of international relations.⁴⁵ For decades research had concentrated on nation-states and their political representatives. But collective non-state actors entered the stage of academic discussions in this field. This change went hand in hand with the elaboration of a new theoretical framework and the critical discussion of its predecessors. Traditionally, theories like “realism,” as well as “neo-realism,” have been conceived of states as exclusive actors in an anarchic interstate system. It was only the internal dimension of politics which has supposedly been affected by the rule of law. By contrast, the foreign policy of states has not been restricted by any laws. According to Realists, foreign policy by nation states was allegedly driven by the will to expand politically and economically.⁴⁶ However, after the emergence and establishment of idealism and institutional liberalism as theoretical approaches in the first decades of the twentieth century (Woodrow Wilson’s internationalist project is surely the most notable example), scholarly attention slowly began to shift to issues of international cooperation as well as to intensifying processes of economic and political interdependence and entanglement.⁴⁷ Arguably, “classic liberalism” in theories of International Relations shares the same roots as theories of civil society as both of these arguments date back to the Scottish Enlightenment.⁴⁸ Moreover, critics of idealism have argued that classical idealism has often been blended with utopian thinking because of this basic continuity. As can be easily imagined, liberal thinking was in deep crisis after the outbreak of the Second World War. Only the emergence of a flurry of new international organizations led to theories which aimed at describing and explaining processes of economic and political interdependencies.⁴⁹ Despite the notable differences in their specific hypotheses and approaches,

⁴⁵ See D. Josselin / W. Wallace, “Non-state Actors in World Politics: A Framework”, D. Josselin / W. Wallace (eds.), *Non-State Actors in World Politics* (Basingstoke 2001), 1-20.

⁴⁶ For a short introduction, see T. Dunne, “Realism”, J. Baylis / S. Smith (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to International Relations* (Oxford 1997), 109-124; Meyers, “Grundbegriffe und theoretische Perspektiven”, 386 ff. Also see the influential study of H.J. Morgenthau, *Macht und Frieden. Grundlegung einer Theorie der internationalen Politik* (Gütersloh 1963), 69 ff.

⁴⁷ T. Dunne, “Liberalism”, J. Baylis / S. Smith (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to International Relations* (Oxford 1997), 147-163; S. Strange, “Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis”, P.F. Diehl (ed.), *The Politics of Global Governance. International Organizations in an Independent World* (London 1997), 41-56, esp. 46; Meyers, “Grundbegriffe und theoretische Perspektiven”, 410-424.

⁴⁸ Meyers, “Grundbegriffe und theoretische Perspektiven”, 410.

⁴⁹ D. Armstrong et al., *From Versailles to Maastricht. International Organisations in the Twentieth Century* (Basingstoke 1996).

theories like (neo-)institutionalism, (neo-)functionalism, regime theory,⁵⁰ and global governance, as well as constructivist approaches now stress the role played by non-state actors. The global world, it now seems, is a product of international organizations.⁵¹ As has been argued, this change is related to the concept of “transnationalism.” If transnational processes are defined as “running through” nation-states, then collective actors separate from and beyond the nation-states need to be taken into account.⁵² Students of International Relations with a special interest in the transnational processes have therefore concentrated on international (non-governmental) organizations.⁵³

Recent debates on civil society have also led to a change in notions of its actors. Jürgen KOCKA, for example, has identified *civil society* as “the vision of a modern, secularized society of free and self-reliant individuals who would manage their relations with one another in a peaceful and reasonable way, through individual competition as well as through voluntary cooperation and association, without too much social inequality and without the tutelage of an authoritarian state.”⁵⁴ As a result, the individual and the biographical resources of civil society have increasingly received scholarly attention. Encompassing normative aspirations and empirical descriptions, ‘civil society’ has been defined as “an ideal-typical category [...] that both describes and envisages a complex and dynamic ensemble of legally protected non-governmental institutions that tend to be non-violent, self-organizing, self-reflexive, and permanently in tension with each other and with the state institutions that frame, constrict, and enable their activities.” This definition paradigmatically encapsulates the two-dimensional nature of ‘civil society’ as a normative concept and an analytical tool, which has been used differently in different contexts.⁵⁵ Its usage in different languages and its understandings have been individually framed.

⁵⁰ See the intriguing critique in J.G. Ruggie, “Epistemology, Ontology and the Study of International Regimes”, idem (ed.), *Constructing World Polity. Essays on international institutionalization* (London 1998), 85-101.

⁵¹ Akira Iriye, *Global Community. The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley / Los Angeles / London 2002).

⁵² See, for example, B. Kohler-Koch, “Interdependenz”, V. Ritter (ed.), *Theorien der internationalen Beziehungen* (Opladen 1990), 110-129; Meyers, “Grundbegriffe und theoretische Perspektiven”, 381ff.

⁵³ There is a vast literature on this issue. For an introduction, see the excellent work by V. Rittberger / B. Zangl, *Internationale Organisationen. Politik und Geschichte* (Opladen 2003).

⁵⁴ J. Kocka, “The difficult rise of a civil society: societal history of modern Germany”, Mary Fulbrook (ed.), *German History since 1800* (London 1997), 495-511, 498f.

⁵⁵ F. Trentmann, “Introduction: Paradoxes of Civil Society” idem (ed.), *Paradoxes of Civil Society. New Perspectives of Modern German and British History* (New York / Oxford 2000), 3-46

Apart from empirical studies, actor-oriented definitions of “civil societies” have been suggested as a way out of the dilemmas of these conceptual debates. These new approaches emphasize a particular mode of conduct which dominates in the sphere of self-organization and voluntary associations. According to this understanding, ‘civil society’ assumes the quality of a normative category of representation including a search for compromise, the recognition of plurality and difference, mutual respect, and non-violence. It is also based on aims transcending particular interests. As ‘civil society’ is restricted to certain modes of interaction in specific spheres, it should not to be conceived as a homogeneous entity encompassing all social relations.⁵⁶

This research report deals mainly with non-governmental international organizations, however, many of their activists have been strongly tied to governmental institutions restricted to the confines of nation-states. Thus, specific types of non-governmental organizations like BRINGOs, CONGOs, DONGOs and MANGOs have been identified in publications on transnational actors of civil society.⁵⁷ These organizations are not tied to governments, but are usually rooted in nation-states.⁵⁸

By contrast, all *transnational* non-state actors are characterized by (a) their relative autonomy from governments, (b) their participation in cross-border networks, and (c) their verifiable impact on political decisions on national and international bodies.⁵⁹

International *governmental* organizations (IGOs) are characterized by a firm, often hierarchical institutional framework. They are based on multilateral treaties between the

⁵⁶ A. Bauerkämper, “Einleitung: Die Praxis der Zivilgesellschaft. Akteure und ihr Handeln in historisch-sozialwissenschaftlicher Perspektive”, idem (ed.), *Praxis*, 7-30, 12f.; J. Kocka, “Nachwort: Zivilgesellschaft. Begriff und Ergebnisse der historischen Forschung”, *ibid.*, 429-439, 434f. For a brief overview of the debate, see D. Gosewinkel / D. Rucht, “‘History meets sociology’. Zivilgesellschaft als Prozess”, D. Gosewinkel / W. van den Daele / J. Kocka (ed.), *Zivilgesellschaft – national und transnational* (Berlin 2004), 29-60, 31-33.

⁵⁷ Briefcase NGOs (BRINGOs), for example, are no more than a briefcase carrying a proposal. Commercial NGOs (CONGOs) are set up by business for particular economic ends. DONGOs (donor NGOs) are created and owned by donors who shift overhead costs outside, Mafias NGO (MANGOs) are criminal NGOs providing services for money laundering, enforcement and protection. Party-NGOs are formed by aspiring, defeated or banned political parties of politicians dressed as national governmental organizations.

⁵⁸ A. Fowler, *Striking a Balance. A Guide to Enhancing the Effectiveness of Non-Governmental Organisations in International Development* (London 1997), 32. Also see Berthold Kuhn, “Zivilgesellschaft aus der Perspektive der Entwicklungsländer”, Arnd Bauerkämper (ed.), *Die Praxis der Zivilgesellschaft. Akteure. Handeln und Strukturen im internationalen Vergleich* (Frankfurt am Main 2003), 391-413, 394f.

⁵⁹ Josselin / Wallace, “Non-state actors in World Politics”, 3f.

governments of nation-states, which are international legal personalities.⁶⁰ According to a widely-shared definition, International Governmental Organizations are “set up by three or more states to fulfill common purposes or attain common objectives.”⁶¹ According to a survey by the Union of International Associations, IGOs must be geographically and functionally differentiated. As regards differences in their *geographical scope*, intercontinental organizations can be distinguished from universal ones. Whereas the membership and activities of intercontinental IGOs merely extend beyond a particular continent, universal ones include no less than sixty member states. Exceeding these types in its scope, the United Nations is the only federation of international organizations at present. With regard to their *functional features*, IGOs, with their prime organizational tasks like the management of cooperation, contrast with official organizations which support a vast international bureaucracy. In general, though, an International Governmental Organization can be defined as “a formal continuous structure established by agreement between members (governmental and/or non-governmental) from two or more sovereign states with the aim of pursuing the common interest of the membership.”⁶² According to the published literature on International Relations, IGOs are created by governments which delegate sovereignty.⁶³ In contrast to International Non-Governmental Organizations, IGOs are usually founded by nation-states. But connections and cooperation between the two types of international organizations have considerably grown in the last decades, particularly after 1990.⁶⁴

With regard to the subject of this paper, *non-governmental* organizations deserve particular attention. They are “autonomous organizations that are non-governmental, that is, they are not instrumentalities of government; and non-profit, that is not distributing revenue as income to owners; and formal, legal entities.”⁶⁵ Similarly, ECOSOC has defined an INGO as follows: “any international organization which is not established by intergovernmental agreements shall be considered as a nongovernmental organization [...], including organizations which accept

⁶⁰ S. Hobe / O. Kimminich, Einführung in das Völkerrecht. Achte, vollständig neu bearbeitete und erweiterte Auflage (Tübingen / Basel 2004), 221-222.

⁶¹ W. Feld / R. S. Jordan, International Organizations. A Comparative Approach (Westport / Conn. 1994), 10.

⁶² Archer, International Organizations, 35.

⁶³ Rittberger / Zangl, Internationale Organisationen, 24.

⁶⁴ Anheier / Glasius / Kaldor, “Introducing Global Civil Society”, 4f.; Rittberger / Zangl, Internationale Organisationen, 27.

⁶⁵ Anheier / Glasius / Kaldor, “Introducing Global Civil Society”, 4. Also see L.M. Salomon / H.K. Anheier, Defining the Nonprofit Sector (Manchester 1997).

members designated by government authorities, provided that such a membership does not interfere with the free expression of views of the organization.”⁶⁶ The manifold objectives of INGOs include the promotion of particular interests in the international and national arenas (*single issue organizations*). International non-governmental organizations support, modify, or oppose the goals of the United Nations, its agencies and affiliated bodies, and/or policies pursued by national governments. In the literature on international non-governmental organizations at least three types of organizations can be identified: genuine, hybrid NGOs, as well as transgovernmental organizations (TGO).⁶⁷ Whereas genuine INGOs are characterized by their exclusively non-governmental memberships, hybrid ones encompass both governmental and non-governmental members.⁶⁸ By contrast, transgovernmental organizations (TGO) initiate and support “relations between governmental actors that are not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of their governments.”⁶⁹ These interstate relations are thus to be interpreted as hybrid forms of transnational exchange. On a different level, various authors have distinguished between transnational organizations (TNOs) and transnational umbrella organizations.⁷⁰

The latest research has led to new definitions of non-state actors according to categories of sociological theories of international relations. Khagram, Riker and Sikkink, for example, relate to “forms of transnational collective action involving nongovernmental organizations interacting with international norms to restructure world politics.”⁷¹ They have thus identified new forms of “transnational collective action”: transnational advocacy networks, transnational coalitions, and transnational social movements.⁷²

The authors proposing these approaches share an interest in the “struggle over meaning.” These organizations of “transnational collective action” utilize certain opportunity structures and political institutions for the reshaping of international norms according to their political aims and

⁶⁶ Quoted in Feld / Jordan, *International Organizations*, 22.

⁶⁷ Archer, *International Organizations*, 41.

⁶⁸ For a typology with regard to their aims and activities, see *ibid.*, 23-25.

⁶⁹ Keohane / Nye, *Transnational Relations*, xv.

⁷⁰ See, for instance, Rittberger / Zangl, *Internationale Organisationen*.

⁷¹ Khagram, et al., “From Santiago to Seattle”, 3.

⁷² The category of „social movements” from which this term stems originally is relatively well documented. Recent methodological considerations are easily accessible in J. A. Goldstone, “Introduction: Bridging Institutionalized and Noninstitutionalized Politics”, J. A. Goldstone (ed.), *States, Parties, and Social Movements* (Cambridge, MA 2003), 1-24; B. Klandermans / S. Staggenborg (eds.), *Methods of Social Movement Research* (Minneapolis 2002).

agendas.⁷³ Like epistemic communities, these organizations assemble international actors who work on various levels in international relations. They are engaged in domestic, inter-, and transnational political arenas and aim at exerting influence in all of them.⁷⁴ Contrary to epistemic communities, transnational advocacy networks rely on “principled beliefs”, i.e. moral representations which allow individuals and collective actors to distinguish two basic categories like “good” and “evil,” as well as “just” and “unjust”. By contrast, epistemic communities draw on so-called “causal beliefs” that are representations of cause and effect.⁷⁵ For our purposes of this contribution, the focus on norms and modes of cognition turns the concept of transnational advocacy networks into a promising conceptual framework for historical analysis.

Altogether, we have to take the underlying normative concepts of civil society as much into account as the varying understandings of its actors. In a triangular analytical framework, historical studies have to relate the development of these two factors to contextual changes.

3. Actors of Transnational Civil Society

In the late eighteenth century, absolutist rule was increasingly questioned and criticized. Various factors such as industrialization, increasing social mobility, processes of professionalization, and social differentiation, as well as cultural paradigms such as the Enlightenment led to the emergence of a new group of well-educated citizens whose main point of identification was separate from the *Anciens Régimes*. Its members assembled in clubs and associations. It was based on deliberation in literary circles and increasingly on public discourses that challenged the claims of political rulers to initiate and control communication “from above.” The Freemasons, who had originated in England in the early eighteenth century, also expanded considerably throughout Europe. Contrary to clubs and learned societies, however, they met secretly. Thus, Freemasons entertained an exclusive rather than a public discourse.⁷⁶

⁷³ Khagram, et al., “From Santiago to Seattle”, esp. 11-13.

⁷⁴ See also D. della Porta / H. Kriesi, “Social Movements in a Globalizing World: an Introduction”, D. Della Porta / H. Kriesi / D. Rucht (eds.), *Social Movements in a Globalizing World* (Houndmills 1999), 3-22, 21.

⁷⁵ V. Rittberger / B. Zangl, *Internationale Organisationen. Politik und Geschichte* (Opladen 2003), 46.

⁷⁶ S.-L. Hoffmann, “Internationalism and the Quest for Moral Universalism. German Freemasonry, 1860-1914”, Martin Geyer / Johannes Paulmann (eds.), *The Mechanics of Internationalism. Culture, Society, and Politics from the 1840s to the First World War* (Oxford 2001), 259-284, 267.

Throughout Europe, monarchical rule was also shaken by the revolution of 1848-49. Although it was finally suppressed in France, Prussia, and the Hapsburg Empire, the revolutionary upheaval profoundly altered the existing monarchies throughout Europe. The concept of absolutist rule began to crumble. The revolution further mobilized societies politically and socially. This process led to the emergence of public spheres. Even in the period of restoration from the late 1840s to the 1860s, political and social mobilization in Western and Central Europe did not come to a standstill. Accelerating industrialization, too, gradually undermined absolutism. Beyond the strata of artisans and merchants and the realm of traditional handicraft, the new bourgeoisie promoted industrial production in factories. The dynamics of commercial and industrial growth gradually loosened the shackles of mercantilist economics.

At the same time, however, in these societies awareness of social and political problems increased. Against this background, philanthropic societies concentrated on the furtherance of particular issues. In order to mobilize support for their specific concerns, they engaged in cross-border cooperation. Ultimately, International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) were founded. As a movement deeply rooted in the European Enlightenment, as well as in the culture of the Quakers, the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, which was established in 1839, has been designated the first organization of this type. Groups like these are testimony to the increasing conviction of their members that states did not only exist to provide security for their own citizens, but also for the well-being of all people collectively.⁷⁷ The activity of these INGOs reached global dimensions, although it did not spread evenly and continuously. Economic and social problems enhanced international solidarity and cooperation. Thus, cross-border networks expanded as the formation of nation-states and territorially-bound political governments propelled the above mentioned networks of activists to extend beyond borders. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the formation of the workers' movement, the demand for peace and the advocacy of women's rights, in particular, became important pillars of civil society. Yet this process was halted by the First World War, which largely destroyed these networks.

Despite organizations like the League of Nations and the pan-European movement of the interwar years, civil society suffered another setback with the rise of fascism, Nazism, authoritarian dictatorships in the interwar years, and in the Second World War. During and after

⁷⁷ Akira Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley 2002), 11.

the war, however, the legal and social foundations of civil societies were broadened substantially in the Western world. While this process was most pronounced in democracies during the Cold War, struggles for a civil society in the Communist dictatorships in Eastern Europe united dissidents and protest movements. These dynamics marked a new stage in the development of transnational networks. But, above all, it was the foundation of the United Nations that marked the final institutionalization of INGOs as political actors transcending the confines of nation-states. In Article 71, the Charter of the UN granted them the legal status as consultative institutions of United Nations Economical and Social Council (ECOSOC). The creation of the European Union finally provided an important framework for the rise of INGOs on a European-wide scale. Their activities have been supported by an emerging transnational public sphere which has gradually evolved in Europe, the United States, and (to a lesser extent) beyond, as a framework for dealing with national issues. Although even the European public sphere is still decentralized and by no means uniform, civil societies have been tied together by INGOs. The increase in cross-border traveling and in economic, as well as personal exchange between Europeans since the 1950s, has reduced tensions and differences. Yet due to the lack of social mobilization for Europe and the resilience of autochthonous traditions in nation-states and regions, a full-fledged European civil society has not appeared on the political horizon.

Paradoxically, it was the Cold War which triggered a notable increase in the number and scope of the actors of civil society. On the one hand, the escalating arms race with the frightening prospect of a nuclear war invigorated the European peace movement in the 1950s and 1960s. On the other hand, both superpowers utilized grass-roots social movements in Europe as their allies in the overarching conflict of the Cold War, which profoundly shaped domestic politics and social relations. By contrast, grass-roots protest against social and political stagnation erupted in western states in the late 1960s. The late 1960s and early 1970s saw the emergence of the new social movements. Addressing both local and global problems, these movements have worked on fields as diverse as environmental issues, developmental policies, human rights, workers' rights, feminism, nuclear disarmament, and consumers' rights. As grass-roots organizations, all these movements share a skeptical attitude to the modernization process. They are also characterized by organizational structures based on densely interconnected networks and a membership consisting of the relatively highly educated middle classes. At present, social movements exert considerable influence on politics on a global scale. However, civil society associations and the

non-profit sector have emerged most strongly in the western world, whereas their formation and expansion has proceeded at a slower pace among developing countries.

3.1 Age of Associations

For many years, investigations into social history and the history of ideas have traced the transfer of key concepts of civil society from Renaissance Italy to North America. Recent historiography, however, has profoundly challenged this view. According to new interpretations, “Aristotelian discourse on civic virtue was not replaced but transformed during the periods of the late Enlightenment and early liberalism.”⁷⁸ Especially in the realm of an educated public, ideas of a sociable society emerged, which was free from the bonds of the closed aristocratic circles. As Tim BLANNING has shown in his study of the *Ançien Régime’s* forms of representation, the glorification of monarchs was increasingly challenged by actors of the emerging public sphere.⁷⁹ Contrary to interpretations of nationalism as a process of secularization and dissemination of a functionalist ideology of modernization, this new view has led to a re-evaluation of the key role of religion in the transformation of the Old Regimes. Religious faith, above all in Protestantism, was not abolished. On the contrary, it became a strong ally of the bourgeoisie. Masonic Lodges, too, received increasing attention in debates on protecting mankind from moral and political corruption.⁸⁰ Contrary to the propositions of authors like Reinhart KOSELLECK and François FURET, new studies have rejected interpretations of the lodges as highly secret places, where Masons gathered and questioned the authority of the Old Regimes. They have argued that the lodges strove to keep their proceedings secret because they aimed at creating and expanding a protected space in which virtue could thrive.⁸¹ According to recent research, these circles were

⁷⁸ Hoffmann, “Democracy and Associations in the Long Nineteenth Century”, 275.

⁷⁹ Blanning has referred to Habermas’ definition of the “public sphere” (Öffentlichkeit), although he does not completely adopt paradigm, especially in its Marxist connotations. See T.C.W. Blanning, *The Culture of Power and the Power of Culture. Old Regime Europe 1660-1789* (Oxford 2002), esp. 1-25. Also see van Horn Melton, *The Rise of the Public in Enlightenment Europe*. Similarly, cf. R. S. Wortman, *Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy. 2 Volumes* (Princeton 1995 / 2000).

⁸⁰ S.,-L. Hoffmann, *Die Politik der Geselligkeit*; M.C. Jacob, “The Enlightenment Redefined. The Formation of Modern Civil Society”, *Social Research* 58 (1991), 475-495; M.C. Jacob, *Living the Enlightenment. Freemasonry and Politics in Eighteenth Century Europe* (New York 1991).

⁸¹ Hoffmann, *Geselligkeit und Demokratie*. For a different view, see G.-F. Budde, “‘Denn unsere Bruderliebe soll ihn leiten.’ Zum Zusammenhang von Künstlerexistenz und Freimaurertum bei Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart”, *Historische Zeitschrift* 275 (2002), 625-650.

embedded and trained in democratic practices by elaborating new by-laws, terms, and conditions.⁸² In their ambition to spread the messages of Enlightenment and to achieve universal brotherhood, they thus transcended the boundaries of the older learned circles which were much more exclusive and restricted to the members of the pre-revolutionary *République des Lettres*.⁸³

By the late eighteenth century, Britain's urban centers had become the hotbeds of a sociability which rapidly spread across Europe. It was quickly adopted by the existing associational culture of the learned circles of the Enlightenment, which also strove for knowledge and moral improvement. The "long nineteenth century" can therefore be regarded as a true "age of association." It was consequently the call for freedom of association that fueled the revolutions of 1848 all over Europe.⁸⁴ But it is important to notice that in this view, the notion of a sphere, separated from the aristocrats' realm of influence was rooted in religious, mainly protestant, representations.

Yet these universalistic claims gradually undermined the constant rise of nation-states. On the one hand, it has been argued that the expansion of bourgeois mass-culture in Europe and new communications technologies fostered membership in associations and lent their cultural representation credibility and attraction. On the eve of the First World War, for example, almost all urban citizens in Western Europe had joined at least one association. These organizations also expanded to new geographical areas and broadened their programs. On the other hand, by the late nineteenth century associations were increasingly split and torn by national conflicts. Acrimonies did by no means subside after the devastations of the First World War. Especially in Germany, new associations like the "National Socialist Workers' Association" (*Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher Arbeiterverein*), which was founded as early as 1920 and transformed into the NSDAP a few years later, whipped up nationalist resentment and hatred. In regimes which succeeded in establishing an unprecedented "total rule," all independent associations were disbanded. Obviously, the formal existence of associations alone does not guarantee and protect civil societies.

⁸² See, for example, M.C. Jacob, *Living the Enlightenment. Freemasonry and Politics in Eighteenth Century Europe* (New York 1991).

⁸³ F. Trentmann, "Introduction: Paradoxes of Civil Society", idem (ed.), *Paradoxes of Civil Society. New Perspectives of Modern German and British History* (New York 2000), 3-46, 13. Also see the case studies of Ian McNeely and Robert Beachy on German information networks and club culture in this volume.

⁸⁴ Hoffmann, *Geselligkeit und Demokratie*, 54; Arnd Bauerkämper, 'Civil Society. History V: 19th Century', Helmut K. Anheier / Stefan Toepler / Regina List (eds.), *International Encyclopedia of Civil Society* (Berlin 2010), 358-361.

A number of studies have identified major stages in the evolution of cross-border associations. Yet these investigations do not provide deep insights into the role of their members, proponents, and adherents. Comparative work encompassing actors' biographies and resources has been neglected, and the social and political practices of these actors remain largely unknown. The following sections assemble some of the findings on these issues.

3.2 The Anti-Slavery Movement

For many years, the history of the abolitionist movement was primarily a topic of American history. In the course of the last three decades, however, the history of the abolitionist movement has produced a set of marvelous historiographical works.⁸⁵ Here, the transatlantic dimension of the system of slave trade, as well as the growing pressures for its abolition, have been analyzed in a comparative, transatlantic, and thereby a transnational perspective.⁸⁶ Above all, the anti-slavery movement initiated spectacular campaigns in the British Empire. That in turn, resulted in concrete government policies. In 1807, the British slave trade was finally abolished.⁸⁷

The first systematic interpretation of the anti-slavery movement was proposed by American historian Eric WILLIAMS in 1944.⁸⁸ He placed the movement into the context of an economic process which had gradually undermined the rationale for the slave trade. Activists of the anti-slavery movement emphasized the fundamental economic drawbacks of slavery and pressed governments to enforce its abolition. As Williams argued, the anti-abolitionist movement was driven by economic interest, not moral claims. Moreover, it was related to the rise of modern industry. This line of argument was taken up and elaborated in the path-breaking study of David

⁸⁵ For a short overview of the literature on this topic, see D.B. Davis, "Looking at Slavery from Broader Perspectives", *American Historical Review* 105 (2000), 452-466; D. Eltis, "Europeans and the Rise and Fall of African Slavery: An Interpretation", *American Historical Review* 98 (1993), 1399-1432.

⁸⁶ See, for example, the discussion about "Crossing Slavery's Boundaries" in an "American Historical Review Forum". This debate concerned the question of whether slavery has to be described within a more systematic, global framework or in a rather narrow perspective, focussing on local case studies. See Davis, "Looking at Slavery from Broader Perspective"; S.L. Engerman, "Slavery at Different Times and Places", *American Historical Review* 105 (2000), 480-484; P. Kolchin, "The Big Picture: A Comment on David Brion Davis' 'Looking at Slavery from Broader Perspective'", *American Historical Review* 105 (2000), 467-471; R.J. Scott, "Small-scale Dynamics of a Large-Scale Process", *American Historical Review* 105 (2000), 472-479.

⁸⁷ S. Drescher, *The Mighty Experiment. Free Labour versus Slavery in British Emancipation* (Oxford 2002), 3ff. This recent anniversary has been marked by the publication of a special issue of *Slavery & Abolition* and a special supplement to *Parliamentary History*: James Malvin, "Introduction," *Parliamentary History* 26 (2007) [Supplement] 1-11.

⁸⁸ E.E. Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery* (Chapel Hill 1944).

Brion DAVIS, who linked the growing anti-slavery protest to the emergence of secular social philosophy and the rise and dissemination of an individualistic notion of man's "ethic of benevolence." Moreover, the anti-slavery movement was now connected to the Smithsonian notion of individual entrepreneurship and a specific protestant ethic, which had taken roots, above all, in sects like the Quakers.⁸⁹ As an historical artifact, the emergence of an international discourse on slavery "reflected the ideological needs of various groups and classes."⁹⁰ This interpretative construction of a link between an economic structural framework – the emergence of capitalism – and individual behavior has been hotly debated among scholars at a high theoretical level.⁹¹ Despite the theoretical richness of this controversy, almost all contributions were based on premises that took the existence of a capitalist system for granted. Later works amended the debate by concentrating on the growth of self-conscious middle classes as proponents of a public sphere centered on coffee houses, associations, book clubs, and debating societies. They became important organizational platforms for the anti-slavery groups and their political campaigns.⁹²

In a further stage of research, historians' knowledge was broadened by comparative studies which highlighted the actors' different cultural and, above all, religious backgrounds. Protestant faith seems to have played an important role in the public advancement of the anti-slavery movement.⁹³ DAVIS triggered another controversy by his proposal to put slavery and its abolition in a "broader perspective", i.e. "the interrelationships that constituted an Atlantic Slave as well as the place of such racial slavery in the evolution of the Western and modern worlds."⁹⁴ In this debate, Rebecca J. SCOTT has demanded to integrate more dynamic "micro-level data into

⁸⁹ Quoted in D.B. Davis, "The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770-1823", T. Bender (ed.), *The Antislavery Debate. Capitalism and Abolitionism as a Problem in Historical Interpretation* (Berkeley 1992), 15-103, 22-24. This is a reprint of some chapters of D.B. Davis, *The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770-1823* (Cornell 1975).

⁹⁰ Davis, "The Problem of Slavery", 19.

⁹¹ Important contributions to this debate by Thomas L. Haskell, David Bion Davis and John Ashworth are reprinted in T. Bender (ed.), *The Antislavery Debate. Capitalism and Abolitionism as a Problem in Historical Interpretation* (Berkeley 1992).

⁹² J.R. Oldfield, *Popular Politics and British Anti-Slavery. The Mobilisation of Public Opinion against the Slave Trade, 1787-1807* (Manchester 1995).

⁹³ S. Drescher, *Capitalism and Antislavery. British Mobilization in Comparative Perspective* (New York 1987); idem, "The Long Goodbye. Dutch Capitalism and anti-slavery in comparative perspective", *American Historical Review* 99 (1994), 44-69; S.L. Engerman, "Emancipations in Comparative Perspective. A Long and Wide View", G. Oostindie (ed.), *Fifty Years Later. Antislavery, Capitalism and Modernity in the Dutch Orbit* (Leiden 1996), 243-262.

⁹⁴ Davis, "Looking at Slavery from Broader Perspective", 454.

macro-level” explanations.⁹⁵ Although Scott has largely concentrated on slavery itself and not on the movements which campaigned for its abolition, investigations on the micro-level are appropriate to examine the actors who were the backbones of anti-slavery groups. As Scott has argued, these studies identify the perceptions of slavery on the part of the advocates of abolition, reconstruct their propositions and demands and explain their public campaigns. Seymour DRESCHER has recently demonstrated that this approach promises new insights into the motives of the proponents of abolition. According to his findings, the British abolition movement was driven by a unique mixture of economic aims, a strong belief in the usefulness of applying modern science to politics and the successful organization of a mass movement.⁹⁶ Cautiously examining the actors’ perspectives, Drescher was able to identify the origins of the abolition of slavery in the British Empire. In his view, this “mighty experiment” was “the most expensive international policy based on moral action in modern history.”⁹⁷

The anti-slavery movement, too, was rooted in a specific historical context. On the one hand, elites’ views of forced labor changed with the onset of industrial and social modernization. They did not raise moral objections against slavery, but they were driven by a utilitarian ideology that was deeply engrained in the political and philosophical thought of the late eighteenth century.⁹⁸ From the perspective of modern economics, forced labor was less productive than the work of free individuals. On the other hand, religion and the churches profoundly shaped the actors’ views of the world as well as their ideas, aims, and conduct.

Inspired by these convictions, a mass movement for the abolition of slavery arose and expanded. The anti-slavery campaign was also fueled by the emergence of a sphere for free political debates as well as the public sphere of associations, literary circles and clubs, which can be traced back to the Enlightenment.⁹⁹ Especially the role of the *hommes des lettres* (but also of a few energetic women) can hardly be overestimated. As Brycchan Carey has shown for Britain, these writers made use of a specific rhetoric of sensibility that was deeply rooted in dominant

⁹⁵ R.J. Scott, “Small-scale Dynamics of a Large-Scale Process”, G. Oostindie (ed.), *Fifty Years Later. Antislavery, Capitalism and Modernity in the Dutch Orbit* (Leiden 1996), 472-479, 472.

⁹⁶ Drescher, *The Mighty Experiment*.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 232.

⁹⁸ S. Drescher, “Abolitionist Expectations: Britain”, *Slavery & Abolition* 21 (2000), 41-66.

⁹⁹ Unlike their counterparts, the enslaved, which were not interconnected. As recent research has shown, however, this does not mean that slave uprisings did not have any impact on a global scale: Kelvin Santiago-Valles, „World-Historical Ties Among Spontaneous’ Slave Rebellions in the Atlantic,“ *Review. A Journal of the Fernand Braudel Center* 28 (2005), 51-83.

cultural paradigms of the time.¹⁰⁰ Starting in North America and England, the mass movement against slavery finally reached its objectives. It became a model for subsequent social movements. In 1787, the *Society for the Abolition of Slave Trade* was founded in London in order to promote the liberation of slaves all over the world. After the slave trade had been banned in Britain in 1807, the movement continued to pressure various governments on this issue. Its public campaigns were remarkably successful. After the American Civil War, slavery gradually lost its saliency as a political issue, at least in the western hemisphere.¹⁰¹ With the Geneva Anti-Slavery Convention in 1926 it was at last formally abolished.¹⁰²

3.3 Peace Movements

Like the movement for abolition, modern pacifism is rooted in late eighteenth-century Anglo-Saxon politics and culture.¹⁰³ Research on the long-term intellectual origins of pacifist groups has shown that circles and groups which advocated the liberation of the slaves laid the foundations of peace movements.¹⁰⁴ Not surprisingly, it was a Quaker who established the first peace society in Europe in 1814.¹⁰⁵ Educated elites, who were horrified by stories of battlefield carnage after more than twenty years of bloody warfare in the wake of the French Revolution, raised demands similar to those advanced by the anti-slavery movement. Especially in Britain, these groups tried to persuade politicians of the backward nature of warfare.¹⁰⁶ Apart from stressing the disastrous impact of war on civilization, they used the economic drawbacks of warfare as an argument. Particularly serious concerns were raised by the potential disruptions of international trade and market exchanges.¹⁰⁷ Historiography has presented the expansion of the peace movements in

¹⁰⁰ Bryccan Carey, *British Abolitionism and the Rhetoric of Sensibility Writing. Sentiment and Slavery* (London/New York 2005).

¹⁰¹ Oldfield, *Popular Politics and British Anti-Slavery*, 41.

¹⁰² S. Hobe and O. Kimminich, *Einführung in das Völkerrecht. Achte, vollständig neu bearbeitete und erweiterte Auflage* (Tübingen/Basel 2004), 251.

¹⁰³ See Peter Brock, *Pacifism to 1914. An Overview* (Toronto 1994); P. Laity, *The British Peace Movement, 1870-1914* (Oxford 2001).

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 44f.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 28, 38f.

¹⁰⁶ The British case is dealt with by Laity, "The British Peace Movement".

¹⁰⁷ This is stressed in *ibid.*, 40; S.E. Cooper, "The Origins and Development of European Peace Movements: From Vienna to Frankfurt", G. Heiss / H. Lutz (eds.), *Friedensbewegungen: Bedingungen und Wirkungen* (Munich 1984), 75-95, 80f.

Europe usually as a narrative “from elite prescriptions to middle-class participation”¹⁰⁸ and of the professionalization of its organization. In this perspective, nineteenth-century peace activism was extraordinarily successful. Peace movements can take credit for numerous international agreements which were concluded between the governments of European nation-states. Moreover, historians and social scientists have argued that nineteenth-century activism for peace ultimately contributed to the formation of the European Economic Union in the 1950s.

Peace activities, though, were not only driven by strictly humanitarian concerns. Richard Cobden, for example, Britain’s leading early peace activist, was anything but a utopian dreamer. Having campaigned against the Corn Laws, he became a popular politician and a prominent liberal theoretician.¹⁰⁹ But peace activists demanded and claimed strict political neutrality. Independent individuals were to promote the universal good by pursuing their own particular interests – they espoused a free-market ideology.¹¹⁰

Martin CEADEL has pointed out the actors’ ideas and convictions and thus espoused a different point of view.¹¹¹ According to him, a fundamental shift from “fatalist thinking” to a “peace-or-war” mentality has been notable in studies of international relations. A view which regarded war as an unavoidable feature of international politics was gradually transformed into a strain of thought which suggested that war and peace were not only clear alternatives, but different options which could be chosen. CEADEL has explicitly outlined transnational causes of this transformation. According to his interpretation, Enlightenment philosophy blended with (protestant) Christian principles. Stressing progress in human life, this amalgamation inspired the tightening of state administrations and fostered the belief in economic progress. However, a new group of members and supporters of peace movements did not emerge.¹¹²

As has been mentioned, the first peace movement was founded in London; a few years later, the *Société de la morale Chrétienne* (1821) was established in Paris, followed by Comte de

¹⁰⁸ This is the title of the first chapter of S.E. Cooper, *Patriotic Pacifism. Waging War on War in Europe, 1815-1914* (New York 1991), 13-29.

¹⁰⁹ P. Brock, *Varieties of Pacifism. A Survey from Antiquity to the Outset of the Twentieth Century* (Toronto 1998), 57.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 53; Cooper, “The Origins and Developments of European Peace Movements”, 78; D. Riesenberger, *Geschichte der Friedensbewegung in Deutschland. Von den Anfängen bis 1933* (Göttingen 1985), 19-23.

¹¹¹ M. Ceadel, *The Origins of War Prevention. The British Peace Movement and International Relations 1730-1854* (Oxford 1996). Also see his recent work: M. Ceadel, *Semi-Detached Idealists. The British Peace Movement and International Relations, 1854-1945* (Oxford 2000).

¹¹² Ceadel, *The Origins of War Prevention*, part I: “From Fatalism to a Peace-or-War Debate”.

Sellon's *Société de la Paix* in Geneva (1830).¹¹³ Significantly, it was an Anti-Slavery Congress in London, which took place in 1840 that served as a model of the First World Peace Congress (1843).¹¹⁴ And even more significant is the fact that Britain's capital provided the scene for the first major event of international pacifism. Consequently, Britain features widely as a prime example of a strong peace movement.¹¹⁵

In France, Saint-Simonianism left its traces on the peace movement. As early as the 1840s, social egalitarianism emerged as a feature which was to shape pacifism in Europe until the eve of the First World War. Thus, peace groups did not only demand to ban militarism, but also pressed governments to pursue social equality.¹¹⁶ The nascent European movement first assembled in 1848 in Paris. In the wake of the European revolutions, the meeting was hosted by Alexandre de Tocqueville. It peaked in a furious speech by French writer Victor Hugo.¹¹⁷ However, it must be emphasized that mid-nineteenth century liberal thinking has not been equated with pacifism.¹¹⁸

The politics of restoration all over Europe, then, led to a temporary standstill, as the international Peace Congress of 1850 demonstrated. Only about 550 participants gathered at a highly symbolic place, the *Paulskirche* in Frankfurt, where revolutionary meetings had been held only two years earlier. After a series of conferences and meetings, peace activism "slid into somnambulance."¹¹⁹ Bloody conflicts like the Crimean War led to disillusionment among peace activists. They increasingly doubted their ability to influence high politics.

According to Sandi COOPER's interpretation, a change in the membership of peace groups, above all, revitalized pacifism in the second half of the nineteenth century. Whereas the early movements had been controlled by small elites until the mid-nineteenth century, the leading social groups were increasingly joined and supported by members of the middle classes in the following decades.¹²⁰ From the late 1860s to the Great War, pacifist groups vigorously

¹¹³ Cooper, "The Origins and Developments of European Peace Movements", 77; Cooper, *Patriotic Pacifism*, 16.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 77, 82; *idem*, *Patriotic Pacifism*, 21ff.; Riesenberger, *Geschichte der Friedensbewegung in Deutschland*, 18.

¹¹⁵ This, of course, is the case in Laity, "The British Peace Movement".

¹¹⁶ Cooper, *Patriotic Pacifism*, 21 ff.

¹¹⁷ Cooper, "The Origins and Developments of European Peace Movements", 85.

¹¹⁸ F. Nögler, *Von der Idee des Friedens zur Apologie des Krieges: eine Untersuchung geistiger Strömungen im Umfeld des Rotteck-Welckerschen Staatslexikons* (Baden-Baden 1990).

¹¹⁹ Cooper, "The Origins and Developments of European Peace Movements", 87.

¹²⁰ Cooper, *Patriotic Pacifism*, 28.

campaigns for peace. In 1867, organized peace activities erupted across Europe. The *Ligue internationale de la paix et la liberté*, which included Victor Hugo, J.S. Mill, Bakunin, Herzen, and Garibaldi as prominent members, and the *Ligue internationale et permanente de la Paix* were founded in Geneva and Paris, respectively.¹²¹ Scattered across France, different peace societies like the *Union de la Paix* in Le Havre were established. Pacifist groups were formed in other European states, too, notably in Italy, Belgium and Germany. The links between the expanding women's networks and the pacifist movement also increased the political thrust of these organizations.¹²²

On the eve of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870/71, three different "schools" of European pacifism had emerged. The first type, represented by the *Ligues* of Sellon in Geneva and Passy in Paris, have been designated as "conservative" by Sandi E. COOPER, as they were almost exclusively devoted to the maintenance of international order.¹²³ They recruited their members from the ranks of academics and were strongly tied to economic liberalism. The second, radical or republican "school" combined a concern for international peace with an updated Jacobin program of international human rights. Its members were mainly drawn from republican refugees and Saint-Simonians. The third group was largely identical with early socialist internationalism.

According to COOPER, this transformation of the ideological foundations of peace movements gave rise to new organizational structures. As transnational ties strengthened, the objectives of peace activists also changed. Thus, her book focuses on a group of mainly Protestant students who assembled in a circle called the *Association des jeunes amis de la Paix* in Nîmes in 1887. Rooted in the French countryside, they kept close ties to Priscilla Hannah Peckover, an English Quaker. She had met the founder of the *Association des jeunes amis de la Paix* as a student.¹²⁴ The development of new means of communication and transport are unanimously regarded as crucial factors for the growing transnational orientations of peace movements in Europe. In the 1880s, for example, the expanding European railway network was widely used by peace activists.¹²⁵ Moreover, the pacifist movements opened themselves to new

¹²¹ Cooper, "The Origins and Developments of European Peace Movements", 89; Cooper, *Patriotic Pacifism*, 33, 36; Riesenberger, *Geschichte der Friedensbewegung in Deutschland*, 37-39. Laity, "The British Peace Movement", 30.

¹²² For a later period, see J. Vellacot, "Feminims as if all People Mattered: Working to Remove the Causes of War", *Contemporary European History* 10 (2001), 375-394.

¹²³ This argument follows Cooper, "The Origins and Developments of European Peace Movements", 94.

¹²⁴ Cooper, *Patriotic Pacifism*, 57.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 63.

organizational structures, which they borrowed, for example, from Henri Dunant's *International Red Cross*.¹²⁶

The last decades before the First World War are unanimously seen as the apogee of the pacifist movement.¹²⁷ The *Paris Universal Peace Congress* of 1889, which took place simultaneously with the World Exhibition and the Meeting of the (Second) *Workers' International*, aroused much interest and enthusiasm in European and North American states alike. In these remarkable days of the "epochal year" for the European peace movement, the *Interparliamentary Union* (IPU) was founded.¹²⁸ It held its first meeting in 1891, when 96 parliamentarians from seven states met.¹²⁹ The IUP was organized in cooperation with the British Members of Parliament, W.R. Cremer, the founder of the *Workmen's Peace Association*, and F. Passy, who had established the *Ligue internationale pour la paix* and the *Société pour l'arbitrage entre les nations*. This intensified cooperation with politicians encouraged peace movements to turn to international law as a propaganda tool. International law was to regulate political relations between nation-states and prevent wars. According to COOPER, references to international law had come to the fore in the campaigns of conservative pacifist groups by the mid-1870s.¹³⁰ As Dorothy V. Jones has shown, the history of the struggle for peace can also be interpreted as a struggle for international law and justice.¹³¹

At the turn of the century, the balance was mixed for pacifism in Europe. On the one hand, pacifist groups could look back on an impressive organizational base and notable political achievements. In 1892, for instance, an international *Peace Bureau*, which coordinated movements in over 20 nations, was established in Bern.¹³² At the First and Second Peace

¹²⁶ Ibid., 35. On the Red Cross, see M. Finnemore, "Rules of War and Wars of Rule: The International Red Cross and the Restraint of State Violence", J. Boli / G.M. Thomas (eds.), *Constructing World Culture. International Nongovernmental Organizations Since 1875* (Stanford 1999), 149-165; D. Riesenberger, *Das Deutsche Rote Kreuz. Eine Geschichte 1864-1990* (Paderborn 2002); D. Riesenberger, *Für Humanität in Krieg und Frieden: Das internationale Rote Kreuz 1863-1977* (Göttingen 1992); M. Vilain, "Das Internationale Rote Kreuz als NGO", C. Frantz / A. Zimmer (eds.), *Zivilgesellschaft international. Alte und neue NGOs* (Opladen 2002), 119-135.

¹²⁷ Jay Winter, however, lets his essay on "dreams of peace and freedom" begin in 1900: Jay M. Winter, *Dreams of Peace and Freedom. Utopian Moments in the Twentieth Century* (New Haven 2006).

¹²⁸ R. Uhlig, *Die Interparlamentarische Union 1889-1914. Friedenssicherungsbemühungen im Zeitalter des Imperialismus* (Stuttgart 1988), 65 ff.

¹²⁹ Riesenberger, *Geschichte der Friedensbewegung*, 39.

¹³⁰ Cooper, *Patriotic Pacifism*, 46f.

¹³¹ Dorothy V. Jones, *Toward a Just World. The Critical Years in the Search for International Justice* (Chicago/London 2002).

¹³² These figures have been taken from Cooper, "The Origins and Developments of European Peace Movements", 75.

Conferences in The Hague (1899 and 1907), national governments met to discuss plans for arms reduction under the supervision of non-governmental peace organizations.¹³³ Moreover, the IPU seemed to become an effective instrument of control over the secret diplomacy of national governments.¹³⁴ On the other hand, tensions between the different strands and branches of the peace movement led to conflicts about the nature and aims of pacifism itself in the late nineteenth century. As there are few specific works on this topic, historians continue to rely on general studies. But the sheer fact that representatives as diverse as the Russian founding father of anarchism, Mikhail Bakunin, and distinguished British aristocrats like Lord Cambden, had to come to terms with each other during the peace conferences points to the difficulties in transnational communication between the proponents of European pacifism. The increasingly important role of women in promoting visions of peace will be dealt with in the next chapter.¹³⁵ Another interesting group which has not yet attracted much attention is the Russian Sect of *Tolstoyans*, which were not only active in Russia, but also disseminated their pacifist message across Europe.¹³⁶ On the brink of the Russian civil war, the members of this fringe group refused to enlist for military service.¹³⁷

In July 1914, all efforts of the peace activists seemed useless. Although the war if attrition promoted the formation of pacifist groups like the International Committee of Women for Permanent Peace (ICWPP) in 1915, their campaigns did not meet a strong response in countries like Austria, Belgium, France and Germany. Yet the failure of the peace movements to prevent war and to terminate hostilities from 1914 to 1918 inspired pacifists to establish new organizations after 1918. These movements aimed at superseding national frameworks by founding branches all over Europe.¹³⁸ Thus, the ICWPP was transformed into the *Women's International League for Freedom and Peace* in 1919. Eleven years later, it had spread to thirty

¹³³ J. Dülffer, *Regeln gegen den Krieg? Die Haager Friedenskonferenzen von 1899 und 1907 in der internationalen Politik* (Berlin 1981); B. Seary, "The Early History. From the Congress of Vienna to the San Francisco Conference", P. Willetts (ed.), "The Conscience of the World". *The Influence of Non-Governmental Organisations in the UN System* (Washington 1996), 15-30, 15ff.

¹³⁴ This is the principal proposition of Uhlig, *Die Interparlamentarische Union 1889-1914*.

¹³⁵ For a collection of sources on the German movements, see H. Lischewski, *Morgenröte einer besseren Zeit. Pazifistische Frauen 1892-1932* (Münster 1995).

¹³⁶ Brock, *Pacifism to 1914*, 48.

¹³⁷ Examples are mentioned by J.A. Sanborn, *Drafting the Russian Nation. Military Conscription, Total War, and Mass Politics, 1905-1925* (DeKalb / Il. 2003).

¹³⁸ This proposition has been advanced by Riesenberger, *Geschichte der Friedensbewegung in Deutschland*, 143. For a detailed study, see Annika Wilmers, *Pazifismus in der internationalen Frauenbewegung (1914-1920). Handlungsspielräume, politische Konzeptionen und gesellschaftliche Auseinandersetzungen* (Essen 2008).

states.¹³⁹ 1937 marked the symbolical end of nineteenth-century pacifism. At the Paris World's Fair of the same year, the spectacular and simultaneous displays of anti-war protest in Picasso's *Guernica*, the new *League of Nations*, a Pavilion of Peace, were already overshadowed by the spectacular pavilions of two totalitarian regimes of a new type. It is plausible that the Soviet and Nazi buildings were intended by the organizers to face one another. In Jay Winter's reading this stands as the last symbolic statement of a pacifism that still believed in a shared European *mission civilatrice*, as he has recently reminded us in his essay on "Dreams of Peace and Freedom."¹⁴⁰

Despite this transnational orientation, historians have generally dealt with the transformation of peace movements in the interwar period within the confines of national paradigms.¹⁴¹ Yet they agree on the view that the shattering experience of industrialized warfare ultimately strengthened cross-border ties between the movements.¹⁴² All in all, the impact of the First World War on international cooperation between peace groups can hardly be overestimated. But the evolution of transnational networks between peace activists was also profoundly influenced by the establishment of the League of Nations. For the first time in history, a significant number of national governments joined together in a supranational organization and thereby recognized and confirmed the central role of international laws for promoting peace.

A different interpretation of this period of time has been proposed by Ilde GORGUET, who has studied the various attempts to create links between the French and German peace movements and thus to reconcile the former "arch-enemies."¹⁴³ In general, the different outcomes of the First World War shaped the programs of the national peace movements. Whereas they achieved legitimate status in Britain,¹⁴⁴ the German and French movements were split

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Jay Winter, *Dreams of Peace and Freedom. Utopian Moments in the Twentieth Century* (New Haven & London 2006), 75-98, esp. 97.

¹⁴¹ See P. Brock / T.P. Socknat (eds.), *Challenge to Mars: Essays on Pacifism from 1918 to 1945* (Toronto London 1999); M. Vaisse (ed.), *Le pacifisme en Europe des années 1920 aux années 1950* (Brussels 1993).

¹⁴² Riesenberger, *Für Humanität in Krieg und Frieden. On the impact of the First World War on collective identities in Europe*, see, for example, B. Davis, "Experience, Identity, and Memory: The Legacy of World War I", *Journal of Modern History* 75 (2003), 111-131; H. Mommsen (ed.), *Der Erste Weltkrieg und die europäische Nachkriegsordnung. Sozialer Wandel und Formveränderung der Politik* (Cologne 2000).

¹⁴³ I. Gorguet, *Les mouvements pacifistes et la réconciliation franco-allemande dans les années vingt (1919-1931)* (Bern 1999).

¹⁴⁴ M. Ceadel, "A Legitimate Peace Movement: The Case of Interwar Britain, 1918-1945", P. Brock / T.P. Socknat (eds.), *Challenge to Mars: Essays on Pacifism from 1918 to 1945* (Toronto 1999), 134-148; M. Ceadel, *Thinking about Peace and War* (Oxford 1987).

between veterans' organizations and left-wing socialist groups. In Germany, pacifist groups also rejected the Versailles Treaty, which they denounced as the seedbed of another war. Moreover, transnational activism for peace failed to make a strong impact on government policy, as Thomas Richard DAVIES has demonstrated in his detailed study of the world disarmament conference, which was held from 1931 to October 1933.¹⁴⁵ On the whole, however, historiography on the transnational dimension of the European peace movement has remained weak.

Few monographs on the cross-border expansion of peace movements in post-war Europe have been published. The interaction, exchange, and interdependencies between various peace groups have only recently been tackled by historians such as Holger NEHRING, who has published case studies of transnational relations between British and German protest movements against nuclear weapons.¹⁴⁶ In a later study, Nehring and Helge PHARO have argued in favor of a holistic understanding of peace. In their view, historical research should not focus narrowly on singular peace movements and their various results. Instead, peace is to be defined as “a dynamic equilibrium, in which the semantic content, argumentative context and political and social foundations of ‘peace’ have been constantly negotiated between different international and domestic actors, between town and countryside, between different religions, between refugees and domestic populations, and between military organizations and civil-society actors.”¹⁴⁷ The special issue, from which this introduction is taken, demonstrates the usefulness of this approach and can be regarded as the latest stage in historical research on peace movements.

In his analysis of the influence of transnational actors such as scientists, Matthew EVANGELISTA has investigated the foundation of a transatlantic movement for nuclear disarmament after the famous manifesto of British philosopher and mathematician Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein was published in 1955. The *Pugwash Committee on Science and World Affairs*, as it came to be known, was established by Joseph Rotblat, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1995. In his book, EVANGELISTA has demonstrated how transnational actors and scientific networks – so-called 'epistemic communities' – succeeded in putting pressure on a

¹⁴⁵ T.R. Davies, *The Possibilities of Transnational Activism. The Campaign for Disarmament between the Two World Wars* (Leiden 1999).

¹⁴⁶ H. Nehring, “Towards a social history of transnational relations: The British and West German protests against nuclear weapons, 1957-1964”, J. Gienow-Hecht (ed.), *New Perspectives on Culture and International History* (New York 2005). Also see idem, “Cold War, Apocalypse and Peaceful Atoms. Interpretations of Nuclear Energy in the British and West German Anti-Nuclear Weapons Movements, 1955-1964”, *Historical Social Research* 29 (2004), No. 3, 150-170.

¹⁴⁷ H. Nehring / H. Pharo, “Introduction: A Peaceful Europe? Negotiating Peace in the Twentieth Century”, *Contemporary European History* 17 (2008), 277-299 (quotation: p. 278).

political system as secretive as the Soviet Union.¹⁴⁸ His biased and static judgements on Soviet history notwithstanding, EVANGELISTA has convincingly shown that even in the field of security politics shared norms and beliefs fostered the emergence of a cross-border social movement. Yet many peace movements and groups were profoundly influenced by the global confrontation of the Cold War. Wilfried von BREDOW and Rudolf BROCKE already argued in 1987 that the search for choices beyond and beneath the bipolar confrontation inspired the activities of peace activists. In their view, peace had become a transnational issue mainly because of the obvious threat of nuclear war to human life. Moreover, the Soviet Union had constituted the World Peace Council as a platform for peace movements engaged in cross-border activities. However, this organization was based on the doctrine of ‘socialist internationalism’, which ultimately was to promote Soviet foreign policy.¹⁴⁹

Transnational orientations in the protest movements against war, namely the movement against the First Gulf War in 1991, suggest that anti-war groups have increasingly become globalised. Ruud KOOPMANS, for instance, has concluded that the war of 1991 seems to be “the first truly ‘global war’.” The extensive global media coverage of the war and the wide diffusion of similar images triggered off vigorous protest, which shook various national governments simultaneously.¹⁵⁰ However, whereas the pictures of the war were similar all over the world, the forms of mobilization and organization of the protests differed markedly. KOOPMAN has emphasized that “the translation of global social processes still passes through a powerful filter of national political cultures and opportunity structures.”¹⁵¹ This ambiguity between national frameworks and transnational orientations will hopefully be investigated in further detailed studies.

Peace movements have fueled transnational and intercultural collaboration between actors of civil society, because peace is a fundamental concern that transcends borders. Moreover, the influential advocacy of war demanded a strong response, especially in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As the rise of dissent movements from the First World War to the 1980s demonstrates, belligerency gave rise to peace campaigns that have repeatedly transcended

¹⁴⁸ M. Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War* (Ithaca / NY 1999).

¹⁴⁹ W. v. Bredow / R.H. Brocke, *Krise und Protest. Ursprünge und Elemente der Friedensbewegung in Westeuropa* (Opladen 1987).

¹⁵⁰ R. Koopmans, “A Comparison of Protests against the Gulf War in Germany, France and the Netherlands”, D. della Porta / H.-P. Kriesi / D. Rucht (eds.), *Social Movements in a Globalizing World* (Houndmills 1999), 57-70.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 69.

national and cultural borders. In their pleas for peace, activists have appealed to civility as the core value of civil society.¹⁵²

3.4 Women's Movement

Researchers have divided the history of the women's movement into three "waves" of feminism.¹⁵³ Interestingly, the first wave of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century has only recently attracted scholarly attention.¹⁵⁴ Investigations have largely concentrated on the North American continent as the birthplace of a feminist movement, which emerged, as it has been argued, in close connection with the abolitionist movement.¹⁵⁵

Two important studies have recently shed some light on the emergence of a transnational women's movement in Europe. Bonnie ANDERSON investigates the international women's movement's early years, whereas Karen OFFEN narrates more than two hundred years of European feminism.¹⁵⁶ Anderson has argued that international feminism first peaked in the late 1850s, when politically active women, who had been driven to take exile in the United States after the suppression of revolutions in Europe, joined their American sisters.¹⁵⁷ The majority of these women had previously worked for socialist networks in Europe where they had established ties to their fellow-activists in foreign states. Anderson has pointed out that the "demand for

¹⁵² Kaelble, *Sozialgeschichte*, 314-318.

¹⁵³ B.S. Anderson, *Joyous Greetings. The First International Women's Movement, 1830-1860* (New York 2000), 19; I. Lenz / M. Mae / K. Klose, "Frauenbewegung weltweit", I. Lenz / M. Mae / K. Klose (eds.), *Frauenbewegung weltweit. Aufbrüche, Kontinuitäten, Veränderungen* (Opladen 2000), 7-20, 19.

¹⁵⁴ Apart from two pioneering studies, see J. Evans, *The Feminists: Women's Emancipation Movements in Europe, Amerika, and Australasia, 1840-1920* (London 1977); J. Rendall, *The Origins of Modern Feminism: Women in Britain, France, and the United States, 1780-1860* (London 1983). One German title could be added, which has been largely ignored by English and American authors: B. Schnetzler, *Die frühe amerikanische Frauenbewegung und ihre Kontakte mit Europa (1836-1869)* (Bern 1971).

¹⁵⁵ See, for example: S.S. Holton, "Segregation, Racism and White Women Reformers: A Transnational Perspective, 1840-1912", *Women's History Review* 10 (2001), 5-25; J.R. Jeffrey, *The Great Silent Army of Abolition. Ordinary Women in the Antislavery Movement* (Chapel Hill 1998). For a survey of the literature on American feminism, see A.M. Boylan, *The Origins of Women's Activism. New York and Boston, 1797-1840* (University of North Carolina Press 2002), esp. 3-5. An attempt at placing the American Women's movement in a global perspective is Lee Ann Banaszak (ed.), *The U.S. Women's Movement in Global Perspective* (Lanham et al. 2006). Unfortunately, the volume is, in fact, mainly and merely a collection of articles on various national movements.

¹⁵⁶ B. Anderson, *Joyous Greetings. The First International Women's Movement, 1830-1860* (New York 2000) and K. Offen, *European Feminism 1700-1950. A Political History* (Stanford 2000). A monograph on Anglo-American feminism has been added by Lucy Delap, *The Feminist Avant-Garde: Transatlantic Encounters of the Early Twentieth Century* (Cambridge 2007).

¹⁵⁷ Anderson, *Joyous Greetings*, 24-27, 179-206.

women's rights arose primarily from women who had been active in movements seeking to reform and improve society."¹⁵⁸ In the United States, they came into contact with women who had already gained some experience in practical work for political associations. Investigations into early American feminism have underpinned the importance of activities such as the organization of fairs and bazaars, which opened up a world beyond the confines of traditional females' roles.¹⁵⁹ These experiences were transferred to Britain where they were taken up by women who spread information on feminist activities across Europe in the latter half of the nineteenth century.¹⁶⁰ Ann Knight, for example, founded the *Sheffield Female Political Association*. She was a Quaker who had engaged in abolitionist activities.¹⁶¹ In the late 1850s, when changes in the means of communications and transport seemed to herald a new era of boundless progress, a truly transnational women's movement emerged.¹⁶² Altogether, this transfer significantly contributed to the foundation of women's groups and movements in Europe. Feminism thus appears to be the result of a complex system of cross-Atlantic cultural transfers.

In her path-breaking political history of European feminism, Karen OFFEN has argued in favor of transnational feminism's revival in the 1870s and 1880s. After feminism had almost broken down after the mass emigration in the wake of the mid-century's revolutions, five "offsetting and intersecting contextual dimensions" led to the re-emergence of feminism and its international expansion: (1) the rising literacy and level of education among women, (2) the growth of nationalism and the formation of nation-states, (3) women's entry into an increasingly urbanised workforce that enabled them to work outside the household in the urban public realm, (4) the increasing rivalry between feminists and socialists, which encouraged feminists to raise more concrete demands and finally, the establishment of a flurry of international organizations at the turn of the century.¹⁶³ Feminists' networks tightened in 1889 when Bertha von Suttner's influential 'Down with the Arms' (*Die Waffen nieder*) was published. In the same year, two

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 11 For the American context, a similar interpretation has been proposed by: M. Tax, *The Rising of the Women. Feminist Solidarity and Class Conflict, 1880-1917* (Urbana / Chicago 2001) [originally published in New York 1980].

¹⁵⁹ Jeffrey, *The Great Silent Army of Abolition*, 8f. and especially chapter 3.3.; D. van Broekhoven, "Better than a Clay Club": The Organization of Women's Anti-Slavery Fairs', *Slavery & Abolition* 19 (1998), 24-45.

¹⁶⁰ L. Sauerteig, "Frauenemanzipation und Sittlichkeit: Die Rezeption des englischen Abolitionismus in Deutschland", R. Muhs / J. Paulmann / W. Steinmetz (eds.), *Aneignung und Abwehr. Interkultureller Transfer zwischen Deutschland und Großbritannien im 19. Jahrhundert* (Bodenheim 1998), 159-197.

¹⁶¹ Anderson, *Joyous Greetings*, 8.

¹⁶² Ibid., 23f.

¹⁶³ K. Offen, *European Feminism 1700-1950. A Political History* (Stanford 2000), 79-83.

international women's congresses were held in Paris amid the centennial of the French Revolution, the euphoria over the World's Fair, and other international meetings. By the late 1880s, the term "feminism" was increasingly used.¹⁶⁴ Covering the decades from the late nineteenth century to 1950, OFFEN has identified considerable similarities between cross-border feminism and pacifism in Europe. Not only did these movements expand in the 1880s, but they were also challenged by national emancipation ideologies and the often male-dominated programs of the internationalist worker's associations. In most European nation-states, the demand for state legislation in order to 'protect' women in industries became a hotly debated issue.¹⁶⁵

Whereas one strand of feminism increasingly adopted a nationalist stance in their struggle toward emancipation (as shown in the contributions to a volume edited by Ute PLANERT),¹⁶⁶ OFFEN has pointed out that internationalist feminist organizations often conflicted with the "international proletarianism" of the Second International. In 1902, the *International Women Suffrage Alliance* (IWSA) was set up in Washington D.C., and in 1903 the *Women's Social and Political Union* was founded in Manchester. The female members of these organizations dealt with topics like sex education, state-regulated prostitution, and women's suffrage in public meetings. The networks of the internationalist women's movement thus had a profound impact on national policies. But they were increasingly diverse, as a wide scope of international and transnational organizations, which often pursued different aims, were founded at the beginning of the twentieth century. A *Joint Standing Committee of Women's International Organizations* was finally founded in 1925. It aimed at pressuring the League of Nations and the International Labour Organization on women's issues.¹⁶⁷ As European women approached political equality, the debate in feminist circles turned to a more general view which identified 'women's issues' with 'human issues.' Demands were therefore increasingly directed to the United Nations and some other international organizations.

Whereas OFFEN has acquainted us with the neglected political history of the "first wave" of women's movements, Leila RUPP has followed a different approach. She has concentrated on the creation of cross-border female identities in a global context – based on Benedict

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 19f., 170-180.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 230.

¹⁶⁶ U. Planert (ed.), *Nation, Politik und Geschlecht. Frauenbewegung und Nationalismus in der Moderne* (Frankfurt am Main 2000).

¹⁶⁷ Offen, *European Feminism*, 347.

ANDERSON's concept of "imagined communities."¹⁶⁸ Her account comes close to the narrative of a failed project, as the women's movement did not prevent outbreak of hostilities in 1914. But in her view, nineteenth-century feminism succeeded in creating internationalist identities, which were largely shaped by international institutions.¹⁶⁹ The "first wave" of feminism, she argued, resulted in the emergence of multiple identities oscillating between inclusion and exclusion and thus foreshadowed the transnational identities of the late twentieth century.¹⁷⁰ In a later article, RUPP has analyzed this "complex relationship between nationalism and internationalism" with regard to the *International Council of Women (ICW)* and the *IWSA*.¹⁷¹ The feminist ideology of difference, which only could evolve in a dynamic global system, demonstrates once more that nation-states were needed in order to create transnational identities.

The role of the ICW, which was founded in 1888, has also been highlighted by Hartmut KAELBLE. The organization was founded by European and American women. Moreover, it shared the widespread feelings of superiority vis-à-vis non-European women, in particular in the colonies. By the 1970s, however, the ICW had evolved into a worldwide organization that has proposed a political agenda on a global scale. In a similar vein, it has increasingly taken a multilateral approach to specifically female problems and demands. This transformation has been supported by the U.N., which has organized and conducted global women's conferences in Mexico (1975), Copenhagen (1980), Nairobi (1985), and Beijing (1995). Yet no independent organization has taken the place of the early ICW in Europe, although the European Commission and the European Court have enhanced gender equality.¹⁷²

Feminist literature on recent developments has stressed the role which "internationalist experiences" have played in shaping the world views and programs of the women's movement after 1945.¹⁷³ Against this background, the women's movement was propelled by a "second

¹⁶⁸ B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York 1991).

¹⁶⁹ L.J. Rupp, "Constructing Internationalism: The Case of Transnational Women's Organizations", *American Historical Review* 99 (1994), 1571-1600; idem, *Worlds of Women. The Making of an International Women's Movement* (Princeton 1997), esp. 207 ff.

¹⁷⁰ Rupp, *World of Women*, 228ff.

¹⁷¹ L. Rupp, "The Making of International Women's Organizations", M.H. Geyer / J. Paulmann (eds.), *The Mechanics of Internationalism. Culture, Society, and Politics from the 1840s to the First World War* (London 2001), 205-234, 233.

¹⁷² Kaelble, *Sozialgeschichte*, 312-314.

¹⁷³ Lenz / Mae / Klose, "Frauenbewegungen weltweit", 13; Anja Weckwert/Ulla Wischermann (eds.), *Das Jahrhundert des Feminismus* (Königstein, Taunus 2006).

wave” in the 1970s, the UN’s decade of women.¹⁷⁴ Research on European movements has underpinned the central role of the program for social action, which was drafted at the EU summit in 1972. The promotion of women’s interests and concerns thus became an official policy of the European Commission.¹⁷⁵ Few investigations into the transnational ties of women’s movements in Europe in the 1970s have been published. Yet some studies of “new social movements” such as Dieter RUCHT’s,¹⁷⁶ which deals with France, Germany, and Britain in a comparative perspective, have shown that feminism organized itself around new principles. Ines HOLTHAUS demonstrated in more detail, the programmatic scope of women’s movements was increasingly extended in order to tackle global issues.¹⁷⁷ This change, in turn, encouraged female activists to adopt new organizational structures and procedures. According to Robert O’BRIEN, Anne Marie GOETZ, Jan Aart SCHOLTE, and Marc WILLIAMS, loose networks and low political leverage are the principal features of globally-oriented women’s movements.¹⁷⁸ In their fascinating case study, the authors have also presented evidence for their proposition that these groups have adopted sophisticated and politically credible critical stances on economic developments in recent decades. For example, they have even been able to put pressure on the World Bank. However, the global interconnections between feminist movements have also given rise to new conflicts. As the chapters in two volumes on issues of global feminism (edited by Ilse LENZ/Michiko MAE/Karin KLOSE and M.J. DIAMOND, respectively) have convincingly demonstrated, the integration of formerly excluded women from “Third World” states has nourished cultural misunderstandings and conflicts over the aims and strategies of contemporary

¹⁷⁴ G. Ashworth, “The United Nations ‘Women Conference’ and International Linkages in the Women's Movement”, P. Willets (ed.), *Pressure Groups in the Global System. The Transnational Relations of Issue-Orientated Non-Governmental Organizations* (London 1982), 125-147; R. Dackweiler, “‘Wir sind der Nukleus der globalen Zivilgesellschaft’ – Zusammenspiel und Wechselverhältnis in der internationalen Frauenbewegung am Beispiel des österreichischen Gewaltschutzgesetzes”, I. Lenz, et al. (eds.), *Frauenbewegung weltweit. Aufbrüche, Kontinuitäten, Veränderungen* (Opladen 2000), 167-198.

¹⁷⁵ V. Schmidt, “Vom Wechselverhältnis zwischen europäischer Frauenpolitik und europäischen Frauenorganisationen”, I. Lenz / M. Mae / K. Klose (eds.), *Frauenbewegungen weltweit. Aufbrüche, Kontinuitäten, Veränderungen* (Opladen 2000), 199-232.

¹⁷⁶ D. Rucht, *Modernisierung und neue soziale Bewegungen. Deutschland, Frankreich und USA im Vergleich* (Frankfurt am Main 1994), 185-232.

¹⁷⁷ I. Holthaus, “Neuere Entwicklungen der internationalen Frauenbewegung: Reaktionen auf globale Prozesse”, *Forschungsjournal Neue Soziale Bewegungen* 9 (1996), 61-70.

¹⁷⁸ R. O'Brien et al., *Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social Movements* (Cambridge 2000), 24-66, esp. 33.

feminism.¹⁷⁹ Only recently have researchers begun to trace the impact of women's movements in post-communist countries on both the history and the present of European actors, as a superb volume by Edith SAURER, Margareth LANZIGER, and Elisabeth FRYSAK aptly demonstrates.¹⁸⁰ As is well known, feminism started to exert considerable influence on the social sciences in the 1980s. Christine SYLVESTER shows in her "Feminist International Relations" that from this decade on feminist theories were, although mostly by feminist researcher's themselves, integrated into the field of International Relations.¹⁸¹

3.5 Workers' Associations

The historiography on workers' associations had been strongly influenced by the actors' self-images: It is the typical example of a historiography in which researchers and their objects overlapped for a long time.¹⁸² It may seem absurd, but under the impact of the *internationalist* ideology of the working-class movement workers' associations have been regarded as the standard example of a *transnational* movement. As several historians have shown, this assumption has caused serious methodological and theoretical problems as some labour representatives have claimed a superior insight into the history of the workers' movement.¹⁸³ After critical research on the topic peaked in the 1970s, interest in the workers' movement has steeply declined in recent years.¹⁸⁴ Apart from nostalgic reviews by activists, historiography on

¹⁷⁹ M.J. Diamond (ed.), *Women and Revolution: Global Expressions* (Dordrecht 1998); I. Lenz / M. Mae / K. Klose (eds.), *Frauenbewegung weltweit. Aufbrüche, Kontinuitäten, Veränderungen* (Opladen 2000).

¹⁸⁰ Edith Saurer / Margareth Lanzinger / Elisabeth Frysak (eds.), *Women's Movements. Networks and Debates in post-communist Countries in the 19th and 20th Centuries* (Cologne 2006).

¹⁸¹ C. Sylvester, *Feminist International Relations. An Unfinished Journey* (Cambridge 2002), esp. 15.

¹⁸² Cf. M. van der Linden / L. H. van Voss, "Introduction", L. H. van Voss / M. van der Linden (eds.), *Class and Other Identities. Gender, Religion and Ethnicity in the Writing of European Labour History* (New York / Oxford 2002), 1-39, 11.

¹⁸³ R. Cox, "Civil society at the turn of the Millennium: prospects for an alternative world order", *Review of International Studies* 25 (1999), 3-28.

¹⁸⁴ The classical works on this topic now seem to be outdated as regards their methodological approach. See G. Bush, *The Political Role of International Trade Unions* (London 1983); L. Lorwin, *The International Labor Movement* (Westport 1973); F. van Holthoon / M. van der Linde (eds.), *Internationalism in the Labour Movement, 1830-1940, 2 Volumes* (Leiden 1988).

the topic has substantially dwindled.¹⁸⁵ By contrast, empirical studies have largely concentrated on the current problems of international trade unionism.¹⁸⁶

The international workers' movement is rooted in the early nineteenth century. As its very designation indicated, it cannot be viewed independently from nationalism, its constant point of reference. As early as 1818, Richard Owen demanded international labor legislation. In his famous 'Communist Manifesto' of 1848, Karl Marx called upon the workers in all nation-states to unite and thus to transgress national borders. In 1864, the *International Working Men's Association*, the *First International*, was founded. The organization was dissolved twelve years later, mainly because of internecine quarrels between Karl Marx and Michail Bakunin. However, the *Second International Working Men's Association* was founded in Paris at the centennial of the French Revolution. As an integral part of the workers' movement, the trade unions constituted separate institutional bodies. The first International Trade Union Conference took place in Berlin in 1901. In 1913, the *Internationaler Gewerkschaftsbund* (International Trade Union Confederation) was established as an international association of trade unions.

According to Moira DONALD, the success of the Second International success was largely due to the particular social and cultural environment it was faced with. In particular, new means of communication and the substantial growth in literacy among workers increased the social cohesion of the working class.¹⁸⁷ The *Second International* even managed to establish educational institutions for workers, which significantly contributed to the marked geographical extension of the organization in the early twentieth century.¹⁸⁸ According to a volume by Jürgen HERRES and Manfred NEUHAUS, the intensified exchange of letters did not only reach bourgeois (*bürgerliche*) circles, but it also contributed to setting up a political public sphere which was directed against official government policies.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁵ Sozialistische Bewegungen gegen Militarismus und Krieg. Erfahrungen und Lehren (Schkeuditz 2000). This book has been published by the "historical commissions" of the PDS, an offshoot of the former East German Socialist Unity Party (SED), and the still existing German Communist Party (DKP).

¹⁸⁶ Recent research on this topic has been presented by K. Moody, *Workers in a Lean World* (London 1997); R. Munck / P. Waterman (eds.), *Labour Worldwide in the Era of Globalization* (London 1999); P. Waterman, *Globalization, Social Movements and the New Internationalism* (London 1998).

¹⁸⁷ M. Donald, "Workers of the World Unite? Exploring the Enigma of the Second International", M.H. Geyer / J. Paulmann (eds.), *The Mechanics of Internationalism. Culture, Society, and Politics from the 1840s to the First World War* (London 2001), 177-204.

¹⁸⁸ D.E. Devreese, "The International Working Men's Association (1864-1876) and Workers' Education: A Historical Approach", *Paedagogica Historica* 35 (1999), 15-21.

¹⁸⁹ J. Herres / M. Neuhaus (eds.), *Politische Netzwerke durch Briefkommunikation. Briefkultur der politischen Oppositionsbewegungen und frühen Arbeiterbewegungen im 19. Jahrhundert* (Berlin 2002).

In the years after the Second World War, the social and political context of the international worker's movement and trade union movement changed once more. At first glance, the power of trade unions in industrial disputes peaked in the 1960s, as Hartmut KAELBLE has emphasized. Thus they emerged as key pillars of the nascent transnational civil society. Yet trade unions in major industrial states have been faced with considerable problems and ambiguities since 1945. In general, they have been challenged by increasingly strong employers' associations. The ongoing process of European integration, for instance, has not only enhanced cross-border cooperation between trade unions, but also propelled the formation of strong employers' associations. Agrarian pressure groups like the *Comité des organisations professionnelles agricoles* (COPA) and organisations of industry such as the *Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe* (UNICE) have restricted the power of trade unions on a European scale.¹⁹⁰

Even more seriously, their traditional orientation towards the nation-states as well as the bipolar confrontation of the two superpowers, which utilized the workers' movements in their ideological struggles, undermined the internationalist claims of the workers' representatives. According to Daphne JOSSELIN, the fight between the Soviet-dominated *World Federation of Trade Unions* (WFTU) and the strongly anti-communist *International Confederation of Free Trade Unions* (ICFTU) absorbed a good deal of political power and organizational capacities.¹⁹¹ In recent years, workers' organizations have been faced with new problems. JOSSELIN shows that three factors have reduced the attractiveness of international unionism to its sympathizers. *First*, their long-lived traditions have inhibited necessary structural reforms. *Secondly*, the unions are still deeply embedded in domestic political structures. This dependency has impeded the formation of cross-national coalitions. *Thirdly*, the shift in employment towards non-unionized labour has significantly contributed to a decrease in trade union membership on a global level.

Robert O'BRIEN and his co-authors have emphasized similar structural problems. In their view, the dwindling attractiveness of trade unions has resulted, above all, from their hierarchical structure. CFTU, which had been joined by 136 states by 1996, coordinates the work of different International Trade Secretariats, which are continuously involved in negotiations with employers. These secretariats are closely affiliated to national or regional trade unions. DELLA PORTA and

¹⁹⁰ H. Kaelble, *Sozialgeschichte Europas. 1945 bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich 2007), 304f.

¹⁹¹ D. Josselin, "Back to the Front Line? Trade Unions in a Global Age", D. Josselin / W. Wallace (eds.), *Non-state Actors in World Politics* (Houndmills 2001), 169-186.

KRIESI argue that they are deeply rooted in the traditional nation-states.¹⁹² Groups, which are connected to the 'new social movements', cannot be integrated into this hierarchical structure. Working at the grass-roots level and often connected to other social movements, they are reluctant to cooperate with the established hierarchies of the transnational workers' movement.¹⁹³

In all of these accounts, international trade-union organizations are presented as “old”, class-based movements. They are seen as manifestations of “rank and file internationalism,” which has been increasingly bypassed by transnational workers' movements.¹⁹⁴ This interpretative change points to the more general differentiation between “internationalization” and “transnationalization” in the historiography about labor movements in Europe. It also highlights, once again, that “transnationalism” has been used as a political, normatively charged discursive weapon. The extension of the analytical scope in the last few decades, however, has been largely confined to Europe. By contrast, the colonies and – after their liberation – the new states of the “Third World” have received little attention.¹⁹⁵ Though he advanced beyond the boundaries of the nation-state and thus considerably enriched scholarship, Georges HAUPT, for instance, has stuck to a narrow geographical perspective.¹⁹⁶ Calling this perspective into question, social scientists increasingly demanded a broad comparative and intensified exchange between different labor movements.¹⁹⁷ Similarly, scholars have pleaded for methodological innovation by taking the specific social contexts into account that have shaped labour movements. In order to promote contextualization, “thick description” has been proposed as an adequate approach.¹⁹⁸ However, the analytical potential of micro-historical and micro-sociological studies remains to be tested in comparative comparisons and studies dealing with cross-border entanglements between actors of civil society.

¹⁹² D. della Porta / H. Kriesi, “Social Movements in a Globalizing World: an Introduction”, D. della Porta / H. Kriesi / D. Rucht (eds.), *Social Movements in a Globalizing World* (Houndmills 1999), 3-22, 19.

¹⁹³ R. O'Brien et al., *Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social Movements* (Cambridge 2000), 67-84, 73 ff.

¹⁹⁴ Cf. T. Kidder / M. McGinn, “In the Wake of NAFTA: transnational workers' networks”, *Social Policy* 25 (1995), 14-21.

¹⁹⁵ van der Linden / van Voss, “Introduction”.

¹⁹⁶ G. Haupt, *Aspects of International Socialism 1871-191* (Cambridge 1986).

¹⁹⁷ M. Ramsay Somers, “Workers of the World, Compare!”, *Contemporary Sociology* 18 (1989), 325-329.

¹⁹⁸ M. Savage, “Class and Labour History”, L. H. van Voss / M. van der Linden (eds.), *Class and Other Identities. Gender, Religion and Ethnicity in the Writing of European Labour History* (New York / Oxford 2002), 55-72.

4. Historicizing Civil Society

Following the theoretical and terminological considerations in this article's *first chapter*, 'civil society' is to be regarded as both a normative concept ultimately based on Aristotelean thought and a historical socio-political formation, which emerged during the European Enlightenment. Investigations of the latter dimension necessitate a differentiation of its historical development into identifiable periods.¹⁹⁹ An increasing body of literature has, therefore, dealt with the development of civil society in European nation-states and across national borders since the late eighteenth century. However, the relationship between basic continuities on the one hand, and change and ruptures on the other, has not remained uncontested. Divergent definitions of 'civil society' as well as the wide range of analytical aims, approaches, and fields have prevented a consensus on the stages in the emergence and development of transnational civil society in Europe.

This chapter focuses on the considerable and continual change in the social foundations of civil society since the late eighteenth century. Different actors have supported and propelled civil society forward in various stages of its development. As will be demonstrated, investigations on actors have shed light on the specific historical contexts which have shaped the emergence and transformation of civil societies. However, detailed studies of the motives and driving-forces of individual and collective mobilization, as well as analyses of the social groups which have supported civil society over the last two decades, have clearly shown its variations. In the last resort, studies of the actors of civil society are apt to historicize civil society.²⁰⁰

4.1 "From Above" or "From Below"? – Conflicting Paradigms

Above all, two different, partially overlapping schemes of temporal differentiation seem promising. The *first* one is based on the mobilization of actors of civil society "from below." It highlights their perspectives. In order to achieve their aims, actors voluntarily set up or joined associations, which have been interpreted as the main driving-forces of civil society in recent historiography. These organizations entered the political stage in the late eighteenth and early

¹⁹⁹ On the problem of the periodization of 'globalization', see J. Osterhammel / N.P. Petersson, *Geschichte der Globalisierung. Dimensionen, Prozesse, Epochen* (München 2003), 24 ff.; A. G. Hopkins (ed.), *Globalization in World History* (New York 2002), 3ff.

²⁰⁰ In general, see Gosewinkel / Rucht, "History meets sociology", 34f., 37.

nineteenth centuries. Their programs and activities were, as Bill SEARY has emphasized, “more cosmopolitan than international.”²⁰¹ Their political influence, however, was rather marginal as their organizational structure was limited to the regional and pre-national sphere. Their practices and issues were mainly shaped by the idealistic claims of their enlightened white, educated, upper-class or noble members.²⁰²

Recent historiography on transnational actors of civil society in Europe has largely concentrated on those associations, which seem to demonstrate the emergence of a voluntary civil society from below. Drawing on the American example, their crucial role for democracy had already been emphasized by Alexis de Tocqueville. According to him, “Americans of all ages, all stations in life, and all types of dispositions are forever forming associations.”²⁰³ Arthur Schlesinger also glorified voluntary organizations in 1944 as the “the greatest school of self-government.”²⁰⁴ Echoing these interpretations, Robert Putnam has recently argued that democracies need the “social capital” generated by membership in associations and their communal activities. In his numerous publications, Putnam has shown himself concerned about the increasing reluctance of Americans to engage in social interaction.²⁰⁵ The notion of “social capital,” which scholarship has accorded to associations, has also inspired historiography to trace the evolution of civil society beyond the confines of national borders. Voluntary associations have therefore been highlighted as important transnational actors of civil society. Yet detailed studies of associations clearly demonstrate that the evolution of a transnational civil society was not a straight and uninterrupted development. Moreover, transnational civil society is by no means a homogeneous entity, but remains fragmented and continuously torn by differences, contrasts, and even conflicts between its actors.

²⁰¹ B. Seary, “The Early History. From the Congress of Vienna to the San Francisco Conference”, P. Willetts (ed.), “The Conscience of the World”. *The Influence of Non-Governmental Organisations in the UN System* (Washington 1996), 15-30, 15.

²⁰² A. Black, “Concepts of civil society in pre-modern Europe”, S. Kaviraj / S. Khilnani (eds.), *Civil Society. History and Possibilities* (Cambridge, New York 2001), 33-38; J. Kocka, “Zivilgesellschaft in historischer Perspektive”, *Forschungsjournal Neue Soziale Bewegungen* 16 (2003), 29-37, 36.

²⁰³ A. de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, ed. J.P. Mayer (Garden City 1969), 513. On Tocqueville’s view of associations, see S.-L. Hoffmann, “Tocquevilles ‘Demokratie in Amerika’ und die gesellige Gesellschaft seiner Zeit”, H. Münkler / H. Bluhm (eds.), *Gemeinwohl und Gemeinsinn. Historische Semantiken politischer Leitbegriffe* (Berlin 2001), 303-325.

²⁰⁴ A.M. Schlesinger, “Biography of a Nation of Joiners”, *American Historical Review* 50 (1944), 24.

²⁰⁵ See, in particular, R.D. Putnam, “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital”, *Journal of Democracy* 6 (1995), 65-78; idem, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York 2000).

The *second approach* is based on a differentiation between categories of organizations. In particular, a large number of investigations by social and political scientists have dealt with the emergence of INGOs operating on a global scale in entangled economies and societies. These studies are characterized by their perspective on transnational civil society “from above.”²⁰⁶ Global changes such as the genesis and expansion of new political, economic, and communicational spheres have been highlighted as important preconditions for the formation of INGOs. The rising global interstate system and the emerging modern international law are particularly noteworthy.²⁰⁷ Paradoxically, the rise of these international actors depended on the emergence and ultimate victory of the nation-state, as well as their integration into international politics, in the second half of the nineteenth century. According to the bulk of literature on INGOs or “transnational social movements,” this is precisely the period when international civil society came into being. The rise of a transnational civil society is therefore intertwined with the incorporation of INGOs into international law.²⁰⁸ This process peaked with the foundation of the League of Nations at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919. In the initial section of this chapter, these first international agreements are dealt with.

4.2 Some Methodological Considerations

These two approaches enable historians to provide useful insights into the history of transnational civil society in Europe. But the constraints of analytical categories like INGOs raise a crucial problem, for this imposes the historian’s own perspective on the classification of the actors of civil society. A contradiction between the retrospective view and the self-images of the actors is the most likely result of this approach.²⁰⁹ The contingencies of social practice are as much submerged as the cultural contexts. Applied to European societies of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the concept of “transnational civil society” raises serious methodological

²⁰⁶ See A. Zimmer, “NGOs als Akteure der internationalen Zivilgesellschaft”, C. Frantz / A. Zimmer (eds.), *Zivilgesellschaft international. Alte und neue NGOs* (Opladen 2002), 9-22.

²⁰⁷ K. Martens, “Alte und neue Players – Begriffsbestimmungen”, Frantz / Zimmer (eds.), *Zivilgesellschaft international*, 25-49, 27.

²⁰⁸ See for example K. Hüfner, “Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) im System der Vereinten Nationen”, *Die Friedenswarte* 71 (1996), 115-123; D. Thüerer, “The Emergence of Non-Governmental Organizations and Transnational Enterprises in International Law and the Changing Role of the State”, R. Hofmann (ed.), *Non-State Actors as New Subjects of International Law* (Berlin 1999), 37ff .

²⁰⁹ On this methodological problem, see Werner / Zimmermann, “Beyond Comparison”; Werner / Zimmermann, “Vergleich”.

problems. In particular, it is burdened with a normative baggage which may conflict with the representations of the actors.

However, both approaches have led to the insight that the years after 1815 and particularly the post-revolutionary period of the mid-nineteenth century were an “era of association” which gave rise to a stage of accelerated growth policy-oriented IGOs and INGOs. This change reflects the fundamental transformation of idealistic circles into policy-oriented actors. New issues emerged which attracted the attention and energies not only of nation-states, but also of the actors of civil society. Even in an autocratic multinational empire such as Tsarist Russia, official and non-state actors alike formed associations.²¹⁰ Above all, the formation of new nation-states (for instance, Italy and Germany) strengthened the determination to work for peace and reconciliation. Increasing migration also significantly contributed to the intensification of exchange between actors of civil society beyond national and cultural boundaries. Above all, new means of communication and traffic bound actors together and considerably facilitated cross-border exchange.²¹¹

This drew social strata and groups, which had been excluded from civil society, into transnational networks. Encountering the “Other,” they were “looking at the opening out of the world.”²¹² As Jörg FISCH argues, this was also the age when many ideas developed by scholars in their largely isolated networks of the late eighteenth century were disseminated and put into practice.²¹³ INGOs, as well, implemented political freedom, democracy, and equality. Like associations, they adopted a formal organizational structure characterized by a clear division of labour and a hierarchical order.

But it was mainly the action of nation-states that set the institutional frame of reference for non-state actors. Thus, national governments concluded bilateral or multilateral agreements. Their representatives signed treaties on communication and transportation as well as on the restriction of warfare. In fact, a strong interstate system had emerged by the 1870s. Governmental and non-governmental actors regularly cooperated, for instance, in preparing international

²¹⁰ The cross-border connections notwithstanding, it would be utterly misplaced to speak of “transnational networks” in this case. For a case study, see Christoph Gumb, “Leibeigenentheater als Ordnungsmodell. Die Bell-Lancaster-Methode und das russische Militär (1815-1825)“, *Comparativ* 15 (2005), 112-142.

²¹¹ This is hardly considered in K.J. Bade, *Europa in Bewegung. Migration vom 18. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich 2000).

²¹² Geyer / Paulmann, “Introduction”, 11.

²¹³ Fisch, *Europa zwischen Wachstum und Gleichheit*, 15 (“Aus der Theorie wurde die Praxis, aus der Idee die Wirklichkeit”).

conferences. Altogether, national and transnational orientations have shaped these programs of both associations and INGOs and the activities of their members at the grass-roots level. Thus, a fruitful periodization has to take both sets of factors into account. The changing cultures of actors in a dialectical relation with the changing social foundations of nearly all European societies led to the break-up of the old inter-state system.

4.3 Towards a Periodization of Transnational Civil Society in Europe

The rise of a transnational European civil society resulted from the transformation of educated circles and networks into bourgeois (*bürgerliche*) associations during the Enlightenment of the late eighteenth century. These voluntary associations soon assumed socializing functions. Concentrating on the interplay between individual motives and social practice, research has shed light on the self-images of the respective historical actors and the societal contexts of cross-border associations as well as on their social and intellectual origins. Social practices of civil society can be traced back to a much earlier period than described in conventional historical research.

From a general vantage point, European civil society's *first stage* was reached when philanthropic associations and literary circles engaged in cross-border and inter-cultural communication in the eighteenth century.²¹⁴ According to this interpretation, the “moral International” (R. KOSELLECK) of the Freemasons aimed at assembling free (rich and male) individuals in association as well as transcending states, estates, and confessions. Thus, they established a transnational network of communicating lodges that stretched from Scotland to Russia's European provinces.²¹⁵ Intricately linked to European Enlightenment, Freemasonry rejected absolutist monarchic rule and gave rise to a new public sphere. However, the lodges

²¹⁴ K.M. Baker, “Enlightenment and the institution of society: notes for a conceptual history”, S. Kaviraj and S. Khilnani (eds.), *Civil Society. History and Possibilities* (Cambridge / New York 2001), 84-104; Blanning, *The Culture of Power and the Power of Culture*, 111f. From the perspective of comparative educational studies, see H. Schmitt, “Die Philanthropische Erziehungsbewegung: Grundpositionen, Kommunikationszusammenhänge und Bedeutung der Musterschulen”, K.-P. Horn et al. (eds.), *Erziehungswissenschaft in Mitteleuropa. Aufklärerische Traditionen – deutscher Einfluß – nationale Eigenständigkeit* (Budapest 2001), 70-91.

²¹⁵ See P. Clark, *British Clubs and Societies, 1580-1800: The Origins of an Associational World* (New York 2000); W. Hardtwig, *Genossenschaft, Sekte, Verein in Deutschland. Vol. 1: Vom Spätmittelalter bis zu französischen Revolution* (Munich 1997); S.-L. Hoffmann, “Democracy and Associations in the Long Nineteenth Century: Toward a Transnational Perspective”, *Journal of Modern History* 75 (2003), 269-300; S.-L. Hoffmann, *Die Politik der Geselligkeit: Freimaurerlogen in der deutschen Bürgergesellschaft 1840-1918* (Göttingen 2000); idem, *Geselligkeit und Demokratie: Vereine und zivile Gesellschaft im transnationalen Vergleich, 1750-1914* (Göttingen 2003); J. van Horn Melton, *The Rise of the Public in Enlightenment Europe*.

secured equality and brotherhood only by imposing secrecy on their proceedings and activities.²¹⁶ Simultaneously, European-wide networks of scholars furthered an increasingly intensive exchange of opinions and views across territorial and cultural boundaries in the *République des Lettres*.²¹⁷ Europe's well-connected white middle-class elites largely constituted the civil society, whereas rising and aspiring social groups like entrepreneurs were still excluded from these circles. However, this stage ended with the French Revolution in 1789.²¹⁸ The Era of Enlightenment is, in fact, the cradle of the associations, which contested the *Anciens Régimes* not only on a regional, but also on supra-regional levels, as the emergence of cross-border networks clearly demonstrates.

Contrary to this interpretation, traditional *political history* has earmarked this period as the “early history” of civil society which was allegedly only gradually emerging.²¹⁹ Political scientist Steven CHARNOWITZ, for example, has identified an anti-slavery association which was founded in 1775 as the first NGO.²²⁰ But the activities of this organization had been limited to North America. Just by searching for organizational structures, political scientists can hardly see a civil society *in statu nascendi*.

It was the Congress of Vienna in 1815 with its subsequent series of conferences, which finally opened up channels for regular cooperation between state and societal actors, although clearly on a restricted scale. The ensuing Restoration, however, also enhanced solidarity and collaboration between liberal associations. The “Spring of Nations” was thus a truly European event in the mid-nineteenth century. This period, often referred to as an “era of associations,” represents the *second stage* in the emergence of cross-border civil society in Europe.²²¹ As German historian Stefan-Ludwig HOFFMANN has summarized, discussions about civic virtue, which had shaped activities of the literary circles and Masonic Lodges, were transformed by a

²¹⁶ Hoffmann, “Internationalism”, 262-265; A.J. LaVopa, “Conceiving a Public: Ideas and Society in Eighteenth-Century Europe”, *Journal of Modern History* 64 (1992), 79-116; D. Goodman, “Public Sphere and Private Life: Toward a Synthesis of Current Historiographical Approaches to the Old Regime”, *History and Theory* 31 (1992), 1-20.

²¹⁷ For a concise overview, see: H. Duchhardt, *Europa am Vorabend der Moderne 1650-1800* (Stuttgart 2003), 165-175; Van Horn Melton, *The Rise of the Public in Enlightenment Europe*.

²¹⁸ Hoffmann, *Geselligkeit und Demokratie*, 33f.

²¹⁹ Seary, “The Early History”.

²²⁰ Charnovitz, “Two Centuries of Participation”, 189f.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, 35. For an overview, see Bauerkämper, “Civil Society. History V: 19th Century”.

new ideal of progress.²²² Phillip NORD has even concluded that this fundamental change was civil society's 'first burst', foreshadowing the cyclical developmental pattern of subsequent years.²²³ As late as the mid-nineteenth century, associations mushroomed almost everywhere in Europe. They recruited their members primarily from the upper (propertied and / or educated) bourgeoisie. These associations regarded and portrayed themselves as an integral part of a larger, cross-border movement. Yet they were rooted in local contexts. Few of these associations, mainly philanthropic ones, managed to transcend these limits. Arguably, the best-known German example is the "philhellenic movement" of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.²²⁴ At the same time, traditional regionally-based organizations like the guilds lost their importance in people's every-day lives.²²⁵ This development peaked in the revolutions of 1848, the heyday of liberal societies across Europe.²²⁶ The Restoration of the following years, however, seriously impeded the cross-border cooperation between liberal groups, which were subsequently outlawed in many European territorial states. The remaining members of these associations did, therefore, by no means expect the "golden age of associations" to come.²²⁷

Researchers concentrating on organizational structures have taken 1849 as the starting-point of transnational society, as Europe's first INGO, the YMCA's World Alliance, was founded in that year. This organization already took the legal structure of the post-Vienna international system of nation-states into account.²²⁸ Ironically, the sole institution which could be accounted as global was excluded from these conferences: the Catholic Church with its vast network of missionary societies and medieval scientific associations.²²⁹ Altogether, international organizations changed from idealistic groups to issue-oriented NGOs which aimed at influencing

²²² Hoffmann, "Democracy and Associations in the Long Nineteenth Century", 275; idem, "Internationalism and the Quest for Moral Universalism", 271.

²²³ P. Nord, "Introduction", N. Bermeo / P. Nord (eds.), *Civil Society before Democracy. Lessons from Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Lanham 2000), xiii-xxxiii, xvi.

²²⁴ N. Klein, *L'humanité, le christianisme, et la liberté. Die internationale philhellenische Vereinsbewegung der 1820er Jahre* (Mainz 2000).

²²⁵ H.-G. Haupt, "Neue Wege zur Geschichte der Zünfte in Europa", idem (ed.), *Das Ende der Zünfte. Ein europäischer Vergleich* (Göttingen 2002), 9-37.

²²⁶ D. Langewiesche (ed.), *Demokratiebewegung und Revolution 1847 bis 1849. Internationale Aspekte und europäische Verbindungen* (Karlsruhe 1998).

²²⁷ Hoffmann, *Geselligkeit und Demokratie*, 55.

²²⁸ Seary, "The Early History", 15.

²²⁹ Charnovitz, "Two centuries of participation", 189, 191; K. Martens, "Alte und neue Players – Begriffsbestimmungen", C. Frantz / A. Zimmer (eds.), *Zivilgesellschaft international. Alte und neue NGOs* (Opladen 2002), 25-49, 27.

policy-making in the mid-nineteenth century. This shaped the structure of civil society for many years to come.²³⁰ With regard to their objectives, these organizations tackled tasks resulting from the rise of the nation-state and the emergence of the bourgeois middle-classes. According to this view, international civil society was the result of Europe's 'Spring of Nations' in 1848. Brian SEARY has demonstrated that the rise of the nation-state, the emergence of international agencies, and, not least, new logistic challenges were caused by the boom of transportation and communication technology. This transformation led to the emergence of organizations like the *International Red Cross* (1863) and the *Universal Postal Union* (1874). It also enforced international regulations on the standardization of measurements of time and space.²³¹ John BOLI and George M. THOMAS, drawing extensively on the neo-institutionalist world-polity model, have traced the foundation of the first international non-governmental organizations back to the year 1875.²³² According to their investigation, a large number of International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) and INGOs were constituted in the 1880s and 1890s.²³³ The number of newly-founded NGOs peaked in 1913, but plummeted during the First World War. Concentrating on the activities of INGOs, these authors have concluded that the first and decisive stage of a transnational civil society covers the second half of Europe's "long nineteenth century". In Steven CHARNOVITZ' scheme, however, these decades only mark the "state of emergence" of these transnational organizations.²³⁴

Contemporaries characterized this time as a "mania for associations" (*Vereinseuphorie*).²³⁵ It can as well be taken as "second or more fruitful eruption" of civil society, in short, as the *third stage* of its evolution.²³⁶ The rise of new associations in European nation-states during this period has been interpreted as a defensive measure on the part of a

²³⁰ Seary, "The Early History", 18.

²³¹ For studies on the standardization of time, traffic and communication, see, for example, C. Blaise, *Die Zähmung der Zeit. Sir Sandford Fleming und die Erfindung der Weltzeit* (Frankfurt am Main 2000); D.R. Headrick, *When Information Came of Age: Technologies of Knowledge in the Age of Reason and Revolution* (Cambridge 2000); C. Neusch / H.J. Teuteberg (eds.), *Vom Flügeltelegraphen zum Internet. Geschichte der modernen Telekommunikation* (Stuttgart 1998).

²³² See J. Boli / G. M. Thomas, "INGOs and the Organization of World Culture", J. Boli / G.M. Thomas (eds.), *Constructing World Culture. International Nongovernmental Organizations Since 1875* (Stanford 1999), 13-49, 22 (Fn. 14).

²³³ *Ibid.*, 23.

²³⁴ In his analysis, it covers the period from 1755 to 1918. Cf. Charnovitz, "Two centuries of participation", 191.

²³⁵ For example: F. Trentmann, "Introduction: Paradoxes of Civil Society", *idem* (ed.), *Paradoxes of Civil Society. New Perspectives of Modern German and British History* (New York 2000), 3-46, 13.

²³⁶ Nord, "Introduction", xvii.

bourgeoisie frightened by the emergence and expansion of the working-classes. Particularly in industrialized cities, threats of disease, disorder, and unrest propelled the formation of bourgeois associations that aimed at morally improving the working-classes. Dominated by the paternalistic attitude of the bourgeoisie, the working classes had to strive for “respectability” within the framework of societies sponsored by urban bourgeois elites. Although these associations remained in a defensive posture, they encouraged a “subscriber democracy” characterized by the collection and distribution of funds.²³⁷ For the United States, in contrast, recent studies on the growth in the number and membership of voluntary associations (which Alexis de Tocqueville, but also academics like Robert D. PUTNAM and Arthur M. SCHLESINGER characterized as a “nation of joiners”)²³⁸ have argued that local initiatives, not general trends like industrialization, urbanization, and migration led to the formation of associations in the latter half on the nineteenth century. Associational life in small cities and towns of the American West and Northwest was therefore more vibrant than in the big cities of the Northeast and Midwest.²³⁹

Whereas ethnocentric views were supported by many activists in the United States, it was nationalism which was taken up by an increasing number of European associations. The rapid expansion of associations from the mid-nineteenth century to the 1890s is intimately connected to the rise of the modern nation-state and its press. In these decades, the transnationally-oriented associations increasingly conflicted with the all-encompassing claims of the nation-states. Internal tensions therefore increasingly tore these associations apart. The conflicts within Freemasonry caused by the Franco-Prussian War (1870/71) exemplify these fissures.²⁴⁰ Instead, the new era was now dominated by nationalist clubs like the *deutsche Turnerbund* or the Czech *Sokol*. In a world increasingly shaped by growing economic interdependencies as well as nationalism, the universal democratic ideals of the associations changed. As a result of encounters with the “other,” they turned to “internationalism.”²⁴¹ Michael GEYER and Johannes PAULMANN have traced the emergence of this concept to the year 1850.²⁴² In their view, the

²³⁷ See, for instance, R.J. Morris, “Voluntary Societies and British Urban Elites, 1780-1850: An Analysis”, *Historical Journal* 26 (1983), 95-118, esp. 101.

²³⁸ A.M. Schlesinger, “Biography of a Nation of Joiners”, *American Historical Review* 50 (1944), 24.

²³⁹ G. Gamm / R.D. Putnam, “The Growth of Voluntary Associations in America, 1840-1940”, *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 29 (1998), 511-557.

²⁴⁰ Mentioned by Hoffmann, *Geselligkeit und Demokratie*, 73.

²⁴¹ Geyer / Paulmann (eds.), *The Mechanics of Internationalism*.

²⁴² They rely on P. Friedemann / L. Hölscher, “Art. ‘Internationale, International, Internationalismus’”, *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* 3 (1982), 367-397.

experience of hitherto unknown means and channels of international communication led to an emphatic expectation of and hope for a coming global age.²⁴³ On first glance, it may seem absurd, but in this way organizations that originally aimed at transcending national boundaries brought forth the reaffirmation of these boundaries.

But it was, above all, in transnational civil society's *fourth stage* of development, in the decades from the 1890s to 1914, when transnational networks spread and became denser. In these decades, the metaphor of a "global economy" was coined.²⁴⁴ Economies were increasingly intertwined and, as a result, ties of communication and cross-border exchange strengthened. Stimulated and promoted by nation-states, this change did not only alter the prevailing mental maps of the populations of European states. It also generated new transnational actors like cross-border sports clubs.²⁴⁵ Organizations as different as the Second Worker's International (1889), the Boy Scouts' Russian Branch (1911), and the Rugby club of Bordeaux were founded.²⁴⁶ With new means of public transport, consumers' horizons also widened.²⁴⁷ This ultimately led to a new type of transnational associations.²⁴⁸ In the three decades before the First World War (the first wave of globalization with regard to the economy),²⁴⁹ the economic and infrastructural foundations of a rapidly growing, dense network of non-state actors emerged, ranging from the international workers' movements to the development of international law. The First World War, however, marked the end of all expectations about a better, international future. The internecine warfare and the ensuing acrimony destroyed almost all remnants of international solidarity. In the fire of the fierce battles, nationalism was finally disentangled from moral universalism.²⁵⁰

²⁴³ M.H. Geyer / J. Paulmann, "Introduction: The Mechanics of Internationalism", Martin H. Geyer / J. Paulmann (eds.), *The Mechanics of Internationalism*, 1-26, 11.

²⁴⁴ Cf. Osterhammel / Petersson, *Geschichte der Globalisierung*, 65.

²⁴⁵ See the relevant sections in J. Boli / G.M. Thomas (eds.), *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations Since 1875* (Stanford 1999); Geyer / Paulmann (eds.), *The Mechanics of Internationalism*.

²⁴⁶ The French Rugby Club is mentioned by Hoffmann, *Geselligkeit und Demokratie*, 87f. The Russian Boy Scouts are a good example of how an institution of civil society can easily be used as tool of a totalitarian dictatorship. See David R. Jones, "Forerunners of the Komsomol. Scouting in Imperial Russia", David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye / Bruce Menning (eds.), *Reforming the Tsar's Army. Military Innovation in Imperial Russia from Peter the Great to the Revolution* (Washington, DC / Cambridge 2004), 56-81.

²⁴⁷ W. König, *Geschichte der Konsumgesellschaft* (Stuttgart 2000), 422 ff.; H.-G. Haupt, *Konsum und Handel: Europa im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen 2003).

²⁴⁸ Haupt, *Konsum und Handel*.

²⁴⁹ J. G. Williamson, "Globalization, Convergence and History", *Journal of Economic History* 56 (1996).

²⁵⁰ Hoffmann, "Internationalism and the Quest for Moral Universalism", 284.

After the Versailles Peace Treaty had been signed, European civil society entered its *fifth stage*. The foundation of the League of Nations and the establishment of the International Labor Association (ILO), in particular, reflected a fundamental cultural change. The experience of hitherto unknown, anonymous violence of industrialized mass slaughter had obviously nourished the emergence of a broad grass-roots internationalist movement in order to prevent a future war.²⁵¹ From a strictly organizational point of view, as well, a new wave of INGOs swept across Europe. As a rule, their by-laws were oriented towards the international system which had been established by the foundation of the League of Nations.²⁵² With regard to their legal foundations, international organizations became fundamental pillars of the international system in the inter-war years. In the post-war years, a flurry of new organizations emerged, whereas the number of dissolving associations dropped. Many new INGOs were now active in the former colonies. In general, a marked correlation between independence movements and the extent of the activities on the part of INGOs can be discerned.

However, according to Ian CLARK, “this emphasis on internationalism and universalism had to coexist with a sharpened sense of nationalism and particularism.”²⁵³ Apart from moral and political universalism, which inspired actors of civil society, the interwar period also witnessed a sharp increase in political, social, and scientific movements that aimed at a “new style” of politics. They enthusiastically demanded to apply new methods of large-scale planning and technological advances to post-war societies in order to achieve a breakthrough to the paradise of an evermore affluent civil society.²⁵⁴ The numbers of international oriented pacifist and veteran associations like the *Conférence Internationale des Associations des Victimes de la Guerre*, youth movements,²⁵⁵ and workers’ organizations, both socialist and communist, also increased. The

²⁵¹ See P. Brock / T.P. Socknat (eds.), *Challenge to Mars: Essays on Pacifism from 1918 to 1945* (Toronto 1999); W. Solzbacher, *Peace Movements Between the Wars. One Man's Work for Peace* (Lewiston 1999).

²⁵² See the periodization in D. Armstrong / L. Lloyd / J. Redmond, *From Versailles to Maastricht. International Organisation in the Twentieth Century* (Basingstoke 1996).

²⁵³ Clark, *Globalization and Fragmentation*, 76.

²⁵⁴ See, for example, S. Kühn, *Die Internationale der Rassisten. Aufstieg und Niedergang der internationale Bewegung für Eugenik und Rassenhygiene im 20. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt am Main 1993); K. Brown, “Gridded Lives: Why Kazakhstan and Montana Are Nearly the Same Place”, *American Historical Review* 106 (2001), 17-48; P. Holquist, “What's So Revolutionary About the Russian Revolution? State Practices and the New-Style Politics, 1914-21”, D.L. Hofmann / Y. Kotsonis (eds.), *Russian Politics. Politics, Knowledge, Practices* (Basingstoke / London 2000), 87-111; J.C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State. How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven 1998).

²⁵⁵ Early comparative studies on this subject include D. Dowe (ed.), *Jugendprotest und Generationenkonflikt im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts. Deutschland, England, Frankreich und Italien im Vergleich. Vorträge eines*

rapid reconstruction and industrialization of the Soviet Union was widely perceived as a model of a planned economy, which camouflaged the excessive terror of the emerging Stalinist dictatorship. The expansion of modern mass culture, which was often conceived as “Americanization,” and the marked increase in traveling also strengthened formal and informal transnational relations, as the foundation of the *International Youth Hostel Association* in 1932 testifies.²⁵⁶ Dreams harbored for years by the activists of civil society came true. In many European states the franchise was extended to hitherto non-enfranchised social strata of the male population. Moreover, women were finally allowed to vote, and in the United Kingdom and Denmark, for example, female politicians like Margaret Bondfield and Nina Bang became ministers.²⁵⁷ However, the rise of Bolshevik Communism, fascist movements and National Socialism eroded the social bases of civil society. Their proponents were subjected to terror, violent suppression, or even annihilation. Sheri BERMAN demonstrates that many voluntary associations, which had served as pillars of civil society in Germany since the Second Empire were infiltrated by the National Socialists and subverted to an ideology that starkly contrasted with the norms of civil society. The erosion and ultimate fall of the Weimar Republic, some historians argue, thus points to the fragility of a civil society that lacked a firm institutional framework.²⁵⁸

After the Second World War, the legal and social foundations of civil societies in Europe have broadened substantially. This expansion characterized the *sixth stage* in the development of transnational networks. It was the foundation of the United Nations, above all, which marked the final institutionalization of INGOs as political actors transcending the confines of the nation-states. In its Article 71, the UN Charter granted them the legal status as consultative institutions of ECOSOC.²⁵⁹ The creation of the European Union finally provided an important framework for the rise of INGOs on a European-wide scale.²⁶⁰ Their activities have been supported by an

internationalen Symposiums des Instituts für Sozialgeschichte Braunschweig Bonn und der Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung vom 17.-19. Juni 1985 in Braunschweig (Bonn 1986); R. Wohl, *The Generation of 1914* (Cambridge, MA 1979).

²⁵⁶ Mentioned by Seary, “The Early History” 17.

²⁵⁷ K. Offen, *European Feminism 1700-1950. A Political History* (Stanford 2000), 341.

²⁵⁸ S. Berman, “Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic”, *World Politics* 49 (1997), 401-429. In general, see M. Foley / B. Edwards, “The Paradox of Civil Society”, *Journal of Democracy* 7/3 (1996), 38-52.

²⁵⁹ Hobe and Kimminich, “Einführung in das Völkerrecht”, 153.

²⁶⁰ See, for example, D. della Porta / H. Kriesi, “Social Movements in a Globalizing World: an Introduction”, D. della Porta / H. Kriesi / D. Rucht (eds.), *Social Movements in a Globalizing World* (Basingstoke 1999), 3-22, 14; G. Marks / D. McAdam, “On the Relationship of Political Opportunities to the Form of Collective Action: the Case of

emerging transnational public sphere which has been established in Europe as a framework for dealing with national issues.²⁶¹ Although the European public sphere is still decentralized and by no means uniform, civil societies in Europe have been tied together by INGOs. The increase in cross-border traveling and in economic as well as personal exchange between Europeans since the 1950s has reduced tensions and differences.²⁶² Yet due to the lack of social mobilization for Europe and the reliance of autochthonous traditions in nation-states and regions, a European civil society has not appeared on the political horizon. As key institutions like the European Commission and the European Parliament have not gained significant legitimacy as independent political “players,” civil society activities have not directed their campaigns towards the European Union. In fact, they have attempted to influence the decisions of the European Commission, which is not susceptible to public pressure, through clandestine and discreet lobbying. Not least, different and even contrasting histories and experiences have divided Europeans, although exchange and entanglements have grown between them since the 1960s.²⁶³

Paradoxically, it was the Cold War which triggered a notable increase in the number and scope of the actors of civil society.²⁶⁴ On the one hand, the escalating arms race with the frightening prospect of a nuclear war invigorated the European peace movement in the 1950s and 1960s.²⁶⁵ But on the other hand, both superpowers exploited grass-roots social movements in Europe as their allies in the overarching conflict of the Cold War, which profoundly shaped

the European Union”, D. della Porta / H.-P. Kriesi / D. Rucht (eds.), *Social Movements in a Globalizing World* (Basingstoke 1999), 97-111.

²⁶¹ T. Risse, “Zur Debatte über die (Nicht-)Existenz einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit”, *Berliner Debatte/Initial* 13 (2002), 15-23. Also see the contributions to J. Requate/M. Schulze Wessel (eds.), *Europäische Öffentlichkeit. Transnationale Kommunikation seit dem 18. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt am Main 2002); H. Kaelble / M. Kirsch / A. Schmidt-Gernig (eds.), *Transnationale Öffentlichkeiten und Identitäten im 20. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt am Main 2002).

²⁶² H. Kaelble, *Europäer über Europa. Die Entstehung des europäischen Selbstverständnisses im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt am Main 2001), 150-183; idem, “Die sozialen und kulturellen Beziehungen Frankreichs und Deutschlands seit 1945”, *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B 3-4/2003, 20 January 2003, 40-46, 45f.

²⁶³ Hartmut Kaelble, “Gibt es eine europäische Zivilgesellschaft?”, *Gosewinkel / Rucht / van den Daele / Kocka* (eds.), *Zivilgesellschaft – national und transnational*, 267-284, idem, *Sozialgeschichte*, 319, 323, 325-327.

²⁶⁴ D. Josselin / W. Wallace, “Non-state Actors in World Politics: A Framework”, D. Josselin / W. Wallace (eds.), *Non-state Actors in World Politics* (Basingstoke 2001), 1-20, 6. For an overview, also on the following account, see Arnd Bauerkämper, ‘Civil Society. History VII: Late 20th and Early 21th Century’, Helmut K. Anheier / Stefan Toepler / Regina List (eds.), *International Encyclopedia of Civil Society* (Berlin 2009), 366-371.

²⁶⁵ M. Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY 1999); H. Nehring, “Towards a social history of transnational relations: The British and West German protests against nuclear weapons, 1957-1964”, J.C E. Gienow-Hecht / F. Schumacher (eds.), *Culture and International History* (Oxford 2003); F. Parkin, *Middle Class Radicalism: The Social Bases of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament* (Manchester 1968).

domestic politics and social relations.²⁶⁶ Finally, protest against social and political stagnation erupted in western states in the late 1960s.²⁶⁷ As has already been emphasized, the late 1960s and early 1970s saw the emergence of the *new social movements*. According to Paul Wapner, it was “Earth Day” in 1970 which marked the beginning of this new type of civic organizations.²⁶⁸ Although research in this field has only started in the social sciences, substantial work has been accomplished in the last three decades. A bibliography of publications on new social movements before 1997 lists an impressive number of titles.²⁶⁹ “Social movement theory” has therefore advanced from early approaches that focused on *collective behavior* to neo-institutionalism²⁷⁰ or on sociological theories of knowledge.²⁷¹

According to Charles TILLY, an outstanding expert in the field, new social movements can be defined as a “sustained challenge to power holders in the name of a population living under the jurisdiction of those power holders by means of repeated public displays of that population’s worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment.”²⁷² This abstract and general definition of “social movements” obviously comprises almost all political activities “outside” official politics. This conceptualization has been taken up by many investigations into social movements. David Meyer and Sidney Tarrow, for example, have even detected a “social movement century” ranging from the late nineteenth to the end of the twentieth century.²⁷³ According to this broad perspective, social movements can be seen as “siblings of modernity.” BUECHLER has recently argued that “social movements have profoundly influenced the contours of modern society and the discipline

²⁶⁶ Josselin / Wallace, “Non-state Actors in World Politics”, 6.

²⁶⁷ There is an expanding literature on this topic. See, in particular, W. v. Bredow / R.H. Brocke, *Krise und Protest. Ursprünge und Elemente der Friedensbewegung in Westeuropa* (Opladen 1987); Buechler, *Social Movements in Advanced Capitalism*; D. della Porta / H.-P. Kriesi / D. Rucht (eds.), *Social Movements in a Globalizing World* (Chippenham 1999); S. Khagram / J.V. Riker / K. Sikkink (eds.), *Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks and Norms* (2002); B. Klandermans, *Methods of Social Movement Research* (Minneapolis 2002); D. Rucht, *Modernisierung und neue soziale Bewegungen. Deutschland, Frankreich und USA im Vergleich* (Frankfurt am Main / New York 1994); J. Smith (ed.), *Globalization and Resistance. Transnational Dimensions of Social Movements* (Lanham 2002).

²⁶⁸ Wapner, “Environmental Activism”, 389.

²⁶⁹ Garner / Tenuto, *Social Movement Theory and Research*.

²⁷⁰ See, for example, Goldstone (ed.), *States, Parties, and Social Movements*; Meyer / Tarrow (eds.), *The Social Movement Society*.

²⁷¹ Buechler, *Social Movements in Advanced Capitalism*. Chapter 2 of Buechler’s monograph is surely one of the most valuable introductions to social movement theory.

²⁷² Tilly, “Agendas for Students”, 247, and, more recently: Charles Tilly / Lesley J. Wood, *Social Movements, 1768-2008* (Boulder/London 2008).

²⁷³ Meyer / Tarrow (eds.), *The Social Movement Society*.

of sociology” alike.²⁷⁴ In this view, social movements emerged in the historical context of overlapping social modernization, nation-building, and the end of “metasocietal guarantees”. They are therefore inextricably linked to “globalization.”²⁷⁵

According to Dieter RUCHT, “new social movements” resulted from the pressing, but unsolved political and social problems of Western welfare states.²⁷⁶ According to this interpretation, new social movements are a response to the emerging “risk society.”²⁷⁷ Addressing both local and global problems, these movements have worked on fields as diverse as environmental issues, developmental policies, human rights, workers’ rights, feminism, nuclear disarmament, and consumers’ rights. Emerging at the grass roots, all these movements share a skeptical attitude to the modernization process. They are also characterized by organizational structures based on densely interconnected networks and a membership consisting of the relatively highly educated middle classes. The “global associational revolution” of the 1990s, in particular, has caused an unprecedented expansion of the non-profit sector, which has become a significant economic force.²⁷⁸ At present, the influence of social movements on politics can hardly be overestimated. This is indicated by their sheer number. In the field of environmental politics alone, there is an estimated number of 100,000 NGOs.²⁷⁹ Hartmut KAELBLE has emphasized that the “new social” movements emerged in the 1960s due to a transformation of values, rapid modernization, and a fundamental change in international relations, as the imperial rule of major European powers evaporated throughout the world and the former colonies became independent states.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁴ Buechler, *Social Movements in Advanced Capitalism*, 3.

²⁷⁵ Willets, “Pressure Groups as Transnational Actors”. In some studies, though, the concept of “new social movements” also covers the nineteenth century. See for example Calhoun, “New Social Movements”.

²⁷⁶ Cf. Rucht, *Modernisierung und neue soziale Bewegungen*, 139.

²⁷⁷ This phrase was coined by U. Beck, *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (Theory, Culture & Society)* (London 1992).

²⁷⁸ L.M. Salomon et al., “Civil Society in Comparative Perspective”, idem et al. (eds.), *Global Civil Society. Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector* (Baltimore 1999), 1-39, 4.

²⁷⁹ Wapner, “Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics”, 2.
²⁸⁰ Kaelble, *Sozialgeschichte*, 306-309.

5. Conclusion

We argue that the emergence and transformation of civil societies in Europe need to be analyzed in their specific historical contexts. With regard to this proposition, studies of actors can shed light on the varying social foundations from which the concept of civil society and its proponents emerged.

Recent research has identified and analyzed a wide range of factors, which have contributed to the genesis of a notion of civility on a transnational scale. But several points deserve closer attention in future research. First, the motives, norms, values, world views and ideologies of the civil society activists should be studied in more detail in order to explain their support for causes beyond their particular interests. Second, the biographical and educational backgrounds of the proponents merit further empirical work. Finally, civil society needs to be conceived as a social practice. Studies of civil society with regard its performative qualities also merit closer attention: which practices, symbols, clothing, and codes of communication did the supporters of internationalism use in order to identify themselves? How did they, in a very practical sense, interact in their conferences? Did, for example, alliances on the level of international politics affect personal relationships in the early international conferences of non-state actors?

The role of religion – both official denominations and religious sects – has been, as shown above, a crucial factor for civil society. With his work on the Masons, Stefan-Ludwig HOFFMANN has aptly demonstrated the fruitfulness of an approach that takes the actors' world-view as a starting point. Although the role of Christian churches has been as ambivalent as the impact of religions, it must not be ignored. Churches have been committed to spiritual guidance and pastoral care. Yet they have also been engaged in charity, philanthropic activities, and social welfare.²⁸¹

Moreover, the discussion of the published literature has highlighted a serious methodological problem. Studies of the actors of civil societies cannot be restricted to the reconstruction of the self-images and self-portrayals of the proponents and activists. Associations which do not share norms like tolerance and mutual recognition may contribute to social mobilization, but they undermine the social foundations of civil society as imagined by its key

²⁸¹ See the contributions to Arnd Bauerkämper / Jürgen Nautz (eds.), *Zwischen Fürsorge und Seelsorge. Christliche Kirchen in den europäischen Zivilgesellschaften seit dem 18. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt am Main 2009).

proponents. Investigations into the aims, norms, and values of actors can therefore contribute to a classification of social movements and networks.²⁸² This is especially important since the concept of civil society has never been an objective, descriptive term, but has ever been a highly normative political catchword with utopian qualities. Rather than simply approving or denying the existence of a civil society, the description of different concepts and varieties of concepts of civil society in different cultural contexts promises to be a rewarding field for the future. The question of possible translations from European contexts to non-European societies is still a hotly debated issue. A perspective that focuses on how concepts are transformed into social and cultural practices seems to be most promising.

As the overview of published literature on transnational actors of civil society has demonstrated, the latter were crucial in establishing cross-border networks. However, they have always been a minority. Even these actors were still tied to their particular national contexts. Transnational actors of civil society have also been transient and bound to the Westphalian system of nation-states. Members of associations and INGOs have by no means continuously supported the normative foundation of civil society and their activities for the promotion of transnational civil society have been even more restricted to certain periods of time and specific constellations. Moreover, the social base of cross-border civil society networks in Europe has changed considerably since the Enlightenment. Initially restricted to a cross-border exchange between literary circles and Masonic Lodges, educated and propertied groups of the bourgeoisie took up the concept of social self-organization against autocratic rule. They engaged in a free exchange of ideas and shared values like mutual respect as well as a commitment to public discussion. In the course of the nineteenth century, the working class established separate organizations on a supranational level. For instance, as issues like peace and women's rights emerged, new groups and movements, which were no longer tied to specific social strata, mobilized support for the causes of peace and an extension of the franchise. Yet a dialectical relationship between transnational and national orientations can be discerned. The nation-state remained an important institutional framework of reference, even to the activists of cross-border civil society networks in Europe. Pinpointing the contradiction between the principles of inclusion and exclusion, Jeffrey ALEXANDER has even defined 'civil society' as "a sphere of solidarity in which abstract universalism and particularistic versions of community are tensely

²⁸² Bauerkämper, "Einleitung", 22.

intertwined.”²⁸³ On the basis of this observation, a set of questions arise which will ultimately broaden research on transnational actors of civil society. The relationship between domestic, international, and transnational issues in international politics before globalization, for instance, merits detailed investigation. In a similar vein, interactions or blockades between West European, American, and other non-European actors of civil society have to be analyzed. This research vista again raises the general issue of the geographical scope which can (and need to) be covered in empirical studies.

As emphasized at the outset, not all actors of transnational civil society in Europe have been dealt with in this research report. Academics who engaged in scientific exchange, for instance, certainly merit a close analysis.²⁸⁴ Similarly, important organizations like the International Red Cross have only been touched upon.²⁸⁵ Cross-border activities by sports clubs also need to be investigated in more detail, although they only partially exceed particular interests in favor of common communal objectives.²⁸⁶ But all findings support the general conclusion that the way to a civil society crossing borders has been marred by contractions and ambivalences in Europe. Proponents of transnational civil society have been confronted with imposed and self-imposed obstacles. A full-fledged, uniform civil society has therefore not been established in Europe. Although its proponents and activists have intensified their cross-border relations, civil society has remained partial and fragmented.²⁸⁷

²⁸³ J.C. Alexander, “Citizen and Enemy as Symbolic Classification: On the Polarizing Discourse of Civil Society”, idem (ed.), *Real Civil Societies. Dilemmas of Institutionalization* (New Delhi 1998), 96-114.

²⁸⁴ E. Ausejo, “The Window Case of Science. The Associations for the Advancement of Science and the Birth of Scientific Congresses in Western Europe”, *Archives Internationales d'Histoire des Sciences* 133 (1994), 338-371; A.W. Daum, “‘The next great task of civilization’: International Exchange in Popular Science”, M.H. Geyer / J. Paulmann (eds.), *The Mechanics of Internationalism. Culture, Society, and Politics from the 1840s to the First World War* (London 2001), 285-320; S. Kühl, *Die Internationale der Rassisten. Aufstieg und Niedergang der internationale Bewegung für Eugenik und Rassenhygiene im 20. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt am Main 1993); L. K. Nyhart (ed.), *Science and Civil Society* (Chicago, Ill. 2002); Gabriele Metzler, *Internationale Wissenschaft und nationale Kultur. Deutsche Physiker in der internationalen Community 1900-1960* (Göttingen 2000).

²⁸⁵ Finnemore, “Rules of War and War of Rules”; Riesenberger, *Das Deutsche Rote Kreuz*; Riesenberger, *Für Humanität in Krieg und Frieden*; Vilain, “Das Internationale Rote Kreuz als NGO”.

²⁸⁶ See, for example, C. Eisenberg, “From England to the World: The Spread of Modern Soccer Football 1863-2000”, *Moving Bodies* 1/1 (2003), 7-22; idem, “The Rise of Internationalism in Sport”, M.H. Geyer / J. Paulmann (eds.), *The Mechanics of Internationalism. Culture, Society and Politics from the 1840s to the First World War* (Oxford 2001), pp. 375-403; idem, “English Sports” und deutsche Bürger. *Eine Gesellschaftsgeschichte 1800-1939* (Paderborn 1999).

²⁸⁷ Tilly, “Agendas for Students”.

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*Am 1. Januar 2005 wurde die Forschungsgruppe "Zivilgesellschaft, Citizenship und politische Mobilisierung in Europa" (ZCM) eingerichtet. Sie geht hervor aus der Zusammenlegung der Arbeitsgruppen "Zivilgesellschaft: historisch-sozialwissenschaftliche Perspektiven" (ZG) und "Politische Öffentlichkeit und Mobilisierung" (PÖM) und ist in den Forschungsschwerpunkt "Zivilgesellschaft, Konflikte und Demokratie" (ZKD) eingegliedert.

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