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A trade-off between enlargement and integration? An analysis of trust between EU nationalities

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**A trade-off between enlargement and
integration? An analysis of trust
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Abstract

This paper analyses the impact enlargements have had on the integration of the European Union (EU). For this purpose, integration was conceptualised as the sense of community across national boundaries and measured as interpersonal trust between EU nationalities. Eurobarometer surveys form the database used, with country dyads serving as units of analysis. The key result is that enlargements do not necessarily weaken trust. Enlargement to the North has actually strengthened trust levels within the EU, despite extending the Community from the central city belt to the Nordic periphery. Enlargements to the South and East, however, have weakened trust levels. The integrative effect of enlargement depends on the extent to which acceding nations differ from existing club members in three main dimensions: the level of modernisation (mechanisms: prestige), cultural characteristics (mechanisms: similarity) and their power in the international system (mechanisms: perceived threat). A cautiously optimistic conclusion can be drawn from the observation that in the past, after each wave of territorial extension, trust has subsequently increased.

Zusammenfassung

In diesem Beitrag werden die Auswirkungen der Erweiterungen auf die Integration der EU untersucht. „Integration“ wird dabei gemessen über *transnationales Vertrauen*: das Ausmaß des generalisierten zwischenmenschlichen Vertrauens, das die EU-Völker ineinander setzen. Eurobarometer-Umfragen der Jahre 1976-1997 dienen als Datenbasis, dyadische Länderpaare als Untersuchungsfälle. Erweiterungen schwächen *nicht automatisch* den Zusammenhalt. So wirkte die Norderweiterung Vertrauen stärkend, obwohl sie vom Städtegürtelzentrum zur nordischen Peripherie ging. Jedoch haben die Süd- und Osterweiterung das Vertrauen geschwächt. Der integrative Effekt von Erweiterungen hängt davon ab, in welchem Maße sich die beitretenden Nationen in drei Schlüsseldimensionen von den Mitgliedern unterscheiden: der am Modernitätsgrad hängenden Reputation, der kulturellen Ähnlichkeit und der an Bevölkerungsgröße und Militärpotential hängenden Bedrohlichkeit. Die Osterweiterung hat die Gemeinschaft in den zwei erstgenannten Dimensionen (weiter) heterogenisiert, und die derzeit geplanten Erweiterungen werden dies auch tun. Vorsichtigen Optimismus kann man aus der Tatsache ableiten, dass bislang auf *jeder* Erweiterungsstufe das gegenseitige Vertrauen nach den Erweiterungen angewachsen ist. Es ist durchaus denkbar, dass wir eine ähnliche atmosphärische Verbesserung in der osterweiterten EU erleben.

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1 Introduction

The recent enlargement of May 2004 has turned the European Union from a Western into a pan-European integration project that now encompasses the majority of European nations. The geographical extensions have made the Community more diverse in many respects: socio-economically, politically and culturally. Although a certain degree of diversity is unavoidable in supra-national community building (Zielonka and Mair 2002), eastward enlargement in particular has been accompanied by fears that a Community of 25 will be too heterogeneous to continue along the road to political integration. Scholars have mainly dealt with the problem of diversity at the institutional level of the EU system, focusing in particular on conflicting interests and decision-making processes (De Witte 2002, König and Bräuninger 2000). The present article, in contrast, analyses the impact of enlargements on the *level of social trust* people have vis-à-vis other EU nationalities, thereby linking the issue to the broader problem of *social integration* within the Community. Since social trust is conducive to cooperation, the production of collective goods, and solidarity (Uslaner 2002), decreasing levels of trust would be an alarm signal for the Community.

Despite its potential importance, there is little information available on the effects the several waves of enlargement have had on processes of community building within the EU. Are the stretching of borders and the increasing diversity within the EU obstacles to social integration between the EU nationalities? This paper analyses the impact enlargements have had on the integration of the EU and ventures to assess the probable impacts of future accessions. For this purpose, I measure “integration” in terms of the level of generalised interpersonal trust flowing between the different EU nationalities, which I refer to as *transnational trust*. The key result is that enlargements do not necessarily weaken trust. Enlargement to the North has actually strengthened trust levels, despite extending the Community from the central city belt to the Nordic periphery. Enlargement to the South and East, however, have weakened integration. The integrative effect of enlargement depends to what extent acceding nations differ from existing club members in three main dimensions: the level of modernisation (mechanisms: prestige), cultural characteristics (mechanisms: similarity) and their power in the international system (mechanisms: perceived threat).

The article is organised as follows: First, I briefly introduce a sociological understanding of “integration” (section 2). The conditions under which enlargements are likely to lead to a deterioration in integration are then outlined; the “incorporation of heterogeneity” is identified as a key factor (section 3). The data base – selected Eurobarometer surveys from 1976-1997 – is described in section 4. In the empirical part of the paper, I trace the development of transnational trust both over time and enlargements (section 5) and analyse why nations trust each other (section 6). The final section 7 draws some conclusions from the main findings.

2 Transnational trust and the integration of the EU – conceptual considerations

Do EU citizens form an integrated societal community with high levels of mutual trust? This very question shows that my definition of integration draws heavily on the ideas of Karl Deutsch, who referred to integration as the sense of community between peoples (Deutsch, et al. 1966). In Deutsch's view, integration as a learning process among the mass of people has to precede political amalgamation, which is then carried out by the elites. A sense of community has many facets. In this paper, I am concentrating on one crucial aspect, which figures quite prominently in the social capital literature as a means of forging links between people, namely generalised trust. More precisely, the paper focuses on generalised trust in people from other member states – what we might call transnational trust. Trust is the expectation that others will behave in a predictable and friendly manner (Inglehart 1991). This includes the expectation that they will not knowingly do one harm and look after one's interests, if possible. Trusting people are more willing than non-trusting to cooperate and to produce collective goods. Trust is also seen as a precondition for solidary behaviour (Uslaner 2002). In contrast, distrust implies an unbridgeable social distance from others, which may find expression in either indifference or ill-will. The level of generalised social trust flowing within the European Community (its social capital, to use a fancy term) is a good indicator of how integrated this community as an assembly of 25 national citizenries potentially is. The barometer of transnational social trust, which measures how much trust each member state's population has in another, indicates how easy or difficult it is to mobilise solidarity within the European Union. For supranational communities, trust as a modern form of social relation (Seligman 1997) is even more valuable, since they, unlike nation states, cannot rely on an assumed sense of mechanic solidarity and strong feelings of identity among its citizens (Münc 1993, Münc 2001).

Admittedly, trust is only one of several forces that contribute to the development of integration. Common values also play their role (Gerhards and Hölscher 2005), as do civil rights. Citizenship of the Union constitutes a distinct membership space, which distinguishes EU citizens from non-EU citizens (Bach 2000, Bach 2003, Ferrera 2005). Furthermore, trust guarantees neither solidarity nor any desire for political unification. It is perfectly possible to trust other nationalities without pursuing unification. Without trust, however, it would scarcely be possible to implement solidary policies among the member states or to deepen political cooperation. Research shows that citizens' support for European integration is, among other things, also driven by the level of trust in the other member states (Genna 2003).

3 EU enlargements, geographic extension and the import of heterogeneity

Stepwise enlargements have extended the EU's territory in a distinctive pattern, from the core of the European city belt to the periphery (Vobruba 2003). On the one hand, Community membership has exerted a magnetic pull, especially for less wealthy countries. On the other hand, member states have a vital self-interest in not being an outpost of the EU, which makes them eager to back their neighbours' attempts to join. As a consequence, a sense of community has to be established between ever more distant units. Presumably, this *territorial expansion* is a first barrier to the development of trust, especially if one accepts the argument that familiarity breeds trust.

What might be even more momentous than the mere geographic dilution of trust is the *incorporation of heterogeneity*, which might constitute a second barrier. Historically, Europe has always had a polymorphic structure characterised by divisions and diversity. The main cultural division has been between northern Protestantism and southern Catholicism, whereas the main political-economic division has been between the well developed West and the less developed East (Rokkan 1999, Therborn 1995). Even today, these differences have not been levelled out. Through enlargements, the Community has gradually incorporated this polymorphic diversity, converting previously external differences into internal ones.

The original EC was made up of Catholic or mixed Protestant-Catholic Western European neighbours, parts of whose territories at least belonged historically to the medieval city belt (Rokkan 1999). By definition, all successive enlargements have increased geographic distances. However, they have also, to differing extents, increased diversity (Lewis 2001). The first enlargement incorporated, for the first time, two predominantly Protestant countries, Denmark and the UK, as well as Catholic Ireland, then a relatively poor and backward country. With southern enlargement, three less wealthy and agrarian countries, with recent experience of political authoritarianism, became members. With its Greek Orthodox religion and own script, Greece was the odd one out in cultural terms. Northern enlargement was less problematic, since the three acceding countries were highly developed in economic terms, had a lengthy record of well-established social democracy and were well known – and sometimes even admired – for their neutrality and stability. The recent enlargement towards the East was of a different kind from previous enlargements, and not only because ten countries entered at the same time (Schmitter and Torreblanca 2001). For the first time, former Communist countries joined the EU. In the past, the Communist threat had been a major driving force in the political amalgamation of Western Europe (Cerruti 2001, Wallace 1999). In the accession region, anomic tendencies (e.g. corruption) are more widespread and the economic contrast with Western Europe is striking. With Slavic and Baltic languages, two additional language families were added to

the existing linguistic diversity. To sum up, the 25 national collectivities assembled together today are more heterogeneous in terms of living standards, political values, social practices and culture than ever before (Alber and Fahey 2004, Fuchs and Klingemann 2002, Gerhards and Hölscher 2005, Heidenreich 2003). To the extent that integration is dependent on similarity, a detrimental impact on the EU's level of integration can be expected.

Several research studies have found evidence of a trade-off between heterogeneity and integration. Comparative historical sociology teaches us that nation state building and the linguistic, religious, economic and administrative homogenisation of territories have been mutually reinforcing processes (Flora 2000, Rokkan 1999). Similarly, the founding fathers of *integration studies* assumed that establishing international political communities would be much easier if the countries involved had a great deal in common (Nye 1971). The experience of almost every single society show that "others", whether minorities, immigrants, foreign workers, resettlers or asylum seekers, are sometimes difficult to integrate. I restrict myself here to research on trust. Ethnic or linguistic fragmentation of a given society tends to result in low rates of interpersonal trust (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002, Delhey and Newton 2004). Similarly, marked social inequalities complicate the emergence of a trust culture (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002, Bornschier 2001, Delhey and Newton 2004, Uslaner 2002). Belief-congruence theory, developed by social psychologists (Rokeach, et al. 1960), might provide a general explanation, since it suggests that the more others are perceived as deviating from the norms and values of our own group, the more we view them with prejudice – and the less trustful we are. Research has shown the social distance people feel vis-à-vis other nationalities is smaller in some places and greater in others (Delhey 2004a, Fuchs, et al. 1993). Whom EU citizens include in their feelings of trust and whom they exclude is the subject of the following analysis.

4 Database and the measurement of trust

We rely for our analysis on data from the European Commission's Eurobarometer survey programme. The Eurobarometer (EB) is a biannual set of public opinion polls conducted in the member states since the early 1970s. The surveys are representative of the population aged 15 and over in each country. Sample sizes are usually around 1,000 respondents, except for Luxembourg which has a sample size of 600, Germany, which has 2,000 (since unification), and the UK, which has 1,300.¹ Questions on social trust in nationalities are not a core part of the EB, but were included nine times between 1976 and 1997, allowing changes over a twenty-year period to be tracked. The following analysis is based mainly on EB 47.0 from 1997, the most recent survey available. Unfortunately, more recent data are not available, but national images (of which images of trustworthiness are part) can be seen as rather stable constructs (Deutsch and Merritt 1965). Additional analysis has been carried out using EB 6 from 1976, EB 14 (1980), EB 25 (1986), EB 33 (1990), EB 39.0 (1993), EB 41.1 (1994), EB 44.0 (1995) and EB 46.0 (1996).

The central indicator is a question which directly asks about trust in people from various countries. The question from the 1997 survey reads as follows:²

“Now, I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from various countries. For each, please tell me whether you (1) tend to trust them or (2) tend not to trust them?”

A list of all the EU nationalities (Belgians, Danes, Germans etc.), plus some non-EU nationalities, was attached. Thus each respondent was delivering a judgement about the trustworthiness of people from the EU countries, including their own co-nationals. From this information a second-order data set was constructed in which the unit is each nationality's rating of the trustworthiness of each of the other nationalities (one-directional dyadic trust). For each pair of countries, an index of *trust* ranging from +100 to -100 was computed, using the procedure developed by Merritt (Merritt 1968). A value of +100 indicates that all members of a national collectivity tend to trust people from a certain country, whereas the score -100 indicates complete lack of trust. A score of zero indicates a balance between equally strong shares of trusters and non-trusters. A second index, *familiarity*, reveals how many respondents are actually able to rate another nationality's trustworthiness, whether positively or negatively. Values range from 0 (completely unfamiliar, low salience) to 100 (completely familiar, high salience).

In order to analyse the network of trust relations within the Community, a saturated network would provide ideal conditions, so that each nation can be analysed in two ways, as truster (the nation doing the rating) and trusted (the nation being rated)³. Such a network is available for the EC/EU with 6, 9, 12 and 15 members, but not with the current 25

Table 1: Available trust ratings from EB 47.0

	Rating nation (truster)	Rated nation (trusted)	Available trust ratings (cases = country dyads)	Cases needed for saturated network	Coverage (in %)
<i>Saturated network</i>					
EC/EU-6	6 BE, DE, FR, IT, LU, NL	6 BE, DE, FR, IT, LU, NL	30	30	100 %
EC/EU-9	9 BE, DE, FR, IT, LU, NL, DK, IE, UK	9 BE, DE, FR, IT, LU, NL, DK, IE, UK	72	72	100 %
EC/EU-12	12 BE, DE, FR, IT, LU, NL, DK, IE, UK, GR, ES, PT	12 BE, DE, FR, IT, LU, NL, DK, IE, UK, GR, ES, PT	132	132	100 %
EU-15	15 BE, DE, FR, IT, LU, NL, DK, IE, UK, GR, ES, PT AT, FI, SE	15 BE, DE, FR, IT, LU, NL, DK, IE, UK, GR, ES, PT, AT, FI, SE	210	210	100 %
<i>Incomplete network</i>					
EU-19 Best approximation to EU-25	15 (as EU-15) BE, DE, FR, IT, LU, NL, DK, IE, UK, GR, ES, PT, AT, FI, SE	19 BE, DE, FR, IT, LU, NL, DK, IE, UK, GR, ES, PT, AT, FI, SE, CZ, HU, PL, SK*	270	600	45 %
Europe	15 (as EU-15***) BE, DE, FR, IT, LU, NL, DK, IE, UK, GR, ES, PT, AT, FI, SE	25 BE, DE, FR, IT, LU, NL, DK, IE, UK, GR, ES, PT, AT, FI, SE, CZ, HU, PL, SK*, TK*, BG**, RO**	309	756	41 %

* Imputed from EB 46.0 (1996).

** Imputed from EB 33 (1990).

*** BG and RO only rated by the EC-12 nations.

Bold figures denote nations added (as trusters or trusted).

Country codes (order as appearing in the table):

BE Belgium, DE Germany, FR France, IT Italy, LU Luxembourg, NL Netherlands, DK Denmark, IE Ireland, UK United Kingdom, GR Greece, ES Spain, PT Portugal, AT Austria, FI Finland, SE Sweden, CZ Czech Republic, HU Hungary, PL Poland, SK Slovakia, TK Turkey, BG Bulgaria, RO Romania.

members (Table 1). With the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, only four of the recent accession countries are listed in the surveys as recipients of trust, and the surveys were conducted only in the old member states. Consequently, we do not know how much the new EU citizens from the East trust people from the old member states and how much they trust each other. Currently, we have less than half of the picture for the EU-25.⁴ Beyond current member states, the EB data also include ratings of the trustworthiness of people from the candidate countries Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey.

5 Trust among Europeans: descriptive analysis

Centrifugal and centripetal enlargements

Below, a Union of 6, 9, 12, 15, and – as far as possible – 25 member states is simulated, following the historical expansions and using *current* (1997) trust relations.⁵ The objective is to classify enlargements with respect to their impact on integration: some might have strengthened the overall level of trust, others might have weakened it. For each stage of extension, the scattergrams simultaneously display the levels of trust and familiarity between nationalities; each dot represents a country dyad (Figure 1).

To a large extent, the publics of the *six founding member states* trust each other and are familiar with each other (top left scattergram). For example, people from Luxembourg are strongly trusted by the Belgians, French and Dutch and people from Belgium are strongly trusted by the French. Only the Italians are rated by the Dutch as rather untrustworthy.

Now we add the country dyads resulting from *north-western enlargement* (top right scattergram). On the trust dimension, the new dyads (black dots) are spread in much the same way as the EU-6 dyads (grey dots). On the familiarity dimension, however, there is a difference: the EU-9 contains more dyads of low familiarity, compared to the EU-6. For example, the Irish are rather unfamiliar with people from Belgium, Denmark and Luxembourg; likewise, the British are unfamiliar with Luxembourgers. In each case, less than 40% of the population have a firm opinion as to whether people from the rated nation can generally be trusted or not.

The simulation of the *southern enlargement* reveals a double centrifugal impact (centre left scattergram). None of the new dyads qualifies as a high-trust relation. Ten of the 60 new dyads are characterised by non-trust rather than trust and for a further four dyads trust and non-trust are precisely in balance. The Greeks in particular show low levels of transnational trust, particularly towards the Germans and the British. With regard to familiarity, the Spanish have more difficulties than any other national group in rating the trustworthiness of people from other member states.

The *northern enlargement*, which brought Austria, Finland and Sweden into the EU, strengthened overall trust (centre right scattergram). The majority of the country dyads added are characterised by high levels of trust. Highly consensually, people from these countries are seen as trustworthy by their EU partners, and in turn they themselves exhibit high levels of transnational trust (the Swedes and Finns more so than the Austrians).


Finally, the impact of the recent *eastward enlargement* is comparable to southern enlargement (bottom left scattergram). None of the new country dyads is a high-trust relation and half of them are characterised by prevailing non-trust. The surveys show a rather low level of trust on the part of old EU members (particularly Germany and Austria) in citizens from the post-socialist new member states. Germans and Austrians seem to be especially worried about eastward enlargement for specific reasons – mass immigration from the east and the assumed negative effects of job competition, reduction in wage levels and crime (Weiss and Strodl 2003). Indeed, two thirds of potential migrants from the accession countries name Germany as their favourite destination and a further ten percent name Austria (Commission 2001).

To sum up, the EU would today enjoy a higher level of social integration if it were still composed of the six founding members. Along both dimensions, the EU-25 is least cohesive. A key message from this descriptive account is that enlargements might give rise to integration costs (as was the case with the southern and eastern enlargements) but do not necessarily do so (e.g. northern enlargement). It depends on which countries are brought together.

Some caution is warranted in evaluating the eastward enlargement because we do not have the information to fully assess the impact of this last wave of accessions. The *actual* situation of the EU-25 might look more pleasant – or unpleasant. Meanwhile, membership status might have helped to improve the perceived trustworthiness of the accession countries. Similarly, the massive and by and large friendly media coverage in the run-up to May 2004 might have rubbed off on public attitudes in Western Europe. However, the actual situation might also look more unpleasant. Here we can rely on information on general interpersonal trust (the tried and tested question “can most people be trusted”?) stemming from other, more recent surveys like the European Value Survey (EVS) or the European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS).⁶

In the EU-15, 38% say that most people can be trusted (EVS data, simple country average). In the accession countries, only 21% are of this opinion.⁷ The bulk of accession countries rank among the “low-trust societies” and none of them among the “high-trust societies” (Delhey and Newton 2004). In this context, it is instructive to know that in 1998

Figure 1: Current levels of trust between EU nationalities, by enlargement step




a quarter of the population in post-Communist countries felt threatened by their neighbouring countries, although this feeling was declining during the 1990s (Haerpfer 2002). Overall, there is evidence to suggest that the incomplete Eurobarometer data tend to lead us to *overestimate* rather than underestimate the level of transnational trust within the EU-25.

The last diagram (bottom right scattergram) additionally takes into account the trust relations with the candidate countries Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, which are universally seen as rather unreliable by EU 15 citizens. In particular, trust in Turks is in short supply (Delhey 2004a). Thus it is foreseeable that the coming *south-eastern enlargement*, which is projected for 2007 with Bulgaria and Romania making the opening, will bring increasing difficulties for the EU's social integration – not only because Western Europeans have such negative, stereotyped opinions about them (which Beck and Grande have condemned as “Western European racism” (Beck and Grande 2004)), but also because Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania on their part are “low-trust societies” and Turkey virtually a “no-trust society”, with only 7% having confidence in “most people” (EVS data).

A diachronic comparison: how different is the EU-25 from previous Communities?

It may be, however, that we have to apply another standard: perhaps the eastward (and southward) enlargement should be compared with the EC-6 *immediately after its formation*, or with the EC-9 *immediately after* the accession of Great Britain, Denmark and Ireland. The data allow for such diachronic comparisons, albeit at a rudimentary level.⁸ A comparison of this kind does indeed put the impression that eastward enlargement had a strongly centrifugal impact into perspective (Figure 2). For the EC-6 of the 1970s, the country dyads are scattered across our two-dimensional field in much the same way as for the EU-25 of today. By and large, at that time the nationalities of the EC-6 did not trust each other any more than the nationalities of the enlarged Union do today. Germany serves as a good example. True, the Germans trust the Poles today less than they trusted the Italians in 1976; however, they trust the Czechs and Hungarians now more than they did the Italians then. With respect to familiarity, dispersion was even greater in the EC-6 back then than in the current EU-25. Hence one can argue that the recent accessions have not put integration under pressure *to an unknown extent*; rather, they took the Community on a journey thirty years back into its own history. But again, caution is warranted because we do not have the information to fully assess the impact of this last wave of enlargement.


Figure 2: Level of trust between nationalities, diachronic comparison of EC 6 and EU 25



Is trust growing over time?

Even more cause for optimism might be derived from the fact that between 1976 and 1997, the West European barometer of trust was on a largely upward trend (Delhey 2004a, Inglehart 1991, Niedermayer 1995). Figure 3 demonstrates this development for the countries of the EC/EU-9 with the help of two snapshots taken more than twenty years apart. As can readily be seen, the dots are more dispersed in the left-hand snapshot (representing the EC-9 in 1976) than in the right-hand snapshot (1997). The EU nationalities have grown closer both in terms of trust and in terms of familiarity. In the 1970s, a handful of dyads existed that were moulded by low trust. At that time, the Germans, Dutch and Luxembourgers had a particularly negative stereotyped image of the Italians, as did the Luxembourgers with regard to the Irish. With respect to our second indicator, familiarity, only 36% of the Danes and Irish were able to judge the trustworthiness of people from Luxembourg; almost two-thirds answered “I do not know”. By the end of the 1990s, the lion’s share of the population in each country was familiar with the partner nations and levels of trust had increased. Prevailing non-trust in particular has become rare (for instance, the British still mistrust people from Germany and France and the Dutch mistrust people from Italy). Calculation of the averages across all 72 dyads within the EC/EU-9 show that the trust barometer has risen from 36 to 49, and the familiarity barometer from 72 to 86. The data cannot provide an answer to the pressing question of what forces have been driving this

Figure 3: Level of trust between EU 9 nationalities, 1976 and 1997



increase in trust. The increase in tourism, convergence of life-styles, generational exchange, long-standing cooperation within EU institutions or the lasting absence of war – all these processes might have contributed to growing trust and familiarity.

In the past, after each wave of territorial extension, trust has grown subsequently. This was the case for the EC-6, EC-9 and EC-12 (for the EU-15, the time series is too short to make a sound statement). The 64 dollar question is: can we expect a similar development for the last enlargement? Some optimism can be derived from the fact that those nationalities – the Italians, Greeks, Portuguese, Spanish and Irish – that initially met with some scepticism have benefited particularly from growing cosmopolitanism. Insofar as their gains in attributed trustworthiness have something to do with membership status or successful modernisation, citizens from the ten new member states may well come to inspire greater trust over time. It is highly likely that trust in East Europeans will increase in the post-accession years, as was the case for the Southern countries. As Kovacs (2004: 96) has put it: “We have admitted them [the Easterners] to our club, the Western Europeans might say, hence they cannot be that bad”.⁹ However, at least in the short run the social trust that may be needed to underpin the “European project” is in short supply.

However, history does not always repeat itself. One warning signal might be evidence that, between 1990 and 1997, transnational trust among West Europeans began to drop slightly in some countries (Delhey 2004a). Interestingly enough, mass support for the EU has shown a similar downturn (see Fuchs, 2002). It remains to be seen whether the recent downturn is a lasting trend. It is perfectly possible that, in retrospect, the period 1970-1990 will turn out to be an exceptionally favoured period that came to a sudden end with the collapse of the Eastern bloc. In Western Europe, at least, there is currently no climate of

increasing cosmopolitanism that will automatically include people from the new member states. Furthermore, any great optimism about citizens of the new member states in their capacity as trusters might well be misplaced. In Ireland, the United Kingdom and Portugal, levels of transnational trust remained by and large unchanged after accession, while in Greece they actually declined in the long run. Non-trust in EU Europeans has become the dominant feeling among Greeks since the mid-1990s. How long it will take to come to terms with the momentous events of 1989 and to put the European project on a path that instils new confidence in people is a question that remains unresolved.

6 Why do nations trust other nationalities?

In order to forecast the impact of coming enlargements on a more systematic basis, it is helpful to learn more about the rationale behind the trust ratings. A multivariate regression analysis can give us deeper insights. It is based on 309 cases, which is the number of dyadic trust ratings available for the EU-25 plus the candidate countries Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey. The dependent variable is the level of dyadic trust the single nations vest in other individual nationalities. A detailed description of predictor variables is provided in the Appendix.

The following considerations are tested against data (cf. Inglehart 1991):

- ❑ Does trust diminish with *spatial distance*? For the computations, the distance (as the crow flies) between the capitals of each pair of countries was used as predictor variable.
- ❑ Does *Community membership* produce a positive balance on what might be called the ‘trust account’? This idea is empirically tested by introducing a variable measuring the common membership years of each pair of countries.
- ❑ Is *cultural similarity* a necessary precondition for trust? Religion and language can be seen as fundamental to the establishment of shared values and world views, which in turn are often seen as indispensable for mutual trust (Earle and Cvetkovich 1995). In the analysis, I concentrate on two variables, language similarity and religious similarity between each pair of countries.

- Is trust influenced by *levels of modernisation*? Here, the argument is twofold. First, with respect to the nationalities as trusters, it is likely that modern (rich, democratic) societies have stronger trust cultures (Sztompka 1999), and due to their cultural norms they are also more ready to vest trust in people from other countries. Second, with respect to the nationalities as targets of trust, it is perfectly possible that modern (rich, democratic) peoples are trusted more. This is close to the idea that *prestige and reputation* are the main criteria we use when deciding whether or not to trust other people (Parsons 1980, Sztompka 1999). How do national groups at large acquire prestige? My hunch is that their reputation depends on how well they match the Western ideal of modernity based on rationality, efficiency and universalistic behaviour, of which economic wealth and effective democratic institutions are visible signs. I have collected five different measures of this broad concept of “modernity”, but since modernisation usually forms a tightknit syndrome, empirically it will be hardly possible to separate out the effects of economic and political modernisation. Compared to Southern and Eastern Europe, the established democracies of Northern and Western Europe are also less plagued by corruption and their citizens enjoy higher living standards. Therefore I have factor analysed the different measures into a single factor, which reflects each country’s level of modernisation (see Appendix for more information).

- How strongly are *feelings of threat* impacting on trust ratings? Big and powerful nations may be seen by others as a threat to their independence and national security, and so it is possible that big nations are less trusted than small ones. In the computation, population size is taken as a measure of power. Furthermore, defeats and victories in wars are of paramount importance for a nation’s collective memory (Cerruti 2001). Former alliances could weld people together, whereas enmities could draw people apart. Presumably, both effects occur. In this analysis, I concentrate on alliances and enmities during WWII.

The key results of the regression analysis are as follows (Table 2):

Trust between nations does not significantly decline with spatial distance, if other determinants are controlled for, especially cultural similarity. Hence, it is not proximity *as such* that explains why trust is higher among neighbouring countries but the increasing commonalities between them that often go along with spatial closeness. For Eurocrats, it is certainly good news that trust between nationalities does not necessarily reflect immutable geographic characteristics. The physical size of a community does not in itself predetermine its potential for trust.¹⁰

The shared experience of working together within the framework of EU institutions has only a small effect on trust. In the regression, the coefficient is actually negative; however, this is an artefact caused by Nordic exceptionalism. The Nordic countries are universally

regarded as highly trustworthy and themselves show high levels of transnational trust. Since it happens to be that two of the three Nordic countries involved here, Sweden and Finland, joined the EU relatively recently, the effect of common membership years shows up as a negative one. However, if one controls for Nordic exceptionalism in the regression, common membership years have a small positive impact on trust. Taken together, trust and distrust seem not crucially related to formal membership status.

Trust is higher between culturally related countries. Language ties in particular are conducive to trust. In part at least, transnational trust, as a specific form of generalised trust, is also based on primordial characteristics, or mechanic solidarity, to use Durkheim's famous term. The pay-off of language ties is stronger than that of a common religious tradition, presumably because language is more important than religion for people's life chances and political identity. However, the impact of religious affinity becomes stronger if one distinguishes only among three religious backgrounds: Western Christian, Orthodox and Muslim (loosely following Huntington's idea of civilisations (Huntington 1997)). This may point to the fact that it is not religious divisions as such that impact weakly on trust, but rather the division between Catholic and Protestant countries.

The modernisation level of the rated nationality is of paramount importance. The more developed a nation is, the more trusted are its people. Economic wealth, a robust democracy and high-quality public institutions combine to produce an image of integrity and reliability, which then converts into attributed trustworthiness. In addition, the level of modernisation of the nation doing the trust rating is important, although to a lesser extent. The higher a country's level of modernity, the more its citizenry trusts other nationalities. Material security and institutions of accountability, including the rule of law, might help to solve the problem of the free delivery of trust, which is a central problem in trust relations (Coleman 1990). In contrast, less modern societies provide only limited solutions to this problem.

Perceived threat complicates trust. Small nationalities usually inspire a high level of trust, whereas powerful nations are perceived with some caution, no matter how culturally close or how rich and democratic they are. Contrary to expectations, past alliances and enmities seem not to influence strongly how EU citizens think about other nations. If we take neutral nations as reference points, Europeans do not trust their former allies any more than they do neutral nations. Past enmity seems to give rise to some distrust in a bivariate analysis, but this effect vanishes if we control for the other variables. It goes without saying, however, that WWII still casts a cloud over some specific relations, like Polish-German or Czech-German relations.

Is it possible to say what matters most? The technical problem preventing an easy answer is that the predictors are correlated to some extent.¹¹ Nevertheless, it is possible to derive some conclusions about *relative importance* by following a procedure developed by Schulze (no date). With help of a series of regressions, the maximum and minimum explanatory power of each variable, or group of variables, is calculated (see Table 3 for detailed information on the procedure). The main message we get is that the modernisation level of the rated nationality matters most for trust. Its maximum power exceeds that of the

Table 2: Regression on dyadic transnational trust (OLS regression)

	Model 1		Model 2	
	beta	t	beta	t
Distance				
Distance between capitals	-.056	-.1249	.025	.633
Community membership-				
Common EC/EU years	-.059	-1.410	-.057	-1.670
Cultural similarity				
Same family of religions (dummy)	.083	1.698	=	=
Same family of religions, Huntington typology (dummy)	=	=	.190***	4.930
Same family of languages (dummy)	.146***	3.671	.187***	5.172
Reputation rated nationality				
Level of modernity of rated nationality	.673***	16.822	.576***	13.896
Perceived threat				
Population size rated nationality	-.179***	5.379	-.095**	-2.971
Allies in WWII (dummy)	-.071	-1.809	-.039	-1.180
Enemies in WWII (dummy)	-.302	-.829	-.019	-.561
Level of modernity of rating nationality				
Level of modernity rating nationality	.246***	7.420	.189***	6.253
Adjusted R ²		.69		.72
Number of cases		309		309

* Significant at .05-level; ** significant at .01-level; *** significant at .001-level.

Number of observations: 309 country dyads, EU-25 plus candidate countries (as far as available).

other predictors by far, and even its minimum power is almost as strong as the maximum power of the second strongest bloc of variables, which is cultural similarity. There remains some ambiguity about the ranking of the other determinants, but a reasonable overall ranking is as follows: (1) degree of modernisation of the rated nationality; (2) cultural affinity; (3) perceived threat; (4) modernisation level of the country doing the rating. Hence, it is not immutable geographical or primordial traits that determine trust in the first place, but a universalistic attribute which can be subject to change: the degree of modernity. Nations can become more modern and thereby gain a better reputation and greater trust.

Table 3: Relative power of main predictors of trust

Predictor variables(s)	Model 1		Model 2	
	Explained variance in %			
	Max	Min	Max	Min
Modernisation level 2 factor scores, rated nation and rating nation	63	37	63	23
Cultural similarity 2 variables	27	3	44*	5*
Perceived threat 1 variable	5	4	5	4
Total explained variance (R ²)	69		71	

Number of observations: 309 country dyads, EU-25 plus candidate countries (as far as available).

* In Model 2, same family of religions is measured using Huntington's typology of religions.

Annotation: In Model 1, the two variables measuring cultural similarity, language and religion, explain 27% of the variance in unidirectional trust between nations, if they are used in a regression as the only predictor variables. This is tantamount to the maximum power of cultural similarity. Employed in one single regression, all predictor variables together explain 69% of the variance in trust. If the cultural variables are removed and a further regression is carried out, the other predictors still explain 66% of the variance in trust. Thus the minimum power of cultural similarity is 3%. It can be concluded that the "true" power of cultural similarity with regard to trust lies somewhere between 3% and 27% ,but it is impossible to say where exactly. The maximum and minimum power of each predictor variable (or set of predictor variables) can be computed in the same way (cf. Schulze, no date).

A second, alternative model was also calculated, including the alternative measure of religious affinity based on Huntington. It should be noted that this measure gives religion (and thereby culture in general) more power, which is clearly reflected in our maximum-minimum calculations. Nevertheless, the modernisation level of the rated nationality retains its winning position, so that the main message remains the same. However, this second model reminds us that cultural particularism is another strong source of cohesiveness, so that cultural overstretch indeed might pose a threat for the EU's aim to form a cohesive community.

7 Conclusion – enlargements vs. integration?

My starting question was: What was the impact of successive enlargements upon the integration of the EU? Following Karl Deutsch, integration was conceptualised as the sense of community across national boundaries and measured as interpersonal trust between EU nationalities. The key result is that enlargements do not *necessarily* weaken trust. Northern enlargement actually strengthened trust levels, despite the fact that it extended the Community from the central city belt to the Nordic periphery. Southern and Eastern enlargement, however, weakened integration. The integrative effect of enlargement depends on the extent to which acceding nations differ from the present club members in three main dimensions: the level of modernisation (mechanisms: prestige), cultural characteristics (mechanisms: similarity) and their power in the international system (mechanisms: perceived threat). The recent enlargement has made an already diverse Community (Zielonka and Mair 2002) even more diverse, particularly with respect to modernisation levels and culture. The EU of 25 is a very unequal and heterogeneous place in which to live. Without much doubt, the coming enlargements towards the Southeast will also qualify as centrifugal, given the big economic gap and the cultural differences between the applicant countries and the member states. Turkey surely is especially problematic, given that it also has a large population.

It can be argued that both processes, enlargement and integration, follow different logics if, and only if, the strategy behind expansion is “calculated inclusion” (Vobruba 2003, Vobruba 2005), as was the case with southern and eastern enlargement (but not with the other expansions). Calculated inclusion means that the core member states were seeking to protect their prosperity and stability by including their poorer and less time-tested neighbouring countries on acceptable institutional conditions and at reasonable financial cost. However, the analysis has shown that “calculated inclusion” threatens to undermine mutual trust, producing a trade-off between enlargement and integration. The Copenhagen criteria are useful for limiting integration costs by defining sticking points related to reputation, but on the other hand, they are not high enough to preclude such costs. Beyond this trade-off, calculated inclusion causes two further problems. Firstly, it reveals a certain degree of tension between the formal and informal processes involved in creating a European societal community. In formal terms, citizenship of the Union grants certain rights and entitlements to all EU citizens, irrespective of nationality. Informally – and in stark contrast – the readiness to trust others varies according to nationality. This incongruity between formal demarcations through EU law and informal demarcations through graded levels of trust might come into conflict with each other. Secondly, inasmuch as a strong sense of community – common identity, empathy, trust – among the general public is necessary to get further measures of political amalgamation accepted, there might be an additional trade-off between enlarging and deepening the Union. It must be admitted, however, that the

single member states hold very different opinions about whether deepening is a valuable goal (Böckenförde 2003) and Lewis has argued that, by and large, each expansion, even the more problematic ones, has strengthened the EU as an institution (Lewis 2001). It goes without saying that this paper is neither a policy prescription nor an attempt to define the EU as a “Western club for the rich”. Moreover, there is always a variety of motives for admitting new members, of which “integration” as defined in this paper is only one. Although recent accessions put cohesiveness under strain, the Community might gain from growing diversity in other respects.

The data cannot tell us whether eastern and the coming south-eastern enlargement will simply postpone or impede the emergence of a well-integrated community of Europeans. Opponents can refer to the centrifugal impact the recent enlargement has had on overall trust levels. Proponents can refer to the situation of the EC-6 in the 1970s, when the level of trust between the national groups was similar to that in today’s enlarged EU. Moreover, past experience has shown that transnational trust is not constant, but variable. There are good reasons for saying that the best remedy against distrust of ‘distant’ peoples is EU membership. We can assume that the notion of “westward enlargement” – the very idea that Western Europe is exporting its political institutions and way of life to the Eastern lands and thus turning „Easterners“ into “Westerners” in the long run – is the main reason why trust in people from accession countries will grow over time. However, this might be attributed to two developments. Firstly, the successful modernisation of accession countries can be seen as crucial, both for raising their attributed reputation *and* for making them willing to vest more trust in other nationalities, whether in Western or Eastern Europe. Secondly, in the old member states welfare gains benefiting broad swathes of the population are necessary to prevent widespread anti-EU resentments, which might be directed against the newcomers.

Notes

- ¹ To keep the time series for Germany intact, only West Germans were included, even after unification.
- ² Comparisons over time are complicated by slight changes in the instrument (see Delhey 2004a).
- ³ More precisely, we are dealing with a doubly saturated network, given each nation's dual role as truster and trusted (Knoke and Kuklinski 1982).
- ⁴ In quantitative terms, the EU-25 consists of 300 dyads with a total of 600 one-directional relations. With our data, we have 270 of these 600 relations at hand.
- ⁵ According to the logic of enlargement, the EU-6 is the benchmark for the North-West enlargement. For southward enlargement, it is the EU-9 and for northern enlargement the EU-12. The analysis was carried out without considering the "silent enlargement" of 1990, when the East Germans joined.
- ⁶ A comparison of these surveys with our information on transnational trust derived from EBs reveals that at the aggregated country level (which gives us 15 cases, namely the 15 old member states), generalised trust in "most people" correlates significantly with average trust in the EU 9 nationalities (excluding co-nationals). Since we have no other information to hand, the former can be used as a proxy for transnational trust, although respondents cannot be expected to limit themselves to EU nationalities when deciding whether "most people" deserve to be trusted.
- ⁷ No information on Cyprus in the EVS.
- ⁸ Unfortunately, the time series does not start until 1976, three years after the first enlargement.
- ⁹ Own translation from German.
- ¹⁰ It is perfectly possible that proximity is conducive to trust in pre-modern societies only, cf. Inglehart 1991.
- ¹¹ However, collinearity is not so high as to rule out the possibility of using these variables in one single regression.

Appendix: Coding of predictor variables

Geographical distance

Distance between the two capitals of each pair of countries (in km, as the crow flies).

Common membership years

Number of shared years of EC/EU membership of each pair of countries. 1997 as year of reference. Scores ranging from 0 (rated nationality not member state in 1997) to 40 (both countries founding members of the Community).

Same language family

Dummy variable with 1 = same and 0 = different family of languages. The following language groups were identified: Germanic, Romance, Greek, Finno-Ugric, Slav, Baltic and Turkish. Due to the particular language constellation, France and Belgium were coded as belonging to the same family of languages.

Same religious family

Dummy variable with 1 = same and 0 = different family of religions. Basis of classification was the historically dominant religious tradition. The following religious traditions were identified: Protestant, Catholic, Greek-Orthodox and Islamic. Bi-confessional countries (mixed Protestant-Catholic) like the Netherlands and Germany are coded as 'similar' to both Protestant and Catholic countries. In a second version of this variable, drawing on Huntington's idea of civilizations (Huntington 1997), Protestant and Catholic countries are combined under the label 'Western Christian' and distinguished from Orthodox and Islamic countries.

National wealth:

GDP per capita (1997) in purchasing power parities, Eurostat data.

Level of corruption

Corruption Perception Index (CPI) from Transparency International, 1997 or later years (10 = "free" – 0 = "highly corrupt").

Freedom House Index

Ratings for political rights and civil liberties (see www.freedomhouse.org) which, for the purposes of this work, were combined into a single political freedom score. The higher the score the greater the freedom. Because it may be some time before political freedom can create a climate of trust, a measure for the mean level of freedom over 20 years (1976-1997)

was also constructed. For countries newly established during this time period, the scores of the predecessor country were taken for the missing years.

Factor score modernization level, rated nation:

Constructed from (factor loadings in brackets): cumulated Freedom House score 1972-1996 (.961); GDP per capita in ppp (.938); absence of corruption (.912); former communist country (-.862); Freedom House score 1996 (.735). The five single indicators explain 78% of the variance of the common factor 'modernisation'.

Factor score modernization level, rating nation:

Constructed from (factor loadings in brackets): cumulated Freedom House score 1972-1996 (.912); GDP per capita in ppp (.902); absence of corruption (.899); Freedom House score 1996 (.768). The four single indicators explain 76% of the variance of the common factor 'modernisation'.

Power

The number of inhabitants (in millions) was taken as measuring the country's relative power in the international system.

Allies and enemies in WWII

Based on the classification allies, axis powers and neutrals, two dummy variables were created: allies (1= yes, 0 = no), and enmity (1= yes, 0 = no).

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