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Profits in pure Bertrand oligopolies

by Frank Stähler
August 1995



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PROFITS IN PURE BERTRAND OLIGOPOLIES*

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Key words. Bertrand competition, Bertrand paradox, implicit collusion, renegotiation-proofness, punishment-proofness.

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Abstract. *This paper demonstrates that the Bertrand paradox does not hold if cost functions are strictly convex. Instead, multiple equilibria exist which can be Pareto-ranked. The paper shows that the Pareto-dominant equilibrium may imply profits higher than in Cournot competition or may even sustain perfect cartelization. The potential scope for implicit collusion is discussed for the case that the Pareto-dominant non-cooperative equilibrium does not support perfect cartelization. Due to multiple non-cooperative equilibria, the discussion involves finitely repeated Bertrand games as well. The paper discusses several strategies which may support implicit collusion. It develops the notion of punishment-proofness, and it demonstrates that strongly renegotiation-proof equilibria exist for sufficiently high discount factors. Finally, extensions are discussed which cover Stackelberg leadership, fixed and sunk costs and endogenous market structures.*

* I am indebted to Gernot Klepper and Peter Michaelis for very useful discussion. The usual disclaimer applies.

Profits in pure Bertrand oligopolies

Since its early beginnings, identifying the relevant strategy set of oligopolists has been a main focus of oligopoly theory. Two positions were taken which are associated with Cournot (1838) and Bertrand (1883): Cournot-based oligopoly models assume that oligopolists determine quantities the sum of which determines prices. Bertrand-based oligopoly models assume that oligopolists set prices which determine their individual demand. The debate about the appropriate assumption would not have received such much academic attention if the implications were not such different, especially for homogeneous goods. But Bertrand's model demonstrated that prices drop down on marginal costs if oligopolists compete by prices instead of quantities. This result entered economic theory as the famous Bertrand paradox which asserts that two are enough for perfect competition.

The Bertrand paradox troubled many economists because they could hardly imagine that increasing the number of firms from a monopolistic market structure to an oligopolistic market structure leaves no scope for prices above marginal costs. Several escape routes were taken in order to reconcile economic intuition about market power and price competition. A first escape route taken very early by Edgeworth (1897) demonstrated that the Bertrand paradox does not hold if firms face a binding capacity constraint. Based on Edgeworth, a lot of papers dealt with so-called Bertrand-Edgeworth models in which firms compete by prices and ration demand if capacity constraints are reached. If a certain firm has to ration demand, the residual demand can be served by other firms. In another approach, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) made the choice of the capacity constraint endogenous such that firms choose their capacity constraints in a first stage, and set prices in a second stage. They demonstrated that this two-stage game of capacities and prices gives the same outcome as the corresponding one-stage game of quantity determination a la Cournot. Other contributions have introduced the notion of supply function equilibria (Grossman,

1981, Hart, 1985). This concept combines price and quantity competition such that the firms strategy set refers to the determination of functions which specify different prices for different individual supply levels.

A second escape route relaxed the assumption of homogeneous goods. Price competition in pure Bertrand oligopolies assumes perfect substitutability of one firm's product through another firm's product. Consequently, a marginal price reduction compared to competitors gives one firm the whole demand. Hotelling (1929) introduced a modification of perfect substitutability by the assumption of positive transport costs and different locations of firms. Other papers generalized this approach and assumed that consumers like or dislike several attributes of goods such that all goods are not perfectly substitutable. Although equilibria for these differentiated goods' markets do not necessarily exist, dropping down the assumption of perfect substitutability guarantees that price reduction does not capture the whole industry's demand. Thereby, marginal price changes imply marginal revenue effects and render price competition in differentiated goods' markets similar to Cournot competition in that point.

A third escape route pronounces the long-run aspects of price competition. The Folk theorem demonstrated that any outcome between the purely non-cooperative one and the cooperative one is sustainable as a subgame-perfect equilibrium in a supergame if the discount factor lies in a sufficiently close neighborhood of unity (Fudenberg, Maskin, 1986). Compared to quantity competition, price competition is supposed to imply weaker constraints with respect to the discount factor in order to sustain implicit collusion (Deneckere, 1983). For the case of constant unit costs for duopolists, it can be shown easily that every discount factor which does not fall short from 0.5 supports any alternative outcome which improves on zero profits including the monopolistic one if defection is punished by the trigger strategy.

So far, an uncountable number of papers have modified the original Bertrand game in order to reinforce the relevance of market power. However, it is sometimes advisable

to go "back to the roots" and try to reconsider the arguments from the distance. The first part of this paper will go backwards in this sense and reconsider Bertrand competition in its simplest variant. The simplest variant is to suppose that the strategy of firms is to set prices for a homogeneous good which determine their individual demand. However, a slight modification with respect to the cost functions will be assumed: instead of constant unit costs, strict convexity of the cost function will be assumed. It will be shown in section 2 that the Bertrand paradox relies crucially on constant unit costs whereas strictly convex cost functions produce multiple equilibria which all guarantee positive profits and which can be Pareto-ranked. This section will also demonstrate that the Pareto-dominant equilibrium may imply profits which surmount those of the corresponding Cournot equilibrium. Even more, Bertrand competition will be shown to be able to sustain the perfectly collusive outcome in a purely non-cooperative environment of a one-shot game.

This result is grounded on the original model of Bertrand competition in combination with strict convexity of the cost function. The model assumes m oligopolists each of which sets an individual price and faces a resulting demand. This assumption is the appropriate one to compare price-based with quantity-based competition. In Cournot models, oligopolists set quantities and face a resulting demand as well. When comparing both models, an enriched Bertrand model should not be compared with the simplest Cournot model. From this point of view, capacity constraints are a very restrictive assumption because they assume that a firm is technologically not able to increase its production beyond a certain level. Capacity constraints imply individual cost functions which do not cover the whole range of possible individual demands because they restrict the domain of the cost function. If infinite marginal costs are ruled out, convex cost functions allow every firm to meet its individual demand for some finite costs. Compared to the case of constant unit cost, convex cost functions are a more appropriate assumption for assessing costs *on the firm level*. As cost functions are the dual of production functions, the existence of a relevant production factor the provision of which is not determined by the firm but fixed (e.g. public

infrastructure) is likely to induce increasing marginal costs for a single firm. Constant unit costs draw heavily on both the assumption of constant economies of scale and the assumption of possible variation of all relevant production factors on the firm level.

In this sense, rationing is an extremely strange assumption, too, because it implicitly enlarges the policy options of oligopolists who are not obliged to serve their individual demands. They may evade by using another allocation scheme than that of pure price setting. Therefore, rationing in Bertrand-Edgeworth models should be contrasted with Cournot models which allow some revision of the determined quantities as well. Additionally, rationing is obviously no appropriate assumption for a lot of markets on which producers have to announce prices which are laid down in contracts with wholesalers or retailers such that any demand should be served by these prices. It is this case which defines the original Bertrand game.

Based on the results of section II, the paper continues by considering long-term effects of pure Bertrand competition. It assumes that the Pareto-dominant one-shot equilibrium obtains profits which fall short from those of perfect collusion in order to face a relevant intertemporal coordination problem for oligopolists. As the paper is not restricted on duopolies but covers the case of more than two oligopolists as well, special attention is given to the potential role subcoalitions of the grand coalition can play. Section III demonstrates that the relevant defection is the defection of a single firm, and that the critical discount factor increases with the degree of implicit collusion. Section IV adopts the concept of weak renegotiation-proofness (van Damme, 1989, Farrell, Maskin, 1989) which allows to return to cooperation after a party has deviated from implicit collusion. It is shown that the corresponding constraints dominate the problem and that a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium which improves on the non-cooperative outcome may not exist. Section V discusses both the credibility for a defecting firm to be punished and the credibility of non-defecting firm to punish. The first aspect will be referred to as punishment-proofness, and the last aspect has been referred to as strong renegotiation-proofness in the

literature (Farrell, Maskin, 1989). The section shows that a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium may exist which is punishment-proof as well. But punishment-proofness may demand modification of the non-defecting parties' strategies which weak renegotiation-proofness assumed by reverting to non-cooperative pricing. It is also shown that this equilibrium is strongly renegotiation-proof for sufficiently high discount factors. Section VI overviews possible extensions of the model, and section VII concludes the paper.

I. The model

The model assumes a demand function which specifies total demand as a function of the lowest price. Total demand decreases with the lowest price, and the demand function is concave:

$$(1) \quad D = X[p], \quad X_p < 0, \quad X_{pp} \leq 0 \quad p = \min\{p_1, \dots, p_m\}.$$

$\{p_1, \dots, p_m\}$ is the set of prices which the m firms specify. The individual demand of a firm depends on the relation of its individual price to the lowest price:

$$(2) \quad \forall p_j \in \{p_1, \dots, p_m\} \wedge p_j = p: \quad k' = \frac{\sum_j p_j}{p},$$

$$x_i = \begin{cases} X/k' & \text{if } p_i = p \\ 0 & \text{if } p_i > p \end{cases}.$$

(2) assumes that all k' firms which announce the lowest price share the corresponding demand equally, whereas every firm announcing a higher price faces no demand. An equal split may be not guaranteed as a certain event but may be expected by every lowest-price-charging firm. In this case, individual demand is stochastic and does not depend on demand realized in previous periods, and firms are supposed to be risk-neutral.

As the demand curve is differentiable for every price, even extremely small price reductions are able to capture the whole demand. The model will assume that small price reductions which make a set consisting of k oligopolists (which can be a singleton) capture the whole demand can be approximated by the original price:

$$(3) \quad x_i = \begin{cases} X(\bar{p})/k & \text{if } p_i = \bar{p} + \varepsilon \\ 0 & \text{if } p_i = \bar{p} \end{cases} \quad \text{for } \varepsilon < 0, \varepsilon \approx 0.$$

(3) shows that reduction by a small ε assumes to capture the whole demand at the original price \bar{p} .

The profits of every firm are the difference between sales and costs. Costs are assumed to be strictly convex, and marginal costs for zero production do not exceed the reservation price:

$$(4) \quad \Pi_i = p_i x_i - C(x_i), \quad C_x > 0, \quad C_{xx} > 0, \\ C_x(0) < X^{-1}[X=0], \quad C_x[X(0)] < \infty, \quad C(0) = 0.$$

X^{-1} denotes the inverse demand function derived from (1). All firms use the same technology so that there is no difference in costs which is a quite reasonable assumption for homogeneous goods. (4) guarantees that demand is strictly positive and that capacity constraints play no role because marginal costs are finite for one firm which serves the maximum market demand. (4) assumes no fixed or sunk costs and ensures that all m firms do not incur losses in the market. Section VI will relax this assumption and will discuss endogenous market structures as well. In section II, the model will also employ specific demand and profit functions to pronounce the relevance of profits in Bertrand oligopolies:

$$(5) \quad D(p) = \frac{a}{b} - \frac{p}{b}, \quad C(x_i) = \alpha x_i + \frac{\beta}{2} x_i^2, \quad a > \alpha$$

(5) defines a linear inverse demand function of the form $p = a - bX$ and a quadratic cost function.

The model assumes further that firms always prefer to produce if their profits are non-negative, and that they choose the cooperative solution if defection gives them the same profits. Additionally, the paper assumes almost perfect knowledge such that all functions are common knowledge for price policies but all firms have to announce prices simultaneously. The analysis is restricted on pure price policy strategies of all firms.

Another conceptual remark concerns the use of differentials in this paper. The paper will discuss the implications of changes in m , i.e. the number of oligopolists, and will specify the number of punishment periods, n_k , for renegotiation-proof equilibria. Obviously, both the parameter m and the variable n_k are restricted on the set of natural numbers. Changes of these terms, however, can be evaluated by derivatives of corresponding functions which employ the set of rational numbers:

$$(6) \quad \mu \in \{m, n_k\}:$$

$$\Omega := \Omega[\cdot, \mu] \mapsto \Xi := \Xi[\cdot, \kappa], \quad \mu \in \mathbb{N}, \kappa \in \mathbb{R}$$

$$\Omega[\cdot, \mu_i] - \Omega[\cdot, \mu_j] = \int_{\mu_i}^{\mu_j} \frac{\partial \Xi[\cdot, \kappa]}{\partial \kappa} \partial \kappa$$

$$\forall \kappa: \frac{\partial \Xi[\cdot, \kappa]}{\partial \kappa} < 0 \Rightarrow \forall \mu_i \neq \mu_j: \left[\Omega[\cdot, \mu_i] - \Omega[\cdot, \mu_j] \right] \left[\mu_i - \mu_j \right] > 0$$

(6) demonstrates that an unambiguous sign of the derivative does also signal the same sign for the change of the original function. (6) will often be made use of, and for the sake of simplicity, the derivatives will use the same functional assignment.

II. The Bertrand paradox reconsidered

The assumption that all firms prefer production if non-negative profits are guaranteed implies that all firms charge the same price which must not fall short from the corresponding marginal costs implied by the resulting individual demand. If cost

functions are (strictly) convex, prices which do not fall short from marginal costs imply (strictly) positive profits. Identical pricing and marginal costs define the first condition a one-shot Bertrand equilibrium has to meet:

$$(7) \quad \forall p_i \in \{p_1, \dots, p_m\}: p_i = p^B, \quad p^B \geq C_x \left[\frac{X(p^B)}{m} \right].$$

p^B denotes the equilibrium price of Bertrand competition. (7), however, is not sufficient for an equilibrium. The second condition wants every firm not to improve on its profits by setting a lower price. This condition can be set up by the use of the profit change function (8) which is defined for non-positive ε only:

$$(8) \quad \varepsilon \leq 0:$$

$$\Delta_i[p, \varepsilon, k] = (-\varepsilon) \cdot \left\{ -p^B \frac{X(p^B)}{k} + C \left[\frac{X(p^B)}{k} \right] + [p^B + \varepsilon] X(p^B + \varepsilon) - C[X(p^B + \varepsilon)] \right\}$$

Δ_i is a function of the price p which is the lowest price charged by k oligopolists ($k \leq m$) if $\varepsilon = 0$, the price reduction ε of a single firm, and the number of firms charging the Bertrand price. If ε is zero, the individual firm does not reduce its price and profits are not changed. If ε is negative, however, this unilateral price reduction implies a profit change which is given in the brackets (note that ε is negative): the firm loses the individual demand shared with the other firms (first term), avoids the corresponding costs (second term), gains the whole demand due to price reduction (third term), and has to carry the corresponding costs (fourth term). The first two terms do not depend on ε . Multiplying the bracket term which indicates the profit change by $(-\varepsilon)$ is a monotone transformation of the profit change. If Δ_i is a monotone transformation of the profit change implied by a price reduction, the extremals are not varied by this transformation.

The second condition for a Bertrand price equilibrium wants every firm not to reduce its individual price unilaterally in order to improve on its profits. Hence, the first derivative of Δ_i for a zero ε and the equilibrium Bertrand price must not be positive:

$$(9) \quad \frac{\partial \Delta_i}{\partial \varepsilon} [p = p^B, \varepsilon = 0, k = m] = p^B X(p^B) \left[\frac{1}{m} - 1 \right] - C \left[\frac{X(p^B)}{m} \right] + C[X(p^B)] \leq 0$$

(9) takes into account that all firms charge the same price. Thus, (9) must hold for every firm in the market. Condition (9) has a straightforward interpretation: A price equilibrium must make every firm refrain from announcing a marginally lower price. (9) indicates that this condition is fulfilled if the increase in profits due to serving the whole demand does not exceed the decrease of profits when sharing the demand equally with all other oligopolists.

A third condition not to be overlooked sets a lower limit to prices. If all firms colluded, they maximized the total profits subject to the sum of production costs. The resulting price of perfect monopolization is given by

$$(10) \quad p^M = C_x \left[\frac{X(p^M)}{m} \right] - \frac{X(p^M)}{X_p(p^M)}$$

Perfect monopolization will be denoted by the superscript M. Note that perfect monopolization does not mean that only one firm is in the market but that all firms realize a price which maximizes the sum of profits. Therefore, (10) gives the solution for a monopolists who employs m plants. Obviously, the Bertrand price equilibrium will never specify a price which exceeds the price of perfect collusion according to (10).

This argument as well as (6) and (9) are collected in (11):

$$(11) \quad \forall p_i \in \{p_1, \dots, p_m\}: p_i = p^B \leq p^M,$$

$$p^B \leq \frac{C\left[\frac{X(p^B)}{m}\right] - C[X(p^B)]}{\left[1 - \frac{1}{m}\right]X(p^B)} > \frac{\left[1 - \frac{1}{m}\right]C[X(p^B)]}{\left[1 - \frac{1}{m}\right]X(p^B)} = \frac{C[X(p^B)]}{X(p^B)},$$

$$p^B \geq C_x \left[\frac{X(p^B)}{m} \right].$$

(11) demonstrates that the equilibrium price must not exceed a term which itself exceeds average costs. This result may be not surprising at first glance because convex cost functions imply marginal costs above average costs and thereby induce profits by the mere curvature of the cost function. Thereby, the existence of at least one equilibrium is proved because equalizing prices and marginal costs fulfils (11). However, the set of equilibria described by (11) is not a singleton, and equilibria exist which are based on prices strictly above marginal costs. This assertion is stated in Proposition 1:

Proposition 1: If cost functions are strictly convex, multiple equilibria exist which can be Pareto-ranked.

Proof:

The proof for the first part of Proposition 1 can be easily given by contradiction. Suppose that (11) entails a unique equilibrium the price of which falls short from the price of perfect collusion and define

$$p' := \frac{C\left[\frac{X(p')}{m}\right] - C[X(p')]}{\left[1 - \frac{1}{m}\right]X(p')}, \quad p'' := C_x \left[\frac{X(p'')}{m} \right].$$

p' gives the limit price indicated by the second line of (11), p'' gives the marginal cost price. If $p' \leq p''$, the set of equilibria were a singleton if both prices fell together:

$$(12) \quad p' = p'' \Rightarrow C[X(p')] = C\left[\frac{X(p')}{m}\right] + \frac{m-1}{m} C_x\left[\frac{X(p')}{m}\right] \cdot X(p')$$

(11), however, contradicts strict convexity by definition of convex functions. Thus, p' and p'' fall apart and multiple equilibria exist which lie between both prices. Additionally, it is obvious that p^M and p'' fall apart. Q.e.d. (12) held only for linear cost functions which equalize marginal and average costs.

The second part of Proposition 1 can be proved by differentiating the profits of every firm with respect to prices:

$$(13) \quad \frac{\partial \Pi_i}{\partial p} = \frac{X_p(p)}{m-1} \left[C_x[X(p)] - C_x\left[\frac{X(p)}{m}\right] \right] > 0 \text{ due to } C_{xx} > 0.$$

(13) shows that profits increase with prices and all equilibria can be Pareto-ranked. The Pareto-dominant equilibrium is specified by setting p equal to $\min\{p', p^M\}$. Q.e.d.

This result contrasts the Bertrand paradox substantially which assumed that prices always drop down on marginal costs. Proposition 1 demonstrates that this assertion depends crucially on constant unit costs. For example, a firm out of three firms announcing a certain price below the price of its competitors has to take into account that tripling the demand implies more than tripling individual costs to serve the demand. Thus, price equilibria above marginal cost exist which make a firm refrain from capturing the whole demand because the increase in costs overcompensates the increase in demand. For the Bertrand equilibrium, marginal costs define only the lower limit of prices but the upper limit according to (11) is determined by comparing the increase in total costs with the increase in demand. Therefore, marginal costs do not play any role for the upper limit, and the Bertrand paradox relies crucially on constant unit costs which by definition equalize marginal and average costs. As (12) holds for constant unit costs which equalize average costs and the (unique) equilibrium price, the proof of Proposition 2 is straightforward.

Proposition 2: *Without fixed costs, strictly convex cost functions imply profits and strictly linear cost functions imply zero profits in a one-shot Bertrand game.*

Proof:

See (12) and Proposition 1.

In the case of convex cost functions, there are several equilibria which cover the price range $[\min\{p', p^M\}, p'']$. Multiple equilibria involve an equilibrium selection problem. It is by no means clear which price will result from the Bertrand game unless more structure in form of an equilibrium selection mechanism is intruded into the model. If one firm sets its individual price equal to marginal costs, other firms can do no better than charging the same price although this equilibrium is Pareto-dominated by all other attainable equilibria. There is a long tradition in economic theory to assume that agents choose the Pareto-dominant equilibria when all equilibria can be Pareto-ranked. As it is not the aim of this paper to add to the debate on equilibrium selection, it will not break with this tradition and assume that $\min\{p', p^M\}$ is selected in the one-shot game. This assumption will be made throughout the rest of this section (and all terms referring to this equilibrium will be denoted either by a prime or the superscript M). Note that this assumption is indeed an optimistic one for this section. However, it were a more restrictive one for the following chapters because it may make defection from implicit collusion obviously more attractive.

As it is a novel conclusion that profits by setting prices above marginal costs are possible in Bertrand oligopolies, it is interesting to explore the behavior of Pareto-dominant profits with the number of oligopolists. Increasing the number of firms has a twofold impact: on the one hand, demand must be divided among more firms, on the other hand, all firms operate at a lower average cost level. Proposition 3 shows that the influence of the number of firms in the market is qualitatively the same as in Cournot competition:

Proposition 3: *Individual profits decrease with the number of oligopolists.*

Proof:

The first part of the proof deals with the case that $p' \leq p^M$ holds. The Pareto-dominant profits are given by (14):

$$(14) \quad \Pi'_i := \Pi_i[p', m] = \frac{p'X(p')}{m} - C\left[\frac{X(p')}{m}\right] = \frac{C[X(p')] - mC\left[\frac{X(p')}{m}\right]}{m-1},$$

the partial derivative of which with respect to prices is positive, i.e.

$$\frac{\partial \Pi'_i}{\partial p'} > 0,$$

because (13) holds for all Bertrand equilibrium prices including the best one. Partial differentiation with respect to the number of firms yields

$$(15) \quad \frac{\partial \Pi'_i}{\partial m} = \frac{X(p')}{m^2} \left[C_x \left[\frac{X(p')}{m} \right] - p' \right] < 0.$$

(15) shows that increasing the number of firms for a constant price decreases profits.

(16) defines the condition for determining the Pareto-dominant price as an implicit function:

$$(16) \quad \Phi[p', m] := \left[1 - \frac{1}{m} \right] p' X(p') - C[X(p')] + C\left[\frac{X(p')}{m}\right] = 0.$$

Partial differentiation with respect to p' and m indicates the sign of the price change due to an increased number of firms:

$$(17) \quad \frac{\partial \Phi}{\partial p'} = \left[1 - \frac{1}{m} \right] \left[X(p') + p' X_p(p') \right] - X_p(p') \left[C_x \left[X(p') \right] + \frac{C_x \left[\frac{X(p')}{m} \right]}{m} \right] > 0,$$

$$\frac{\partial \Phi}{\partial m} = \frac{X(p)}{m^2} \left[p' - C_x \left[\frac{X(p')}{m} \right] \right] > 0,$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{dp'}{dm} < 0,$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{d\Pi_i}{dm} = \frac{\partial \Pi_i}{\partial m} + \frac{\partial \Pi_i}{\partial p'} \frac{dp'}{dm} < 0.$$

dp'/dm is unambiguously negative and thereby proves the negative sign of the total derivative of profits with respect to m . For the second part of the proof, it is well-known that

$$(18) \quad \frac{\partial \Pi_i^M}{\partial p^M} < 0, \quad \frac{\partial \Pi_i^M}{\partial m} < 0$$

must hold for perfect collusion. The derivative with respect to price must be negative because any unilateral increase (decrease) away from the price of perfect collusion must decrease (increase) individual profits. The derivative with respect to m must be negative because (15) holds in general. Defining the perfect collusion's price determination as an implicit function completes the proof:

$$(19) \quad \Psi[p^M, m] := p^M X_p(p^M) - X_p(p^M) C_x \left[\frac{X(p^M)}{m} \right] - X(p^M) = 0,$$

$$\frac{\partial \Psi}{\partial p^M} = X_{pp}(p^M) \left[p^M - C_x \left[\frac{X(p^M)}{m} \right] \right] - \frac{X_p(p^M)^2}{m} C_{xx} \left[\frac{X(p^M)}{m} \right] < 0,$$

$$\frac{\partial \Psi}{\partial m} = \frac{X_p(p^M) X_p(p^M)}{m^2} C_{xx} \left[\frac{X(p^M)}{m} \right] < 0,$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{dp^M}{dm} < 0,$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{d\Pi_i^M}{dm} = \frac{\partial \Pi_i^M}{\partial m} + \frac{\partial \Pi_i^M}{\partial p^M} \frac{dp^M}{dm} < 0.$$

Q.e.d.

Proposition 4 demonstrates that the effect on the total industry's profits is ambiguous except for the case of p^M .

Proposition 4: *The profits of the industry increase with number of firms if the price of perfect collusion is an equilibrium. For all other Pareto-dominant prices, the impact is ambiguous.*

Proof:

The total profits of an industry are denoted by Π . Differentiation yields:

$$(20) \quad \Pi := pX(p) - mC\left[\frac{X(p)}{m}\right],$$

$$\frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial p} = X(p) - X_p(p) \left[p - C_x \left[\frac{X(p)}{m} \right] \right] \begin{cases} = 0 & \text{for } p = p^M \\ > 0 & \text{for } p < p^M \end{cases}$$

$$\frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial m} = \frac{X(p)}{m} C_x \left[\frac{X(p)}{m} \right] - C \left[\frac{X(p)}{m} \right] > 0,$$

$$\text{because} \quad \frac{C \left[\frac{X(p)}{m} \right]}{\frac{X(p)}{m}} < C_x \left[\frac{X(p)}{m} \right],$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{d\Pi}{dm} = \frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial m} + \frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial p} \frac{dp}{dm} = 0 \text{ for } p = p^M, \text{ undetermined for } p < p^M.$$

Q.e.d.

The section has always taken into account the restricting relevance of p^M compared to p' . Comparing the determination of p' and p^M , it cannot be ruled out that p^M is lower than p' because p' was determined not as profit-maximizing but as equalizing the

profits in the grand coalition and the profits of marginally reducing its individual price below p^c . As one expects Cournot competition to imply prices above marginal costs as well, the relationship between Cournot competition and Bertrand competition is also not quite clear on purely theoretical grounds. The general assumptions of the model ensure a unique Cournot equilibrium which results in a price according to

$$(21) \quad p^c = C_x \left[\frac{X(p^c)}{m} \right] - X_x^{-1} \left[\frac{X(p^c)}{m} \right] \cdot \frac{X(p^c)}{m}.$$

X_x^{-1} denotes the derivative of the inverse demand function with respect to output. In order to shed some more light on the relationship to both perfect collusion and Cournot competition, the following two propositions adopt the specific functions introduced by (3). The individual production levels for the Pareto-dominant, not by p^M restricted output level, the Cournot output level and output level of perfect collusion are given by (22), (23) and (24), respectively:

$$(22) \quad x_i^c = \frac{a - \alpha}{\frac{\beta}{2}(m+1) + b},$$

$$(23) \quad x_i^c = \frac{a - \alpha}{b(m+1) + \beta},$$

$$(24) \quad x_i^M = \frac{a - \alpha}{2bm + \beta}.$$

Proposition 5: *The Pareto-dominant equilibrium may imply profits which surmount profits of the corresponding Cournot equilibrium.*

Proof:

Pareto-dominant profits exceed the Cournot profits if the individual output level according to (22) falls strictly short from the one according (23). Such a β exists:

$$(25) \quad \beta > \frac{2bm}{m-1} := \hat{\beta}(m), \quad \frac{d\hat{\beta}}{dm} = -\frac{2b}{(m-1)^2} < 0$$

Q.e.d.

β measures the degree of convexity of the specific cost function. If β exceeds $\hat{\beta}(m)$, the Pareto-dominant Bertrand equilibrium entails higher profits than the Cournot equilibrium. The reason has to be found in convexity and in the individual demand discontinuity: if cost functions are sufficiently convex, Bertrand prices can surmount marginal costs substantially because even a unilateral reduction from a high price implied costs which overcompensated the additional demand. In Cournot competition, a marginal variation of output does only imply a marginal change of profits, but in Bertrand competition the discontinuity in individual demand to be served and the overproportional increase in costs makes firms refrain from charging lower prices. (25) shows that the critical β decreases with the number of firms because the demand increase is the higher the more firms are in the market. More firms in the market let the individual market share for identical pricing shrink, and they let the jump from individual demand to total demand to be served when charging a lower price increase.

Proposition 6 demonstrates that $\min\{p', p^M\} = p^M$ may hold.

Proposition 6: *The Pareto-dominant equilibrium may imply the maximum profits of collusive profit maximization.*

Proof:

Firms in Bertrand oligopoly will never increase prices beyond the price of perfect cartelization. Thus, p' is dominated by p^M if the individual demand according to (22) falls short of the monopolized demand according to (22). Such a β exists:

$$(26) \quad \beta \geq \frac{2b(2m-1)}{m-1} := \hat{\beta}(m), \quad \frac{d\hat{\beta}}{dm} = -\frac{2b}{(m-1)^2} < 0.$$

Q.e.d.

If β does not fall short from $\hat{\beta}(m)$, the Bertrand equilibrium entails perfect collusion because any marginal price reduction increased costs more than sales. (26) shows that the critical β decreases with the number of firms because of the same reasons given for the comparison with Cournot competition.

This section has demonstrated that Pareto-dominant Bertrand equilibria may entail higher profits than in Cournot competition and even guarantee the collusive outcome. Strict convexity of cost functions serves as a threat not to undermine prices because the jump in sales may fall extremely short of the increase in costs. Compared to Cournot competition, market power alone does not result in profits in Bertrand competition. Instead, it is the combination with strictly increasing marginal costs which reinforces the relevance of market power in Bertrand oligopolies.

III. Potential collusion in Bertrand oligopolies

The last section has demonstrated that multiple equilibria exist for the one-shot Bertrand game if cost functions are strictly convex. Dynamic price competition is well-known to be able to enlarge the set of equilibria. This section will deal with such supergames which may allow to sustain profits above the purely non-cooperative one. Apparently, repetition of the price game is only necessary to improve on the one-shot outcome if $\min\{p', p^M\} = p' < p^M$ holds. This assumption will be made throughout the next sections although $p^B = p^M$ is not guaranteed if $\min\{p', p^M\} = p^M$ holds. But if p^M could be sustained in a one-shot game, it may be found to improve on profits by intratemporal coordination rather than taking recourse to intertemporal strategy specification.

This section will consider two subgame-perfect strategies which may sustain collusion in finitely or infinitely repeated Bertrand games. As other non-cooperative equilibria exist, it is well-known from Benoit and Krishna (1985) that other than one-shot equilibria may be sustained in games with a finite number of repetitions. This section

will start with finite repetition and turn to infinite repetition afterwards. The following strategy may support other than non-cooperative equilibria in finitely repeated Bertrand games.

Trigger strategy I: Charge the price p^* in the first period. Charge the price p^* also in all following periods except the last one if all other firms have charged the price p^* as well. If one firm has defected by charging a lower price, charge the price p' in all future periods including the last one. If no firm has defected, charge the price p' in the last period.

For obvious reasons, the case of defection of all firms will be neglected throughout this paper. All variables and functions which refer to outcomes sustained by repetition will be denoted by a star. This strategy is called a trigger strategy as it does not allow to return to cooperation after one firm has defected. This strategy sustains p^* if (C1) holds:

(C1) $\forall k < m, \forall \tau \in \{0, \dots, T\}$:

$$\frac{1 - \delta^{(T-\tau)}}{1 - \delta} \Pi_i^* + \delta^{(T-\tau)} \Pi_i' \geq \Pi_i^d(k) + \delta \frac{1 - \delta^{(T-\tau)}}{1 - \delta} \Pi_i''$$

T denotes the last period, and the superscript d denotes defection from collusion of a subset of oligopolists which consists of k firms. The defection profits depend on the number of "breaching" oligopolist. (C1) demands that the discounted profits from implicit collusion, i.e. setting price p^* in all except the last periods, and setting p' in the last period, must not fall short from defection in one period and the discounted profits of reverting to p' for the rest of the time horizon.

(C1) must hold for all τ . Proposition 7 identifies the relevant period the constraint of which according to (C1) dominates all other periods.

Proposition 7: *If defection restricts the scope of implicit collusion in a finitely repeated Bertrand game, the binding constraint is determined by the next-to-last period.*

Proof:

Define

$$\forall \tau < T;$$

$$\Theta(\tau) := (1 - \delta^{(T-\tau)})\Pi_i^* + (1 - \delta)\delta^{(T-\tau)}\Pi_i' - (1 - \delta)\Pi_i^d(k) - (\delta - \delta^{(T-\tau+1)})\Pi_i''$$

which gives (C1) as a function of τ for all periods except the last one in which Π_i^* and Π_i^d play no role. If Θ is positive, trigger strategy I supports the respective price p^* .

Differentiation with respect to τ yields

$$\frac{\partial \Theta}{\partial \tau} = \delta^{(T-\tau)} \ln \delta [\Pi_i^* - \Pi_i' - \delta(\Pi_i'' - \Pi_i')]$$

the sign of which depends on $\Pi_i^* - \Pi_i' - \delta(\Pi_i'' - \Pi_i')$, but is unambiguously either negative or positive. Suppose that $\Pi_i^* - \Pi_i' - \delta(\Pi_i'' - \Pi_i')$ is non-positive, i.e.

$$(27) \quad \Pi_i^* \leq \Pi_i' + \delta(\Pi_i'' - \Pi_i')$$

which implied that the constraint becomes less biting the higher τ is. Thus, the relevant constraint were given by $\tau = 0$. A fortiori, the next-to-last period should be sustained, i.e.

$$\Theta(\tau = T - 1) = (1 - \delta)\Pi_i^* + (1 - \delta)\delta\Pi_i' - (1 - \delta)\Pi_i^d(k) - \delta(1 - \delta)\Pi_i'' > 0$$

$$(28) \quad \Leftrightarrow \Pi_i^* > \Pi_i^d(k) + \delta(\Pi_i'' - \Pi_i')$$

should be satisfied. (28), however, contradicts (27) such that a non-negative derivative is not possible. Consequently, the derivative must be negative and proves that Θ becomes more biting with τ because Θ is decreased in the course of time. If Θ holds

for T-1, it holds for all other previous periods. For the last period, $p' > p''$ ensures superiority of pursuing trigger strategy I. Q.e.d.

Proposition 7 proves that (C1) is fulfilled for all τ if

$$(C1) \quad \forall k < m: \quad \Pi_i^* + \delta \Pi_i' \geq \Pi_i^d(k) + \delta \Pi_i''$$

is satisfied. In terms of the discount factor, trigger strategy I sustains the price p^* if

$$(29) \quad \delta \geq \frac{\Pi_i^d(k) - \Pi_i^*(p^*)}{\Pi_i' - \Pi_i''} := \hat{\delta}(p^*)$$

holds. $\hat{\delta}(p^*)$ denotes the critical discount factor.

If the Bertrand game is infinitely repeated, trigger strategy II may sustain collusion.

Trigger strategy II: Charge the price p^* in the first period. Charge the price p^* also in all following periods if all other firms have charged the price p^* as well. If one firm has defected by charging a lower price, charge the price p^B in all future periods.

Trigger strategy II does not specify p^B which may be any price belonging to the non-cooperative equilibrium set, but it is obvious that the strongest support for collusion is provided by setting p'' after defection. Trigger strategy II sustains the price p^* if (C2) holds.

$$(C2) \quad \forall k < m: \quad \frac{1}{1-\delta} \Pi_i^* \geq \Pi_i^d(k) + \frac{\delta}{1-\delta} \Pi_i^B.$$

(C2) demands that the discounted profits of collusion in all periods must not fall short from those of defection in one period and non-cooperation in all following periods. Due to the infinite time horizon, no specification of the "binding" period is necessary. In terms of the discount factor, trigger strategy II sustains the price p^* if

$$(30) \quad \delta \geq \frac{\Pi_i^d(k) - \Pi_i^*(p^*)}{\Pi_i^d(p^*) - \Pi_i^B} := \hat{\hat{\delta}}(p^*)$$

holds, $\hat{\delta}(p^*)$ denotes the critical discount factor.

However, it is still unknown for finitely as well as for infinitely repeated Bertrand games which size k of the breaching coalition of firms is relevant. Proposition 8 clarifies this point.

Proposition 8: *If defection restricts the scope of implicit collusion, the binding constraint is determined by defection of a single firm.*

Proof:

First, note that any coalition which defects is not able to continue by starting some kind of collusion among its members only because there is no scope for joint pricing other than to adopt the price which the other firms specify. Thus, no coalition of defecting firms is able to agree upon continuing collusion among themselves. (Note that this implication does not hold in general for quantity-based collusion because a subcoalition might improve on the non-cooperative outcome by partial collusion.)

Second, suppose that an identical, small reduction from p^* is taken by k firms. The defection profits are

$$\Pi_i^d(k) = \frac{p^* X(p^*)}{k} - C \left[\frac{X(p^*)}{k} \right].$$

Differentiation with respect to k gives

$$\frac{d\Pi_i^d}{dk} = -\frac{X(p)}{k^2} \left[p^* - C_x \left[\frac{X(p^*)}{km} \right] \right] < 0$$

and shows that the defection profits are the higher the lower the number of defecting oligopolists is:

$$(31) \quad \max \{ \Pi_i^d(k) | k \leq m \} = \Pi_i^d(1) := \Pi_i^d(p^*)$$

Q.e.d.

(31) redefines the defection profits as a function of the price p^* for the defection of a single firm. (31) specifies the critical discount factors of (29) and (30) such that a discount factor which makes defection of a single firm unprofitable makes defection of all other coalitions unprofitable as well. A salient result of the infinitely repeated Bertrand game with constant unit cost is the assertion that any other equilibrium other than the unique one-shot equilibrium may be sustained if the discount factor does not fall short from $1/m$. The reason is that constant costs mean defection profits which are m times the collusive profits, and reverting to non-cooperation implies zero profits. This result does not necessarily hold for convex cost functions because the relationship of

$$\hat{\delta}(p^*) = \frac{\left[1 - \frac{1}{m}\right] p^* X(p^*) - C[X(p^*)] + C\left[\frac{X(p^*)}{m}\right]}{p' X(p') - C\left[\frac{X(p')}{m}\right] - p'' X(p'') + C\left[\frac{X(p'')}{m}\right]} \quad \text{and}$$

$$\hat{\hat{\delta}}(p^*) = \frac{\left[1 - \frac{1}{m}\right] p^* X(p^*) - C[X(p^*)] + C\left[\frac{X(p^*)}{m}\right]}{p^* X(p^*) - C[X(p^*)] - \Pi_1^B}$$

to $1/m$ is unclear. Additionally, the critical discount factor is changed unambiguously with changes of p^* for both (29) and (30).

Proposition 9: *The critical discount factors $\hat{\delta}$ and $\hat{\hat{\delta}}$ increase with profits to be sustained by implicit collusion.*

Proof:

A necessary prerequisite for proving Proposition 9 is the relative behavior of the collusive profits and the defection profits with the price p^* :

$$(32) \quad \forall p^* \in [p', p^M]:$$

$$\frac{d\Pi_i^*}{dp^*} = \frac{1}{m} \left[X(p^*) + p^* X_p(p^*) - X_p(p^*) C_x \left[\frac{X(p^*)}{m} \right] \right] \geq 0,$$

$$\frac{d\Pi_i^d}{dp^*} = X(p^*) + p^* X_p(p^*) - X_p(p^*) C_x [X(p^*)] > 0,$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{d\Pi_i^d}{dp^*} > \frac{d\Pi_i^*}{dp^*} \Leftrightarrow$$

$$(0 >) - X_p(p^*) \left[C_x \left[\frac{X(p^*)}{m} \right] - C_x [X(p^*)] \right] < \frac{m-1}{m} [X(p^*) + p^* X_p(p^*)] (> 0).$$

(32) demonstrates that the marginal defection profit is always greater than the marginal collusion profit. (32) proves the first part of Proposition 9 directly because differentiating (29) under the use of (31) gives

$$(33) \quad \frac{d\hat{\delta}}{dp^*} = \frac{1}{\Pi_i' - \Pi_i''} \left[\frac{d\Pi_i^d}{dp^*} - \frac{d\Pi_i^*}{dp^*} \right] > 0$$

which is unambiguously positive. Differentiation of (30) under the use of (31) gives

$$(34) \quad \frac{d\hat{\delta}}{dp^*} = \frac{1}{\Pi_i^d(p^*) - \Pi_i'} \left[\hat{\delta} \frac{d\Pi_i^d}{dp^*} - \frac{d\Pi_i^*}{dp^*} \right] > 0.$$

(34) is also positive because

$$\frac{d\hat{\delta}}{dp^*} [p^* = p^M] = \frac{\Pi_i'(p^M) - \Pi_i'}{[\Pi_i^d(p^M) - \Pi_i']^2} \frac{d\Pi_i^d}{dp^*} > 0$$

holds, because due to the vanishing marginal collusive profit for p^M , (34) is positive for p^M . A negative range of (34) implied therefore a minimum which demanded as a necessary condition

$$\exists p''', \dot{p}: \quad p'' \leq \dot{p} < p''' < p^M, \quad \frac{d\hat{\delta}(p''')}{dp^*} = 0 \Rightarrow \hat{\delta}(\dot{p}) = \frac{\frac{d\Pi_i^*(\dot{p})}{dp^*}}{\frac{d\Pi_i^d(\dot{p})}{dp^*}} > 1$$

which contradicts (32). Q.e.d.

This section has demonstrated that collusion is possible in both finitely and infinitely repeated Bertrand games. It has also determined the relevant defection and the behavior of the discount factor. The analysis was implicitly based on subgame-perfection. The following section will deal with punishment strategies which substitute for trigger strategies such that return to cooperation is possible which was ruled out in this section.

IV. Weakly renegotiation-proof Bertrand equilibria

The last section employed trigger strategies which do neither firm allow to return to cooperation after deviance from p^* has occurred once. These strategies ground their credibility purely on subgame-perfection: as no firm can improve on charging another price than p^B or p if all other firms do as well, the punishment strategy defines an equilibrium. This assertion may be found a too strong assumption, especially when renegotiation is possible. Obviously, all firms regret that defection quits every future cooperation. However, if defection did not change the continuation payoffs of defecting firms, no cooperation were possible.

The concept of weak renegotiation-proofness reconciles the demands of punishing a deviating firm and the option to return to cooperation. *An equilibrium is called weakly renegotiation-proof if its continuation payoffs implied by the respective strategies are not Pareto-dominated by other strategies.* Typically, these strategies specify reverting to non-cooperation for a certain period of those firms which have not defected. This period is infinitely long if the firms which have defected do not play cooperatively during punishment, i.e. are punished by "legal" defection of the other firms. If they do, punishment will be finished after a certain punishment length, and the firms which had punished return to cooperation. For infinitely repeated Bertrand games, return to cooperation and punishment for defection is given by pursuing punishment strategy I.

Punishment strategy I: Charge the price p^* in the first period. If no firm has defected (state 1), charge the price p^* also in the next period. If k firms have defected by charging a lower price (state 2), charge the price p^B in the next n_k periods. If a firm of those which have defected does not charge a price which exceeds p^B during the n_k periods (state 3), restart charging p^B for the next n_k periods (state 2). If all firms which have defected have charged a higher price than p^B during the n_k periods (state 4), charge price p^* in period (n_k+1) and return to state 1.

Such a punishment strategy is able to sustain an equilibrium which improves on the non-cooperative Bertrand equilibrium if

- every firm is made refrain from defection in one period and no cooperation in all future periods (*profitability*),
- every firm is made refrain from defection in one period and punishment during n_k periods compared to collusion in (n_k+1) periods (*ex ante compliance*),
- every firm wants to return to cooperation after it has defected, i.e. wants to carry the punishment costs for n_k periods and thereby wants to restart cooperation compared to infinite punishment (*ex post compliance*), and
- every firm which has not defected improves on its profits by punishment compared to non-cooperation.

The last condition will be discussed at the end of this section, but it should be clear that - due to (15) - profits are higher than in the non-cooperative equilibrium if a smaller number than m oligopolists charges the price p^B . The first condition repeats the condition for the trigger strategy, i.e. cooperation must be profitable compared to defection and infinite non-cooperation, the second and the third condition will be referred to as *ex ante* and *ex post* compliance, respectively.

For general n_k , ex ante and ex post compliance are materialized in (C3) and (C4), respectively:

$$(C3) \quad \frac{1 - \delta^{n_k+1}}{1 - \delta} \Pi_i^* \geq \Pi_i^d(k) + \delta \frac{1 - \delta^{n_k}}{1 - \delta} \Pi_i^p \Rightarrow \frac{1 - \delta^{n_k+1}}{1 - \delta} \Pi_i^* \geq \Pi_i^d(k),$$

$$(C4) \quad \frac{1 - \delta^{n_k}}{1 - \delta} \Pi_i^p + \frac{\delta^{n_k}}{1 - \delta} \Pi_i^* \geq \frac{1}{1 - \delta} \Pi_i^B \Rightarrow \frac{\delta^{n_k}}{1 - \delta} \Pi_i^* \geq \frac{1}{1 - \delta} \Pi_i^B.$$

The superscript p denotes the profits enjoyed by a firm during punishment. As these firms are expected to set prices above those of firms which have not defected, their punishment profits are zero. Note that n_k must belong to the set of natural numbers and is not given ex ante but determined by the punishment strategies. (C3) and (C4) are fulfilled for every $n_k \in \mathbb{N}$ if p^* is set equal to p^B because this trivial non-improving equilibrium equalizes collusive and defection profits. Compared to the trigger strategy I, weak renegotiation-proofness adds another two conditions which dominate (C2).

Proposition 10: The conditions of ex ante and ex post compliance dominate the profitability constraint.

Suppose that an n_k exists which fulfils (C3) and (C4) and which improves on the non-cooperative Bertrand equilibrium. (C2) implies

$$\Pi_i^* \geq (1 - \delta) \Pi_i^d(k) + \delta \Pi_i^B,$$

and (C3) and (C4) imply

$$\exists n_k \in \mathbb{N} : \quad \Pi_i^d \leq \frac{1 - \delta^{n_k+1}}{1 - \delta} \Pi_i^*,$$

$$\Pi_i^B \leq \delta^{n_k} \Pi_i^*,$$

$$\Rightarrow (1 - \delta) \Pi_i^d + \delta \Pi_i^B \leq (1 - \delta^{n_k+1}) \Pi_i^* + \delta^{n_k+1} \Pi_i^* = \Pi_i^*,$$

respectively, which inserted into the reformulation of (C2) demonstrate that (C2) is always fulfilled. Q.e.d.

Comparing (C3) and (C4) demonstrates that n_k has different impacts on ex ante and ex post compliance. If the punishment length is increased (decreased), ex ante compliance is strengthened (weakened) because the periods of zero profits are given more (less) weight. On the contrary, ex post compliance is weakened (strengthened) because the costs of reinvesting into cooperation after defection are increased (decreased). (C3) and (C4) must be met for any relevant $\Pi_i^d(k)$. As Proposition 8 still applies, one may concentrate on the defection profits of a single firm which enter only (C3) and not (C4) because these profits are sunk after defection. (C4) implies a critical profit $\hat{\Pi}_i(n_k)$ from which Π_i^* must not fall short in order to ensure ex post compliance:

$$(35) \quad \hat{\Pi}_i(n_k) := \frac{\Pi_i^B}{\delta^{n_k}}, \quad \hat{\Pi}_i(n_k = 0) = \Pi_i^B$$

$$\frac{d\hat{\Pi}_i}{dn_k} = -\ln \delta \frac{\Pi_i^B}{\delta^{n_k}} > 0, \quad \frac{d^2\hat{\Pi}_i}{dn_k^2} = [\ln \delta]^2 \frac{\Pi_i^B}{\delta^{n_k}} > 0.$$

$\hat{\Pi}_i(n_k)$ is defined as a function of n_k and has an increasing, convex shape. According to (C3), the defection profits must not exceed $\check{\Pi}_i(n_k)$ in order to ensure ex ante compliance. $\check{\Pi}_i(n_k)$ is also defined as a function of n_k and has an increasing, convex shape as well.

$$(36) \quad \Pi_i^d(\hat{\Pi}_i) \leq \frac{1 - \delta^{n_k+1}}{1 - \delta} \hat{\Pi}_i := \check{\Pi}_i(n_k), \quad \check{\Pi}_i(n_k = 0) = \Pi_i^B$$

$$\frac{d\check{\Pi}_i}{dn_k} = -\frac{\ln \delta}{\delta^{n_k}(1 - \delta)} \Pi_i^B > 0, \quad \frac{d^2\check{\Pi}_i}{dn_k^2} = \frac{[\ln \delta]^2}{\delta^{n_k}(1 - \delta)} \Pi_i^B > 0$$

Comparing (35) and (36) reveals that both functions coincide for $n_k = 0$ and that due to $1/(1-\delta) > 1$

$$\frac{d\check{\Pi}_i}{dn_k} > \frac{d\hat{\Pi}_i}{dn_k}$$

holds, i.e. the $\check{\Pi}_i$ -curve is always steeper than the $\hat{\Pi}_i$ -curve.

The defection profits as a function of the critical profit level $\hat{\Pi}_i$ exhibit also an increasing, convex shape because Π_i^d does not depend directly on n_k but only indirectly via $\hat{\Pi}_i$ such that

$$\frac{d\Pi_i^d}{d\hat{\Pi}_i} \frac{d^2\hat{\Pi}_i}{dn_k^2} > 0$$

holds.

Because all functions are increasing and convex and all start at Π_i^B for $n_k = 0$, there is maximally only one intersection of two functions possible. Two intersections implied concavity of at least one function. Furthermore, it is known from (32) that $d\Pi_i^d/d\Pi_i^* > 1$ such that the shape of the Π_i^d -function must lie strictly leftwards from the shape of the $\hat{\Pi}_i$ -function. Intersection of the Π_i^d -function is therefore only possible with the $\check{\Pi}_i$ -function. The attainable punishment specifications of n_k are determined by the subset of natural numbers in the range for which the Π_i^d -function does not lie above the $\check{\Pi}_i$ -function. Three cases can be distinguished which are given in the following figures.

Figure 1: $\Pi_i^* = \Pi_i^B$






Figure 1 depicts the case in which improvement on the non-cooperative equilibrium is not possible. The range for which Π_i^d falls short from $\tilde{\Pi}_i$ is too small such that no $n_k \in \mathbb{N}$ exists which could guarantee both ex ante and ex post compliance. Such an n_k exists for the case depicted in Figure 2.

Figure 2: $\Pi_i^B < \Pi_i^* < \Pi_i^M$



In Figure 2, $n_k \in \{1, 2, 3\}$ is able to sustain a profit level beyond the non-cooperative one. The best available profit can be read from the intersection of $n_k = 3$ with the critical profit level $\hat{\Pi}_i$. Figure 2 depicts the case of a profit-improving equilibrium which falls short from perfect collusion. Perfect collusion is sustained in the case depicted by Figure 3.

Figure 3: $\Pi_i^* = \Pi_i^M$.

In Figure 3, Π_i^d does not intersect $\hat{\Pi}_i$ in the relevant range such that perfect collusion can be sustained by specifying $n_k^* \in \mathbb{N}$.

Collecting the arguments, it is obvious that the best available outcome is reached when n_k is maximized subject to the constraints imposed by (C3) and (C4). Thus, the chosen number of punishment periods which maximizes collusive profits is determined by

$$(37) \quad \exists n_k \in \mathbb{N} : \quad n_k^* = \max \{ n_k \in \mathbb{N} \mid \Pi_i^d(\hat{\Pi}_i) \leq \check{\Pi}_i(n_k) \wedge \hat{\Pi}_i(n_k) \leq \Pi_i^M \}.$$

(37) and the shapes of all curves imply Proposition 11.

Proposition 11: *If a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium exists which improves on the Pareto-dominant one-shot equilibrium, such a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium does also exist for a unity punishment length.*

Proof: Omitted.

The specification of n_k makes a difference for finitely repeated Bertrand games. Punishment strategy II is a stationary strategy which may improve on the non-cooperative equilibrium.

Punishment strategy II: Charge the price p^* in the first period. If no firm has defected (state 1), charge the price p^* also in the next period if the next period is not the last period. If k firms have defected by charging a lower price (state 2), charge the price p'' in the next period. If a firm of those which have defected does not charge a price which exceeds p'' during the punishment period (state 3), restart charging p'' for the next period (state 2). If all firms which have defected have charged a higher price than p'' during the punishment period (state 4), charge price p^* in the following period and return to state one if this period is not the last one, and charge p' if the following period is the last one.

This strategy has specified a of punishment period of one. Without further justification, this specification were an arbitrary assumption which may restrict the scope for collusion more than necessary. However, this specification will be shown to be implied by finitely repeated Bertrand games if strategies are stationary. Stationary means that n_k is not made dependent on the period of defection.

Table 1 demonstrates the impact of different n_k on the profits of a firm after defection.

Table 1: Profits after defection for different punishment periods in finitely repeated Bertrand games

t	0	1	2	3	4 = T
$n_k = 5$	0	0	0	0	0
$n_k = 4$	0	0	0	0	Π'_i
$n_k = 3$	0	0	0	Π'_i	Π'_i

Table 1 shows that a firm which has defected would realize no profits if $n_k = 5$ and if it accepts punishment. Obviously, $n_k = 5$ cannot guarantee ex post compliance whereas $n_k = 4$ and $n_k = 3$ allow to realize profits. But when $t = 1$ or $t = 2$ are reached, respectively, $n_k = 4$ and $n_k = 3$ can also not guarantee ex post compliance. This evaluation is the intuition for Proposition 12.

Proposition 12: *A stationary punishment scheme for finitely repeated Bertrand games implies a punishment period of unity length. If $\Pi'_i < [(1 + \delta)/\delta]\Pi''_i$, no weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium exists which improves on the non-cooperative equilibrium.*

Proof:

The proof will be developed by discussing ex post compliance in finitely repeated Bertrand games. Ex post compliance is guaranteed if (C5) is met:

(C5) $\forall \tau \leq T - 1$:

$$(a) \quad \delta \frac{1 - \delta^{n_k}}{1 - \delta} \Pi'_i + \delta^{[\tau - T]} \Pi'_i \geq \frac{1 - \delta^{[T - \tau + 1]}}{1 - \delta} \Pi''_i \quad \text{if} \quad n_k < T - \tau,$$

$$(b) \quad \delta^{[\tau - T]} \Pi'_i \geq \frac{1 - \delta^{[T - \tau + 1]}}{1 - \delta} \Pi''_i \quad \text{if} \quad n_k = T - \tau,$$

$$(c) \quad 0 \geq \frac{1 - \delta^{[T-\tau+1]}}{1 - \delta} \Pi_i'' \quad \text{if} \quad n_k > T - \tau.$$

If the punishment period falls short from the remaining periods, i.e. $n_k < T - \tau$, the discounted sum of collusive profits plus Π_i' must exceed the discounted sum of realizing Π_i'' . If punishment covers the whole range of collusive profits, i.e. $n_k = T - \tau$, the discounted value of realizing Π_i' in the last period must exceed the discounted sum of realizing Π_i'' in all remaining periods. If $n_k > T - \tau$, punishment gave the defector no profits.

Obviously, (C5c) must be ruled out a priori. This condition must be met for all τ and proves Proposition 12.

$$(C5) \quad \forall \tau \leq T - 1: n_k \leq T - \tau \Rightarrow n_k = 1$$

$$\Rightarrow \Pi_i' \geq \frac{1 + \delta}{\delta} \Pi_i'' > 2\Pi_i''$$

Q.e.d.

(C5)' develops a restriction which must hold as a necessary condition for any weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium which improves on the non-cooperative profits. As (C5a) is dominated by (C5b), the Pareto-dominant profits must not fall short from $(1+\delta)/\delta$ times the profits of marginal cost pricing. Since $(1+\delta)/\delta$ exceeds 2 for $\delta < 1$, any profit-improving weakly renegotiation-proof equilibria in finitely repeated Bertrand games is not possible if Π_i' falls short from double Π_i'' . This result holds for all strategies because it addresses only defection in the next-to-last period. Note that (C5)' depends on neither the collusive nor the defection profit level.

(C6) gives the condition for ex ante compliance for all periods which do not cover the last one.

$$(C6) \quad (1 + \delta)\Pi_i' \geq \Pi_i^d.$$

Compliance in the last two periods is ex ante given if the profits of realizing Π_i^* and Π_i' do not fall short from realizing Π_i^d and Π_i'' . This condition coincides with (C1). Since neither (C1)' nor (C6) dominate the other restriction on purely theoretic grounds, p^* is determined according to (38) for finitely repeated Bertrand games which employ punishment strategy II:

$$(38) \quad p^* = p^B \quad \text{if} \quad \Pi_i' < \frac{1+\delta}{\delta} \Pi_i'',$$

$$p^* = \min\{p^M, p^{**}\} \quad \text{if} \quad \Pi_i' \geq \frac{1+\delta}{\delta} \Pi_i''$$

with
$$p^{**} = \arg \max_p \left\{ \min \left[\frac{\Pi_i^d(p)}{1+\delta}, \Pi_i^d(p) - \delta[\Pi_i' - \Pi_i''] \right] \right\}.$$

(38) determines the collusive price for stationary punishment strategies. However, dynamic schemes may exist which Pareto-dominate stationary schemes.

Proposition 13: A dynamic punishment scheme Pareto-dominates the corresponding stationary punishment scheme if a $\hat{\tau}$, $\hat{\tau} < T-1$, exists for which (C5b) is fulfilled.

Proof: see appendix.

If another τ exists which meets (C5b), a punishment scheme is able to specify longer punishment periods for potential defection. For example, if (C5b) is also fulfilled by $\tau = T-2$, ex post compliance is also guaranteed if defection from the collusive price in T-3 is punished by a two-period punishment. The appendix proves that this two-period punishment pronounces ex ante compliance and allows to realize collusive profits in T-3 which surmount Π_i^* implied by the stationary punishment scheme.

All firms which have not defected from p^* are expected to punish by charging p^B or p'' , respectively. Punishment is credible because the respective profits which punishing firms enjoy during punishment,

$$(39a) \quad \forall k \geq 1: \quad \Pi_i = \frac{p''(m)X[p''(m)]}{m-k} - C \left[\frac{X[p''(m)]}{m-k} \right] > \Pi_i'',$$

$$(39b) \quad \forall k \geq 1: \quad \Pi_i = \frac{p^B(m)X[p^B(m)]}{m-k} - C \left[\frac{X[p^B(m)]}{m-k} \right] > \Pi_i^B,$$

according to the respective punishment strategies surmount the non-cooperative profits since profits increase with a decreasing number of oligopolists for a given price (see (15)). $p^B(m)$ and $p''(m)$ denote the non-cooperative prices for m oligopolists. (39a) and (39b) show that punishment is in that sense credible and will be carried through.

V. Punishment-proof and strongly renegotiation-proof Bertrand equilibria

Weak renegotiation-proofness bases its credibility on two assumptions: first, every firm which has defected is not able to submit a proposal which substitutes for punishment and restarting cooperation. In this sense, firms which punish are assumed to commit itself credibly to punish and to reject any weakly renegotiation-proof alternative even if it Pareto-dominates punishment and restarting cooperation. That equilibria improving on non-cooperative outcomes should be also immune against alternative weakly renegotiation-proof proposals was introduced by the refinement of strong renegotiation-proofness (Farrell, Maskin, 1989). *An equilibrium is called strongly renegotiation-proof if it is weakly renegotiation-proof, and no weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium exists which Pareto-dominates punishment and restarting cooperation according to the strategy specification of the original equilibrium.*

Before turning to strong renegotiation-proofness, another demand will be introduced which is called punishment-proofness. The motivation for punishment-proofness is due to the possibility that a subcoalition of all oligopolists and not only single firms may defect from implicit collusion. Weak renegotiation-proofness assumed that all firms act the same in that they all either accept or reject punishment. A single firm,

however, may have an incentive to defect unilaterally from being punished whereas it hopes that other firms accept punishment. *An equilibrium is called punishment-proof if the condition for ex ante and ex post compliance hold and if no defector is better off by unilaterally deviating from being punished after defection.*

In a duopolistic setting, punishment-proofness raised no problem because all firms act the same since the maximum number of defecting firms is one. If several firms have defected, however, they may enter a prisoners' dilemma situation. According to the punishment strategies, every defection from being punished of a single firm is responded to by a new start of punishment. Thus, only if every firm accepts to be punished, cooperation is restarted. But a single firm may increase its profits by charging the same price which is charged by the punishing firms. If it is the only firm pursuing this strategy, the corresponding costs are the delay of a restart of cooperation. Therefore, every single firm has an incentive to deviate from being punished if a unilateral defection provides him with profits which exceed the costs of a delayed restart of cooperation.

$$(40a) \quad \Pi_i[p^B(m), m - k + 1] > \delta^{nk} \Pi_i^*$$

$$(40b) \quad \Pi_i[p''(m), m - k + 1] > \delta \min\{\Pi_i^*, [\Pi_i' - \Pi_i'']\}$$

(40a) and (40b) give the respective conditions for an incentive of a single firm to defect from being punished in infinitely and finitely repeated Bertrand games, respectively. Note that (40a) and (40b) cannot hold for $k = 1$, because defection from being punished of single firm is ruled out by ex post compliance. If (40a) is valid, a single firm is better off if it charges the price p^B and delays return to cooperation by n_k periods, given that all other firms accept punishment. Due to the prisoners' dilemma among firms to be punished, (40a) does not give the realized profits but the incentive to deviate from punishment if all other firms do not. (40b) gives the incentive for finitely repeated Bertrand games employing a stationary punishment scheme. The incentive to deviate from one-period punishment is given if defection profits surmount

the delay of a restarting cooperation which is determined either by the collusive profits or the difference between realizing Pareto-dominant profits and marginal cost pricing profits. If $\min\{\Pi_i^*, [\Pi_i' - \Pi_i'']\} = \Pi_i^*$, punishment-proofness is at least not given for all periods except the last one, if $\min\{\Pi_i^*, [\Pi_i' - \Pi_i'']\} = \Pi_i' - \Pi_i''$, punishment-proofness is at least not given for the last period T. If $\Pi_i[p''(m), m - k + 1] > \delta \max\{\Pi_i^*, [\Pi_i' - \Pi_i'']\}$ holds, punishment-proofness is given for neither period. Of course, anticipation of defection from punishment destroys ex ante compliance as well.

However, weak renegotiation-proofness and punishment-proofness may be reconciled by alternative pricing rules:

$$(41a) \quad \tilde{p}(k): \quad \Pi_i[\tilde{p}(k), m - k + 1] = \delta^{n_k} \Pi_i^*,$$

$$(41b) \quad \tilde{p}(k): \quad \Pi_i[\tilde{p}(k), m - k + 1] = \delta \max\{\Pi_i^*, [\Pi_i' - \Pi_i'']\}$$

Proposition 14: A weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium exists which is punishment-proof as well if the price determination according to (41a) and (41b), respectively, fulfils $p' \leq \tilde{p}(k) \leq p''$ and $p' \leq \tilde{p}(k) \leq p''$, respectively.

Proof:

If both prices belong to the ranges indicated by Proposition 14, both prices qualify for prices of a non-cooperative equilibrium. Then, defection from being punished can be avoided by this pricing rule which specifies the price charged by the firms which have not defected as a function of the number of firms which have defected. The punishment strategies are modified:

Punishment strategy III: Pursue punishment strategy I except for p^B which is substituted for by $\tilde{p}(k)$ as the price to be charged when k firms have defected.

Punishment strategy IV: Pursue punishment strategy I except for p which is substituted for by $\bar{p}(k)$ as the price to be charged when k firms have defected.

(41a) and (41b) make every single firm indifferent between defecting unilaterally from punishment and accepting punishment. (41a) and (41b) restore weak renegotiation-proofness because both ex ante and ex post compliance are not endangered when there is no incentive to defect unilaterally from being punished, and (41a) and (41b) can be interpreted as generalizing ex ante and post compliance. If $\bar{p}(k)$ and $\tilde{p}(k)$, respectively, belong to the set of non-cooperative equilibrium prices, weak renegotiation-proofness is made immune against unilateral deviations. Q.e.d.

Strong renegotiation-proofness is guaranteed if no alternative can improve on punishment and restarting cooperation. Because the set of Pareto-dominant, weakly renegotiation-proof equilibria is a singleton such that only one best, attainable equilibrium exists, firms which have defected will propose to restart the original agreement at once instead of punishment and restarting cooperation later on. This alternative quits punishment and does not change profits after punishment should have ended because it specifies the same outcome from this point on. Obviously, firms which have defected will always improve on their profits. If the other firms do as well and they cannot credibly commit themselves to reject this proposal, they can be expected to accept this proposal. Accepting the original agreement instead of punishment, however, had the fatal implication that any punishment strategy were incredible because all firms anticipate that they will never be punished, and any collusion could not be sustained unless firms can credibly commit themselves to reject any proposal which substitutes for punishment. If this commitment is ruled out, strong renegotiation-proofness is given if the profits enjoyed by punishing are higher than those of collusion.

Proposition 15: A strongly renegotiation-proof equilibrium exists for a sufficiently high discount factor.

Proof:

Strong renegotiation-proofness is given if

$$(42a) \quad \Pi_i[\tilde{\bar{p}}(k), m - k] \geq \Pi_i^*$$

$$(42b) \quad \Pi_i[\tilde{\underline{p}}(k), m - k] \geq \Pi_i^*$$

hold, respectively. (42a) and (42b) take into account that no firm will defect from being punished if $\bar{p}(k)$ and $\tilde{\bar{p}}(k)$, respectively, are charged by other firms during punishment. Combining (41a) and (42a) produces the critical discount factor

$$(43a) \quad \delta^{nk} \geq \frac{\Pi_i[\tilde{\bar{p}}(k), m - k + 1]}{\Pi_i[\tilde{\bar{p}}(k), m - k]} := \tilde{\delta}^{nk}.$$

Because profits decrease with the number of oligopolists for a given price, the RHS falls short from unity. Hence, a set of discount factors exists all of which surmount the critical discount factor $\tilde{\delta}$ and thereby guarantee strong renegotiation-proofness.

From (41b), it is known that $\Pi_i[\tilde{\bar{p}}(k), m - k + 1] \geq \delta \Pi_i^*$ must hold. In combination with (42b), strong renegotiation-proofness is assured if

$$(43b) \quad \delta \geq \frac{\Pi_i[\tilde{\bar{p}}(k), m - k + 1]}{\Pi_i[\tilde{\bar{p}}(k), m - k]} := \tilde{\delta}$$

holds. In (43b), the numerator falls short from the denominator, too. Thus, a set of discount factors exists all of which surmount the critical discount factor $\tilde{\delta}$ and thereby guarantee strong renegotiation-proofness.

Q.e.d.

VI. Extensions: Stackelberg models and endogenous market structures

The last sections have adopted the standard assumptions of Bertrand competition. This section will discuss two lines of extensions, the impact of Stackelberg leaders and open markets, which both provide new results for Bertrand competition under increasing marginal costs. It will concentrate on non-cooperative equilibria because assuming a certain mover structure as well as endogenous market structures complicate the discussion of implicit collusion such substantially that they deserved an own paper (for a paper on collusion in open markets, see Friedman, Thisse, 1994). Throughout this section, all prices will be dealt with as functions of the number of oligopolists operating in the market. This assignment allows to deal explicitly with the impact of moves either for a given number of firm or for a number of potential rivals.

Obviously, Stackelberg leaders cannot play such a dominant role in Bertrand competition as in Cournot competition because prices they announce may either be adopted or even cut by other competitors. For a given market structure, the first-mover advantage cannot provide a Stackelberg leader with higher profits compared to other firms, but the Stackelberg leader is able to fix the price such that the maximum attainable profits in a non-cooperative setting are guaranteed.

Proposition 16: If a certain firm out of the m firms has a first-mover advantage such that it can credibly commit on announcing a certain price without any option for revision, the equilibrium price is given by $\min\{p^M(m), p'(m)\}$.

Proof:

The proof can be given in the traditional backward induction fashion. Suppose first that all firms have a certain position such that the Stackelberg leader announces his price firstly, a second firm announces its price secondly, etc., until the last firm announces its price. Proposition 16 holds if every firm following the other firm has no incentive to charge a lower price, thereby capturing the whole market demand. The

last firm to announce a price has obviously no incentive to charge a lower price if the price announced by the next-to-last firm lies in the range between $p'(m)$ and $p''(m)$. Thus, the price specified by the Stackelberg leader would not be attacked by the last firm if all other firms have taken this price as well. The next-to-last firm knows that the last firm will not charge a lower price if all $m-1$ firms have charged a price in this range. If all $m-2$ firms have taken this price, the next-to-last firm will also not deviate from this price; due to (17) and (19), both p' and p^M are increased with a decreasing number of oligopolists. As they know that all following firms will either take the same price or cut the price, they know that they will be never alone with this price so that any restriction implied by p'' will be only temporary. Thus, the incentive to take the price announced by preceding firms is strengthened the lower the number of preceding firms is. Therefore, all firms will take the price which all preceding firms have announced if it falls into the range between p' or p^M , respectively, and p'' . This result does also hold if some firms have to move simultaneously because increasing the number of firms to move simultaneously in a stage has the same impact as decreasing m in (17) and (19). As a result, the Stackelberg leader may charge all prices in this range, and will choose the price which maximizes his (and consequently also all other firms') profits. Q.e.d.

The introduction of fixed costs does not change the results for the closed market unless fixed costs are assumed to overcompensate the profits based on marginal cost pricing. If they do, however, fixed costs can be expected to make any firm refrain from charging marginal costs. Fixed costs therefore imply an additional restriction

$$(11)' \quad \forall i: \quad \Pi_i(p^B) \geq 0$$

which should be added to (11). Therefore, the assumption of no fixed costs has biased the investigation of section II in favor of the Bertrand paradox. If fixed costs are zero, (11)' is redundant because marginal costs always exceed average costs in this case. If fixed costs are non-zero and marginal costs are constant, there is no price which gives strictly positive demand and fulfils (11) and (11)' if more than one firm is in the

market. In any case, fixed costs do not change the essentials of section II but strengthen the arguments given there.

Fixed costs are, however, a constructive assumption if market structures are endogenous and determined by the non-profit condition. If

$$(4) \quad \Pi_i = p_i x_i - C(x_i), \quad C_x > 0, \quad C_{xx} > 0,$$

$$C_x(0) < X^{-1}[X=0], \quad C_x[X(0)] < \infty, \quad C(0) = FC > 0,$$

is substituted for (4), one may determine the market structure in an open market. If entry decisions are a game under perfect knowledge, all firms can make their decision dependent on other firms' entries into the market. In this case, constant unit costs and fixed costs implied a monopoly because any industry structure involving more than one firm induced losses for every firm. This conclusion does not hold for strictly convex cost functions.

Proposition 17: If market entry is allowed and all firms observe their rivals' entry decisions, multiple equilibria may exist.

Proof:

(44) uses the non-profit condition to determine the equilibrium number m^* of firms entering the Bertrand market:

$$(44) \quad \Pi_i[p^B(2)] < 0: \quad m^* = 0 \quad \text{if} \quad \Pi_i^M < 0,$$

$$m^* = 1 \quad \text{if} \quad \Pi_i^M \geq 0,$$

$$\Pi_i[p^B(2)] \geq 0: \quad m^*: \quad \Pi_i[p^B(m^*)] \geq 0, \quad \Pi_i[p^B(m^* + 1)] < 0.$$

If fixed costs are very high, the market will either not be served or monopolized. If the market carries more than one firm, the equilibrium number of firms entering the market depends on the price which is charged by all m^* firms. As multiple equilibria exist for a given firm structure, the equilibrium firm structure is not necessarily

unique. Consider the following example which gives the profit structure for monopoly, for marginal cost pricing and for the Pareto-dominant price:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pi_1^M &= 10, & \Pi_1[p'(2)] &= 5, & \Pi_1[p''(2)] &= 1, & \Pi_1[p'(3)] &= 3, \\ \Pi_1[p''(3)] &= -1, & \Pi_1[p'(4)] &= -2, & \Pi_1[p''(4)] &= -5. \end{aligned}$$

Obviously, no firm will either leave or enter the market in at least two cases: first, if two firms are in the market which charge the respective marginal cost price, second, if three firms are in the market which charge the respective Pareto-dominant price. Q.e.d.

If a certain mover structure is given only for market entry, the results are not changed. However, the firms arrive at a different result if a Stackelberg leader exists which does not only move first with respect to entry, but with respect to price announcement as well. (45) gives the unique equilibrium price.

$$(45) \quad p^{B^*} :=$$

$$\arg \max_p \left\{ \Pi_1[p^B(m^*)] \Pi_1[p^B(m^* + 1)] < 0, p''(m^*) \leq p^B(m^*) \leq \min\{p'(m^*), p^M\} \right\}$$

Proposition 18: If market entry is allowed, if all firms observe their rivals' entry decisions, and if a certain firm out of the m firms has a first-mover advantage such that it can credibly commit on entry or non-entry and on announcing a certain price without any option for revision, the equilibrium price is given by p^{B^} .*

Proof: Omitted.

The arguments are quite similar to the case of a fixed market structure. The only difference is the fact that no natural last mover exists. However, the Stackelberg leader can specify a price such that the profits of all firms in the market are maximized but no further firm wants to enter because further entry incurred losses for all firms. Therefore, the Stackelberg leader specifies a price which lies at the margin between entry and non-entry of a further firm, such that a small price increase implied entry of

a further firm. This strategy gives all firms which enter maximum profits which are basically due to the integer constraint on the industry structure.

If market entry is a game under almost perfect knowledge (as the price game), all firms have to decide simultaneously whether to entry or not to entry without being able to observe the decisions of their potential rivals. Proposition 19 extends the well-known result for asymmetric equilibria.

Proposition 19: If market entry is allowed and all potential firms have to enter simultaneously without being able to observe their rivals' entry decisions, multiple equilibria for asymmetric pure strategies in a one-shot Bertrand game may exist such that the number of firms entering the market is undetermined.

Proof: See Proof of Proposition 17.

Proposition 17 has demonstrated that the number of firms which are carried by the market varies with the price charged by firms. Therefore, Proposition 19 is straightforward.

It is also well-known that in addition to the asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium exists. The idea is that firms do not decide on entry or non-entry by certainty but enter the market by probability q . For evaluating the equilibrium q , they have to assess the price which they expect if a certain number of firms have entered. For every potential industry structure, the expected price is assumed to be evaluated by means of a probability function with density function f_m :

$$(46) \quad \forall m, 1 < m \leq \bar{m}: \quad \hat{p}(m) := \int_{p'(m)}^{p^S(m)} f_m(p) dp$$

$$\text{with} \quad \int_{p'(m)}^{p^S(m)} f_m(p) dp = 1, \quad p^S(m) := \min\{p'(m), p^M(m)\},$$

$$\hat{p}(1) = p^M.$$

\bar{m} denotes the number of potential rivals which are able to enter the market. Firms are assumed to be risk-neutral such that they evaluate their entry decisions on the basis of the expected prices $\hat{p}(m)$ according to (46). (47) ensures that the market does not carry all potential rivals so that a certain entry, i.e. $q = 1$, is no equilibrium strategy:

$$(47) \quad \exists m^{**} < \bar{m}: \quad \Pi_i[\hat{p}(m^{**}), SC] \geq 0, \quad \Pi_i[\hat{p}(m^{**} + 1), SC] \leq 0$$

(47) assumes some strictly positive sunk costs SC which are implied by market entry and which pronounce the problem associated with the simultaneous move structure of the entry game. m^{**} is the critical number of firms for which profits become negative by market entry of an additional firm. In standard industrial organization models, the determination of the equilibrium q is unique because the outcome for a every possible industry structure is assumed to be unique. Due to the evaluation along (46), this uniqueness is not guaranteed.

Proposition 20: If market entry is allowed and all potential firms have to enter simultaneously without being able to observe their rivals' entry decisions, multiple equilibria for symmetric mixed strategies in a one-shot Bertrand game may exist.

Proof:

All firms maximize their expected profits by choosing the corresponding entry probability q . In a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, no firm is able to improve on its expected profits by specifying a different probability, given the (identical) probabilities of all other firms. This condition is met if the expected profits are zero, because positive (negative) profits implied improvement for a firm by increasing (decreasing) its entry probability. The equilibrium probability q^* is determined in (48).

$$(48) \quad q^*: \quad q^* \sum_{j=0}^{\bar{m}-1} \binom{\bar{m}-1}{j} [1-q^*]^{\bar{m}-j-1} q^{*j} \Pi_i[\hat{p}(\bar{m}-j-1)] = 0.$$

(48) mirrors the expected profits: the probability of one firm's own entry must be multiplied with the expected profits of the industry structures which are made possible by different behavior of all other firms. The probability of non-entry can be neglected because non-entry implies zero profits. As an example, suppose that three potential rivals may enter the market, and the profit structure is

$$\begin{aligned} \Pi_i[p^M] - SC &= 2.25, & \Pi_i[p'(2)] - SC &= 2, & \Pi_i[p''(2)] - SC &= -3, \\ \Pi_i[p'(3)] - SC &= 1.75, & \Pi_i[p''(3)] - SC &= -4. \end{aligned}$$

Assume further that every firm expects marginal cost pricing if two firms enter and Pareto-dominant pricing if three firms enter. This probability specification gives the quadratic equation

$$q^2 - q + 2.25 = 0$$

which has two relevant solutions:

$$q_1^* = 0.3419, \quad q_2^* = 0.6581.$$

Q.e.d.

Thus, unless the probability functions are further specified, a unique equilibrium is not guaranteed. Such a specification must go beyond assuming a specific functional form, because the change of the spread between p'' and p' or p^B , respectively, is unknown on purely theoretical grounds. Such a specification could adopt some focal point assumptions such that firms will always charge the Pareto-dominant price.

If the game is repeated, all firms will reconsider to enter the market after every stage if they have not entered in the past. A firm which has entered will not exit because entry costs were sunk. The probability $q(t)$ to enter in period t in a multi-stage game is influenced by the expected number of firms in future stages which have not yet been realized:

$$(49) \quad \forall t - 1 \geq \tau:$$

$$\sum_{j=0}^{\bar{m}-\hat{m}(t-1)} \binom{\bar{m}-\hat{m}(t-1)}{j} [1-q(t-1)]^{\bar{m}-\hat{m}(t-1)-j} q^j j + \hat{m}(t-1) = \hat{m}(t),$$

$$\hat{m}(\tau) = m(\tau).$$

(49) specifies the expected number of firms, $\hat{m}(t)$, which depends on the equilibrium strategy. For past and experienced periods, the realized number of firms is taken, of course. Every firm solves an intertemporal maximization problem the dynamic equilibrium of which is defined by (50):

$$(50) \quad \forall \tau \geq 0, \quad \forall t \geq \tau:$$

$$q^*(t) = 0 \quad \text{if} \quad m(\tau-1) \geq m^{**},$$

$$q^*(t):$$

$$\sum_{t=\tau}^T \delta^t q^*(t) \sum_{j=0}^{\bar{m}-\hat{m}(t)-1} \binom{\bar{m}-\hat{m}(t)-1}{j} [1-q^*(t)]^{\bar{m}-\hat{m}(t)-j-1} q^{*j} \Pi_i [\hat{p}(\bar{m}) - \hat{m}(t) - j - 1] = 0$$

$$\text{s.t. (49)} \quad \forall T: \quad \tau < T \leq \infty.$$

The probability of entry is set zero for all remaining periods if the critical number of firms is at least reached. If this number is not reached, the equilibrium path of entry probabilities equalizes the discounted profits with zero, taking into account the impact on expected future industry structure. As this path is evaluated on stochastic grounds, a revaluation is undertaken in every period on the basis of the realized market structure. Because this dynamic version is obviously not able to remove the feature of multiple equilibria, different paths may exist which constitute a dynamic equilibrium.

VII. Concluding remarks

This paper has demonstrated that the Bertrand paradox does not hold if cost functions are strictly convex. Instead, multiple equilibria were shown to exist which can be Pareto-ranked. The paper has also shown that the Pareto-dominant equilibrium may

imply profits higher than in Cournot competition or may even sustain perfect cartelization. Turning to repetition of the Bertrand game, the paper has demonstrated that other than non-cooperative equilibria may be sustained by finite and by infinite repetition.

The novelty of this paper's results concerns two main conclusions: first, other than marginal cost pricing equilibria are possible in pure Bertrand oligopolies without taking recourse to rationing, second, multiple equilibria exist in the one-shot game and in several entry games except when a Stackelberg leader is assumed. The first conclusion narrows the gap between Cournot- and Bertrand-based oligopoly models without additional assumptions. It is the impression of the author that Bertrand-based oligopoly models have either too often relied on the assumption of constant unit costs or have employed other mechanisms like capacity constraints and rationing without assuming corresponding mechanisms in the respective Cournot game. The assumption of constant unit costs has been shown not to be an innocent one but the one which drives prices down on marginal costs.

The second conclusion strengthens the difference between Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly models for which the existence and uniqueness of a non-cooperative equilibrium is guaranteed by the assumptions of this paper. Unless constant unit costs are assumed, the crucial difference between both models turns out as the equilibrium selection problem encountered by Bertrand competition. The multiplicity of equilibria in the one-shot game, however, does also allow to sustain collusion in a finitely repeated Bertrand game.

This paper has not explored the impacts of relaxing the homogeneity assumption. However, it should be obvious that the results for perfect substitutability are likely to hold for nearly perfect substitutability as well. It is hence also not clear whether firms are always better off when pronouncing the heterogeneity of their goods compared to their competitors. Instead, it may be found attractive for firms not to stress heterogeneity because a high degree of homogeneity gives shelter against price

reductions of other firms as it caused significant demand increases and consequently overproportional cost increases for price-reducing firms if marginal costs increase.

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Appendix

From Proposition 13, one can conclude that (C5b) is fulfilled for $\tau = T-2$ if it is fulfilled in general for a $\hat{\tau} < T-1$. Consider the following amendment to punishment strategy II:

Amendment to punishment strategy II: Punishment strategy II holds for all periods except defection in period T-3. If a firm deviates in period T-3, it will be punished for two periods. Firms which have not defected charge price p'' . If all firms which have defected charge a higher price, all firms charge p' in the last period, if a firm which has defected does not charge a higher price during punishment, punishment is restarted such that p'' is charged in all remaining periods.

This amendment does not claim to guarantee the best available outcome but will be shown to be able to improve on the stationary punishment scheme. It implies the dynamic scheme $[n_k(t), \Pi_i^{**}(t)]_0^T$ such that

$$(A1) \quad \forall t \neq T-2: n_k(t) = 1, \quad n_k(T-2) = 2$$

holds. $n_k(t)$ denotes the number of punishment periods starting in period t after defection in $t-1$ has occurred, and $\Pi_i^{**}(t)$ denotes the collusive profits of the dynamic plan. The proof is given if $\Pi_i^{**}(t) \geq \Pi_i^*$ holds for all t . Additionally, assuming $\Pi_i^* < \Pi_i^M$ ensures a potential for improvement. If (C5b) is fulfilled, i.e.

$$(A2) \quad \delta^2 \Pi_i' \geq (1 + \delta) \Pi_i''$$

holds, ex ante compliance determines the critical profit reachable by two-period punishment:

$$(A3) \quad \Pi_i^{**}(T-3) + [\delta + \delta^2] \Pi_i^* + \delta^3 \Pi_i' \geq \Pi_i^{dd}(T-3) + \delta^3 \Pi_i''.$$

(A3) gives the possible profits for period $T-3$ which should not fall short from the one of the purely stationary punishment strategy to prove Pareto-dominance. Π_i^{dd} denotes defection from the collusive profit level of period $T-3$. Note that (C1)' plays no role for (A3) as it concerns the last two periods. Define

$$(A4) \quad \Pi_i(p^* + \lambda) := \Pi_i^{**}(T-3), \quad \Pi_i^d(p^* + \lambda) := \Pi_i^{dd}(T-3),$$

which indicate the change of profits and prices in period $T-3$ compared to all other periods which apply the stationary punishment scheme. $\lambda = 0$ indicates the stationary price and the stationary profit sustained by finite repetition. (C6) gives for the LHS of (A3)

$$(A5) \quad \Pi_i^{**}(T-3) + [\delta + \delta^2] \Pi_i^* + \delta^3 \Pi_i' \geq \Pi_i^{**}(T-3) + \delta \Pi_i^* + \delta^2 [\Pi_i^d + \delta \Pi_i''].$$

A fortiori, (A3) is met if the RHS of (A5) surmounts the RHS of (A3):

$$(A6) \quad \begin{aligned} \Pi_i^{**}(T-3) + \delta \Pi_i^* + \delta^2 \Pi_i^d &\geq \Pi_i^{dd}(T-3) \Leftrightarrow \\ \Pi_i^{**}(T-3) &\geq \Pi_i^{dd}(T-3) - \delta \Pi_i^* - \delta^2 \Pi_i^d \end{aligned}$$

There is scope for Pareto improvement if (A6) is fulfilled for a strictly positive λ . Comparing (A6) and (C6) for $\lambda = 0$, (A7) shows that there is indeed scope for a strictly positive λ because (A6) is overfulfilled for a zero λ :

$$(A7) \quad \forall \delta > 0: \quad \Pi_i^* \geq \frac{\Pi_i^d}{1+\delta} > (1-\delta)\Pi_i^d = \Pi_i^{dd}(p^*+0) - \delta\Pi_i^d \leq \Pi_i^{**}(p^*+0).$$

Q.e.d.