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**Mapping Political Support in the 1990s:
A Global Analysis**

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Zusammenfassung

Die vorliegende Analyse soll den Grad der politischen Unterstützung der Bürger in globaler Perspektive beschreiben. Es wird nachgewiesen, daß die Bürger Einstellungen zur politischen Gemeinschaft, zur Demokratie als Regierungsform und zur Performanz der Demokratie voneinander trennen können. Die Verteilung dieser Einstellungen Mitte der neunziger Jahre wird für 38 Länder berichtet. Für eine kleinere Gruppe von Ländern können diese Einstellungen mit Daten aus dem Jahre 1990 verglichen werden.

Als Ergebnis kann festgehalten werden, daß in den meisten Ländern ein relativ hohes Maß an Zustimmung zur Demokratie als Regierungsform festzustellen ist. Gleichzeitig wird aber die Performanz der Demokratie negativ beurteilt. Es wird spekuliert, daß von der Gruppe der "unzufriedenen Demokraten" zukünftig Impulse für die Weiterentwicklung der Demokratie zu erwarten sind. Die Zeitvergleiche zeigen keine einheitlichen Trends an. Sie weisen vielmehr auf Entwicklungen hin, die in den unterschiedlichen Ländern in sehr unterschiedlicher Weise verlaufen.

Abstract

Over the past quarter century, an unprecedented and often unanticipated wave of democratization has spread over large parts of the world. While some skepticism is reasonable regarding both the level and durability of many of the new experiments of democratization, the direction and scope of these developments are largely beyond dispute. The main goal of this essay is to use an unprecedented body of comparative survey research to map patterns and forms of political support across a wide range of political conditions. While the goal is primarily descriptive, in the course of the descriptions interesting themes emerge, such as the finding that there are no major trends suggesting a decline in support for democracy as a form of government, neither *de jure* nor *de facto*, or that the fact of dissatisfaction does not imply danger to the persistence or furtherance of democracy.

*Hans-Dieter Klingemann**

Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis

1 The general issue

Over the past quarter century, an unprecedented and often unanticipated wave of democratization has spread over large parts of the world. While some skepticism is reasonable regarding both the level and durability of many of the new experiments within the *Third Wave* of democratization (Huntington, 1991), the direction and scope of these developments are largely beyond dispute. One need not adhere to the premise that this movement is an inevitable endpoint (Fukuyama, 1992) in human governance in order, nonetheless, to acknowledge the current historical reality. The breadth and depth of the trend does need not, however, carry with it the presumption of permanence. The previous two waves of democratization over the past century were followed with considerable backsliding. Evidence of similar retrogression is evident within the Third Wave. Some countries, such as Nigeria, have been participants in both the second and the third wave, and have already fallen back. Others, such as Turkey and various Latin American cases, continue to struggle with an apparently tenuous grasp on the climb to status as stable democracies. Most democratic theorists would argue that the success or failure of such experiments is in large part a function of the support built among the citizenry, support that lends *legitimacy* to the regime. It is further asserted that legitimacy is heavily influenced by or almost a function of the *performance* of the regime (Lipset, 1959; Lipset et al. 1993, 1994).

The main goal of this essay is to use an unprecedented body of comparative survey research to map patterns and forms of political support across a wide range of political conditions. While the goal is primarily descriptive, in the course of the descriptions at least two interesting themes emerge. First, there are no major trends suggesting a decline in support for democracy as a form of government in the abstract or as applied to existing democratic experience. Certainly, there is no evidence of a *crisis of democracy*. (see also Klingemann and Fuchs, eds., 1995; in contrast, see Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki,

* Richard I. Hofferbert has helped to cut and substantially rewrite an earlier draft of this chapter. Christian Welzel has critically read the text. I want to gratefully acknowledge this generous help. The chapter is to appear in Pippa Norris (ed.). *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.

1975). There are, to be sure, citizens of established and of fledgling democracies who express considerable dissatisfaction with the performance of their regimes. But – and this is the second theme that emerges from my exercise in multi-national attitudinal mapping – the fact of dissatisfaction does not imply danger to the persistence or furtherance of democracy. There is a significant number of people spread around the world whom I label *dissatisfied democrats*. They clearly approve of democracy as a mode of governance, but they are discontent with the way their own system is currently operating. The dissatisfied democrats can be viewed as less a threat to than a force for reform and improvement of democratic processes and structures as the *third wave* continues to flow.

Since the beginning of the 1990s an unprecedented number of countries on the globe have implemented some variant of a democratic political structure. However, while formal institutions of representative democracy are in place, their likely persistence is subject to dispute and disagreement. This is true for both the old and the newly established democratic regimes. Crisis theories dominate the debate. Fuchs and Klingemann (1995) have recently reviewed and empirically evaluated major hypotheses on why public support for democratic politics may be eroding. They and their collaborators did not find much empirical evidence for any of the various crisis theories, at least as far as the Western European countries up to the end of the 1980s were concerned. Overall, citizens of the Western European democracies had not withdrawn support for their democracies. Crisis theorists and other critics seemed to have underestimated the adaptive capacities of these countries' democratic institutions. In possible contrast, however, the newer democracies, and especially those in Central and Eastern Europe, are suffering stress because they have to cope with simultaneous political and economic transformations. Under these circumstances, arguments that predict a return to authoritarian rule or anarchy command some plausibility (for example, Ekiert, 1991). Despite this plausibility, empirical analyses (especially those reported by Mishler and Rose 1994, 1996, 1997 and Rose and Mishler, 1996) demonstrate that citizens of Central and Eastern European countries are prepared to face that double challenge. At least they do not want to give up their newly established democratic structures or to return to the old regime. Mishler and Rose (1997:447) summarize results of their most recent survey analysis as follows: "There is little basis in this analysis to fear that the collapse of democracy is imminent or that a return to authoritarianism is inevitable. To the contrary, as long as the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe protect the individual liberties that citizens so highly value, skepticism is unlikely to degenerate into distrust."

Most scholars agree that the survival of democracies rests on a broad and deep foundation of support among the citizenry. Democracies lacking such a foundation of legitimacy are at risk. Political systems, and in particular democracies, that are ineffective in

meeting public expectations over long periods of time can lose their legitimacy, with consequent danger to the regime. As broad theoretical assertions, at a high level of abstraction, this chain of reasoning is largely accepted by systems analysts and democratic theorists alike. But operationalization and measurement of concepts as well as sufficient historical and comparative data for test of the key linkages have proved largely elusive. Political and parallel academic developments in the late twentieth century have provided an opportunity to begin remedying these shortcomings.

This essay exploits the impressive resources of the *World Values Survey* to map certain key elements of political support among the mass publics in established, experimental, and would-be democracies. Specifically, I shall develop indices fitted reasonably well to the three forms of support highlighted in Table 1: support for the *political community* ("identification with the political community"); for *democracy as a form of government* ("legitimacy of the political regime"); and approval of the regime's *performance* ("effectiveness of the political regime"). The extent of political support and approval along three dimensions is examined by means of comparable national surveys.

My argument here is that ordinary people can differentiate between different objects of support – between the political community, the desirability of a democratic regime, and actual regime performance. Further, they can be critical of how well the regime or the authorities are functioning without necessarily concluding that the democratic form of government needs to be abandoned. Dissatisfaction with the regime's or the incumbent authorities' effectiveness must not by necessity translate into delegitimation of democracy. Performance is not the only source of legitimacy. In contrast to non-democratic regimes legitimacy is also heavily based on procedures, too (Linz and Stepan, 1996).

The Concept of *Political Support*

Scholarly insistence on the need for congruence between the form of governing institutions, on the one hand, and political culture, on the other, can easily be traced in an unending stream back at least to Aristotle. However, among modern democratic theorists, the concept of *political support* and its component elements is most commonly discussed with reference to the work of David Easton. Easton distinguishes between the *objects* of support and the *types* of support. Within objects, he distinguishes from each other support for the *political community*, the *regime*, and the incumbent *authorities*. Between types, Easton distinguishes between *specific* and *diffuse* support.

Building on and refining this framework, in the interest of operationalization, Dieter Fuchs (1993) offers a nine-cell taxonomy along two dimensions, as illustrated in Table 1.

Fuchs' taxonomy of political support is similar but not identical to the one offered earlier by Easton. Fuchs' two dimensions are *objects* (which are identical to Easton's use of the same terms) and *modes* of attitudes, the latter moving beyond Easton's *specific* and *diffuse* terminology. Again, the three objects of political support are, in Easton's terms: *political community*, *political regime*, and *political authorities*.

Table 1: A Taxonomy of Political Support

		<i>Attitude Objects</i>		
		Community	Regime	Authorities
<i>Modes of Attitudes</i>	Expressive	Identification with the Political Community	Identification with the Political Regime	Identification with the Political Authorities
	Moral	Legitimacy of the Political Community	Legitimacy of the Political Regime	Legitimacy of the Political Authorities
	Instrumental	Effectiveness of the Political Community	Effectiveness of the Political Regime	Effectiveness of the Political Authorities

Adapted from: Dieter Fuchs (1993). "Trends of Political Support in the Federal Republic of Germany," in: Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Ralf Rytlewski, eds., *Political Culture in Germany* (London: Macmillan), p. 238.

The *political community* is the cultural entity that transcends particularities of formal governing structures and encribes the elemental identity of the collectivity constituting the polity. The *regime* is constituted of those formal institutions that persist and transcend particular incumbents. And the *political authorities* are those officials occupying governmental posts at a particular time. Thus a citizen might have adhered strongly to her or his status as a member of the Soviet Union as a political community without necessarily holding to the particular institutions of that political regime or even to the particular territorial definition of the polity. However, when a self-definition, such as *Russian* takes precedence over an alternative attitude object, such as *Soviet*, then the definition of political community is likewise different. One can also identify with the political community and still advocate a substantially different regime. A Pole, strongly identified with the Polish political community may nonetheless have been an ardent member of Solidarity and thus sought to depose the pre-1989 regime. And, finally, one could well accept the current Polish regime but campaign vigorously for the electoral victory of the opposition.

Fuchs offers his three-part concept of *modes* of attitudes as a refinement of Easton's diffuse and specific *types* (Table 1). The *expressive* mode is focused not on the

performance of the object (community, regime, or authorities), but rather on certain attributes of the object itself. It is, in a sense, the "real" type of diffuse identification. The *moral* mode incorporates the idea of propriety. It is the sense that the status of the political community, regime, or authorities is a matter of appropriateness, or that it is right that things should be as they are, or that the investiture of office is as things should be – that they are legitimate. The *instrumental* mode rests upon explicit or implicit means-ends calculations. Thus, one who chooses to maximize employment opportunities by emigrating from one political community to another is acting instrumentally. Choosing to re-write the constitution (regime) or to displace incumbent officials (authorities) for comparable ends is likewise *instrumental* behavior.

Data from the World Values Survey allow for rather clear measurement of the forms of political support contained in the three shaded boxes in the Fuchs taxonomy (Table 1), namely: identification with the political community, as well as legitimacy and effectiveness of the political regime. These attitudinal constellations will be mapped across countries by geographic regions, by age and relative democraticness of regimes, and by general level of economic development. A mapping of these components will be a significant start toward comparative understanding of the breadth and forms of political support across the world of established, fledgling, and would-be democracies near the turn of the millennium.

2 Surveys, time points and indicators

Today, in many countries, attitudes of citizens are monitored routinely. However, if it comes to the study of political attitudes across countries and time comparable data are not so easy to come by. Such efforts as the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and of the New Democracies Barometer (NDB), sponsored by the Austrian Paul Lazarsfeld-Society, have done a lot to improve the situation.

In this study I rely mainly on the comparative *World Values Surveys (WVS)*¹. This survey, which is coordinated by Ronald Inglehart, is still the only comparative survey project that, in principle, aims at global coverage.² Surveys during the mid-1990s from the World Values Survey, appropriate for measuring the relevant aspects of political support, were available

1 Data collection in the former republics of the Soviet Union and in West and East Germany has been supported by a grant of the VW Foundation.

2 For the first major analyses of the early waves of the World Values Survey, see Ronald Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles*. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1977; Ronald Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1990; Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Post-Modernization*. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1997.

from 39 countries. They include countries of North and Central America (4), South America (6), Australia (1), Asia (5), Africa (2), Western Europe (8) and Eastern Europe (13).³ In addition, differing levels of political support in the mid-nineties can be compared to those at the beginning of the nineties in 25 of these countries. Since not all of the indicators selected for analysis are available in every survey, I shall report the exact number of countries on which specific analyses are based. In addition to the World Values Survey, I also consult three regional comparative surveys to monitor satisfaction with the democratic process, which is an important indicator of regime performance.⁴ A detailed overview of surveys used in the analysis is presented in Appendix 1. It shows that, in all, 87 surveys are available for 63 countries for the mid-nineties. The geographic coverage of the data is illustrated in the map in Figure 1. These countries include about 45 percent of the world population. However, as already noted, limited availability of specific, comparable indicators restricts the number of countries available for different aspects of the analysis.

Large-scale cross-national surveys are, by necessity, cooperative projects. Funding by a single source is virtually impossible to obtain. This implies that indicators which finally enter the questionnaire are a result of much discussion and some compromise or they are, as is the case of the surveys paid for by the European Commission, beyond control by academic researchers. For this reason analysts face problems of secondary analysis. They are obliged to use those indicators that finally entered the questionnaire, even though alternatives might have been preferred. This should be kept in mind when it comes to the choice of indicators for the different types of political support.

The immediate task is to test the extent to which key theoretically posited dimensions of political support can be identified within the available data.

Political Community. Two indicators are available for the measurement of **support for political community**. The first one taps the expressive mode of evaluation; the second one is closer to a moral mode of evaluation. The "country" serves as the attitude object in both cases. The respective survey questions read as follows:


- "How proud are you to be a [citizen of this country]? (4) Very proud, (3) quite proud, (2) not very proud, (1) not at all proud;"

3 For our purposes, West and East Germany were analyzed separately and counted as two cases.

4 These are (1) the 1996 Latinobarometer Survey coordinated by Marta Lagos which covers 11 countries, (2) the West European 1995 Eurobarometer Survey carried out on behalf of the European Commission which together with an associated Norwegian survey comprises of 18 countries (Great Britain and Northern Ireland as well as West and East Germany counting as separate cases), and (3) the 1996 Central and Eastern Eurobarometer Surveys (19 countries) also sponsored on a regular base by the European Commission. Cross-time comparisons for the performance indicator with the early nineties are possible for subsets of countries both for the Western European Eurobarometer Surveys (15 countries) and the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer Surveys (18 countries).

- "Of course we all hope that there will be not another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country? (1) yes, (0) no."

Figure 1: The Geographical Scope of the World Value Surveys 1994/97 Used in the Analyses



Democracy as a Form of Government. Basic to my thesis here is that citizens can compare and evaluate alternative types of regimes, beyond merely assessing the immediate attractiveness of the particular regime with which they are currently living. Thus, inquiry into the attractiveness of *democracy* is possible (assuming authorities allow the research to be conducted) even among populations living under non- or quasi-democratic regimes. In the same sense that people can discriminate between specific incumbent authorities and the regime, so they can discriminate between their current regime and conceivable alternatives. Thus, the respondents in the World Values Survey were asked the following two questions regarding the object *democracy*:

- I am going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each would you say it is (4) a very good, (3) a fairly good, (2) a fairly bad or (1) a very bad way of governing this country?

- Having a democratic system.⁵
- I am going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic system. Could you please tell me if you (4) agree strongly, (3) agree, (2) disagree, or (1) disagree strongly, after I read each of them?
- Democracy may have many problems but it's better than any other form of government'.⁶

The two questions above tap the extent to which people find democracy as a form of regime attractive. The companion to our assumption that such an assessment can be made is also the assumption that the existing regime can be evaluated, to some extent independently of whether or not it is itself the most attractive among conceivable alternatives. Along with this goes also the assumption that people can distinguish between the moral propriety of the regime and its empirical performance.

Regime Performance. Four questions are used to measure regime performance:

- "People have different views about the system for governing this country. Here is a scale for rating how well things are going: (1) means very bad and 10 means very good. Where on this scale would you put the political system as it is today?"
- "How satisfied are you with the people now in national office are handling the country's affairs? Would you say you are (4) very satisfied, (3) fairly satisfied, (2) fairly dissatisfied or (1) very dissatisfied?"
- "I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it (4) a great deal of confidence, (3) quite a lot of confidence, (2) not very much confidence, or (1) none at all?"
- The Parliament;
- The Government in (Capital City).

In addition to these questions one widely used indicator for regime performance is available in the three regional surveys mentioned above. The reference object is the quality of the democratic process, that is the constitutional reality in the citizen's country. For the Western European and the Latin American surveys the relevant question reads as follows:

5 The item has been asked in the context of a four item battery. The additional three items read as follows: "Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections"; "Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country"; "Having the army rule".

6 This item, too, has been asked as part of a four item battery. These are the additional three items: "In democracy, the economic system runs badly"; "Democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling"; "Democracies aren't any good at maintaining order".

- "On the whole, are you (4) very satisfied, (3) fairly satisfied, (2) not very satisfied, or (1) not at all satisfied with the way democracy works (in your country)?"

The question wording is slightly different for the Central and Eastern European surveys:

- "On the whole, are you (4) very satisfied, (3) fairly satisfied, (2) not very satisfied or (1) not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in (your country)?"

Despite the difference, these latter two indicators are treated as equivalent because of the specific historical contexts in which they have been used.

3 The dimensionality of political support

From what has been argued above we would expect dimensional analysis to yield the following three distinct factors:

- Support for political community,
- Support for democracy as a form of government, and
- Evaluation of the current performance of democracy.

The dimensionality is tested by (confirmatory) factor analysis both for the pooled data and for each single country. Table 2 shows that the pooled analysis strikingly bears out our expectation. The pattern which was predicted for theoretical reasons is clearly there.⁷ This means that the analytically defined distinct types of political support are also kept apart in the minds of the citizens. This is an important finding. It means that one may meaningfully discuss identity with the political community independently of the form of government or its performance. Further, it enables the identification of people who are dissatisfied with the actual performance of democracy but at the same time support democracy as a form of government, the *dissatisfied democrats*.

⁷ All eight indicators are available for 37 of the 39 WV-surveys taken in the mid-nineties. Part of the relevant questions are missing in the Chinese and in the South Korean surveys. The single country analyses confirm the general pattern in 30 out of the 37 cases. The deviant cases are Taiwan, the Philippines, Nigeria, Estonia, Russia, Belarus, and the Ukraine. In 5 out of these 7 cases the dimension of democracy as a form of government stands out as it should. In Nigeria and Russia the same is true for the political community dimension. However, although the general hypothesis is not born out in all countries, it holds in the overwhelming majority.

Table 2: Dimensions of Political Support: Pooled Analysis of World Values Survey, 1994/97 (38 countries) (Rotated Factor Matrix)

	<i>Political Community</i>	<i>Democracy as a Form of Government</i>	<i>Performance of Democracy</i>
Fight for Country	.81	-.06	.03
National Pride	.71	.12	.15
Democracy Good Way of Governing	.02	.83	.10
Democracy Best Form of Governing	.03	.84	.04
Performance of System	.01	.14	.69
Performance of People in National Office	.07	.10	.67
Performance of Parliament	.09	.01	.77
Performance of Government	.12	-.04	.82
Eigenvalue	1.20	1.46	2.24
% Total Variance	15	18	28

The analyses reported in Table 2, thus, clearly confirm that these three dimensions are present and distinct across a multi-country (pooled) set of respondents. Given, however, that the general fit and specific factor loadings vary somewhat from country to country, it is less cumbersome to use the factor analysis to guide the construction of simpler, additive indices.⁸ Thus, I have constructed three such indices – one for each of the three concepts.⁹

8 I could have used factor scores from the pooled analysis; however, those scores for any single country would be directly weighted by the overall distribution across countries. An additive score avoids this statistical encumbrance.

9 I have checked the inter-correlations of the variables involved and found them satisfactory in the cases of support for democracy as a form of government (pooled correlation .44, average of single country correlations .39) and evaluation of performance of democracy (pooled correlations system for governing:people in national office .40, system for governing: confidence in parliament .30, system for governing:confidence in government .37, people in national office:confidence in parliament .32, people in national office:confidence in government .37, confidence in parliament: confidence in government .63; averaged single country correlations correspond in all cases to those reported for the pooled analysis). The inter-correlation between the two indicators forming the dimension of support for the political community, however, were considerably weaker (pooled correlation .19) and not significant at the .001 level in two of the 38 countries (The Philippines and Taiwan; average single country correlation .19). Thus, in addition to discussing scale distributions we might wish to look at the two indicators forming the scale also separately.

- *Support for Political Community*: The variables "fight for country" (0/1) and "national pride" (recoded 1,2 = 0; 3,4 = 1) are added to form a three point scale of support for the political community: 1 = low support; 2 = medium support; and 3 = high support. Proportion of citizens with high support for political community are displayed in the respective tables.
- *Support for Democracy as a Form of Government*: The variables "democracy best form of government" and "democracy good way of governing" are added to form a seven-point scale, ranging from 1 = low support to 7 = high support. Proportion of citizens with scale values 5 - 7 are displayed in the respective tables.
- *Performance of Democracy*: The variables "performance of the system for governing" (recoded 1-3 = 1; 4-5 = 2; 6-7 = 3; 8-10 = 4), "performance of people in national office" (1-4), "confidence in parliament" (1-4), and "confidence in government" (1-4) are added to form a 13-point scale: 1 = low performance to 13 = high performance. Proportion of citizens with scale values 8 - 13 are displayed in the respective tables.

4 Support for political community

An expressed willingness to fight for one's country, combined with a high degree of national pride might be variously labeled. Here we use these questions for an index of *support for the political community*. At least on the surface, it would not seem to be much of a shift to label such attitudes either *patriotism* or *nationalism*. Often, in discussions of the positive aspects of political community it is indeed the case that the other side of the coin could be negatively assessed under the label *nationalism*. Whether or not one attaches a pejorative valence to the phenomenon depends, in part, on the context in which it is being used. However, it is indeed the case that, in the pooled analysis of all respondents over all of the countries included, the index retains its orthogonality with both approval of democracy and assessment of performance (Table 2). The index of support for political community at least is statistically independent of and not antithetical to support of democracy as a form of government. Thus, the concept of political community, as conceptualized and measured here, may denote a benign form of patriotism and not necessarily carry a pathological connotation.

Support for the political community scale values range from 1 (low support) to 3 (high support). To aid in mapping from a cross-country perspective the countries are displayed and arrayed in Table 3 by the proportion of citizens with a high level of support for political community, divided in columns across regions. On average the mean level in 38 countries is

68 percent.¹⁰ This average disguises a very high range of 75 percent points. It is not a goal of this essay to evaluate alternative explanations for the cross-national distributions along the dimensions of political support, however, some comment on the distribution in Table 2 is not out of order. Azerbaijan and Turkey rank highest; the two parts of Germany and Japan trail the distribution, with a level of support of 37 and 18 percent respectively. The latter finding confirms a well known pattern which has often been related to the World War II experiences of these countries. While in all other countries at least half of its citizens identify with their political community, the German and Japanese citizenry carry the burden of their nationalistic past quite visibly, resisting even what might be considered a form of salutary patriotism. As far as support levels for Azerbaijan and Turkey are concerned these two countries have to cope with challenges to a redefinition of their respective political communities. However, the same is true for a number of the other newly formed Central and Eastern European states. In these cases the findings are mixed. Of the 14 countries included in the survey 7 range above average and an equal number range below average.

Table 3: Mapping Support for Political Community

<i>Country</i>	<i>Global Regions</i>						
	Western Europe	Eastern Europe	Asia	Africa	Northern & Central America	Southern America	Australia Oceania
Azerbaijan		93					
Turkey		92					
Peru						86	
Venezuela						85	
Slovenia		85					
Sweden	85						
China			84				
Philippines			83				
Norway	81						
Finland	78						
USA					76		
Dominican Republic					75		
Australia							73
Belarus		72					
Croatia		71					
Mexico					71		
Puerto Rico					71		
Yugoslavia		70					
Armenia		70					
Georgia		69					
South Africa				69			

¹⁰ The relevant indicators are missing for South Korea.

Table 3: (continuation)

Country	Global Regions						
	Western Europe	Eastern Europe	Asia	Africa	Northern & Central America	Southern America	Australia Oceania
Chile						67	
Brazil						64	
Moldova		63					
Argentina						63	
Ukraine		62					
Taiwan			62				
Russia		62					
Nigeria				61			
Switzerland	60						
Estonia		58					
Spain	58						
Uruguay						56	
Lithuania		54					
Latvia		52					
East Germany		37					
West Germany	36						
Japan			18				
Mean	66	67	62	65	73	71	73

38 Country Mean = 64

The number of countries varies across regions not only because of the varying number of nation states in each region but also because of the relative success in organizing the World Values Survey in different countries. With these cautions in mind, there are no striking differences in support for the political community across regions that are comparable to those within the regional groupings themselves. Thus, the Asian range is from Japan's uniquely low 18 to China's relatively high 84 percent support for the political community. Eastern European countries range from 37 to 93 percent, and so on – a range far greater than the modest differences between regional means.

Table 4 offers a different view of the map of support for political community. It arrays countries in three columns: older democracies, younger (*Third Wave*) democracies, and what might be entitled younger *would-be* democratic systems. Age of system does of itself seem to discriminate between the democratic systems, with the mean of the older systems at 64 and the younger at 61 percent high support for the political community. The countries with lower democracy scores, however, exhibit a rather higher mean score (69) than either the older or the younger democracies. Whether or not this is a reflection of the darker side of a sense of political community cannot be determined until more time passes during which

progress toward democratization may or may not be registered in the currently low democracy countries.

Table 4: System Age, Level of Democracy, and Support for Political Community (World Values Survey, 1994/97)*

<i>Systems Over 40 Years** , High Democracy*** (1996)</i>		<i>Systems Under 40 Years, High Democracy (1996)</i>		<i>Systems Under 40 Years, Low Democracy (1996)</i>	
Country	% High Support for Political Community	Country	% High Support for Political Community	Country	% High Support for Political Community
Sweden	85	Slovenia	84	Azerbaijan	93
Norway	81	Croatia	71	Turkey	92
Finland	78	South Africa	69	Peru	86
USA	76	Chile	67	Venezuela	85
Australia	73	Brazil	64	Philippines	83
Puerto Rico	71	Argentina	63	Dominican	
Switzerland	60	Estonia	58	Republic	75
West	36	Spain	58	Belarus	72
Germany					
Japan	18	Uruguay	56	Mexico	71
		Lithuania	54	Yugoslavia	70
		Latvia	52	Armenia	70
		East	38	Georgia	70
		Germany			
				Moldova	63
				Ukraine	62
				Taiwan	62
				Russia	62
				Nigeria	61
Mean	64		61		69
Mean 1995 Per Cap GDP (US\$)	26,808		6,978		2,190

* China does not fit any of the 3 categories

** System Age: Gurr, POLITY III Dataset (ICPSR No. 09263)

*** High Democracy = Freedom House 1996 Rating ≥ 2

Low Democracy = Freedom House 1996 Rating < 2

All of the older democracies are high in per capita gross domestic product (GDP) (mean, \$26,808). The range is wider and the mean lower (\$6,978) for the fledgling democracies. And the would-be democracies (perhaps a triumph of hope over expectation in cases such

as Yugoslavia – i.e., Serbia and Montenegro –, Nigeria, or Belarus) are clearly, as a set well down the roll of affluence.

The political turbulence beneath the Third Wave of democratization heightened the sense of possible political change around the world. As interesting as the cross-national distribution of political attitudes at a single time, such as publics' support for their respective political communities, may be the likely changes in distribution of such attitudes. Certainly in light of the scholarly skepticism cited in the introductory section of this essay, any general downward trend would be cause for grave concern. The data for monitoring and mapping those changes, while far from ideal, are unprecedented in the history of social science. Thus, it is possible, for a large number of the countries included in the World Values Survey not only to examine cross-national distributions, but also to plot changes in certain attitudinal configurations. There is not a full complement of items included in the various scales for all multiple times across all 39 countries in this study, but some of the items have been repeated. Because most analyses claim that standards of comparison have changed we restrict cross-time comparisons to the period from shortly after the breakdown of the former communist regime to the most recently available data.

Are there any patterns of change in the mid-1990s, compared to a few years earlier? National pride can be compared over time for 24 countries, as reported in Table 5. There is an increase in the proportion of citizens who are "very proud" or "quite proud" of their country in 9 countries (average increase 5 percent points), no change in six countries (+ or - 2.5 percent points), and a decline in national pride in 9 countries (average decline 11 percent points). No country stands out with respect to increasing levels of national pride. As far as decline is concerned, it is most expressed in the three Baltic countries as well as in the two parts of Germany. There is a tendency of further increase in countries which are already high in national pride and a tendency of further decrease where national pride is already low.

Table 5: Change in National Pride in the 1990s

<i>Country</i>	<i>Very proud or quite proud (mid 90s, %)</i>	<i>Pattern of change as compared to the early 90s (%)</i>		
		Increase	No change	Decline
USA	98		-0.1	
Australia	97		-1*	
South Africa	97	+5		
Mexico	94	+5		
Turkey	94		+2	
Spain	92	+5		

Table 5: (continuation)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Very proud or quite proud (mid 90s, %)</i>	<i>Pattern of change as compared to the early 90s (%)</i>		
		Increase	No change	Decline
Slovenia	92		+1	
Finland	89	+7		
Norway	89	+6		
Sweden	89	+5		
Argentina	89	+3		
China	88	+6		
Chile	87		+1	
Nigeria	85		-1	
Brazil	84			-3
Belarus	79			-3
Switzerland	78			-3
Russia	71	+6		
Lithuania	69			-18
Latvia	67			-24
Estonia	67			-17
East Germany	62			-12
Japan	62			-4
West Germany	57			-11

* In Australia change is measured as compared to 1981.

Data on changes in the readiness to fight, perhaps the more nationalistic of our two indicators, are available for the same 24 countries (Table 6). The proportion of citizens ready to fight for their country has gone up in 10 countries (average increase 10 percent points), has been stable in 4 countries (+ or - 2.5 percent points), and gone down in 10 countries (average decrease 10 percent points). The average figures hide large country differences. A particularly large increase in the readiness to fight could be observed in two South American countries (Brazil +37, Argentina +20 percentage points); the largest decrease occurred in the three Baltic states (Latvia -30, Estonia -16, Lithuania -16 percentage points). However, unlike the apparent broadening of the range of national pride, there is no obvious general pattern to these changes in willingness to fight for the country.

Table 6: Change in Willingness to Fight for Country in the 1990s

Country	Would fight for my country (mid 90s, %)	Pattern of change as compared to the early 90s (%)		
		Increase	No change	Decline
Turkey	96	+4		
China	93			-4
Sweden	92	+4		
Slovenia	90	+8		
Norway	89	+3		
Belarus	88			-3
Finland	84			-3
Russia	82		-1	
USA	77		-0.4	
Australia	75		-0.4*	
Estonia	75			-18
Chile	74			-9
Mexico	73	+3		
Brazil	72	+37		
South Africa	70			-7
Switzerland	70	+4		
Nigeria	70			-10
Lithuania	68			-16
Latvia	68			-30
Argentina	67	+20		
Spain	59		-0.1	
East Germany	50			-3
West Germany	49	+8		
Japan	24	+4		

* In Australia change is measured as compared to 1981.

5 Support of democracy as a form of government

The factor analyses reported in Table 2 reinforce the argument that the public's support for democracy as a *form of government* can be separated both analytically and empirically from the evaluation of *performance of democracy*. It should be clear where this is leading. It is leading to the suggestion, offered in the introduction, that persons dissatisfied with the current performance of democracy, especially in fledgling democracies, do not necessarily constitute a reservoir of anti-democratic sentiment. In fact, it may well be the case that those who support democracy as a form of government but also give a poor score to current performance of democracy in their own country – those whom I label as the

dissatisfied democrats – may well constitute a potential force for *improving* rather than for *abandoning* the democratic experiment.

Support for democracy as a form of government is measured by a seven point scale. The country mapping in Table 7 reports the proportion of citizens with a positive attitude (scale values 5 to 7). Support for democracy as a form of government is generally rather high in the 38 countries under study. Interestingly, the range is anchored and fully covered by the post-communist countries of Central Europe and the former USSR. As a set, these countries are not distinctive; nor are other geographic regional patterns apparent, other than the clustering of the Western Europeans on the higher end of the scale. The mean value for all 38 countries is 84 percent. Eleven countries, most of them West European states, have over 90 percent support for democracy as a form of government, suggesting that experience with functioning democratic regimes, with all their blemishes, far from leading to cynicism and rejection, reinforces citizens' commitment to that ever more widely accepted form of government. In another 16 countries democracy is supported by 8 out of 10 citizens. Russia shows the lowest level of support. Among the 11 countries where support ranges from 71 to 79 percent are another 5 Eastern European countries, 3 South American states as well as Finland and the Philippines.

Table 7: Mapping Support for Democracy as a Form of Government

Country	Global Regions						
	Western Europe	Eastern Europe	Asia	Africa	Northern & Central America	Southern America	Australia/Oceania
Azerbaijan		97					
Croatia		95					
Uruguay						94	
West Germany	93						
Norway	93						
Sweden	93						
Spain	92						
Switzerland	91						
East Germany		91					
Argentina						90	
Dominican Republic					90		
Turkey		89					
Japan			88				
Yugoslavia		88					
USA					88		
Nigeria				87			

Table 7: (continuation)

Country	Global Regions						
	Western Europe	Eastern Europe	Asia	Africa	Northern & Central America	Southern America	Australia/Oceania
Puerto Rico					87		
Lithuania		86					
Peru						86	
South Africa				85			
Estonia		85					
Georgia		85					
Venezuela						85	
South Korea			84				
Taiwan			83				
Australia							83
Slovenia		82					
Latvia		79					
Chile						79	
Brazil						78	
Belarus		75					
Finland	75						
Armenia		75					
Ukraine		75					
Philippines			72				
Mexico					71		
Moldova		71					
Russia		51					
Mean	90	81	82	86	84	86	83

38 Country Mean = 84

No additional insight emerges readily when, as in Table 8, the countries are arrayed by system age and level of democracy. The high level democracies have not apparently disappointed their citizens, but the mean difference between the older (88 percent mean) and younger (86 percent) democracies is hardly worthy of note. Some doubt is spread among those not attaining a high democracy score, but still a large majority of the citizens of these countries approve of democracy as a form of government, thus perhaps warranting the reference to them as *would-be* democracies.¹¹ This would support the hypothesis that the attitudinal base of democracy can also be generated from within a non-democratic state. Thus, democratic attitudes must not, by necessity, be a product of socialization under the condition of democratic rule.

¹¹ No indicators are available to assess change over time with respect to support of democracy as a form of government.

Table 8: System Age, Level of Democracy, and Support for Democracy as a Form of Government (World Values Survey, 1994/97)

<i>Systems Over 40 Years*</i> <i>High Democracy**</i> (1996)		<i>Systems Under 40 Year,</i> <i>High Democracy</i> (1996)		<i>Systems Under 40 Years,</i> <i>Low Democracy</i> (1996)	
Country	% High Support for Democracy	Country	% High Support for Democracy	Country	% High Support for Democracy
West	93	Croatia	95	Azerbaijan	97
Germany		Uruguay	94	Dominican Republic	90
Norway	93	Spain	92	Turkey	89
Sweden	93	East Germany	91	Yugoslavia	88
Switzerland	91	Argentina	90	Nigeria	87
Japan	88	Lithuania	86	Peru	86
USA	88	South Africa	85	Georgia	85
Puerto Rico	87	Estonia	85	Venezuela	85
Australia	83	South Korea	84	Taiwan	83
Finland	75	Slovenia	82	Belarus	75
		Latvia	79	Armenia	75
		Chile	79	Ukraine	75
		Brazil	78	Philippines	72
				Moldova	71
				Mexico	71
				Russia	51
Mean	88		86		80

* System Age: Gurr, POLITY III Dataset (ICPSR No. 09263)

** High Democracy = Freedom House 1996 Rating \geq 2;

Low Democracy = Freedom House 1996 Rating $<$ 2

6 Evaluation of performance of democracy

Data for evaluation of performance are available for 37 countries. The additive scale ranges from 1 (low) to 13 (high). In the mapping exercise, Table 9 displays the proportion of citizens with scale values 8 to 13. Compared to support for democracy as a form of government, evaluation of performance of democracy is considerably lower in all countries (average 26 percent). Only in such diverse countries as Azerbaijan, Norway and South Africa do more than half of the citizens evaluate performance highly. There is, in Table 9, some evidence of a regional pattern, with the Western Europeans again, as a set,

manifesting high assessments although, even there, the spread from Spain's 18 to Norway's 70, is much wider than the inter-regional means.

Table 9: Mapping Evaluation of Regime Performance

<i>Country</i>	<i>Global Regions</i>						
	Western Europe	Eastern Europe	Asia	Africa	Northern & Central America	Southern America	Australia Oceania
Azerbaijan		77					
Norway	70						
South Africa				54			
Switzerland	46						
Taiwan			42				
Philippines			41				
Chile						38	
Croatia		38					
Puerto Rico					34		
Sweden	33						
Peru						32	
Brazil						28	
Yugoslavia		26					
USA					25		
Turkey		25					
Finland	23						
Australia							23
Estonia		22					
Mexico					22		
West Germany	22						
Slovenia		21					
Uruguay						21	
Georgia		21					
Spain	18						
Armenia		17					
Lithuania		17					
Argentina						16	
Latvia		16					
East Germany		15					
Moldova		12					
Japan			12				
Nigeria				11			
Ukraine		10					
Belarus		8					
Venezuela						6	
Dominican Republic					6		
Russia		4					
<i>Mean</i>	35	20	38	32	22	23	23

37 Country Mean = 26

No doubt, democracy thrives and can be built on a widespread, healthy dose of skepticism. And it is not at all clear where the bottom is for positive benefit. But surely in some cases these surveys must be tapping more than skepticism and moving more into the zone of dismay. There must be some concern for the situation in Russia (4 percent), the Ukraine (10 percent) and Belarus (8), as well as in Venezuela (6 percent) and the Dominican Republic (6 percent). In these countries taken together only 1 citizen out of 10 is satisfied with the performance of the respective political regime.

Again, I must stress the value of separating support for democracy as a form of government from citizens' evaluations of the contemporary performance of their particular political regime, however much it may meet or stray from democratic norms. Thus, for example, 87 percent of Nigerians hold to the belief that democracy is the desired form of government, even though only 11 percent of them approve of the performance of their troubled political system (realistically, most would argue, in this time period). Likewise, over 89 percent of Turks support the principles of democracy, while barely a quarter assess contemporary performance highly. Such disparities are not confined to polities having long experience with such dramatic regime changes as military coups, as have both Nigeria and Turkey. There is likewise a broad difference in the support for and evaluation of democracy in both Germany's. Support for democracy as a form of government in the recently reunited parts of that country is 93 and 91 percent, West and East respectively, while evaluation of current performance is only 22 percent in the West and 15 percent in the East.

Table 10, arraying the countries again by system age and level of democratization, is perhaps more revealing in the case of evaluations of system performance than were its counterparts for support for the political community (Table 4) or for democracy as a form of government (Table 8). There is a stepwise decline in the mean evaluations as one moves from the older (mean = 32 percent) to the younger democracies (27 percent), and from these to the *would-be* democracies (23 percent).¹²

¹² The interesting case of Azerbaijan, of course, broadens the range in the set of younger, low-scoring political systems. That former Soviet country has led the pack on all three scores – highest on sense of political community, highest in support for democracy as a form of government, and highest in evaluation of regime performance – even though it has a rather poor political and economic record. In 1996, Azerbaijan scored 6 (low, compared to a high of 1) on the Freedom House political rights scale. And it had a per capita GDP of only \$480 in 1995, which was about half of what it had been in 1990. We could speculate that the on-going dispute with Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabak region, coupled with standing tensions with Iran over the co-ethnic Azeris there, probably stimulated the nationalistic element of the political community score. Why the broad optimism over system performance and support for democracy, may be another question, the answer to which may be found in country-wide optimism as Caspian oil begins to flow.

Table 10: System Age, Level of Democracy, and Evaluation of Regime Performance (World Values Survey, 1994/97)

<i>Systems Over 40 Years*, High Democracy** (1996)</i>		<i>Systems Under 40 Years, High Democracy (1996)</i>		<i>Systems Under 40 Years, Low Democracy (1996)</i>	
Country	% High Regime Performance	Country	% High Regime Performance	Country	% High Regime Performance
Norway	70	South Africa	54	Azerbaijan	77
Switzerland	46	Chile	38	Taiwan	42
Puerto Rico	34	Croatia	38	Philippines	41
Sweden	33	Brazil	28	Peru	32
USA	25	Estonia	22	Yugoslavia	26
Finland	23	Slovenia	21	Turkey	25
Australia	23	Uruguay	21	Mexico	22
West Germany	22	Spain	18	Georgia	21
Japan	12	Lithuania	17	Armenia	17
		Argentina	16	Moldova	12
		Latvia	16	Nigeria	11
		East Germany	15	Ukraine	10
				Belarus	8
				Dominican Republic	6
				Venezuela	6
				Russia	4
Mean	32		27		23

* System Age: Gurr, POLITY III Dataset (ICPSR No. 09263)

** High Democracy = Freedom House 1996 Rating ≥ 2

Low Democracy = Freedom House 1996 Rating < 2

Satisfaction with the way democracy works has long been used as an indicator for the citizens' evaluation of the performance of democracy in their respective countries (Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svensson 1995) and it correlates .46 with the performance of democracy scale discussed above.¹³ The indicator is not available for most of the World Values Surveys. However, it has been widely included in the three regional surveys mentioned earlier. This data-base allows for cross-national comparison for the mid-1990s for 50 countries (Table 11). Among these are 17 Western European countries, 22 from Central and Eastern Europe, and eleven South American Countries. Satisfaction with the

¹³ The association of the index *performance of democracy* and the indicator *satisfaction with the democratic process* can be assessed for ten Eastern European countries and West Germany. The intra country correlations range from .30 for Belarus and .55 for East Germany. The mean of the intra country correlations is .43 which is only slightly lower than the pooled correlation (.46).

democratic process has not been particularly stunning in the mid-1990s. The average proportion of those who are very or fairly satisfied is only 40 percent. But again the average hides much difference across countries. While the Western Europeans, with the exception of the southern countries (Spain, Portugal, and Italy, in particular) are on the higher side (average, including the southern countries, is 56 percent), the Latin Americans are certainly on the lower end (average 29 percent). Of the Central and Eastern Europeans, Hungary, Slovakia, Belarus, Ukraine, Armenia, Russia, Moldova, and Bulgaria score very low, indeed.

Table 11: Mapping Satisfaction with the Democratic Process (Regime Performance) in the 1990s

<i>Country</i>	<i>Percent very or fairly satisfied</i>		
	<i>Western Europe (1995)</i>	<i>Eastern Europe (1996)</i>	<i>Latin America (1996)</i>
Denmark	83		
Norway	82		
Luxembourg	77		
Albania		76	
The Netherlands	71		
Ireland	70		
West Germany	67		
Austria	63		
Northern Ireland	57		
Romania		56	
Sweden	55		
Belgium	54		
Finland	52		
Uruguay			52
Poland		48	
East Germany		48	
France	47		
Great Britain	46		
Georgia		44	
Azerbaijan		43*	
Slovenia		43	
Spain	41		
Estonia		41	
Czech Republic		41	
Yugoslavia		41	
Macedonia		41	
Portugal	40		
Croatia		39	
Ecuador			35
Argentina			35
Lithuania		33	
Paraguay			31
Venezuela			30

Table 11: (continuation)

Country	Percent very or fairly satisfied		
	Western Europe (1995)	Eastern Europe (1996)	Latin America (1996)
Peru			30
Chile			29
Greece	28		
Latvia		28	
Bolivia			25
Brazil			22
Hungary		22	
Slovakia		21	
Belarus		20	
Ukraine		20	
Armenia		19	
Italy	19		
Colombia			16
Mexico			12
Russia		8	
Moldova		6*	
Bulgaria		6	
Mean	56	34	29

* Data for Azerbaijan (February 1997) and Moldova (December 1996) are taken from the World Values Survey (Eastern Europe).

50 Country Mean = 40

Change over time in performance is difficult to assess. In part, because the respective indicators are not available in a large number of cases, and in part because the indicators which are available are not exactly comparable. Table 12, however, presents a very summary overview of averages for varying numbers of countries (depending on the source of surveys) of publics' evaluations of different facets of regime performance (for details compare Appendix 2). In general, the common theme of declining assessment of political institutions is reflected, with both the number of countries experiencing decline and the average percentage of declines generally exceeding increases. Confidence in parliaments is particularly pronounced, with 15 of 22 countries showing decline, and an average cross-national average of -12 percent points.

Satisfaction with the "democratic process", however, which already was at a low level at the beginning of the Nineties, showed fewer cases of decline than of increase, and the cross national average was an inconsequential -.3 percent points. More noteworthy, given their dramatic regime changes in the early 1990s, the Central and Eastern European countries experience equal numbers of increases as declines, with no net change – even given the much vaunted difficulties of readjustment, breakdown of law and order, corruption, dual economic and political transformations, and widespread governmental instability. It might be expected that the disappointment would be concentrated in the countries of the former

USSR, compared to the others (perhaps placing the three Baltic countries in the latter set, as well). However, the surveys reveal no such – or any other obvious – pattern. Increases in confidence in the democratic process are registered in Albania, Romania, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Belarus, and Armenia, with declines in Georgia, Slovenia, Russia, Moldova, and Bulgaria.

*Table 12: Changes in Evaluations of Regime Performance in the 1990s**

<i>Object of Evaluation</i>	<i>Increasing (N of countries)</i>	<i>Decreasing (N of Countries)</i>	<i>Overall Mean % Change</i>
General System Performance (N=12)	4	8	-7
Confidence in Parliament (N=22)	3	15	-12
Confidence in the Government (N=9)	3	5	-12
Satisfaction with the "Democratic Process" (N=15, EB)**	7	4	-0
Satisfaction with the "Democratic Process" (N=18, Central & Eastern EB)***	7	7	0

* World Values data, unless otherwise noted. Not included are cases where no change was evident. Timing of surveys varies somewhat, but change is generally measured from the early 1990s to about 1995 or 1996. Details and specific country listings and distributions are documented in Appendix 2.

** EU countries, based on Eurobarometer surveys (EB). The mean is heavily skewed downward by Portugal's 35.5 percent drop. Excluding this case, the mean would be a 2.4 percent increase.

*** Central and Eastern Eurobarometer surveys. Moldovan data (1996) are from the WVS.

Detailed tables are documented in Appendix 2.

The absence of clear patterns is itself useful information. It suggests that there are no evident pathologies of confidence, across the board, uniquely challenging the new or would-be democracies. Their problems, to the extent that they are grave, seem to be specific rather than general. They point to the importance of political processes within countries. This turns the attention to the macro level. Let us conclude by highlighting a few critical macro observations that bring the threads of this discussion somewhat together.

7 Conclusion: Relationships Between Community, Democracy, and Performance

The factor analysis reported in Table 2 supported the utility of at least a part of the Easton/Fuchs taxonomy (Table 1) of system support. Three of the cells in this nine-cell scheme have been addressed with measures constructed out of surveys from dozens of countries:


- Support for Political Community
 - Attitude object - the political community
 - Mode of attitude - expressive
- Approval of Democracy as a Form of Government
 - Attitude object - the regime
 - Mode of attitude - moral
- Evaluation of Current Performance of Democracy
 - Attitude object - the regime
 - Mode of attitude - instrumental

The factor analysis (Table 2) demonstrated that the indices used for these three concepts tapped clearly distinguishable and distinct dimensions at the level of individual survey respondents. That micro distinctness, however, does not rule out the possibility of interesting relationships between these three phenomena at the macro level. I shall conclude by presenting two graphs that demonstrate the extent to which such relationships may prove interesting.

By way of introducing the relevant graphs of the different attitudes, I want to return to a theme raised earlier, namely the phenomenon of the *dissatisfied democrats*. This is the label I apply to those people who put a high rating on the attractiveness of democracy as a form of government but at the same time place a low rating on the performance of their particular democratic regime. For the present, I shall not distinguish between dissatisfied democrats in established, fledgling, or would-be democracies. Of course, extrapolations as to the systemic consequences of actions based on such a disjunction between desired and actual states would need to account for the setting in which the disjunction occurs. The likely actions of mobilized dissatisfied democrats in pre- or non-democratic systems would no doubt take very different form from their counterparts in functioning democracies. The former could be hypothesized, for example, as having a high revolutionary potential, while the latter might be expected to serve a reforming and enhancing role in their respective democracies. Some insight may be suggested by the aggregate relationships.


Figure 2 plots on the vertical axis the percentage of high support for the political community. The horizontal axis is an aggregate relative of the *dissatisfied democrats*, in that it is the difference in the percentage of respondents expressing support for democracy as a form of government and the percentage evaluating the regime's current performance positively. Thus, the graph tells us that countries in which there is a wide disparity between the moral assessment of democracy and the instrumental evaluation of the system's performance of the system are also likely to be countries with a relatively low support for the political community. Thus, there is indeed a potential for erosion of the broadest, perhaps most basic identity within a polity that can be linked to the extent to which its performance matches the moral aspirations of the population. However, there is sufficient ambiguity in the fit of my measure to the concept of political community (as noted in the earlier discussion of *patriotism* and *nationalism*) and sufficient spread in the relationship to put this proposition on the agenda as just that – a proposition, worthy of further exploration.

Figure 2: Support for Political Community by Difference between Support of Democracy as a Form of Government and Evaluation of its Performance



Similar material for further exploration is presented in Figure 3, plotting countries according to the percentage approving democracy in the abstract versus the performance of their particular system. Again, good performance, at the system level, is associated with approval of democracy as an abstraction. However, the correlation is rather weak, thus, allowing for a typology which distinguishes between citizens who support or oppose democracy as a form of government and those who are satisfied or dissatisfied with the way democracy works in their respective countries. Figure 2 shows that performance cannot be ignored. The evidence of Figures 2 and 3, to be sure, are consistent with the standing claim that effectiveness is a condition for legitimacy. However, I think the evidence is sufficiently mixed to underscore the need for considerable refinement, especially now that the range of national political experience has been broadened so dramatically and now that there is a growing body of heretofore hardly imaginable evidence available for more detailed exploration of the inner workings of embryonic, adolescent, and mature democracies.

Figure 3: Support of Democracy as a Form of Government by Positive Evaluation of Performance of Democracy



The data, remarkable as they are, do not provide all the answers to the questions posed here. However, the evidence is sufficient to invite a great deal more exploitation. My effort at mapping should serve as an introduction. But it also is consistent with other recent

inquiry in casting doubt on the much-acclaimed "decline" or "crisis" critiques of modern democracy. I can find no evidence of growing dissatisfaction with democracy as a form of government. Further, there is no apparent evidence that the dissatisfied democrats across the globe constitute a danger to democracy. Quite the contrary, they may well be the hope for the future of democratic governance.

Appendix 1

Mapping Political Support Countries, Time Points and Surveys Used in the Analysis

Countries	Population size	Time points and surveys	
		94/97	90/91
1. AMERICA			
1.1 North America			
– United States of America	270.211.000	WVS	WVS
– United Mexican States		WVS	WVS
Estados Unidos Mexicanos	97.122.000	LAT	
1.2 Central America			
– Dominican Republic		WVS	
República Dominicana	8.073.000		
– Puerto Rico	3.819.000	WVS	
1.3 South America			
– Republic of Venezuela		WVS	
República de Venezuela	22.139.000	LAT	
– Republic of Peru		WVS	
República del Perú	23.740.000	LAT	
– Federative Republic of Brazil		WVS	WVS
República Federativa do Brazil	158.438.000	LAT	
– Republic of Chile		WVS	WVS
República de Chile	14.671.000	LAT	
– Argentine Republic		WVS	WVS
República Argentina	35.598.000	LAT	
– Oriental Republic of Uruguay		WVS	
República Oriental del Uruguay	3.201.000	LAT	
– Republic of Bolivia		LAT	
República de Bolivia	7.629.000		
– Republic of Ecuador		LAT	
República de Ecuador	12.346.000		
– Republic of Colombia		LAT	
República de Colombia	35.097.000		
– Republic of Paraguay		LAT	
República del Paraguay	4.913.000		

Countries	Population size	Time points and surveys	
		94/97	90/91
2. AUSTRALIA			
– Commonwealth of Australia	18.308.000	WVS	WVS (81)
3. ASIA			
– Japan Nippon	125.545.000	WVS	WVS
– Republic of Korea Taehan-min 'guk	45.258.000	WVS	WVS
– Republic of China on Taiwan Zai Taiwan de Chung-hua Min-kuo	21.531.000	WVS	
– People's Republic of China Zhonghua Renmin Gonghegua	1.214.412.000	WVS	WVS
– Republic of the Philippines Republica de Filipinas Republika ng Pilipinas	70.449.000	WVS	
4. AFRICA			
– Federal Republic of Nigeria	98.238.000	WVS	WVS
– Republic of South Africa Republiek van Suid-Afrika Azania	42.068.000	WVS	WVS
5. EUROPE			
5.1 Northern Europe			
– Kingdom of Denmark Kongeriget Danmark	5.225.000	EB	EB
– Kingdom of Norway Kongeriket Norge	4.501.000	WVS EB	WVS EB
– Kingdom of Sweden Konungariket Sverige	8.886.000	WVS EB	WVS
– Republic of Finland Suomen Tasavalta Republiken Finland	5.153.000	WVS EB	WVS

Countries	Population size	Time points and surveys	
		94/97	90/91
<i>5.2 Western Europe</i>			
– United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	57.804.000		
Great Britain	(56.210.000)	EB	EB
Northern Ireland	(1.594.000)	EB	EB
– Republic of Ireland Eire	3.611.000	EB	EB
– French Republic République Française	58.354.000	EB	EB
– Kingdom of the Netherlands Koninkrijk der Nederlanden	15.532.000	EB	EB
– Kingdom of Belgium Koninkrijk België Royaume Belgique	10.057.000	EB	EB
– Grand Duchy of Luxembourg Groussherzogdem Lëtzebuerg Grand-Duché de Luxembourg Grossherzogtum Luxemburg	405.000	EB	EB
<i>5.3 Central Europe</i>			
– Polish Republic Polska Rzeczpospolita	38.691.000	EEB	EEB
– Republic of Lithuania Lietuvos Respublika	3.694.000	WVS EEB	WVS EEB
– Republic of Latvia Latvijas Republika	2.467.000	WVS EEB	WVS EEB
– Republic of Estonia Eesti Vabariik	1.470.000	WVS EEB	WVS EEB
– Federal Republic of Germany Bundesrepublik Deutschland	82.706.000		
West Germany	61.077.000	WVS EB	WVS EB
East Germany	16.706.000	WVS EB	WVS EB
– Swiss Confederation Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft Confédération Suisse Confederazione Svizzera	7.082.000	WVS	WVS

Countries	Population size	Time points and surveys	
		94/97	90/91
– Republic of Austria Republik Österreich	7.945.000	EB	
– Republic of Slovenia Republika Slovenije	1.988.000	WVS EEB	WVS EEB
– Republic of Croatia Republika Hrvatska	4.784.265	WVS EEB	
– Czech Republic	10.354.000	EEB	EEB
– Slovak Republic	5.388.000	EEB	EEB
– Hungarian Republic Magyar Köztársaság	10.263.000	EEB	EEB
<i>5.4 Eastern Europe</i>			
– Russian Federation/Russia Rossiiskaya Federatsiya/Rossiya	148.050.000	WVS EEB	WVS EEB
– Republic of Belarus Respublika Belarus	10.442.000	WVS EEB	WVS EEB
– Ukraine Ukraina	51.792.000	WVS EEB	EEB
– Republic of Moldova Republicii Moldova	4.380.000	WVS	EEB
<i>5.5 Southern Europe</i>			
– Italian Republic Repubblica Italiana	58.008.000	EB	EB
– Kingdom of Spain Reino de Espana	40.132.000	WVS EB	WVS EB
– Portuguese Republic República Portuguesa	9.855.000	EB	EB
– Hellenic Republic Eleniki Demokratia	10.511.000	EB	EB
<i>5.6 South Eastern Europe</i>			
– Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Federativna Republika Jugoslavija	10.515.000	WVS	EEB
– Republic of Macedonia Republika Makedonija	1.875.000	EEB	EEB
– Republic of Albania Republika Shqiperise	3.466.000	EEB	EEB
Countries	Population size	Time points and surveys	
		94/97	90/91

– Republic of Bulgaria		EEB	EEB
Republika Bulgariya	8.977.000		
– Romania	23.051.000	EEB	EEB
– Republic of Turkey		WVS	WVS
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti	63.898.000		
– Georgia		WVS	
Sakartvelos	4.500.000	EEB	EEB
– Republic of Armenia		WVS	
Hayastani Hanrapetoutioun	3.808.000	EEB	EEB
– Azerbaijan Republic		WVS	
Azarbaijchan Respublikasy	7.574.000		

WVS World Values Surveys

LAT Latinobarometer Surveys

EB Eurobarometer Surveys

EEB Central and Eastern Eurobarometers Surveys

Appendix 2

Table 12.1: Performance of the System of Governing in the 1990s: Evidence from the World Values Survey

<i>Country</i>	<i>Positive evaluation of performance in the mid-90s</i>	<i>Pattern of change as compared to the early 90s (%)</i>		
		Increase	No change	Decline
South Africa	48			-12
Chile	44			-6
USA	35			-20
Spain	31	+8		
Estonia	30	+13		
Lithuania	29	+16		
Latvia	24	+5		
Mexico	23			-7
Turkey	18			-31
Belarus	12			-11
Nigeria	9			-29
Russia	7			-38

Table 12.2: Confidence in Parliament in the Nineties: Evidence from the World Values Survey

<i>Country</i>	<i>A great deal or quite a lot of confidence (mid-90s, %)</i>	<i>Pattern of change as compared to the early 90s (%)</i>		
		Increase	No change	Decline
Norway	69	+10		
South Africa	60			-6
Turkey	48			-9
Sweden	45		-2	
Estonia	44			-25
Mexico	43	+8		
Chile	38			-25
Nigeria	37			-17
Spain	37		-1	
Brazil	34	+10		
Finland	33			-3
Australia	30			-25*
Belarus	30		+0.5	
USA	30			-15
West Germany	29			-21
Japan	27			-3
Lithuania	26			-39
Latvia	25			-47
Slovenia	25			-11
Russia	23			-24
East Germany	17			-24
Argentina	15		-1	

* In Australia change is measured as compared to 1981.

Table 12.3: Confidence in Government in the 1990s: Evidence from the World Values Surveys

<i>Country</i>	<i>Citizens with a great deal or quite a lot of confidence (%)</i>	<i>Pattern of change as compared to the early 90s (percent-points)</i>		
		Increase	No change	Decline
Chile	53			-6
Estonia	50			-14
Turkey	47	+15		
Mexico	42	+17		
Latvia	38			-19
Lithuania	36			-22
Spain	31	+3		
USA	31			-11
Nigeria	27		+0.6	

Table 12.4: Satisfaction with the Democratic Process in Europe in the 1990s: Evidence from the Eurobarometer Surveys

<i>Country</i>	<i>Very or fairly satisfied in May 1995 (%)</i>	<i>Pattern of change as compared to November 1991 (percent-points)</i>		
		<i>Increase</i>	<i>No change</i>	<i>Decline</i>
Denmark	83	+9		
Norway	82	+9		
Luxembourg	77		+0.3	
The Netherlands	71	+9		
Ireland	70	+14		
West Germany	67		+1	
Northern Ireland	57	+14		
Belgium	54		+2	
East Germany	48	+4		
France	47	+4		
Great Britain	46			-14
Spain	41			-15
Portugal	40			-35
Greece	28			-6
Italy	19		-0.3	

Note: May 1995 is the latest satisfaction with democracy measurement available.

Table 12.5: Satisfaction with the Democratic Process in Europe in the Nineties: Evidence from the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer Surveys

<i>Country</i>	<i>Very or fairly satisfied in November 1996 (%)</i>	<i>Pattern of change as compared to November 1992 (percent-points)</i>		
		<i>Increase</i>	<i>No change</i>	<i>Decline</i>
Albania	76	+34		
Romania	56	+27		
Poland	48	+12		
Georgia	44			-7
Slovenia	43			-6
Estonia	41	+12		
Czech Republic	41		+2	
Macedonia	41			-10
Lithuania	33			-18
Latvia	28	+10		
Hungary	22		-2	
Slovakia	21		-2	
Belarus	20	+9		
Ukraine	20		-0.4	
Armenia	19	+6		
Russia	8			-5
Moldova	6*			-32
Bulgaria	6			-33

Note: November 1996 is the latest measurement available.

* Data for Moldova (December 1996) are taken from the World Values Survey (Eastern Europe).

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