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From Riches to Rags, and Back? Explaining the Growth Trajectory of Argentina since the 1890s

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From Riches to Rags, and Back? Explaining the Growth Trajectory of Argentina since the 1890s

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PRELIMINARY
Comments welcome

Abstract: Argentina is the only country in the world that was “developed” in 1900 and “developing” in 2000. Although various underlying reasons have been identified (chiefly political instability, financial development, inflation, trade openness, and international financial integration), no study has quantitatively assessed their relative importance. This paper tries to fill this gap. We use the power-ARCH framework and annual data since 1896 to study how important are these factors vis-à-vis both growth and growth volatility. Our results suggest that financial development, trade openness and political instability are the main factors, with important differences in terms of their short versus long-run behavior.

JEL Codes: C14, O40, E23, D72

Keywords: economic growth, financial development, volatility, political instability, trade openness, power-GARCH

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1. INTRODUCTION

The general economic trend since the Industrial Revolution is one of economic betterment. Since 1850, there has been a clear, sustained and undeterred increase in living standards across the globe. A few countries were rich or developed in, say, year 1900 and remain rich or developed in, say, year 2000, for instance, the U.S. and the U.K. A few others were developing in 1900 but turned around and by year 2000 were counted among the developed countries, e.g., Japan and most of the European periphery. The vast majority of countries was relatively poor, or developing, in year 1900 and remains so in year 2000.

There is only one country in the world that was developed in 1900 and developing in 2000. Argentina. Although clearly placed among the 10 highest incomes per capita in the world in 1900, “Argentina's ratio to OECD income fell to 84 percent in 1950, 65 percent in 1973, and a mere 43 percent in 1987... Argentina is therefore unique (della Paolera and Taylor, 2003, p. 5). Unsurprisingly, this “Argentine puzzle” has received a great deal of attention and scholars have identified several potential reasons, chiefly among them political instability, macroeconomic volatility, inflation, trade openness, public deficit, and international and domestic financial developments. Surprisingly, however, there are no studies trying to quantify and assess the relative importance of this array of reasons, at least that we are aware of. This paper tries to fill this gap. Our aim is to put forward answers to the following questions: What is the relationship between, on the one hand, financial development (domestic and international), inflation, openness and political instability and, on the other hand, economic growth and growth volatility? Are the impacts of these variables (on economic growth) direct or indirect (via the conditional growth volatility)? Does their intensity and sign vary over time, in general and, in particular, do these vary with respect to short- versus long-run considerations?

This paper tries to answer such questions using a power-ARCH (PARCH) framework and annual time series data for Argentina covering the period from 1896 to 2000. In doing so, there are three related but different lines of research we should highlight and to which we try to contribute to: the scholarship on finance and growth, the economic literature on political instability,¹ and the economic history work on the

¹ Durlauf et al. (2005) survey the macroeconomics of growth and instability literature. One paper that tries to link these literatures, and is close to ours in this sense, is Asteriou and Price (2001), which present time series (quarterly data) evidence for

so-called Argentinean puzzle.

In terms of the literature on the finance-growth nexus, this paper tries to contribute by putting forward novel econometric evidence based on historical data. These allow us to investigate whether the impact of different measures of financial development on growth occurs directly or indirectly, via growth volatility. Levine (2005) reviews the finance-growth literature and argues that the overall consensus is for a positive, lasting, significant and causal effect from financial development to economic growth. He also shows that the effect is, as expected, stronger from measures of financial efficiency (for instance, the share in GDP of credit to the private sector) than from measures of financial depth (such as M3 over GDP). By constructing different measures of financial development, in this paper we can throw some light on the possible distinction among the effects of different measures over a much longer period of time than normally considered in the literature.²

One of the main benefits of our choice of econometric framework is that it helps shedding light on an important and resilient puzzle on the relationship between output growth and its volatility. While Ramey and Ramey (1995) show that growth rates are adversely affected by volatility, Grier and Tullock (1989) argue that larger standard deviations of growth rates are associated with larger mean rates. We argue that separating the predicted from the unpredicted components of growth volatility can be of great importance and may be able to generate new insights on this relationship. Moreover, the majority of ARCH papers examining the growth-volatility link are restricted to these two key variables. That is, they seldom assess whether the effects of the presence of other variables affect the relation and, in the rare occasions that happens, they are usually inflation and its volatility that comes into play.³ One contribution

the UK since 1960.

² Our data and framework also allow us to raise a few new questions. In particular, Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003), Tornell et al. (2004) and Loayza and Ranciere (2006) note that although the development of the financial system is robustly associated with economic growth across countries, it is also often found to be the main predictor of financial crises. That is, the long-run effect of finance on growth is positive, while in the short-run the effect is negative. Cross-country heterogeneity, in general, and business cycles synchronization issues, in particular, may play an undesirably large role in this result. Because in this paper we use data for only one country (Argentina) and we find supporting evidence for this asymmetric dynamic effect, one possible contribution of our paper is to help dispel such concerns surrounding this important result. In addition, our framework allows further investigation of the workings of these effects as we hypothesize that the short-run effect may work mostly through growth volatility, while the long-run work may work directly (that is, on the economic growth rates.)

³ For a comprehensive review of this literature see Fountas et al. (2006). In addition, Gillman and Kejak (2005) bring together for comparison several main approaches to modeling the inflation-growth effect by nesting them within a general monetary endogenous growth model with both human and physical capital.

of this paper is to study if and how the growth-volatility relationship changes in light of a much wider set of variables. Note also that the use of annual data allows us to perform a more appropriate test of the hypothesis that predicts a positive effect of output variability and uncertainty on the growth rate of output.⁴

We present our main results in three blocs: direct, indirect and dynamic (short and long-run) effects. We find evidence for direct influences from financial development, informal political instability (e.g. guerilla warfare), trade openness and public deficit, and equally importantly no such evidence from international financial markets (UK interest rate), inflation and formal political instability (e.g. constitutional changes). Sensitivity analysis helps narrowing this set down to financial development (positive) and trade openness (negative) as major drivers of growth. One particularly important result is that when we investigate the impacts of financial development and informal instability jointly, the latter seems to vanish (the exception being guerrilla warfare) thus reinforcing the evidence for an important role of financial development on economic growth. How does this set of variables affect predicted growth volatility (and thus growth via volatility)? The evidence for indirect effects we find is mostly from formal political instability, inflation, trade openness and public deficit. Further robustness tests shows that the main (negative) impacts are from formal instability and openness. Finally, our investigation of the dynamic effects shows important differences in terms of short and long run behavior of our key variables: the informal instability effects (antigovernment demonstrations and assassinations) are larger in the short- than in the long-run, while those for financial development and trade openness are negative in the short- but positive in the long-run. In addition to their novelty, we believe the importance of these findings is also in terms of the policy lessons they can generate. The vast existing literature has said little in this respect. In this paper, we show that although the positive direct effects of financial development dominate the negative ones of informal political instability, the formal instability is detrimental to growth via the volatility channel and, together with trade openness, may have played a substantial role in the demise of the Argentinean economy since the 1890s.

⁴ Black (1987) argues that investments in riskier technologies will be pursued only if the expected return on these investments (expressed as the average rate of output growth) is large enough to compensate for the extra risk. As real investment takes time to materialize, such an effect would be more likely to obtain in empirical studies utilizing low-frequency data.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets the historical context for the paper by documenting the decline of Argentina from a position of a rich or developed country in year 1900 to that of a middle-income or developing country in year 2000. Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 provides details and justification for our econometric methodology. Section 5 has our baseline econometric results and the results from various sensitivity tests are presented in Section 6. Section 7 concludes and suggests directions for future research.

2. THE ARGENTINE RIDDLE

Argentina is unique. For about three centuries, it was part of the Spanish colonial empire. It became independent in the early XIXth century. Uncharacteristically, the Argentinean Independence was a rather complicated process. It stretches from the May Revolution in 1810, through the July 9th declaration in 1816 (when the United Spanish Provinces of South America unilaterally declare independence) and culminates in 1824 with the defeat of the Spanish Empire in the battle of Ayacucho.

Characteristically, the fifty or so years that followed were marked by severe political instability. There was a long sequence of civil wars, mainly opposing the interests of the capital, Buenos Aires, to those of the provinces. This is a period of rather modest growth rates which ended with national unification. The Industrial Revolution in Europe fueled demand for primary products and provided new means to satisfy it through important technological innovations: around 1875 the transportation of meat from the other side of the world was made possible and it was made cheap.

There is little disagreement among economists that the period from 1875 to the eve of World War I is the Golden Age, or the Belle Époque, of Argentinean economic history (Taylor, 1992; Sanz-Villarroya, 2007). Just to illustrate this, note that for the year 1913, della Paolera and Taylor (2003) estimate income per capita in Argentina to be (in 1992 US Dollars) around USD 3,797. They show that this is higher than the corresponding figures for France and Germany (USD 3,452 and USD 3,134) and is substantially higher than the same figures for Spain or Italy. Massive inflows of foreign capital (physical as well as human) supported the rapid expansion of the exports of primary products (grain, meat, wool and leather)

which couple with favorable international conditions, ultimately fuelled very rapid rates of economic growth. There is also little disagreement that the Argentina's uniqueness is because no other country climbed down so dramatically from the selected group of advanced, rich or developed countries.

The major disagreement among economic historians to this day is not *whether* but actually *when* (and, of course, *why*) this unchecked decline started. Some argue that it started with the 1930 crisis (e.g., Diaz-Alejandro 1985), others argue for an earlier turning point (for instance, Taylor suggests 1913), while Sanz-Villarroya (2005) estimates that the first important structural break for Argentina happens in 1899⁵

Irrespective of exactly when the decline started, its existence was not undisputed until the immediate post II World War. In 1947 Argentina was still ranked the 10th country in the world in terms of per capita income (Alston and Gallo, 2007, p. 6). della Paolera and Taylor (2003) note that “by 1900 Argentina's income per capita had risen from about 67 per cent of developed country-levels in 1870, to 90 percent in 1900, and 100 per cent in 1913 Whatever its exact status in 1913, for all practical purposes Argentina was an advance country” (2003, p. 5). They also calculate that since then the ratio of Argentina's income to OECD income fell to 84 percent in 1950, then to 65 percent in 1973, and then to 43 percent in 1987. This ratio rebounds in the 1990s but again reverts with the 2001 crisis.⁶ Last, but not least, it should not go unnoticed that in a recent book on the Great Depressions of the XXth Century (Kehoe and Prescott, 2007), Argentina is the only country that has two chapters (out of 16) entirely and solely dedicated to its economy.

It is not surprising, therefore, that there is a vast literature on the Argentine puzzle, providing alternative explanations for its long-run relative economic decline. One argument is that increased direct competition in international markets during and after WWI (especially from the other areas of new settlement, i.e. Australia and Canada) has an important role to play, as does the sharp decline in immigration and foreign capital inflows. One other argument is that its relative decline is well explained

⁵ Below we present and discuss our Bai-Perron estimates of the date of structural breaks in Argentinean growth. We find (and adjust our estimates accordingly below) evidence for two structural breaks: 1922 and 1964 (for a full treatment of this issue, see Campos et al. 2008).

⁶ Growth was negative from 1999 onwards culminating with around -10% in year 2002. The 2001 crisis entailed a default on large part of the external debt, devaluation, inflation, and the freezing of bank accounts (the *corralito*.) Riots, looting and anti-government demonstrations followed. See Kehoe (2003) for a discussion.

by the fact that the agricultural frontier was reached much earlier in Argentina than in Australia and Canada. Australia's restrictive immigration policy contrasts with Argentina's liberal one, which has been blamed by Diaz-Alejandro (1985) among others, for the difficulties in sustaining and raising productivity levels. Solberg (1987) argues for another reason, this time in terms of Argentina's adoption of a land distribution policy that favored large farm holdings and sustained high levels of wealth inequality. In light of the very accommodating migration policy, the large inflows of workers end up concentrating in Buenos Aires and gave rise to a well-organized and increasingly powerful worker's union movement. It suffices to say that this movement was intimately tangled with the Peron governments, after WWII.

Finance has also received a great deal of attention in terms of its potential role in explaining the Argentinean decline (della Paolera and Taylor, 1998). For example, Prados de la Escosura and Sanz-Villarroya (2006) argue that contract intensive money is actually the key factor in explaining the Argentinean puzzle. Taylor (2003) associates the Argentine decline to extremely low savings rates (the high population dependency rate linked to the immigration policy). This argument combines with Solberg's view and highlights the issue of (restricted) access to finance as a way of perpetuating high inequality levels. Moreover, the role of the financial sector does not need to be limited to domestic or national aspects. Many believe that there may have been excessive dependence on foreign capital in the Belle Époque (British foreign capital to be precise) and the associated radical changes around WWI as an important cause of the Argentinean decline (Taylor, 1992).

Such radical shifts in market conditions extended from the financial to the goods markets, the emphasis here being on international trade. Until 1914, Argentina was an aggressive exporter exhibiting extremely high levels of openness to international trade (measured as the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP.) The data we use in this paper (more details below) shows that this ratio exceeds 50% in the years immediately before WWI, with a clearly declining trend in the inter-wars years (the ratio goes down from about 45% to 20% in these twenty years), and it never exceeds 25% from 1945 to almost 2000. If one believes that exports alone are a major driving force of economic growth, then these numbers surely provide fuel to placing openness as a major reason for the Argentine decline (Diaz-Alejandro, 1970). One

important caveat that should be mentioned in this context is that it is unclear (and still much debated) what were the reasons for such a reversal. In particular, the debate is whether this was mainly the disruption and closing up of international markets first with WWI and then with the Great Depression, or was it mainly the adoption of excessively protectionist policies by successive Argentinean governments. Note that these policies inspired and were later reinforced by the import substitution model advocated by the leading Latin American economist of the time, Raul Prebisch (from Argentina.)

In addition to trade policies, many scholars believe that standard macroeconomic policies, in general, and their lack of consistency and the resulting high degree of macroeconomic instability, in particular, are also to blame. For instance, della Paollera et al. (2003) show how public deficits throughout Argentinean history (and inflation, mostly since the 1970s), also seem to play also an important role in explaining the decline.

Although there is a large literature associating the long-run relative decline of the Argentinean economy with political factors,⁷ we are unaware of studies that try to quantitatively evaluate this association. For instance, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) observe that: “The political history of Argentina reveals an extraordinary pattern where democracy was created in 1912, undermined in 1930, re-created in 1946, undermined in 1955, fully re-created in 1973, undermined in 1976, and finally reestablished in 1983” (2006, p. 7). In a recent paper, Alston and Gallo (2007) identify the onset of widespread electoral fraud in the 1930s as a turning point for the erosion of the rule of law and one main reason for the Argentinean decline.

In what follows, we take these considerations on board in trying to provide a comprehensive quantitative account of the relative importance of the main reasons often identified with the Argentinean debacle, namely political instability, domestic financial development, trade openness, macroeconomic volatility (inflation and public deficits) and the international financial system.

3. DATA

⁷ See also della Paolera and Taylor (2003) and references therein.

The data set we put together for this paper comprises various measures of financial development, political instability, economic growth as well as a number of additional explanatory variables reflecting well-established alternative explanations for the Argentinean decline. We use various measures of financial development. One is the ratio of M3 to GDP, from Alston and Gallo (2007). The main reason for considering this variable is that it has been used extensively in the finance-growth literature (King and Levine, 1993; Levine, 2005). One well-known drawback of this measure, however, is that the ratio of M3 to GDP reflects financial depth or the relative size of the financial system. It does not necessarily reflect how efficient the financial system actually is. We also use a narrower version of this variable (M1 over GDP) to check for the robustness of our results (source of the data for this measure is Bordo et al., 2001). Our other two measures of financial development try to capture the efficiency of the financial sector, not its relative size. The source for both is Mitchell (2003). The first is the bank deposits by the private sector over GDP (private deposits or PD), which we believe is a good proxy for the share of credit to the private sector over GDP. Our second measure from Mitchell (2003) is the total deposits in savings banks over GDP. Given its more restrictive nature and the fact that the exact definition of savings bank contains an unobservable legal element, we use this variable mostly for robustness check thereby attaching greater weight to PD.

We also explore the hypothesis that different types of political instability have different effects on economic growth.⁸ This is done by further developing the distinction between formal and informal political instability introduced in Campos and Karanasos (forthcoming). The distinction is based on whether or not different forms of instability originate from within the political system: guerrilla warfare are thus informal political instability, while constitutional reforms are classified as formal instability. In addition to the obvious policy implications this taxonomy generates (in a literature in which policy implications are scarce), this distinction allows us to investigate questions that naturally have not been investigated so far, such as whether or not the effects of some forms of informal instability are more

⁸ Another puzzle we are interested in regards the duration of the political instability effects: while the conventional wisdom is that these are severe in the long-run, Campos and Nugent (2002) and Murdoch and Sandler (2004) argue that they are significantly stronger in the shorter- than in the long-run. In Campos and Nugent (2002), the long-run effect vanishes when the African countries are excluded from the estimation and when institutions are taken into account.

severe in short-run, whether or not they vanish in the long-run, and whether or not the main effect of formal instability occurs through growth volatility. One of our hypotheses is that the answer to these three questions is the same (“yes”) and below we provide further justification as well as full econometric support.

Our informal political instability variables⁹ are as follows: anti-government demonstrations (peaceful public gatherings of at least 100 people), assassinations (defined as politically motivated murder or attempted murder of a high government official or politician), strikes (a general strike of 1,000 or more workers involving more multiple employers and aimed at government policies), and guerrilla warfare (armed activity, sabotage, or bombings by independent bands of citizens and aimed at regime overthrow). Most of these series are available since 1919. Our informal political instability variables are as follows: the number of cabinet changes, the size of the cabinet, the number of constitutional changes and legislative elections. Our basic data source is the Cross National Time Series Data set (Banks 2005) which contains historical series on income per capita and various dimensions of instability.¹⁰ This is a commercial database that has been extensively used in the scholarship on growth and political instability (Durlauf et al., 2005.) Data are available yearly for Argentina from 1896 until 2000, for various instability series, excluding the two World War years (that is, 1914 to 1918 and 1939 to 1945).

Our measures of inflation, trade openness and public deficit are from Alston and Gallo (2007). Inflation is measured as yearly changes in the consumer price index (CPI). Public deficit is proxied as the ratio of the federal deficit to GDP, but it does exclude state-owned enterprises.¹¹ Trade openness is measured in standard fashion as the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP. Alston and Gallo (2007) have carried out various necessary adjustments to underlying data from Venganzones and Winograd (1997), from the Ministry of Economy of Argentina and from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.

Finally, international financial sector developments have also been repeatedly blamed for

⁹ Our political instability variables enter one by one in the econometric framework we use, so our results are not affected by the taxonomy and as such it is used simply to facilitate the interpretation.

¹⁰ We have obtained GDP growth and level figures from various other sources (as well as industrial output series) and initial results (not reported) show that these different measures do not affect our results below.

¹¹ Because the original inflation series contain a number of obvious outliers between the years 1987 and 1991 (reaching almost 5,000% in 1989), we lower the relative weight of these observations for estimation.

Argentina's poor economic performance. There are two aspects of this issue that are often said to play a role: the first being the credit crunch associated with the onset of WWI and with the Great Crisis of 1929, and the second being the change in global financial leadership which went from London to New York during this period. We must say that we proceed as if the second aspect is less important, but also that we are absolutely sure it is much more difficult to measure than the first. Thus, in standard fashion in this type of study, we use the level of interest rates in the United Kingdom as our proxy for the overall conditions in international financial markets (the source of these data is Bordo et al. 2001). Because the transition to the U.S. financial leadership is often said to be even less beneficial to Argentina (mainly because American investors often refrained to take managerial control of Argentine firms), our estimates for this effect should be conservative and if at all biased will show a smaller than actual effect of the international financial market in the Argentinean decline.

4. ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK

The PARCH model was introduced by Ding, Granger and Engle (1993) and quickly gained currency in the finance literature.¹² Let growth (y_t) follow a white noise process augmented by a risk premium defined in terms of volatility:

$$y_t = c + kh_t + \lambda x_{it} + \varepsilon_t, \quad (1)$$

with

$$\varepsilon_t = e_t h_t^{\frac{1}{2}},$$

where x_{it} is either the political instability or the financial development variable or one of the other explanatory variables.¹³

In addition, $\{e_t\}$ are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d) random variables with

$E(e_t) = E(e_t^2 - 1) = 0$, while h_t is positive with probability one and is a measurable function of the

¹² See, for example, Karanasos and Kim (2006). Karanasos and Schurer, (2005, 2008) use this process to model output growth and inflation respectively.

¹³ Because the original financial development, openness, public deficit and UK interest rate variables, are I(1), they enter our models in first differences.

sigma-algebra Σ_{t-1} , which is generated by $\{y_{t-1}, y_{t-2}, \mathbf{e}\}$.

In other words, h_t denotes the conditional variance of growth. In particular, h_t is specified as an asymmetric PARCH(1,1) process with lagged growth included in the variance equation:

$$h_t^{\frac{\delta}{2}} = \omega + \alpha h_{t-1}^{\frac{\delta}{2}} f(e_{t-1}) + \beta h_{t-1}^{\frac{\delta}{2}} + \gamma y_{t-1} + \phi x_{it}, \quad (2)$$

with

$$f(e_{t-1}) \equiv [|e_{t-1}| - \zeta e_{t-1}]^{\delta},$$

where δ (with $\delta > 0$) is the heteroscedasticity parameter, α and β are the ARCH and GARCH coefficients respectively, ζ with $|\zeta| < 1$ is the leverage term and γ is the level term for the l th lag of growth.¹⁴ In order to distinguish the general PARCH model from a version in which δ is fixed (but not necessarily equal to two) we refer to the latter as (P)ARCH.

The PARCH model increases the flexibility of the conditional variance specification by allowing the data to determine the power of growth for which the predictable structure in the volatility pattern is the strongest. This feature in the volatility process has important implications for the relationship between political instability, finance, inflation, and growth and its volatility. There is no strong reason for assuming that the conditional variance is a linear function of lagged squared errors. The common use of a squared term in this role is most likely to be a reflection of the normality assumption traditionally invoked. However, if we accept that growth data are very likely to have a non-normal error distribution, then the superiority of a squared term is unwarranted and other power transformations may be more appropriate.

The PARCH model may also be viewed as a standard GARCH model for observations that have been changed by a sign-preserving power transformation implied by a (modified) PARCH parameterization. He and Teräsvirta (1999) emphasize that if the standard Bollerslev type of model is augmented by the heteroscedasticity parameter (the power term), the estimates of the ARCH and GARCH coefficients almost certainly change.¹⁵

¹⁴ The model imposes a Box-Cox power transformation of the conditional standard deviation process and the asymmetric absolute residuals.

¹⁵ Karanasos and Schurer (2008) find that the relationship between the variable and its conditional variance is sensitive to changes in the values of the heteroscedasticity parameter. Put differently, the estimated values of the in-mean and the level effects are

5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS

We present our main results in three interdependent blocs: the direct, indirect and dynamic (short and long-run) effects. We proceed with the estimation of the PARCH(1,1) model in equations (1) and (2) in order to take into account the serial correlation observed in the levels and power transformations of our time series data. The Tables below report the estimated parameters of interest for the period 1896-2000. These were obtained by quasi-maximum likelihood estimation (QMLE) as implemented in EVIEWS. The best fitting specification is chosen according to the Likelihood Ratio (LR) results and the minimum value of the Information Criteria (IC) (not reported). Once heteroscedasticity in the conditional mean has been accounted for, our specifications appear to capture the serial correlation in the growth series.¹⁶

Our set of variables tries to reflect the different explanations for the Argentinean puzzle previously put forward by economic historians. This set comprises domestic and international financial developments, informal and formal political instability, inflation and public deficit, and the degree of openness to international trade. In order to study the direct effects of our set of explanatory variables, we specify model 1 with $\phi = \gamma = 0$ in equation 2, while model 2 with $\lambda = 0$ in equation 1 allows us to investigate their indirect impacts on growth.¹⁷

5.1. Direct Growth Effects

Table 1 reports the results from our estimation of the PARCH(1,1) model for each one of the elements in our set of explanatory variables. The parameter we are most interested in is λ (in the last column.) The results reveal that the direct effects of financial development on per capita economic growth rates are positive and statistically significant, those of trade openness, informal political instability (guerrilla

fragile to changes in the power term.

¹⁶ For all cases, we find that the leverage term is insignificant, so we re-estimate excluding this parameter.

¹⁷ As indicated in the previous section we jointly estimate the conditional mean and variance of growth in order to take into account PARCH effects. At the same time, with a limited number of time-series observations the non-linear structure should not be overextended as this imposes excessive requirements on the data. Therefore, we estimate the direct (model 1) and indirect (model 2) effects separately.

warfare) and public deficit are negative,¹⁸ whereas the effects of formal political instability, international financial developments (interest rate in the United Kingdom) and inflation are not statistically significant, at conventional levels.

As for the in-mean parameter (k), notice that in all cases the estimates are statistically significant and positive which is in line with the theoretical argument of Black (1987). Also the estimated power term coefficients δ are rather stable, with the Akaike IC (AIC) criteria choosing a (P)ARCH specification with estimated power term ranging from 0.8 (e.g., inflation) to 0.9 (e.g., public deficit.)¹⁹

How robust are these baseline individual results? As discussed above, previous research on Argentina has given considerable weight to the roles of informal political instability and financial development. It is not as surprising therefore that these are the two dominant influences since they are the ones we estimate with greatest precision. One first robustness test would be to investigate whether or not such powerful and precise effects obtain in the presence of the other explanatory variables. In other words, we want to be sure that they remain if we add to the baseline specification any of our four additional variables. Tables 2 and 3 have these results. Table 2 present these results in great detail for the case of inflation, while Table 3 only reports the main parameters of interest for trade openness, public deficit, and UK interest rates.²⁰

The parameters we are most interested in Table 2 are λ_1 and λ_2 . Panel B reinforces that formal political instability have no direct effects on growth (cf. λ_1) and the same conclusion remains for the case of inflation. In the latter case (i.e., for λ_2), this is correct for all three panels so our previous results still hold. Interestingly, Panel C shows that the direct effect of financial development is little affected by the addition of inflation to the model, with all four indicators still showing a positive effect and only one of them (M3/GDP) now becoming statistically insignificant. It should be stressed that the effects from the indicators of financial depth are weaker than those from indicators of financial efficiency, which as noted

¹⁸ This result for trade openness is clearly unexpected. Notice, however, that we show below that its short-run effects are negative but the long-run impact is positive.

¹⁹ Notice that in all our estimations the ARCH and GARCH parameters (α and β) are highly significant in the majority of the cases. (see Tables 1,2,5,6,8 and 9). Also the estimated power term coefficients δ are stable ranging from 0.80 to 1.00.

²⁰ The complete results are available from the authors' upon request.

above is a result that easily echoes previous findings in the wider growth-finance literature. Panel A shows, however, that accounting for inflation weakens the influence of informal instability. Although the results for the four forms of instability retain their negative sign only guerrilla warfare still shows a strong negative growth impact. In terms of the in-mean parameter (k), notice that in all cases remains statistically significant and positive.

Table 3 summarizes the main results when we add the three remaining explanatory variables. Notice we only report these results for informal political instability and financial development because we have shown above that formal instability has no direct impact.²¹ Panel A of table 3 shows our estimates for λ_1 and λ_2 , as before for the case of informal political instability, but with λ_2 now reflecting respectively the direct effects of trade openness (columns 1 and 2), public deficit (columns 3 and 4) and UK interest rates (columns 5 and 6.) Starting with the case of trade openness, all four informal political instability variables show the expected negative and statistically significant direct effects. As for the direct impact of trade openness itself, although it is always negative it is statistically significant in only half of the cases. The effects of public deficit disappear whereas those for informal instability tend to retain their statistical significance (the exception being assassinations.) Finally, it is very interesting to see that UK interest rate now show the expected negative and significant influence in three out of four cases (the exception is for general strikes,) and this has also somewhat mixed effects in terms of informal instability (the negative impact remaining significant for guerrilla warfare and assassinations.)²²

Panel B of table 3 shows our estimates for λ_1 and λ_2 as before for the case of financial development. All four financial development variables still show the expected positive and statistically significant direct impact for both trade openness and UK interest rates (M3 over GDP loses significance for the public deficit case). As for the influence of trade openness, it is still negative and statistically significant in three out of the four cases, while for public deficit the estimate of λ_2 is significant in only

²¹ Although formal political instability does not affect growth directly, as we will see below, we find it affects growth volatility (that is, it has important indirect effects.) We return to these issues in great detail in sub-section 5.2 below.

²² This also suggests that future research may do well in further exploring the relationship between financial globalization (integration) and domestic political instability.

one case. Once we control for domestic financial development, the coefficients on the UK interest rates become insignificant again.

One last important robustness test regards the joint direct effects of the two main reasons highlighted by previous research on the Argentinean puzzle, namely financial development and informal political instability. Table 4 presents these results.²³ It is obviously clear that the influence of financial development dominates that of informal instability. Despite the fact that all of our sixteen estimates of λ_1 are still negative, only those related to guerrilla warfare remain statistically significant. Not surprisingly in light of previous results, the direct impact of M3 over GDP is not statistically significant. Yet all other estimates of λ_2 for financial development remain positive and statistically significant (the one exception being savings deposits with guerrilla warfare.)

In summary, we find that the main explanatory factors, solely in terms of their direct effects on economic growth in Argentina, turn out to be financial development and trade openness. Although informal political instability also seems to play an important role, we find that only one aspect seems to survive our battery of sensitivity tests, that being guerrilla warfare. We now turn to the investigation of the indirect effects.

5.2. Indirect (Via Volatility) Effects

Table 5 reports the estimation results for each one of the elements in our data set for what we call the indirect effect, which is the effect on growth via the volatility channel. The parameter we are most interested in is ϕ (in the next to last column.) The results reveal that the indirect effects of trade openness and formal political instability (constitutional changes) on the conditional volatility of per capita economic growth rates are negative and statistically significant whereas those of inflation and public deficit are positive. Interestingly, domestic and international financial development, and formal instability have no indirect impact.²⁴

²³ The full results are not reported for the sake of space, we report only the two main parameters of interest. They are similar to those fully discussed above and are available from the authors' upon request.

²⁴ In the expressions for the conditional variances reported in the Tables, various lags of growth (from 1 to 12) were considered with the best model ($l = 6$) chosen on the basis of the minimum value of the AIC.

As above, we proceed by investigating the robustness of these results. Specifically, and for comparability purposes, we ask how the results from the various aspects of financial development and political instability change if we have in the baseline model one of the four explanatory variables. Tables 6 and 7 present these results as before with Table 6 reporting the full set of estimates for the inflation case, and table 7 summarizing the results (only for formal instability) from the remaining three variables in our set.

As it can be seen in Table 6, the indirect negative effect of formal political instability remains statistically significant throughout (Panel B). Focusing our attention on the ϕ_1 and k parameters, we can see that all four forms of formal instability affect volatility negatively ϕ_1 ($\phi_1 < 0$) and, since $k > 0$, they affect growth negatively as well. Interestingly, only one financial development and one informal instability measure reveals such indirect effects. (instead, as discussed above, they exhibit a direct impact on growth). That is, it appears that the volatility of growth is independent of changes in financial development and informal instability. These results reinforce the notion that the type of political instability matters vis-à-vis economic growth: while informal may have a direct effect, the impact of formal instability operates indirectly, via growth volatility. Moreover, evidence for a positive impact of inflation on volatility also remains strong. This is in line with the theoretical argument in Dortsey and Sarte (2000). Moreover, notice that since the estimates for the in-mean parameter (k) and the level coefficient (γ) are statistically significant and positive there is strong evidence for a positive bi-directional feedback relationship between growth and its volatility,²⁵ which is robust to the presence of various finance and instability variables and inflation. Table 7 summarizes the results for the other three explanatory variables in our basic set. There is widespread support for the previous formal political instability results (the exception being for the case of cabinet size). We also find robust evidence for the negative indirect impact of trade openness and, slightly less so, for the positive influence of UK interest rates, while the results for public deficit become considerably more mixed.

²⁵ The existing empirical literature focuses mainly on the effect of volatility on growth, see Fountas et al. (2006) and Fountas and Karanasos (2007).

In summary, we find robust evidence that both informal political instability and trade openness affect growth indirectly its volatility. No other variables in our basic set exhibit such robust estimates of their indirect effects.

5.3. Dynamic Aspects

In this section we investigate how short- and long-run considerations help us refine our baseline results. Another potential benefit from this exercise is that the required use of lags may help ameliorate any lingering concerns about endogeneity. In order to estimate short- and long- run relationships we employ the following error correction (P)ARCH form

$$\Delta y_t = \theta \Delta x_{i,t-l} + \varphi (y_{t-1} - c - \zeta x_{i,t-1}) + u_t, \quad (3)$$

where θ and ζ captures the short and long-run effects respectively, and φ is the speed of adjustment to the long-run relationship.²⁶ This is accomplished by embedding a long-run growth regression into an ARDL model.²⁷ In other words, the term in parenthesis contains the long-run growth regression, which acts as a forcing equilibrium condition

$$y_t = c + \zeta x_{it} + \varepsilon_t, \quad (4)$$

where ε_t is $I(0)$. The lag of the first difference of either the political instability or financial development variable or one of the explanatory variables ($\Delta x_{i,t-l}$) characterizes the short-run effect. The condition for the existence of a long-run relationship (dynamic stability) requires that the coefficient on the error-correction term be negative and not lower than -2 (that is, $-2 < \varphi < 0$). We also take into account the PARCH effects by specifying the error term u_t as follows

$$u_t = e_t h_t^{\frac{1}{2}}, \quad (5)$$

where

²⁶ As pointed out by Loayaza and Rancière (2006) the requirements for the validity of this methodology are that: i) there exists a long-run relationship between the variables of interest and, ii) the dynamic specification of the model is sufficiently augmented so that the regressors are strictly exogenous and the resulting residual is serially uncorrelated.

²⁷ For details on the “ARDL approach,” see Pesaran (1997) and Pesaran and Shin (1999).

$$h_t^{\frac{\delta}{2}} = \omega + \alpha |u_{t-1}|^{\delta} + \beta h_{t-1}^{\frac{\delta}{2}}.$$

Table 8 presents the results on the estimation of short and long-run parameters linking the four explanatory variables with growth. In all cases, the estimated coefficient on the error correction term (φ) lies within the dynamically stable range $(-2, 0)$. From investigating whether dynamic considerations affect our conclusions, we find important differences in terms of short and long-run behavior of our explanatory variables, more specifically, while the effect of public deficit (negative) is similar in the long- and short-run, that of the UK interest rate is negative in the short- and positive in the long-run. Interestingly, trade openness has only a positive long-run impact on growth.

Table 9 presents the results on the estimation of the dynamic parameters linking informal instability and financial development with growth. In all cases, the estimated coefficient on the error correction term (φ) lies within the dynamically stable range $(-2, 0)$. More precisely, the estimates of φ for informal instability and financial development lie within the range -0.74 to -0.43 and -0.85 to -0.55 , respectively.

Regarding the short and long-run estimates, θ and ζ we focus our analysis first on those obtained from the informal instability variables. All four estimates of the short-run coefficients are highly significant and negative and for two cases their absolute values are higher than the corresponding values for the long-run coefficients (for assassinations, the long-run effect is not significantly different from zero). This provides supporting evidence for the notion that the duration of the political instability effect does indeed matter and, for antigovernment demos and assassinations, such effects tend to be considerably stronger in the short- than in the long-run as previously noted by Campos and Nugent (2002) and Murdoch and Sandler (2004).

Next we discuss the results regarding the financial development variables. In the long-run, we find that financial development affects growth positively. This result is very much in line with the large empirical literature reviewed by Levine (2005) and it is interesting we can reproduce it with our rather

different methodology. Maybe more interestingly, the short-run coefficients tell a very differently story: we find that the short-run impact of financial development on growth is negative and significant. Thus our results square well with recent findings by Loayaza and Rancière (2006), among others, in that the sign of the relationship between economic growth and financial development depends on whether the movements are temporary or permanent (the effect being negative in the former and positive in the latter.) Finally, it is noteworthy that our results are robust to various measures of financial development and also that the stronger long-run effects we obtain are for our measures of financial efficiency rather than for our measures of the size of the financial sector (according to Levine, 2005, this is also in line with the recent evidence).

5.4 Breaks

One final important robustness test regards the role of structural breaks. We use the methodology developed by Bai and Perron (2003) to examine whether there are any structural breaks in growth, its volatility, the various political instability series and the first differences of the four financial development variables. Bai and Perron (2003) address the problem of testing for multiple structural changes under very general conditions on the data and the errors. In addition to testing for the existence of breaks, these statistics identify the number and location of multiple breaks.

In the case of the economic growth series (and, interestingly, also for growth volatility) the Bai-Perron methodology supports two structural break points.²⁸ The first occurs for year 1922 and the second for year 1964. For our political instability variables, we find no structural breaks for the assassinations, guerilla warfare, cabinet and constitutional changes series,²⁹ and we also find no breaks in the four financial development variables.

However, our Bai-Perron results support that general strikes have one structural break, which is dated for year 1955. This is a result of great importance: 1955 is the year of the military coup in which President Juan Domingo Perón was overthrown by the military thus concluding a defining chapter in

²⁸ As a measure of volatility we use the power transformed absolute growth $|y_t|^d$.

²⁹ Our data shows no guerilla warfare before 1948 and after 1977.

Argentine history. Further, we also find one structural break in cabinet size and legislative elections (they are dated 1946 and 1949, respectively) while in anti-government demonstrations we find two breaks dated 1954 and 1972.³⁰

In what follows, we incorporate dummy variables in the equations (1), (2) and (5), thus taking into account breaks in the political instability variables and in the volatility of growth. First, we introduce the following notation. D_{1t}, D_{2t} are (intercept) dummies defined as $D_{1t}, D_{2t} = 1$ in the periods 1922-2000 and 1964-2000, respectively, and $D_{1t}, D_{2t} = 0$ otherwise. Similarly, D_{it} is a (slope) dummy indicating the period which starts from the year of the break in the political instability variable (x_{it}). For example for strikes and government crises $D_{it} = 1$ in the period from 1955 to 2000 whereas for cabinet size $D_{it} = 1$ during the period from 1946 until the end of the sample.

The augmented model is given by

$$y_t = c + kh_t + \lambda x_{it} + \lambda_d D_{it} x_{it} + \varepsilon_t,$$

and

$$h_t^2 = \omega + \omega_1 D_{1t} + \omega_2 D_{2t} + \alpha h_{t-1}^2 f(e_{t-1}) + \beta h_{t-1}^2 + \gamma y_{t-1} + \phi x_{it} + \phi_d D_{it} x_{it}. \quad (6)$$

Recall that the coefficients φ and λ capture the impacts of the political instability variable on growth and its volatility respectively. Similarly, φ_d and λ_d correspond to the two effects from the year of the break onwards. Thus the two effects are captured by φ and λ in the period up to the year of the structural break, and by $\varphi + \varphi_d$ and $\lambda + \lambda_d$ during the period from the year of the break until the end of the sample. As above in order to study the direct effects of political instability and financial development we

³⁰ With arguably one exception (anti-government demonstrations in 1972, which were motivated by demands for the return of Perón from exile), all the structural breaks in our political instability series occur during Perón governments. Perón was elected president three times. His first term is from 1946 to 1952. He is re-elected in 1951, his second term starts in 1952 and ends abruptly in 1955. His third term is between 1973 (allowed to return from Spain after 18-year exile) and 1974 (suffers fatal heart attack.) Although marked by severe economic problems, the second term (1951 to 1955) is more often remembered by the political instability (the various terrorist attacks being a sad prelude to the so-called “Dirty War” of 1970s.)

specify model 1 with $\varphi = \varphi_d = 0$, while model 2 with $\lambda = \lambda_d = 0$ allows us to investigate their indirect impacts on growth.

We also incorporate intercept dummies and level effects in the conditional variance equation (5), as follows

$$h_t^{\frac{\delta}{2}} = \omega + \omega_1 D_{1t} + \omega_2 D_{2t} + \alpha |u_{t-1}|^{\delta} + \beta h_{t-1}^{\frac{\delta}{2}} + \gamma y_{t-l} \quad (7)$$

Overall, we find our results (not reported) to be quite robust to the inclusion of the structural break dummies.³¹ That is, (i) informal instability have a direct negative effect on growth, while formal instability have an indirect (through volatility) negative impact on growth, (ii) financial development affects growth positively in the long-run but negatively in the short-run, (iii) the effects of the informal instability are significantly stronger in the short- than in the long-run.

It is also noteworthy that the causal negative effect of strikes reflects the period 1955-2000, which is not surprising given the intricate relationship between the Peron government and organized labor. Interestingly, before 1949 there is no causal effect from legislative elections to growth volatility, whereas after 1949 a negative impact began to exist. Finally, the coefficient of M3 over GDP also becomes insignificant, while the same does not happen to the other measures, which go beyond the size of the financial sector.

6. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Using a PARCH framework and data for Argentina from approximately 1890 to 2000 we ask the following questions: What is the relationship between, on the one hand, financial development (domestic and international), inflation, trade openness and political instability and, on the other hand, economic

³¹ The results (not reported) are also robust to the inclusion of intercept dummies (D_{1t}, D_{2t}) in the mean equation for growth as well.

growth and (predicted) growth volatility? Are these effects fundamentally and systematically different? Does the intensity and the direction (the sign) of these effects vary over time, in general and, in particular, do they vary with respect to short- versus long-run considerations? We find that the main explanatory factors, solely in terms of their direct effects on economic growth in Argentina, turn out to be financial development and trade openness. Although informal political instability also seems to play an important role, we find that only one aspect seems to survive our battery of sensitivity tests, guerrilla warfare. Further, we find robust evidence that both formal political instability and trade openness affect growth indirectly via its volatility. No other variables in our basic set exhibit such robust estimates of their indirect effects. From investigating whether dynamic considerations affect our conclusions, we find important differences in terms of short and long-run behavior of our key variables, more specifically, while the effect of political instability (negative) is similar in the long- and short-run, that of financial development is negative in the short- and positive in the long-run whereas trade openness has only a positive long-run impact.

These findings are interesting in themselves but they also matter because they raise a number of new questions that we believe may be useful in motivating future research. Here we highlight two suggestions. Regarding the role of finance in the process of economic development, our finding reinforces a large body of previous research in that we also show a strong, positive impact of financial development on growth in the long-run. We find that different forms of political instability affect growth through different channels over different time windows, making up for a strong and rather resilient effect that seem really too powerful vis-à-vis the benefits brought to the table by financial development. We can not forget however that Argentina is unique: no other country in the world since the Industrial Revolution went from riches to rags. Put it differently, Argentina is an outlier and further research could try to replicate our analysis using the historical experience of other countries (ideally in a panel setting). That is, to study the relationship between financial development and economic growth in a panel of developing countries would strengthen what we know. Yet, the data requirements are very heavy indeed, with most developing countries lacking historical data even on key figures, such as per capita GDP, going back to the beginning or middle of the

XIXth century. This, of course, does not make this task less important.

The second suggestion refers to a possible methodological improvement, namely the application of the bivariate GARCH model to the problem at hand (albeit the relatively small number of observations). The joint estimation of the political instability-financial development-growth system in a panel of countries would clearly represent progress and is something we feel future research should try to address.

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Table 1. Direct effects on Economic Growth,
(P)ARCH estimates

$x_{it} \downarrow$	k	α	β	δ	λ
Inflation	1.05 (2.42)	0.48 (4.34)	0.69 (7.66)	0.80 –	-4×10^{-5} (0.71)
Trade Openness	0.90 (1.95)	0.77 (3.63)	0.47 (2.28)	0.80 –	-0.06 (1.73)
Public Deficit	0.72 (1.94)	0.95 (3.05)	0.43 (2.00)	0.90 –	-0.07 (3.13)
UK Interest Rate	0.94 (3.86)	0.82 (3.64)	0.44 (1.61)	0.90 –	-0.0007 (0.37)
Guerilla Warfare	1.00 (3.69)	0.77 (5.43)	0.47 (3.13)	0.90 –	-0.0013 (4.35)
Constitutional Changes	1.80 (1.99)	0.56 (3.01)	0.48 (1.25)	0.80 –	-0.0027 (1.35)
Private Deposits/GDP	0.76 (2.66)	0.70 (4.99)	0.57 (4.94)	0.80 –	0.98 (9.21)

Table 1 reports parameter estimates for the following model:

$$y_t = c + kh_t + \lambda x_{it} + \varepsilon_t, \text{ and}$$

$$h_t^{\frac{\delta}{2}} = \omega + \alpha h_{t-1}^{\frac{\delta}{2}} |e_{t-1}|^{\delta} + \beta h_{t-1}^{\frac{\delta}{2}}$$

The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.

Table 2. Direct Effect of Political Instability/Financial Development and Inflation on Economic Growth, (P)ARCH estimates

	k	λ_1	λ_2	α	β	δ
Panel A. Informal Political Instability $x_{it}^{(pi)}$						
Anti-Government Demos	0.83 (3.16)	-0.0007 (1.62)	-3×10^{-5} (0.44)	0.78 (3.49)	0.47 (1.79)	0.90 -
Assassinations	0.84 (2.14)	-0.0010 (1.58)	-1×10^{-5} (0.25)	0.83 (4.42)	0.47 (2.18)	1.00 -
Guerilla Warfare	0.80 (3.12)	-0.0012 (4.52)	4×10^{-7} (0.01)	0.95 (6.16)	0.43 (2.83)	1.00 -
Strikes	1.08 (2.36)	-0.0013 (1.38)	-1×10^{-5} (0.25)	0.67 (3.94)	0.56 (4.91)	1.00 -
Panel B. Formal Political Instability $x_{it}^{(pi)}$						
Cabinet Changes	1.39 (2.49)	-0.0120 (1.39)	-2×10^{-5} (0.14)	0.55 (1.85)	0.54 (1.21)	0.90 -
Cabinet Size	1.24 (3.02)	-3×10^{-5} (0.29)	-4×10^{-6} (0.08)	0.44 (4.75)	0.70 (9.69)	0.80 -
Constitutional Changes	1.61 (2.40)	-0.0002 (0.06)	-7×10^{-6} (0.10)	0.34 (3.69)	0.77 (10.19)	0.80 -
Legislative Elections	0.78 (2.37)	-0.0005 (0.31)	-2×10^{-5} (0.33)	0.69 (4.35)	0.58 (4.21)	0.90 -
Panel C. Financial Development ($x_{it}^{(fd)}$)						
Private Deposits/GDP	1.52 (2.14)	0.99 (5.79)	4×10^{-5} (0.94)	0.79 (4.47)	0.56 (6.79)	0.90 -
Savings Bank Deposits/GDP	0.61 (2.18)	0.59 (2.99)	3×10^{-6} (0.11)	0.78 (4.64)	0.55 (4.25)	0.80 -
M3/GDP	0.70 (1.96)	0.29 (1.06)	-9×10^{-6} (0.15)	0.86 (3.77)	0.48 (2.79)	0.90 -
M1/GDP	0.55 (1.71)	0.50 (3.00)	-2×10^{-5} (0.94)	1.11 (3.31)	0.36 (1.34)	0.90 -

Table 2 reports parameter estimates for the following model:

$$y_t = c + kh_t + \lambda_1 x_{it}^{(j)} + \lambda_2 \pi_t + \varepsilon_t, \quad h_t^{\frac{\delta}{2}} = \omega + \alpha h_{t-1}^{\frac{\delta}{2}} |e_{t-1}|^{\delta} + \beta h_{t-1}^{\frac{\delta}{2}},$$

where the superscript j indicates either a political instability (pi) or financial development (fd) variable, and π_t denotes inflation.

The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.

Table 3. Direct Effect of Informal Political Instability/Financial Development and Trade Openness/Public Deficit/UK Interest rate on Economic Growth, (P)ARCH estimates

x_{it} :	Trade Openness		Public Deficit		UK Interest rate	
	λ_1	λ_2	λ_1	λ_2	λ_1	λ_2
Panel A. Informal Political Instability (x_{it}^{pi})						
Anti-Government Demos	-0.0013 (2.08)	-0.02 (1.43)	-0.0010 (1.69)	-0.003 (0.14)	-0.0011 (1.32)	-0.006 (11.80)
Assassinations	-0.0018 (2.59)	-0.02 (1.49)	-0.0075 (1.26)	-0.049 (1.73)	-0.0015 (3.09)	-0.002 (2.18)
Guerilla Warfare	-0.0010 (2.52)	-0.04 (3.26)	-0.0009 (1.87)	-0.013 (0.64)	-0.0012 (3.45)	-0.005 (18.08)
Strikes	-0.0011 (1.78)	-0.04 (2.47)	-0.0025 (4.51)	-0.020 (0.70)	-0.0010 (1.49)	-0.002 (1.30)
Panel B. Financial Development (x_{it}^{fd})						
Private Deposits/GDP	0.58 (2.71)	-0.04 (1.35)	0.92 (4.31)	-0.01 (0.47)	1.01 (3.19)	0.0002 (0.16)
Savings Bank Deposits/GDP	0.53 (2.22)	-0.04 (3.96)	0.62 (3.92)	-0.03 (2.67)	0.55 (2.27)	-0.0015 (0.95)
M3/GDP	0.40 (2.06)	-0.07 (2.90)	0.09 (0.59)	-0.03 (0.94)	0.38 (2.59)	-0.0002 (0.15)
M1/GDP	0.42 (5.23)	-0.04 (2.90)	0.55 (2.41)	-0.02 (0.81)	0.55 (2.49)	0.0010 (0.45)

Table 3 reports parameter estimates of λ_1 and λ_2 for the following model:

$$y_t = c + kh_t + \lambda_1 x_{it}^{(j)} + \lambda_2 x_{it} + \varepsilon_t, \quad h_t^{\frac{\delta}{2}} = \omega + \alpha h_{t-1}^{\frac{\delta}{2}} |e_{t-1}|^{\delta} + \beta h_{t-1}^{\frac{\delta}{2}},$$

where the superscript j denotes either an informal political instability (pi) or a financial development (fd) variable and x_{it} indicates either trade openness or public deficit or UK interest rate.

The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.

Table 4. Direct Effect of Informal Political Instability and Financial Development on Economic Growth, (P)ARCH estimates

$x_{it}^{(fd)}$:	Private Deposits/GDP		Savings Bank Deposits/GDP		M3/GDP		M1/GDP	
	λ_1	λ_2	λ_1	λ_2	λ_1	λ_2	λ_1	λ_2
Informal Political Instability ($x_{it}^{(pi)}$)								
Anti-Government Demos	-0.0008 (1.29)	0.83 (10.55)	-0.0001 (0.60)	0.55 (5.15)	-0.0006 (1.41)	0.11 (0.71)	-0.0006 (1.04)	0.36 (3.31)
Assassinations	0.0004 (0.91)	0.94 (9.06)	-0.0002 (0.25)	1.00 (4.13)	-0.0006 (0.44)	0.30 (0.98)	0.0003 (0.48)	0.47 (3.07)
Guerilla Warfare	-0.0009 (2.35)	0.58 (4.49)	-0.0011 (2.91)	0.16 (0.87)	-0.0010 (3.01)	0.04 (0.58)	-0.0007 (2.24)	0.32 (4.74)
Strikes	-0.0006 (1.41)	0.80 (6.59)	-0.0008 (1.95)	0.50 (3.37)	-0.0011 (1.65)	-0.21 (1.53)	-0.0004 (0.76)	0.41 (3.72)

Table 4 reports parameter estimates of λ_1 and λ_2 for the following model:

$$y_t = c + kh_t + \lambda_1 x_{it}^{(pi)} + \lambda_2 x_{it}^{(fd)} + \varepsilon_t, h_t^{\frac{\delta}{2}} = \omega + \alpha h_{t-1}^{\frac{\delta}{2}} | e_{t-1} |^\delta + \beta h_{t-1}^{\frac{\delta}{2}}$$

The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.

Table 5. Indirect effect on Economic Growth, (P)ARCH estimates

$x_{it} \downarrow$	k	α	β	δ	ϕ	γ
Inflation	1.66 (3.03)	0.60 (5.36)	0.54 (7.52)	0.80 —	5×10^{-5} (2.98)	0.24 (2.44)
Trade Openness	1.65 (2.72)	0.75 (6.41)	0.28 (0.16)	0.80 —	-0.20 (3.48)	0.19 (2.69)
Public Deficit	1.02 (2.73)	0.69 (5.45)	0.45 (5.15)	0.80 —	0.12 (2.44)	0.29 (4.76)
UK Interest Rate	1.55 (2.26)	0.50 (2.98)	0.55 (5.35)	1.00 —	0.004 (1.57)	0.15 (4.67)
Guerilla warfare	1.12 (2.46)	0.73 (4.80)	0.46 (4.00)	0.90 —	0.0007 (0.82)	0.10 (2.00)
Constitutional Changes	1.18 (1.94)	0.69 (4.40)	0.45 (4.15)	1.00 —	-0.0077 (3.40)	0.18 (3.75)
Private Deposits/GDP	2.05 (2.23)	0.41 (3.04)	0.62 (6.75)	0.80 —	0.58 (0.53)	0.40 (5.69)

Table 5 reports parameter estimates for the following model:

$$y_t = c + kh_t + \varepsilon_t, \text{ with}$$

$$h_t^{\frac{\delta}{2}} = \omega + \alpha h_{t-1}^{\frac{\delta}{2}} | e_{t-1} |^{\delta} + \beta h_{t-1}^{\frac{\delta}{2}} + \gamma y_{t-6} + \phi x_{it}$$

The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.

Table 6. Indirect Effect of Political Instability/Financial Development and Inflation on Economic Growth, (P)ARCH estimates

	k	α	β	γ	ϕ_1	ϕ_2	δ
Panel A. Informal Political Instability (x_{it}^{pi})							
Anti-Government Demos	3.07 (3.88)	0.45 (3.98)	0.58 (8.53)	0.10 (5.90)	-0.0011 (6.03)	6×10^{-5} (5.39)	1.00 -
Assassinations	2.23 (3.66)	0.59 (4.89)	0.49 (7.83)	0.15 (4.30)	-0.0021 (1.14)	8×10^{-5} (3.35)	0.80 -
Guerilla Warfare	3.33 (3.43)	0.54 (4.47)	0.50 (7.45)	0.12 (5.97)	0.0007 (0.93)	4×10^{-5} (2.10)	0.90 -
Strikes	4.01 (2.44)	0.51 (3.92)	0.54 (7.40)	0.12 (3.59)	0.0013 (1.23)	2×10^{-5} (5.60)	0.80 -
Panel B. Formal Political Instability (x_{it}^{pi})							
Cabinet Changes	1.70 (2.07)	0.44 (6.56)	0.55 (12.90)	0.19 (2.98)	-0.0064 (4.99)	5×10^{-5} (1.47)	1.00 -
Cabinet Size	1.96 (3.36)	0.61 (3.17)	0.56 (6.70)	0.17 (8.89)	-0.0003 (13.42)	6×10^{-5} (2.28)	1.00 -
Constitutional	1.37 (1.54)	0.58 (5.33)	0.51 (5.81)	0.16 (2.06)	-0.0090 (3.82)	2×10^{-5} (0.58)	1.00 -
Legislative Elections	2.86 (2.63)	0.38 (4.99)	0.54 (8.45)	0.16 (5.70)	-0.0161 (2.37)	6×10^{-5} (1.96)	0.90 -
Panel C. Financial Development (x_{it}^{fd})							
Private Deposits/ GDP	2.25 (5.17)	0.40 (4.67)	0.64 (9.04)	0.15 (2.05)	3.05 (3.26)	8×10^{-5} (3.66)	0.90 -
Savings Bank Deposits/ GDP	1.69 (2.19)	0.52 (3.63)	0.55 (6.02)	0.20 (4.09)	-0.04 (0.04)	8×10^{-5} (2.21)	0.80 -
M3/GDP	2.59 (4.64)	0.49 (5.69)	0.55 (7.54)	0.11 (3.30)	1.05 (1.41)	7×10^{-5} (3.34)	0.80 -
M1/GDP	2.11 (3.10)	0.54 (5.99)	0.58 (6.78)	0.25 (2.56)	0.05 (0.07)	5×10^{-5} (6.80)	0.80 -

Table 6 reports parameter estimates for the following model:

$$y_t = c + kh_t + \varepsilon_t, \quad h_t^{\frac{\delta}{2}} = \omega + \alpha h_{t-1}^{\frac{\delta}{2}} | e_{t-1} |^{\delta} + \beta h_{t-1}^{\frac{\delta}{2}} + \gamma y_{t-6} + \phi_1 x_{it}^{(j)} + \phi_2 \pi_t,$$

where the superscript j indicates either a political instability (pi) or a financial development (fd) variable and π_t denotes inflation. The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.

Table 7. Indirect Effect of Formal Political Instability and Trade openness
Public Deficit/UK Interest Rate on Economic Growth, (P)ARCH estimates

x_{it} :	Trade Openness		Public Deficit		UK Interest rate	
	ϕ_1	ϕ_2	ϕ_1	ϕ_2	ϕ_1	ϕ_2
Formal Political Instability (x_{it}^{pi})						
Cabinet Changes	-0.0037 (5.16)	-0.08 (4.73)	-0.0034 (2.28)	0.01 (0.86)	-0.0065 (1.71)	0.01 (4.26)
Cabinet Size	-0.0011 (0.90)	-0.06 (4.14)	-0.0002 (4.52)	0.06 (4.90)	-0.0003 (1.07)	0.02 (1.70)
Constitutional	-0.0123 (10.44)	-0.08 (4.85)	-0.0066 (1.73)	0.08 (3.72)	-0.0116 (7.31)	0.01 (5.11)
Legislative Elections	-0.0100 (2.06)	-0.16 (2.53)	-0.0094 (1.84)	0.01 (0.21)	-0.0063 (3.22)	0.01 (4.65)

Table 7 reports parameter estimates for the following model:

$$y_t = c + kh_t + \varepsilon_t, h_t^{\frac{\delta}{2}} = \omega + \alpha h_{t-1}^{\frac{\delta}{2}} |e_{t-1}|^\delta + \beta h_{t-1}^{\frac{\delta}{2}} + \phi_1 x_{it}^{(pi)} + \phi_2 x_{it} + \gamma y_{t-6},$$

where x_{it} indicates either trade openness or public deficit or UK interest rate.

The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.

Table 8. The short- and long-run Growth effects of Inflation/
Trade Openness/Public Deficit/UK Interest rate

$x_{it} \downarrow$	θ_l	ζ	φ	α	β	δ
Inflation	-5×10^{-5} (0.75) $l=0$	0.0001 (1.53)	-0.88 (9.98)	0.91 (5.22)	0.42 (4.81)	0.90 -
Trade Openness	-0.10 (1.45) $l=3$	0.25 (2.01)	-0.58 (4.83)	0.65 (5.16)	0.61 (7.64)	0.90 -
Public Deficit	-0.11 (9.08) $l=0$	-0.17 (5.88)	-0.60 (25.94)	1.42 (4.08)	0.22 (2.16)	0.80 -
UK Interest rate	-0.015 (4.77) $l=5$	0.016 (4.21)	-0.39 (7.47)	1.27 (3.81)	0.14 (0.95)	0.90 -

Table 8 reports parameter estimates for the following model:

$$\Delta y_t = \mu + \theta \Delta x_{i,t-l} + \varphi(y_{t-1} - c - \zeta x_{i,t-1}) + u_t, \text{ with}$$

$$h_t^{\frac{\delta}{2}} = \omega + \alpha |u_{t-1}|^{\delta} + \beta h_{t-1}^{\frac{\delta}{2}}. \theta \text{ (} l \text{ is the order of the lag) and}$$

ζ capture the short- and long-run effects respectively. φ

indicates the speed of adjustment to the long-run relationship.

The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.

Table 9. The short- and long-run Growth effects of Informal Political Instability/Financial Development

	θ	ζ	φ	α	β	δ
Panel A. Informal Political Instability ($x_{it}^{(pi)}$)						
Antigovernment Demos	-0.0036 (1.81) $l=5$	-0.0017 (2.37)	-0.43 (6.69)	0.84 (4.11)	0.51 (4.58)	0.80 -
Assassinations	-0.0010 (2.38) $l=2$	-0.0007 (1.54)	-0.64 (4.52)	1.18 (4.45)	0.34 (2.88)	0.90 -
Guerilla Warfare	-0.0011 (7.00) $l=0$	-0.0017 (3.83)	-0.74 (7.03)	1.14 (5.76)	0.34 (5.24)	0.90 -
Strikes	-0.0014 (4.01) $l=0$	-0.0015 (3.26)	-0.65 (6.34)	1.16 (5.81)	0.31 (4.08)	0.80 -
Panel B. Financial Development ($x_{it}^{(fd)}$)						
Private Deposits/GDP	-1.35 (1.81) $l=5$	0.94 (23.72)	-0.44 (4.64)	0.37 (2.63)	0.80 (6.69)	0.90 -
Savings Bank Deposits/GDP	-0.55 (1.89) $l=1$	0.59 (4.84)	-0.70 (3.23)	0.74 (6.69)	0.56 (6.21)	0.80 -
M3/GDP	-0.16 (3.00) $l=4$	0.16 (1.60)	-0.83 (4.11)	0.81 (6.59)	0.52 (7.19)	0.80 -
M1/GDP	-0.21 (1.91) $l=1$	0.43 (4.20)	-0.85 (4.14)	0.74 (6.89)	0.54 (6.62)	0.80 -

Table 9 reports parameter estimates for the following model:

$\Delta y_t = \mu + \theta \Delta x_{i,t-l}^{(j)} + \varphi(y_{t-1} - c - \zeta x_{i,t-1}^{(j)}) + u_t$, with
 $h_t^{\frac{\delta}{2}} = \omega + \alpha |u_{t-1}|^{\delta} + \beta h_{t-1}^{\frac{\delta}{2}}$. θ (l is the order of the lag) and ζ capture the short- and long-run effects respectively. φ indicates the speed of adjustment to the long-run relationship.

The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.







