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## Ability Matching and Survival of Start-Ups

#### Bettina Müller\*

#### March 2010

#### Abstract

In this paper, I analyse how the survival of new firms is affected by the average ability level in the founding team, the team size, team members' homogeneity with respect to ability, and team members' heterogeneity with respect to education. As a theoretical basis, I apply the O-ring theory (Kremer (1993)). Using a rich employer-employee data set on the whole population of Danish firms founded in 1998, I find that the average ability level in a team and the team size have positive effects on firm survival. Having a team at all is the most crucial factor for the probability of survival of young firms. The degree of homogeneity with respect to ability and the degree of heterogeneity with respect to educations have no effect on the survival probability.

**Keywords:** entrepreneurship, firm survival, O-ring theory, start-ups

JEL Classification: D23, L25, L26, M13

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## 1 Introduction

New firms are regarded to be of substantial importance for the development of an economy, especially for innovation, growth, and the creation of jobs. However, new firms also face a high risk of failure. For example, Mata and Portugal (1994) report that only about half of the firms in their data set survived the first four years and Audretsch (1991) finds that only a third is still in operation after ten years. Thus, there seems to be a high risk connected with the establishment of firms. In order to reduce this risk and to create general conditions which help young firms to be in business for longer periods, it is important to know what determines the survival of new firms in the first years of their existence.

New firms are typically human-capital intensive, and the individuals involved are regarded to be one crucial success factor (see e.g. Gompers and Lerner (2001)). As Fabel (2004a,b) and Fabel and Weber (2005) note, a particular sort of risk may arise in organising human-capital intensive activities: If the skills necessary for running the firm are provided by several individuals who are each a specialist in one particular skill and if the performance of one of these specialists is below a critical level, the whole project can fail. That is: Human-capital intensive activities are likely to be characterised by complementarities in the abilities of the individuals performing the essential tasks. These complementarities could be a reason for the observed high failure rates of young firms.

One way to formalise complementarities in ability is given by the O-ring production approach by Kremer (1993). The O-ring theory assumes that a project consists of a series of tasks, each of which must be fulfilled at a certain minimum level of quality for the project to have success. The survival probability of a firm is given by the joint probability of each team member performing her task at a certain minimum level of quality. For new firms this seems to be an appropriate description since the whole project can fail if only one task is not performed carefully. For example, the best idea is not worth anything if it is not marketed appropriately to potential costumers. The O-ring theory is therefore used as the theoretical basis for deriving hypotheses about the effects of complementarities in abilities on young firms' survival.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Its name originates from the accident of the space shuttle Challenger which exploded in 1986 because of the malfunctioning of only one of its components: the O-rings of the booster.

The O-ring setup assumes a positive effect of ability and a negative effect of team size on firm survival. Ability of workers is conceptualized by the probability to perform an assigned task sufficiently well. Higher ability comes along with lower individual failure rates which increases the survival chances of the firm. On the other hand, since tasks are tied to persons, taking on a further person is a further source of risk since another link in the chain of necessary tasks has to be completed. Thus, it should be observed that, given team size, a higher average ability in the team is associated with a higher survival probability and, given ability, a larger team size is associated with a lower survival probability. These are the first two hypotheses tested in this paper.

The O-ring theory further implies that individuals segregate between firms according to their level of ability. In labour market equilibrium this results in homogeneous workforces within firms. Observing inhomogeneous teams should therefore be a transitory phenomenon caused by imperfect information about each others' abilities. Hence, it is additionally analysed how the degree of homogeneity with respect to team members' ability influences the probability of firm survival. Finally, the fourth variable investigated is the degree of heterogeneity in educations. This is motivated by the assumption that for the different tasks knowledge from different fields is necessary.

For the analyses in this paper, I draw on register data covering the entire population of firms founded in Denmark in 1998 as well as all individuals involved in these new firms. This leaves me with a sample of more than 14,000 firms which are distributed over all sectors of the economy. The data provide rich information on the individuals allowing to control for ability when estimating the effect of size on survival and to determine the degree of homogeneity with respect to ability as well as with respect to educations within firms. Ability is measured by the average hourly wage that the individuals get over their working life.

The results show that both team size and ability have a positive effect on the survival of young firms. Most important is founding in a team at all. In contrast, the homogeneity with respect to ability and the heterogeneity with respect to educations do not effect the probability of firm survival.

The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 the hypotheses for the empirical analysis are derived from the O-ring theory. In Section 3, the data are described. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy and Section 5 the results. Section 6 concludes.

## 2 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses

The O-ring theory goes back to Kremer (1993) and applies to production processes which consist of a series of tasks each of which must be performed at a certain minimum level of quality for the output to have positive market value. Individual ability corresponds to the probability that an individual performs her task sufficiently well. The project as a whole only has a positive outcome if all team members perform their tasks at a certain minimum level of quality. Otherwise, output is zero. This is modelled by including individual abilities multiplicatively in the production function

$$Y = F(k, n) \left[ \prod_{i=1}^{n} q_i \right] n, \tag{1}$$

where k refers to physical capital, n to the number of tasks and  $q_i \in (0,1)$  to the probability that the individual assigned to task i works sufficiently well, which is her ability. Following the literature, it is assumed that each task requires one person, i.e. n is also the number of individuals.<sup>2</sup> According to the exposition above,  $[\prod_{i=1}^{n} q_i]$  can be interpreted as the survival probability of the firm.

The survival probability exhibits the following two properties. First, for a given team size, the survival probability increases in the ability level of each individual in the team

$$\frac{\partial(\left[\prod_{i=1}^{n} q_i\right])}{\partial q_i} = \prod_{i \neq i} q_i > 0, \tag{2}$$

And second, for a given ability level, the survival probability decreases in the size

 $<sup>^{2}</sup>$ In his seminal paper, Kremer (1993) explicitly mentions that n indicates the number of tasks and not necessarily the number of employees. But his exposition of the theory uses the assumption of one person per task and Fabel (2004b) follows him in this respect.

of the  $team^3$ 

$$\frac{\partial(\left[\prod_{i=1}^{n} q_i\right])}{\partial n} = \ln(q)q^n < 0. \tag{3}$$

Formulated as empirical hypotheses, equation (2) and (3) yield

H1a: Given team size, the probability of firm survival increases in the ability level of the team members.

H1b: Given the ability level of the team members, the probability of firm survival decreases in team size.

One can argue that the effect of insufficient task performance on survival depends on the phase of a firm's life cycle. In the conception phase of the business idea the product might have no market value at all if one of the involved team members does not perform her task sufficiently well. Consequently, the firm might have no basis anymore and therefore has to give up. In contrast, if the firm already reached its operation phase, it is no longer inevitable that the firm dissolves if someone makes a mistake. Low-level performance during contract fulfillment for one client can be compensated by normal-level performance for another. The firm can make a loss but this loss is not necessarily threatening for the whole business. Nevertheless, the effects concerning ability level and team size on the survival rate should also be observed in the operation phase of the firm, albeit weaker.

The assumption of the O-ring theory that team size is negatively related to firm survival cannot easily be reconciled with the results already established in the literature.<sup>4</sup> The existing studies almost unanimously come to the conclusion that size is positively related to survival. The positive relationship between size and survival is sometimes even regarded as a stylized fact (Geroski (1995), Sutton (1997), Caves (1998)). However, most of the papers cannot control for ability due to data restrictions. Taking equation 2 and 3 together, it is possible that the effect of size appears to be positive as in most of the previous empirical studies.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>In equilibrium, these two effects are balanced and there is a unique failure probability for optimally composed firms. It is even possible to give a value for this failure probability: 0.632.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Evans (1987a,b), Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1989), Phillips and Kirchhoff (1989), Mata and Portugal (1994), Mata, Portugal, and Guimarães (1995), Audretsch and Mahmood (1995), Brüderl, Preisendörfer, and Ziegler (1996), Cabral and Mata (2003), Prantl (2003), and Jørgensen (2005).

This is the case when higher able persons build larger teams. As shown by Kremer (1993), the O-ring theory implies that ability and team size are positively correlated. Thus, the positive effect of team size found empirically could result because ability is not controlled for.

Team size also appears to be positively related to survival when human capital variables such as length of education, educational degrees or labor market experience are included in the regressions (Brüderl et al. (1996), Prantl (2003), and Jørgensen (2005)). However, human capital variables only capture part of individuals' ability and may not fully represent the q of the O-ring theory. The theory itself suggests to use wages as representation of ability. To see this, consider a firm that maximizes expected profits and employs only individuals of one ability level<sup>5</sup>

$$\max_{q,k,n} \pi(q,k,n) = pF(k,n)q^n n - w(q)n - rk \tag{4}$$

For the following, a specific functional form for F(k,n) is needed. Normalising output price p to one and specifying output per team member F(k,n) as  $k^{\alpha}n^{1-\alpha}$  as in Fabel (2004b) the firm does not want to change the ability level of its workers if

$$\frac{\partial \pi(q,k,n)}{\partial q} : k^{\alpha} n^{1-\alpha} q^{n-1} n = \frac{dw(q)}{dq}, \tag{5}$$

i.e. if marginal revenue of changing the ability level equals marginal costs. The first order condition with respect to capital k is

$$\frac{\partial \pi(q, k, n)}{\partial k} : \alpha k^{\alpha - 1} n^{1 - \alpha} q^n = r.$$
 (6)

Solving equation 6 for k, inserting it into equation 5, and integration yields<sup>6</sup>

$$w^*(q) = (1 - \alpha) \left(\frac{\alpha}{r}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha}} (n^*)^{\frac{1}{1 - \alpha}} q^{\frac{n^*}{1 - \alpha}}.$$
 (7)

This is a monotonously increasing function of ability, i.e. each ability level is unambiguously reflected in a certain wage and a higher ability level comes along with a higher wage. In the empirical analysis, wages are therefore used as a measure of ability.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>As will be explained below, the O-ring theory actually implies the sorting of individuals according to their ability, which results in homogeneous workforces within firms.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>The constant of integration is zero since an individual with zero ability destroys the product with certainty and therefore cannot receive positive wages.

Besides insufficient ability, the O-ring theory implies a further reason why a firm can fail: better outside options for at least one team member. These can arise when teams are built with the wrong partners. In the production function (1), the marginal product of ability of the individual assigned to task i is increasing in the average ability levels of the individuals assigned to the other tasks

$$\frac{d^2Y}{dq_i d\left(\prod_{j\neq i} q_j\right)} = F(k, n)n > 0.$$
(8)

This means that skills are complementary.<sup>7</sup> If labour markets are competitive, this implies that firms which have started to employ individuals with the highest ability in the population (and still have suboptimal size) can attract other individuals of the highest ability level since they can pay them the highest wage. Firms with medium ability individuals cannot successfully compete for higher able individuals but are successful in attracting medium ability individuals compared to firms with lower average ability level. This leads to homogeneity in the ability levels of all individuals within firms.

As a theory for describing an equilibrium, the O-ring theory implies that heterogeneous teams are not formed at all since abilities are publicly observable and heterogeneous teams are unattractive for high-ability individuals. Thus, in equilibrium it is useless to search for an effect of the degree of homogeneity on firm survival. But, as shown in Müller (2008), the ability levels of team members in just established firms exhibit a considerable amount of heterogeneity although not as much as in randomly assembled teams. It is possible that this is partly due to measurement error, since ability always has to be approximated somehow. But it might also be the case that abilities are not perfectly observable so that individuals mistakenly choose the wrong partners. Moreover, each individual might only overlook a small set of potential partners. Thus, teams with similar but not the same level of ability are built. If real abilities and suitable partners become known over time only, better outside options for some team members can arise and a firm can close down because of too much diversity in the abilities. Thus, a further hypothesis is

H2: Given average ability and team size, the probability of firm survival increases in the degree of homogeneity with respect to the ability of the team members.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>This is the same concept of complementarity as applied e.g. by Milgrom and Roberts (1990, 1995) in order to explain the joint usage of certain technologies.

As mentioned above, in the literature on the O-ring theory, it is assumed that each task requires one person. This is a rather strong assumption as it rules out the cases where one individual can perform several tasks and several individuals are assigned to one task. But under this assumption, it can be expected that individuals are qualified for certain tasks but not for others due to their field of education. Presumably, a firm with a team consisting of individuals with different educational backgrounds can rely on a broader basis of knowledge and therefore has a higher probability of survival. Hence, a third hypothesis is

H3: Given average ability and team size, the probability of firm survival increases in the degree of heterogeneity in educations of the team members.

With H2 and H3, this paper is also related to the literature of the so called "upper echelons research" in business administration (Hambrick and Mason (1984)), which analyses the impact of team composition on firm performance.<sup>8</sup> However, the focus of the upper echelons research lies mainly on well established and rather big firms.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, none of these studies looks at homogeneity in ability as it is done in this paper and all papers that consider new firms are interested in other outcome variables than survival.

#### 3 Data

The data used in this paper are provided by Statistics Denmark, Denmark's federal statistical office. These are register data, which cover the whole population of firms which are set up in Denmark in 1998 and that were still in operation at the end of that year.<sup>10</sup> The total number of new firms at the end of 1998 amounts to 16,063. On an annual basis, these firms were observed until 2001 or until they shut down.<sup>11</sup> In the start-up year industry of business, legal form and location of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>For overviews, see Carpenter et al., 2004, Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996 or Jackson, 1992.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>Roure and Madique (1986), Roure and Keeley (1990), Ensley, Carland, and Carland (1998), Ensley and Amason (1999), Ensley and Amason (1999), Beckman, Burton, and O'Reilly (2007), and Zimmerman (2008) condsider new firms.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>Firms that started in 1998 and shut down within the same year are not contained in the data set.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>The same procedure has been applied to all firms founded in 1994. However, for these firms it is only possible to merge individual information for the person who registered the firm

the firm are registered. Additionally, the current number of employees and the current amount of exports, purchases, and sales are recorded in the start-up year and at the end of each year during the follow-up period.

By a combination of firm and personal identification numbers (ID), it is possible to link the firm-level information to information on individuals which is stored in the Integrated Database for Labour Market Research (IDA). The IDA database covers a wide range of variables on the total Danish population from 1980 onwards, including the complete education and employment history. The latter can be used to generate the relevant variables for the individuals involved in the new firms in all years. Due to missing information about the employees for some firms, 14,171 firms of the original 16,063 firms can be used for the subsequent analysis.

A drawback of the data is that it is not possible to identify the persons who perform the necessary tasks in the firm. However, as the great majority of the new firms are small entities, each person can be considered to be important.<sup>12</sup> In the following, firms with at least two persons involved are referred to as "team foundations".

## 4 Empirical Approach

The effects of the variables relevant for this paper are determined by estimating a duration model. In principle, the exit of a firm can occur at any time during the year, i.e. survival time is continuous. However, in the data at hand it is only reported whether the respective firm still exists at the end of the year. Since spell lengths are only observed in intervals, a model for interval censored data is estimated. The relevant hazard rate is the probability of exit during year j given survival up to year j-1

$$h_j(X) = P(j-1 < T \le j|T > j-1, X), \tag{9}$$

with the authorities for the start-up year. Since it is essential for determining the degree of homogeneity between team members to either have information on all individuals or to have at least a representative sample of the individuals, the analysis is restricted to the 1998 cohort.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>Figure 1 in the appendix shows the average number of individuals per firm over the whole period of consideration by industry. The total average firm size is 1.7 persons.

where j denotes the half-open interval  $(year_{j-1} - year_j]$ . Duration models based on this type of data can be estimated by applying methods for standard binary outcome models (see e.g. Sueyoshi (1995) and Jenkins (2005)). The dependent variable contains the information whether or not firm i survived year j

$$S_{ij} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if firm } i \text{ survives year } j \\ 0 & \text{if firm } i \text{ does not survive year } j \end{cases}$$
 (10)

The likelihood function is constructed as follows: The probability that firm i survives year j is given by  $P(S_{ij} = 1) = 1 - h_{ij}(X_{ij}, \beta)$ . Correspondingly, the probability that firm i does not survive year j is given by  $P(S_{ij} = 0) = h_{ij}(X_{ij}, \beta)$ . Considering only one firm, the probability for the sequence of outcomes  $s_{ik}$  over the whole period of observation amounts to

$$P(S_{i1} = s_{i1}, S_{i2} = s_{i2}, \dots, S_{ij} = s_{ij}) = \prod_{k=1}^{j} (1 - h_{ik}(X_{ij}))^{s_{ik}} h_{ik}(X_{ij})^{1 - s_{ik}}.$$
 (11)

Since this holds for all firms, the likelihood function for the whole sample is

$$\mathcal{L} = \prod_{i=1}^{n} \left[ \prod_{k=1}^{j} (1 - h_{ik}(X_{ij}))^{s_{ik}} h_{ik}(X_{ij}))^{1 - s_{ik}} \right].$$
 (12)

Taking logs, the loglikelihood function is

$$\log \mathcal{L} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{k=1}^{j} [s_{ik} \log(1 - h_{ik}(X_{ij}))) + (1 - s_{ik}) \log(h_{ik}(X_{ij}))].$$
 (13)

One observation is a firm-year combination and the probability of surviving the following year is estimated.

To make the model estimable, a functional form for the hazard rate  $h_{ik}(X_{ij})$  must be chosen. In principle, any continuous distribution function can be used. As it is known from practical applications of binary choice models, the results are not very sensitive to the functional form of the distribution functions. Therefore, the choice of the functional form for the hazard rate reduces to the question what can be implemented easiest. For this paper, the logistic distribution is chosen which turns equation (13) into a likelihood function of a pooled logit model. In order to allow the hazard rate to vary with survival time (duration dependence), year dummies are added to the list of regressors. To account for firm heterogeneity which is not captured in the observable variables, a random effects logit is estimated. In this case the hazard rate becomes

$$h_{ik} = \frac{exp(X_i'\beta + c_i)}{1 + exp(X_i'\beta + c_i)},\tag{14}$$

where  $c_i$  reflects the unobservable firm effect. In random effects models for binary variables, it is assumed that this effect is sampled along with the dependent variable and observable independent variables and it is removed by integrating it out.<sup>13</sup> Here, the distribution of  $c_i$  is assumed to be  $N \sim (0, \sigma_c)$  and the removal of this effect is carried out with the default approximation routine implemented in STATA's xtlogit command.

In Table 1, the distribution of the life duration of the firms in the data set is shown. At the end of the observation period in 2001, only about half of the firms still exist. The largest number of exits occurs in the second year after foundation.

Table 1: Survival and hazard rates

	surviving firms	number of exits	survival rate	hazard rate
1998	14,171	0	1.000	0
1999	11,822	2,349	0.834	0.166
2000	8,994	2,828	0.635	0.239
2001	7,369	1,625	0.520	0.181

Source: Statistics Denmark, author's calculations.

## Measurement and Specification

As mentioned in Section 2, wages are used to measure ability. Statistics Denmark provides the average hourly wage once per year for each year the individual was wage employed. For the analyses in this paper, these wages are corrected for inflation, disciplines, and industry effects. The goal of correcting the wages this way is to exclude all components which do not represent ability.<sup>14</sup> After the

 $<sup>^{13} \</sup>mathrm{For}$  details, see e.g. Wooldridge (2002), pp. 482.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>The effects of disciplines and industries were corrected for to take out demand effects: If, for example, engineers are in short supply, their wages rise due to the working of the market forces and not due to an increase in their abilities in the first line. See Müller (2008) for further discussion of the wage correcting procedure.

correction, the average lifetime hourly wage of an individual is calculated, starting with her year of labour market entry until 2001. Thus, for the estimations in this paper, the ability level in a team is the average of the corrected lifetime wages across all team members. The degree of homogeneity of abilities is determined by calculating the standard deviation of the corrected lifetime wages. For easier interpretation, the negative of the standard deviations is included in the regressions.

As a measure of the degree of heterogeneity in education, the Herfindahl-Index of the highest education attained is calculated for each team. The Herfindahl-Index is a measure of concentration. For the purpose of this paper, it is computed as

$$H = \sum_{i=1}^{n} s_i^2, \tag{15}$$

where  $s_i$  denotes the share of education i in a team.

The range of possible values of the Herfindahl-Index depends on the number of individuals in a team. To correct for this and to make the Herfindahl-Index better comparable between teams of different size, the index is transformed to the [0,1]-interval in the following way

$$H^{tr} = 1 - \left(H - \frac{1}{n}\right) \frac{n}{n-1} \in [0,1].$$
 (16)

As a result, it takes on the value zero if all individuals have the same education and becomes one if each individual attained a different education. With this transformation, teams in different firms are treated as equally diverse if all individuals have different educations, independently of team size.

The variable the Herfindahl-Index is based on can take on more than 1,000 values, i.e. it provides highly detailed information on the education of the individuals. Since the educational degree is only a crude measure for the task actually fulfilled in the firm, there is no obvious level of aggregation for this variable. In this paper, the variable has not been aggregated in any respect for calculating the Herfindahl-Index.

The empirical model is estimated in two different versions: In the first, only characteristics of the start-up year are considered. This takes account of the

fact that the conditions at start have a lasting effect on the organisation and the outcome of young firms (e.g. Mata and Portugal (1994) or Baron, Burton, and Hannan (1996)). The second version allows the regressors to take on different values over time.

As control variables, the share of exports in sales and regional as well as industry dummies are used. Since it is assumed that all relevant observable and unobservable abilities of the individuals are reflected in the wages, no further ability measures are included in the regressions. In order to account for the conjecture that the marginal effect of the first partner is different from the marginal effect of a second or a third partner, a dummy which takes the value one if at least two persons are involved in the firm is included in addition to the variable "team size".

Table 2 and Table 3 show descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regressions. The numbers are based on firm-year combinations. Table 2 shows the figures for characteristics in the start-up year whereas in Table 3 it is allowed that the variables change over time. Surviving firms exhibit a higher average ability, but also have more employees than non-surviving firm. And teams in surviving firms are less homogeneous with respect to ability and less heterogeneous with respect to educations than in non-surviving firms.

Table 2: Descriptive statistics - Start-up year characteristics

variable	all	firms	surviv	ing firms	non-surviving firms		
	mean	std.dev.	mean	std.dev.	mean	std.dev.	
avg. ability	3.731	0.325	3.735	0.321	3.714	0.340	
team size	1.456	1.830	1.511	1.941	1.215	1.189	
team (y/n)	0.133	0.340	0.147	0.355	0.069	0.253	
homogeneity in abilities	-0.036	0.113	-0.040	0.118	-0.019	0.087	
heterogeneity in educations	0.115	0.308	0.127	0.321	0.061	0.232	
share of exports in sales	0.020	0.123	0.022	0.126	0.015	0.108	
copenhagen	0.429	0.495	0.422	0.494	0.459	0.498	
city	0.299	0.458	0.297	0.457	0.306	0.461	
rural	0.273	0.445	0.281	0.450	0.234	0.424	
low-technology	0.020	0.141	0.022	0.148	0.011	0.106	
medium-low technology	0.010	0.099	0.011	0.103	0.007	0.081	
medium-high technology	0.002	0.049	0.002	0.049	0.002	0.047	
high technology	0.135	0.342	0.146	0.353	0.089	0.284	
construction	0.099	0.298	0.100	0.300	0.091	0.288	
wholesale trade	0.034	0.180	0.035	0.183	0.030	0.169	
retail trade	0.197	0.397	0.184	0.388	0.252	0.434	
hotels, restaurants	0.062	0.242	0.057	0.232	0.084	0.278	
knowlintens. high-tech serv.	0.108	0.310	0.104	0.306	0.124	0.330	
knowlintens. market serv.	0.199	0.399	0.202	0.402	0.183	0.387	
other knowlintens. serv.	0.033	0.179	0.035	0.183	0.027	0.163	
freight transport	0.101	0.301	0.101	0.302	0.100	0.300	
number of observations	31	,992	26	5,129	5	5,863	

Notes: The numbers are based on firm-year combinations.

Source: Statistics Denmark, author's calculations.

Table 3: Descriptive statistics - Time-varying characteristics

variable	all	firms	survivi	ing firms	non-surviving firms		
	mean	std.dev.	mean	std.dev.	mean	std.dev.	
avg. ability	3.724	0.322	3.727	0.319	3.713	0.337	
team size	1.697	2.621	1.804	2.819	1.199	1.230	
team (y/n)	0.178	0.382	0.204	0.403	0.055	0.227	
homogeneity of ability	-0.051	0.134	-0.059	0.142	-0.016	0.079	
heterogeneity in educations	0.153	0.347	0.176	0.366	0.048	0.207	
share of exports in sales	0.022	0.126	0.023	0.129	0.014	0.109	
number of observations	31	,895	26	5,273	5,622		

Notes: The numbers are based on firm-year combinations.

Source: Statistics Denmark, author's calculations.

#### 5 Results

Table 4 shows the estimation results. The figures are the marginal effects calculated at the mean of the independent variables. For the estimations in columns (1) and (2), only the values of the respective variables in the start-up year are considered. Columns (3) and (4) show the results when the values of the variables are updated each year. As can be seen from the critical value of the LR-test  $(\bar{\chi}_{01}^2)$ , the hypothesis that unobserved effects do not play a role can be rejected for both versions of the empirical model. Therefore, only the results from the RE logit are considered in the following.

Concerning the effect of ability and team size, it turns out that both the average ability in a team and the size of the team have a positive impact on the survival probability. Additionally, having a team at all has a much stronger effect on survival than including a further person in a team. Considering only start-up year characteristics, an increase of the average ability by one standard deviation increases the probability of survival by 1 percentage point. An additional team member yields a 0.5 percentage points higher survival rate but the first partner increases the survival probability by 12 percentage points. Allowing for time varying characteristics, the effects remain roughly the same both regarding sign

Table 4: Results (marginal effects)

start-up year characteristics time-varying characteristics

dep. var.: survival of the following year (yes/no)

	start-up year characteristics								
	pooled	logit	RE lo	ogit	pooled	logit	RE lo	git	
	coeff.	std.err.	coeff.	std.err.	coeff.	std.err.	coeff.	std.err.	
	(1)	)	(2)	)	(3)	)	(4)		
avg. ability	0.031***	0.006	0.033***	0.007	0.028***	0.006	0.030***	0.007	
team size	0.004**	0.002	0.005**	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.004***	0.002	
team (y/n)	0.114***	0.017	0.118***	0.017	0.149***	0.014	0.118***	0.015	
homogeneity in abilities	0.015	0.041	0.016	0.044	-0.022	0.040	-0.021	0.034	
heterogeneity in educations	-0.022	0.030	-0.024	0.032	-0.007	0.031	-0.012	0.025	
share of exports in sales	0.050**	0.021	0.052***	0.021	0.047**	0.020	0.044**	0.019	
regional dummies (ref.cat. cope	enhagen)								
city	0.012**	0.005	0.013**	0.005	0.009*	0.005	0.011**	0.005	
rural	0.038***	0.005	0.041***	0.006	0.036***	0.005	0.039***	0.005	
industry dummies (ref.cat. low-	technology	)							
medium-low technology	0.056***	0.016	0.058***	0.016	0.039**	0.017	0.038***	0.014	
medium-high technology	0.040*	0.022	0.043*	0.022	0.035*	0.021	0.036**	0.017	
high technology	-0.016	0.047	-0.015	0.053	-0.015	0.045	-0.005	0.052	
construction	0.041***	0.012	0.041***	0.012	0.022*	0.012	0.021*	0.012	
wholesale trade	-0.011	0.014	-0.013	0.016	-0.014	0.014	-0.018	0.017	
retail trade	-0.074***	0.015	-0.083***	0.019	-0.074***	0.015	-0.100***	0.023	
hotels, restaurants	-0.130***	0.020	-0.150***	0.029	-0.155***	0.021	-0.230***	0.042	
knowlintens. high-tech serv.	-0.034***	0.015	-0.037**	0.017	-0.030**	0.014	-0.036**	0.019	
knowlintens. market serv.	0.002	0.013	0.001	0.014	0.006	0.012	0.004	0.014	
other knowlintens. serv.	0.026*	0.015	0.027*	0.016	0.031**	0.014	0.029**	0.013	
freight transport	-0.015	0.014	-0.016	0.016	-0.025*	0.014	-0.028	0.018	
time dummies (ref.cat. 1999)									
2000	-0.091***	0.005	-0.111***	0.018	-0.087***	0.005	-0.173***	0.014	
2001	-0.044***	0.006	-0.083**	0.035	-0.044***	0.006	-0.232***	0.036	
pseudo- $\mathbb{R}^2$	0.036				0.057				
log likelihood	-14,686.78	9	-14,685.74	2	-14,005.66	1	-13,979.795		
$ar{\chi}^2_{01}$			2.09*				51.73***		
number of observations	31,992		31,992		31,895		31,895		

Notes: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* depict significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Marginal effects are calculated at the means of the independent variables. For the calculation of the marginal effects of the RE logit, the random effect is set to its mean value zero. For a detailed description of the combined industries, see Table 5 in the appendix. Source: Statistics Denmark, author's calculations.

and magnitude. H1a cannot be rejected but H1b can. Thus, I cannot find the countervailing effect of team size and ability in the failure probability suggested by the O-ring theory. Instead, I can corroborate the finding of earlier studies stating that firms founded with a higher number of persons have higher survival chances. Interestingly, this result appears even when ability is controlled for.

The effects of homogeneity in abilities and heterogeneity in educations can be found in row three and four of Table 4. Obviously, the degree of homogeneity in abilities and the degree of heterogeneity do not have any effect on the survival probability of young firms. This result casts doubt an the assumption that team heterogeneity is an important variable to explain firm performance as put forward in the upper echelons literature. These doubts concern at least new firms. What is striking about the previous studies on new firms is that it is obviously difficult to identify any effect of team heterogeneity at all. However, this could also be a small number-problem as the authors of the previous studies rely on rather few firms and selected industries. In contrast, the analysis in this paper uses a high number of observations but also finds no effect. This suggests that team heterogeneity is rather unimportant for firm performance.

A possible reason for the missing effect of team heterogeneity is that diversity is a double-edged sword (Hambrick, Cho, and Chen (1996), Ensley and Amason (1999)). Concerning ability, it is attractive for a high ability individual to look for other high ability individuals because of their lower failure probability. On the other hand, high ability individuals also demand a high compensation for their labour input. Thus, if not all tasks are essential for the success of the project — and it seems that they are not — it could simply be cheaper to employ an individual with low ability. Concerning educations, heterogeneity may provide a broader basis of knowledge. But on the other hand, different educations also represents different modes to interpret the world what could lead to misunderstandings and even to conflict among the team members. Overall, the effects can cancel out.

With the results presented in Table 4, the O-ring theory does not describe the situation in young firms very well. However, one can argue that the theory only applies to a subset of industries. Task complementarity might only be particular for the production environments in certain sectors. However, this is not confirmed in the data. To account for the probable limited applicability of the theory the

regressions are performed separately for different industries. This differentiation does not lead to any results systematically different from those found for all firms. However, as can be seen in Table 6 and Table 7 in the appendix, the main results are driven by the firms in the service sectors.

Moreover, it might be the case that firms founded with university graduates are better described by the O-ring theory than firms founded without university graduates. The reason is that firms with university graduates are more likely to deal with innovative products and therefore with more complex technologies which require specialists in different fields. Good matching might therefore be particularly important for these firms. However, as shown in Table 8 in the appendix, regressions run for firms founded with university graduates only, again do not lead to major differences compared to the effects for all firms. The only deviation from the results for all firms is that for team with university graduates it is only important to have a team at all. A further team member has no additional effect. This again confirms the conjecture that the step from a single entrepreneur to a team is the crucial step to increase the probability of survival of young firms.

## 6 Conclusions

In this paper, I analyse how the survival of young firms is affected by the average level of ability in a team, the team size, team members' homogeneity with respect to ability, and team members' heterogeneity with respect to educations. As theoretical basis the O-ring theory of production is used. It turns out that the average level of ability in a team and the team size have positive effects on a firms' probability to survive the next year. Most important is having a team at all. In contrast, homogeneity with respect to ability and heterogeneity with respect to educations do not have any effect on the probability of survival.

With these results, the O-ring theory does not seem to apply to young firms. Presumably, the main reason is that it does not allow for redundancies. One good worker cannot be substituted by two mediocre workers in the theory. This is an extreme assumption. If tasks are really critical, it might be worthwhile to back up these tasks with a second person who checks the work output of the first.

Furthermore, it is probably always possible to absorb mistakes in the course of the project at least to some extent.

For policy, the results of this paper suggest that young firms can be supported in their longevity by making sure that several persons are involved and the ability of the persons is as high as possible. However, the degree of diversity in ability and educations can be neglected.

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
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
# Appendix

Table 5: Definition of industries

	NACE - code	description
	15 10	
ow-technology	15, 16	food, beverages and tobacco
	17, 18, 19	textile and clothing
	20, 21, 22	wood, pulp, paper products, printing and publish
		ing
	36, 37	other manufacturing and recycling
medium-low technology	23	coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fue
	25	rubber and plastic products
	26	non-metallic mineral products
	27	basic metals
	28	fabricated metal products
	351	shipbuilding
medium-high technology	24, excl. 24.4	chemicals excl. pharmaceuticals
	29	non-electrical machinery
	31	electric machinery
	34	motor vehicles
	352, 354, 355	other transport equipment
nigh-technology	244	pharmaceuticals
3,	30	computers, office machinery
	32	electronics, communication
	33	scientific instruments
	353	aerospace
knowledge-intensive	64	post and telecommunications
nigh-tech services	72	computer and related activities
9	73	research and development
knowledge-intensive	61	water transport
market services (excl.	62	air transport
inancial inter-	70	real estate activities
mediation)	71	renting of machinery and equipment w/o operator
	, -	and of personal and household goods
		other business activities
	74	Other Business activities
other knowledge	, -	
other knowledge- ntensive services	74 80 85	education health and social work

**Source:** OECD (2003).





Reading aid: Firms in the knowledge-intensive market services have on average 1.50 individuals during the period 1998 to 2001.

A \* at the sector names indicates whether firms with university graduates differ significantly from firms without university graduates at the 5% level. For a detailed description of the combined industries, see Table 5. **Source:** Statistics Denmark, author's calculations.

Table 6: Results (marginal effects) for firms founded in the manufacturing sector

dep. var.: survival of the	following	year (ye	s/no)						
	start-	up year	characteri	stics	time-varying characteristics				
	pooled	logit	RE logit		pooled logit		RE logit		
	coeff.	std.err.		std.err.	coeff.	std.err.	coeff.	std.err.	
	(1)	)	(2)		(3)		(4)		
avg. ability	0.035	0.024	0.004*	0.003	0.023	0.023	0.014	0.012	
team size	0.004	0.004	0.000	0.000	-0.001	0.003	0.000	0.001	
team (y/n)	-0.059	0.078	-0.003	0.012	0.169***	0.064	0.061*	0.034	
homogeneity in abilities	-0.095	0.119	-0.010	0.012	0.076	0.128	0.027	0.048	
heterogeneity in educations	0.092	0.063	0.007	0.008	-0.126	0.149	-0.047	0.041	
share of exports in sales	0.040	0.072	0.003	0.005	0.040	0.060	0.019	0.025	
$regional\ dummies$ (ref.cat. co	penhagen)								
city	0.020	0.016	0.002	0.001	0.014	0.016	0.007	0.008	
rural	0.035**	0.016	0.003*	0.002	0.026*	0.016	0.014	0.009	
$industry\ dummies\ (ref. cat.\ lo$	w-technolog	y)							
medium-low technology	0.048***	0.015	0.004**	0.002	0.034**	0.015	0.015*	0.009	
medium-high technology	0.032*	0.018	0.002*	0.001	0.029*	0.017	0.012	0.008	
high technology	-0.014	0.038	-0.001	0.005	-0.008	0.035	0.000	0.017	
$time\ dummies\ (ref. cat.\ 1999)$									
2000	-0.106***	0.021	-0.049***	0.014	-0.095***	0.020	-0.095***	0.022	
2001	-0.078***	0.023	-0.180***	0.045	-0.075***	0.022	-0.180***	0.038	
pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.040				0.049				
log likelihood	-814.614		-811.340		-783.096		-778.218		
$\bar{\chi}^2_{01}$			6.55***				9.76***		
number of observations	2,124		2,124		2,131		2,131		

**Notes:** \*\*\*, \*\*, \* depict significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Marginal effects are calculated at the means of the independent variables. For the calculation of the marginal effects of the RE logit, the random effect is set to its mean value zero. For a detailed description of the combined industries see Table 5. **Source:** Statistics Denmark, author's calculations.

Table 7: Results (marginal effects) for firms founded in the service sectors

	start-ı	ıp year	characteri	stics	time-varying characteristics				
	pooled	logit	RE logit		pooled logit		RE logit		
	coeff.	std.err.		std.err.		std.err.		std.err	
	(1)	<u> </u>	(2)	)	(3)	)	(4)		
avg. ability	0.036***	0.007	0.039***	0.009	0.032***	0.007	0.038***	0.009	
team size	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.006**	0.003	0.009***	0.003	
team (y/n)	0.130***	0.021	0.138***	0.021	0.134***	0.020	0.121***	0.016	
homogeneity in abilities	0.045	0.049	0.052	0.054	-0.035	0.048	-0.034	0.045	
heterogeneity in educations	-0.009	0.040	-0.011	0.043	0.046	0.038	0.034	0.034	
share of exports in sales	0.065***	0.023	0.072***	0.025	0.064***	0.023	0.068***	0.024	
regional dummies (ref.cat. cope	enhagen)								
city	0.011**	0.006	0.013**	0.007	0.009	0.005	0.013*	0.007	
rural	0.040***	0.006	0.044***	0.007	0.038***	0.006	0.045***	0.006	
industry dummies (ref.cat. reta	il trade)								
wholesale trade	0.054***	0.007	0.060***	0.009	0.051***	0.007	0.056***	0.007	
hotels, restaurants	-0.048***	0.011	-0.056***	0.015	-0.067***	0.011	-0.083***	0.018	
knowlintens. high-tech serv.	0.035***	0.007	0.041***	0.009	0.038***	0.007	0.046***	0.007	
knowlintens. market serv.	0.069***	0.006	0.076***	0.008	0.072***	0.006	0.079***	0.007	
other knowlintens. serv.	0.084***	0.009	0.090***	0.010	0.085***	0.008	0.081***	0.009	
freight transport	0.052***	0.007	0.059***	0.009	0.043***	0.007	0.050***	0.007	
time dummies (ref.cat. 1999)									
2000	-0.100***	0.006	-0.130***	0.026	-0.095***	0.006	-0.199***	0.023	
2001	-0.045***	0.007	-0.103**	0.049	-0.043***	0.007	-0.253***	0.053	
pseudo- $\mathbb{R}^2$	0.032				0.054				
log likelihood	-12,297.51	2	-12,296.26	6	-11,705.559		-11,688.144		
$ar{\chi}^2_{01}$			2.49*				34.83***		
number of observations	25,543		25,543		25,434		25,434		

**Notes:** \*\*\*, \*\*, \* depict significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Marginal effects are calculated at the means of the independent variables. For the calculation of the marginal effects of the RE logit, the random effect is set to its mean value zero. For a detailed description of the combined industries see Table 5. **Source:** Statistics Denmark, author's calculations.

Table 8: Results (marginal effects) for firms founded with university graduates

dep. var.: survival of the fo	ollowing ye	ear (yes	/no)						
	start-	up year	characteri	stics	time-varying characteristics				
	pooled	logit	RE le	RE logit		pooled logit		RE logit	
	coeff.	std.err.	coeff.	std.err.	coeff.	std.err.	coeff.	std.err	
1.00%		,				·			
avg. ability	0.056***	0.015	0.056***	0.015	0.049***	0.015	0.052***	0.016	
team size	0.001	0.003	0.001	0.003	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.003	
team (y/n)	0.158***	0.054	0.158***	0.045	0.126***	0.046	0.111***	0.037	
homogeneity in abilities	0.088	0.085	0.088	0.098	0.028	0.102	0.014	0.092	
heterogeneity in educations	-0.037	0.136	-0.037	0.117	0.048	0.097	0.039	0.081	
share of exports in sales	0.050	0.035	0.050	0.034	0.043	0.032	0.042	0.031	
regional dummies (ref.cat. cope	enhagen)								
city	0.014	0.011	0.014	0.011	0.009	0.010	0.008	0.011	
rural	0.034***	0.013	0.034***	0.012	0.032***	0.012	0.031***	0.012	
industry dummies (ref.cat. low-	technology	)							
medium-low technology	-0.007	0.068	-0.007	0.068	-0.026	0.069	-0.033	0.085	
medium-high technology	-0.070	0.082	-0.070	0.096	-0.078	0.079	-0.063	0.117	
high technology	-0.215***	0.079	-0.215*	0.125	-0.234***	0.070	-0.267	0.206	
construction	-0.046	0.043	-0.046	0.043	-0.046	0.042	-0.058	0.055	
wholesale trade	-0.013	0.033	-0.013	0.033	-0.019	0.031	-0.021	0.037	
retail trade	-0.041	0.031	-0.041	0.031	-0.034	0.029	-0.043	0.037	
hotels, restaurants	-0.161***	0.055	-0.161***	0.057	-0.175***	0.056	-0.223**	0.095	
knowlintens. high-tech serv.	-0.023	0.028	-0.023	0.029	-0.014	0.027	-0.013	0.031	
knowlintens. market serv.	-0.009	0.025	-0.009	0.026	-0.006	0.024	-0.010	0.027	
other knowlintens. serv.	-0.023	0.035	-0.023	0.035	-0.012	0.032	-0.017	0.038	
freight transport	-0.037	0.047	-0.037	0.045	-0.055	0.048	-0.077	0.065	
time dummies (ref.cat. 1999)									
2000	-0.095***	0.013	-0.095***	0.013	-0.078***	0.012	-0.123***	0.033	
2001	-0.071***	0.014	-0.071***	0.014	-0.058***	0.013	-0.160**	0.078	
pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.038				0.048				
log likelihood	-2,614.543		-2,614.543		-2,484.622		-2,483.193		
$ar{\chi}^2_{01}$			0.00				2.86**		
number of observations	5,844		5,844		5,825		5,825		
named of observations	J,U 14		J,0 1 T		5,020		5,025		

Notes: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* depict significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Marginal effects are calculated at the means of the independent variables. For the calculation of the marginal effects of the RE logit, the random effect is set to its mean value zero. For a detailed description of the combined industries see Table 5.

Source: Statistics Denmark, author's calculations.