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Economic and legal aspects of international environmental agreements: The case of enforcing and stabilising an international CO 2 agreement

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Economic and Legal Aspects of International Environmental Agreements

The case of enforcing and stabilising an
international CO₂ agreement

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Oktober 1995



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Economic and Legal Aspects of International Environmental Agreements

The case of enforcing and stabilising an international CO₂ agreement

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Key words. International environmental agreements, international cooperation, non-compliance, enforcement, global warming, international law.

JEL classification: Q20, K33

Abstract. *The protection of the global environment is impeded by multilateral externalities which the international community attempts to bring under control by entering into international agreements. International agreements, however, can suffer from non-compliance and free-riding behaviour by sovereign states and must therefore be enforced and stabilised internationally.*

This paper describes instruments for the enforcement and stabilisation of an international CO₂ agreement and evaluates them in the light of economic and legal theory. Economic instruments build on repetition and use utility transfers, economic sanctions and flexible treaty adjustments. Important legal instruments are reciprocal obligations and cooperation duties, international funding and transfer rules, treaty suspension, retorsions and reprisals, treaty revision, and monitoring.

The paper shows that economic and legal instruments are compatible to a considerable extent. It develops proposals for the enforcement and stabilisation of a global CO₂ agreement and other multilateral treaties.

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I. Introduction

This paper deals with economic and legal aspects of enforcing and stabilising international environmental agreements. International environmental agreements comprise treaties, contracts, international accords, and common policies made and pursued by sovereign states, possibly with the help of international organisations, in order to cope with global or international environmental problems. International or global environmental problems include many issues, for instance the loss of species and biological diversity, the modification of the earth's atmosphere by ozone depleting substances and emissions of greenhouse gases, the pollution of transboundary river systems and the oceans.

Among the current global environmental threats the issue of carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions ranks prominently. CO₂ emissions are due to the use of fossil energy, mainly coal, oil and gas, but also deforestation. Curbing CO₂ emissions has an important impact on national economies as it constrains production and consumption and affects international trade in fossil fuels and in other goods. Since it is irrelevant for the global climate development which particular countries make the necessary CO₂ reductions, and as only a joint approach by at least a number of the world nations has a chance of success, severe conflicts over CO₂ limitations and reduction obligations as well as over their enforcement, maintenance and progressive development can be foreseen.

Any ambitious international CO₂ agreement gives rise to an incentive for all countries to exploit the situation by cheating and free-riding on other countries' emission reduction efforts. Countries may, for instance, first sign and ratify the agreement, and later not comply with their obligations and eventually breach the agreement. Or, countries may simply choose not to participate in the CO₂ agreement at all, as they hope to win a free-rider position. An effective CO₂ agreement must face these threats and provide instruments to cope with them.

How much emission reductions can be agreed upon in CO₂ limitation talks and subsequently be achieved is crucially dependent on the instruments available to deter non-compliance and rectify actual breaches of the CO₂ agreement and on the policies

applied to deal with free-riders. Hence, finding and providing for instruments which entice countries to join an international CO₂ agreement in the first place and enforce and stabilise it is an integral part of negotiating and writing the terms of the agreement.

The paper describes and evaluates the dual approach to the enforcement and stabilisation of an international CO₂ agreement which is entertained on the one hand by economic theory and on the other hand by the theory of international law. The paper shows that the suggested instruments are compatible, as one would expect, in a number of important respects. But it also points to certain deficiencies in international law and to certain misperceptions and overlooked mechanisms in economic theory concerning the working of international cooperation.

The paper is organised as follows. Section II describes major problems associated with worldwide CO₂ emissions and with respect to negotiating a CO₂ limitation agreement. Section III deals with the economics of enforcing and stabilising a CO₂ agreement and describes the relevant instruments. Section IV contains a description of treaty enforcement and stabilisation in international law. Based on these, Section V discusses the identified legal instruments from an economic perspective. The last section concludes the paper with a synthesis which attempts to sketch mechanisms for a stable CO₂ treaty and proposes questions for further research.

II. Coping with global CO₂ emissions

A. The global CO₂ problem

The trace gas CO₂ is a non-noxious natural element of the earth's atmosphere and a major component of the carbon cycle which is the basis for organic life on earth. CO₂ is released into the atmosphere when organic matter is burned or decomposes and it is sequestered again as plants grow and the biomass increases. CO₂ in the atmosphere is a major determinant of the earth's temperature equilibrium as it transforms incoming solar radiation into heat (the greenhouse effect). By and large, an increase in the atmospheric CO₂ concentration increases the atmosphere's energy density and its temperature, which can cause major shifts in global climate conditions.

The global atmospheric CO₂ concentration has been increasing at a growing pace since the beginning of the industrial revolution, in the wake of which huge fossil fuel reserves, chiefly coal, oil and gas, became available and were used in industrial processes, household heating, electricity production and transportation. Recently, the destruction of forests, particularly in the tropics, is adding considerably to the atmospheric CO₂ stock.

There is a general agreement among climate scientists that an effective doubling of the atmospheric CO₂ concentration from pre-industrial levels, which is expected to occur under business as usual policies within the next decades, will lead to a mean global temperature increase in the range of 1.5 to 4.5° C. This increase will have potentially large but varying effects on regional climate conditions.¹ Moreover, it is considered possible that the earth's climate may not change smoothly with a risk of irreversible catastrophes once certain thresholds of CO₂ concentration or temperature levels have been surpassed. Despite the still considerable uncertainties it seems sound to predict that the impacts of global warming will vary greatly from country to country, possibly leaving some countries as winners but with the majority of countries standing to lose.

The costs of abating CO₂ emissions are substantial.² At present, there is no feasible end-of-pipe technology for CO₂ emissions. Although the use of scrubbers for CO₂ and the storing of the removed carbon may become technically feasible in the future, the

¹ The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Impact Assessment Working Group finds, for instance, an ambiguous impact on agriculture and forestry in terms of *global* production, but potentially severe shifts in *regional* fertility, severe stress on natural ecosystems due to the speed of change, shifts in regional water supply and demand, and an increase in natural hazards (draught, flooding, storms and cyclones etc.) with potentially devastating impacts especially on the poor in semi-arid areas, coastal lowlands and on islands of some Third World countries, which all could lead to unprecedented migratory pressure. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, *Climate Change: The IPCC Impact Assessment* (eds. W.J. McG. Tegart, G.W. Sheldon, D.C. Griffiths), 1990.

² *Comp.*, e.g., Nordhaus, "The Cost of Slowing Climate Change: a Survey", 12/1 *The Energy Journal* 37 (1991); W.R. Cline, *The Economics of Global Warming*, Chapter 4 and 5, at 144 *et seq.*, 185 *et seq.*, 1992; Dean and Hoeller, "Costs of Reducing CO₂ Emissions: Evidence from Six Global Models", 19 *OECD Economic Studies, Special Issue: The Economic Costs of Reducing CO₂ Emissions* 15 (1992).

technology would be very costly in money and energy efficiency terms. Hence, reducing CO₂ emissions must largely rely on economising on carbon input, either by improved energy efficiency and/or by carbon substitution (replacement of coal by natural gas etc.) and/or by reducing demand for energy services.

Carbon emissions from fossil fuels vary greatly between countries in absolute quantities as well as per capita and per unit of GDP.³ The different reliance of countries on carbon fuels, their different energy needs and varying energy efficiency and their differing states of economic development imply that the present and future costs of reducing CO₂ emissions vary greatly between countries. This adds to the conflict potential in CO₂ limitation talks and treaty implementation, in particular between developed and developing countries,⁴ but also between industrial countries (OECD) and oil exporting countries (OPEC) and between various other groups of countries.

B. An international CO₂ agreement

The earth's atmosphere can be described as a global environmental medium which is shared by all countries. Its use as a recipient for CO₂ emissions by individual countries deteriorates climate conditions of other countries, too. Thus, CO₂ emissions are a public bad for the international community. In economic terms, CO₂ emissions produce external costs, which are not borne by the polluter but by third parties. External costs are typically not taken into account in benefit-cost analyses of individual states, which merely balance the cost of reducing their emissions with the benefit which accrues only to them. In case of CO₂ the domestic costs of emission abatement are substantial whereas the benefits which can be bought by own reductions are hardly no-

³ The United States released 5,020 million tons of energy related CO₂ in 1990 and holds a world share of 23.27 per cent, followed by Russia and China with 2,400 million tons and 11.13 per cent each (Japan 1,060 mil. t and 4.91 per cent, Germany 1,039 mil. t and 4.82 per cent, European Community 3,180 mil. t and 14.74 per cent, OECD 10,400 mil. t and 48.21 per cent). Whereas the US emitted 19.97 tons of CO₂ per capita in 1990, India had only 0.72 tons per capita. Whereas China needed 5.78 kg of CO₂ in 1990 to produce one US Dollar of GDP (1985 prices), Japan spent only 630 grams (US 1.09 kg, Germany 1.34). See OECD/IEA, *Climate Change Policy Initiatives*, at 28 *et seq.*, 1992.

⁴ See, e.g., Lembke, "Umweltpolitik in der Nord-Süd-Dimension: UNCED 1992 und danach", 5 *Zeitschrift für angewandte Umweltforschung* 322 (1992), Zimmermann, "Ökonomische Aspekte globaler Umweltprobleme", *id.* 310.

ticeable for most countries since their share in global CO₂ emissions is simply too small.⁵

External costs of CO₂ emissions have a correspondence in external benefits of emission reductions. A unilateral reduction of emissions by one country can be seen as the production of an international public good since the benefit of a smaller atmospheric CO₂ concentration accrues as an external benefit to other countries too. Moreover, such external benefits may even lead countries to cut back on their own reduction efforts since the problem becomes relatively less pressing. Theoretically, CO₂ abatement by one country or a group of countries can even be overcompensated by increased emissions elsewhere in the world if higher domestic costs, e.g. a CO₂ tax, shift production to countries with much higher CO₂ emissions per unit of output, as for instance, China. Therefore, from a purely national point of view, it is not in the interest of most countries to reduce their CO₂ emissions more than marginally. Consequently, their abatement efforts remain much below the global optimum which would take all external effects of national emission policies into account when fixing individual countries' emission targets.

To overcome the non-cooperative behaviour of self-interested states and implement national CO₂ policies which maximise the world net benefit requires an international coordination mechanism, which – in the absence of a world central authority – must link each country's effort to reciprocal foreign efforts and thus make benefits supplied depend on benefits received. Such a link could be an international CO₂ agreement which specifies a cooperative CO₂ reduction strategy and emission levels for each participant or an equivalent emission allocation mechanism.

The conclusion of treaties as a means of a regulatory international environmental policy is an important though not the only element in the development of international law, which has addressed questions of environmental protection in the broadest sense. Their origins reach far back into history. There exist new elements related to the envi-

⁵ The great majority of countries have a share in world total CO₂ emissions (21,570 mil. t., 1990) of less than two per cent, e.g. Italy: 1.91 per cent, see *Climate Change Policy Initiatives*, *supra*, note 3.

ronment already at the level of rules and basic international legal principles and customary international law.⁶ Those elements comprise responsibilities of states for transboundary air pollution,⁷ basic principles on the use of transboundary environmental media within and outside the domain of state sovereignty,⁸ and the claim to regulate the use of these media also with respect to third parties.⁹

These lines of development are less clear-cut than the international treaty law. But they are equally part of the international legal system and thus belong to the legal framework conditions of the relations between states. They do not only influence the behaviour of individual states in the field of the environment by way of commandments and prohibitions but they also shape, most extensively and in a complex way, the legal environment in which countries conclude and implement treaties. Just as private contracts concluded under a national legal system, international treaties cannot, in their legal relevance, be looked at in isolation. Their meaning and implications unfold only when they are seen in light of the legal system. In this case this is the international legal system.

An analysis of international environmental agreements must take account of this fact in two respects. On the one hand, the particularities in the structure of the international legal system must be taken into account when the legal meaning of an agreement is examined. On the other hand, it must be observed that legal developments with respect to environmental matters are not restricted to international treaty law, but also

⁶ *Comp. Heintschel v. Heinegg*. In: K. Ipsen et al., *Völkerrecht*, Introduction to Chapter 13 at para. 2-9 (3rd edition, München, 1990).

⁷ Compare the decision of the arbitration court in the Trail Smelter Case of April 16, 1938 and of March 11, 1941, RIAA III, 1911 *et seq.* and 1938 *et seq.* and the decision of OLG Saarbrücken of 1957, NW II (1958), 752, which obliged a French coal pit to pay damages to a German citizen who was harmed by smoke and coal dust, and which the court based on the French damage compensation law.

⁸ *E.g.*, the arbitration decision in the Lac Lanoux case, RIAA XII, 281; see also Andrassy, "Nachbarrecht und Wassernutzung". In: F.A. v.d. Heydte, I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, St. Verosta, K. Zemanek (eds.), *Völkerrecht und rechtliches Weltbild*, 55 at 55 *et seq.*, 1960. See also the arbitration decision in the Gut Dam case, ILM 8 (1969), 118 *et seq.* Concerning areas outside the realm of state sovereignty see the "Antarctic Treaty" of 1959.

⁹ See here the "Antarctic Treaty" of 1959, which may constitute a so called "objective regime", which obliges also those countries which are not parties to the treaty. *Comp. Fischer*. In: *Völkerrecht*, *supra*, note 6, at § 12 para. 34.

pertain to rules and basic principles of international law, and that such legal developments influence the conclusion, content and validity of treaties.

International treaties are agreements that are concluded between sovereign states with the will to be legally bound by the treaty and the obligations stipulated therein. In legal theory, sovereignty is the prerequisite which enables states to enter into binding agreements, and this includes the possibility that states give up parts of their sovereign powers by ratifying international treaties. The rules which govern treaty relationships between states are laid down in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

The will to be legally bound does, of course, not imply that the parties in reality always comply with their obligations. But, since treaties are built on the principle of reciprocity, i.e. they stipulate reciprocal rights and obligations to generate mutual benefits, the parties to an agreement usually have an original interest in complying with their obligations. This is obvious in many international treaties that deal with situations of bilateral exchange, e.g., the exchange of goods in international trade, although the rights and obligations themselves may be framed in a multiparty treaty, e.g., the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

Bilateral reciprocal treaties are comparable with so called exchange contracts under civil law, e.g., a procurement contract. It is the only purpose of performance in such contracts to secure counter-performance, e.g., payment, in return for the performance due (*quid pro quo*). Thus, performance and counter-performance point into opposing directions — they are reciprocal — and their proportions is a result of the market process.

But the pattern of bilateral reciprocity does not carry through to international environmental treaties which regulate multilateral externalities. Such treaties are distinct in character in so far as the exchange reciprocity is much less perfect since with multilateral externalities reciprocity is necessarily multilateral too. Consequently, a state that breaches or abstains from a CO₂ agreement nevertheless enjoys the benefit of the joint cooperative efforts of those other states that comply with the agreement. Reciprocity, interpreted as an ongoing relationship of equal exchange, in which the participation of the other partner is conditional on compliance by the first and, hence, non-compliance

produces its own punishment, does not exist here. A country that joins an already large agreement coalition and pays the price of cooperative CO₂ reductions would get much less in return since it already receives the biggest part of the agreements benefit as a free lunch. Hence, it has little, if any, incentive to join. Moreover, the same argument holds for a country that has the choice not to comply with the CO₂ agreement of which it is a member.

Hence, other than in the case of exchange contracts under civil law, which are made to achieve opposing individual interests, environmental agreements are characterised by a common purpose and by parallel contributions. As a rule, the purpose of such agreements consists in protecting a common environmental medium. To that end, the states which are party to the agreement usually commit themselves equally to refrain from polluting the environmental medium or to reduce pollution.

A comparison of such constellations with contractual patterns in civil law draws attention to partnership contracts and similar agreements (joint ventures, cooperations, etc.).¹⁰ Such contracts rest on the notion of cooperation, in which the participants make contributions in order to jointly achieve a common goal. Here, the proportion of the parties' contributions is subject to very different notions of equity and fairness compared to the assessment of the proportions between performance and reward in exchange contracts. The yardstick for the latter case is that performance and counter-performance must be equivalent.¹¹ However, in cooperative cases, which are of interest here, the proportion of the parties' contributions are not exclusively determined by the rule of equal performance. Important are rather notions of equity and fairness, elements of which are the interest of each party in the achievement of the common goal, but also each party's wealth and ability to pay.¹²

¹⁰ *Comp. D. Medicus, Schuldrecht II*, at 216 *et seq.*, 5th edition, 1992.

¹¹ *Id.* note 13 at 210.

¹² Compare, for instance, the sharing of costs in the "Convention for the Protection of the Rhine against Pollution by Chlorides" of 1976, in which the Netherlands, due to their interest in the success of the agreement (the desalination of the Rhine), was committed to pay 34 per cent of the costs of a desalination project in Alsace, whereas France, the major polluter, was to pay only 30 per cent of the costs.

The question of equity in an ambitious global CO₂ agreement is indeed vital for enlisting sufficient support from all kinds of states. There are several studies which focus on the issue of an equitable distribution of gains from joint CO₂ abatement and on possible bargaining outcomes in CO₂ negotiations.¹³

But the standard economic concern is the quest for a cost-effective international CO₂ abatement policy, which minimises the global costs of achieving a given emissions target. Important instruments for a cost-effective global CO₂ policy are tradeable permits (or CO₂ quota trading) and an international CO₂ tax.¹⁴ Grubb proposes a system of international CO₂ quota trading in which CO₂ quotas are initially allocated to states on a population basis.¹⁵ This would allow to handle the equity and cost-effectiveness issues with only one instrument. Other researchers consider a system of international or harmonised national CO₂ taxes with transfer payments between countries. However, history shows that large wealth transfers between countries have hardly any chance in real world treaties. Instead, and despite the inefficiencies implied, most international emissions reduction agreements, e.g., the ECE Protocols on SO₂ and NO_x, function with some kind of non-transferable reduction quotas, which are in principle equal for all signatories.

¹³ See, e.g., Welsch, "Equity and Efficiency in International CO₂ Agreements". In: E. Hope and S. Strøm (eds.), *Energy Markets and Environmental Issues: A European Perspective*, 211, 1992; Welsch, "Inequality Aspects of Alternative CO₂ Agreement Designs", 16 *OPEC Review* 23 (1992); Rose, "Reducing conflict in global warming policy: The potential of equity as a unifying principle", 18 *Energy Policy* 927 (1990); Barrett, "Reaching a CO₂ Emission Limitation Agreement for the Community: Implications for Equity and Cost-Effectiveness", *European Economy: The Economics of Limiting CO₂ Emissions*, Special edition No. 1 – 1992, 3; Bohm, "Distributional Implications of Allowing International Trade in CO₂ Emission Quotas", 15 *The World Economy* 107 (1992).

¹⁴ See, e.g., J.M. Epstein and R. Gupta, *Controlling the Greenhouse Effect: Five Global Regimes Compared*, Brookings Occasional Papers, The Brookings Institution, Washington DC., 1990; Hoel "Efficient International Agreements for Reducing Emissions of CO₂", 12/2 *The Energy Journal* 93 (1991); UNCTAD (ed.), *Combating Global Warming: Study on a Global System of Tradeable Carbon Emission Entitlements*, UNCTAD/RDP/DFP/1, 1992; OECD (ed.), *International Economic Instruments and Climate Change*, 1993.

¹⁵ M. Grubb, *The Greenhouse Effect: Negotiating Targets*, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1989.

Other contributions take a more comprehensive look at possible CO₂ agreements,¹⁶ and discuss institutional options for negotiating and administering a global climate regime.¹⁷ Few authors deal with the stability of a CO₂ abatement coalition,¹⁸ and explore compliance and enforcement issues in a global CO₂ regime.¹⁹

The Framework Convention on Climate Change, which was signed during the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, is the beginning of a worldwide climate policy. Formally, the Climate Convention is designed as a framework convention in the style of the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer of 1985 and the ECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution of 1979, and it needs completion by future climate protocols. But negotiators did succeed in stipulating that developed countries must take measures which are aimed at stabilising their emissions on the 1990 level and at reducing them to an earlier level until the year 2000. (Note the deliberate vagueness in specifying targets. If pursued seriously, this obligation results in a rather arbitrary and probably inefficient emission reduction quota for each country.) Moreover, no reduction obligations were agreed upon for developing countries. Instead, developing countries can expect financial and technological support within the framework of the Global Environmental Facilities (GEF). Other obligations like research, reporting and regular discussions are more of a preparatory nature and aim at facilitating the intended follow-up conferences and more serious decisions on CO₂ re-

¹⁶ E.g., *The Greenhouse Effect: Negotiating Targets*, supra, note 16; W.A. Nitze, *The Greenhouse Effect: Formulating a Convention*, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1990.

¹⁷ E.g., K. Kaiser, E.U. von Weizsäcker, S. Comes, R. Bleischwitz, *Internationale Klimapolitik: Eine Zwischenbilanz und ein Vorschlag zum Abschluß einer Klimakonvention*, Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Bonn, 1991.

¹⁸ E.g., Barrett, "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements", 46 *Oxford Economic Papers* (N.S.) 878 (1994); A. Bauer, *Der Treibhauseffekt: Eine ökonomische Analyse*, at 160-86, 1993.

¹⁹ E.g., Barrett, "Free Rider Deterrence in a Global Warming Treaty". In: OECD (ed.), *Convention on Climate Change: Economic Aspects of Negotiations*, 73, 1992; Ress, "Ex Ante Safeguards Against Ex Post Opportunism in International Treaties: Theory and Practice of International Law", 150 *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, 279 (1994).

duction targets which are called for by the Climate Convention's explicit aim to stabilise global climate conditions.

But a meaningful CO₂ agreement which includes *all* countries is difficult to achieve because of the pervasive free-rider incentive that was described above. If free-riding is possible by not signing an agreement it becomes ever more attractive with every additional country that joins the CO₂ abatement coalition. Whether joining or abstaining is more profitable depends on the characteristics of each country's CO₂ abatement cost and benefit function. Thus, before joining a CO₂ treaty, each country must decide whether its benefit from cooperation is larger than its free-rider benefit, and each (potential) CO₂ abatement coalition must determine which share of the net benefits it wants to offer to yet hesitating countries and which other strategies and instruments it can apply to induce reluctant countries to join. Hence, agreeing on a CO₂ treaty is a bargaining process between all potential parties.

In addition to luring or coercing states into joining the CO₂ agreement, a large initial participation can also be achieved by making the treaty's coming into force subject to a high initial ratification rate. This is a usual practice in international treaties which guarantees early participants a certain minimum benefit and confronts every hesitating country with the risk of an all-or-nothing outcome so that the free-rider benefit is by no means certain.²⁰ Hence, it may be better for them to join. However, this approach merely transforms the problem of free-riding into a problem of enforcing the treaty after ratification. Obtaining a meaningful and stable CO₂ agreement may therefore depend on the ability of states to credibly commit themselves to their treaty obligations and on the ability of the parties to enforce the treaty's terms with respect to members and non-members.

C. The need for treaty enforcement and stabilisation

An international agreement is stable if the contractual relationship continues to exist and the obligations laid down therein are observed. Although sovereign states are ca-

²⁰ Black, Levi, Fellow, and de Meza, "Creating a Good Atmosphere: Minimum Participation for Tackling the 'Greenhouse Effect' ", 60 *Economica* 281 (1993).

pable of concluding *legally* binding agreements, evidence suggest that this does not preclude them from behaving non-compliant.²¹ For every *practical* decision, the sovereignty of a state is also the condition which allows each state to behave opportunistically and always in accordance with its proper interests, which may include the violation of a legally binding treaty. This is due to the fact that, unlike national legal systems, the international system lacks any superior authority which can enforce the legal order in general and, more specifically, contract obligations by means of a supreme power. The notion of sovereignty is therefore used in economic theory to indicate the fact that a state, when choosing from the set of possible actions, will take at any time only the costs and benefits of its action into account, and can never be induced, prior or after entering into an agreement, to take an action which it would not choose freely when taking the related costs and benefits into account. Such costs and benefits can depend on contractual relations. But contracts and treaties can only influence the behaviour of a sovereign state in so far as they affect the costs and benefits of each possible action. This implies that sovereign states, as seen by economic theory, are incapable of credibly committing themselves to any effectively binding obligation, because no state, as long as it remains sovereign, can relinquish pursuing the national interest and behaving opportunistically in any future actions.

Hence, under conditions of state sovereignty, even treaties which have been duly ratified and which are in force remain always in jeopardy unless they are self-enforcing. Self-enforcing treaties are designed and equipped with appropriate instruments and mechanisms in such a way that a continued interest of all signatories to remain a party to the treaty is ensured. This can be achieved by making use of existing real-life interdependencies between states, which are characterised by the existing options for

²¹ Well known are cases of non-compliance with the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling and with the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), e.g., trade in ivory and rhino horn. *Comp.* on the effectiveness of international environmental agreements, e.g., P. Sand (ed.), *The Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements: A Survey of Existing Legal Instruments*, 1992.

mutual actions. It is the aim of this study to uncover such options so they can be used in a CO₂ treaty as enforcement and stabilisation instruments.

Although the question of compliance with and enforcement of a CO₂ agreement is closely related to the above question of the agreement's existence, size and extension, the situation is nevertheless somewhat different since with the existence of a CO₂ treaty, countries have different strategies, which lead to different net benefits and to different stabilisation and enforcement instruments. One difference concerns the fact that states, as members of a CO₂ agreement, are confronted with an ongoing relationship in which their partners may not (be able to) react instantaneously to a violation but can alter the nature of the future relationship which would then have negative effects on the violator too. The difference is obvious when considering international law. International pressure, for instance economic sanctions, may be perfectly legal when invoked against a non-compliant country, but the same instruments can be illegal when applied against a country which has never become a party to the agreement. Also the economic stakes for applying sanctions may be of different size, depending on whether a non-compliant country had to expect their use as a member of the treaty or whether they are applied as an unjust interference with a foreign country's policies with the possibility of due legal reactions.

In economic theory, the rationale of breaching a international agreement can be described as follows. When a country's government considers whether breaching the CO₂ treaty or complying with it would be the most beneficial option, it makes a comparison between the net present value of both options. The present value is the discounted net benefit of all future periods. Generally, a sovereign state can be presumed to renege on the CO₂ treaty whenever the present value of breaching it exceeds the present value of complying with its terms. Although at first, a country may have joined a CO₂ agreement in the belief that being a party to the agreement is clearly a better choice than not joining, reasons may emerge subsequently which induce this country to violate the agreement or quit participation in it. Such reasons may be:

- The opportunity to take advantage of the CO₂ treaty's existence by becoming a free-rider: When a country which has already ratified the CO₂ treaty realises that, after

more countries have joined; it would be more profitable to leave the treaty, it may rationally decide to violate or revoke it. This incentive to defect is particularly pronounced if a treaty comes into force only on the condition that a certain minimum number of countries ratify it. In this situation, it may be better for some countries to join first than to have no agreement at all, and seek to sneak out again later on when the treaty's existence is not endangered by its defection. The possibility to free-ride on other parties' efforts is the dominant reason for this type of non-compliance and treaty breach.

- The difficulty to adjust the CO₂ agreement's abatement obligations quickly to a changing number of members: If the remaining parties to the agreement are unable to react and adjust their abatement efforts to the new situation of fewer coalition members immediately or at least in the long-run, then a non-compliant country may enjoy a temporal or permanent advantage. This advantage stems from the fact that the remaining countries continue to sustain a too tight CO₂ emission level, which was adequate for the larger coalition, but which would no longer be in their common interest after the first country's defection. To take advantage of this reaction rigidity is particularly tempting for those members which have a high time preference since their future benefits of continued common CO₂ abatement weighs relatively little. But it is also conceivable that a country deceives its partners and joins the treaty with the secret intention to renege later in order to take advantage of the remaining parties. Hence, the existence of a **reaction time-lag** gives also rise to an incentive to breach the CO₂ treaty.
- A considerable shift in the bargaining power of participating countries in the course of time and/or due to the gradual implementation of the agreement: If the relative bargaining power of a participating country grows in the course of time it may eventually try to realise a bigger net benefit by violating the agreement with the intention to induce renegotiations of obligations. Such a shift in the bargaining power of a participating country is possible, for example, when the relationship undergoes a fundamental transformation as a result of the agreement's implementation. This may occur, for instance, if some parties irreversibly implement the agreement as a

front end investment such that they have nothing to offer later, which disturbs reciprocity when the remaining countries are to catch up. This is, for instance, the case in the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, in which developing countries are granted a grace period of ten years. Another example is the possibility that a country capitalises future benefits provided by the agreement, for instance by using financial transfers obtained for reducing CO₂ emissions in the future as collateral for raising international debt in the present. Once that debt is raised, the remaining incentive to produce further CO₂ reductions in the future is weak. **Irreversibilities** cause this type of breaches of a CO₂ agreement.

- Changes of the relevant circumstances that result in a disadvantage for certain member countries: Such changes may be unexpected and can result as a consequence of initially wrong predictions and estimates of costs and benefits, or because of a sudden lack of authority to implement and enforce the agreement domestically. But also a CO₂ agreement that is based on expected net benefits may not be fulfilled by a country for which the implicit risk of the agreement materialises in a bad state of nature, for instance because its realised costs are higher or its damages of global warming are lower than average, so that the net benefit of complying with the agreement becomes negative. These breaches of a CO₂ agreement are caused by **learning effects**.

The following section discusses economic instruments which the international community can employ to enforce and stabilise a CO₂ treaty.

III. Treaty stabilisation and economic theory

A basic paradigm, which is often used to describe international relations in the framework of non-cooperative game theory, is the simple prisoners dilemma. It describes a situation in which two parties have the choice to cooperate or not. The prisoners dilemma is characterised by net benefits for both parties such that it is always better for each of them not to cooperate whatever the other does, although they were both better off if both did cooperate.

Due to the externalities of CO₂ abatement, joint CO₂ abatement resembles the prisoners dilemma. But it also differs in some aspects which influences the bringing about and sustaining of cooperation: First, a large number of countries is involved. This induces free-riding. Second, the abatement costs and benefits of countries differ and may be interdependent. Third, countries are not equal in size. Fourth, they can choose from continuous strategies, namely the various degrees of abatement efforts or violations and other actions, e.g. trade measures. Fifth, they are uncertain about the outcome of their actions. Sixth, CO₂ abatement is a repeated process.

The following discussion of economic stabilisation instruments is based on the assumption that a breach of a CO₂ treaty always produces economic gains for the non-compliant party if the remaining parties continue with their cooperative behaviour. Hence, we are here only concerned with economic considerations which can be put in benefit-cost terms of the various strategic options at hand. Any stabilisation instrument must therefore aim at counter-balancing gains obtained by a breach of the CO₂ treaty.

Avoiding possible gains from non-compliant behaviour is possible by designing the agreement in such a way that the occurrence of situations in which the non-compliance option may be chosen is avoided or minimised. An adequate sharing of the gains from cooperation by wealth transfers could achieve this. Furthermore, parties to a CO₂ agreement can react to violations of the agreement *ex post*, e.g. by effectively punishing the non-compliant partner with reciprocal non-compliance or with economic sanctions. A necessary condition for the success of future punitive reactions to non-compliance is, however, that the non-compliant state or government does not discount the future too heavily, so that future costs can have a sufficiently large impact on today's decisions.

Economic stabilisation instruments can further be subdivided into internal and external instruments and flexible adjustments to the agreement. Internal stabilisation instruments are those which are directly tied to the accomplishment of the agreement's purpose, in particular by making own future CO₂ reductions conditional on the effort and behaviour of other parties. External instruments are those which apply means that are external to the direct CO₂ abatement obligations, for instance sanctions and

monetary transfers. Finally, adjustments of the agreement in due time before non-compliance can induce countries to abstain from violations of the agreement and to accept the new obligations and implement them.

The following Section III.A deals with the possibility of a stable coalition under various assumptions. Section III.B describes internal stabilisation strategies. Sections III.C through E are concerned with external stabilisation instruments (transfers, sanctions, cross-default mechanisms). And Section III.F discusses possibilities for a flexible CO₂ agreement and the notion of a dynamic agreement.

A. Stable coalitions

Models on the formation of environmental coalitions between sovereign states have been proposed by several authors. In a model with identical countries Barrett shows that cooperation of more than three countries is only stable under the following conditions:²² Each country's marginal abatement benefits must be decreasing in global reductions so that their non-cooperative abatement efforts are interdependent; and the CO₂ reduction coalition always maximises its joint net benefit and re-adjusts its abatement efforts when a country joins or leaves. Joining is interesting since every new member benefits from additional reductions of the old members. But with each new member the free-rider benefit increases so that the incentive to join is decreased. Therefore, the size of the coalition remains necessarily limited.²³ Stability in the sense of Barrett is achieved when no single country wants to join or leave.

Barrett finds that a large coalition is only possible if the difference in net benefits between cooperation and non-cooperation is small; if it is large so that full cooperation would be very profitable only a very small coalition can exist.²⁴ He identifies the first

²² Barrett, "International Environmental Agreements as Games". In: Rüdiger Pethig (ed.), *Conflicts and Cooperation in Managing Environmental Resources*, 11, 1992; *Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements*, *supra*, note 18.

²³ A similar result holds for heterogeneous countries, too. See S. Barrett, *Heterogeneous International Environmental Agreements*, CSERGE Working Paper GEC 93-20, Center for Social and Economic Research on the Global Environment, University College London, 1993.

²⁴ See Barrett, "Economic Analysis of International Environmental Agreements: Lessons for a Global Warming Treaty". In: OECD (ed.), *Responding to Climate Change: Selected*

case with the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. In this treaty a large number of countries agreed on substantial CFC reductions most of which would have been made unilaterally, too. He identifies the second case with an international CO₂ agreement in which the cost-benefit ratio is very much smaller than in the ozone case and the free-rider effect has much more weight.

In a model proposed by Bauer countries have different size in terms of their CO₂ emissions.²⁵ She shows that even with constant marginal benefits large coalitions are possible if one assumes a stepwise process in which ever larger bilateral coalitions are formed which consist of countries or subcoalitions of similar size. The model is driven by the fact that a coalition of two countries is stable whereas a coalition of three is never stable. Hence, it is never profitable for a country to leave a coalition of four members — i.e. a coalitions of two subcoalitions of two countries — since its partner in the subcoalition would then quit, too. This effect renders coalitions of four stable. (Note that this is a different stability concept than Barrett's.)

The process of stepwise coalition building can continue endlessly, but with the restriction that in larger coalitions one country, usually the smallest, can defect without destroying the remaining coalition. Hence, coalitions of seven or thirteen and more are possible and stable — and a rather complicated structure of coalitions of various size with a few individual free-riders results. Bilateral relations seem to be a catalyst for forming non-trivial larger coalitions. Bauer identifies this coalition building process with bi- and multilateral pre-agreement negotiations, in which the conditionality of participation plays an important role. The increasing size of countries serve to produce a clear coalition structure in the model as smaller countries profit more from free-riding than larger ones.

In a model by Black et al. cooperation is driven by the uncertainty of countries about whether an agreement which requires a minimum number of signatures will

Economic Issues, 109, 1991; S. Barrett, *The Paradox of International Environmental Agreements*, mimeo, London Business School, 1991.

²⁵ A. Bauer, *International Cooperation over Environmental Goods*, Münchener Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge Nr. 92-17, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät der Ludwig-Maximilians Universität München, 1992; *Der Treibhauseffekt*, *supra*, note 18.

materialise.²⁶ The countries are uncertain about whether a sufficient number of countries will sign and ratify the treaty so that it can come into force. Not joining the agreement is therefore risky and must be balanced against the expected free-rider benefit. This risk induces countries to participate in larger numbers than under full information. Critical for this result are the assumptions that countries do not renegotiate after they failed to reach the minimum number of signatories, and that they remain committed to the agreement after it has come into force although free-riding would benefit them more.

Heal demonstrates that cross effects in benefits, technological externalities or fix costs of abatement can also lead to a minimum critical coalition.²⁷ In this coalition, each member pursues its non-cooperative abatement strategy. The agreement serves only to coordinate actions on a higher non-cooperative abatement level that is stable but would not be attainable by independent moves. Heal chooses cost and benefit functions which imply a coordination problem in addition to the free-rider problem. With additional cooperative abatement, the minimum critical coalition would be smaller.

It is interesting to note that the climate threshold effect, which describes a sudden and irreversible climate deterioration, could produce a minimum critical coalition in the sense of Heal. In this coalition, each country would be decisive since without it a CO₂ concentration in excess of the threshold could not be avoided. As a result, the defection of only one member country would destroy the coalition, so that each country loses the entire coalition benefit when it quits. The threat of the threshold effect may thus help avoid its consequences.

B. Stabilisation by repetition

In the above models, actions are immediately followed by reactions. But this simplification may not be appropriate for describing an international CO₂ agreement since in-

²⁶ Black et al., *supra*, note 20.

²⁷ G.M. Heal, "Formation of International Environmental Agreements". In: C. Carraro (ed.), *Trade, Innovation, Environment*, 301, 1994.

ternational verification of CO₂ abatement is difficult. Explicitly modelling the time structure may be more realistic. Although the introduction of a reaction delay can increase the non-compliance benefit, repetition can contribute to solving the enforcement and stability problem.

Repetition is a powerful ingredient of cooperative behaviour in prisoners dilemma-like situations since the sequential nature of cooperation allows to fight back after a deviation has occurred.²⁸ Repetition reintroduces reciprocity on a higher level since it ties present and future benefits and/or costs together. A country which considers breaching the CO₂ agreement must thus balance the additional present net benefit of non-compliance against its future costs when the remaining countries retaliate. Retaliation may consist in reciprocal non-cooperation in the next or in future periods.

The cost-benefit calculation of a country which considers violating the agreement is critically influenced by its time preference expressed by the discount rate. A high discount rate gives more weight to present benefits whereas a low discount rate values future benefits relatively more. Hence, repetition in connection with a sufficiently low discount rate can secure cooperation when there is always more to gain from continued cooperation than from a breach of the agreement with subsequent retaliation.

There are a number of internal punishment strategies which consist in realising non-cooperative levels of CO₂ emissions in future periods in response to a breach of the CO₂ agreement by a member country.

²⁸ Game theory allows to derive this result for infinite horizon games, but not for games with a finite number of repetitions. In such games punishment is not only impossible in the last stage but, by backward induction also at all previous stages. Since each party tries to cheat first, the non-cooperative outcome is played right from the first stage on. See, e.g., Abreu, "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting", 56 *Econometrica*, 383 (1988) for a theoretic treatment, and R. Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, 1984, for a computer evaluation of repeated prisoners dilemma strategies. In contradiction to the theoretically predicted impossibility of cooperation in finitely repeated prisoners dilemma games, experimental studies of human behaviour show that most people tend to cooperate until shortly before the final stage of the game. See, e.g., Selten and Stoecker, "End Behavior in Sequences of Finite Prisoner's Dilemma Supergames", 7 *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization* 47 (1986).

1. Trigger strategy

A well known retaliation strategy is the so called trigger or grim strategy. It requires that all parties pursue cooperative abatement until one party is observed to cheat. In this case the CO₂ agreement becomes void and each country's emissions fall back to the non-cooperative level forever. An example for the application of the trigger strategy in an international treaty is the Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals (signed 1957, adopted 1976). It stipulates that each of the four parties to the treaty (US, Canada, USSR, Japan) can give notice of the treaty's termination whenever consultations on a violation turn out to be unsuccessful.

The trigger strategy punishes the non-compliant country very effectively. It can counterbalance relatively large free-rider gains and can thus enforce stable cooperation between a large number of countries. The size of the abatement coalition depends, of course, on the discount rate of all countries. Especially those countries with a lower discount rate will find the free-rider position the more attractive the more countries have already joined the agreement so that full cooperation need not emerge.

But the trigger strategy does not only punish the non-compliant country. The punishing countries also suffer when they terminate the agreement and increase their CO₂ emissions. Therefore, they have an incentive to renegotiate in order to continue or resume cooperation. Hence, the trigger strategy is not a credible threat. But even worse, the trigger strategy may be impossible to apply in the CO₂ case because the technology applied may prevent a return to the pre-agreement emission level. Hence, a country which wants to leave the CO₂ agreement need not necessarily fear its termination for punishment.

2. Matching efforts

Another punishment strategy concerns the re-adjustment of abatement efforts upon non-compliance of one country. This is a much weaker stability concept. It is used in Barrett's model, although not in a sequential moves context. The strategy requires that a country which deviates from its CO₂ abatement obligations is excluded and that the

remaining countries jointly decrease their efforts somewhat so that the new abatement target maximises the remaining coalition's net benefit.

Barrett's results with this strategy are hardly promising. They are even less promising in a repeated moves framework. The non-compliance gains are larger here because of the detection and reaction time lag. Furthermore, a defection by one country will prompt entry by another country, which renders the matching strategy worthless. Re-adjustments do not occur in equilibrium so that every member has an incentive to defect. Hence, punitive re-adjustments require that the abatement coalition is a closed shop and that the number of members is held down to a suboptimum level. But again, countries can hardly commit themselves to permanent losses from a suboptimum abatement coalition. Moreover, the loyal parties to the agreement have an incentive to renegotiate with the non-compliant country and re-accept it in disregard of its past violations. If this is anticipated, the agreement becomes inherently instable again.

3. Modified tit-for-tat

Another internal punishment strategy is modified tit-for-tat. This strategy avoids the incentive to renegotiate. The usual tit-for-tat strategy stipulates that in each subsequent move each party chooses that action which the other party has chosen in the previous move. After cooperation has started tit-for-tat is equivalent to the trigger-strategy — and it suffers from the same deficiencies. Modified tit-for-tat is adapted to a multi-party agreement. It requires to continue with cooperation until one country defects, and then to exclude this country and re-adjust emissions among the remaining members, and not to forgive and re-admit the non-compliant country before it has paid damages or made a front end abatement concession. Such a concession could be to go back to the higher abatement efforts of the old coalition for at least one period, whilst the other parties remain at the lower abatement level. The re-admitted country's abatement effort is thus not matched for some time, so that it must bear higher costs and has a lower net benefit while it produces additional external benefits for the loyal parties.

Modified tit-for-tat is interesting as a punishment strategy, because it can eliminate the gains from non-compliance without, at the same time, inducing the loyal parties to renegotiate with the violator. This can be achieved by tailoring the front end concession in such a way that the outcome of renegotiations is always strictly worse for the loyal parties, whilst paying the concession to be accepted again is always better for the non-compliant country than permanent exclusion from the agreement. Hence, the modified tit-for-tat strategy is (weakly) renegotiation proof. Of course, renegotiations can still become necessary if a change in other circumstances had caused non-compliance.

One may object that modified tit-for-tat is unrealistic in a CO₂ agreement, because CO₂ abatement levels are not flexible enough due to technological and political rigidities. But the strategy need not be restricted to shifting abatement efforts. Much more subtle renegotiation proof strategies which involve other areas of international relations like trade are conceivable and may even not be explicit in the agreement. An example for an implicit punishment of this sort can be seen in the fact that an unreliable country has a weaker bargaining position in international negotiations or must accept a higher risk premium when borrowing from international banks.

C. Transfers

Repetition strategies are not sufficient to enforce a meaningful international agreement that suffers from severe multilateral externalities. Utility transfers between countries can play an important role for the stability of a CO₂ agreement. But they can have a destabilising impact, too, if given carelessly.

There are several examples of transfers in international environmental treaties. An early one is the Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals mentioned above. In this treaty, Canada and Japan gave up their wasteful practice of catching seals at sea in return for receiving a share of the annual catch of the United States and Russia which harvest seals much more efficiently on their breeding islands. A more recent example is the Multilateral Fund of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. The Fund pays for the incremental costs of implementing

the Protocol in developing countries. Major countries, namely China and India, acceded to the Montreal Protocol only after the developed countries had offered to pay these transfers. Another recent example are the Global Environmental Facilities (GEF), which pay for CO₂-related and other environmental projects in developing countries which are of a global interest.

One important reason for transfers between member countries of a CO₂ agreement is the fact that their costs and benefits of CO₂ abatement differ substantially. Developing countries concentrate their efforts on economic development instead of environmental protection. Due to their low per capita income they are reluctant to substitute low-cost but environmentally harmful technologies by high-cost but environmentally friendly ones. Their focus on development issues overrules environmental aspects in many cases. This pattern seems to hold for CO₂ reduction policies, too. The opportunity costs in terms of a lost increase in economic prosperity are significant for these countries when they have to bear the corresponding costs of CO₂ abatement alone.

Although these opportunity costs are considered high by developing countries this does not mean that their costs of reducing CO₂ are substantial when compared internationally. On the contrary, CO₂ abatement costs are usually significantly lower in developing countries. This is mostly due to a very wasteful use of fossil energy resources. A global reduction policy which need not take sovereignty constraints into account would allocate reductions in a way that would equalise marginal abatement costs over countries for any given worldwide reduction target. Minimising the costs of CO₂ reductions would require concentrating reduction policies on developing countries in order to make use of the significant cost differentials. Such a policy would, however, leave many developing countries worse off if they had to bear the corresponding abatement costs in their countries themselves. Obviously, sovereign countries would never agree to such a scheme. This is the reason why some kind of transfers are considered necessary for reaching an international CO₂ agreement that abates CO₂ emissions at lowest costs. Such a policy would compensate especially those countries which shoulder a great deal of reductions but benefit only moderately.

Another reason for making transfers in an international CO₂ agreement is to induce countries to participate which would otherwise free-ride or else would breach the agreement. Even if costs and benefits of CO₂ abatement were identical over all countries and hence efficiency were not an issue many countries would benefit more from free-riding than from participating in the CO₂ agreement. This is simply because the agreement exists and other countries engage in CO₂ abatement already. In this situation, transfers which compensate for the loss of the free-rider benefit can be used to induce more countries to participate. Similarly, such transfers can prevent countries from breaching the agreement if their non-compliance benefit is insufficient to compensate for the loss of previously received transfers. However, the amount of transfers needed to induce a further country to join or stay in the agreement increases with the size of the CO₂ abatement coalition. And transfers can even exceed incremental costs as measured against the non-agreement situation if countries can gain from increasing their emissions when the rest of the world reduces CO₂. Finally, paying transfers reduces the interest of the donor countries in the agreement. Transfers can therefore only be used to stabilise a sizeable CO₂ abatement coalition if donor countries can credibly commit to bearing the double burden of paying transfers and complying with their own abatement obligations.

Carraro and Siniscalco show that a limited extension of a stable coalition is possible if the coalition members *or* the remaining free-riders are committed to making utility transfers to newly joining countries.²⁹ These transfers are self-financed by the additional benefit from more extensive cooperation. The commitment assumption is, of course, crucial for the result and not very plausible in the framework of the model. But it may be justified in a CO₂ agreement in which parties can employ sufficient additional stabilisation instruments.

There are basically three kinds of utility transfers. These are monetary transfers, in-kind transfers and other concessions (issue linking). Transfers can be given in the

²⁹ C. Carraro and D. Siniscalco, "Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment", 2 *Environmental Papers* 35, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano, 1992.

context of various schemes,³⁰ which has different implications for the stability of a CO₂ agreement.

1. Monetary transfers

If donor countries make monetary transfers they can hardly prevent that the receiving country uses these funds for purposes for which they were not earmarked. Since the donor knows the non-compliance option of the recipient he will be reluctant to transfer money unless he can be assured that the recipient's best use of the funds is in line with global environmental policies. In the case of CO₂, however, it is evident that the receiving countries prefer to use the transfers to tackle poverty or local environmental problems (which may but need not go hand in hand with global objectives).

Mohr addresses a similar problem which can arise in the context of a system of internationally tradeable CO₂ emission permits.³¹ Such a system allocates the reduction of CO₂ emissions in a cost-effective way over countries. Mohr shows that a CO₂ agreement which is based on tradeable CO₂ permits is burdened with a severe sovereignty risk despite the fact that countries may initially receive permits in excess of their CO₂ emissions. For instance, when permits are distributed per capita among countries, many developing countries can sell permits on the international CO₂ permit market.³² A country may sell its excess permits and then use this income to boost its economy, which would expand CO₂ emissions. Once the country has sold all its excess permits it loses interest in the CO₂ agreement and starts to emit CO₂ without possessing the necessary permits.

To permit only the lease of permits does not solve this sovereignty problem. The country may then borrow against the future income stream from leased permits which

³⁰ Comp, Barrett, "Side Payments in a Global Warming Convention". In: *Convention on Climate Change*, *supra*, note 19, 49.

³¹ E. Mohr, "Global Warming: Economic Policy in the Face of Positive and Negative Spillovers". In: H. Siebert (ed.), *Environmental Scarcity: The International Dimension*, 187, at 205, 1990.

³² Note that developed countries would not necessarily want to sign an agreement with such a distribution rule for CO₂ permits because the implied transfers could make them worse off than without an agreement which includes those countries that would benefit from the permit scheme.

it uses as collateral and later breach the CO₂ agreement when its own emission schedule tightens. When an opportunistic country must invest in emission reduction or restrain economic growth in order to service its debt with income from leased permits, it will rather breach the CO₂ agreement and/or repudiate its debtor obligations. A possible solution would be to restrain permit sales or leasing to such an amount that opportunistic countries can always cover their emissions. But this conflicts with the purpose of the permit scheme to minimise worldwide CO₂ reduction costs.

Another way to prevent countries to renege on the CO₂ agreement would be to make payments to them apart from their income from selling permits so that complying is always the better option. This scheme could be supported by an international CO₂ tax and an appropriate sharing rule. But it would also require that one group of countries can fully commit itself to paying the tax to all opportunistic countries. Moreover, depending on the number of opportunistic countries, such a tax scheme would become so costly that the net benefit of the donors from joint CO₂ abatement would probably be negative.

Hence, financing a CO₂ reduction project in an opportunistic country directly on the basis of the (incremental) costs of the project can be a much more attractive policy. Donor countries can then be assumed to restrict such payments to maximise their own net benefit from environmental investments in foreign countries. This policy would be like a restricted CO₂ agreement that includes only some (developed) countries which buy their CO₂ reductions where they are cheapest. But such an agreement would be unable to maximise global net benefit.

Obviously, transfers for CO₂ abatement projects must be made on the basis of strict conditionality. Payments must be made *after* the accomplishment of the project or relevant parts of it. Conditional transfers are *de facto* transfers in kind. They imply a CO₂ abatement policy which is restricted to more or less irreversible investments. This policy is not necessarily cost-effective, but it can be the best option under conditions of country sovereignty.

2. In-kind transfers

This section introduces two donor strategies which guarantee a higher degree of compliance than monetary transfers do. These strategies are compensations in kind instead of cash and compensations for an irreversible technology.

In-kind transfers can mitigate the sovereignty risk because their retrading potential is restricted in many cases. Compared to monetary transfers, in-kind transfers cannot be re-allocated to other purposes without costs. When the recipient must bear significant retrading costs an alternative use of the transfer becomes less attractive. If the retrading costs cover the value of the transfer completely any alternative use is impossible. For instance, the erection of a modern power plant incurs sunk costs because there is no alternative use. Therefore, a policy of in-kind transfers that replace inefficient domestic power plants in a foreign country by more modern, energy efficient plants, would be self-enforcing and stable.

In-kind transfers are always a superior instrument when the receiving country might behave non-compliant and income effects are "normal" in economic terms.³³ In-kind transfers are applied in many situations in which institutional arrangements cannot guarantee compliance.³⁴ Therefore, it is not surprising that proposals for global environmental policies rely heavily on in-kind transfers. The currently discussed "joint implementation" approach, which is provided for in the Framework Convention on Climate Change, allows to reduce CO₂ emissions abroad by e.g. replacing old with modern energy technologies.³⁵ Financing modern technology in developing countries would reduce the global CO₂ emissions at lower costs compared to making the same

³³ See F. Stähler, *Pareto Improvements by In-kind-transfers*, Kiel Working Paper No. 541, The Kiel Institute of World Economics, 1992; F. Stähler, *Superior In-kind-transfers*, mimeo, 1993.

³⁴ See, *Pareto Improvements by In-kind-transfers*, *supra*, note 33.

³⁵ "Joint implementation" goes back to an earlier proposal by a group of seven large electric utilities, the E7, who suggested that they should be allowed to fulfil their national CO₂ reduction obligations by erecting modern power plants in other countries. The E7 consists of the French Electricité de France, Hydro Quebec and Ontario Hydro from Canada, Tokyo Electric Power Co. and Kausai Electric Power Co. from Japan, The Italian Ente Nazionale per l'Energia Elettrica and the German Rheinisch-Westfälische Elektrizitätswerke.

reductions in the already highly energy efficient electricity industry of developed countries. Additionally, it would restrict the danger of non-compliance substantially.

Compensations for an irreversible technology are another option for stabilising international environmental agreements. An irreversible technology is an abatement technology which does not allow to increase emissions again after a reduction has been made. Irreversibility implies that emissions in the following periods cannot exceed emissions in the previous period. For example, introducing a low-emission but capital-intensive technology can render a switch to another technology prohibitively expensive. This ratchet effect restrains the non-compliance options of a country which receives transfers for an irreversible technology because any national reduction policy is limited by the previous policies.

Stähler demonstrates in a model with transfers that irreversibility can provide commitment options which render these technologies superior even if they are more costly than equivalent reversible technologies.³⁶ This result can explain the choice of a cost-inferior reduction technology which is very capital-intensive. This policy is the more successful the less the recipient takes the future impact of the irreversibility effect into account. A high discount rate of the recipient can benefit the donor, because it decreases the share of the transfer which compensates the recipient for being locked into an irreversible technology. A high discount rate of a receiving country, which prevents transfers for a reversible technology, favours compensation policies for very capital-intensive irreversible technologies.

3. Issue linking

The third transfer strategy consists in linking otherwise separate issues in which the participating countries have a mutual interest. Concessions in a second environmental agreement or in trade relations can be a substitute for monetary or in-kind transfers. Such concessions can be of equal value for the receiving country, but may be much preferred by the donor country. The 1992 Rio Conference, which was called UN

³⁶ F. Stähler, *On the Economics of International Environmental Agreements*, Kiel Working Paper No. 600, 1993.

Conference on Environment *and* Development, seems to have promised such a link to the developing countries.

Issue linking is easier in bilateral than in multilateral relationships. Folmer et al. show that the scope for using transfers can be extended by linking up the CO₂ agreement with other issues.³⁷ If two country negotiate cooperation in two separate and repetitive issues then these issues can be linked in one or two mutually dependent and even tacit agreements so that each country is allowed an advantage over the other in one of the two fields. Issue linking does not require financial resources, can help solve another international problem and can appear more equitable to each party's constituency. It can be cheaper for both parties when monetary transfers are difficult to make or bear additional political or economic costs (e.g., raising taxes). The stability of interconnected agreements is secured by the repetitive character of the relationship. Reneging on one issue would inevitably induce the other country to renege on the other issue.

A similar result is derived by Carraro and Siniscalco.³⁸ They suggest linking the CO₂ agreement with an agreement on joint research and development (R&D). The R&D gains are appropriable only by the parties to the agreement and therefore free-riders do not exist. The link between the two agreements is made by a cross-admission clause that restricts access to the R&D agreement to the members of the CO₂ agreement. Consequently, a breach of the CO₂ agreement results in an expulsion from the R&D agreement. Carraro and Siniscalco show that entering into the linked agreements is profitable for a large coalition of countries, and perhaps even for all countries. But they do not show how the cross-admission clause and the punishment strategy of excluding a non-compliant country from joint R&D can be made credible and why countries should not exhaust all profitable R&D agreements independently of the CO₂ agreement. It seems that the commitment problem reappears here under a different

³⁷ Folmer, v. Mouche, Ragland, "Interconnected Games and International Environmental Problems", 3 *Environmental and Resource Economics* 313 (1993).

³⁸ C. Carraro and D. Siniscalco, *Policy Coordination for Sustainability: Commitments, Transfers, and Linked Negotiations*, FEEM Working Paper 63.93, 1993.

cover. Nevertheless, the strategy can be interesting for stabilising a CO₂ agreement if developed countries can credibly commit to the link³⁹ and since developing countries cannot be taken to build an equally potent R&D coalition among themselves.

D. Sanctions

Another external stabilisation instrument are economic sanctions. Sanctions have been used widely in non-environment contexts as explicit or implicit threats, and they were executed in quite a number of cases with variable success in order to support a large variety of foreign policy goals.⁴⁰ The use of economic sanctions in environmental contexts, especially in support of environmental agreements, is still rare.⁴¹ One example is the USA-Mexican Yellow Fin Tuna case in which the US banned tuna imports from Mexico because Mexican fishermen used fishing methods which caused a high death rate among dolphins and which were not in agreement with US national legislation.⁴² Sanctions based on national legislation (Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments) were also used as effective threats by the US against a number of countries (Japan, Norway, Spain etc.) which objected to or did not comply with the whaling quotas of the International Whaling Commission. Recently, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer stipulated sanctions against free-riders who are not parties to the Protocol.⁴³ These sanctions take the form of specific trade restrictions. They were later extended as part of the non-compliance procedures to those parties to the Protocol which are determined to be in violation of their obligations.⁴⁴

³⁹ *Comp.* Section III.D on cross-default clauses.

⁴⁰ *Comp.*, G.C. Hufbauer, J.J. Schott, K.A. Elliott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy* (Vol. 1), *Supplemental Case Histories*" (Vol. 2), 2nd edition, 1990.

⁴¹ A study of the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) identifies 19 international environmental agreements that use some form of trade sanctions to improve compliance. See, USITC, *International Agreements to Protect the Environment and Wildlife*, at 5-1 *et seq.*, USITC Publication 2351, 1991.

⁴² Note that the the US import restrictions against Mexican tuna were declared to be not permissible under GATT rules.

⁴³ The trade restrictions against countries not parties to the Montreal Protocol are controversial and awaiting decision by the GATT panel.

⁴⁴ Annex VI, accepted by Decision IV.5(4) of the Fourth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, contains an "Indicative List of Measures that Might be Taken by a

In the context of international agreements sanctions are intended to work as a threat which is not actually executed. In fact, their execution is a signal that they have failed to meet their primary purpose, namely to deter non-compliance. The true effectiveness of sanctions is difficult to evaluate because there is hardly any empirical information on the success of explicit or implicit threats against foreign countries. Studies like Hufbauer et al. on the effectiveness of sanctions are therefore incomplete.

In contrast to transfers, sanctions decrease the net benefit from non-compliance which reduces the temptation to violate the agreement. Sanctions are attractive compared to transfers since they cause costs only when the agreement is breached. This, however, will not occur if the threat is effective. Successful sanctions are therefore a much cheaper stabilisation instrument. Sanctions are only an effective threat if their impact on the non-compliant country is large enough to offset the net benefit from non-compliance. Moreover, when the execution of sanctions after a violation is not certain their impact must be even more severe because the potential violator will base his decision on the expected impact, which is always smaller.

1. Credibility

Sanctions can only function effectively if they constitute a threat which is credible. This crucial condition is difficult to meet since economic sanctions do not only hurt the target country, but usually also have a negative effect on the sanctioning country. Consider, for instance, a trade embargo. In the wake of the embargo the target country may suffer because it is cut off from certain imports or must buy elsewhere at higher prices. But at the same time the former suppliers are cut off from their markets. The exporting government may therefore refrain from or regret the execution of sanctions. Due to this adverse incentive the threat of imposing sanctions may not be credible in

Meeting of the Parties in Resect of Non-Compliance with the Protocol". Para. C of the list reads: "Suspension, in accordance with the applicable rules of international law concerning the suspension of the operation of a treaty, of specific rights and privileges under the Protocol, whether or not subject to time limits, including those concerned with industrial rationalization, production, consumption, trade, transfers of technology, financial mechanism and institutional arrangements." See UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/L.1/Rev.2, at 30 (emphasis added).

which case the sanction strategy has no effect. Therefore, sanctions must be made credible.

Sometimes sanctions can be designed in such a way that their execution is not costly or is even profitable for the executor, e.g., the suspension of development aid. Another example is the US-Mexican Tuna case mentioned earlier. The import restrictions for Mexican tuna freed American fishermen from foreign competition. As this allegedly paid a political dividend, the import restriction on its own account was beneficial in the eyes of the US government. But also trade restrictions which benefit the economy as a whole are possible, e.g., an optimal trade tariff. However, apart from usually violating GATT rules, trade restrictions can boomerang if the trade partner retaliates, which then leaves both countries worse off. The capacity to retaliate depends, of course, on the relative strength of the countries involved. Therefore, trade sanctions are rarely observed between partners of equal economic size, for instance between the United States and the European Union, but are more frequently used against weaker countries.

Lobby groups and the public opinion in general can render a threat of sanctions credible. A government that has the choice to threaten a foreign country either in secrecy, using diplomatic channels, or in public can use the media to commit itself to the threat. This is possible if the government would lose face in the eyes of the electorate if it failed to execute the threat when this becomes necessary. This effect can be enhanced further by stirring up public emotions concerning the case under dispute. Addressing the public can thus turn an otherwise incredible threat into a self-binding and therefore credible commitment.

A government that uses a threat can also willingly create a situation in which it is unable to revoke the execution of the threat. This is, for instance, possible by irrevocably delegating the execution of sanctions to another institution. This technique is used by the US Congress which has enacted laws that order the administration to take retaliatory actions against foreign countries which are found in violation of trade or environmental agreements (Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments). Reinforcing commitment by such legislation is possible since it usually takes some time for the

legislator to revoke and replace his previous legislation and since such a move would erode the legislators' public image and political capital.⁴⁵ But the power to execute sanctions may also be delegated to an international body, for instance to a supervisory board of the CO₂ agreement or another international institution like the United Nations or the World Bank. An international organisation would be particularly suitable for this task if it has more or less independent authority and if the envisaged sanctions fall into its field of responsibility, for instance the distribution or denial of grants or credit to foreign countries.

2. Uncertainty

A commitment to punish another country can hardly ever be made totally credible in a surrounding in which the costs, benefits and discount rates of countries can vary. Countries find themselves in a situation of uncertainty. The existence of uncertainty, however, opens a new avenue to commitment since uncertainty permits the sanctioning country to build up a reputation for being tough. Reputation ties a present case of non-compliance to the future behaviour of the parties in such a way that the costs of executing sanctions today earn a benefit in the future due to the improved compliance of the sanctioned party or any other party that observes the sanctions in future periods. After sanctions have been executed at least once, the probability of a future violation is decreased or vanishes completely since opportunistic parties have reason to believe that non-compliance will be answered with sanctions again. Therefore, the net benefit over time from executing sanctions under conditions of uncertainty may well be positive, and hence the threat becomes credible.

As in formal reputation models,⁴⁶ tough governments which will definitely punish non-cooperative behaviour may exist with a certain probability, for instance, because

⁴⁵ A similar strategy is used by the US in trade negotiations. See J. Bhagwati and H.T. Patrick (eds.), *Aggressive Unilateralism: America's 301 Trading Policy and the World Trading System*, in particular Chapter 6, 1991.

⁴⁶ See, Selten, "The Chain Sore Paradox", 9 *Theory and Decision* 127 (1978); Kreps and Wilson, "Reputation and Imperfect Information", 27 *Journal of Economic Theory*, 253 (1982); Milgrom and Roberts, "Predation, Reputation and Entry Deterrence", *id.* 280.

their cost-benefit ratio suggests punishment or they employ other not readily observable commitment instruments. If an opportunistic country believes that some tough governments exist, the other countries can play on this belief and pretend to be tough, too, even though they would normally be weak and would rather not execute sanctions in the situation they face. An opportunistic country will infer from the experience of sanctions that its opponent is likely to be tough. Consequently, it will refrain from violating the agreement henceforth or at least it will suppress its tendency to behave non-compliant since it must reckon with sanctions. Thus, the possibility of building up a reputation for being tough can serve as a commitment strategy.

The crux of the reputation commitment strategy, however, is that each and every violation must necessarily be answered with sanctions since otherwise the true weakness of the country that leaves a violation unanswered becomes known. It would lose its reputation and deterrence capacity with the consequence that violations occur henceforth and cooperation breaks down. If violations cannot be excluded with certainty and sanctions merely reduce the probability of future violations somewhat, then maintaining ones reputation by repeated sanctions can become rather costly.

However, under certain behavioral assumptions also the occasional execution of sanctions can play an integral part in stabilising international relations.⁴⁷ This is possible if violators react mechanically to the experience of sanctions or non-sanctions with reducing or increasing their frequency of non-compliance. It is then the sanctioning country's best strategy to maintain a certain level of reputation, measured as the probability of non-compliance, by answering only each second violation with sanctions.⁴⁸ Hence, not only the credible threat with sanctions but also their execution can be a stabilising element in international relations.

⁴⁷ J. Heister, *Sanctions and Reputation*, mimeo, 1993.

⁴⁸ The mechanical reaction of potentially non-compliant countries implies that governments have imperfect or no recall, i.e. that past experience vanishes. Otherwise governments could learn and would recognise a discrepancy between their expected probability of sanctions and the true (alternating) frequency of sanctions.

3. Multilateral sanctions

The application of the reputation commitment strategy to a multilateral CO₂ agreement could rely on single large countries. But it could be more successful to establish an enforcement institution, in which strong countries with a sufficiently large sanction capacity decide and act jointly. This institution can rely on the reputation commitment strategy if it consists of the same members for a sufficiently long time. The members of the enforcement institution should be considered tough with a high probability.

Reputation can be preserved to some extent in a multilateral setting without always executing sanctions if acquiescing cannot be observed by other countries. Another possibility consists in deliberately failing to detect violations or in treating them as minor offences that do not justify sanctions. But this requires that monitoring and compliance rules are vague. An example for ambiguity (and flexibility) is the provision for "scientific" whaling in the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling. Violations are often overlooked in the case of human rights. And monitoring provisions are rare in international environmental agreements as most treaties rely on self-reporting. Moreover, violations are often negotiated with the offending country in secrecy and offer numerous possibilities for compromise. Such procedural provisions may well contribute to the stability of an international agreement in that they obscure violations and maintain the illusion that most countries comply with the agreement and that "real" violations will certainly be answered with countermeasures. Thus, certain misperceptions and the lack of information on other parties actions can save an agreement that is insufficiently enforced from erosion.

Successful trade sanctions often depend on joint implementation by as many countries as possible. Countries which do not participate in a trade embargo do not only save the costs of execution. They profit twofold in that they leave the enforcement of the CO₂ agreement to other countries and increase their profit from trade with the country under embargo. As experience shows, free-riding on international sanctions or otherwise circumventing and evading sanctions is tempting. This behaviour often renders economic sanctions much less effective. Under such conditions, the threat of

sanctions, becomes incredible again, although individual countries may be committed – and thus international sanctions may not deter violations of the CO₂ agreement.

Trade sanctions against a non-compliant country must therefore be complemented by a credible commitment to execute the punishment by (almost) *all* countries. If this is impossible, the CO₂ agreement must contain provisions that force the execution of sanctions on all countries whether they are members of the CO₂ agreement or not. A self-enforcing and therefore credible threat is possible in a multilateral environment if the CO₂ agreement specifies that sanctions are directed against both, non-compliant countries and all countries that do not execute the sanctions.⁴⁹ This double sanction strategy is successful if the number of parties to the CO₂ agreement or rather their economic weight in international trade is sufficiently large relative to all countries and if countries do not collude in shirking. The strategy works since *every* country, whether party to the CO₂ agreement or not, is better off when it joins the sanctions coalition. Every country will implement the sanctions, because otherwise it would have to suffer the same sanctions itself. The critical number of parties to the agreement which is sufficient to make such a comprehensive sanction scheme credible depends mainly on the kind of sanctions envisaged and on the economic weight of the targeted country.

The same strategy can also be applied to enlarge an existing CO₂ abatement coalition of already sufficient size. This is possible if all countries which free-ride on the CO₂ agreement, whether they are signatories or not, are considered non-compliant countries and are therefore subject to sanctions. It seems that this strategy was successfully used to induce cooperation by hesitating countries in the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, as the Protocol was supported by a coalition of countries which was large in terms of their production of CFCs and related products.

⁴⁹ See J. Heister, *Who Will Win the Ozone Game? On Building and Sustaining Cooperation in the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer*, Kiel Working Paper No. 579, 1993.

4. Related instruments

Another way of making a sanction scheme credible is to compensate countries for their costs of executing them. This requires the establishment of a transfer fund. It could have a dual purpose. The fund could be used to assist the members of the CO₂ agreement in implementing their obligations. This would contribute to stabilising the agreement. The fund could also be used as a source for compensation payments in the case that sanctions against a non-compliant country become necessary. This would render the threat more credible since no sanctioning country would suffer directly and relative to the status quo, since the contributions to the fund would be sunk costs from the perspective of an individual country. Furthermore, due to the enhanced credibility of the threat sanctions are less likely, which allows that more of the funds can be used for compliance assistance.

The resources of this fund may not only consist of voluntary or contracted contributions from donor countries. It may also include collateral or other values which must be given into the custody of the fund when joining the CO₂ agreement. Collateral is virtually a bond or hostage that serves to guarantee continued cooperation and compliance since in the case of a breach of the agreement it is forfeited and becomes available for compensating those loyal parties which suffer from the violation and execute sanctions. Rejoining the agreement would, of course, require renewing collateral payments so that this way of making a commitment binding could, in addition, be renegotiation proof. A country which breaches a CO₂ agreement which contains such provisions would automatically execute sanctions against itself.

Another kind of bond is a country's international reputation for being a reliable partner in international relations and business. This goodwill is put at stake when a country ratifies an agreement and it is forfeited when the country defaults – with the possible consequence that the country must pay a higher risk premium to foreign partners. A similar stability instrument is the requirement to implement the provisions of the CO₂ agreement into national law. This would open the possibility of prosecuting violations in national courts. And it would virtually take hostage the reputation and trustworthiness of the country's juridical system.

Finally, the linking of international agreements with each other by way of a cross-default clause, which is described in the next section, can be interpreted as a special sanctions instrument, the triggering of which lies in the hands of the opportunistic country itself.

E. Cross default mechanisms

A cross default mechanism takes advantage of the multi-dimensionality of international relations. If a country maintains international relations in two or more areas a contract violation by this country can induce a reaction of foreign contractual partners not only in that area where the violation occurred. For example, if a country violates an environmental agreement it may be punished by a credit embargo if it also maintains a debtor position in international capital markets. Under a cross default mechanism a sovereign is deemed to be in default of two or more contracts even if only one of these is violated. Thereby she loses the option of discriminating between contracts such that now she can only violate or honour all the contracts covered by a cross default mechanism. She must therefore face sanctions in more than one area and thus has an increased incentive to honour contracts. Hence such a cross default scheme can be used to stabilise international contractual relations.

In doing so one must, however, bear in mind that a country's various international contracts rarely link it to one and the same foreign contractant. Instead, a government maintains international contracts with a variety of foreign contractants. For example, the other contractant in an international environmental agreement signed by a government may be an international environmental agency or another government, whereas it maintains a debtor position with respect to a foreign private consortium of banks. Hence under a cross default mechanism a party may be supposed to impose sanctions against another country although it has not suffered from the contract violation itself. A cross default mechanism covering a sovereign therefore requires a cross default contract between at least two foreign parties each of which maintains a contract with the same third and sovereign party. This cross default contract specifies the actions all

the parties to it must undertake if anyone party to it suffers from a contract violation of the sovereign with whom each of them is contractually linked.

As in principle a cross default contract itself may be subject to a sovereignty problem a cross default mechanism can only improve on a situation if the cross default contract is less burdened by an enforcement problem than the set of international contracts it is supposed to stabilise. This is for example the case if all the parties to a cross default contract are private and subject to the jurisdiction of a single country.

Mohr analyses a situation where a country is in an international debtor position and has a contractual relationship with a foreign or international environmental agency.⁵⁰ This model shows that in the absence of risk the environmental treaty can be completely stabilised by a cross default contract between the agency and the lender(s). Responsible for this stabilisation is the self-interest of lenders which under the cross default mechanism have an incentive to ration loans such that the lender does not violate the debt contract and consequently the environmental treaty too. This result hinges, however, on the certainty assumption as under risk and competitive conditions lenders accept a default risk if compensated in credit markets by a sufficiently large risk premium.

In another paper, Mohr and Thomas take account of risk.⁵¹ They show that a cross default contract pools the individual sovereignty risks faced by the parties to the cross default contract, such that for low enough individual risks risk pooling reduces the sovereignty problem faced by the parties to the cross default contract. Furthermore, if credit markets anticipate risk pooling conditions exist under which risk pooling also increases the welfare of the sovereign. A further property of risk pooling by a cross default contract is that when applied to an international environmental treaty and international debt it induces a debt-for-nature swap undertaken by the sovereign in collaboration with foreign lenders.

⁵⁰ Mohr, "International Environmental Permit Trade and Debt: The Consequences of Country Sovereignty and Cross-Default Policies", 3 *Review of International Economics* 1 (1995).

⁵¹ E. Mohr and J. Thomas, *Pooling Sovereignty Risks: The Case of Environmental Treaties and International Debt*, Kiel Working Paper No. 568, 1993.

F. Flexibility, renegotiations and dynamic agreements

Flexibility with respect to the fulfilment of obligations is a totally different approach to the stability problem. At first sight, flexibility allows a party to the agreement to appropriate gains which otherwise would be considered a violation. Legalising any violations would imply that a breach of the agreement can legally never occur. Flexibility can therefore be a somewhat dangerous provision in international agreements since flexible obligations lend themselves to being exploited unnecessarily and at the expense of all other parties which can be taken to reciprocate with violations. Thus flexibility tends to erode the agreement. Therefore, if flexibility is used as a stabilisation instrument it cannot be applied at random but needs clear rules and limits.

At second sight, flexibility can transform an agreement from a set of static obligations that may be violated into a dynamic process in the continuation and sustainability of which all parties are interested. The fact that adjustments are possible in a flexible regime increases the willingness of countries to join the agreement despite important uncertainties associated with the CO₂ problem. Furthermore, if adjustments are an integral part of the agreement all obligations and rules remain subject of permanent negotiations in which parties have something to gain, for instance additional reductions, and something to lose, namely the breakdown of the process and the end of agreement.

Promises and actions, procedural rules and mutual observation can be tied together in a flexible and dynamic agreement in such a way that parties can react to arising problems quickly and jointly and with the aim to stabilise ongoing cooperation. The dynamic CO₂ agreement can then transform into a self-referential, self-reproducing (autopoietic) system⁵² and may evolve into an international regime which obliges countries to participate and which — if comprehensive and powerful enough — can set the rules for using the environment for non-participants too.⁵³

⁵² B. Marin, *Contracting Without Contracts: Economic Policy Concertation by Autopoietic Regimes Beyond Law?*, EUI Working Paper No. 278, European University Institute, Florence, 1987.

⁵³ Compare, for instance, the development of the Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer. Compare also the European Union with its integrationist thrust, which was strong enough to survive repeated crises.

1. Flexible obligations

The most basic way of building flexibility into a CO₂ agreement is to anticipate the potential difficulties which countries may have when fulfilling the agreed obligations. These obligations can then be made dependent on the development of the relevant conditions which determine the capacity or willingness of countries to comply with the agreement. One possibility to introduce a certain flexibility into a CO₂ agreement would be to index each country's abatement obligations with the development of its population or GNP. Or one may use as index the CO₂ related shifts in a country's climate and environmental conditions. The chosen indices should, of course, be as far as possible exogenous to the policy options countries have so that there is no incentive to manipulate the situation so as to relieve ones CO₂ abatement burden. Indexed obligations may, for instance, imply increased or reduced CO₂ quotas or they may lead to higher or lower transfer payments.

Another possibility for making a CO₂ agreement more flexible is to allow a temporary suspension of agreed obligations (escape clauses) in order to bridge a difficult situation. Or the agreement may define excusable violations, perhaps granted on the condition that the country accepts to make compensations, e.g. future higher CO₂ reductions, for its deviations from the terms of the treaty.

But the use of flexible obligations is only possible in relatively narrow limits. Flexibility cannot induce a country to enter or stay in a meaningful abatement coalition if the gains from free-riding are far greater than from joint abatement. Moreover, the indexation of obligations can have perverse results. For instance, to secure the continued participation of a country which learns that it is on the whole favourably affected by climate change would require that the climate index reduces that country's abatement obligations since its bargaining power has grown and the free-rider option has become more attractive. Conversely, a country which learns that its climate change damages are more severe than expected can be burdened with stricter abatement obligations since its outside option deteriorates.

2. Renegotiations

Renegotiations lead to an adjustment of the CO₂ agreement to which all members agree. In the context of treaty stabilisation, renegotiations are a spontaneous bargaining processes in a situation which is critical for the stability of the agreement or for the further participation of a particular country. The aim of renegotiations is usually to comfort one or several parties by adjusting the agreement in such a way that the causes for a potential breach of the agreement are eliminated. This does, of course, not exclude the use of a threat with sanctions or other countermeasures in the negotiations in order to put pressure on a non-compliant country. But successful renegotiations usually imply a redistribution of the net benefits from cooperation and possibly also an adjustment of the agreed obligations for all parties.

Many international treaties contain provisions for arbitration and conciliation procedures. These procedures can be renegotiations if they do not only aim at interpreting the agreement and determining whether a country is in compliance or not and in as much as they can modify obligations. The general problem with the arbitration and conciliation instrument is that it is very blunt when a country is determined to breach the treaty unless it is granted an additional advantage which the other parties are not willing to give. A country which rejects the results of arbitration and reconciliation and is not cooperative in renegotiations cannot be kept within the bounds of the agreement with this instrument.

Renegotiations which are provided for in an agreement make the agreement manipulable. Treaty revisions become a problem when they do not take their cause into account. If previous treaty violations are ignored in renegotiations and treaty revisions and thus de facto accepted this constitutes an incentive to realise the gains from non-compliance. The option to renegotiate can thus be destabilising. A similar problem occurs if in implementing the treaty irreversibilities emerge which shift the bargaining powers of the parties. For instance, irreversible front end performance by one side and treaty revisions are mutually exclusive provisions in treaties since front end performance is no rational option if the other side can later renegotiate. But treaty revisions are reasonable and necessary to cope with new and exogenous information and develop-

ments which could otherwise motivate a treaty breach, e.g., environmental damage, technical progress, population growth.

A country may, for instance, first ratify the CO₂ agreement and, after having gained a better bargaining position, try to obtain a more favourable sharing of the cooperation gains through forcing all parties into renegotiation by small violations of the agreement. One may think of the possibility that a government promotes a domestic anti-abatement movement. This can be a bargaining commitment to which partners must give in in renegotiations. Or the country may apply short-lived and reversible abatement technologies whereas all other countries use long-lived and irreversible abatement strategies. The bargaining power then shifts to the technologically more flexible country which can threaten to quit whilst all other countries are stuck in irreversible technologies. Therefore, due to the possibility of renegotiations all countries may have an incentive to distort their abatement choice and select more costly but reversible abatement strategies in order to gain a better position in renegotiations.

3. Dynamic agreements

The more recent international environmental agreements have turned their permanent development and adjustment into a matter of principle. Examples for these dynamic agreements are the ECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (1979) with its four protocols,⁵⁴ the Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer (1985) with the Montreal Protocol (1987) and its adjustments and amendments, and the Rio Convention on Climate Change (1992). The characteristic feature of most protocols to these agreements is that they stipulate an emission target which is to be reached by each party in a given time frame and that they provide for regular meetings of the parties to review and adjust the agreement. Hence, countries are tied into a repeated bargaining situation which allows to take regular account of any shifts in their

⁵⁴ The protocols concern the final establishment of the European Monitoring and Evaluation Program (EMEP) (1984), and the emissions of SO₂ (1985), NO_x (1988) and hydrocarbons (1991), *see infra*, note 98.

bargaining power and of possible causes for violations and to condition further progress on behaviour in past periods.

Adjustments in dynamic treaties are not spontaneous. They are a rule-driven procedure for continuously adjusting and improving the treaty design, its mechanisms and obligations. Dynamic treaties are particularly well suited for dealing with insecurities in the treaty's targets which are due to scientific and economic uncertainties or the motives of the parties. A dynamic treaty permits to integrate its enforcement and stabilisation into an almost permanent negotiation process. It can be more stable for several reasons, e.g., the speeding-up of the parties' reactions to non-compliance. The reputation and loyalty of the parties is more significant in dynamic agreements because previous behaviour influences the next round of negotiations. New treaty obligations can depend directly on the fulfilment of old obligations which produces a ratchet effect if fulfilment is irreversible.

Stähler shows in a model with two countries which apply an irreversible abatement technology that a permanently adjustable agreement which provides for repeated steps into the direction of full cooperation is self-enforcing although full cooperation is never reached.⁵⁵ Self-enforcement in this agreement is ensured by the fact that in each period each country can win more by proceeding further in future rounds than by breaching the agreement and thereby ending cooperation on the achieved level. The international negotiations on the protection of the ozone layer illustrate this stepwise process. The Climate Change Convention is still very weak with respect to CO₂ reduction obligation but it can be expected that those obligations will be tightened gradually by the Conference of the Parties once previous obligations have successfully been met.

Another aspect of dynamic agreements is the fact that, due to the permanent procedural cooperation, unilateral enforcement is replaced with an institutionalised joint management of the agreement and its stability. Parties act together in monitoring, evaluating and deciding on achievements and default and in taking remedial steps to

⁵⁵ *On the Economics of International Agreements, supra*, note 36.

secure compliance if necessary. This is important because agreements which suffer from multilateral externalities lack bilateral reciprocity and can therefore not be enforced unilaterally.

Finally, the institutionalised form of discussions and negotiations, which characterises dynamic agreements, allows parties to learn from each other, disseminate information, pass on technical knowledge, build up a common body of normative expectations and rules and create an atmosphere of trust. All this facilitates the building of a consensus and the settlement of disputes within the framework of the agreement.⁵⁶ A dynamic international agreement, which is a dynamic process instead of a static set of obligations can establish an autopoietic regime which replaces and functions as the non-available centralised authority in governing international environmental affairs. Autopoietic regimes are self-referential, self-reproductive and hence self-stabilising.⁵⁷ All or some subgroups of the parties to a dynamic regime can develop leadership in enforcing the regime by establishing structures which bind less reliable parties and by threatening potential violators and free-riders which would stand alone against the remaining parties if they attempted to challenge the accepted rules of the game. Hence, dynamic agreements constitute process oriented stability systems which beef up and can give a new meaning to the rather static stability and enforcement instruments which were discussed in the preceding sections. A dynamic agreement can employ these instruments in a coordinated manner in order to sustain and expand a meaningful CO₂ abatement coalition.

IV. Legal aspects of treaty stabilisation

The point of departure of this study is the concept of stability of international agreements. Elements of this stability are transfer rules, sanctions, treaty adjustments and revisions, and monitoring. It has already been shown that the concept of stability of international agreements, when understood in this way, is closely connected in many

⁵⁶ *Comp. Gehring, "International Environmental Regimes: Dynamic Sectoral Legal Systems", 1 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 35 (1990).*

⁵⁷ *Comp., Contracting Without Contracts, supra, note 52.*

ways with legal considerations. Sanctions and treaty adjustments or treaty revisions have frequently been dealt with in legal writing, often so from the point of view of tackling the stability problem.⁵⁸ The term itself has less often been used, mostly in the context of considerations concerning the design of resources and investment contracts in developing countries.⁵⁹ In a problem oriented view of international environmental law, the stability of a treaty can be defined as the continued existence of the contractual relationship plus compliance with the treaty. The following sections investigate elements of stability from a legal point of view.

A. Transfer mechanisms in international environmental treaties

Transfer mechanisms play an important role for the stability of international treaties. They are based on the idea that the maintenance and stability of international environmental regulation necessitate the acceptance of environmental obligations by individual states. This acceptance can be brought about by granting them an advantage in the form of a transfer of funds or, e.g., technology. The term "transfer" is of economic origin and is not part of the legal language of treaties. But in many cases, treaties contain rules which, under functional aspects, can be considered transfer mechanisms.⁶⁰

The cooperation principle which governs international environmental agreements suggests taking as a transfer any advantage for an individual party which deviates from the rule of equal contributions and which allows to take certain differences between countries into account and yet achieve the common goal.

⁵⁸ See, e.g., Horn, "Die Anpassung langfristiger Verträge im internationalen Wirtschaftsverkehr". In: H. Kötz, W. Frhr. Marschall von Bieberstein (eds.), *Die Anpassung langfristiger Verträge* 9, at 9 et seq., 1984.

⁵⁹ Comp., Ch. Kirchner, E. Schanze, F.G. von Schlabrendorff, A. Stockmayer, Th. Wälde, M. Fritsche, R. Patzina, *Rohstofferschließungsvorhaben in Entwicklungsländern, Teil 1: Interessenrahmen, Verhandlungsprozeß, rechtliche Konzeption*, 1977; E. Schanze, M. Fritsche, Ch. Kirchner, F.G. von Schlabrendorff, A. Stockmayer, W. Hauser, M. Bartels, W. Mahoney, *Rohstofferschließungsvorhaben in Entwicklungsländern, Teil 2: Probleme der Vertragsgestaltung*, 1981.

⁶⁰ For example, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Germany committed themselves in Art. 7 of the "International Convention on Protection of the Rhine from Pollution by Chlorides" of 1976 to pay 70 per cent of the construction costs of a desalination plant in Alsace.

1. Possible forms of transfer mechanisms

Looking at international environmental agreements from this perspective, very different regulatory approaches can be found that serve the aim of securing the common goal despite differences in the individual participants' points of departure. However, clearly defined and quantified payment obligations benefiting certain states, which in principle can be thought of as a model for transfer mechanisms, cannot be detected. In particular, the following regulatory structures can be observed, the transfer function of which appears highly questionable in some cases.

a) *Cooperation obligations, in particular technical cooperation*

Provisions which oblige all parties to cooperate in order to achieve the common goal are widespread in international environmental agreements.⁶¹ In as far as these duties are further specified, cooperation in the field of technology and science are usually emphasised, which on the one hand often pertain to technical assistance,⁶² and on the other to the passing-on of scientific information.⁶³ Although they may neither be

⁶¹ *Comp.* Art. 2 (2) lit a, c, d of the "Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer" of 1985; Art. 2 of the "Mexico-U.S. Agreement to Co-operate in the Solution of Environmental Problems in the Border Area" of 1983; Art. 3 of the "Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area" of 1974; Art. 13 of the "GA-Resolution 3281 (XXIX) Charta of Economic Rights and Duties of States" of Dec. 12, 1974; Principle 1 and 2 of the "Draft Principles of Conduct in the Field of the Environment for the Guidance of States in the Conservation and Harmonious Utilization of Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States" of 1978; No. 8 of the "Montreal Guidelines for the Protection of the Marine Environment against Pollution from Land-Based Sources" of 1985; Art. 7 (1) of the "International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation" of 1990; Art. II 3 (a) of the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals" of 1979.

⁶² *Comp.* Art. 202 of the "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea" of 1982; No. 9 of the "Montreal Guidelines for the Protection of the Marine Environment against Pollution from Land-Based Sources" of 1985; Art. 7 (1), Art. 9 (1) of the "International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation" of 1990; Art. 9 of the "International Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes" of 1972; Art. 11 of the "Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution" of 1976.

⁶³ *Comp.* Art. 4 of the "Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution" of 1979; Art. 8 of the "International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation" of 1990; Art. 11 of the "Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution" of 1976; Art. 4 of the "Protocol Concerning Pollution Emergencies in the South Pacific Region" of 1986; Art. 16 of the "Mexico-U.S. Agreement to Co-operate

specified qualitatively nor quantitatively, such cooperation duties are by no means legally irrelevant. Furthermore, they are often effective in practical terms.

Understanding the significance of cooperation duties is difficult. It appears almost certain that they are not yet a title to a specific contribution to cooperation, particularly payments. Their significance rather is that they oblige states to a specific behaviour. It can be derived from this obligation to cooperate that states may not leave unanswered or decline to consider any demand for cooperation from another state. They also may not break off existing cooperation relationships without reason. Positively one may conclude that states are obliged to consider requests for cooperation and to give a reasoning for their decisions.

The contents of such cooperation obligations is therefore a cooperative behaviour, which may include financial or technological transfers. As a general rule, this transfers take place between the relevant bodies of the states concerned and are limited to their specific abilities and resources.⁶⁴ As far as technologies are transferred, these are usually those employed in the public sector. They usually do not include industrial know-how.⁶⁵

It already follows from this characterisation that cooperation obligations are not transfers in the economic sense. Their purpose is exclusively to buttress the common protective goal and the primary protective obligations directed thereon. Obligations to cooperate, therefore, cannot be understood to offer other states a clear and definable advantage, which may qualify as a transfer.

in the Solution of Environmental Problems in the Border Area" of 1983; Art. IX of the "Revised Canada-U.S. Agreement on Great Lakes Water Quality" of 1978, amended by the Protocol of 1987.

⁶⁴ *Comp.* Art. 6 of the "Mexico-U.S. Agreement to Co-operate in the Solution of Environmental Problems in the Border Area" of 1983; Principle 7 of the "UNEP Draft Principles of Conduct in the Field of the Environment for the Guidance of States in the Conservation and Harmonious Utilization of Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States" of 1978.

⁶⁵ *Comp.* Art. 12 of the "Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircrafts" of 1972; Art. 13 (2) of the "Convention for the protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the wider Caribbean Region" of 1983; Art. 6 of the "Mexico-U.S. Agreement to Co-operate in the Solution of Environmental problems in the Border Area" of 1983.

b) *Differentiated environmental standards as transfers?*

Quite often, international environmental treaties contain differentiated provisions according to which states which are parties to the treaty are subject to different protection standards and are given different deadlines for implementing and complying with those standards.⁶⁶ These different obligations, which are often justified by differences in countries' economic capabilities, give relieve or further burden the individual states in different ways. However, they can hardly be taken to correspond to the concept of transfer rules, because the different willingness and ability of states to bear environmental protection obligations are not taken account of by specific privileges, but rather by reduced obligations. If, however, those provisions relate to a stock of resources which already has a monetary value, such as, for example, fisheries, the suspension of protection standards virtually constitutes an allocation of exploitation rights. This does indeed correspond to the concept of a transfer.

c) *Differentiated financial contributions to the financing of common tasks*

International environmental treaty regimes often provide for some functions to be performed jointly and in cooperation. Those functions may include stock-taking, researching, and monitoring. Funding those operations is usually based on the rules of contributions to international organisations which are proportional to the gross national product of the countries in question. But these rules cannot necessarily be qualified as transfer mechanisms. This is because the financial contribution of states cannot be understood to aim at granting advantages to states in order to compensate for the bearing of certain environmental obligations.

⁶⁶ *Comp.* Art. 2 of the "Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Concerning the Control of Emission of Nitrogen Oxides or Their Transboundary Fluxes" of 1988, which, although it obliges all parties to reduce their emissions to the level of 1987 or some earlier year, stipulates, in fact, very different abatement levels; Art. 5 (1) of the "Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer" of 1987. Compare also No. 1.1.1. Annex 1 of the "Montreal Guidelines for the Protection of the Marine Environment against Pollution from Landbased Sources" of 1985.

d) *Transfer of environmentally friendly technologies*

Rules on the transfer of technologies are relatively frequent, particularly in the more recent environmental treaties.⁶⁷ These include, among other things, also rules covering industrial technologies.⁶⁸ However, these rules usually do not go beyond an obligation of states to promote such a technology transfer. In addition, they frequently require that the transfer should take place at market conditions.⁶⁹ Therefore, such provisions cannot be deemed to comply with the notion of transfers as applied here.

e) *Funds supporting structural change in the member states — contributions and disbursement*

Special funds in support of structural change in individual member countries, which are set up occasionally in more recent treaties, come much closer to the concept of transfers.⁷⁰ Those funds are financed by differentiated contributions just as mentioned above.⁷¹ The distributed funds are earmarked for undertaking the necessary structural adaptations in the countries in question. These provisions can be characterised as transfer mechanisms.

2. Transfers outside of treaties

The relatively rare appearance of transfer mechanisms in international environmental treaties does not imply that such transfers do not take place. They can be provided

⁶⁷ *Comp.* Art. 144 and Annex III Art. 5 of the "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea" of 1982; No. 5 of the "Cairo Guidelines and Principles for the Environmentally Sound Management of Hazardous Wastes" of 1987; Art. 9 II of the "International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation" of 1990.

⁶⁸ *Comp.* Annex III Art. 5 (2) - (4) of the "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea" of 1982.

⁶⁹ *Comp. id.* at para. 3 a.

⁷⁰ *Comp.* the "International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damages" of 1971, amended by the Protocols of 1976 and 1984; Art. 15 of the "UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage" of 1972; Decision II/8 Financial Mechanism of the "1990 Decisions, Adjustments and Amendments to the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer"; Art. VI.6 of the "Framework Convention on Climate Change" of 1992; Art. 19 of the "Convention on Biological Diversity" of 1992.

⁷¹ *Comp.* Art. XIX (3) of the "Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources" of 1980.

without any legal provisions, solely in the political context, and they can be connected with expectations that have no legally but possibly a very strong politically binding effect. The nature and size of such transfers cannot be identified in detail since the external observer usually lacks the necessary information about the exact connections to other political issues and subjects and about the exact nature of a transfer. The crucial difference between transfers based on mere political considerations and a legally binding commitment consists in the fact that the assertion of claims, the maintenance of obligations and the treatment of violations is subject to different rules. A relationship based on mere political understandings turns out to be stable only as long as the political circumstances under which it was made remain constant. Any shift in the relevant decision factors in foreign policy puts the commitment in doubt.

3. Evaluation: The significance of legally binding transfer rules

Unlike mere political commitments, legal obligations are based on the will of the parties concerned to be bound by law. The binding force of a legal obligation therefore is based on legal authority and is independent of the subsisting political will of a state to act accordingly. Of course, as has been shown above, states may decide not to comply with a legal obligation for some reason. They will, however, be much more reluctant to do so as is true for mere political commitments. Committing a breach of an international legal obligation seriously affects the reputation of a state and therefore may cause much higher political costs. As far as transfers, e.g. development assistance etc., are concerned, potential donor states so far have been reluctant to accept any legal obligations upon their contributions. In this perspective the legally binding transfer provisions as stipulated in modern international environmental treaty regimes mark a substantial progress.

B. Sanctions

The mere possibility of executing sanctions in response to contract violations can contribute in a wider sense to the stabilisation of treaties in reducing the probability of such a violation, merely by the possibility of their application.

In private law a party to a contract has a variety of possible reactions at hand to remedy a contract violation of another party to the contract.⁷² In principle the purpose of such reactions is to carry on the contractual relation and to persuade the non-compliant party to fulfil its obligations. Private law primarily seeks to urge contracting parties to stand by their obligations. The termination of a contract is only admissible if performance of an obligation is proven to be definitely impossible or is finally and uncontestedly refused. Sanctions in private law amount to compensation to be paid for economic losses resulting from non-compliance.⁷³ In this context, sanctions in general mean that the non-compliant party has to bear the losses which the other party has suffered due to non-compliance.⁷⁴ Here it becomes once more evident that the private exchange contract can be compared only with difficulties with an international environmental treaty. This is because a damage due to a violation of an environmental treaty can only be proven under certain circumstances (damage of health, life, property, property rights, forgone profits). Only recently we can observe some development in this area.⁷⁵

In the reality of international law the possibilities for reactions to treaty violations are based on the principle of the sovereignty of states. States have a variety of remedies at hand in this regard. In applying those remedies, e.g. sanctions, they have to comply with only a few general principles of international law. More specific rules about the sanctions to apply may, however, be stipulated in the relevant treaty itself.⁷⁶ It must be borne in mind, however, that whenever such means of reaction have been codified their purpose usually is to mitigate the general rules.⁷⁷ Provisions as to the admissibility of sanctions, the kind of measures to be taken and their intensity have so

⁷² *Comp.* §§ 275 *et seq.* and 325 *et seq.* Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB).

⁷³ *Comp.* § 325 para. 1 BGB.

⁷⁴ *Comp.*, e.g., § 280 BGB.

⁷⁵ *Comp.* the Amoco Cadiz case. See I. Luge, *Haftung als notwendiger Teil des internationalen Meeresumweltschutzes*, at 120, 1989.

⁷⁶ As, for instance, the principle of proportionality. *Comp.* Fischer, *supra*, note 9, at § 57, para. 45.

⁷⁷ In order to avoid this result, the "Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific" of 1989, Art. 3 (3), expressly allows the contracting states to take measures which are much tougher than those suggested in the Convention.

far only rarely been codified in environmental treaties. Therefore, the general international law rules apply.

In general international law three different kinds of sanctions exist. These are suspension, retorsion and reprisal.

1. Treaty suspension

Under certain circumstances, a treaty may be suspended under international law. This is to mean that the relevant international obligations are temporarily or finally dismissed. At first glance, this may not be deemed to be a reasonable method for treaty stabilisation as it, in effect, amounts to the contrary. If, however, state parties to an international agreement have an interest in its continuation, the possibility that other state parties may opt for suspension in cases of non-compliance may well qualify as a sanction in the sense discussed here. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VC) permits under certain conditions such a suspension by one or several parties to an international treaty. In principle, however, it refers in Art. 57a to the contractual stipulations. The parties to a treaty are thus free to agree on particular rules for treaty suspension. Art. 60 regulates the suspension of a treaty after a violation. It is required that this violation must be a major violation of the treaty. Art. 60 (3) defines a major violation as a rejection of the treaty which is not admissible under the VC or as a violation of a stipulation of the treaty which is essential for attaining its objective. Beyond that, Art. 60 allows for a partial or total suspension of a treaty. The state possessing the right of suspension is free in choosing either. It is, however, bound to respect the principle of proportionality. In the context of a treaty violation this implies that a party can refuse to honour the treaty only to an extent which corresponds to the degree of non-compliance by the other party. In the context of environmental treaties in particular it will, however, be difficult to bring about reciprocity exactly.

Furthermore, Art. 60 distinguishes between bilateral and multilateral treaties. In the case of a bilateral treaty, of course, the other party may rely on treaty suspension. In the case of multilateral treaties several possibilities exist. In the case of a substantial violation of the treaty all states being a party to it, except of course the violating state,

can jointly decide on a partial or total suspension of the treaty. Furthermore, a state which has exceptionally suffered from the treaty violation can cancel rights and duties emanating from the treaty vis-à-vis the violator. This stipulation, however, applies only to those multilateral treaties which are structured that way that it can reasonably be divided into a number of single relationships between contracting parties. In the case of so called integral treaties such disaggregation is impossible and other rules apply. For those cases Art. 60 (2) c stipulates that each party to the treaty, except the one which is responsible for a major violation, can execute a partial or total suspension vis-à-vis each other party to it. However, this procedure can only be applied if the treaty is such that a major violation by one party changes the situation of each party fundamentally. A point in case are disarmament treaties.⁷⁸

It is doubtful, however, whether these procedures can be applied to environmental treaties. They can be easily applied only in the case of mere cooperation and information treaties. However, when the subject of the treaty is the fixing of production procedures or emission limits then the obligations involved cannot in a strict sense be fulfilled "between" the parties to the treaty. For illustration, it would be equally absurd to cease applying an environmental standard at home as a reaction to a treaty violation of another state just as it would be to cease observing human rights at home if they were violated in another state.

A suspension of an environmental treaty is therefore only feasible in the case of information or cooperation treaties or if financial contributions are stipulated which can be cancelled in the case of a treaty violation.

2. Retorsion and reprisal under general international law

States are in principle free in the design of their relationship to other states. The only limit to be observed under international law is the use of force. This freedom contains the right to entice other states to a certain behaviour by imposing a disadvantage on them. In international law these kinds of actions are called retorsion and reprisal.

⁷⁸ *Comp. Heintschel v. Heinegg, supra*, note 6, at § 15 para. 86.

There is a ranking in between the ^{retorsion}retorsion and the reprisal.⁷⁹ The retorsion is a less severe instrument compared to reprisal. It consists of an unfriendly act which, however, does not contradict to international law. It is supposed to remedy an equally unfriendly yet legal action of another state. For instance, the termination of development aid which is based on a mere political commitment qualifies as a retorsion. A retorsion can also be applied to address a violation of international law. It is, however, characterised by the fact that it is not itself a violation of international law.

A reprisal is an interference in particular rights of a state which has caused a violation of international law by another state whose international legal rights have been violated. The purpose of a reprisal is to induce the violating state to a rectification or a behaviour in compliance with international law. A reprisal is only constrained by the prohibition of force under the UN Charter, Art. 2 (4).⁸⁰ The preconditions for a reprisal are the following:

1. A reprisal may only be executed by a state which has directly suffered from a previous wrongdoing. A violation of the rights of a state is given whenever another state does not honour a treaty. However, there exist obligations in international law which have an *erga omnes* effect. This is to say that they are binding upon all states. The question arises which party has the right to enforce such obligations. In this case, collective decisions and actions brought about by some objective procedure are of course to be preferred to unilateral coercive action. As a last resort, however, individual states can take recourse to non-military reprisals.
2. A further precondition for a reprisal is that it may be imposed only after a demand of rectification has been made. It must be terminated immediately after rectification has been provided for.
3. A reprisal must not interfere in interests which are protected by norms of the international legal *ius cogens*.

⁷⁹ *Comp. Fischer, supra*, note 9, at § 57 para. 44 *et seq.*

⁸⁰ *Id.* at para. 48.

4. Furthermore it must not substantially exceed the previous wrongdoing. The principle of proportionality also holds for reprisals.
5. A reprisal may only affect rights and legal interests of the opponent but not those of third parties.

Each transgression of the reprisal right is a reprisal excess, which in turn is itself an international legal wrong and which entitles the opponent to redress it with a counter-reprisal.⁸¹

In case of an environmental treaty a reprisal could therefore be a blocking of contractually fixed financial assistance in response to a violation of legal environmental norms. In turn, in response to a default on contractually fixed financial assistance a reprisal could be the non-observance of contractually fixed environmental standards. However, it must be borne in mind that the observance of environmental standards is an obligation vis-à-vis all other parties to the treaty. This obligation may therefore only be cancelled if all states default on their financial obligations. Otherwise the precondition under 5. would not be met.

3. Evaluation

The sanctions which are admissible under the general international law can be considered treaty stability elements with respect to violations of international environmental treaties. In that respect one has to distinguish between information and cooperation treaties and treaties which set environmental standards. In the case of treaties which set standards a sanction must not imply the non-observance of the standards, because this would endanger the objective of the treaty. The possibility to execute a retorsion or a reprisal outside the treaty can be stabilising in the sense of inducing states to honour the treaty in which they otherwise had lost their interest.⁸²

⁸¹ *Comp. Heintschel v. Heinegg, supra*, note 6, at § 15 para. 86.

⁸² The United States, for instance, have repeatedly induced various states to comply with the whaling quota of the International Whaling Commission by warning those states according to the Pelly Amendments and threatening them with sanctions. *Comp., e.g., Wilkinson, "The Use of Domestic Measures to Enforce International Whaling Agreements: A Critical Perspective"*, 17 *Denver Journal of International Law and Policy* 271 (1988/89).

C. Treaty revision and adjustment

Another element of treaty stabilisation, as has been shown, is treaty flexibility. Contract law in general and, more specifically public international law refers to this notion. Modifications and alterations of treaties are admissible under certain circumstances in order to adapt treaty provisions to changes of the basic circumstances.

1. Principles

Just as in private law the parties to an international treaty can alter the treaty at any time unanimously.⁸³ The Vienna Convention permits in Part IV Art. 39 in principle the possibility of alterations of treaties.

A change and modification of treaties is thereby possible in principle and must fulfil only few preconditions. Some of these are the notification of all parties of the desire to alter in case of multilateral treaties,⁸⁴ and the right of each of the other parties to the treaty to participate in the decision on the new stipulations⁸⁵ and in the negotiations and agreement on the decision to alter the treaty⁸⁶ as well as the right to become a party to the new treaty⁸⁷. A special case is the alteration of a multilateral treaty only between some parties to the effect of changing the treaty only in between them. This is feasible if either such a modification in the relation between only some of the parties is stipulated in the treaty⁸⁸ or if it is not explicitly ruled out⁸⁹, and if the contractual rights of the other parties⁹⁰ as well as the objective of the treaty⁹¹ are not adversely affected.

⁸³ Heintschel v. Heinegg, *supra*, note 6, at § 13 para. 1.

⁸⁴ Art. 40 (3) VC

⁸⁵ *Id.* lit. a.

⁸⁶ *Id.* lit. b.

⁸⁷ *Id.* para. 3.

⁸⁸ Art. 41 (1) a and (2) VC.

⁸⁹ *Id.* lit. b.

⁹⁰ *Id.* lit. b i.

⁹¹ *Id.* lit. b ii.

2. Special rules for treaty revision and adjustment

Similar rules are contained in environmental treaties. For example, such rules are contained in the treaty on long-range transboundary air pollution of the ECE and its supplementary protocols.⁹² The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer of 1985 contains special rules which do not only relate to the Convention itself but also to the protocols which are to supplement it.⁹³ It also contains a unilateral right of proposing alterations which is supposed to pay due tribute to specific scientific and technical considerations.⁹⁴ The Conference of States Parties to that Convention may agree on such revision by a qualified majority (3/4 of the present and voting parties for alterations of the convention,⁹⁵ 2/3 for an alteration of the protocols⁹⁶. Such revision is then proposed to the member states for ratification, approval or acceptance.⁹⁷

3. The dynamic concept of a treaty in modern international legal procedures

Modern international environmental rules increasingly depart from the idea of a once and for all, complete and conclusive contractual regulation in favour of a dynamic development in which environmental rules materialise in a multi-stage process, which is often based on so called framework conventions, which provide for general objectives and procedures only and set up some institutions.⁹⁸

⁹² *Comp.* Art. 12 of the "Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution" of 1979; Art. 7 of the "Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or Their Transboundary Fluxes by at Least 30 Per Cent" of 1985; Art. 6 of the "Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on Long-Term Financing of the Co-operative Programme for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-Range Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe" of 1984.

⁹³ Art. 9 of the Convention.

⁹⁴ *Id.* para. 1.

⁹⁵ *Id.* para. 3.

⁹⁶ *Id.* para. 4.

⁹⁷ *Id.* para. 3 *in fine*.

⁹⁸ *Comp.* the "Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution" of 1979; "Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or Their Transboundary Fluxes by at Least 30 Per Cent" of 1985; "Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on Long-Term Financing of the Co-operative Programme for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-Range Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe" of 1984; "Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Concerning the Control of Emissions of

Only at subsequent stages — frequently in the form of supplementary protocols — will a system of rules be specified and partly be made mandatory. This ongoing negotiation and rule-making process frequently permits by way of acceleration, delay or by a revision of protocols an adaptation to changing economic and political conditions.

4. Evaluation

To conclude, in principle an alteration of contracts is feasible on the international legal stage if all parties agree. To the more, by way of specific treaty rules, modifications and alterations have been made more easy to achieve, e.g. by waiving the unanimity requirement. To the more, a dynamic design of contractual regimes has furthermore facilitated to take into account changes of the relevant circumstances.

D. "Monitoring": Supervision and inspections

A further question which emanates from the contractual stabilisation approach relates to monitoring. Monitoring is very important, because the status of environmental media and the compliance with standards set for their protection is difficult to verify.

The instrument of monitoring is relatively new in international law. So far it has been applied in particular in disarmament treaties and in human rights treaties. The substance of this instrument is a commitment of participating states to either admit observers on their own territory⁹⁹ or to report themselves¹⁰⁰. In case of disarmament

Nitrogen Oxides or Their Transboundary Fluxes" of 1988; "Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Concerning the Control of Emissions of Volatile Organic Compounds or Their Transboundary Fluxes of 1991; "Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution" of 1976; "Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by Dumping from Ships and Aircrafts" of 1976; "Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by Oil and other Harmful Substances in Cases of Emergency" of 1976; "Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution from Land-based Sources" of 1980; "Protocol Concerning Mediterranean Specially Protected Areas" of 1982.

⁹⁹ Similarly, the provision under V. of the time schedule of 1989 of the "International Whaling Convention" of 1946, according to which at least two whaling inspectors must be on each factory vessel, which have to supervise conduct and whaling procedures.

¹⁰⁰ Provision VI. No. 25 a of the time schedule of 1989 for the "International Whaling Convention" of 1946, according to which the governments of the member states are obliged to report to the Whaling Commission, Art. 8 and 9 of the "Convention on Long-Range

treaties most frequently an outside control is applied. In the area of human rights, however, upon agreement of the states concerned, independent rapporteurs may be entrusted with monitoring functions. Often they are empowered to choose whatever information sources they may deem appropriate. In the area of human rights this procedure proves effective because states at least try to give the impression to the outside world of sympathising with the human rights idea. Future must show whether in the realm of environmental law a similar effect occurs.

The basic legal issue in monitoring is that of territorial sovereignty. The principle of territorial sovereignty means that a state has a sovereign right to control all activities taking place on its territory. Carrying out inspections on the territory of a state, therefore, requires the state's consent.¹⁰¹ This holds true even in the case that a state has accepted some international obligations. It is a well established principle of international law that a state may not bar interferences any more on the basis of its sovereign rights if that state has accepted international obligations in the matter.¹⁰² This argument, however is not understood to go as far as to allow inspection teams to enter the country without consent. Prior consent of the state concerned, therefore, is required with the exception of those rather rare cases, where a treaty expressly provides otherwise. A point in case is Art. 4 of the Protocol on the reduction of sulphur emissions in Europe.¹⁰³

Transboundary Air Pollution" of 1979, which stipulates an exchange of information and the establishment of official monitoring stations in accordance with the EMEP.

¹⁰¹ No. 13 of the "Montreal Guidelines for the Protection of the Marine Environment Against Pollution from Land-Based Sources" of 1985; Art. 11 of the "Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources" of 1974; Art. 10 of the "Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution" of 1976; Art. 4 of the "Protocol Concerning Cooperation and Combatting Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by Oil and Other Harmful Substances in Cases of Emergency" of 1976; Art. 29 of the "UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage" of 1972.

¹⁰² Heintschel v. Heinegg, *supra*, note 6, at § 55 para. 4 *et seq.*

¹⁰³ "Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or Their Transboundary Fluxes by at Least 30 Per Cent" of 1985.

For example the ECE Convention provides for an internationally coordinated measurement and control system.¹⁰⁴ Such systems are most important for the detection of risks, causes and possible solutions in particular in the case of cross-border environmental problems. This is, however, not necessarily associated with an allocation of duties relating to the supervision of the application and implementation of the treaty. Such an allocation requires that the nature, extent and frequency of measurements and their appraisal as well as the dissemination and collection of data have been agreed upon.¹⁰⁵

Therefore, "monitoring" is an element of controlling the compliance with standards and therefore it serves attaining a treaty's objective by making violations observable and thus providing for the possibility of reactions.

V. Economic aspects of legal stabilisation mechanisms

From the preceding description of the various treaty enforcement and stabilisation instruments it transpires that there are differences between the economic and legal approach. This section further addresses these differences from the perspective of economic theory.

A. Transfers

Transfers are compatible with international legal theory. But it seems very difficult to identify different kinds of transfers, their magnitude and their purpose. Section IV.A characterises transfers as deviations from equal contributions of the parties to a common goal. Equal contributions is a normative concept which is debatable from the point of view of non-cooperative bargaining theory.

If equal contributions means equal costs (relative to GNP) for each party this benchmark captures only one side of the story since states will take costs and benefits

¹⁰⁴ Art. 9 of the "Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution" of 1979.

¹⁰⁵ No. 11 of the "Montreal Guidelines for Protection of the Marine Environment Against Pollution from Landbased Sources" of 1985, Protocol I Art. 3 of the "Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific" of 1989.

into account. Benefits need not accrue to the parties in equal amounts (relative to their contributions or GNP). Equal *net* benefits of a cooperative activity can be the result of a bargaining process between the participating states. The axiomatic Nash bargaining solution and the strategic Rubinstein solution suggest an even secondary distribution (equal split) between the parties if those are equal with respect to their outside options and their discount rates.¹⁰⁶ Otherwise the distribution will be biased to the advantage of the country which has a more favourable outside option and is more patient. If the original distribution of gains from cooperation do not coincide with the bargaining outcome transfers must be used to redistribute these gains and achieve the agreed distribution of net benefits.

In a multilateral CO₂ agreement the outside option of parties is particularly important for determining transfers. This is the case since parties cannot commit themselves to cooperative behaviour. In the CO₂ game, the non-cooperative benefit of some states may be larger than their benefit from cooperative abatement if sufficiently many states already cooperate. This is relevant because — as long as property rights or regulatory regime for using the global environment do not exist — one must assume that every sovereign state has the right to appropriate, by action or default, whatever benefit it can obtain. This is the case for using the atmosphere as a CO₂-deposit and it holds for the right to appropriate any windfall profits which other countries produce. Therefore, an obligation to make equal contributions to solve the CO₂-problem cannot, from the point of view of economic theory, *a priori* be the benchmark for determining transfers.

The non-cooperative approach assumes a completely self-interested state which operates only for opportunistic reasons. An opportunistic state may abstain from or join an abatement coalition and it may defect later without regard to other parties' utility if this fits its interests. Therefore, the net gains from cooperation including transfers must at least amount to the benefits which a state can secure alone. If in a given situation the outside option is the superior choice for a state compared to cooperation, the

¹⁰⁶ Nash, "The Bargaining Problem", 18 *Econometrica* 155 (1950); Rubinstein, "Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model", 50 *Econometrica* 97 (1982).

difference between the free-rider utility and this state's benefit from cooperative CO₂ abatement defines the lower limit of transfers. This is probably the relevant case for many (developing) countries, provided that no other stabilisation mechanisms are being used.¹⁰⁷

To take state opportunism as relevant for assessing transfers is in line with international law and economic theory. The criterion does not rely on debatable notions of justice and international equity. It is supported by the observation that CO₂ reduction services must literally be bought in developing countries, e.g., by financing reduction project through the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and joint implementation schemes or through redistributive CO₂ permits or tax schemes.¹⁰⁸ These transfers will, however, not suffice to entice *all* free-riders to join an efficient CO₂ abatement coalition and to comply with the agreement. The funds needed are likely to exceed the willingness to pay of even a committed abatement coalition, e.g., the OECD.¹⁰⁹

Apart from distributing the gains from cooperation, inducing countries to participate and discouraging treaty violations, transfers can serve several other purposes. E.g., they can contain a premium for accepting environmental risks or support countries which face an environmental disaster or contain an element of development aid. This does not imply that transfers are necessarily additive.

Contrary to the assessment in Section IV.A, from an economic point of view, many provisions in international treaties can serve the role of transfers. An obligation of parties to cooperate by giving technical assistance and exchanging scientific and technical information cannot readily be recognised as a transfer. Section IV.A.1.a argues that the resulting advantages are not defined clearly enough to justify a transfer.

¹⁰⁷ Comparable cases are the desalination of the Rhine and the removal of SO_x from British power plants, which, however, feature mostly unidirectional externalities. For the latter *comp.* Mäler, "The Acid Rain Game". In: H. Folmer, E. Ierland (eds.), *Valuation Methods and Policy Making in Environmental Economics*, 1989.

¹⁰⁸ Note that the GEF and "joint implementation" are transfer instruments which are already provided for in the Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992. Joint implementation allows states to fulfil their CO₂ reduction obligations abroad.

¹⁰⁹ *Comp. Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment*, *supra*, note 29; *Policy Coordination for Sustainability*, *supra*, note 38.

Cooperation obligations in treaties concern almost exclusively the public sector. It is obvious that the provision of public goods involves very different costs in different countries. Sharing these public goods, e.g., scientific information, with other countries does not involve any significant additional costs. Cooperation in this field improves global efficiency and can then be dealt with under this aspect. But access to such goods can also have a great value for some (developing) countries. This can raise their willingness of complying with a treaty considerably. Thus, under functional aspects cooperation duties can serve the role of a transfer. They can have an important treaty stabilising effect, especially when assistance must be given in a crisis situation.

Section IV.A.1.b suggests that reduced environmental obligations cannot be understood as transfers. Differentiated CO₂ abatement obligations can in deed be the result of an efficient cooperative abatement policy. The differences are then motivated by cost differentials between countries. But different standards can also reflect concessions which are intended to induce parties to join and comply with a treaty. Agreed abatement below the efficient level in the receiving country and/or inefficiently high abatement in the donating country can function as a transfer. But as a rule, transfers should be used to improve efficiency and not to impair it.

Differentiated financial contributions to the financing of international task are not regarded as transfers in the legal sense (IV.A.1.c). In deed, different contributions seem to be motivated by general distributional rather than by cost-effectiveness or treaty stabilisation considerations. If countries benefit in proportion to their GNP from a common project, making contributions depend on GNP is roughly in line with bargaining theoretic predictions. Other contribution formulas may indicate a different distribution of project benefits or contain an element of transfers.

Establishing an international fund, which the legal analysis recognises as a transfer mechanism, is probably the most conclusive form of organising utility transfers in a multilateral agreement. Which purposes the fund serves depends very much on the disbursement regulations and practice. In principle, an international fund is very well suited to stabilise a treaty. First, the incentive to pay agreed transfers into a multilateral fund is stronger than the incentive to make bilateral transfers. Second, fund contributi-

ons can be regarded as a bond if the treaty stipulates that a non-compliant country loses the right to disbursements. The disbursement delay can countervail the delay with which the international community can react to non-compliance. Third, if funds are disbursed on the basis of strict conditionality and only for well defined projects of global interest, they come very close to in-kind transfers. Hence, with regard to treaty stability the role of an international fund can go much beyond the task of mere project financing and promoting structural change in the recipient countries.

Section IV.A.2 acknowledges that international transfers outside of environmental treaties (official development aid, special trade preferences etc.) are essential for treaty stability. The fact that these transfers are given without a legally binding obligation ensures that they can effectively be used to stabilise international relations. The fact that international legal obligations cannot be enforced by a court system requires establishing relationships of factual instead of contractual dependence. Not legally binding transfers do just this. They allow to react quickly, more flexibly and often also more forcefully to a contract violation. External transfers are well suited for stabilising an agreement exactly because their suspension or termination is credible.

The recent willingness of states to write binding transfer obligations into treaties need not contradict this. This development may rather indicate a differentiation of transfers with respect to their purpose. Transfers which directly buy environmental services, e.g., through funding of CO₂ projects by the GEF, are being increasingly accepted by taxpayers in donor countries. But transfer obligation which only redistribute the gains from cooperation can hardly be explained to the public. And to contractually fix (monetary) transfers intended to stabilise a treaty can be counterproductive, since this impedes the flexibility to react to treaty violations. In addition, transfers which are contractually linked to a certain treaty cannot be used to stabilise other treaties. Unlinked transfers are advantageous since different treaties are likely to come under pressure at different times.

It remains difficult to identify transfers in international treaty relations and to unambiguously assign different tasks to them. Nevertheless, it is clear that transfers have an important role to play in achieving and stabilising a CO₂ agreement.

B. Sanctions

The economic analysis in Section III suggests that there are two forms of sanctions: first, measures which directly concern the treaty obligations, e.g., reciprocal non-compliance or modification of contractual obligations (internal stabilisation), and second, measures which concern relations outside of the violated treaty (external stabilisation). Internal treaty stabilisation can be identified with the possibility to suspend or terminate a treaty under international law. External stabilisation refer to retorsions and reprisals.

The termination of a treaty, as stipulated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is equivalent with the trigger strategy described in Section III.B. But legally, this instrument does not apply to the case of a multilateral CO₂ treaty since the suspension or termination of the treaty would hurt other parties too. This result is in line with contract theory, but only in so far as the threat with terminating the treaty is not credible and therefore without effect. But that some reduction in the abatement obligations of the loyal parties (the matching strategy) should be legally impossible is not supported by contract theory. On the contrary, a re-adjustment of the treaty obligations is in the interest of the remaining parties. Whether matching is an effective disincentive depends also on the speed of the reaction. Lengthy decision procedures reduce the power of this instrument since in the meantime the violator can enjoy the higher free-rider benefit which emanates from this time-lag. The matching strategy should therefore be codified in a CO₂ treaty, for instance by making obligations directly depend on the total number of compliant parties¹¹⁰ or by letting a small commission decide on the new obligations. If this is not feasible one could give each party the right to claim a certain revision of the treaty if any party defects.

Retorsions and reprisals are international sanctions in the narrow sense. The legal distinction between these instruments is not important for the economic analysis. As above, retorsions and reprisals cannot be used in a multilateral CO₂ treaty if they affect the loyal parties too. They can therefore only concern bilateral relationships of

¹¹⁰ *Comp.* the stability concept used by Barrett, *supra*, at note 22.

parties, as for instance the suspension of funding and development aid or the termination of trade. As pointed out earlier, the threat with retorsions or reprisals is not always credible and may then be ineffective. Some techniques to make self-binding threats were discussed above in Section III.D. From the perspective of contract theory the desirable development in international law is clear: to help reduce or eliminate this credibility problem.

The principle of proportionality of sanctions is part of international law. Excessive reprisals are an offence which can be answered by counter-reprisals. From a contract theoretic perspective proportionality is a questionable criterion if it implies that the impact of sanctions must not exceed the gains from non-compliance in the case observed. If a treaty violation cannot be detected with certainty or if sanctions are not absolutely credible (i.e. their probability is smaller than one) the expected net benefit of non-compliance is always positive with sanctions that are proportional in this sense. A treaty breach can thus not be deterred. Therefore, contract theory suggests that the principle of proportionality should be interpreted to allow that the impact of sanctions should match the *expected* net benefit of any observed violation. Only sanctions that are punitive in this sense can stabilise an environmental treaty effectively. Hence, parties to a CO₂ treaty should agree to sanctions which sufficiently overcompensate the gains actually realised by the non-compliant party. Agreed punitive sanctions are an admissible instrument in international treaties.

But punitive sanctions can be difficult to use, too, since they may be less credible, for instance if they cost more to execute. Increasing the impact of sanctions can even be counterproductive if this renders their execution so improbable that the *expected* impact decreases. This weakens the treaty. Hence, the success of punitive sanctions depends even more on the ability to make credible threats.

But even absolutely credible sanctions must not be excessive. With excessive threats an imbalance between parties' interests can develop and build up until the threat finally loses its effect. When the treaty obligations are then violated a sudden and hefty re-adjustment of the treaty can become necessary. Shock-like adjustments can, however, lead to inefficiencies for all parties. They can put the entire treaty at risk. The

correct design of a sanction threat with respect to its impact and credibility is therefore most important and critical for the stability of an international CO₂ treaty.

C. Treaty revision and adjustments

As was pointed out in Section IV.C, treaty revisions are always possible with the consent of all parties. But they are also permissible between a limited number of parties if there are no negative effects on the remaining parties. Agreed treaty revisions can thus be a substitute for automatic re-adjustments of treaty obligations in response to a violation. This was proposed as a stabilisation instrument in Section III.F above. When negotiating a treaty revision, procedural regulations, e.g., for treaty cancellation, voting rules and procedural delays, can play an important role as they can influence the bargaining power of the parties and determine the outcome of renegotiations.

As was already explained, allowing renegotiations in treaties can induce treaty violations. Thus, the option to renegotiate can have a destabilising effect. This problem can, of course, also occur in dynamic agreements. A CO₂ treaty should therefore specify the conditions under which renegotiations and treaty revisions are acceptable. Furthermore, the treaty should provide for instruments which deter non-compliance induced by the possibility to renegotiate. There should, for instance, be no room for renegotiating the abatement obligations of less developed countries in the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer *after* the industrial countries have fulfilled their abatement obligations. A compromise between necessary treaty adjustments and counterproductive renegotiations consists in clearly predefined flexible treaty obligations, e.g., by indexing environmental standards.

Dynamic treaties are a very interesting development under the aspect of treaty stabilisation. More research appears necessary to better understand the treaty stabilising properties of dynamic regimes.¹¹¹

¹¹¹ *Comp.* the discussion in Section III.F.

D. Monitoring and dispute settlement

Many provisions in international treaties have the purpose to support the above discussed enforcement and stabilisation instruments. An important provision in this respect concerns the monitoring of compliance with the agreed obligations. Monitoring provides information which allows to invoke other stabilisation instruments, e.g. sanctions. In most treaties monitoring is subject to national sovereignty and is usually done by self-reporting. In-place monitoring by foreign representatives is rarely provided for. This is a source for cheating that should be overcome. In a CO₂ treaty, monitoring should, e.g., be opened to non-governmental organisations. Compliance reports should be made public in order to give countries more incentive to care for their reputation. A loss of trustworthiness amounts to an effective sanction since this can have a negative influence on present and future public or private international relations, e.g., international borrowing or direct investments: The risk premium of an unreliable country is higher.

Dispute settlement procedures can reinforce the reputation effect. Legal proceedings at the International Court of Justice raise public awareness. But, of course, a Court ruling alone is no direct enforcement instrument in international relations unless it is backed by more forceful instruments to execute it. The same holds for arbitration procedures and similar dispute settlement provisions. Moreover, such provisions can have an influence on the application and effect of other stabilisation instruments. For instance, long court proceedings raise the temptation to violate the treaty and subsequently strengthen the bargaining power of the non-compliant party.

E. Evaluation

Compared with the great number of international environmental treaties there is relatively little experience with non-compliance and with the use and effectiveness of enforcement and stabilisation instruments. One reason may be that most ambitious international environmental agreements which regulate multilateral externalities are rather young. Another reason may be that the stipulated environmental targets and individual parties obligations fall considerably short of the cooperative protection level or that the

cooperative and non-cooperative solutions are not far apart from each other¹¹². A still further reason may be that treaty violations pass unnoticed since they do not evoke any observable reaction. But the observation of relatively few treaty violations could also indicate that treaty enforcement and stabilisation is in fact successful. Since it is the purpose of such provisions to avoid violations the effectiveness of treaty stabilisation measures is hardly observable. An interesting exception are the treaties on international fishing and the protection of endangered species. In these cases, open or covered treaty violations were observed in the past. An example is the International Whaling Convention which was repeatedly and successfully enforced by threatening to invoke sanctions, e.g., by the United States against Japan.

It appears useful to attempt a match of the different motivations for treaty violations with the most suitable enforcement and stabilisation instrument in each case.

Transfers obviously have a rather limited scope in the case of extensive and ambitious international environmental agreements, e.g., a CO₂ treaty. Due to the necessary large volume of the transfers needed to secure full cooperation in the presence of strong free-rider incentives, their use is likely to be restricted to promoting the establishment of the treaty and perhaps to a limited enlargement of the treaty coalition. This can be done through a multilateral fund which disburses project money. The fact that such transfers can be motivated with buying environmental services abroad strengthens the public willingness to make such transfers. This does not exclude that they can have a stabilising effect too. Non-financial transfers and issue linking, e.g. trade preferences, are likely to have a somewhat larger scope. This is partly due to the fact that they cannot readily be recognised as transfers as they do not touch upon financial resources. Differentiated treaty obligations which distract from achieving the cost-effective outcome should not be used to make utility transfers at all. Hence, transfers should mainly be employed to reach a cost-effective solution, to guarantee the parties the utility they would have without a treaty and to redistribute, if necessary, the total co-

¹¹² As suggested by Barrett, *supra*, at note 24.

operation gains. It will be difficult to go against the total free-rider utility solely with transfers. This requires sanctions.

Credible sanctions have a much larger stabilisation potential than transfers as they mainly work with the denial of advantages which increasingly accrue from the growing worldwide economic integration. Sanctions can therefore be used to fight against free-riders, where this is legally admissible, and to wipe out the gains a non-compliant party can obtain by exploiting reaction time-lags and irreversibilities. Sanctions should be the preferred stabilisation instrument as they work without imposing heavy costs on the international community as long as they are credible.

Finally, learning effects and other exogenous shifts in the bargaining power of parties should be contained by flexible adjustments of the treaty. Predefined flexibility and conditional obligations are preferable to spontaneous renegotiations since their anticipation can motivate violations. Dynamic treaties can provide for an integrated enforcement and stabilisation regime. But their success largely depends on sophisticated formal and informal behavioural and procedural rules. These rules must guide the expectations which countries have and must make use of the fact that global environmental protection takes place in the framework of infinitely repeated cooperation between countries in many fields.

The evaluation of the described legal enforcement and stabilisation mechanisms on the background of contract theory suggests the following: Legal enforcement and stabilisation mechanisms appear remarkably vague and poorly defined. This leaves a country uncertain about the transfers it can receive, about the sanctions it must expect and about the possible treaty adjustments.

Apparently, the preservation of the accepted body of international law and the achieved state of international cooperation has a high value. But these achievements are put at risk by using international sanctions. The destructive force of sanctions can stabilise cooperation, but it can also trigger a vicious circle of non-cooperative actions. In the language of game theory: If parties make mistakes, a cooperative Nash-equilibrium can give way to a non-cooperative equilibrium, from which it is difficult to escape again. This danger can at least partly explain the lack of counter-measures in

treaties and the legal limits which sanctions must obey, namely the principle of proportionality, the distinction between retorsions and reprisals, the prohibition of treaty suspension which hurt third parties and the softening effect which sanction provisions within treaties can have.

The question arises whether the weak legal definition of enforcement and stabilisation mechanisms in multilateral environmental agreements can be justified under stability aspects, too. Uncertainty which emanates from the lack of clearly defined enforcement and stabilisation mechanisms can be stabilising. This is possible when reputation strategies are involved, as is apparently the case in international relations. Furthermore, vagueness permits the fine-tuning of a reaction to the specific situation so that a violation can be remedied without unnecessarily jeopardising other international relations. Additionally, the non-codification of stabilisation instruments allows, within the limits mentioned above, to employ as counter-measures the entire body of international relations, which are constantly changing. This is important, because at different times different counter-measures can deliver a credible threat.

But in multilateral treaties with many participants the observed lack of clearly codified stabilisation instruments can also have a severe drawback. The reason is that in such treaties many countries need to agree on the appropriate adjustments and counter-measures and, moreover, must jointly execute them. There are usually numerous reasons to disagree in a particular non-compliance case, and free-riding on other countries' enforcement efforts is also tempting. Therefore, it is rather unlikely that decisions on additional transfers, treaty adjustments or effective sanctions can quickly be taken and that threats are credible. This view seems to be well supported by the experience with multilateral actions in many fields, as for instance violations of human rights and peace keeping.

The hypothesis can therefore not be rejected that the theory of international law should develop new, more clearly defined and codified enforcement and stabilisation mechanisms to help the international community cope with the severe non-compliance incentives which are present in the new and coming, necessarily very ambitious global environmental regimes. In the concluding Section VI of this paper we show that a joint

approach by contract theory and international legal theory can produce new proposals and an advancement in this direction.

VI. Synthesis: A stable CO₂ agreement

This section draws conclusions from the above discussion. It presents proposals for concrete stabilisation mechanisms to be used in or in connection with a future CO₂ Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change. Such stabilisation mechanisms should, in principle, be compatible with economic reasoning and with the established principles of international law. In some cases, however, there may be good reasons to deviate from established legal conceptions, whereas in other cases new treaty stabilisation mechanisms may introduce too much alteration and thus instability into the existing international legal system and are therefore presently not feasible.

A first conclusion from our examination of stabilisation instruments in international environmental agreements is the observation that enforcement and stabilisation is a two-layered affair. It is not sufficient for an agreement to provide for stabilisation instruments if these instruments are not enforceable themselves. This is most obvious in the case of economic sanctions, which must be credible and hence need appropriate design and institutional backing themselves. But also the promise of transfers needs an appropriate framing in order to be credible. And flexibility requires that criteria and procedures are available to assess the situation and defend against abuse. Hence, the stability of stabilisation mechanisms is of great importance for their success.

As was pointed out in the legal analysis in Section IV, stabilisation mechanisms are often not codified in a treaty itself, but are based on general international law. One frequently finds, however, a great number of procedural and institutional rules in such treaties. These are often subject to fierce controversies in negotiations and constitute the major part of a treaty's text. Examples embrace the rules and institutions for disbursing funds, monitoring provisions and reporting requirements, non-compliance and dispute settlement procedures and the like. These institutional and procedural provisions are the basis for the successful application of stabilisation mechanisms of the kind discussed in this paper. They may therefore be called secondary stabilisation in-

struments as they enable transfers, sanctions and flexibility mechanisms to work as stabilisation mechanisms for the treaty. Hence, any treaty must indeed design them carefully. They frame the strategies which countries have, given the threat of sanctions, the promise of transfers and the possibility to fulfil obligations flexibly and renegotiate.

With this in mind, it is suggested that a stable CO₂ agreement should incorporate all or a selection of the following features:

1. The CO₂ treaty should stipulate a high **minimum participation requirement** to come into force. This requirement should be stated in terms of the number of states, their economic weight and the world wide CO₂ emissions covered.

Justification: This induces countries, and important countries in particular, to sign and ratify the treaty, because without their participation abatement obligations will not or are unlikely to exist, and therefore they will forego any gains from joint cooperative action. A large number of participating countries yields international legitimacy to any acts performed under the treaty. A big economic weight of the abatement coalition enhances her potential for actions like economic sanctions against non-compliant countries and outsiders. A large total amount of CO₂ emissions covered by the treaty guarantees a minimum climate effect of the treaty without which many countries will have no incentive to participate.

2. Individual states' abatement obligations should **match the abatement efforts** of other states. Thus, they should depend positively on the number of signatories or rather the total amount of CO₂ emissions covered by the treaty.

Justification: As this provision shifts abatement upwards as countries join and downwards as countries defect, it strengthens reciprocity and thus the incentive to join and comply since joining becomes more profitable and defecting less so. Non-compliance would thus virtually be punished by a partial suspension of the treaty's environmental obligations.

3. A **defection penalty** or a front end abatement concession should be paid by a non-compliant country before punishment is lifted and the country is admitted to the treaty again.

Justification: This provision reduces the exploitable possibility of avoiding punishment by renegotiating after non-compliance is detected.

4. In principle, abatement and general treaty **obligations should not be differentiated** between types of countries, except as justified by global efficiency. Differentiations of obligations motivated by other considerations should be made explicit as exceptions to the rule.

Justification: This allows to identify differentiations as a form of transfer, which in turn makes it easier to (re)negotiate them and replace them by alternative, possibly more efficient, transfer instruments. Equivalent and concomitant obligations strengthen reciprocity and reduce shifts in bargaining power due to irreversible treaty fulfilment by one side. This avoids the kind of time inconsistency found in the Montreal Protocol, in which developing countries enjoy a grace period of ten years.

5. A **global CO₂ Fund**, possibly within the framework of the Global Environmental Facilities, should be established. The resources of the Fund should come from at least the following sources:

- An initial payment by all countries which join the agreement should be transferred to the Fund. This payment may be substituted by other assets placed in the custody of the Fund.

Justification: An initial payment serves as collateral.

- Regular contributions by *all* countries which are a party to the treaty should be made. The funds should be disbursed to the recipients only with delay. Contributions by a non-compliant country should be forfeited after its defection. Non-payment of contribution is considered non-compliance.

Justification: These rules strengthen the collateral property of the Fund. Payments are easy to monitor and can be used as an indicator of the willingness to comply in future rounds.

- Funds generated in connection with the punishment of non-compliant or non-participating countries, for instance a punitive tariff on trade in CO₂ intensive goods, should be transferred to the Fund.

Justification: This strengthens the justification and enforceability of punishment.

6. The funds should be disbursed in the form of **in-kind transfers**. Strict conditionality and in-place supervision of financed projects should be mandatory. Irreversible technologies for CO₂ reduction options should be financed with priority.

Justification: In-kind transfers for irreversible projects make non-compliance with respect to already achieved reductions impossible or less likely.

7. Other forms of bi- and multilateral transfers should be encouraged. They can be stabilising if they are properly enforced themselves.

- Such transfers may for instance comprise administrative, technical and scientific assistance by more advanced countries.
- An international carbon tax or transferable CO₂ permits can — besides improving the cost-effectiveness of CO₂ abatement in the participating countries — work as a transfer mechanisms. But the distribution of CO₂ permits or tax revenues as a means of effecting transfers may alone not contribute much to the stability of a *globally comprehensive* CO₂ agreement, and may even be destabilising.

Justification: The transfers necessary to bring about efficiency and full cooperation can easily exceed the willingness-to-pay of (uncommitted) donor countries. Only those (possibly inefficiently low) abatement efforts which are in the interest of the donors can be realised in the recipient countries without weakening treaty stability on the donors' side. Moreover, international property rights

(tradeable emission permits) require international enforcement themselves, or they will not be respected. And international taxes must be collected and tax obligations be enforced.

8. The CO₂ treaty should be **linked to other international issues** via institutions and other treaties, such that the participation in other beneficial international activities can be made conditional on the participation in and compliance with the CO₂ treaty. Possible candidates for linking would be trade agreements or treaties on joint research and development.

Justification: Existing and purpose-built institutions reduce negotiation and transaction costs as well as enforcement and stabilisation costs. They facilitate beneficial issue-linking (transfers) or punitive issue-linking (sanctions) thus favouring participation and compliance and deterring free-riding and non-compliance. A wide-ranging example for linking strategies is the European Union.

9. The private sector should be involved in stabilising a CO₂ treaty by means of **cross default contracts** between governments on the one side and industry and trade on the other side, linking public environmental and private business interests.

The cross default contract can be made mandatory by the CO₂ treaty. An example is a cross default contract with international banks.

Justification: A cross default contract is equivalent with prespecified sanctions, except that it is reciprocal in tying both the government (or environmental agency) and the private sector into enforcing each others interests. The cross default contract itself is enforceable by the domestic court system and can benefit both partners. Apart from the possibility of involving the private sector, a cross-default mechanism can bring about and buttress an issue linking such as is discussed under 8. It need not necessarily involve the private sector.

10. The **monitoring** of compliance should be permitted on the spot and opened to non-governmental organisations. Non-compliance reports should be widely published.

Justification: This strengthens self-deterrence of non-compliance as it induces a loss of confidence in the non-compliant country. It damages the countries international reputation and good-will, which can entail a higher risk premium in future transactions and treaties payable to international business partners and foreign governments.

11. Treaty obligations should be required to serve directly as or be implemented in **domestic law**.

Justification: This strengthens self-deterrence as it allows domestic prosecution of non-compliance with the international treaty and thus takes the legal system of a non-compliant country hostage of her international obligations.

12. Appropriate **sanctions** against non-compliant and, where legally possible, against non-participating countries should be provided for. They may comprise the suspension of all benefits and advantages granted under the CO₂ treaty or independent thereof, in particular monetary and non-monetary transfers, suitable restrictions of trade in commodities and services, including financial services, and the suspension of participation in international organisations and treaties and other diplomatic measures. Any threat with sanctions must be made credible by e.g. the following provisions.

- Parties or non-parties to the treaty which evade the sanctions are to be considered non-compliant and must then be subject to sanctions themselves.

Justification: Such a system of mutually supportive sanctions is credible provided the number and economic weight of the states parties to the treaty is sufficiently big. Actually imposing the required sanctions is then the best option for each country taken *individually* since otherwise it would have to face sanctions itself. Thus, sanctions have maximum effect as every country participates. This strategy can also be used to extend the CO₂ treaty coalition. It was apparently used in the Montreal Protocol.

- The CO₂ Fund, in particular the contributions of and the funds earmarked for the non-compliant country, should be used to compensate compliant countries for their costs of imposing sanctions.

Justification: This renders sanctions more credible since with compensations countries taken *individually* do not lose from participating in sanctions. Truly credible and fully deterrent sanctions leave the fund untouched.

- The execution of sanctions should, as far as possible, involve and be delegated to international institution, preferably those which possess and can orchestrate their own means of sanctions, e.g., the World Bank, which can suspend loans, project financing, consulting etc. Under uncertainty, this institution can build up reputation by executing sanctions.

Justification: Delegation and reputation strengthen the threat of sanctions in that they are credible commitments.

13. The impact of sanctions should match the *expected* benefit of treaty violations and free-riding in each case. An international authority should set **punitive sanctions** if monitoring is not perfect. The members of the sanctions authority must be known to be tough, e.g. representatives of countries which suffer heavily under climate change.

Justification: Only sanctions of a sufficient impact can deter not fully observable treaty violations. The necessary intensity of sanctions and the means to achieve it cannot be prespecified for each case with sufficient precision. Hence, the deterrence effect must be based on the reputation for toughness and good judgement of the sanctions authority.

14. The CO₂ abatement obligations should be kept **flexible** by indexing them to relevant exogenous variables or by allowing certain deviations which should, however, be banked for later compensation. Flexibility needs clear criteria and supervision. Moral hazard needs to be contained.

Justification: Flexibility alleviates the burden from a country for some time thus allowing for an alternative to outright non-compliance. Flexibility rules must be kept under tight control in order to prevent abuse and concealed non-compliance.

15. The **renegotiation** of existing obligations should be restrained to cases which are justified by new and unexpected information. Renegotiations should always be placed in the framework of a general review of the treaty.

Justification: A too extensive possibility to renegotiate can be destabilising as it invites violations. The prospect of easy renegotiations may weaken the treaty as it entices opportunistic countries to join, whereas more committed countries will anticipate violations and opportunistic attempts to renegotiate and thus lose interest.

16. The CO₂ treaty should be a **dynamic** regime. That is, it should be established as a rule-driven, stepwise process of setting and implementing ever stricter abatement obligations and accompanying regulations.

Justification: Dynamic agreements offer each participant the chance to additional benefits with each (irreversible) step. Non-compliance would seriously disturb or interrupt this process. Additionally, the general amendments and adjustments to a dynamic treaty can correct unfavourable developments without touching upon previous obligations and achievements. In this respect, the Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer supplemented by the Montreal Protocol with its repeated adjustments and amendments is an example for a global CO₂ treaty.

The above list of treaty stabilising features, which is certainly not exhaustive, contains suggestions to be employed in a CO₂ treaty, for drafting other new treaties or amending existing ones. In doing so, states are, in general, free to draft and conclude whatever rules they may deem appropriate and politically feasible. Most of the recommendations made are therefore permissible under international law.

There are, however, some limitations since states are obliged to observe those international law rules and entitlements they are not competent to modify or otherwise to interfere with. A coalition of states may agree upon a wide variety of obligations, sanctions, transfers and benefits to be applied and provided for among themselves.

Problems arise, however, when interests and rights of states are concerned, which are not participating. It is a fundamental principle of law in general that no treaty provision is allowed which impairs rights and legal interests of third parties. There are few exceptions to this principle, as sometimes international treaty law may have a so-called *erga omnes* effect. Those limitations must be observed in the recommendations on issue linking (8.), cross-default contracts (9.) and sanctions (12.) above.

Establishing links (e.g. through cross-default contracts) between otherwise separate issues is admissible in the whole range of international relations, provided it is not foreclosed by binding international law obligations. To do so, all requirements for the modification of a specific obligation have to be met. Such modifications may theoretically be incorporated in a new international CO₂ treaty, provided that the parties to the treaty are competent to amend those other legal obligation. If this is not the case those modifications must be concluded according to the rules provided for in the relevant treaties or conventions concerned.

Trade concessions and preferences are negotiated by a great number of states under GATT, the Generalised System of Preferences, the Caribbean Basin Initiative or the Lomé System and are legally binding. They thus can only be modified by all states concerned. If not all states participate in the proposed CO₂ agreement those modifications have to be tabled at the respective negotiation rounds, which periodically take place to review those trade agreements.

The granting of funds and the financing of international development assistance is based on far less strict legal rules. In deciding about new projects, links may be established as permitted by the relevant programme. World Bank or UN financed projects are often granted subject to the willingness of states to accept additional environmental obligations. Linking project finance to issues not directly related to the project is not easy under the existing programmes. It may require to establish new terms and conditions for project funding which take broader issue linking into account.

Also the proposal to impose sanctions on non-participating states (12.) raises legal concerns. The term sanctions is ambiguous in legal perspective. Sanctions may have a mere political impact (retorsion) and in this case they are admissible without limits.

But if they impair interests recognised and relevant under international law (reprisals) they are clearly illegal. Trade sanctions against non-parties, for instance, will be widely inadmissible as far as they concern binding GATT obligations.

The recommendation to implement international legal obligations into national law (11.) points to an important deficit. The proper implementation of international environmental law obligations is a growing concern. Two different kinds of international obligations must be distinguished with respect to their implementation in national law. Some international law obligations are drafted in a way that they can be directly applied as part of the national law. This is the case if they are directly addressed to individuals and are meaningful in this regard. Standards for maximum individual exposure to environmental effects, individual rights to review administrative decisions in national and foreign courts and individual rights to compensation belong to this category. Such international law obligations may be transferred to national law just as they stand.

Other international law provisions which primarily address the states and their authorities require national decisions. A general CO₂ abatement objective for a whole state will not be meaningful to individuals of that state if embodied literally in the national legal order. The states addressed by such obligation have to consider which kind of policies to implement in order to meet their international duties. Means and mechanisms to be applied may be prescribed by international law, but more often international treaty law is tacit in this regard. The recommendation to oblige states to conclude cross-default agreements with their national industries (13.) may be such a prescription of the means to be adopted by states in order to implement their international obligations.

Some of the proposals mentioned in this final chapter seem to warrant further legal and economic research, particularly in the two fields of applying sanctions and linking strategies to enforce and stabilise global environmental agreements.

The possibilities to apply sanctions against both participants and non-participants to an international CO₂ agreement should be further studied. Most important are questions which pertain to the use of sanctions in relation to the international trading and

legal systems. The aim of such research should be to reconcile the beneficial potential of sanctions as stabilisation instrument in dealing with global environmental problems and their potentially destabilising effect on the international economic and legal systems. Particular questions would be how the policy of treaty stabilising sanctions can be administered by the GATT or the new World Trade Organisation (WTO) and whether an objective climate regime can be established and legally justified which allows to use sanctions against states which do not participate in it.

Equally important further research concerns the various integration strategies as they create interdependence between states by linking otherwise separate international issues. How issue linking can best be organised, which roles institutions and treaties can play in the joint management of the international commons in relation to other international tasks, how such integration can be extended to all states and how national and international law and policies and how the public and private sector should interact to guarantee the stability of both the ecological and the human-built systems, these are relevant questions for legal and economic research warranting further joint efforts.

Another, not less interesting task would be to further clarify the role of institutional and procedural rules in international treaties, as, for instance, dispute settlement procedures, in their capacity to support the enforcement and stability characteristics of such treaties and buttress the enforcement and stabilisation instruments that were discussed in this paper.