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Conference Paper

Near Is My Shirt, But Nearer Is My Skin: Ideology or Self-Interest as Determinants of Public Opinion on Fiscal Policy Issues

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Near Is My Shirt, But Nearer Is My Skin: Ideology or Self-Interest as Determinants of Public Opinion on Fiscal Policy Issues

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Abstract

Several empirical studies derive that personal positions with respect to policy measures are dominated by ideology instead of narrow self-interest. In the present field study we carried out a telephone survey with 1.003 respondents all over Austria. Instead of only measuring self-interest indirectly, we requested respondents to assess directly whether they expect to be affected by policy measures. Our results indicate that such a subjectively measured narrow self-interest explains attitudes towards economic policies at least as good as ideological conviction. In some cases, however, ideology appears to determine whether people feel affected by a proposed policy measure.

Key words: public opinion, sociotropic voting, ideology, self-interest, telephone surveys

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1 Introduction

Which factors determine public opinion on economic policy issues? How do people derive their personal positions with respect to policy measures? Although these questions are at the heart of an understanding of voting behavior and, probably, for the making of economic policies in democratic societies (*Page and Shapiro, 1983*), Public Choice theory still lacks a unique conception about the process of individual preference formation and voter motivation. Somewhat simplifying, two broad lines of reasoning to explain opinion formation can be separated, an egocentric (self-interest) approach and a sociotropic approach.

Simple rational choice theory claims that individual attitudes towards economic policies are determined by narrow self-interest. Individuals know what is in their own interest and make choices accordingly. Based on perceptions of the individual costs and benefits people develop expectations about the net effects of policies on their personal well-being. If the expected effect of a certain policy measure is positive, the respective citizen-voters are in favor of it. All that is required for an accurate determination of individual attitudes towards some specific policy measure is an assessment of the economic consequences on personal well-being. Hence, from this point of view individual opinion is exclusively shaped by egocentric motivation.

This view is often criticized. First, it is argued that an average person does not have the capability to calculate the individual costs and benefits of most policy measures. She/he usually lacks the technical knowledge and the information to gauge the personal consequences of certain policy measures on her/his personal well-being. Second, rational citizen-voters usually do not have an incentive to become informed about economic policy issues. As the cost of acquiring information are positive and the individual impact of an informed vote on final election outcomes is negligible, citizen-voters should remain rationally ignorant with respect to the effects of most policy issues.

Attitudes towards economic policies are then often driven by ideological convictions (*Downs, 1957*). Party ideologies serve as a substitute for the individual cost of acquiring political and economic information. Yet such ideologically shaped opinions might still be consistent with self-interested behavior. Rational individuals 'choose' a certain ideology as an information short-cut, and their choice depends on which ideological party affiliation is expected to suit best to selfish motives. In many cases ideological and self-interested opinion formation are therefore not easily separable.

A somewhat different thinking dominates the sociotropic approach. According to this view, when forming opinions about economic policies, people have a normative view of the world in mind, i.e. a notion how it 'should' be (*Denzau and North, 1994*). Ideas and ideologies matter in particular in collective choices, as people do not have an incentive to collect information. According to the theory of low-cost decisions and expressive voting (see e.g. *Kirchgässner and Pommerehne, 1993; Brennan and Lomansky, 1993*) supporting or opposing a specific economic policy has no direct consequences for personal well-being, as individual action does not have an effect on the overall outcome. In such a situation it is almost without personal costs to express ideological convictions that are not necessarily in accordance with narrow self-interest. On the contrary, in the market sphere decisions which are only based on ideological judgments are associated with high costs as the consequences of a decision are borne by the decider. Hence, due to the low cost character of expressing preferences in the political sphere, ideology and a personal conception of "the common good" are stronger motives in

individual voting behaviour and may thus explain opinion formation much better than pure self-interest.

Empirical investigations of individual and collective opinion formation so far often support the latter view. Studies from the fields of economics, sociology and political science show an increasing interest in the topic of self-interest and opinions on economic policy issues and address the question of the empirical relevance of former assumptions (see *Citrin and Green, 1990; Sears and Funk, 1990; MacKuen et al., 1992; Mutz, 1993; Holbrook and Garand, 1996; Krause, 1997; Fuchs et al. 1998; Boeri and Tabellini, 2005*). In general, these studies find (often based on the 1996 “*Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy*”) that attitudes towards economic policy issues deviate with a systematic bias from self-interest, i.e. the opinion whether a specific economic policy should be carried out is often not systematically related to egoistic motivations. Empirical studies for the U.S. (*Walstad, 1997; Caplan, 2001, 2002, 2006*) and for Germany (*Heinemann et al., 2007*) conclude that knowledge and ideology are of special relevance in explaining the bias, or are even the main determinants of opinion formation.

In a widely recognized recent paper, *Blinder and Krueger (2004)* use a specially designed telephone survey to address the problem of opinion formation on economic policy issues in the U.S. A main result of their study is that public opinion on the quality and adequacy of economic policies is mainly driven by ideological factors. With respect to policy issues like taxes, budget deficits, minimum wages, social security, and health insurance, ideology is the most consistently important determinant of individual preferences and policy acceptance, whereas objective measures of self-interest are the least important. These findings seem consistent with the idea that people use ideology as a short cut for deciding which position to take, especially when informing oneself is costly. *Blinder and Krueger (2004)* report that in many cases respondents in the telephone survey seem to have answered against their narrow self-interest, which is proxied by 'objective' variables, most notably household income.

Yet it is somewhat questionable whether narrow self-interest can be measured objectively. What matters eventually is what people *believe* to be in their self-interest. *Blinder and Krueger* have in mind a specific economic model on how certain individuals are affected by particular economic policies. In general there is no guarantee that the *Blinder-Krueger* economic view of the world is identical to what respondents think about the working properties of an economy. Most probably, this is not the case, as laymen usually have a different view of the economic world (*Caplan, 2001*). If we want to know whether people systematically neglect their own self-interest in the process of opinion formation on economic policies in favor of an ideologically defined common good, we should have a better, i.e. a *subjective measure of self-interest*. Put differently, in order to find out if narrow self-interest is really dominated by ideological convictions and ideas of 'the public good', it is important to know which policies people perceive to be in their self-interest or not. As ideology should serve as a simple rule-of-thumb in case of a lack of knowledge, people might express ideological preferences that appear to be against their self-interest from the view of economists. However, in their own view respondents might express opinions on policy issues which they believe to be in their narrow interest. The main purpose of the present paper is to examine whether the often found dominance of ideological convictions survives if we measure self-interest more subjectively and directly.

The methodology of the present study closely follows *Blinder and Krueger (2004)*. In autumn 2008 we carried out a telephone survey with 1.003 respondents all over Austria. The survey consisted of a

series of questions about personal opinions on a variety of fiscal policy issues. In contrast to *Blinder-Krueger* we not only asked for certain 'objective' measures that appear to be related to egocentric opinion formation. We additionally requested respondents directly to assess whether they expect to benefit from certain economic and fiscal policy measures. Hence, we need not speculate about a respondent's economic view of the world and whether he/she deviates from narrow self-interest; we simply asked them. All in all, our results show that – in contrast to *Blinder and Krueger (2004)* and several other investigations –subjectively measured narrow self-interest explains attitudes towards economic policies at least as good as ideological conviction.

A usual and often heard objection is that in interviews individuals can easily express opinions for an economic policy although they know that this policy will reduce their own well-being or income. Hence, doubts have been raised about whether the questions commonly asked in opinion polls show true preferences. This is certainly correct, but it does not invalidate our results. Taking part in a public opinion survey is comparable to the act of voting. In either case, individual action does not have individual consequences. Hence, both are certainly situations in which it is not individually costly to express socially desired or ideological preferences.

The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we present a very short overview on the political and methodological background of the study and the telephone survey. Section 3 reports some descriptive statistics. In section 4 we present the main results of our logit-regressions and discuss the results in the light of the two different approaches to opinion formation. Section 5 concludes.

2 Political and methodological background

In September 2008 we launched a telephone survey in Austria in order to replicate and verify the results of *Blinder and Krueger (2004)* that “*ideology seems to play a stronger role in shaping opinion on economic policy issues than either self-interest or knowledge*“ for the case of Austria. Of course we adapted the methodology; in particular we focus on ideology and self-interest only, leaving out knowledge as a possible determinant in the present study. 1.003 eligible Austrian voters were interviewed over the telephone. Fieldwork covered the last days of the campaign in federal elections for the Austrian National Council in 2008 and some of the first days after the elections.

One of the main topics discussed during the election campaign was whether and in which way a reform of the income tax should be put into practice.¹ The two parties which formed a grand coalition before as well as after the elections in principle agreed on the need for an income tax reform and that the reduction should amount to approximately € 3 bn, i.e. about 1% of GDP (*Statistik Austria, 2009*). Although it was obvious that at least parts of the income tax reductions had to be financed by raising other taxes and/or by cutting expenditures in the federal budget, politicians' statements on financing the income tax reform were at best very ambiguous. Against this background we asked the participants of our survey which of the following ten policy measures would be appropriate for financing a reduction of the income tax²:

- Raising the VAT
- Raising the petroleum tax

¹ Note that in September 2008 there was still no open public debate about the possible consequences of the U.S. housing market and financial crisis on the Austrian economy.


² To prevent order biases the sequence of categories was randomized.

- Raising profit taxes on public/private limited companies
- Raising environmental taxes on companies
- Impose a property or inheritance tax
- Raising the tax on capital returns
- Increasing public debt
- Cutting social security benefits
- Cutting subsidies for companies
- Cutting jobs in public administration

In stark contrast to *Blinder and Krueger* and other similar studies we did not only ask the respondents for socio-demographic characteristics, i.e. sex, age, occupation, personal income and education to assess whether they might be adversely affected by a certain policy measure, but also whether they believe this measure would have an adverse impact on them. This survey design enables us to find out how the *perceived adverse impact of a policy* measure influences its acceptance among the public.

To assess the effects of ideology on the acceptance of our policy measures we asked our interviewees to assign their political position on a five point Left-to-Right-Scale (LRS). Alternately the respondents could also choose “other” if they did not think the proposed scale matched their ideological position, or “refuse to answer” (the two latter categories were asked unprompted). Figure 1 shows the distribution of respondents' answers along the Left-to-Right-Scale. It is definitely clear that the by far largest group of people classifies itself as centrists, while the share of (moderate) leftists is slightly larger than the share of (moderate) rightists.

Figure 1: Ideological self-assignment based on the Left-to-Right-Scale




3 Descriptive Statistics

3.1 Acceptance of measures and subjective ('perceived') self-interest

Descriptive analyses reveal a clear adverse correlation between the share of respondents who suppose a given policy measure is appropriate for financing a tax reform (acceptance) and the share of respondents who think this specific measure would have an adverse impact on them (Pearson's Correlation Coefficient = -0.89). In other words: the more people expect to be adversely affected by a


certain measure, the fewer people tend to accept this measure (see Figure 2). The least popular measure is a VAT increase, followed by an increase of the petroleum tax. Almost 80 % of the respondents think that raising profit taxes is an appropriate way to finance a personal income tax reduction, and about 70% think that savings by reducing jobs in public administration is an appropriate measure.

Figure 2: Acceptance of policy measures and average perceived personal impact



Remarkably this strong correlation does not simply imply that people who fear an adverse impact on themselves oppose a certain measure while people who do not feel affected are in favor of it. Figure 3 clearly shows that the rates of acceptance show a similar pattern for both groups (Pearson's Correlation Coefficient = 0.97), i.e. if many people feel negatively affected only few support a given measure, even among those who do not expect an adverse impact on themselves, and vice versa. However, in all cases adversely affected persons are less likely to accept a certain measure than people who do not expect a negative impact. In eight out of ten cases the difference is significant ($p < 0.05$). Only "cutting subsidies for companies" and "raising the VAT" do not show significant differences. In the latter case this is probably due to the fact that hardly anybody supports a higher VAT (4%), while a vast majority (89%) feels adversely affected by VAT increases so that there is hardly any room for a big differential among the groups.


Figure 3: Acceptance of policy measures by subjective ('perceived') impact



3.3 Acceptance of measures and ideological orientation

Looking at the rates of acceptance according to ideological orientation based on the Left-to-Right-Scale³ we find a similar pattern. The rates of acceptance are highly correlated for all displayed groups (see Figure 6), while the differences between the ideological groups are significant for the same eight policy measures as above. However, while people who assign themselves to the political centre or the right agree on average with 3.5 measures and 3.4 measures respectively, leftists agree with 4.2 political measures (which are significantly more).

Figure 6: Acceptance of policy measures by political self-assignment



³ For clarity the groups "left" and "moderately left" as well as "right" and "moderately right" were merged into the groups "(moderate) leftist" and "(moderate) rightist" respectively.

Figure 5 also shows that people who declare themselves as standing 'left' in general seem to prefer tax increases (except for VAT) compared to people with a centrist or rightist ideological orientation. With respect to spending cuts differences between the ideological groups seem to disappear. Moreover, center and right ideology appear to be very closely related, while leftist ideology is much more distinct.

4 Results of logit regressions

4.1 Basic results

To analyze more deeply the impact of perceived adverse impacts and ideological orientation we ran a set of logit regressions to reveal the main drivers of acceptance of policy measures as a dependent variable. We included the following possible determinants of acceptance into our models:

1. "Subjective" self-interest
 - Expected adverse impact of the policy measure (dummy)
2. "Objective" self-interest
 - Occupation (set of dummies: employee in the private sector, employee in the public sector, self-employed, retired; reference group: others)
 - Personal net income (ordinal)
 - Living in a big city (100,000 inhabitants and more, dummy)
3. Ideology
 - (Moderately) leftist (dummy)⁴
4. Control variables
 - Sex (dummy)
 - Age (ordinal)
 - Educational level (ordinal)

Of course several of these variables are correlated. E.g., our survey shows that the higher the degree of education, the higher is the probability of adhering to a more left-wing ideology. However, tests of collinearity did not give any reason for concern. Interaction terms were not implemented given the methodological problems that their use causes in logit-models (see *Ai and Norton, 2003*). Seven of the ten models tested are properly specified, while for three models the chosen predictors are not meaningful, i.e. these three models fail in explaining the differences in the acceptance of the respective policy measures. The remaining seven models yield Pseudo-R² ranging from 0.16 – which we suppose to be acceptable – to rather limited 0.03.

Summing up results of our estimates we find that perceived adverse personal consequences of a policy measure have a significant impact on the acceptance of this measure in all seven properly specified models (at the 95%-level, see Table 1). The signs of the coefficients are – as expected – negative in all those cases, i.e. the acceptance of a policy measure is systematically lower among persons who expect to be adversely affected personally. This means that (perceived) self-interest clearly plays

⁴ As the descriptive results showed clear differences between (moderate) leftists on the one hand and centrists and (moderate) rightists on the other hand, the ordinary left-to-right-scale has been recoded into a dummy variable indicating whether a respondent declared herself as (moderately) left or not. Respondents who did not assign themselves to the left-to-right-scale (i.e. refused to answer or answered that the categories appropriate for them) were omitted from further analyses.

a remarkable if not dominant role – compared to ideology - in forming personal opinions on policy measures.

Personal net income, which is regularly used as a variable to proxy self-interest in many empirical investigations, is insignificant in all models. From an egoistic model of opinion formation, we would at least have expected that a higher net income is also associated with an increasing probability of acceptance of cuts in social benefits and a reduced acceptance of property tax increases in order to finance income tax reductions. With respect to occupation/profession as a determinant of objective self-interest, we find that public sector employees support profit tax and inheritance tax increases to a higher degree than other groups of persons. Somewhat surprisingly they do not oppose job cuts in the public sector significantly more often than other vocational groups. Interestingly people living in big cities (> 100.000 inhabitants) have a lower probability of accepting job cuts in the public sector than people from less urban areas. We suppose that this results from the large number of public sector employees living in the big cities where most of the workplaces in public administrations are located.

Remarkably, the share of opponents of higher petroleum taxes rises with the respondents' age. This is counterintuitive as older people (above 65) are less likely to have access to cars (*Herry and Sammer, 1998*) and therefore are less prone to increased petroleum taxes. Consistently they also feel adversely affected by higher petroleum taxes to a lesser extent than younger peer groups. We guess this contradiction between the low rate of adverse consequences and the high rate of refuse reflects differences in the valuation of private transport among different peer groups and might therefore indicate that ideological positions beyond political attribution might play a significant role in the opinion formation.

Political ideology plays a significant role in five of the seven proper models. Ideological left-wingers are systematically likelier to accept tax rises as policy measures than self-declared right-wingers and centrists, even when we control for objective and subjective self-interest as well as a number of further socio-economic variables. Somewhat surprisingly left-wingers are not significantly more dismissive towards cutting social security benefits than centrists and rightists.

Table 1: Acceptance of policy measures by several determinants (logit models, full specification)

	Pseudo R ²	Sub- jec- tive self- inter- est Expected adverse consequences of measure	Objective self-interest						Ide- ology (Moderate) Leftist	Control variables		
			Employee in the private sector	Employee in the public sector	Self-employed	Retired	Personal monthly net income	Living in a big city		Sex	Age	Educational level
Increasing VAT	0.14								↑		↑	
Increasing the petroleum tax	0.16	↓						↑		↓	↑	
Raising profit taxes on public/private limited companies	0.07	↓		↑				↑			↓	
Raising environmental taxes on companies	0.08	↓					↑	↑		↓		
Impose a property or inheritance tax	0.03	↓		↑				↑			↑	
Raising the tax on capital returns	0.06	↓						↑				
Increasing public debt	0.05	↓										
Cutting social security benefits	0.07	↓										
Cutting subsidies for companies	0.01											
Cutting jobs in public administration	0.08	↓								↑		

Expected adverse consequences of measure: 0 = No, 1 = Yes

Occupation (Employee in the private sector/Employee in the public sector/Self-employed/Retired): 0 = No, 1 = Yes, Other = Reference group

Living in a big city: 0 = No, 1 = Yes

Personal monthly net income: 1 = none, 2 = Up to 1000 €, 3 = 1001 to 1500 €, 4 = 1501 to 2000 €, 5 = 2001 to 2500 €, 6 = 2501 to 3000 €, 7 = More than 3000 €

(Moderate) Leftist: 0 = Rightist, moderate rightist, centrist, 1 = Moderate leftist, leftist

Sex: 0 = Female, 1 = Male

Age: 1 = 16 to 25 years, 2 = 26 to 35 years, 3 = 36 to 45 years, 4 = 46 to 55 years, 5 = 56 to 65 years, 6 = 65 years and older

Educational level: 1 = Compulsory education attendance, 2 = Apprenticeship, 3 = Vocational school, 4 = Abitur (British A-Level), 5 = University (of applied sciences)

↑ ... Positive coefficient, significant at the 95%-level

↓ ... Negative coefficient, significant at the 95%-level

✘ ... Variable not included in the model

■ ... Model misspecified, set of chosen predictors not meaningful (linktest, hat: p > 0.05)

■ ... Model misspecified, unobserved predictors or interactions probable (linktest, hatsq: p < 0.05)

4.2 Alternative specifications

To get a picture on how subjective and objective self-interest and ideology mutually impair each other we ran alternative specifications of the models introduced above. By omitting the subjective ('perceived') self-interest the indicators of objective self-interest become more important in explaining the acceptance of policy measures (Table 2). The number of significant cases of objective self-interest jumps from 4 to 10 out of 42 possible cases (6 variables x 7 valid models). Public sector employees, for example, now are less likely to accept job cuts in the public sector than other occupational groups, while self-employed are more in favor of lowering public security benefits than others. This shows that subjective ("perceived") self-interest corresponds to people's objective self-interest.

While in our basic model-setting ideology does not correspond significantly – and somewhat surprisingly – with the proposition of cutting social security benefits, by omitting the perceived self-interest from the model ideology becomes a significant predictor of people's attitudes towards this policy measure: leftists now are significantly less likely to acclaim to cutting social security benefits than centrists and rightists.

Table 2: Acceptance of policy measures by several determinants (logit models without 'subjective' – perceived - self-interest)

	Pseudo R ²	Sub- jec- tive self- inter- est	Objective self-interest							Ide- ology (Moderate) Leftist	Control variables		
			Expected adverse consequences of measure	Occupation	Employee in the private sector	Employee in the public sector	Self-employed	Retired	Personal monthly net income		Living in a big city	Sex	Age
Increasing VAT	0.13	✘									↑		↑
Increasing the petroleum tax	0.12	✘						↑	↑		↓	↑	
Raising profit taxes on public/private limited companies	0.05	✘		↑					↑			↓	
Raising environmental taxes on companies	0.07	✘						↑	↑		↓		
Impose a property or inheritance tax	0.03	✘		↑					↑			↑	
Raising the tax on capital returns	0.03	✘	↑				↓	↑	↑				
Increasing public debt	0.02	✘							↑				
Cutting social security benefits	0.04	✘			↑				↓				
Cutting subsidies for companies	0.01	✘											
Cutting jobs in public administration	0.06	✘		↓				↓			↑		

Expected adverse consequences of measure: 0 = No, 1 = Yes

Occupation (Employee in the private sector/Employee in the public sector/Self-employed/Retired): 0 = No, 1 = Yes, Other = Reference group

Living in a big city: 0 = No, 1 = Yes

Personal monthly net income: 1 = none, 2 = Up to 1000 €, 3 = 1001 to 1500 €, 4 = 1501 to 2000 €, 5 = 2001 to 2500 €, 6 = 2501 to 3000 €, 7 = More than 3000 €

(Moderate) Leftist: 0 = Rightist, moderate rightist, centrist, 1 = Moderate leftist, leftist

Sex: 0 = Female, 1 = Male

Age: 1 = 16 to 25 years, 2 = 26 to 35 years, 3 = 36 to 45 years, 4 = 46 to 55 years, 5 = 56 to 65 years, 6 = 65 years and older

Educational level: 1 = Compulsory education attendance, 2 = Apprenticeship, 3 = Vocational school, 4 = Abitur (British A-Level), 5 = University (of applied sciences)

↑ ... Positive coefficient, significant at the 95%-level

↓ ... Negative coefficient, significant at the 95%-level

✘ ... Variable not included in the model

... Model misspecified, set of chosen predictors not meaningful (linktest, hat: $p > 0.05$)

... Model misspecified, unobserved predictors or interactions probable (linktest, hatsq: $p < 0.05$)

Omitting ideology as a predictor changes the set of properly specified models somewhat (Table 3). While this modification does not change the impact of perceived self-interest, it moderately raises the number of cases where objective measures of self-interest have a significant impact on the acceptance of policy measures from 4 out of 42 possible cases to 5 out of 48 (as now 8 models are properly specified). Three of these 5 cases occur in a specific model, i.e. apply to the acceptance of job cuts in the public sector. We therefore conclude that ideology and objective self-interest are only loosely related – at least as far as our set of objective measures is concerned.

Table 3: Acceptance of policy measures by several determinants (logit models without ideological orientation)

	Pseudo R ²	Sub- jec- tive self- inter- est Expected adverse consequences of measure	Objective self-interest						Ide- ology (Moderate) Leftist	Control variables		
			Employee in the private sector	Employee in the public sector	Self-employed	Retired	Personal net income	Living in a big city		Sex	Age	Educational level
Increasing VAT	0.10								✘	↑		↑
Increasing the petroleum tax	0.14	↓							✘	↑	↓	↑
Raising profit taxes on public/private limited companies	0.05	↓		↑					✘			↓
Raising environmental taxes on companies	0.06	↓					↑		✘		↓	
Impose a property or inheritance tax	0.02	↓							✘			↑
Raising the tax on capital returns	0.05	↓							✘			
Increasing public debt	0.05	↓							✘			
Cutting social security benefits	0.06	↓							✘	↑		
Cutting subsidies for companies	0.01								✘			
Cutting jobs in public administration	0.08	↓		↓	↑			↓	✘		↑	

Expected adverse consequences of measure: 0 = No, 1 = Yes

Occupation (Employee in the private sector/Employee in the public sector/Self-employed/Retired): 0 = No, 1 = Yes, Other = Reference group

Living in a big city: 0 = No, 1 = Yes

Personal monthly net income: 1 = none, 2 = Up to 1000 €, 3 = 1001 to 1500 €, 4 = 1501 to 2000 €, 5 = 2001 to 2500 €, 6 = 2501 to 3000 €, 7 = More than 3000 €

(Moderate) Leftist: 0 = Rightist, moderate rightist, centrist, 1 = Moderate leftist, leftist

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Age: 1 = 16 to 25 years, 2 = 26 to 35 years, 3 = 36 to 45 years, 4 = 46 to 55 years, 5 = 56 to 65 years, 6 = 65 years and older

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↑ ... Positive coefficient, significant at the 95%-level

↓ ... Negative coefficient, significant at the 95%-level

✘ ... Variable not included in the model

... Model misspecified, set of chosen predictors not meaningful (linktest, hat: p > 0.05)

... Model misspecified, unobserved predictors or interactions probable (linktest, hatsq: p < 0.05)

Removing the objective measures of self-interest from our basic models leaves the impact of perceived self-interest on the acceptance of policy measures unchanged (Table 4). The number of cases where ideology plays a significant role goes up from 5 to 6 out of 7 properly specified models. As the set of properly specified models differs from our basic specification a significant influence of ideology emerges for two policy measures which did not show a significant impact of ideology in the basic setting. Leftists oppose cutting social security benefits significantly more often than centrists and rightists when subjective self-interest is not included in the model specification.

Table 4: Acceptance of policy measures by several determinants (logit models without 'objective' self-interest)

	Pseudo R ²	Sub- jec- tive self- inter- est Expected adverse consequences of measure	Objective self-interest							Ide- ology (Moderate) Leftist	Control variables		
			Employee in the private sector	Employee in the public sector	Self-employed	Retired	Personal monthly net income	Living in a big city	Sex		Age	Educational level	
Increasing VAT	0.09		✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗		↑	↓	
Increasing the petroleum tax	0.14	↓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	↑		↓	↑
Raising profit taxes on public/private limited companies	0.05	↓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	↑			
Raising environmental taxes on companies	0.07	↓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	↑		↓	
Impose a property or inheritance tax	0.03	↓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	↑			↑
Raising the tax on capital returns	0.04	↓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	↑			
Increasing public debt	0.05	↓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗				
Cutting social security benefits	0.06	↓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	↓		↓	
Cutting subsidies for companies	0.01		✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗				
Cutting jobs in public administration	0.06	↓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗		↑	↑	↑

Expected adverse consequences of measure: 0 = No, 1 = Yes

Occupation (Employee in the private sector/Employee in the public sector/Self-employed/Retired): 0 = No, 1 = Yes, Other = Reference group

Living in a big city: 0 = No, 1 = Yes

Personal monthly net income: 1 = none, 2 = Up to 1000 €, 3 = 1001 to 1500 €, 4 = 1501 to 2000 €, 5 = 2001 to 2500 €, 6 = 2501 to 3000 €, 7 = More than 3000 €

(Moderate) Leftist: 0 = Rightist, moderate rightist, centrist, 1 = Moderate leftist, leftist

Sex: 0 = Female, 1 = Male

Age: 1 = 16 to 25 years, 2 = 26 to 35 years, 3 = 36 to 45 years, 4 = 46 to 55 years, 5 = 56 to 65 years, 6 = 65 years and older

Educational level: 1 = Compulsory education attendance, 2 = Apprenticeship, 3 = Vocational school, 4 = Abitur (British A-Level), 5 = University (of applied sciences)

↑ ... Positive coefficient, significant at the 95%-level

↓ ... Negative coefficient, significant at the 95%-level

✗ ... Variable not included in the model

... Model misspecified, set of chosen predictors not meaningful (linktest, hat: $p > 0.05$)

... Model misspecified, unobserved predictors or interactions probable (linktest, hatsq: $p < 0.05$)

Summarizing, people who expect adverse effects of a certain policy measure on themselves are less likely to assent to this specific measure. Subjective (perceived) self-interest therefore turns out to be a valid and robust indicator of the acceptance of policy measures – given that large proportions of the observed variance remain unexplained. The same holds true for ideology – given raising taxes is the topic. Leftists are clearly in favor of tax increases compared to centrists and rightists. Attitudes towards cutting public expenses seem to be unaffected by ideological orientation when subjective and/or objective measures of self-interest are taken into account. Only after removing variables representing self-interest from the models the impression of an ideological bias emerges, i.e. that leftists are more reluctant to cuts in public spending than centrists and rightists.

4.2 Ideology and perceived adverse affection

To complete the picture and to find out whether ideology has an impact on the expectations of adverse impacts stemming from policy measures we ran similar logit regressions as above on the acceptance of policy measures: the model specification stays in principle the same while – of course – the expected adverse impact is now the dependent variable.

In principle, we should not expect ideological convictions to have a significant impact on people's perception of the consequences of specific policy measures: whether an action affects a person ad-

versely is not a question of ideology or political belief. Nevertheless, the results presented above indicate some interaction of ideology and (perceived) self-interest. All in all our models do not cope very well with this task. Only four out of ten models are properly specified (Table 5). This might be interpreted as an indication that in these cases ideology – on the one hand – does not contribute much in explaining perceived self interest, as the chosen set of predictors turns out to be not meaningful and/or unobserved predictors (including unobserved interaction effects) are indicated. In these cases the same is true for our objective measures of self-interest, suggesting that the concept of subjective self-interest covers objective interests beyond the scope of our dataset and/or only imagined interests.

Focusing on the four properly specified models we find that objective self-interest determines subject self-interest in all four cases. Most times the coefficients' signs are headed in the expected direction. Still, it is astonishing that the self-employed feel less affected by increasing the capital return tax than other groups and, moreover, that the pensioners suppose to be less prone to cuts of social security benefits than other occupational groups as their (main) income, i.e. pensions are a social security benefit. Yet, we cannot exclude that the pensioners do not identify received pension payments as a social transfer. Ideology is a significant predictor in two of the four properly specified models. This suggests that the political orientation might at least in some cases influence the perception of political measures. However, we cannot reject the possibility that ideology only proxies objective interests not operationalized in our models.

Table 5: Determinants of subjective ('perceived') adverse consequences of policy measures (logit-models)

	Pseudo R ²	Objective self-interest						Ideology (Moderate) Leftist	Control variables		
		Employee in the private sector	Employee in the public sector	Self-employed	Retired	Personal monthly net income	Living in a big city		Sex	Age	Educational level
Increasing VAT	0.06						↓			↑	
Increasing the petroleum tax	0.11					↑	↓				
Raising profit taxes on public/private limited companies	0.03		↓			↑	↓				
Raising environmental taxes on companies	0.03		↓	↑			↓				
Impose a property or inheritance tax	0.02							↓		↑	
Raising the tax on capital returns	0.03			↓		↑					
Increasing public debt	0.01				↓						
Cutting social security benefits	0.04		↓	↓	↓						
Cutting subsidies for companies	0.08		↓				↓				
Cutting jobs in public administration	0.05		↑								

Occupation (Employee in the private sector/Employee in the public sector/Self-employed/Retired): 0 = No, 1 = Yes, Other = Reference group

Living in a big city: 0 = No, 1 = Yes

Personal monthly net income: 1 = none, 2 = Up to 1000 €, 3 = 1001 to 1500 €, 4 = 1501 to 2000 €, 5 = 2001 to 2500 €, 6 = 2501 to 3000 €, 7 = More than 3000 €

(Moderate) Leftist: 0 = Rightist, moderate rightist, centrist, 1 = Moderate leftist, leftist

Sex: 0 = Female, 1 = Male

Age: 1 = 16 to 25 years, 2 = 26 to 35 years, 3 = 36 to 45 years, 4 = 46 to 55 years, 5 = 56 to 65 years, 6 = 65 years and older

Educational level: 1 = Compulsory education attendance, 2 = Apprenticeship, 3 = Vocational school, 4 = Abitur (British A-Level), 5 = University (of applied sciences)

↑ ... Positive coefficient, significant at the 95%-level

↓ ... Negative coefficient, significant at the 95%-level

✘ ... Variable not included in the model

■ ... Model misspecified, set of chosen predictors not meaningful (linktest, hat: p > 0.05)

■ ... Model misspecified, unobserved predictors or interactions probable (linktest, hatsq: p < 0.05)

5 Conclusions

Following *Blinder and Krueger (2004)* we conducted a survey among 1.003 eligible Austrian voters in order to test whether their findings and those of several others - namely that ideology is a more powerful predictor of attitudes towards policy measures than self-interest – hold. Nevertheless we modified the methodology by introducing the concept of “subjective (perceived) self-interest”: we asked people if they think a specific measure will affect them adversely.

We find that subjective self-interest – in this specific case the expectation of personally adverse consequences of a policy measure – is the most important, if not dominant, identified determinant of the acceptance of policy measures. People who expect to personally face adverse consequences of a policy measure are less likely to find this measure appropriate.

Our results therefore do not suggest that “*ideology seems to play a stronger role in shaping opinion on economic policy issues than either self-interest or knowledge*” (*Blinder and Krueger, 2004*) – given that our operationalizations of both – self-interest and ideology – differ from the operationalizations chosen by Blinder and Krueger and that we do not account for knowledge in our models. On the contrary, our results indicate that (*subjective, perceived*) *self-interest* is the stable factor in opinion formation while the influence of ideology is vastly dependent on the nature of the tested policy measure (tax raises vs. spending cuts).

Ideology too appears to play a part in the process of opinion forming, but only in certain contexts. In particular (moderate) leftists are more likely to accept tax raises as adequate policy measures than centrists and (moderate) rightists. Concerning cuts in public expenditures the political orientation is a significant predictor only after measures of objective and/or subjective self-interest are omitted from the analyses.

Some results related to the attitudes towards raising the petroleum tax among different age groups suggest that ideological concepts apart from political ideology might play a role in shaping opinions on policy measures, for example peer group related concepts of private transport.

However, we find that objective self-interest and ideology are only loosely related. Moreover, subjective (perceived) self-interest and ideology contribute to the acceptance of policy measures in parallel; therefore not substituting each other at least as far as tax increases are concerned. This addresses the question whether (political) ideology is the laymen’s shortcut to political opinion formation, not because of some normative view of the world how it “should be”, but because ideology shapes the positive view of how the economy works.

Subjective and objective self-interest as well as ideology only explain a small fraction of the variation inherent in the formation of public opinions. For example 80% of those not feeling adversely affected think that raising profit taxes on corporations is an appropriate measure for financing a reform of the income tax, while still 60% among those who feel adversely affected agree with this measure. This of course raises the question on what determines the opinion formation of those 60% and how the relevant determinants can be measured.

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Annex 1 - List of Variables

Acceptance of policy measures (0 = No, 1 = Yes)

- f10_1x ... Increasing VAT
- f10_2x ... Increasing the petroleum tax
- f10_3x ... Raising profit taxes on public/private limited companies
- f10_4x ... Raising environmental taxes on companies
- f10_5x ... Impose a property or inheritance tax
- f10_6x ... Raising the tax on capital returns
- f10_7x ... Increasing public debt
- f10_8x ... Cutting social security benefits
- f10_9x ... Cutting subsidies for companies
- f10_10x ... Cutting jobs in public administration

Expected adverse consequences of measure (0 = No, 1 = Yes)

- f11_1x ... Increasing VAT
- f11_2x ... Increasing the petroleum tax
- f11_3x ... Raising profit taxes on public/private limited companies
- f11_4x ... Raising environmental taxes on companies
- f11_5x ... Impose a property or inheritance tax
- f11_6x ... Raising the tax on capital returns
- f11_7x ... Increasing public debt
- f11_8x ... Cutting social security benefits
- f11_9x ... Cutting subsidies for companies
- f11_10x ... Cutting jobs in public administration

Occupation (0 = No, 1 = Yes , Other = Reference group)

- s3_1x ... Employee in the private sector
- s3_2x ... Employee in the public sector
- s3_3x ... Self-employed
- s3_4x ... Retired

s4x ... Personal monthly net income (1 = None, 2 = Up to 1000 €, 3 = 1001 to 1500 €, 4 = 1501 to 2000 €, 5 = 2001 to 2500 €, 6 = 2501 to 3000 €, 7 = More than 3000 €)

GrStadt ... Living in a big city (0 = No, 1 = Yes)

leftist ... (Moderate) Leftist (0 = Rightist, moderate rightist, centrist, 1 = Moderate leftist, leftist)

s1x ... Sex (0 = Female, 1 = Male)

s2x ... Age (1 = 16 to 25 years, 2 = 26 to 35 years, 3 = 36 to 45 years, 4 = 46 to 55 years, 5 = 56 to 65 years, 6 = 65 years and older)

s7x ... Educational level (1 = Compulsory education attendance, 2 = Apprenticeship, 3 = Vocational school, 4 = Abitur (British A-Level), 5 = University (of applied sciences))

Annex 2 – Acceptance of policy measures by several determinants (logit models, full specification)

Collinearity Diagnostics

Variable	VIF	SQRT VIF	Tolerance	R- Squared
f11_1x	1.04	1.02	0.9607	0.0393
s3_1x	2.38	1.54	0.4196	0.5804
s3_2x	1.76	1.33	0.5694	0.4306
s3_3x	1.74	1.32	0.5749	0.4251
s3_4x	4.02	2.01	0.2487	0.7513
s4x	1.70	1.30	0.5896	0.4104
GrStadt	1.11	1.05	0.9045	0.0955
leftist	1.06	1.03	0.9463	0.0537
s1x	1.24	1.11	0.8056	0.1944
s2x	2.55	1.60	0.3915	0.6085
s7x	1.27	1.13	0.7852	0.2148
Mean VIF	1.81			

	Eigenval	Cond Index
1	6.6078	1.0000
2	1.1353	2.4125
3	1.0189	2.5466
4	1.0041	2.5652
5	0.7732	2.9234
6	0.5768	3.3846
7	0.4243	3.9465
8	0.1855	5.9685
9	0.1240	7.3007
10	0.0640	10.1625
11	0.0604	10.4619
12	0.0258	15.9941

Condition Number 15.9941
 Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from scaled raw sscp (w/ intercept)
 Det(correlation matrix) 0.0816

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -108.88629
 Iteration 1: log likelihood = -100.20432
 Iteration 2: log likelihood = -94.379397
 Iteration 3: log likelihood = -94.124386
 Iteration 4: log likelihood = -94.122586
 Iteration 5: log likelihood = -94.122585

Logistic regression
 Number of obs = 729
 LR chi2(11) = 29.53
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0019
 Pseudo R2 = 0.1356
 Log likelihood = -94.122585

f10_1x	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
f11_1x	-.7908343	.5486105	-1.44	0.149	-1.866091 .2844225
s3_1x	-.5523875	.6826995	-0.81	0.418	-1.890454 .785679
s3_2x	-.5168884	.9427688	-0.55	0.584	-2.364681 1.330904
s3_3x	-.5492724	.9475763	-0.58	0.562	-2.406488 1.307943
s3_4x	.8530472	1.060614	0.80	0.421	-1.225718 2.931812
s4x	-.2544873	.2294624	-1.11	0.267	-.7042252 .1952507
GrStadt	.3662238	.4539218	0.81	0.420	-.5234466 1.255894
leftist	-.5472242	.5102837	-1.07	0.284	-1.547362 .4529135
s1x	1.723561	.5476459	3.15	0.002	.6501945 2.796927
s2x	-.4019306	.2272795	-1.77	0.077	-.8473903 .043529
s7x	.3744895	.1831893	2.04	0.041	.015445 .7335339
_cons	-2.809879	1.037068	-2.71	0.007	-4.842495 -.7772629

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -108.88629
 Iteration 1: log likelihood = -96.753467
 Iteration 2: log likelihood = -94.495369
 Iteration 3: log likelihood = -94.114269
 Iteration 4: log likelihood = -94.092761
 Iteration 5: log likelihood = -94.092673
 Iteration 6: log likelihood = -94.092673

Logistic regression
 Number of obs = 729
 LR chi2(2) = 29.59
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
 Pseudo R2 = 0.1359
 Log likelihood = -94.092673

f10_1x	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
_hat	1.209533	.8709117	1.39	0.165	-.4974224 2.916489
_hatsq	.0353261	.1425574	0.25	0.804	-.2440812 .3147334
_cons	.2683865	1.23363	0.22	0.828	-2.149484 2.686257

Collinearity Diagnostics

Variable	VIF	SQRT VIF	Tolerance	R- Squared
f11_8x	1.06	1.03	0.9406	0.0594
s3_1x	2.39	1.54	0.4190	0.5810
s3_2x	1.77	1.33	0.5641	0.4359
s3_3x	1.75	1.32	0.5706	0.4294
s3_4x	4.00	2.00	0.2497	0.7503
s4x	1.71	1.31	0.5835	0.4165
GrStadt	1.10	1.05	0.9097	0.0903
leftist	1.06	1.03	0.9442	0.0558
s1x	1.24	1.12	0.8036	0.1964
s2x	2.53	1.59	0.3950	0.6050
s7x	1.27	1.13	0.7891	0.2109

Mean VIF 1.81

	Eigenval	Cond Index
1	6.2722	1.0000
2	1.1370	2.3487
3	1.0293	2.4685
4	1.0098	2.4922
5	0.7689	2.8560
6	0.5968	3.2418
7	0.4953	3.5586
8	0.3595	4.1768
9	0.1634	6.1957
10	0.0735	9.2375
11	0.0623	10.0353
12	0.0318	14.0462

Condition Number 14.0462

Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from scaled raw sscp (w/ intercept)

Det(correlation matrix) 0.0803

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -273.34912
 Iteration 1: log likelihood = -255.6748
 Iteration 2: log likelihood = -254.1837
 Iteration 3: log likelihood = -254.17551
 Iteration 4: log likelihood = -254.17551

Logistic regression

Number of obs = 721
 LR chi2(11) = 38.35
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0001
 Pseudo R2 = 0.0701

Log likelihood = -254.17551

f10_8x	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
f11_8x	-.9182604	.245707	-3.74	0.000	-1.399837 - .4366836
s3_1x	.1676866	.386877	0.43	0.665	-.5905784 .9259517
s3_2x	-.4410568	.5602256	-0.79	0.431	-1.539079 .6569653
s3_3x	.6927721	.4745904	1.46	0.144	-.237408 1.622952
s3_4x	-.016997	.5168362	-0.03	0.974	-1.029977 .9959833
s4x	-.1831846	.1234806	-1.48	0.138	-.4252022 .0588331
GrStadt	-.0593064	.2732316	-0.22	0.828	-.5948305 .4762177
leftist	-.5407952	.2935375	-1.84	0.065	-1.116118 .0345277
s1x	.4722305	.264573	1.78	0.074	-.0463231 .990784
s2x	-.1452428	.1087218	-1.34	0.182	-.3583336 .0678481
s7x	-.0015756	.0966527	-0.02	0.987	-.1910114 .1878601
_cons	-.6267806	.5063046	-1.24	0.216	-1.619119 .3655582

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -273.34912
 Iteration 1: log likelihood = -257.59448
 Iteration 2: log likelihood = -253.30715
 Iteration 3: log likelihood = -253.29626
 Iteration 4: log likelihood = -253.29626

Logistic regression

Number of obs = 721
 LR chi2(2) = 40.11
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
 Pseudo R2 = 0.0734

Log likelihood = -253.29626

f10_8x	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
_hat	1.871682	.6679095	2.80	0.005	.562603 3.18076
_hatsq	.2400832	.1759443	1.36	0.172	-.1047614 .5849278
_cons	.6707242	.5908411	1.14	0.256	-.4873032 1.828752

Collinearity Diagnostics

Variable	VIF	SQRT		R-Squared
		VIF	Tolerance	
f11_9x	1.07	1.04	0.9323	0.0677
s3_1x	2.38	1.54	0.4197	0.5803
s3_2x	1.79	1.34	0.5599	0.4401
s3_3x	1.76	1.33	0.5692	0.4308
s3_4x	4.08	2.02	0.2449	0.7551
s4x	1.70	1.30	0.5899	0.4101
GrStadt	1.10	1.05	0.9112	0.0888
leftist	1.07	1.03	0.9389	0.0611
s1x	1.24	1.11	0.8085	0.1915
s2x	2.59	1.61	0.3854	0.6146
s7x	1.27	1.13	0.7871	0.2129
Mean VIF	1.82			

	Eigenval	Cond Index
1	5.9151	1.0000
2	1.1927	2.2270
3	1.0899	2.3297
4	1.0035	2.4279
5	0.8087	2.7044
6	0.6845	2.9397
7	0.5782	3.1984
8	0.3894	3.8977
9	0.1664	5.9615
10	0.0778	8.7187
11	0.0619	9.7715
12	0.0319	13.6129

Condition Number 13.6129
Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from scaled raw sscp (w/ intercept)
Det(correlation matrix) 0.0780

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -453.26151
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -448.90752
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -448.90581

Logistic regression	Number of obs	=	662
	LR chi2(11)	=	8.71
	Prob > chi2	=	0.6485
Log likelihood = -448.90581	Pseudo R2	=	0.0096

f10_9x	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
f11_9x	.0068012	.217672	0.03	0.975	-.4198282 .4334305
s3_1x	-.3199154	.2651928	-1.21	0.228	-.8396838 .199853
s3_2x	-.4926285	.3475371	-1.42	0.156	-1.173789 .1885318
s3_3x	-.6283894	.3613006	-1.74	0.082	-1.336526 .0797469
s3_4x	-.5029098	.3425901	-1.47	0.142	-1.174374 .1685544
s4x	.1131987	.0822663	1.38	0.169	-.0480403 .2744376
GrStadt	-.0113556	.1816979	-0.06	0.950	-.3674769 .3447657
leftist	.1749939	.177729	0.98	0.325	-.1733486 .5233364
s1x	.1822719	.1761276	1.03	0.301	-.1629319 .5274756
s2x	.1122901	.0779601	1.44	0.150	-.0405088 .2650891
s7x	-.0392612	.067488	-0.58	0.561	-.1715352 .0930128
_cons	-.6913961	.3573799	-1.93	0.053	-1.391848 .0090557

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -453.26151
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -448.42019
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -448.40718
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -448.40718

Logistic regression	Number of obs	=	662
	LR chi2(2)	=	9.71
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0078
Log likelihood = -448.40718	Pseudo R2	=	0.0107

f10_9x	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
_hat	.4870005	.6162227	0.79	0.429	-.7207739 1.694775
_hatsq	-1.03008	1.038071	-0.99	0.321	-3.064663 1.004502
_cons	-.0093925	.1185666	-0.08	0.937	-.2417787 .2229938

Collinearity Diagnostics

Variable	VIF	SQRT		R-Squared
		VIF	Tolerance	
f11_10x	1.06	1.03	0.9476	0.0524
s3_1x	2.37	1.54	0.4213	0.5787
s3_2x	1.79	1.34	0.5585	0.4415
s3_3x	1.73	1.32	0.5769	0.4231
s3_4x	3.93	1.98	0.2543	0.7457
s4x	1.71	1.31	0.5841	0.4159
GrStadt	1.09	1.05	0.9147	0.0853
leftist	1.06	1.03	0.9467	0.0533
s1x	1.24	1.12	0.8032	0.1968
s2x	2.51	1.58	0.3985	0.6015
s7x	1.26	1.12	0.7955	0.2045

Mean VIF 1.80

	Eigenval	Cond Index
1	5.9867	1.0000
2	1.1331	2.2985
3	1.1058	2.3268
4	1.0093	2.4355
5	0.7654	2.7966
6	0.6892	2.9472
7	0.5749	3.2269
8	0.3893	3.9217
9	0.1714	5.9095
10	0.0793	8.6895
11	0.0625	9.7839
12	0.0330	13.4777

Condition Number 13.4777
Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from scaled raw sscp (w/ intercept)
Det(correlation matrix) 0.0829

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -423.31279
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -389.01683
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -388.30468
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -388.30315
Iteration 4: log likelihood = -388.30315

Logistic regression
Log likelihood = -388.30315
Number of obs = 708
LR chi2(11) = 70.02
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.0827

f10_10x	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
f11_10x	-.9673482	.2028759	-4.77	0.000	-1.364978 - .5697188
s3_1x	.2473249	.2852318	0.87	0.386	-.3117191 .8063689
s3_2x	-.5326851	.3639809	-1.46	0.143	-1.246074 .1807043
s3_3x	.796065	.4380097	1.82	0.069	-.0624184 1.654548
s3_4x	-.0301894	.3790557	-0.08	0.937	-.7731249 .7127461
s4x	.0422723	.0953207	0.44	0.657	-.1445529 .2290974
GrStadt	-.4976017	.1972875	-2.52	0.012	-.884278 - .1109253
leftist	-.2369422	.1955418	-1.21	0.226	-.6201971 .1463127
s1x	.3469719	.1969894	1.76	0.078	-.0391203 .7330641
s2x	.2400413	.0856197	2.80	0.005	-.0722297 .4078529
s7x	.1448	.0741193	1.95	0.051	-.0004712 .2900712
_cons	-.3018396	.3715728	-0.81	0.417	-1.030109 .4264297

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -423.31279
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -389.20229
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -388.29023
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -388.28598
Iteration 4: log likelihood = -388.28598

Logistic regression
Log likelihood = -388.28598
Number of obs = 708
LR chi2(2) = 70.05
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.0827

f10_10x	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
_hat	1.036637	.2356121	4.40	0.000	.5748453 1.498428
_hatsq	-.0255112	.1376084	-0.19	0.853	-.2952188 .2441964
_cons	-.0004869	.1388518	-0.00	0.997	-.2726314 .2716576

Annex 3 – Acceptance of policy measures by several determinants (logit models without ‘subjective’ – perceived - self-interest)

Collinearity Diagnostics

Variable	VIF	SQRT VIF	Tolerance	R- Squared
s3_1x	2.37	1.54	0.4216	0.5784
s3_2x	1.75	1.32	0.5713	0.4287
s3_3x	1.73	1.32	0.5772	0.4228
s3_4x	3.96	1.99	0.2528	0.7472
s4x	1.71	1.31	0.5859	0.4141
GrStadt	1.10	1.05	0.9108	0.0892
leftist	1.06	1.03	0.9468	0.0532
s1x	1.24	1.11	0.8068	0.1932
s2x	2.53	1.59	0.3957	0.6043
s7x	1.27	1.13	0.7881	0.2119
Mean VIF	1.87			

	Eigenval	Cond Index
1	5.7542	1.0000
2	1.1342	2.2524
3	1.0181	2.3773
4	1.0037	2.3944
5	0.7640	2.7444
6	0.5764	3.1595
7	0.4028	3.7798
8	0.1710	5.8005
9	0.0802	8.4693
10	0.0624	9.6035
11	0.0330	13.2099

Condition Number 13.2099
 Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from scaled raw sscp (w/ intercept)
 Det(correlation matrix) 0.0859

Annex 4 – Acceptance of policy measures by several determinants (logit models without ideological orientation)

Collinearity Diagnostics

Variable	VIF	SQRT		R-Squared
		VIF	Tolerance	
f11_1x	1.04	1.02	0.9621	0.0379
s3_1x	2.41	1.55	0.4153	0.5847
s3_2x	1.80	1.34	0.5560	0.4440
s3_3x	1.67	1.29	0.5979	0.4021
s3_4x	3.94	1.99	0.2537	0.7463
s4x	1.69	1.30	0.5902	0.4098
GrStadt	1.09	1.04	0.9207	0.0793
s1x	1.21	1.10	0.8236	0.1764
s2x	2.51	1.58	0.3984	0.6016
s7x	1.28	1.13	0.7803	0.2197
Mean VIF	1.86			

	Eigenval	Cond Index
1	6.2531	1.0000
2	1.1349	2.3473
3	1.0114	2.4865
4	1.0028	2.4971
5	0.6832	3.0254
6	0.4473	3.7389
7	0.1921	5.7056
8	0.1245	7.0882
9	0.0632	9.9504
10	0.0614	10.0907
11	0.0263	15.4290

Condition Number 15.4290
 Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from scaled raw sscp (w/ intercept)
 Det(correlation matrix) 0.0883

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -139.05462
 Iteration 1: log likelihood = -129.90606
 Iteration 2: log likelihood = -124.82493
 Iteration 3: log likelihood = -124.64751
 Iteration 4: log likelihood = -124.64687
 Iteration 5: log likelihood = -124.64687

Logistic regression
 Number of obs = 924
 LR chi2(10) = 28.82
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0013
 Pseudo R2 = 0.1036
 Log likelihood = -124.64687

f10_1x	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
f11_1x	-.4746259	.5240467	-0.91	0.365	-1.501739 .5524868
s3_1x	-.9755235	.5961048	-1.64	0.102	-2.143868 .1928205
s3_2x	-.8363936	.7757693	-1.08	0.281	-2.356873 .6840862
s3_3x	-1.105469	.8753234	-1.26	0.207	-2.821071 .6101335
s3_4x	.2119853	.8514097	0.25	0.803	-1.456747 1.880718
s4x	-.0700955	.1905369	-0.37	0.713	-.4435411 .30335
GrStadt	.1715122	.4013359	0.43	0.669	-.6150916 .9581161
s1x	1.40822	.4464776	3.15	0.002	.5331396 2.283299
s2x	-.2596375	.1907051	-1.36	0.173	-.6334126 .1141376
s7x	.3460981	.1594046	2.17	0.030	.0336708 .6585255
_cons	-3.411415	.9180069	-3.72	0.000	-5.210675 -1.612155

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -139.05462
 Iteration 1: log likelihood = -126.36963
 Iteration 2: log likelihood = -124.46229
 Iteration 3: log likelihood = -124.28626
 Iteration 4: log likelihood = -124.28322
 Iteration 5: log likelihood = -124.28321

Logistic regression
 Number of obs = 924
 LR chi2(2) = 29.54
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
 Pseudo R2 = 0.1062
 Log likelihood = -124.28321

f10_1x	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
_hat	1.765106	.8962089	1.97	0.049	.0085692 3.521643
_hatsq	-.128206	.1457282	0.88	0.379	-.1574161 .413828
_cons	1.013852	1.293131	0.78	0.433	-1.520637 3.548341

Collinearity Diagnostics

Variable	VIF	SQRT		R-Squared
		VIF	Tolerance	
f11_9x	1.05	1.03	0.9503	0.0497
s3_1x	2.41	1.55	0.4146	0.5854
s3_2x	1.80	1.34	0.5542	0.4458
s3_3x	1.69	1.30	0.5908	0.4092
s3_4x	3.98	1.99	0.2516	0.7484
s4x	1.68	1.30	0.5960	0.4040
GrStadt	1.07	1.04	0.9304	0.0696
s1x	1.21	1.10	0.8257	0.1743
s2x	2.53	1.59	0.3947	0.6053
s7x	1.26	1.12	0.7909	0.2091
Mean VIF	1.87			

	Eigenval	Cond Index
1	5.5871	1.0000
2	1.1907	2.1662
3	1.0527	2.3038
4	1.0018	2.3616
5	0.7362	2.7549
6	0.6616	2.9060
7	0.4227	3.6357
8	0.1750	5.6501
9	0.0786	8.4332
10	0.0621	9.4870
11	0.0316	13.3004

Condition Number 13.3004
 Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from scaled raw sscp (w/ intercept)
 Det(correlation matrix) 0.0871

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -564.82395
 Iteration 1: log likelihood = -560.84117
 Iteration 2: log likelihood = -560.84009

Logistic regression	Number of obs =	824
	LR chi2(10) =	7.97
	Prob > chi2 =	0.6320
Log likelihood = -560.84009	Pseudo R2 =	0.0071

f10_9x	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
f11_9x	-.1356998	.1878592	-0.72	0.470	-.503897 .2324974
s3_1x	-.224569	.2379905	-0.94	0.345	-.6910217 .2418838
s3_2x	-.4615312	.3041973	-1.52	0.129	-1.057747 .1346844
s3_3x	-.458881	.3228488	-1.42	0.155	-1.091653 .1738911
s3_4x	-.4429798	.3024844	-1.46	0.143	-1.035838 .1498787
s4x	.124634	.0749817	1.66	0.096	-.0223275 .2715955
GrStadt	.147615	.1618528	0.91	0.362	-.1696106 .4648405
s1x	.0588716	.1556521	0.38	0.705	-.246201 .3639442
s2x	.0747871	.0695112	1.08	0.282	-.0614524 .2110267
s7x	-.0581373	.0602323	-0.97	0.334	-.1761903 .0599158
_cons	-.4881742	.318784	-1.53	0.126	-1.112979 .1366311

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -564.82395
 Iteration 1: log likelihood = -560.64087
 Iteration 2: log likelihood = -560.63474
 Iteration 3: log likelihood = -560.63474

Logistic regression	Number of obs =	824
	LR chi2(2) =	8.38
	Prob > chi2 =	0.0152
Log likelihood = -560.63474	Pseudo R2 =	0.0074

f10_9x	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
_hat	.6564606	.6426706	1.02	0.307	-.6031506 1.916072
_hatsq	-.7281998	1.139823	-0.64	0.523	-2.962212 1.505812
_cons	-.0121396	.1142327	-0.11	0.915	-.2360316 .2117525

Annex 5 – Acceptance of policy measures by several determinants (logit models without ‘objective’ self-interest)

Collinearity Diagnostics

Variable	VIF	SQRT VIF	Tolerance	R- Squared
f11_4x	1.01	1.01	0.9899	0.0101
left1st	1.03	1.02	0.9681	0.0319
s1x	1.02	1.01	0.9794	0.0206
s2x	1.05	1.03	0.9494	0.0506
s7x	1.05	1.02	0.9528	0.0472
Mean VIF	1.03			

	Eigenval	Cond Index
1	3.9283	1.0000
2	0.8081	2.2047
3	0.5967	2.5657
4	0.4421	2.9810
5	0.1815	4.6521
6	0.0432	9.5306

Condition Number 9.5306
Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from scaled raw sscp (w/ intercept)
Det(correlation matrix) 0.9205

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -480.64598
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -449.17528
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -448.78019
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -448.77974

Logistic regression
Log likelihood = -448.77974

Number of obs	=	719
LR chi2(5)	=	63.73
Prob > chi2	=	0.0000
Pseudo R2	=	0.0663

f10_4x	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
f11_4x	-.5766827	.1820406	-3.17	0.002	-.9334756 -.2198897
left1st	.8486372	.1915481	4.43	0.000	.4732099 1.224065
s1x	-.239531	.1619505	-1.48	0.139	-.5569481 .0778862
s2x	-.2404982	.051257	-4.69	0.000	-.3409601 -.1400363
s7x	.0724833	.0617258	1.17	0.240	-.0484971 .1934637
_cons	1.210852	.3248965	3.73	0.000	.5740668 1.847638

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -480.64598
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -449.1765
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -448.39067
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -448.38287
Iteration 4: log likelihood = -448.38287

Logistic regression
Log likelihood = -448.38287

Number of obs	=	719
LR chi2(2)	=	64.53
Prob > chi2	=	0.0000
Pseudo R2	=	0.0671

f10_4x	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
_hat	.8434484	.2195117	3.84	0.000	.4132134 1.273683
_hatsq	.1577894	.1788003	0.88	0.378	-.1926527 .5082315
_cons	-.0184788	.098198	-0.19	0.851	-.2109434 .1739857

Collinearity Diagnostics

Variable	VIF	SQRT VIF	Tolerance	R- Squared
f11_9x	1.02	1.01	0.9776	0.0224
leftist	1.04	1.02	0.9641	0.0359
slx	1.02	1.01	0.9796	0.0204
s2x	1.07	1.03	0.9357	0.0643
s7x	1.05	1.02	0.9519	0.0481
Mean VIF	1.04			

	Eigenval	Cond Index
1	3.8336	1.0000
2	0.8634	2.1072
3	0.6352	2.4567
4	0.4469	2.9289
5	0.1783	4.6363
6	0.0425	9.4933

Condition Number 9.4933
 Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from scaled raw sscp (w/ intercept)
 Det(correlation matrix) 0.9065

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -474.35896
 Iteration 1: log likelihood = -471.70413
 Iteration 2: log likelihood = -471.70367

Logistic regression Number of obs = 693
 LR chi2(5) = 5.31
 Prob > chi2 = 0.3792
 Log likelihood = -471.70367 Pseudo R2 = 0.0056

f10_9x	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
f11_9x	-.0288748	.2048817	-0.14	0.888	-.4304357 .372686
leftist	.1764816	.1714505	1.03	0.303	-.1595551 .5125184
slx	.2385678	.1558459	1.53	0.126	-.0668847 .5440202
s2x	-.0760276	.0491958	-1.55	0.122	-.0203943 .1724495
s7x	-.0127043	.0598032	-0.21	0.832	-.1299164 .1045078
_cons	-.6820787	.3179047	-2.15	0.032	-1.305161 -.0589968

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -474.35896
 Iteration 1: log likelihood = -471.27498
 Iteration 2: log likelihood = -471.27464

Logistic regression Number of obs = 693
 LR chi2(2) = 6.17
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0458
 Log likelihood = -471.27464 Pseudo R2 = 0.0065

f10_9x	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
_hat	1.956293	1.12327	1.74	0.082	-.2452754 4.157861
_hatsq	1.816485	1.959265	0.93	0.354	-2.023604 5.656574
_cons	.0690417	.1571853	0.44	0.660	-.2390358 .3771193

Collinearity Diagnostics

Variable	VIF	SQRT		R-Squared
		VIF	Tolerance	
f11_10x	1.01	1.00	0.9932	0.0068
leftist	1.03	1.01	0.9730	0.0270
s1x	1.03	1.01	0.9728	0.0272
s2x	1.06	1.03	0.9474	0.0526
s7x	1.05	1.03	0.9510	0.0490
Mean VIF	1.03			

	Eigenval	Cond Index
1	3.8981	1.0000
2	0.7869	2.2257
3	0.6621	2.4264
4	0.4290	3.0143
5	0.1803	4.6492
6	0.0436	9.4548

Condition Number 9.4548
 Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from scaled raw sscp (w/ intercept)
 Det(correlation matrix) 0.9193

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -433.47263
 Iteration 1: log likelihood = -406.72292
 Iteration 2: log likelihood = -406.22705
 Iteration 3: log likelihood = -406.22683

Logistic regression
 Number of obs = 736
 LR chi2(5) = 54.49
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
 Pseudo R2 = 0.0629

f10_10x	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
f11_10x	-1.097461	.1955387	-5.61	0.000	-1.48071 - .7142124
leftist	-.3170437	.1899047	-1.67	0.095	-.6892501 .0551628
s1x	.4193061	.174868	2.40	0.016	.0765711 .762041
s2x	.2167636	.0544796	3.98	0.000	.1099856 .3235416
s7x	.1310754	.0663373	1.98	0.048	.0010566 .2610942
_cons	-.0715567	.3347001	-0.21	0.831	-.7275568 .5844433

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -433.47263
 Iteration 1: log likelihood = -405.34079
 Iteration 2: log likelihood = -404.81169
 Iteration 3: log likelihood = -404.81065
 Iteration 4: log likelihood = -404.81065

Logistic regression
 Number of obs = 736
 LR chi2(2) = 57.32
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
 Pseudo R2 = 0.0661

f10_10x	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
_hat	1.468805	.3189911	4.60	0.000	.8435939 2.094016
_hatsq	-.2974565	.1764526	-1.69	0.092	-.6432972 .0483841
_cons	-.0676197	.1632644	-0.41	0.679	-.387612 .2523726

Annex 6 – Acceptance of policy measures by several determinants (logit models without ‘objective’ self-interest)

Collinearity Diagnostics

Variable	VIF	SQRT		R-Squared
		VIF	Tolerance	
f11_lx	1.03	1.01	0.9719	0.0281
left1st	1.03	1.01	0.9741	0.0259
s1x	1.03	1.01	0.9742	0.0258
s2x	1.07	1.04	0.9332	0.0668
s7x	1.06	1.03	0.9463	0.0537
Mean VIF	1.04			

	Eigenval	Cond Index
1	4.5185	1.0000
2	0.6795	2.5788
3	0.4733	3.0898
4	0.1852	4.9397
5	0.1146	6.2797
6	0.0290	12.4873

Condition Number 12.4873
Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from scaled raw sscp (w/ intercept)
Det(correlation matrix) 0.9004

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -109.97872
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -101.96287
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -99.899653
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -99.832951
Iteration 4: log likelihood = -99.832767

Logistic regression	Number of obs	=	761
	LR chi2(5)	=	20.29
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0011
Log likelihood = -99.832767	Pseudo R2	=	0.0923

f10_lx	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
f11_lx	-.9351058	.5385789	-1.74	0.083	-1.990701 .1204893
left1st	-.4328064	.4963807	-0.87	0.383	-1.405695 .5400819
s1x	1.338971	.5126939	2.61	0.009	.3341095 2.343833
s2x	-.272612	.131884	-2.07	0.039	-.5311 -.014124
s7x	.2781196	.1689839	1.65	0.100	-.0530827 .6093219
_cons	-3.295133	1.003557	-3.28	0.001	-5.262067 -1.328198

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -109.97872
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -101.15758
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -99.75155
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -99.599853
Iteration 4: log likelihood = -99.596257
Iteration 5: log likelihood = -99.596254

Logistic regression	Number of obs	=	761
	LR chi2(2)	=	20.76
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0000
Log likelihood = -99.596254	Pseudo R2	=	0.0944

f10_lx	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
_hat	1.900437	1.295345	1.47	0.142	-.6383931 4.439267
_hatsq	.1380031	.1936901	0.71	0.476	-.2416225 .5176287
_cons	1.349181	2.04309	0.66	0.509	-2.655201 5.353564

Collinearity Diagnostics

Variable	VIF	SQRT VIF	Tolerance	R-Squared
f11_2x	1.04	1.02	0.9624	0.0376
left1st	1.04	1.02	0.9648	0.0352
s1x	1.02	1.01	0.9766	0.0234
s2x	1.08	1.04	0.9222	0.0778
s7x	1.05	1.03	0.9496	0.0504
Mean VIF	1.05			

	Eigenval	Cond Index
1	4.4541	1.0000
2	0.6918	2.5374
3	0.4649	3.0953
4	0.1952	4.7772
5	0.1608	5.2638
6	0.0332	11.5787

Condition Number 11.5787
 Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from scaled raw sscp (w/ intercept)
 Det(correlation matrix) 0.8896

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -296.34904
 Iteration 1: log likelihood = -260.22364
 Iteration 2: log likelihood = -254.46831
 Iteration 3: log likelihood = -254.41887
 Iteration 4: log likelihood = -254.41885

Logistic regression Number of obs = 763
 LR chi2(5) = 83.86
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
 Pseudo R2 = 0.1415
 Log likelihood = -254.41885

f10_2x	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
f11_2x	-1.53728	.2608951	-5.89	0.000	-2.048625	-1.025935
left1st	.7001217	.2374996	2.95	0.003	.2346311	1.165612
s1x	.0642406	.2337293	0.27	0.783	-.3938604	.5223416
s2x	-.3512414	.074843	-4.69	0.000	-.497931	-.2045518
s7x	.2603965	.0897424	2.90	0.004	.0845046	.4362885
_cons	-.616775	.5139301	-1.20	0.230	-1.624059	.3905094

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -296.34904
 Iteration 1: log likelihood = -266.78085
 Iteration 2: log likelihood = -256.58373
 Iteration 3: log likelihood = -254.37987
 Iteration 4: log likelihood = -254.3788

Logistic regression Number of obs = 763
 LR chi2(2) = 83.94
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
 Pseudo R2 = 0.1416
 Log likelihood = -254.3788

f10_2x	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
_hat	.9234887	.2941293	3.14	0.002	.3470058	1.499972
_hatsq	-.026105	.0925449	-0.28	0.778	-.2074897	.1552797
_cons	-.0303598	.245726	-0.12	0.902	-.5119739	.4512544

Collinearity Diagnostics

Variable	VIF	SQRT VIF	Tolerance	R- Squared
f11_3x	1.01	1.01	0.9871	0.0129
left1st	1.03	1.02	0.9662	0.0338
s1x	1.02	1.01	0.9767	0.0233
s2x	1.05	1.03	0.9495	0.0505
s7x	1.05	1.03	0.9512	0.0488
Mean VIF	1.04			

	Eigenval	Cond Index
1	3.8425	1.0000
2	0.8640	2.1089
3	0.6231	2.4833
4	0.4479	2.9288
5	0.1787	4.6367
6	0.0438	9.3694

Condition Number 9.3694
 Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from scaled raw sscp (w/ intercept)
 Det(correlation matrix) 0.9162

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -373.56199
 Iteration 1: log likelihood = -356.4683
 Iteration 2: log likelihood = -355.7343
 Iteration 3: log likelihood = -355.73381

Logistic regression
 Number of obs = 714
 LR chi2(5) = 35.66
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
 Pseudo R2 = 0.0477
 Log likelihood = -355.73381

f10_3x	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
f11_3x	-1.045416	.2210326	-4.73	0.000	-1.478631 - .6121997
left1st	.6560987	.2292949	2.86	0.004	.206689 1.105508
s1x	.1049112	.1884771	0.56	0.578	-.2644971 .4743194
s2x	.0370932	.0581893	0.64	0.524	-.0769556 .1511421
s7x	-.1313119	.0722285	-1.82	0.069	-.2728771 .0102533
_cons	1.538983	.3696323	4.16	0.000	.8145172 2.263449

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -373.56199
 Iteration 1: log likelihood = -356.7526
 Iteration 2: log likelihood = -355.72093
 Iteration 3: log likelihood = -355.72002
 Iteration 4: log likelihood = -355.72002

Logistic regression
 Number of obs = 714
 LR chi2(2) = 35.68
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
 Pseudo R2 = 0.0478
 Log likelihood = -355.72002

f10_3x	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
_hat	.9102548	.5666	1.61	0.108	-.2002608 2.02077
_hatsq	.042681	.2574337	0.17	0.868	-.4618799 .5472418
_cons	.0330936	.3015073	0.11	0.913	-.5578498 .6240369

Collinearity Diagnostics

Variable	VIF	SQRT VIF	Tolerance	R- Squared
f11_4x	1.01	1.01	0.9899	0.0101
left1st	1.03	1.02	0.9681	0.0319
s1x	1.02	1.01	0.9794	0.0206
s2x	1.05	1.03	0.9494	0.0506
s7x	1.05	1.02	0.9528	0.0472
Mean VIF	1.03			

	Eigenval	Cond Index
1	3.9283	1.0000
2	0.8081	2.2047
3	0.5967	2.5657
4	0.4421	2.9810
5	0.1815	4.6521
6	0.0432	9.5306

Condition Number 9.5306
Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from scaled raw sscp (w/ intercept)
Det(correlation matrix) 0.9205

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -480.64598
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -449.17528
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -448.78019
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -448.77974

Logistic regression
Log likelihood = -448.77974

Number of obs	=	719
LR chi2(5)	=	63.73
Prob > chi2	=	0.0000
Pseudo R2	=	0.0663

f10_4x	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
f11_4x	-.5766827	.1820406	-3.17	0.002	-.9334756 -.2198897
left1st	.8486372	.1915481	4.43	0.000	.4732099 1.224065
s1x	-.239531	.1619505	-1.48	0.139	-.5569481 .0778862
s2x	-.2404982	.051257	-4.69	0.000	-.3409601 -.1400363
s7x	.0724833	.0617258	1.17	0.240	-.0484971 .1934637
_cons	1.210852	.3248965	3.73	0.000	.5740668 1.847638

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -480.64598
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -449.1765
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -448.39067
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -448.38287
Iteration 4: log likelihood = -448.38287

Logistic regression
Log likelihood = -448.38287

Number of obs	=	719
LR chi2(2)	=	64.53
Prob > chi2	=	0.0000
Pseudo R2	=	0.0671

f10_4x	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
_hat	.8434484	.2195117	3.84	0.000	.4132134 1.273683
_hatsq	.1577894	.1788003	0.88	0.378	-.1926527 .5082315
_cons	-.0184788	.098198	-0.19	0.851	-.2109434 .1739857

