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## Governance, democracy and poverty reduction: lessons drawn from household surveys in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America

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
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**December 2005**



# Governance, Democracy and Poverty Reduction: Lessons drawn from *household surveys* in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America

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# GOVERNANCE, DEMOCRACY AND POVERTY REDUCTION: LESSONS DRAWN FROM *HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS* IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA

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## ABSTRACT

Public statistics face quite a challenge when it comes to measuring new dimensions of development (institutions, governance, and social and political participation). To take up this challenge, modules on *Governance, Democracy and Multiple Dimensions of Poverty* have been appended to household surveys by National Statistics Institutes in twelve African and Latin-American developing countries. This paper presents the issues addressed and the methodological lessons learnt along with a selection of findings to illustrate this innovative approach and demonstrate its analytic potential. We investigate, for instance, the population's support for democratic principles, the respect for civil and political rights and the trust in the political class; the "need for the State", particularly of the poorest; the extent of petty corruption; the reliability of expert surveys on governance; the perception of decentralisation policies at local level; the level and vitality of social and political participation, etc. The conclusive appraisal made opens up prospects for the national statistical information systems in the developing countries. The measurement and tracking of this new set of objective and subjective public policy monitoring indicators would benefit from being made systematic.

**Keywords:** Africa, Latin America, Democracy, Monitoring Mechanism, Household Surveys, Governance, Poverty, Corruption, Development Policy, Statistics.

## RESUME

La mesure des nouvelles dimensions du développement (institutions, gouvernance, participation, sociale et politique) pose un redoutable défi à la statistique publique. Pour y répondre, des modules thématiques sur la *Gouvernance*, la *Démocratie* et les *Multiplés Dimensions de la Pauvreté* ont été greffés sur des enquêtes auprès des ménages réalisées par les Instituts Nationaux de la Statistique de douze pays en développement, africains et latino américains. On présente ici les enjeux et les enseignements méthodologiques de cette expérience, ainsi qu'une sélection de résultats illustratifs de cette approche novatrice. On s'interroge sur l'adhésion des citoyens aux principes démocratiques ; le respect des droits civils et politiques ; la confiance envers les institutions et la classe politique ; le « besoin d'Etat », notamment des pauvres ; l'ampleur de la petite corruption ; l'efficience des institutions ; la fiabilité des enquêtes-experts sur la gouvernance ; l'appréciation des politiques de décentralisation au niveau local ; le niveau et la dynamique de la participation sociale et politique, etc. Le bilan concluant qui en est tiré ouvre des perspectives pour les systèmes nationaux d'informations statistiques dans les PED. La mesure et le suivi de cette nouvelle batterie d'indicateurs objectifs et subjectifs au service de la conduite des politiques publiques mériteraient d'être systématisés.

**Mots clés :** Afrique, Amérique latine, Démocratie, Dispositif de suivi, Enquêtes auprès des Ménages, Gouvernance, Pauvreté, Corruption, Politique de développement, Statistique.

**JEL Code :** I31, I32, I38, H11, D73, O54, O55

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## INTRODUCTION

Following the relative failure of structural adjustment policies in the developing countries, there is a growing international consensus today about the importance of both the content of economic policies and the process by which they are implemented, particularly in the light of new international poverty reduction strategies (PRSP and HIPC initiatives). New factors such as governance, ownership and participation are now becoming core elements of development programmes. At the same time, the development research agenda has been extended to take into account the interactions between four major dimensions: growth, distribution (of income and assets), the quality of institutions (especially public institutions) and the type of political system (or, more generally, society's system of values). Current indicators and aggregates therefore endeavour to incorporate these aspects in order to measure and evaluate development strategies.

It was to address this major challenge shared by Metagora that two regional institutions (AFRISTAT and the Secretariat General of the Andean Community) and thirteen National Statistics Institutes (NSIs) in Africa and Latin America decided to work in partnership with DIAL to explore the possibilities of using official household surveys as a tool for measuring and monitoring these new development aspects. The statistical operations were conducted in seven economic capitals in West Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo), in Madagascar and in four Andean countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) from 2001 to 2005. Three specific modules ('*Multiple Dimension of Poverty*', '*Governance*' and '*Democracy*') were appended to classic household surveys (the *1-2-3 Survey* in Africa and the main household survey conducted by each NSI in the Latin American countries).

Although still tentative, these initiatives are already producing promising and conclusive findings and methodological lessons. Initial analyses of the surveys are shedding new light on phenomena that had hitherto received little (if any) attention. This paper looks at current African and Latin American experiences to show the usefulness of the household surveys as statistical tools to help develop and monitor indicators of governance and democracy in developing countries. The first section presents the general framework and the issues involved in measuring governance and democracy in the developing countries. The second section concerns the basic mechanism used for the surveys and the main methodological lessons learned. The third section presents a few examples of empirical findings selected to demonstrate the usefulness of such an approach in terms of analysis and policy implications. The last section presents the conclusion and looks at future prospects.

### **1. MEASURING GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRACY: WHAT CAN THE HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS CONTRIBUTE?**

#### **1.1. The issues at stake: governance and democracy at the heart of the development policies**

In late 1999, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) launched a joint initiative to place poverty reduction at the heart of development policy. All low income countries wishing to receive financial assistance from one of these two organisations, or debt relief under the HIPC (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries) Initiative, are required to draw up poverty reduction programmes, known as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). The PRSP principles have introduced three major innovations, which deserve to be acknowledged as such. The fact that the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) consider poverty reduction rather than structural adjustment to be their main objective is a welcome innovation. Secondly, for the first time the multidimensionality of poverty, beyond its monetary income component, is fully acknowledged (World Bank, 2000a). Thirdly, the adoption of the concept of a participatory process to define and monitor PSRPs could reinforce democracy in countries where the population generally has few ways of making itself heard (Cling, Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2003).

With the launch of the PRSPs, the BWIs have made a definite break with past practice. Previously, although national experts helped define policies and these policies were negotiated, poor countries had



very little influence or leeway. It would be an understatement to say that the information available to the public was limited: the majority of documents used during the negotiations were kept confidential.

Almost all the structural adjustment plans have failed in the low-income countries, especially in Africa. This is partly due to social and political obstacles preventing the programmes from being implemented and partly because the projects were ineffective even when they were properly applied. Two underlying shortcomings in the BWI intervention method go a long way towards explaining these failures. Firstly, it was assumed that international experts were best qualified to draft suitable policies for the country concerned, based on the notion of best practices. Secondly, those responsible for the programmes at national level were supposed to be able and willing to implement them efficiently despite the fact that they were considered incompetent, that they were kept at arm's length when the strategies were drawn up, and that they did not necessarily totally believe in them.

Two conditions have been established as a result of the development of the notion of "governance", mooted as one of the key conditions for the success of these policies, and the wind of democratisation with its emphasis on the need to pay more heed to the "voiceless" nationally and internationally. Firstly, more attention should be paid to a country's specific economic, socio-political and institutional context. Secondly, there should be a heightened awareness of how important it is for policies to be actively backed by both governments and the population at large.

As regards strategy implementation, the principle of participation by all of society's stakeholders heralds new ways of conducting national affairs in the future. With its emphasis on the right to information and freedom of speech, participation meets the goal of tackling the exclusion and marginalisation aspects of poverty. Yet this precept could cover much more ground. "Participation" can only really make a difference if it helps right dysfunctions in the workings of democracy in poor countries. It should therefore strengthen the capacities and powers of intermediate bodies (the media, trade unions, associations, etc.) in the drafting, monitoring, supervision, evaluation and revision of policies. Seen from this angle, information - especially its educational aspect - becomes critically important. It makes public choices and the management of affairs of State more open, whilst allowing the different stakeholders to put pressure on and even penalise the State if it fails. In short, the challenge is to ensure that the principle of accountability takes root, making the State responsible to its citizens for its actions.

The concept of a participatory process, which presupposes the active involvement of all society's stakeholders in the drafting, monitoring and implementation of poverty reduction strategies, should first of all enhance the debate and help devise a more appropriate strategy that meets real social needs. This approach, known as "*empowerment*", is intended to give the general public, and the poor in particular, a chance to influence policies that affect their living conditions by improving the definition and consideration of their problems and expectations.

For all these reasons, then, the notions of "good governance" and democracy are now pointed out as decisive factors for the success of economic policies and, more generally, for explaining national development levels. They are more than just instrumental (democracy contributes to good governance, which itself promotes growth and curbs inequality). They are constituent elements of the population's well-being (UNDP, 2002). For example, respect for individual freedoms (political freedom, freedom of speech, etc.) may be deemed an intrinsic element of development. By the same token, a respectable administration boosts the general feeling of justice by reducing discriminatory practices (e.g. by reducing corruption).

The new World Development Report (World Bank, 2005), with its focus on equity and development, provides additional arguments for promoting these aspects. The contention is as follows. Although there could be a clash between equity and efficiency in the short run, these two factors are complementary in the medium and long run. Development trajectories are largely conditioned by the institutions, which are themselves shaped by the distribution of power in the different societies. For example, history has shown that the economic institutions that tend to develop and take root in countries where power is in the hands of a small elite are not conducive to development. Conversely, greater political equality, wherein democracy is a catalyst, improves the quality of institutions by

extending the range of social groups that can actively contribute to the political, social and economic spheres. This consequently improves the prospects for prosperity. By acknowledging for the first time that political processes and institutions are behind virtuous development circles, the report makes *empowerment* policies one of the two pillars (along with reducing market imperfections) for both poverty reduction strategies and strategies to promote equal opportunities nationally and internationally.

Lastly, a new demand for public policy monitoring and assessment indicators has been created by the consideration of governance and democracy issues in development policies, and especially in poverty reduction strategies, and the acknowledgement of the crucial role played by the political economy as a factor for successful reforms. The implementation and quantification of these new policies' key words – *accountability, ownership, participation, voicing* and *empowerment* – pose a formidable challenge to the public statistics system, hitherto poorly equipped to meet it.

The legitimacy of this new statistical focus is all the greater since, in addition to the “institutional” demand generated by the development policies, the academic world and especially the field of economics is showing an interest in it. With the turnaround in players (microfoundations of macroeconomics), new prospects have opened up in growth economics in the last ten years. A considerable number of studies have endeavoured to overcome the limits of the traditional approach by introducing, in addition to the classic production factors (capital and labour) and technological change, new variables to explain long-run development paths (ethno-linguistic fractionalisation, religious diversity, the “quality” of the institutions, the origin of law, legal and political regimes, geographic location, cultural factors, etc.; for a review of the literature in this field, see Feng, 2003; Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2005a). This revival of what, to coin Srinivasan (2001), could be called a real growth econometrics “industry” is fuelled by a proliferation of new international databases. Table 1 gives an idea of some of the main sources in this field (see Sudders and Nahem, 2004, for a more comprehensive presentation).

**Table 1: Examples of international databases on governance**

Indicator/database	Institution
<b>Governance</b>	
- CPIA (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment) - Governance Matters I-IV (Voice and accountability, Political stability, Government effectiveness, Regulatory quality, Rule of law, Control of corruption) - ICRG (International Country Risk Guide) - IEF (Index of Economic Freedom) - IPC (Perception Corruption Index)	World Bank  Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastruzzi/World Bank  Political Risk Services Group The Heritage Foundation Transparency International
<b>Democracy</b>	
- Political rights, Civil liberties, Freedom Status - Polity I-IV (Polity's institutionalized-democracy index) - Bollen's Index (Bollen's liberal-democracy Index)	Gastil/Freedom House Gurr/University of Maryland (CIDCM) Bollen/University of North Carolina/(ICPSR)
<b>Other indicators</b>	
- ELF (Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization) - World Values Survey (Trust, well-being, etc.)	Roeder/Dept. Political Science, University of California, San Diego Inglehart/WVS Association, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan

## 1.2. Household surveys: an appropriate instrument?

The approach based on qualitative and participatory methods, referred to nowadays generically as PAs (*Participatory Assessments*), was first developed in the mid-1990s, particularly in the field of poverty with *Participatory Poverty Assessments* (PPAs). Its main objective is to take account of the views of society's different players, especially the poor. It is based on two underlying principles. Firstly, recognition of the fact that the poor are poverty "experts" and are in the best position to define the nature of the phenomenon, its origins and how to escape it. Secondly, recognition that poverty has many facets that may be hard to cover in traditional quantitative surveys and cannot be reduced to the usual lone monetary criterion. The general participatory approach entails more than just collecting

data. It is designed to involve the different key players, especially representatives of the poor, in the process of monitoring the policies implemented.

PPAs have been introduced in many countries (around sixty), largely at the instigation of the World Bank. They are based on sociological and anthropological surveys using various techniques such as open and semi-directive, individual and focus group interviews, visual methods (tables and diagrams) and observations (World Bank, 2002). The participatory assessments have been used for a vast consultation programme (*Consultations with the Poor*) initiated by the World Bank to give the poor a hearing (Narayan *et al.*, 2000; Narayan *et al.*, 2000). The objective is to obtain their views on four particular themes:

- Perceptions of poverty (definition of the concept, causes and difficulties encountered);
- The main problems and priorities involved in drafting policies;
- Their experiences with the various institutions (local and outside the community);
- Gender inequality, both within the household and the community.

#### 1.2.1. Main findings and limitations of the PPAs

The PPAs' main findings are twofold. Firstly, this approach has provided greater insight into poverty. In particular, it has shed light on its many aspects. In addition to the traditional aspects associated with income and consumption levels and access to education and health, the analyses reveal other aspects such as vulnerability and insecurity, exclusion and the inability of the poor to influence the socio-economic factors that determine their standard of living (*powerlessness*), and a lack of dignity and self-respect. Secondly, from the policy point of view, the basis for reform is broader and firmer. Participatory methods have triggered a dialogue, which promotes policy ownership by involving the various stakeholders.


However, this approach has its limitations. The first is that the data collected are over-descriptive and not very helpful for decision-making. Decision-makers more often than not require quantitative data to help with policy-making. Yet there are many different perceptions, which highlight conflicts of interest. The question also has to be asked as to whether the views expressed in the surveys are representative of those of the poor population as a whole - the *voiceless*. Furthermore, the direct impact of participatory assessments may be limited, especially in the short term. Yet the methods generate huge expectations among those involved, who consider their (time-consuming) involvement to be an investment. Disappointment due to over-optimism can then quickly demotivate the population, bringing into question the continuity of the participatory process. Finally, those using participatory approaches are generally not very interested in follow-up work and assessing reforms once they have been implemented.

#### 1.2.2. Subject-specific modules appended to the statistical surveys: an alternative approach

PPAs designed to give the "poor a voice" using qualitative and participatory methods have clearly improved the information available on poverty. But one particular question needs to be asked: how far can we go on this track? This approach leaves unsolved the problem of converting findings into information that can be used to implement specific policies at national level.

An alternative and/or complementary approach may be proposed, which meets the need to gather representative opinions and could consequently solve the problem of having to make a trade-off between the many different points of view. This approach is to graft modules in the form of opinion polls onto classic periodic quantitative surveys - preferably relatively "light" surveys. These opinion polls relate to topics that vary from year to year. The qualitative questions put by the participatory approaches are thus standardised within these modules. People (including the poor) are asked how they perceive poverty (definition and causes), what their problems and requirements are, what they think about the policies already implemented and how they would devise appropriate strategies to meet their expectations.

**Diagram 1: Qualitative modules for understanding links between governance, democracy, economic policies and living conditions**



In addition to this approach, subject-specific modules can be included to cover the households' cultural, social and political environment. Paradoxically, there is virtually no information available on these subjects in the developing countries, especially Africa, even though many analysts stress social, cultural and political factors as determining the way in which African societies operate.

This approach has the advantage of collecting both *objective data* on the situation of households and individuals (based on the socio-economic part of the survey: income/consumption levels, housing conditions, etc.) and *subjective data* on the survey respondents' perceptions and evaluations (degree of satisfaction with their living conditions, their difficulties and needs, and their opinions regarding policies and how the institutions are run; Table 2). Since the surveys are representative, the subjective data are quantifiable: the share of the population with a given point of view can be measured. Opinions can also be analysed in terms of the characteristics of the individuals concerned. Lastly, the behaviour and opinions of the poor can be compared with the rest of the population when the survey is linked to a classic living conditions assessment for households as a whole, thus shedding light on the poverty reduction strategies.

**Table 2: Comparison of the two methods: Participatory assessments/subject-specific modules grafted onto quantitative surveys**

	Participatory methods (PPAs)	Subject-specific modules grafted onto traditional quantitative surveys
<b>Method:</b>	A basket of tools	Standardised method
<b>Main tool</b>	Semi-structured interview	Formalised questionnaire
Cost	Moderate or low ( <i>depending on the objective and the extent of geographical coverage</i> )	High or moderate, but very low marginal cost if the quantitative survey has already been planned
Form of participation	Active participation through open discussions and situation analysis	Consulting the general public on its views Survey: passing on the voice of the excluded
Sample	Small or medium-sized (targeting the poor) but not very representative	Large sample representative of all population categories
<b>Type of information collected</b> <b>→ Results</b>	Qualitative and descriptive information (hard to quantify) → Detailed knowledge of the situation of the poor and their points of view	Information that is both quantitative and qualitative, quantifiable (in-depth statistical analysis possible) → Broader diagnosis of the situation of the poor (in relation to others); classification of priorities and opinions according to their weight in the population
<b>Main limitations</b>	Many different situations and points of view → Information not very helpful for decision-making	Since the questions are predetermined: → Need for prior knowledge of the situation of the poor, to avoid imposing outside viewpoints and overlooking what may be crucial factors and questions

Thus, at a time when public policies are starting to focus on the concept of *empowerment*, socio-political surveys are helping to give a voice to social groups traditionally on the fringes of the

decision-making process and boost their bargaining power. This contribution is proving to be all the more important in that, in the poorest countries where intermediate civil society institutions are in their infancy if they exist at all, such surveys, along with elections, are the only way in which the *voiceless* can make themselves heard by the authorities.

### 1.2.3. Economic policies, governance, democracy and opinion polls

Subject-specific modules incorporated into representative household surveys may be an original poverty analysis tool largely underused in the developing countries, but they pave the way for a wide range of applications of more general scope. The wave of democratisation worldwide, and especially in sub-Saharan Africa, has made the widespread use of opinion polls possible and indeed necessary as a source of information and policy guidance, alongside the traditional instrument of economic statistics. On the one hand, the setting up of democratic regimes has removed the political obstacles (censorship) that ruled out such polls, and on the other, the very fact that democracy exists implies that everyone can have access to information, and as much of it as possible. Hence it is only natural that modern communication technologies should be made available for use by the general public and its representatives, faced as they are with numerous problems making collective choices, to report on the different sensitivities and how they are evolving and hence inform the public debate. We have elsewhere discussed the usefulness of such an approach for electoral sociology and socio-political surveys (Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2003a; Roubaud, 2003a et 2003b). Yet there are infinite possibilities, as the proliferation of surveys and diversity of subjects addressed in the developed countries show. Similarly, while it is the poor in whom we are interested here, society can be split up in a wide variety of ways: women, young people, civil servants, etc.

Paradoxically, the young democracies in the South have not yet taken full advantage of this amazing opportunity. There are several reasons for this lag, which is relative given the infancy of the democratic process. The lack of financial resources is largely to blame. In sub-Saharan Africa, public statistics and research institutes have borne the brunt of the budgetary crisis and are dying off (Afristat, 1998), while the lack of solvent demand is inhibiting the development of the private sector (opinion research institutes and marketing departments). In addition to this financial constraint, there is a lack of skilled human resources able to provide expertise in both sampling techniques and the handling of socio-economic and political issues. Even in the field of research, there are very few sociologists and political scientists who are both African specialists and experts in the use of quantitative analysis instruments. Finally, mention should be made of the official statistical information systems, which have always measured "hard" economic variables (growth, inflation, unemployment, etc.) in preference to socio-political and subjective indicators: electoral choices, preferences, opinions and values. The World Bank economists, who played a key role in defining policies and monitoring systems in Africa, bear some responsibility for this bias. However, even within this institution, this view is beginning to be called into question, with an increasing amount of work being done on the "quality of growth" (World Bank, 2000b), showing that the economic trajectory of developing countries depends just as much on factors hitherto considered as "extra-economic": democracy, governance, ownership, etc. A whole series of new databases has thus come into use (indices showing perceptions of corruption, civic and political freedom, ethno-linguistic "fractionalisation", etc.) along with new generations of household surveys such as the Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaires (CWIQ surveys).

Although the merits of this type of survey are not in doubt, there is a question mark over which institution should be responsible for them. In the developed countries, they are generally conducted by private opinion research institutes, but many of them are financed from public funds and conducted by governments or scientific research organisations. In France, for example, short-term household surveys are carried out by INSEE and CREDOC, and political surveys by CEVIPOF (1978, 1985, 1995, 1997, etc.). At European and international level, there are the long-term monitoring systems such as the Euro-barometers, opinion polls conducted in the European Union countries every year since 1970, the Political Action Surveys and the World Values Surveys. The latter have already published four successive editions (1981, 1990, 1995 and 1999-2001), extending the geographical coverage from 22 countries for the first wave to 43 for the second and 65 for the most recent wave (Inglehart, 1997, Inglehart and Welzel, 2005).

As already mentioned, in the poorest developing countries, especially in Africa, organisations of this kind do not perform this task. In most countries, they are non-existent, and where they do exist, human and financial resources are often too limited for this kind of operation to be possible. There are therefore at least three reasons for considering that the National Statistics Institute (NSI) is the best candidate for conducting such surveys. Firstly, the NSI generally has the key technical expertise in household surveys. Secondly, these surveys often serve a genuine public service mission and hence require public funds. Thirdly, the strong potential demand for these surveys is a powerful lever that could help reinstate the social function of the NSIs, which has unfortunately fallen into disrepute in many cases. Madagascar is a good example of the relevance of this choice. A balance can and must be found between information overkill in the developed countries (the findings of some 800 polls were disseminated in France alone in 1991, not counting the plethora of unpublished polls for private use) and the virtual non-existence of such figures in poor countries.

At the end of the day, whatever reservations one may have about opinion polls (the effect of pre-conditioning, the artificial construction if not manipulation of public opinion, etc.: Bourdieu, 1980; Champagne, 1990; Meynaud and Duclos, 1996; Blondiaux, 1998), they have more to do with the misuse of such polls ("naïve" and simplified reading, biased interpretations, giving in to the dictates of commerce), than with their intrinsic legitimacy as an information tool. If the necessary precautions are taken when they are used - technical and ethical precautions, as should be taken with any scientific approach - they represent an essential element of knowledge about democratic societies and their smooth running<sup>1</sup>. Systematically banned under totalitarian regimes, opinion polls are a product of democratic society (Cayrol, 2000).

Participatory processes provide the conceptual framework and confer legitimacy on the part played by society at large in strengthening governance and democracy in developing countries. The present weakness of civil society organisations in the three areas of representativeness, legitimacy and capacity leads us to cast a critical eye over experiments currently being carried out in the field. If any progress is to be made, action is needed simultaneously on two fronts:

- Strengthening the "intermediate bodies" able to pass on people's aspirations and act as a counterweight. We have to fill the yawning gap between the State, the political elite, the all-powerful *big men* and the *little men* acting alone. This is the stance taken by numerous donors who support institutional structures such as associations of water users and rural producers, mutual savings and loan associations, trade unions and human rights leagues, and election-monitoring groups. By its very nature, this is a long-term process;
- Strengthening the accountability, or democratic responsibility, of governments whilst helping the general public to make their preferences and choices known (voicing and empowerment) by means of household surveys and opinion polls. It is this method, which is largely overlooked and yet much easier to put into effect, that we shall explore here.

These two complementary fronts interact positively with one another. The survey findings provide the civil society organisations (CSOs) with an excellent foundation to underpin their demands (*advocacy*) and increase their legitimacy and also serve as an instrument for informed dialogue with the official bodies. In return, the CSOs can encourage the ownership and sustainability of the surveys by expressing a strong social demand for them and taking part in their design, tracking and dissemination (user committees; see Box 3).

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<sup>1</sup> A. Lancelot (1984) identified at least four ways in which opinion polls can underpin democracy: the selection of governing bodies (choice of candidates and elected representatives), monitoring (providing constantly updated information on the general public's reaction), respect for the rights of the opposition (when all levels of power are held by the same party, they reflect the diversity a proportional system would provide) and support for the culture of freedom (the pluralism and information dissemination without which democracy is simply a meaningless expression).

## 2. THE SURVEYS: GENERAL PRESENTATION AND METHODOLOGICAL LESSONS

This section presents the main characteristics and particularities of the survey system used (sampling and subject coverage) as well as the initial methodological lessons drawn from this experiment.

### 2.1. The surveys' characteristics

Based on the experience acquired by the MADIO project in Madagascar since 1995 – a project that has tested and improved the survey system by identifying the most relevant questions – three specific modules (*Multiple Dimensions of Poverty, Governance and Democracy*) were developed and appended to the *1-2-3 Survey* on employment, the informal sector and poverty (Box 1). The survey was conducted in seven WAEMU economic capitals (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo) and in Madagascar from 2001 to 2004 (Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2005b). The experiment was also applied in four Andean countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) from 2002 to 2005. In Latin America, the modules were grafted onto the main household survey conducted by each NSI as part of the official statistics system. The surveys covered a representative sample of over 35,000 adults accounting for 21,000 households in the eight African cities. Over 50,000 people were interviewed in the four Latin American countries, with a national and regional level of statistical inference.

The success of the operations from both a methodological point of view (governance and democracy can be measured reliably) and analytic standpoint (the findings can be used to inform public policies) prompted an ownership process with two countries deciding to permanently incorporate this type of survey into their national statistical information system. INSTAT in Madagascar now carries out the survey annually while the INEI in Peru conducts the operation on an ongoing basis using own resources to assess the temporal dynamics (monthly, quarterly and annual) of the indicators studied. Other countries such as Benin and Côte d'Ivoire are also considering conducting the surveys on a regular basis.

#### Box 1:

##### The pioneering MADIO project in Madagascar

The method of introducing subject-specific modules into representative household surveys was applied in the Madagascar capital starting in 1995, when they were appended to the *1-2-3 Surveys* conducted by the MADIO project within the Madagascar NSI (INSTAT). The surveys retained a certain number of common questions while addressing different subjects, which varied from year to year:

- The inhabitants of Antananarivo and economic policy (phase 3, consumer survey, 1995);
- The educational policy and structural adjustment (phase 1, Labour Force Survey (LFS), 1996);
- Elections, political parties, ethnic groups and religion (phase 1, LFS, 1997);
- The reform of the administration, privatisation and corruption (phase 1, LFS, 1998);
- Poverty via subjective household assessments (phase 3, consumption survey, 1998);
- The management of savings and the use of the banking system (phase 3, consumption survey, 1998);
- The single tax and real property tax (phase 1, LFS, 1999);
- Economic growth (phase 1, LFS, 1999);
- The different dimensions of poverty, violence and exclusion (phase 1, LFS, 2000, 2001);
- The impact of the crisis (phase 1, LFS, 2002-2003);
- The different dimensions of poverty, governance and democracy (2003, 2004 and 2005).

This approach was also applied by the *Rural Observatories*, an innovative survey design set up by MADIO to analyse and monitor the rural areas. Different issues were addressed:

- The impact of the liberalisation reforms (1995);
- The respective roles of men and women (1997);
- The education strategies (1998);
- Subjective poverty and social capital (1999).

This approach was not just limited to the household surveys. It was also systematically incorporated into the business surveys (EAI or Annual Survey of Industry). The main focuses of the subject-specific modules were: businessmen and the economic policy (1995, 1996 and 1999); taxation (1997); central government reform, privatisation and international trade openness (1998).

Lastly, drawing on the experience gained by MADIO, this approach was extended beyond the project in two forms. Firstly, the module on subjective poverty was inserted into INSTAT's national household survey (EPM) in 2001 (Lokshin, Umapathi and Stefano Paternostro, 2004). Secondly, at the request of the European Union, a specific national survey also conducted by INSTAT (INSTAT, 2004) addressed the subject of economic and political reforms. The incorporation of Madagascar into the *Afrobarometer* network and the 2005 survey were also part of this move.

From an institutional point of view, this programme is part of the international Metagora project hosted by the OECD/Paris21 and financed by the European Union and Swiss, Swedish and French bilateral co-operation agencies. The purpose of this project is to propose methods for measuring human rights, democracy and governance. At the Montreux Conference on Statistics, Development and Human Rights held by IAOS and the Swiss Federal Statistical Office in September 2000, a large-scale dialogue (representing 123 countries and 35 international organisations) was launched for the first time between the community of statisticians and human rights organisations. The organisers showed a great deal of interest in the work by MADIO presented at this conference. This contact continued in subsequent years during the Metagora project set-up phase, in particular with a series of seminars on these same subjects (Munich, January 2002; Merida, Mexico, April 2002; Brussels, November 2002; and Berlin, August 2003)<sup>2</sup>. DIAL and its partners' extending of this work beyond the Madagascar case to take in West Africa and Latin America confirmed that there was a tie-in with the goals of the future Metagora project. This work was therefore naturally incorporated as one of the Metagora components when it was set up in February 2004.

Although repeating the survey annually means that the indicators can be monitored over time, the main asset of the surveys in the other African capitals was to simultaneously conduct identical surveys in a number of different countries, thus laying the foundations for proper regional data comparability. This factor is all the more noteworthy in that, to our knowledge, it is the first experiment of its kind in the area of socio-economic surveys of households in sub-Saharan Africa. The *1-2-3 Survey*, which forms the basis for the mechanism, is a system of three nested surveys designed to track the trends in employment, the informal sector and poverty in the developing countries. The first phase is a survey of household employment, unemployment and working conditions (phase 1: Labour Force Survey). The second phase concerns the head of informal production units (IPUs). The third phase is a household consumption survey designed to estimate households' standards of living and analyse the determinants of poverty (phase 3: survey on consumption, points of purchase and poverty). To this basic structure are added the subject-specific modules appended to one of the phases in line with the statistical unit studied (household, individual or IPU). Given that the statistical unit for the *Multiple Dimensions of Poverty* module of this project was the household, it was appended to the phase 1 household sheet. The *Governance* and *Democracy* modules were interested in the opinions of individuals aged 18 years and over, and so were incorporated into phases 1 or 3 depending on the country (Table 3).

**Table 3: Main characteristics of the modules in Africa**

%	West Africa							Madaga	Total
	Cotonou	Ouaga-dougou	Abidjan	Bamako	Niamey	Dakar	Lome	Antananarivo	
<b>Phase 1 sampling plan:</b>									
Total number of basic units	464	713	2,483	993	368	2,041	129	1,330	8,521
Number of basic units in sample	125	125	125	125	125	125	125	108	983
Initial number of households in sample	3,000	2,500	2,500	2,500	2,500	2,500	2,500	3,019	21,019
Final number of household in sample	3,001	2,458	2,494	2,409	2,500	2,479	2,500	3,019	20,860
<b>Subjective Poverty module:</b>									
Survey date	10/2001	10/2001	06/2002	10/2001	09/2002	10/2002 02/2003	09/2001	12/2002 01/2003	-
Unit of analysis	Househld	Househld	Househld	Househld	Househld	Househld	Househld	Househld	Househld
Number of households	3,001	2,458	2,494	2,409	2,500	2,479	2,500	2,734	20,575
Questionnaire	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full
Number of questions	78	78	78	78	78	78	78	78	78
<b>Governance and Democracy modules</b>									
Survey date	10/2001	10/2002	06/2002	10/2001	09/2002	10/2002 02/2003	10/2001	04/2003	-
Unit of analysis	Adult	Adult	Adult	Adult	Adult	Adult	Adult	Adult	Adult
Survey phase	Phase 1	Phase 3	Phase 1	Phase 1	Phase 1	Phase 1	Phase 3	Phase 2'	-
Number of individuals	6,328	2,023	4,794	4,482	6,431	6,829	1,840	2,807	<b>35,534</b>
Questionnaire	Full	Partial	Partial	Partial	Full	Partial	Partial	Partial	-
Number of questions	124	119	117	117	124	113	114	120	-

Sources: 1-2-3 Surveys, Phase 1, Phase 3, *Multiple Dimensions of Poverty*, *Governance and Democracy* modules, 2001/2003, National Statistics Institutes, AFRISTAT, DIAL, our own calculations.

<sup>2</sup> *Measuring Democracy and Good Governance*, The European Commission, EUROSTAT, CDG Munich Centre, Munich, January 2002; *Indicators and Diagnosis on Human Rights: The Case of Torture in Mexico*, Comisión nacional de los derechos humanos, Merida, Mexico, April 2002; *Statistics and Human Rights*, The European Commission, EUROSTAT, Munich Centre, Brussels, November 2002; the International Statistics Institute International Conference, Berlin, August 2003.



The survey mechanism was tailored to local particularities in the Andean countries, based on the common matrix designed for the African case. The more advanced development of the national statistical system meant that the three modules could be grafted to household surveys programmed by each national statistics institute: the ENAHO survey in Peru, the SIEH (for the “*Governance*” and “*Democracy*” modules) and ENIGHU surveys (for the “*Multiple Dimensions of Poverty*”) in Ecuador, and the MECOVI survey in Bolivia. The advantages of this strategy were twofold. Firstly, it drew on all the beneficial properties of these surveys (geographic, subject and time coverage), forming the main official household survey in the three countries. Secondly, it reduced the cost of data collection for the modules to a marginal outlay. However, it limited the possibilities of cross-referencing the modules with the classic socio-economic variables derived from the questions already included in the basic survey. This substantially reduced the analytic coverage from an international comparative point of view. Moreover, in the case of Ecuador, the use of two different surveys as the basis for the incorporation of the modules ruled out any possibility of matching information on *subjective poverty* and data on *governance* and *democracy* at individual level.

The surveys in all three countries took in large-scale national samples (Table 4). The experiment in Peru is the most accomplished to date, with the modules forming an integral part of the ENAHO survey along with the employment, income and consumption modules. Under the ENAHO sampling scheme, the modules cover a sample of around 20,000 households (annual average) with national, regional and even department representativeness. Moreover, the fact that ENAHO is an ongoing survey meant that it was possible to build annual, quarterly and even monthly tracking indicators right from the introduction of the modules in May 2003. Like Peru, the sample of 19,059 people in GD module and 11,256 in MP module in Ecuador provided a subnational level of statistical inference (four major cities, as well as other urban and rural areas). However, this was a one-off survey (March 2004 in the case of SIEH survey and 2003-2004 in the case of ENIGHU survey) and not an ongoing survey. The survey’s statistical properties were the most limited in Bolivia since the sample covered only 1,570 individuals in GD module, which corresponded to a one sixth of data collection by the MECOVI survey (from September to October 2004) and 9,196 in the MP module over the whole survey period (November 2003-October 2004). The sample was drawn so as to guarantee national and regional representativeness. It is worth noting here that the countries’ different survey characteristics reflect the national statistical system’s level of development.

**Table 4: Main characteristics of the modules in the Andean Countries**

	<b>Peru</b>	<b>Ecuador</b>	<b>Bolivia</b>
<b>Sample size</b>	18,918 households (ENAHO) 18,918 in GD module 18,918 in MP module	19,059 households (SIEH survey) 11,270 households (ENIGHU survey), 19,059 in GD module 11,256 in MP module	9,433 households (MECOVI) 9,196 in MP module 1,570 in GD module
<b>Survey Period</b>	May 2003- Oct. 2005 Continuous	March 2004 (GD, SIEH) 2003-2004 (MP, ENIGHU)	Nov. 2003-Nov. 2004 (MP) Sept-Nov 2004 (GD)
<b>Geographic &amp; subject coverage and inference levels</b>	National, regional, department & demo+socio economic+ GDMP modules	National, regional, 4 biggest cities & demo+socio+economic+ GDMP modules	National, regional & demo+socio+economic+ GDMP modules
<b>Regional questionnaire harmonisation process</b>	CAN-Metagora	CAN-Metagora	CAN-Metagora
<b>Participatory process, institutionalisation</b>	INEI (NSO) NGOs; Academics; Public agencies	INDEC (NSO)	INE (NSO)
<b>Governance, democracy indicators</b>	Objective (process & outcomes) and perceptions	Objective (process & outcomes) and perceptions	Objective (process & outcomes) and perceptions
<b>Policy impact</b>	Institutional & poverty gender disaggregation	Institutional & poverty gender disaggregation	Institutional & poverty gender disaggregation

Sources: ENAHO, SIEH, ENIGHU and MECOVI surveys, *Multiple Dimensions of Poverty*, *Governance* and *Democracy* modules, 2003/2005, National Statistics Institutes, CAN, DIAL, our own calculations.

### 2.1.1. The subject content of the questionnaires

From the point of view of subject content, the DIAL researchers developed three generic modules: *Multiple Dimensions of Poverty*, *Governance* and *Democracy*. These were then discussed and revised by the project's different partner institutions, bearing in mind that the choice of questionnaires put at the end of the day was decided on at national level by a process of development and consultations in each country (see below). In general, the configuration of the questionnaires and the formulation of questions themselves had to meet two criteria:

- Firstly, the total number of questions put in the modules had to take account of the fact that the modules were appended to existing surveys whose scope (employment, consumption, living conditions, etc.) differed from that of the modules and from one country to the next. This constraint obviously affected the volume of data that could be reasonably collected;
- Secondly, the project's comparative objective had to be balanced with the need to avoid glossing over national particularities and centres of interest. This brought two considerations into play. On the one hand, a choice of questions needed to be made. Some of the questions were taken as they stood from other international initiatives (such as the *World Value Surveys*) to be able to compare the answers with those obtained in other regions of the world where the surveys were conducted. Others, however, were specially designed to meet the survey's specific goals. On the other hand, there was the concern to have the questionnaires harmonised between countries (especially within each of the two regional subspaces) to incorporate the project's regional dimension while allowing for more targeted questions corresponding to national centres of interest.

It is worth noting that, in addition to the possibilities of comparison, the fact of selecting a certain number of questions from other international survey projects on similar and related subjects in generally different geographic areas also provided certain scientific and operational guarantees (reference conceptual framework, consistency and relevance of the questions, already tested in practice) by bringing economies of scale into play.

The questionnaires put in Africa resembled the generic model very closely, ensuring a maximum comparability of findings. In the Andean countries, however, there was more of a departure from the basic structure and greater differences between countries, reflecting the greater weight of local considerations compared with the project's common goals. We will therefore take a brief look at the content of the three generic modules (see the questionnaires in the appendix) largely applied in the African countries. We will then cover some of the main contributions made by the questionnaires proposed in the Andean countries.

The *Multiple Dimensions of Poverty* module proposes new poverty tracking indicators to inform and enhance the content of poverty reduction policies. Despite unanimous recognition of the multifaceted nature of poverty, analyses of the different forms of this phenomenon and the links between these forms are scarce, especially in the poor countries. This is due mainly to a lack of accurate data in this field. The *Multiple Dimensions of Poverty* module is hence designed to bridge this gap by collecting data to build relevant indicators on poverty in its various dimensions. Particular attention has been paid to household perceptions of their living conditions. Unlike the classic approach, which focuses on household income and consumption levels, this method concentrates on the households' own subjective assessment of their level of well-being.

The module therefore explores different dimensions of poverty by combining the two "objective" and "subjective" approaches. Firstly, subjective poverty is addressed by a number of questions concerning respectively: well-being or the individuals' general perception of the living conditions; the level of satisfaction with minimum needs seen by the population as basic; the relative notion of poverty or how the households rank their standards of living compared with those around them; subjective poverty in terms of financial difficulties (their assessment of their financial situation and the level of their income compared with the minimum level they deem necessary to live decently). Secondly, the households' extent of vulnerability and insecurity is measured by means of their perception of the instability of their income and the dynamics of observed income. Objective information on acts of violence against

individuals, households and neighbours is also collected. Thirdly, poverty in terms of social capital is gleaned from the extent of integration into or exclusion from society: participation in associations or networks, household/individual mutual assistance set-ups, regular interest in the news. Added to these different aspects are the data collected by the basic *1-2-3 Survey* system. So, in addition to income, precise data are available on human capital (levels of education), housing conditions, and so on.

A last set of questions looks directly at the policy lines adopted. These questions focus more specifically on the poverty reduction strategies applied in the countries studied to find out: the definition of poverty as seen by the people interviewed; whether or not poverty reduction is a priority; the level of information about the poverty reduction strategy development process; whether or not the households are involved in this process; and the households' assessment of the policies implemented. These questions constitute a way of applying the principle of participatory monitoring (monitoring by the population) of the measures put in place by the government. They can be used to put pressure on the leaders to be accountable for their actions (accountability).

The *Governance* module focuses mainly on the running and efficiency of the public institutions, objectively and subjectively, and the role of the State. Following a general question on how well the administration is run, we endeavour to obtain a more detailed diagnosis of the services and institutions by establishing a ranking based on the measurement of individual confidence indices, which are also evaluated over time. A certain number of questions then seek to identify the main sources of dysfunctions, with a particular focus on corruption and absenteeism among civil servants. The indicators used for these two points are both subjective (e.g. perception of corruption) and, more originally, objective (actual incidence of petty corruption, type of transactions and services involved, and amount actually paid).

The second part of the *Governance* module looks at how much support there is among the populations for the main economic policies. It seeks to find out the extent to which the people approve of the programme of Washington Consensus reforms implemented in most of the developing countries and in the countries studied in particular, or whether certain social groups to be identified by the survey are more or less strongly against these policies. A certain number of key policies are identified such as liberalisation, the privatisation of public-sector enterprises, the status of civil servants, the financial contribution of users to the social sectors, and the place of the private sector in education. In general, the aim is to identify opinion trends to shed light on the central question of the respective roles of the State and markets in regulating the national economy. Questions are also asked about the authorities' policy implementation capabilities (credibility, political will, competence and transparency).

Lastly, a few more general questions are put to look at the country's long-term trajectory: for example, what are the main historical domestic and foreign causes of underdevelopment, including governance; what are the country's ten-year priorities, comparing strictly economic policies (curbing inflation) with empowerment policies (guaranteeing freedom of speech and improving participation); and what are the principles that a more just society should have (poverty reduction and inequalities of income and opportunity).

The *Democracy* module addresses three classic subjects in the field of political surveys: support for democratic principles, the actual running of democracy and the nature of the link between citizens and polity. The set of questions about support for democracy is designed to measure and describe how individuals understand and perceive this political configuration compared with others. Following an extremely general question, which does not define what we understand by democracy, we ask the respondent to define what he or she understands democracy to mean. The purpose of these questions is to test the universality of the concept of democracy. Overall support for democracy is also studied by comparing the opinion of democracy with other types of political systems and by asking questions about perceived advantages and disadvantages of democracy.

Similar reasoning lies behind the questions on the running of democracy in the country of residence. Following a general question, respondents are asked to assess the main problem areas, where the different democratic principles are more or less respected, and which should be addressed by targeted policies. Respondents are also asked how well they think the running of democracy has developed

over time. Among the possible dysfunctions, questions are asked about the role of the political class and democratic intermediate bodies. Two related questions are asked regarding respect for human rights and the outcomes of the decentralisation policies.

Lastly, the population's relationship with the political sphere is illustrated by three main constituent elements: political participation, politicisation (interest in politics and political competence) and political leanings. Whereas the questions on democracy concern respondents' perceptions, the questions on the rapport with the political sphere include both subjective and objective indicators (voting behaviour, participation in protest actions, and frequency individual's political discussions). In addition to a diagnosis of democracy's state of health, the tracking of these different indicators has direct economic policy implications. For example, political participation is an intrinsic component of development, but its enlargement, especially to underprivileged groups, also forms a way of reducing poverty since it is supposed to increase the chances of success with the policies.

The three modules together make up some 200 questions used to gain an insight into these three issues seen as essential, but about which little information has hitherto been available. In some countries, even, no quantitative data was available prior to these surveys. The questionnaire is clearly far from exhaustive, since the aim was to use this first overview to define some strategic indicators and track them over time. The modules can also be used to identify some key issues (inept institutions, dysfunctioning democratic principles, rejection of a type of policy, etc.) for which detailed surveys with special focuses can be set up (see the surveys on violations of human rights in Mexico, on the land reform in South Africa, and on the rights of ethnic minorities in the Philippines as studied by other components of Metagora).

#### 2.1.2. The Mirror Survey for the African countries: an innovation

As a complement to the survey tool of households in the areas of *Governance* and *Democracy*, a survey of experts was conducted in the eight African countries. A total of 250 specialists from the South and the North responded to this *Mirror Survey* (researchers, development specialists, decision-makers, high-ranking public officials, politicians, etc.). Its aim was to compare the general public's responses with those of the experts on questions common to both studies.

The "experts" were asked to select a country (of the eight) based on their own individual knowledge and then fill in the *Mirror Survey* questionnaire, which was actually a simplified version of the questionnaire put at grass roots level. Two sets of questions were put for each of the two modules (Governance and Democracy; Table 5):

- The first set of questions concerned the expert's own opinion as regards these same questions. For example, given the same question as above, they were asked to give their personal opinion of how well democracy worked in the chosen country.
- The second and most original set of questions was designed to gain an idea of what the experts thought the interviewees answered on average. For example, as regards the question "*Does democracy work well in the country?*", each respondent had to estimate the percentage of ordinary citizens who answered "*Yes*" in their chosen city;

**Table 5: Excerpt from the *Mirror Survey* questionnaire**

MODULE: DEMOCRACY (D)																												
					What the surveyed population answered (% of those who answered "YES" in the chosen capital)	Your own analysis or opinion																						
<b>D1. In general, are you in favour of democracy?</b> YES NO					% YES [ ][ ][ ][ ]																							
<b>D2. Does democracy work well in this country?</b> YES NO					% YES (++ and +) [ ][ ][ ]	In your opinion, [ ][ ] <b>1</b> (yes, very well), <b>2</b> (yes, fairly well), <b>3</b> (no, not really) <b>or 4</b> (no, not at all)																						
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++		+		-		--																						
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8																					
<b>D3. Democracy is often associated with the following characteristics. Which of these do you consider to be essential and are they respected in this country?</b> 1. Yes 2. No (for 2 questions) Fundamental? Respected?					% YES / % YES Yes, fundamental/Yes, respected	In your opinion, <b>1.</b> (Yes) <b>2.</b> (No) Fundament/Respected																						
A. Freedom of speech and the press																												
B. Equality before the law																												
C. Political freedom (choice of political party)																												
D. Free and transparent elections																												
E. Freedom of movement																												
F. Freedom of worship																												
<b>D5. Do you think democracy has improved in this country since the first half of the 1990s?</b> 1. Improved 2. Same 3. Deteriorated					% of "1. Improved" [ ][ ][ ]	In your opinion, <b>1, 2 or 3</b> [ ][ ]																						

In general, the two sets of questions (“*What do you think they answered?*” and “*What is your own opinion?*”) have a common denominator. Yet not all the questions are relevant. For example, as regards the question, “*Which group do you feel proudest to belong to? 1. Your country 2. Your ethnic group,*” we were only interested in what they thought the respondents answered. Lastly, to hone the analysis, the experts were asked to provide a certain number of classic personal socio-demographic characteristics: gender, age, occupation, knowledge in the field, etc.

The issue of sampling for the *Mirror Survey* was obviously complicated in that there was no comprehensive sampling frame covering all potential “experts”. We therefore applied the method used by most of the expert surveys, drawing on DIAL’s networks of correspondents worldwide, in both the North and the South. We also had access to the networks of other partner institutions working on these issues (the DAC/OECD GovNet, the Metagora project, the French Directorate General for International Co-operation and Development (DGCID), etc.). In addition, the questionnaire was applied during meetings of experts (CODI, ECA and Addis-Ababa meetings) and training sessions organised by various institutions (InWent Centre, Munich) for development practitioners. Last but not least, the survey questionnaire was sent to all recipients of DIAL’s newsletter *Dialogue* and was also put online on the DIAL website. Although the nature of the *Mirror Survey* is such that its representativeness cannot be formally assessed due to a lack of a clearly defined reference population, the close correlation with the main international databases on this subject can be considered to be a form of ex-post validation of the survey (see the findings below).

2.1.3. The subject matter particularities of the modules in the Andean countries

In the Andean countries, a process of consultations when designing the questionnaires led to a more in-depth study of some subjects (such as governance) than in the case of the African countries. Despite the regional meetings of experts held by the CAN to harmonise the questionnaires, this bottom-up approach limited the extent of comparability between countries. We will not detail all the subjects covered here – solely those that differ from the generic structure and are directly associated with policy formulation and evaluation.

In Peru and Ecuador, an open question was put to find out what the population felt were the country’s main problems. This identified whether the problems perceived by the population were on the political agents’ agenda (parties and local and national representatives), part of the public debate expressed in the media or concerns developed by the international institutions, hence giving concrete expression to

one of democracy’s missions (Sen, 2005). The information on the individuals and households’ sociodemographic and economic characteristics indicated whether, for example, the poor’s diagnosis of the country’s problems was the same as the rest of the population. This question was also used to assess the relevance of the reforms and policies advocated by the international bodies and to define the extent of ownership of these policies.

In addition to information on the population’s confidence in the different institutions, the questionnaires used in Ecuador and Peru also obtained a keen assessment of the efficiency of the institutions. It was acknowledged that the success or failure of the economic policies depends not only on their content, but also on the quality of the institutions responsible for implementing them. Based on the aim of adopting a policy-oriented approach, the institutions are identified at relatively detailed levels of disaggregation and form the subject of different diagnoses capable of giving rise to reforms specific to each institution. The surveys in Ecuador and Peru considered two central aspects of institutional efficiency: efficiency measured by the rate of access to the institutions and the quality of public reception (number of times individuals have to contact the institution for a procedure to be completed, general assessment of reception, etc.) and, in keeping with the African surveys, an estimated objective rate of the incidence of petty corruption and the cost it represents for the households. Studies of corruption have generally focused on large-scale corruption such as embezzlement of public funds and corruption affecting companies. Little interest has been shown in petty corruption. The questions on corruption put to the households in Peru and Ecuador included “socially accepted” forms or forms imposed by the social hierarchies mainly to the detriment of the indigenous populations. In addition to evaluating the amounts paid, we endeavoured to assess the extent of the population’s resistance to corruption (refusal to pay), whether they filed a complaint with the authorities and the reasons for not reporting corruption (Table 6). Fear of reprisals, inaction by the public authorities and a lack of information as to how and where to file a complaint were also mentioned. The survey therefore identifies, for example, whether corruption particularly affects the judiciary and the police, institutions responsible for applying and enforcing the law.

**Table 6: Excerpt from the Governance module on institutional efficiency (ENAHQ questionnaire – Peru)**

GOBERNABILIDAD (Persona de 18 años y más de edad)																	
6. En los últimos 12 meses, Ud. o algún miembro del hogar ha hecho uso de los servicios, tales como:		7. Encontró inmediatamente al personal en la oficina de.....?		8. ¿Cuántas veces acudió para realizar el.....?		9. Considera que el..... ¿Le ocasionó pérdida de tiempo y/o gasto significativo en transporte u otros?		10. ¿Cómo calificaría el servicio de.....?		11. ¿Le solicitaron, se sintió obligado o dio voluntariamente retribuciones como: regalos, propinas, sobornos, coimas, etc.?		12. ¿Cuánto fue el monto total gastado en regalos, propinas, sobornos, coimas, etc. en.....?		13. Cuando le solicitaron o dio voluntariamente los regalos, sobornos, coimas, etc. ¿Denunció ante las autoridades pertinentes?		14. ¿Por qué no denunció?	
Servicios		SI	NO	SI	NO	Nº Veces	¿Concluyó?	SI	NO	CÓDIGO	CODIGO	MONTO	SI	SI	NO	CODIGO	
1. ¿Trámites en la Municipalidad (Partida de nacimiento, apertura de establecimiento, licencia de construcción, etc.)?.....		1	2	1	2		1 2	1	2					1	2		
2. ¿Trámites en ESSALUD?.....		1	2	1	2		1 2	1	2					1	2		
3. ¿Trámites en bancos del estado (Banco de la Nación, Banco de Materiales, Banco Agrario)?.....		1	2	1	2		1 2	1	2					1	2		
4. ¿Trámites en el Poder Judicial (Juzgado de Paz)?.....		1	2	1	2		1 2	1	2					1	2		

In addition, the objective rate of corruption can be compared with these same households’ subjective perception of the level of and growth in corruption in the country. In the Andean subregion, huge expectations of the cleaning up of public management have been generated by the transition from autocratic regimes discredited by large-scale corruption scandals to new democratic regimes bringing with them hope for change. The surveys identify whether these soaring aspirations, in sharp contrast with the modesty of actual progress made in terms of supervision, transparency and accountability of public management, have prompted the feeling that corruption has held steady or, worse still, risen.

In addition to the real changes, the perception of the effectiveness of the policies conducted and their expected results needs to be taken into consideration to provide a better understanding of the populations' level of support for the economic policies that directly concern them. Decentralisation is a core element of these policies with, among other things, social expenditure managed locally. The questionnaires used in Peru and Ecuador gauge the population's support for these policies, support that varies from one social group to the next, the effects expected from the policies and the actual outcomes obtained (Table 7).

**Table 7: Excerpt from the Governance module on institutional efficiency (ENAHQ questionnaire – Peru)**

23. ¿Está ud. de acuerdo con que la descentralización ha significado... (Acepte sólo una alternativa)					
(USE TARJETA)	Bas- tante?	Sufi- ciente- mente?	Poco?	Nada?	NO SABE
1. Una mayor participación en la toma de decisiones?.....	1	2	3	4	5
2. Una mejora en los servicios? .....	1	2	3	4	5
3. Mayor atención a las demandas de los ciudadanos? .....	1	2	3	4	5
4. Mayor injusticia / abusos por parte de autoridades locales? .....	1	2	3	4	5

**2.2. The main lessons learned**

The general methodological lessons that can be drawn from this experiment are as follow:

- The approach offers all the recognised advantages of a statistical household survey: transparent measurement procedures, representativeness of collected information and quantification of phenomena, providing benefits such as the ability to compare indicators across different time periods. Such properties compare positively with those of the macro indicators drawn from the international databases, despite the gradual improvement in their quality (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2005). The household survey sample sizes and sampling methods provide high-quality estimators whose precision can be meticulously computed. This is not possible with most of the opinion polls using the quota method. For example, Table 8 presents the confidence interval for responses to the question on growth in corruption by area of residence in Peru. The findings show that rural dwellers are significantly more pessimistic than urban dwellers on this issue. This could reflect a bias in the anti-corruption policies in favour of the towns or a lack of communication regarding these policies in the countryside.

**Table 8: In your opinion, corruption since last year?**

	Rural	Urban	Total
- Has increased	31.0	39.1	36.6
95% confidence interval	[29.0 - 33.0]	[37.4 - 40.9]	[35.3 - 38.0]
- Has decreased	8.4	10.5	9.9
95% confidence interval	[7.5 - 9.5]	[9.5 - 11.6]	[9.1 - 10.7]
- Is the same	49.1	48.8	48.9
95% confidence interval	[47.5 - 14.0]	[46.9 - 50.6]	[47.4 - 50.3]
- Don't know	11.5	1.6	4.7
95% confidence interval	[10.3 - 12.9]	[1.3 - 2.1]	[4.2 - 5.2]
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100


Sources: ENAHQ July 2003-June 2004, Governance Module, INEI, Peru, our own calculations.

- The wealth of the collected information allows for in-depth policy-oriented analyses, which would be impossible using other methods. These analyses are more useful to the development of specific policies than the aggregate indicators on governance and democracy available from international databases. There is also a broad consensus today that the two approaches are more complementary than competitive. Firstly, the aggregate governance indicators, where the basic data are made up of country/year, have the advantage of extensive geographic and/or time coverage. They can be used for both “growth econometrics” analyses and to rank the countries, subject to caution as to the accuracy of the indicators. These uses are of direct interest to the donors. Secondly, the surveys provide many possibilities for understanding individual behaviour and hence for a more thorough definition of specific and better targeted policies.
- While collecting both objective (behaviour and actual experiences) and subjective data (perception and satisfaction) on poverty, governance and democracy, we consider the possibility of monitoring and comparing the two basic aspects of these phenomena. For example, the perception of corruption can have just as decisive an impact on a country’s political or economic stability as the objective incidence of corruption.
- Moreover, these two aspects can be combined with classic variables concerning the individuals and households’ socio-economic characteristics (income, occupation, gender, age, ethnic group, etc.). The findings can hence be disaggregated and specific population group characteristics and disparities highlighted, focusing in particular on the cases of the most disadvantaged and those who suffer the most from discrimination. This approach therefore allows for indicators to compare the situations (or perceptions) of men and women, poor and rich, and even different ethnic groups.
- In Peru and Ecuador, subnational representativeness means that regional indicators can be produced (spatial disaggregation). This is of particular relevance to steering existing decentralisation processes and assisting local democracy and governance.
- Furthermore, this approach to simultaneously conduct the same surveys in different countries opens up new and interesting possibilities for international comparability.

The third part of this study presents some concrete illustrations of these different advantages on all these fronts in terms of both policy design and evaluation.



**Diagram 2: The strong points and basic principles of the modules appended to the I-2-3 Survey**



2.2.1. An evaluation of the mechanism’s relevance and the robustness of its findings

An evaluation of the surveys conducted and related studies clearly shows that it is possible to develop indicators to evaluate how well the institutions and democracy are working, and to measure the extent of support for policies among the general public. These indicators are generally easier to collect than traditional socio-economic indicators such as monetary poverty (Table 9). The non-response rate for questions on governance and democracy is generally lower than the non-response rate observed for questions on income (Amegashi *et al.*, 2005).

**Table 9: Rates of non-response to certain module questions in Africa**


%	Cotonou	Ouaga-dougou	Abidjan	Bamako	Niamey	Dakar	Lome	Total
Running of the State	0	3.6	0.9	1.1	2.7	5.2	3.5	2.2
Opinion of democracy	0	2.8	0.5	0.9	1.9	3.1	0.3	1.1
Income stated in value	59.9	45.7	59.0	56.6	47.6	43.3	62.7	53.4
Income stated in value or brackets	97.7	93.4	96.8	93.3	84.8	90.2	98.3	93.6
Income not given	2.3	6.6	3.2	6.7	15.2	9.8	1.7	6.4

Sources: I-2-3 Surveys, Phase 1, Governance and Democracy modules, 2001/2003, National Statistics Institutes, AFRISTAT, DIAL, our own calculations.

This observation also holds in Latin America. For example, in the case of Peru, where accurate calculations were able to be made, the rate of non-response to the modules was low (from 2% to 4%) and was approximately half that for the entire standard ENAHO questionnaire. Moreover, the inclusion of the module did not increase the rate of non-response to the usual questionnaire. Contrary to certain upstream concerns, experience showed that introducing the modules into the official household surveys already in place did not undermine the quality of responses to this basic survey’s questions, and produced generally lower non-response rates (Figure 1). In some cases, the modules generated such interest among respondents that they were more inclined to answer the more classic socio-economic questions (consumption and income). Another reason why the appended questions did not undermine the quality of the survey as a whole is that interview time remained extremely reasonable. In Peru, the average length of an interview for all three modules was 31 minutes (nine

minutes for the *Governance* module, 10 minutes for the *Democracy* module and 12 minutes for the *Multiple Dimensions of Poverty* module).

**Figure 1: Rates of non-response to the basic survey and the *Governance* and *Democracy* modules in Peru**



Sources: ENAHO May 2003-March 2004, Governance and Democracy modules, INEI, Peru, our own calculations.

Lastly, although the results obtained from introducing the modules dispelled concerns as to the feasibility and reliability of this type of survey<sup>3</sup>, the experience was not problem-free. However, the problems experienced were able to be overcome in most cases. For example, the NSIs, unlike the opinion research institutes, have little experience in surveys on perceptions and opinions of policies, democracy, etc. Particular care was therefore taken with the survey's preparatory stages (drafting of manuals for interviewers and supervisors, centralised staff training, a pilot survey to test the questions, and interaction between the survey designers and interviewers). In Peru, an FAQ Database was set up during the survey so that the co-ordination team in Lima could immediately answer questions put by interviewers and supervisors throughout the country. The FAQ Database was managed in real time and could be consulted on the Internet at any time on: [www.inei.gob.pe/ineibpr/enahobpr.htm](http://www.inei.gob.pe/ineibpr/enahobpr.htm).

Nevertheless, in the rural areas of the Andean countries (the survey covered the entire country), where the poor and relatively uneducated indigenous population is mainly found, some of the interviewees found it hard to understand the concepts used (democracy, political systems, etc.), did not know that certain public institutions existed (especially in the area of defending and protecting citizens' rights), and had trouble ranking their opinions (country's main problems, etc.). As regards corruption, in particular, they tended to consider that the "gifts" to civil servants were part of the traditional (Andean) system of mutual assistance or they viewed corruption as "normal".

These intrinsic problems are reflected by a high percentage of "don't knows" specifically in response to certain questions. However, this situation should not be confused with a refusal to answer all or part of the survey. In the case of the Andean countries, non-responses to certain questions were closely correlated with the level of education (language problems were ruled out in that interviewers speaking the local dialects conducted the surveys in areas with high indigenous population concentrations<sup>4</sup>, see the 3<sup>rd</sup> section, analysis of the findings). Although it is hard to interpret refusal to answer the survey in the absence of information on the characteristics of the non-respondents, this type of non-response does provide some valuable information. It tells us exactly how integrated into citizenship the historically marginalised populations are. It provides an indicator of the ability of individuals to

<sup>3</sup> Two doubts were cleared up. The first was the preconceived idea that asking questions about such issues as corruption, politicisation, and support for values inevitably results in high non-response rates that could compromise the entire survey. The second concerned what were seen as insurmountable survey implementation problems, especially as regards understanding the questions and the poor statistical robustness of the findings.

<sup>4</sup> The interview language issue is crucial in multilingual societies where certain members of the population, especially the marginalized groups, do not necessarily have a command of the official language. Although the questionnaires were written in French for French-speaking Africa (with the exception of Madagascar, where the Malagasy version was used) and in Spanish in the Andean countries, they were systematically put to the interviewees in their local language with the main concepts having been previously translated into the different dialects. The interviewers were therefore selected and assigned geographically based on this criterion.

understand and express themselves, the extension of which should be one of the aims of the empowerment policies. The survey also helps further the expression of the “voice” of the poorest population groups, even if these groups have to make do with stating their lack of comprehension or ignorance when it comes to such issues as preferences for a political system, diagnosing the country’s problems and assessing the running of democracy.

### 2.2.2. Comparison with other international initiatives to highlight the mechanism’s strong points

A scientific comparison with other international initiatives (*Afrobarometer* and *Latinobarómetro*, and *African Governance Project*) reveals a close convergence of findings in the common fields – confirming the robustness of the proposed indicators – and the areas in which the different instruments complement each other (Tables 10 and 11). The close involvement of National Statistics Institutes in the measurement of governance and democracy, the accuracy of the estimators and the intrinsic link with traditional economic indicators, particularly poverty, are major assets of our approach. Also, the wide diversity of political contexts, in terms of freedoms and rights, in which the surveys were conducted, shows that the approach can be implemented in a wide range of developing countries, extending well beyond the scope of just the new democracies. Furthermore, in countries that have experienced huge political upheaval (e.g. Côte d’Ivoire, Madagascar and Togo in Africa; Ecuador and Bolivia in Latin America), where the general public has shown particularly strong support for democracy, the survey provides a better insight into the nature of the problems, and could probably be used for the implementation of targeted preventive measures before the identified tensions degenerate into open conflict. From a more general point of view, an additional argument for the merits of the approach is found in the proliferation of regional projects using household surveys to gauge governance questions worldwide, including in sub-Saharan Africa (see, Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2005) on *Afrobarometer* and ECA (2005) on the surveys associated with the peer review mechanism).

**Table 10: Comparative table of three regional initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa**

	<b>PARSTAT Project (AFRISTAT/DIAL)</b> <i>1-2-3 Survey</i>	<b>AFROBAROMETER</b> (MSU/IDASA/CDD-Ghana)	<b>UN-ECA Project (NEPAD peer review process)</b>
<b>Countries concerned (coverage)</b>	Capitals of 7 African countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo) + 7 cities in Madagascar - Urban areas (35,000 individuals; over 4,000 per country on average)	18 countries (Southern Africa, East Africa and West Africa)  National sample (urban+rural) (in general 1,200 individuals/country)	Phase 1: 14 countries Phase 2: 19 countries national coverage (100 experts and 2,000 heads of household per country)
<b>Objectives</b>	Overview of situation/understanding/measurement and tracking+comparison → Statistical household survey (all individuals in the household)	Measurement of the social, political and economic climate Monitoring and comparison of countries	Monitoring of good governance progress in Africa <i>Peer Review</i> for NEPAD → Three instruments:
<b>Methodology</b>	Standardised modules (opinion surveys) appended to classic surveys (1-2-3 Survey on employment and consumption) → cross-referencing with socio-economic variables (income, employment, etc.)	→ Household survey (opinion polls) (one individual/household)  A standardised set of questions (standard tool: see Eurobarometer; latino-barometro and Asian Barometer)	1- Opinion of a panel of experts (assessment<>indicator) 2- Opinion survey (of heads of household) 3- Documentary review (factual and/or background info on the institutions)
<b>Organisation / Institutions: Co-ordination team &amp; partners</b>	<i>Co-ordination and technical assistance:</i> AFRISTAT and DIAL <i>Partners responsible for the surveys and analyses:</i> National Statistics Institutes	<i>Network</i> co-ordinated by IDASA – South Africa, CDD-Ghana and Michigan State University (MSU) <i>National partners</i> (in charge of the surveys): Independent private bodies: research institutes, NGOs, private sector	Co-ordination UN – CEA  Partners: National Research Institutes and/or private consultants (research bodies) <> (independence)
<b>Dissemination of findings</b>	Country analysis ◊ Local press National and regional conferences/seminars Broad public dissemination	Informs the policy decision-making process, generally by the NGOs  Dissemination to decision-makers, donors, journalists/researchers	Discussion workshops & publication of findings at national level + <i>Africa Governance Report (AGR)</i> presented at the 2005 African Development Forum

In Latin America, the diagnosis derived from the comparison with the *Latinobarómetro* project is similar to that obtained for Africa. It clearly reveals the complementarity of the two approaches. The *Latinobarómetro* surveys have the major advantage of a geographic scope covering virtually the entire continent (18 countries) and a time coverage beyond compare (the first operation dates back to 1995).

The questionnaire's perfect harmonisation guarantees comparability between countries, but leads to less ownership of the survey at local level. The surveys focus essentially on the populations' perceptions and are less detailed about the socio-economic aspects. This limits the possibilities of a tie-in with the economic policies and especially with poverty reduction. Moreover, the small samples mean that we have to make do with a general picture at national level, while the modular surveys presented here can be used to inform policies right down to local level. These last two limitations reduce the possibilities of disaggregating the *Latinobarómetro* surveys by different population groups, some of whom (the most disadvantaged) should precisely be a special focus. The modular surveys also provide the opportunity to track both perception indicators and objective indicators (perception and actual frequency of corruption, for example). Lastly, there is the direct involvement of the NSIs and the incorporation of the surveys into the official statistical systems, which makes them a real *public good*. This choice opens up new prospects for data accessibility and institutionalisation in the public field, which is not generally the case with the operations conducted by private institutions constrained by profitability imperatives.

**Table 11: Comparative table of two regional initiatives in Latin America**


	<b>Latinobarómetro</b>	<b>NSI-CAN-DIAL Modules / Metagora</b>
<b>General objective</b>	Overview of democracy, politics and society in Latin America	Use household surveys to quantify governance, democracy, participation and subjective poverty.
<b>Sample size</b>	1,000 – 1,200 individuals	1,700 – 21,000 individuals
<b>Sampling plan</b>	Multilevel random sampling (through to the selection of housing and then the selection of the respondent using the quota method - with the exception of Chile)	Random, multilevel, stratified
<b>Level of inference</b>	National	National, regional and departmental
<b>Data producer</b>	Private sector	National Statistics Institutes
<b>Socio-economic variables</b>	15	Over 80
<b>Module subject-specific variables</b>	91	40-50
<b>Background analysis for dissemination</b>	Press notes	National and regional reports
<b>Types of questions</b>	Perception and attitudes regarding the issues	Perception and attitudes regarding the issues, and actual experiences (objective variables)
<b>Time series</b>	Annual since 1995 (for certain questions)	Annual since 2002 and monthly as of 2003 (Peru)
<b>Financing</b> a) Sources b) Costs	a) International donors b) 20,000-40,000 USD per country for data collection	a) State and international donors b) 34,000-1,000,000 USD for the entire survey per country; marginal cost for the modules
<b>Comparison between countries</b>	18 countries, all the questions	3 countries; a few questions
<b>Dissemination</b>	<i>The Economist</i> , regional press conferences, the Internet, press notes	Underway (Peru: meetings of experts, the Internet, Ministry of the Economy and Finance, Presidency of the Council of Ministers, quarterly bulletins and annual INEI publications)
<b>Strong points</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ International comparability of the questions, sampling plan, survey period</li> <li>▪ Number of countries</li> <li>▪ Tracking over time</li> <li>▪ Long-term financing</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ More detailed analysis</li> <li>▪ Greater geographic disaggregation</li> <li>▪ Robustness of the results</li> <li>▪ Institutionalisation</li> <li>▪ Greater number of objective indicators</li> <li>▪ Larger sample size</li> <li>▪ Access free of charge to the databases (Bolivia and Peru)</li> </ul>

### 2.2.3. The process of setting up the surveys and disseminating the findings

As regards demand, the processes of setting up the surveys and disseminating the findings form one of the strong points of the system. The aim here is to build a process that satisfies the principles of the new poverty reduction strategies and, more generally, the development policies: accountability, ownership and participation. Such an ambition can only be realised if it is in line with the real situation of the institutions in each country, whether public or originating from civil society. It is moreover this constraint that justifies the application of a different strategy in Africa to Latin America.

## Box 2: An historical perspective on the implementation process of the monitoring of corruption in Madagascar

**1995 : First estimation of the extent of corruption in Madagascar (with Household survey)  
Headlines in the press: « Outcry against corruption! »**



**1995**  
It then became impossible to ignore the problem  
**the Ministry of Justice took steps to introduce a system of sanctions.**

☞ **a draft law on the fight against corruption**  
“ ... It is important to bear in mind that, on the basis of the statistical survey conducted in May 1995 by the MADIO project, co-financed by the French Ministry for Cooperation and the European Union: ‘the issue of corruption seems to be a recurring problem which haunts the capital’s inhabitants, 96% of them consider that it is a major problem in Madagascar’. ‘Over 40% of people aged over 18 in the capital had had to pay a corrupt civil servant during the previous year’. Whatever the credibility of this survey and the interpretations that have been drawn from it, there is no doubt that corruption is a social problem in Madagascar ... and it is necessary to combat the practice of corruption as energetically as possible”.

**BUT Draft law was rejected by the Government Council in 1999**  
☞ Importance of context & characteristics of institution  
(~ authoritarian regime and problem of governance)

**2002**  
Institutional change → Stress put on transparency  
☞ 2003 Creation of an independent council (CSLCC)  
☞ 2004 Independent anti-corruption office (BIANCO)

➤ **Headlines in the press in may 2005: « More confidence & less corruption »**  
after the public conference presenting the first results of the survey



In Africa where institutions are weak, the process is a long-term one starting with the Madagascar example and moving onto the West African countries. At the outset, at the instigation of the MADIO project, variable subject-specific modules were added to the 1-2-3 Surveys every year starting in the mid-1990s. Based on the pilot test conducted in 1995 and decided on unilaterally by the statisticians, the process has been gradually consolidated by a system of mutual feedback and adjustment between “supply” and “demand”<sup>5</sup>. The systematic holding of public conferences and the wide circulation of

<sup>5</sup> This first survey conducted in 1995 immediately gave rise to in-depth analyses whose findings were swiftly and widely disseminated to answer topical questions of the moment (Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 1996).

findings beyond the small circle of decision-makers has demonstrated social demand for these issues, while repeating the surveys has provided the possibility to hone the statistical tools. Although the institutions (ministries, employers' organisations, trade unions, etc.) took part in the process, the media played a central role. By massively reporting on the findings, raising new questions and supporting the entire approach, the media brought to light the existence of an initially latent and then explicitly formulated demand and contributed to the institutionalisation of the process (see Box 2).

Only when the experiment had been consolidated in Madagascar was it extended to the WAEMU countries where a similar cycle tailored to each national configuration was launched. Generally speaking, such an approach in itself helps instruct in and enhance the democratic debate and strengthen the institutions – the NSIs, obviously, but also civil society organisations that draw on the surveys to underpin their expertise and hence their legitimacy – while spreading the “culture of statistics”.

The approach in Latin America, where the institutions are sounder, was different and streamlined. The Peruvian case is an emblematic example: national ownership of the survey under the joint co-ordination of the INEI, the Ministry of Finance and the Prime Minister's Cabinet; broad-based civil society participation in the design of the questionnaire and data analysis; institutionalisation of the survey revision process over time; and possibilities for South-South co-operation for Peruvian experts to help other countries in the region (Box 3).

### **Box 3: The ownership process of the modules in Peru: a bottom-up approach**

Initial discussions on the issues of measuring governance and democracy were launched in May 2002 when the modules conducted by the DIAL researchers in Africa were presented at a regional workshop of statistics experts held by the Secretariat General of the Andean Community. Although this experiment met with an extremely positive reception in all the countries (especially the Director General of DANE in Columbia), the Peruvian INEI was the first to take on board this new methodology by immediately deciding to introduce the modules into its own household survey mechanism. A first full-scale operation was conducted in the last quarter of 2002, when a tailored questionnaire focusing essentially on subjective poverty was put to the 20,000 households interviewed by the Peruvian household survey (ENAHO). The interest generated by the publication of the survey's initial findings set a process in motion that is worth mentioning here.

An overarching aim of the introduction of the “Governance, Democracy and Multiple Dimensions of Poverty” (GDMP) modules into the ENAHO was the importance of the ownership process, both internally in the national statistics institute and externally by civil society. This process involved many public institutions and civil society bodies. The country's political environment was no doubt conducive to an official body – the INEI for the first time in its history – conducting an opinion survey of households on issues as sensitive as the incidence of corruption and the amount of confidence in public institutions, respect for human rights, and the running of democracy. In fact, President Fujimori's flight to Japan following the uncovering of a network of corruption organised by his main adviser V. Montesinos<sup>6</sup>, followed by the arrival of a transition government and the election of A. Toledo driven by the main democratic anti-corruption forces actually strengthened the institutions and put in place the following policies: anti-corruption, defence of citizens' rights, transparency in the management of public finances, economic and political decentralisation, and citizen participation (especially in social policies).

The INEI's ownership of the project was not limited to its new director's decisive agreement to conduct the surveys. The process also extended to the civil servants in charge of setting up the surveys, with a series of internal technical discussions regarding the modules' objectives and concepts, which had hitherto never been addressed by INEI surveys. These joint think tanks were extended to regional level under CAN, with the participation of experts from each of the NSIs in the Andean countries.

Civil society's ownership of the modules and their findings came about in two stages. Firstly, scepticism about the survey's feasibility and the consistency of the information obtained was appeased by the pertinence and quality of the findings obtained in 2002. It had been proved that it was possible for an NSI to conduct this type of survey, that the rate of non-response was actually lower than for the traditional surveys and, above all, that the population was most interested in the questions put. The database and all the technical documents were made available to the public free of charge. A brief summary of the initial findings was published on the Ministry of the Economic and Finance (MEF) website and presented at a public conference, giving rise to interviews on national Peruvian radio. In the second stage, once the survey's credibility was established, the INEI opened up a dialogue with civil society and other public bodies concerned by governance issues.

<sup>6</sup> In this regard, see McMillan and Lobaton (2004).

### **Box 3: The ownership process of the modules in Peru: a bottom-up approach (Contd.)**

A large number of institutions answered the INEI's call. Several discussion meetings were held for each institution to propose subjects/questions that it wanted to see addressed by the questionnaire. Various NGOs also took part, including those working on anti-corruption (*ProEtica* and *Transparencia*), defending human rights (*Association Pro-Derechos Humanos*), public management transparency (*Ciudadanos al Dia*), capacity building, democratic participation and local governance (*Grupo Propuesta Ciudadana*), the participation of the poor in the definition and implementation of social policy (*Mesas de Concertación de Lucha contra la Pobreza*), and problems affecting young people (*Consejo Nacional de la Juventud*). Among the public bodies taking part were *Defensoría del Pueblo* (responsible for defending citizens' rights), *Contraloría de la República* (responsible for the transparency of calls for tender and public procurement), *the Presidency of the Council of Ministers* (PCM), and the *MEF* for whom the "governance" aspect was one of the commitments made with the Bretton Woods institutions (integration into the matrix of policies). Last but not least, Peruvian research centres, political science experts (from the *Institute of Peruvian Studies*) and *World Bank* officials also took part in the discussions.

These consultations produced an amended version of the initial questionnaire with the approval of all the participants. The questionnaire was tested on the ground by a pilot survey. Following the training of the team of interviewers (comprising the ten best national supervisors), the lessons drawn from the pilot survey – conducted in ten departments chosen to take account of the country's linguistic diversity and differing extents of urbanisation – led to a definitive version of the questionnaire and the tailoring of the survey mechanism. New survey manuals were produced for the modules. Intensive, centralised training was organised for all the interviewers and supervisors. It took just six months from the start of the consultation process for the survey of over 20,000 households to be put in place.

The advantages of the bottom-up process in setting up the modules are undeniable in that they guarantee real ownership of the results. The downside of this is that it was harder to harmonise the questionnaires for all the Andean countries. There is hence less comparability between this region's countries than in Africa. Continuity of tracking is guaranteed by the institutionalisation of the survey and the process. For example, as in the case of Peru, time series are available for governance, democracy and other indicators, which can be compared with the public policies conducted in these areas. Lastly, since the survey was a public budget item, it forms part of the INEI's ongoing operations and is incorporated into the National Statistics Plan.

The survey's sustainability is hence based on four pillars: a participatory process to set it up, the dissemination of the findings and data (public good), institutionalisation (co-ordinated by the INEI) and financial sustainability (survey part of the public budget).

Downstream, experience has shown that there is often more demand for governance and democracy indicators than traditional socio-economic indicators – as shown by the high public and media turnout at events to announce findings in the countries under study (Madagascar, Mali, Peru, etc.). Furthermore, by providing food for thought for public debate on policies and the major development issues, this type of survey helps strengthen democracy, reveal the wishes of the public and empower 'voiceless' sectors of the population.

### **3. SOME ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE OF FINDINGS**

Following these methodological considerations, some empirical elements are called for to illustrate the merits of the approach. A few examples have been chosen from each of the three modules. A more detailed analysis can be found in the regional survey report (Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2005b for Africa; Herrera and Roubaud, 2005 for the Andean countries) and in each of the national reports. Due to the extremely good comparability of data on Africa, we have decided to separate out the analyses by continent to present a selection of African findings followed by Latin American findings.

#### **3.1. Some findings in French-Speaking Africa**

##### **3.1.1. Subjective poverty or the consideration of the different factors influencing the perception of poverty**

The multifaceted nature of poverty is now unanimously acknowledged. Driven in particular by Amartya Sen, the definition of poverty, initially based solely on the monetary criterion, has gradually been extended to take in different concepts such as a lack of *capabilities* (e.g. opportunities to access education and health), vulnerability, a feeling of exclusion, and dignity. The *1-2-3 Survey* module on the *Multiple Dimensions of Poverty* explores the individuals' points of view and their perception and assessment of their situation. We have looked at the notion of subjective poverty, with one of the

approaches being based on the classic concept of satisfaction of basic needs as a way of defining poverty<sup>7</sup>. Unlike the indicators usually used, which are normally based on objective criteria, we ask the population to define what they consider to be basic needs and to express their level of satisfaction as regards these needs.

Although the minimum basket of needs (the top seven<sup>8</sup> of 26 suggested items) for a decent standard of living is on the whole the same regardless of the country studied, the classification of these needs and percentage of the population deeming them important varies from one country to the next. Bamako and Ouagadougou stand out in particular for the extremely low proportion (less than half) of inhabitants who view access to electricity as essential (Figure 2). Similarly, less than two-thirds of the population in Bamako and Niamey deem it vital to “be able to send their children to school”. These findings can be explained in part by the phenomenon of attrition of preferences or self-adjusted aspirations in view of their limited supply in the most underprivileged countries. For example, Bamako and Ouagadougou are the least well-equipped capitals in terms of access to electricity (only some 40% of the households are connected to the network). Given that they are used to the absence of electricity in their homes (and their neighbours’ homes), a large proportion of these towns’ inhabitants do not see electricity as an absolute necessity.

The survey compares individuals’ levels of satisfaction with the level of importance placed on a given form of hardship. Lome and Antananarivo stand out from the other cities with generally extremely low levels of satisfaction, especially when compared with the population’s aspirations (Diagram 2). Bamako and Niamey are striking for their small gaps between the population’s aspirations and perceptions of actual living conditions in terms of the main basic needs identified. Although the satisfaction indices are fairly low (less than or barely over 60% for certain items), the levels for each of the corresponding items near if not top the percentages of those who deem them essential.

In general, dissatisfaction with the health supply is striking in all the cities studied. As already mentioned earlier, the satisfaction indices are extremely low for Lome and Antananarivo (29% and 39%). They are also less than 50% for Ougadougou and Cotonou (at 46% and 49% respectively). They come to barely 60% in the three other cities (56% for Abidjan, 57% for Dakar and 61% for Bamako). Consequently, over one-third of the population in all the cities is dissatisfied with the existing health services.

Another more general approach to subjective poverty is to look at the household’s general perception of its well-being (subjective well-being or “*happiness*”). The first analyses of this factor date back to the 1970s and the pioneering work by Easterlin (1974). This issue lies at the core of a new wave of research today with the recent tie-in made with the notion of poverty, now viewed in its broadest sense. Yet this approach based on well-being is rarely used for analyses of developing countries. Nevertheless, it sheds new and ground-breaking light on the way in which individuals perceive their living conditions.

Households’ overall assessment of their well-being varies considerably from one country to the next. The proportion of those who state that they find it “hard to make ends meet” – and who can therefore be classed as poor from a subjective point of view – ranges from 25% in Bamako to 57% in Lome. The survey indeed finds a close correlation between the level of satisfaction regarding the needs previously identified as being basic and the perception of subjective well-being (Figure 3).


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<sup>7</sup> See Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2001) for more details on the different poverty approaches and the links between them.

<sup>8</sup> The seven are: receiving treatment in the event of illness, access to water, access to electricity, having decent housing, being able to take three meals a day, being able to send children to school, and having a stable job. We subsequently only refer to the first six items, given that we have no information about household satisfaction in terms of the integration of all of its members into the labour market.



**Figure 2: Level of satisfaction with needs deemed as basic**




Sources: 1-2-3 Surveys, Multiple Dimensions of Poverty module, 2001/2003, National Statistics Institutes, AFRISTAT, DIAL, our own calculations.

The inhabitants of Abidjan are an exception in this regard in that they have a fairly negative perception of their well-being (44% deem that they find it hard to make ends meet) despite a relatively high satisfaction index for the needs viewed as basic (less than 30% are dissatisfied with more than six

items<sup>9</sup> as opposed to an average of 36% for the eight capitals; 57% for Lome and 49% for Antananarivo). Abidjan is hence ranked in sixth place if the population's subjective well-being alone is considered, but is in third place based on its level of satisfaction with needs identified as basic.

**Figure 3: Assessment of well-being and level of satisfaction with basic needs**



Sources: 1-2-3 Surveys, Multiple Dimensions of Poverty module, 2001/2003, National Statistics Institutes, AFRISTAT, DIAL, our own calculations.

These findings make a case for the use of different approaches to analyse poverty, especially subjective approaches that consider the population's points of view. A number of different factors can influence individuals' perceptions of their living conditions. These constituent elements of well-being are not necessarily taken into account when just one approach is used or when just the most classic and normative approaches are used.

### 3.1.2. Indicators for monitoring governance

Of the analytic findings obtained using the data from the module on governance, we use mainly those regarding corruption here. This phenomenon is seen as one of the main obstacles to the efficiency of the administration and is measured by a range of tools as part of the public service reforms. On the whole, and regardless of the city, the vast majority (over 90%) of the population believes that corruption is a major problem. Relatively fewer mention the harmful effect of the administration's politicisation (85%), absenteeism (78%) and incompetence among civil servants (69%).


*Corruption is reduced by improving civil servants' wages and an active anti-corruption policy*

The availability of a long series of data (covering nearly ten years) for the Madagascan capital means that the development of corruption can be tracked and a first assessment made of the impact of public policies addressing corruption (Figure 4). The findings reveal a steady, sharp downturn in petty corruption from 1995 to 2001 (from 42% to 10%). These figures are based on an objective indicator: the percentage of individuals who fell victim to corruption in the year preceding the survey. The empirical observation highlights a strong negative correlation between the level of corruption and civil servants' wages, which rose 50% in real terms over the 1995-2001 period (Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2003b). Although this relationship cannot be formally tested since the series is not long enough and other factors may also have affected the level of corruption (such as inflation and political

<sup>9</sup> To measure the overall feeling of dissatisfaction, we set the threshold as being dissatisfied with six or more items (at least six needs not satisfied) of the top ten items ranked by the population as being the most essential.

stability), its does corroborate the presumption that the administration’s performance depends positively on civil servants’ wages. By way of an illustration, we observed that multiple jobholding also decreased over the same period. This finding provides food for thought for the controversial theoretical debate regarding the influence of civil servants’ wage levels on corruption. It contradicts the findings of multinational cross-cutting analyses that generally find no significant link between the perception of corruption and civil servants’ wages. If found to hold using larger samples, this correlation would have major implications for the reform of public services in the developing countries. This observation could partially explain the virtually systematic failure of the first generation of civil service reforms when drastic cuts were made to civil servants’ wages.

**Figure 4: Civil servants’ wages and effect on corruption in Madagascar from 1995 to 2004**



Sources: Razafindrakoto, Roubaud (2001) and 1-2-3 Surveys, phase 1 (Labour Force) 1995-2004, MADIO, DIAL/ INSTAT, our own calculations.

Note: The corruption “module” was not included in the survey in 1996, 1997 and 1999. The corruption figures are derived from an objective indicator (percentage of victims of corruption during the previous year).

The second point worth raising concerns the period following the political crisis in Madagascar in 2001-2002 and shows that active policies substantially reduce the amount of corruption. The level of corruption rose again in 2002 following the political crisis and the economic downturn. When the new administration came into power, the authorities placed the emphasis on transparency. The Conseil Supérieur de Lutte Contre la Corruption (CSLCC) was set up in 2003 to build awareness and implement specific strategies. The Bureau Indépendant ANti-COrruption (BIANCO) was established in 2004 to monitor and apply concrete measures. The positive effect of these initiatives can already be seen. The population feels that the corruption situation has definitely improved (the balance of opinion was +49 points in 2004 as opposed to +39 in 2003 for petty corruption; and +50 in 2004 compared with +36 in 2003 for major corruption). This perception by the capital’s inhabitants is borne out by the analysis of objective indicators, which shows that the rate of corruption fell from 16% in 2003 to 8% in 2004. The weight of corruption in household budgets also fell from 3.3% in 2003 to just 1.2% of households’ annual incomes in 2004.

*How much can we trust the experts’ opinion on corruption?*

Corruption and, more broadly, governance indicators are based mainly on experts’ assessments. When these experts’ opinions are compared with the population’s point of view and experience using the *mirror survey* (see above), it is found that the experts systematically overestimate the level of corruption suffered by the citizens (Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2005d). Whereas an average of 13% of the population in the eight cities said that they had been direct victims of acts of corruption over the past year<sup>10</sup>, the experts estimated this rate at 54%. Likewise, barely 5% of the population considers

<sup>10</sup> See Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2004a) for a detailed analysis of the profile of victims of corruption.


accepting a bribe in the exercise of their duties to be acceptable behaviour (Figure 5). The experts reckon this proportion to be 32%. On the whole, the experts have a much more negative view of the situation than the population.

This huge overestimation of actual corruption levels would be a lesser evil if it were consistent across the board. Yet major disparities in the relative ranking of the countries show that this is far from being the case. For example, the relatively positive image that the experts have of Burkina Faso (*the country of honest men*) – with the lowest occurrence of petty corruption in the *mirror survey* and the lowest percentage of experts deeming corruption to be a major problem in the country – is belied by the population’s own perception and actual experiences. Conversely, Togo has a significantly lower level of daily corruption than the regional average, but is ranked the worst offender by the experts.

In fact, there is no correlation between the two variables measuring the rate of corruption (the first estimated by the experts and the second based on population surveys): the correlation coefficient, albeit not significant, is even negative (-0.19). However, the *mirror survey* findings are correlated with the indicators published in the international databases. For example, the correlation between the frequency of corruption as based on the *mirror survey* and the “control of corruption” indicator built by Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (KKZ) for 2002 is -0.52. This makes for a positive link, since this indicator falls as corruption rises<sup>11</sup>. On the other hand, the correlation between the real rate of corruption and the KKZ indicator is 0.48 (and therefore in the wrong direction), but not significant.

These observations raise doubts about the reliability of the expert-based data, which are nevertheless widely used by donors to allocate official development assistance in particular. Admittedly, this finding is limited to petty corruption and the eight countries studied. It could reasonably be argued that it is precisely in these countries lacking in information that the perception indices should be furthest from the reality. Yet the question clearly stands as to what exactly the perception indicators based on these surveys measure. Our findings in no way undermine the relevance of these types of indicators since they reflect a fairly commonly held perception of corruption, even if this perception does not reflect reality. This said, if corruption phenomena are to be understood in all their complexity, these indicators should be combined with a new generation of indicators based on objective measurements.

**Figure 5: Deviations between the real frequency of petty corruption and the experts’ perceptions in French-speaking Africa**



Sources: 1-2-3 Surveys, Governance module, 2001/2003, National Statistical Institutes, AFRISTAT, DIAL (35,594 persons interviewed; 4,500 on average in each country); Mirror survey (246 experts surveyed; 30 experts on average in each country), DIAL, our own calculations.

<sup>11</sup> The calculation of the Spearman coefficient of rank correlation produces similar findings: 0.02 between the *mirror survey* data and the population survey data; -0.50 between the findings of the *mirror survey* and the indicator from the base by Kaufmann *et al.* (2005).

*Creating broad-based coalitions to reform the administration: a massive consensus for an incentive/sanctions system*

A string of reforms has been implemented to solve the public administration's structural dysfunctions, but to little avail despite the population's clear and largely shared message to improve the supply of public services. The reforms should operate on two fronts at once and comprise two types of measures: measures to increase government officials' productivity and measures to raise the number of civil servants to cover needs better.

There is a real consensus to set up an incentive/sanctions system (Table 12). An average of 93% of each city's inhabitants are in favour of merit-based remuneration or performance pay. They even go further when it comes to coercive measures since 82% would like to see penalties introduced for civil servants who do not do their job properly, without ruling out the possibility of their being dismissed in the event of serious misconduct. In addition, over four in five individuals (82%) support the idea of promoting decentralisation to make the administration more user-friendly for the taxpayer. Note that decentralisation does not just affect administrative governance, but can also have political virtues in terms of local democracy.

This consensus prevails in all the cities, with certain marginal local particularities. In Dakar, there is support for each of the three measures with an approval rate of over nine in ten inhabitants. A full 98% approve the principle of performance pay. Although there is general support overall for the promotion of the merit-based principle, the desire to see strict sanctions applied (dismissal) in the event of serious misconduct is less uniform. Interestingly enough, there is most doubt in this regard in the countries with the most authoritarian regimes (Togo and, to a lesser extent, Burkina Faso). The citizens of these countries may be scared of seeing what is deemed a fair principle diverted in practice from its original intent by misuse and possibly political use.

Support for decentralisation also varies from one country to the next. Paradoxically, support is weakest in Niger and especially in Mali where the process is one of the most advanced. It is as if the demand for decentralisation were extremely strong across the board, yet that, in the countries where steps had been taken to introduce decentralisation and its negative effects had started to come to light, support for this type of reform was becoming more circumspect (while remaining largely positive).

**Table 12: Measures to improve the administration's efficiency by country**

% Think that the following measures could improve public service quality/efficiency	West Africa							Mada	Total
	Coto nou	Ouaga- dougou	Abidjan	Bamako	Niamey	Dakar	Lome	Antana- narivo	
1.- Performance pay	85.0	91.6	96.2	89.5	94.0	98.2	95.7	92.5	<b>92.9</b>
2.- Dismiss civil servants for misconduct	83.7	74.6	82.6	84.5	82.5	93.0	68.9	87.7	<b>82.2</b>
3.- Promote decentralisation	87.6	78.3	96.7	67.7	64.4	90.5	87.6	80.8	<b>81.8</b>

Sources: 1-2-3 Surveys, Governance module, 2001/2003, National Statistics Institutes, AFRISTAT, DIAL, our own calculations.

Although there is nothing new about these reforms, what is worth noting here is the massive support of all social groups for their principles (Table 13). For example, there is nothing to distinguish the poor from the other groups when it comes to the measures to be taken to make the civil service more efficient. What is even more interesting is the fact that almost as many civil servants support such measures themselves. They are almost as positive about some of the most repressive measures. "Only" 80% (as opposed to 82% for the population as a whole) are in favour of severe sanctions and even dismissal for unscrupulous civil servants, while 89% (compared with 93%) support performance-based wages. The civil servants, who would normally be expected to be the most hostile to this type of reform, and those with the most to lose (union members, seniors and the least skilled) are barely less convinced of the merits of these measures.

These findings show that civil servants, who are often suspected of refusing change by adamantly maintaining their positions and holding onto their acquired advantages, should not hinder the administration's reform. More broadly speaking, the survey shows the possibility of forming coalitions comprising the vast majority of the population in favour of measures reputed to be hard to implement.

**Table 13: Support for measures to improve the administration's efficiency by income levels**

Think that the following measures could improve public service quality/efficiency	Total	Civil servants	Per capita income quartiles			
			1 <sup>st</sup> quartile	2 <sup>nd</sup> quartile	3 <sup>rd</sup> quartile	4 <sup>th</sup> quartile
1.- Performance pay	<b>92.9</b>	89.2	93.1	92.5	93.1	92.8
2.- Sanction/dismiss civil servants for misconduct	<b>82.2</b>	80.4	81.2	82.3	82.1	83.1
3.- Promote decentralisation	<b>81.8</b>	87.3	81.6	80.7	80.4	84.6

Sources: 1-2-3 Surveys, Governance module, 2001/2003, National Statistics Institutes, AFRISTAT, DIAL, our own calculations.

### 3.1.3. Democracy: an evaluation of how well it works and the population's aspirations

The *1-2-3 Surveys* Democracy module provides some extremely useful information for the consolidation of the process embarked upon in many of the continent's countries at the beginning of the 1990s. In particular, the findings show that African citizens, and especially the poor, have massively embraced the principles of democracy contrary to preconceived ideas and despite the huge and varying national breaches in the respect of certain civil and political rights – freedom of speech, transparent elections and especially equality before the law.

*Democracy is massively embraced by rich and poor alike*

When asked if they support democracy, an average 87% of each city's inhabitants say they are in favour of this type of political system. Nearly half (49%) say they are “*very much in favour of democracy*” while 38% are simply “*in favour of democracy*”. This leaves less than 15% against democracy. This general finding holds true for each country. Togo, an outpost, is worth highlighting from this point of view given the country's current political situation. It is among the inhabitants of Lome that the highest percentage of people expressing an unreserved hankering for democracy is found, with over 63% “*very much in favour of democracy*”.

Not only does support for democracy in general ring loud and clear, but this type of political system is more appreciated by far than any other form of government (Table 14). Three other types of political systems in addition to democracy were put forward for the population's consideration: they were all largely rejected. The people showed themselves to be fundamentally opposed to any form of authoritarian regime, whether headed by a “strong man” or by the army. Less than one in five adults saw these regimes in a positive light (18% for the “strong man” hypothesis and 14% for a military regime). Neither did the cities' inhabitants want experts, rather than a democratically elected government, to decide what is right for the country. Although 35% were prepared to accept this type of leadership, this choice came in way behind democracy, which picked up over 86% of the votes.

**Table 14: Assessment of the different forms of political system by income levels**

Opinion of the different political systems:	Total	Per capita income quartiles			
		1 <sup>st</sup> quartile	2 <sup>nd</sup> quartile	3 <sup>rd</sup> quartile	4 <sup>th</sup> quartile
A. Have a strong man as leader	<b>18.2</b>	19.6	18.9	18.0	16.3
B. The army governs the country	<b>14.4</b>	13.7	15.6	15.2	12.3
C. The experts decide what is good for the country	<b>34.7</b>	35.6	33.9	35.8	33.2
D. Have a democratic political system	<b>86.2</b>	87.5	85.7	86.3	87.2
<b>The shortcomings of democracy:</b>					
A. The economy does not work well in a democracy	<b>31.3</b>	32.9	32.5	31.2	28.3
B. Democracies are unable to maintain order	<b>34.3</b>	35.2	35.4	34.5	32.1
C. Democracies find it hard to make decisions	<b>47.2</b>	47.0	47.9	47.3	47.1
D. Democracy is better than the other forms of government	<b>80.9</b>	81.3	80.1	80.0	82.4

Sources: 1-2-3 Surveys, Democracy module, 2001/2003, National Statistics Institutes, AFRISTAT, DIAL, our own calculations.

This massive support for democracy does not mean that the population sees it through rose-coloured glasses. The people also acknowledge that it has a certain number of shortcomings. For example, 31% state that the economic system does not work well in a democracy. Over one-third thinks that democracies have problems maintaining order. And nearly half consider that democracies find it hard to make decisions due to conflicts of interest that can arise between different social classes and lobby groups without being able to be solved in an authoritarian manner. Yet at the end of the day, these

shortcomings are minor compared with the advantages that democracy can bring. Four in five people are convinced that, all things considered, compared with other types of political systems, democracy – understood as a political process for appointing leaders via the ballot box – is the best system of government.

These reservations about the democratic system are found a little more among the poorest populations. Some 20% and 14% respectively of people in the 1<sup>st</sup> quartile would not be against the army or a strong man having the power, as opposed to 16% and 12% for the richest quartile. A total of 35% of the poorest individuals, as opposed to 32% of the richest, feel that democracy is unable to maintain order. Yet the deviations are small and statistically insignificant, and the poorest individuals, like the rest of the population, massively prefer democracy despite its drawbacks. The poor even score higher than average (88% versus 86%) in preferring a democratic system. The poor's support for democratisation is borne out by detailed econometric analyses (Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2003c, 2004b et 2005a). These findings contradict the theory that the poor's own values and economic situation make them recalcitrant about the establishment of democratic regimes.

### *Is democracy a Western concept?*


What hides behind the word “democracy”? This question is key in that an entire school of thought based on culturalist theories considers that democracy is a Western value and that it means something different in other historical and cultural contexts. So a definition is needed here as to what “democracy” means to the people of the region. This entailed giving the survey respondents a list of features traditionally associated with democracy and asking them if they considered them to be integral to this notion.

The finding was unequivocal: the region's populations have the same idea of democracy as that which prevails in historical democracies. This suggests that there is a universalist concept of democracy in both Africa and the North. Approximately 95% of the respondents considered all six of the elements on the list to be essential. They felt that a democracy should essentially guarantee the holding of “*free and transparent elections*”, “*freedom of speech and the press*” and “*political freedom (choice of political party)*” as well as “*equality before the law*”, “*freedom of worship*” and “*freedom to travel*”. If all six of the characteristics are put together, 86% of the population felt that they are all essential to democracy. This consensus regarding the definition of democracy was borne out in all the cities regardless of the groups' standards of living (poor or rich). Over 85% of the population everywhere and in all the per capita income quartiles considered that each of the six properties was fundamental for democracy.

### *An assessment of the effort required to consolidate democracy*

A comparison of the more or less fundamental nature of each of the six properties selected with whether they are respected provides an idea of the main weaknesses of the democratic set-up in each country. This information can be gleaned by comparing the proportion of those who deem them all to be essential with the proportion of those who consider them all to be respected (Figure 6). The ratio is obviously the lowest in Togo and highest in Senegal, with the other countries showing fairly similar opinions from this point of view.

**Figure 6: Respect for the basic principles of democracy by country**




Sources: 1-2-3 Surveys, Democracy module, 2001/2003, National Statistical Institutes, AFRISTAT, DIAL, our own calculations.

Another way of measuring and displaying the gap between the population’s aspirations and whether the six essential characteristics of democracy are respected is to place them on the same diagram and compare two hexagons (Figure 7)<sup>12</sup>: one measuring the percentage of the population that considers each of the six properties of democracy to be fundamental (the surface area of this hexagon represents the “area of aspirations” or demand) and the other measuring the percentages of the population who consider that these aspects are respected in the country (the surface area of this hexagon could be called the “actual area of democracy” or respect for democracy). Togo again reveals the same findings as before, being in a critical situation on the democratic front and standing out clearly from all the other countries. Conversely, Senegal comes out as the highest performer in terms of democratic freedoms, even if they are far from perfectly respected. This exercise hence measures how far the different countries have yet to go to consolidate democracy and points to possibilities for reforms to be undertaken.

<sup>12</sup> Here we adopt an identical approach to that previously applied to measure subjective poverty. This approach consists of comparing the importance of a need with the households’ level of satisfaction.



**Figure 7: Perception of how well democracy works compared with aspirations**



Sources : 1-2-3 Surveys, Democracy module, 2001/2003, National Statistical Institutes, AFRISTAT, DIAL, our own calculations.

Given that the survey looks at opinions covering a large range of societal issues, it shows the state of unrest that could threaten the country's social and political stability. Côte d'Ivoire and Togo are emblematic examples of this. The population in Togo is glaringly dissatisfied with all the areas covered (Table 15). Lome lags way behind in last position for both governance and, worse still, democracy. Togo appears as an incongruity in the region, explaining the Lome inhabitants' thirst for political change. The results for Côte d'Ivoire are more paradoxical (Roubaud, 2003c). At first glance, the inhabitants of Abidjan are not particularly pessimistic about the way in which they are governed. In fact, on certain points, Abidjan is among the leaders for "good governance" (authorities' will to reform, taking the population's aspirations into consideration, and growth in corruption).


**Table 15: Perception of the administration's main problems by country**

%	Abidjan	Cotonou	Ouagadougou	Bamako	Niamey	Dakar	Antananarivo	Lome
Democracy works well	57.4	70.5	45.8	55.8	47.9	77.4	72.7	9.8
The administration runs well	53.0	46.4	52.0	52.2	53.9	61.0	71.8	20.1
The will for reform is really there	75.3	39.0	44.1	47.8	54.3	-	90.5	11.7
The politicians take the population's aspirations into consideration	51.9	18.4	26.7	33.1	33.7	39.8	72.1	6.5
<b>GROWTH (balance of opinion)</b>								
The running of democracy has improved since 1990	+39 pts	+17 pts	+44 pts	+22 pts	+24 pts	+69 pts	+51 pts	-59 pts
The running of the administration has improved since 2001	+10 pts	-8 pts	-3 pts	+8 pts	+2 pts	+30 pts	+55 pts	-38 pts
Corruption has increased since 2001	+6 pts	-64 pts	-59 pts	-28 pts	-45 pts	-	+36 pts	-28 pts

Sources: 1-2-3 Surveys, Governance and Democracy modules, 2001/2003, National Statistics Institutes, AFRISTAT, DIAL, our own calculations.

Yet a closer look reveals a much more worrying diagnosis. When the findings are disaggregated based on the ethnic or religious dividing line used in the most extremist political assertions, between the "people of the North" and those of the South, the split definitely finds popular expression in Abidjan (Figure 8). The "people of the North" are extremely distrustful of the official institutions and national authorities. Moreover, they believe that the situation is getting worse, despite the official appeasement of the conflict. The survey clearly reveals a deeply divided population, wherein ethnic group is the key criterion for the focus of public opinion. The concept of *Ivoirité* has taken shape among the common citizens, giving rise to an internal split in the social body along dividing lines based on cultural identity tensions.

**Figure 8: Indices of satisfaction with the administration and democracy by ethnic group**



Sources: 1-2-3 Surveys 2002, Governance and Democracy modules, INS, Côte d'Ivoire, our own calculations. Note: Dynamics: balance of opinion. Krou: President Gbagbo's ethnic group. Northern Mandes: ethnic group in the North of Côte d'Ivoire.

In both cases, the survey is a powerful tool for informing policies: firstly, to improve the understanding of the nature of conflicts at grass-roots level, beneath the voice of the "visible" players

(warlords, politicians, journalists, etc.); secondly, and consequently, by providing the possibility to track changes in the situation in real time. These “early warning indicators” offer the means to take action before tensions degenerate into open conflict.

### 3.2. Some findings in the Andean countries

#### 3.2.1. Governance issues at the core of the Andean countries’ main problems

The open question on the country’s main problems confirms what was found in Africa based on a more limited closed question. Governance is considered to be one of the main problems in the three Andean countries (Table 16). Admittedly, the “*lack of jobs*” and “*poverty*” stand largely accused, but “*corruption*” and the “*government’s lack of credibility*” also appear top of the list. In the case of Peru, where we can look back over three years, the lack of will to combat corruption and, more generally, a string of broken promises has significantly increased the percentage of those who think that the “*government’s lack of credibility*” and the “*government’s lack of transparency*” are the greatest problems (from 4% in 2002 to 9% in 2003-2004). These two grievances together outrank “*corruption*” in the classification of the country’s major problems. In Ecuador, the issue of corruption is felt even more keenly than in Peru. It is mentioned by two-thirds of the citizens as a serious problem (as opposed to 17% in Peru), virtually on a par with the “*lack of jobs*” and ahead of “*poverty*”. Lastly, in the two Andean countries, the general subject of governance (corruption and the government’s credibility and transparency) take first place among the nation’s main problems as perceived by the population.

This diagnosis is directly reflected in the confidence that the citizens have in the institutions. The population shows the most distrust of the institutions that should, in principle, enforce the law (the judiciary and the police). The trade unions and political parties – the civil society institutions meant to defend rights and “represent” the citizens in the public debate – do not fare any better. Only the Church, which often plays the role of mediator in serious social conflicts, escapes these judgements unscathed. It is worth noting that, despite the paltry quality of the public education and health services, the population remains highly attached to them and gives them a high confidence score.

**Table 16: The population’s assessment of the country’s main problems (Ecuador and Peru)**

	Ecuador		Peru	
	Main problems	Priority No. 1	Main problems	Priority No. 1
<b>Lack of jobs</b>	<b>71.5%</b>	<b>31.21%</b>	<b>61.7%</b>	<b>43.72%</b>
<b>Corruption</b>	<b>66.7%</b>	<b>28.77%</b>	<b>16.5%</b>	<b>7.59%</b>
<b>Poverty</b>	<b>54.2%</b>	<b>15.60%</b>	<b>48.8%</b>	<b>27.94%</b>
<b>Lack of public institution credibility</b>	<b>17.7%</b>	<b>7.09%</b>	<b>14.3%</b>	<b>7.09%</b>
External debt	14.9%	5.67%	-	0.00%
Crime	19.8%	3.24%	5.7%	1.42%
Poor quality of public education system	12.2%	2.23%	9.5%	2.53%
Poor quality of public health system	8.0%	1.11%	3.2%	0.51%
Drugs	7.7%	0.91%	1.5%	0.20%
Feuds among the political class	3.5%	0.81%	-	-
Domestic violence	5.2%	0.41%	1.2%	0.20%
Lack of social security coverage	2.9%	0.30%	1.1%	0.10%
Lack of government transparency	-	-	4.8%	1.62%
Prostitution	3.6%	0.20%	0.7%	0.00%
Others	5.8%	2.43%	14.3%	7.09%
<b>Total</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>100%</b>

Sources: SIEH-ENEMDU-2004, INEC, Ecuador; ENAHO 2003-2004 INEI, Peru, Governance module, our own calculations.  
 Note: The percentages in the “main problems” column come to over 100% because the question was a multiple choice question.

This lack of confidence in the supervisory institutions and the perception of endemic corruption are directly linked to the actual prevalence of corruption and not solely to a subjective opinion of it. The Peruvian findings demonstrate this since the highest concentration of corruption suffered by the population is found in the police and the judiciary (30% and 15% of cases), with the poor being more

frequently victims than the non-poor (Table 17). Moreover, in 90% of cases where corruption is not reported, it is due to fear of reprisals and the indifference of the authorities.

**Table 17: Institutional disaggregation allows for better focused anti-corruption policies (Peru)**  
Distribution (%) of the frequency of corruption by institution

Institutions	National	Urban	Rural	Poor	Non Poor
Police	30.3	31.5	24.0	33.4	29.2
Judiciary	14.9	14.3	17.4	16.2	14.4
Agricultural minister	6.8	9.1	5.7	4.3	9.3
Migrations	6.4	5.0	32.2	18.2	5.7
Local (municipal) government	5.9	6.2	5.0	4.6	6.7
Arbitrage and reconciliation office	4.8	2.9	13.5	7.6	3.4
National Development Project Fund (FONCODES)	3.2	1.7	3.7	4.7	1.1
National Electoral processes office (ONPE)	2.8	3.3	1.0	3.0	2.6
National Electoral Jury (JNE)	2.7	0.0	12.8	6.9	0.0
Civil registers (RENIEC)	2.0	1.8	2.6	2.1	2.0

Sources: ENAHO 2002, Governance module, INEI, Peru, our own calculations.

Note: has been asked, felt forced to or gave voluntarily gifts, tips, gratuities, bribes, etc.

In Peru in 2002, the incidence of petty corruption – i.e. the percentage of individuals who had been victims of corruption – was 6.1% (Table 18). This estimate takes account of the fact that approximately 15% of individuals had not had any contact with the State in the twelve months preceding the survey. It is likely that it is precisely corruption that discourages or prevents individuals from accessing the State, which hence denies them access to public services. As in Africa and contrary to what is generally believed, the non-poor are more concerned than the poor and frequency increases with the standard of living. The sums paid by the households to corrupt civil servants account for 0.4% of their total expenditure. This amount is not insignificant considering that it represents approximately one-third of the State transfers received by households by way of social poverty reduction programmes.

**Table 18: Corruption and poverty in Peru: Are the poor less or more affected by corruption?**

Expenditure Quartiles	Incidence (All individuals)	Incidence (Individuals in contact with Public services)	Average Cost Soles per capita/year	Weight of corruption (% of food expenditure)	Reason for non reporting: Fear of the consequences, don't know how to
I (poorest)	2.6%	3.1%	4.8	0.8%	49%
II	4.4%	5.3%	8.4	0.9%	41%
III	5.0%	5.8%	7.2	0.7%	23%
IV	6.2%	7.1%	21.6	1.4%	31%
V (wealthiest)	7.9%	8.9%	33.6	1.2%	30%
<b>Household condition</b>					
Non Poor	6.8%	7.9%	69	1.3%	30%
Poor	3.9%***	4.6%***	15***	0.7%	37%***
<b>Total</b>	<b>5.2%</b>	<b>6.1%</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>1.1%</b>	<b>32.3%</b>

Sources: ENAHO 2002-IV, Governance module, INEI, Peru, our own calculations.

Note: the incidence represents the ratio of individuals who live in households where at least one member has been a victim of corruption.

\*\*\* The differences between Poor and Non Poor are significant at 1%.


It is of note here that, unlike the Peruvian case, the relative cost of corruption in the household budget in African countries is generally higher for the poor than for the rich. One of the possible explanations for this is the fact that the questionnaire on household expenditure in Peru is more detailed and includes the various purchasing modes (monetary spending, for own consumption, cash income, and public and private donations). More important, however, is the fact that the Peruvian ENAHO survey has a national coverage, including urban and rural households, whereas the African surveys concern solely the capitals. The low presence of the State and the high incidence of poverty in rural areas (overall rate of 76% with 46% of extreme poor in the fourth quarter of 2003) mean that the rural Peruvian households are less “exposed” to the risk of corruption. Moreover, the costs of corruption

probably have a dissuasive effect on many of them, hence increasing their marginalisation from State services. If the African surveys were to include rural households, which are harder hit by poverty and have less access to public institutions, corruption would probably be found to have a lesser impact at national level than that found in urban areas.

3.2.2. The population supports democracy despite its dysfunctions

In keeping with the observation in Africa, the majority of the population believes in the values of democracy and prefers it to other political systems, despite the lack of confidence in the public institutions and a rather lukewarm assessment of how well democracy works in the country. In both Ecuador and Peru, over two-thirds of the population stated that they were “*very much in favour*” or “*more in favour*” of democracy as a mode of government (Figure 9). Conversely, less than one in five individuals was “*not really or not at all in favour*” of democracy. It is important to note that the proportion of individuals who responded “*don’t know*” was relatively high, particularly among women and in rural areas where adults have had little access to education. This finding has at least two direct implications as regards public policies. Firstly, the social inclusion of the indigenous population – and its greater participation in the public debates and democratic life in general – calls for increased access to a quality education system and information campaigns targeting the adult population. Secondly, the subordination of women in both the private and public spheres is no doubt one of the challenges that must be met if democracy is to be consolidated in the Andean countries.

**Figure 9: Support for democracy by gender and area of residence (Ecuador and Peru)**




Sources: SIE-ENEMDU-2004, ENAHO-2004, INEC, Ecuador, INEI, Peru, Democracy module, our own calculations.

The most widespread opinion among the citizens of Ecuador and Peru is that democracy is the best form of government, despite the problems it may pose. Among the main shortcomings usually ascribed to democracy, it is the fact of finding it “hard to make decisions” that poses the greatest problem in both Peru and Ecuador. However, a higher percentage of the population in both countries mentions the problems with “maintaining order” and “the economic system”.

Likewise, when the interviewees in Bolivia were asked to state their preferences for different types of political system, they, like those in Ecuador and Peru, were also in the vast majority in favour of a democratic system. It should be noted, however, that there are differences between the countries as regards the level of support for other forms of political regime (Figure 10). In Ecuador and Peru, the population is somewhat lenient when it comes to military regimes. This view is not shared in Bolivia. This finding can probably be explained by the nationalistic nature of the military regimes in Peru and Ecuador, during which land reforms were introduced while oil resources were nationalised. In Bolivia, however, these military regimes are associated rather with the repression of the trade union movement and the suppression of individual guarantees and freedoms. Lastly, the massive and extensive disfavour in which the political class is held (over 90% of the interviewees feel that politicians only think of their own interests) is most probably behind the positive view individuals have of technocratic regimes (which come in second place behind democracy in the three Andean countries).


**Figure 10: Support for democracy varies across countries (Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru)**



Sources: SIE-ENEMDU-2004, INEC, Ecuador; ENAHO 2003-2004 INEI, Peru; ECH 2004, INE, Bolivia, Democracy module, our own calculations.

The preference for a democratic political regime in Peru is greater among the populations who suffer discrimination (ethnic, social, etc.; Figure 11). In a context of huge inequalities and the prevalence of discriminatory practices, the populations who tend to be excluded from the social body express high expectations and count explicitly on greater democracy, with its underlying principles of equality before the law and equal opportunities, to prevent injustices in society.

**Figure 11: Relevant insights for poverty/discrimination analysis. Those suffering discrimination have the strongest preferences for democratic regimes (Peru)**




Sources: ENAHO May 2003-December 2004, Democracy module, INEI, Peru, our own calculations.

The population has great expectations of the democratic systems. So, even where support is massive, it can be eroded over time to the benefit of non-democratic regimes. In Peru, the predominant feeling is that democracy has not improved since 1990 (beginning of the corrupt, autocratic Fujimori regime). Opinions are even more negative on this point in Ecuador. The use of ongoing surveys in Peru since May 2003 means that three indicators can be compared over time: preference for a democratic system, the perception of corruption and the assessment as to how well democracy works (Figure 12). The findings are unequivocal: as the indicators of the perception of corruption and democratic dysfunctions worsen, the preference for an authoritarian or military regime gains ground.

It should be noted that the population’s perception of corruption suggests that it has worsened over the period, whereas the objective indicator of the frequency of petty corruption (suffered by the

households) has not changed significantly. This clearly shows the merits of an approach combining both “subjective” and “objective” aspects. Individuals’ support for political options – and hence whether or not they support anti-corruption policies – is based on a broad vision of governance. The gap between the populations’ expectations generated by an all-out display of announcements of policies in favour of “good governance” and reforms that take too long to find expression in significant acts in practice is problematic from this point of view.

**Figure 12: Support for democratic regimes weakens as the perception of corruption increases and democratic performance worsens (Peru)**



Sources: ENAHO May 2003-December 2004, Governance module, INEI, Peru, our own calculations.

A number of hypotheses can be put forward to explain the deviation between the objective and subjective indicators of corruption. In addition to the gap between the population’s expectations as regards the fight against corruption and transparency – expectations quite rightly generated during the transition to democracy by the elected candidate’s manifesto – and the actions actually taken, the feeling that corruption has worsened in Peru may be explained by two associated factors. Firstly, the press has come to play an increasingly important watchdog role and has increasingly spoken out against cases of corruption. Secondly, these publicised cases of embezzlement, which tend to bolster the idea of a worsening of the situation, concern large-scale corruption (and not petty corruption, which directly affects the households and is measured by our objective indicators). They concern mainly: misappropriation of funds and poor management of public resources with various cases of public procurement nepotism; the use of public oil corporation funds to repair the presidential palace; extremely high wages paid to ruling party members without the required skills for the job; favouritism for the president’s family; the mismanagement of public funds intended for social programmes and used to pay stars and drinks for private celebrations, etc. Lastly, another possible explanation is the inertia of the objective corruption indicator, whose reference period is the last twelve months, whereas the subjective indicator is more influenced by the most recent cases of large-scale corruption.

3.2.3. A survey mechanism to evaluate policies: the assessment of local governance

The centralisation of political and economic power in the capitals and cities of the Andean region has made second-class citizens of the populations in the country’s interior, which has triggered a very strong demand for real decentralisation. The aim is to transfer the resources and decision-making power to the local authorities to bring government closer to the citizens. In response to this demand, a decentralisation and devolution policy with local particularities has been launched in all the Andean countries. This process has given rise to a greater State presence in the villages that had long been left out in the cold due to their geographic remoteness and the indifference of the elite. At the same time, the local populations are taking a more active part in decisions with the election of representatives who are bound to be accountable for their actions and transparent in their management. However, the transfer of responsibilities to the local authorities has not had all positive effects. Although decentralisation is likely to further the expression and consideration of citizens’ demands, it could also

lead to more injustice and abuse by local corrupt bigwigs. It is therefore important to identify these governance problems at local level, problems that can take different forms and be more or less serious depending on the regions and communities. Upstream, before the introduction of the policies, how much local support was there for the decentralisation policy? What regions were the most in favour of it? What results did the different populations expect from it? Downstream, following the implementation of the reform, what were the results and how were they judged by these same populations?

The survey mechanism in Peru, and in Ecuador to a lesser extent, was specially designed to answer these questions (subject coverage and infra-national inference). In the case of Peru, it is naturally found that the population is massively in favour of the introduction of a decentralisation policy there where the demands for regional autonomy have been the strongest in the last four years (especially in the department of Arequipa and the Amazonian departments; Table 19). It is also in the departments where support is the greatest that a higher percentage of the population thinks that decentralisation will take the population's aspirations more into consideration. Lastly, the negative correlation between support for decentralisation and the view that it will result in more injustice and abuse by the local authorities is a consistent finding.

In Peru in 2002, before the decentralisation policy was introduced and the municipal authorities were elected, the population had positive expectations and the potential perverse effects of this strategy were minimised. In Arequipa, a town where eight in ten inhabitants wanted decentralisation to be introduced, 65% thought that the local authorities would pay more attention to their needs. Correspondingly, a low percentage (29%) believed that decentralisation would generate more injustice. With the reforms now implemented, Arequipa is also the region where the population's ex-post evaluation of the process is the most negative. In fact, only a minority think that decentralisation has given the citizens more of a voice and has improved public services (18% and 17% respectively). Less than one-third (28%) considers that the population has taken a greater part in decision-making. Nearly half of the population even believes that decentralisation has brought greater injustice and abuse by the local authorities. It therefore comes as no surprise to find that there was a "*paro regional*", a popular revolt, in Arequipa that completely paralysed economic activity for several days with a series of uncontrolled street demonstrations.



**Table 19: Evaluation of local governance in Peru: Do you agree that the decentralisation process would imply/has implied?**


Departments	Favourable to decentralization process	More attention to peoples' demands		More injustice and abuse by local authorities		Greater participation in decision making	An improvement in public services
	Before	Before	After	Before	After	After	After
Amazonas	63	39	25	56	26	30	25
Ancash	37	27	15	56	12	21	16
Apurimac	51	24	25	64	30	29	28
<b>Arequipa</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>17</b>
Ayacucho	38	32	15	36	15	15	14
Cajamarca	39	24	17	35	27	16	17
Cusco	62	48	18	43	41	22	21
Huancavelica	45	34	20	59	47	24	20
Huanuco	61	48	24	46	28	29	23
Ica	71	40	13	59	26	27	16
Junin	50	32	9	66	46	18	10
La Libertad	61	41	22	49	39	28	21
Lambayeque	83	75	29	25	21	52	35
Lima	76	55	33	41	46	42	35
Loreto	95	88	64	12	58	61	62
Madre de Dios	74	56	34	44	39	37	35
Moquegua	63	50	25	45	51	24	27
Pasco	77	52	24	40	67	24	29
Piura	51	31	21	50	36	30	24
Puno	51	41	7	38	37	19	7
San Martin	85	49	32	51	21	27	26
Tacna	64	50	17	48	52	30	22
Tumbes	59	23	20	77	53	40	32
Ucayali	78	38	28	62	43	28	40
Total	66	47	25	44	38	32	26
% population that agrees with the statement.							

Sources: ENAHO 2004, Governance and Democracy modules, INEI, Peru, our own calculations.

### 3.2.4. Economic exclusion and central government shortcomings limit the exercise of democratic participation

In Peru, just over one in ten individuals (13%) did not vote in the municipal elections in 2002. Yet the stakes were high in that these elections preceded the gradual introduction of a decentralisation policy involving the transfer of the social programmes to the municipalities and regional governments. It may seem paradoxical that the individuals should have “chosen” to abstain when the return to democracy – following a decade of authoritarian centralisation and corruption – was giving them the opportunity to replace the largely discredited local political elite. It could be posited that the disrepute of the parties and the entire political class was so bad that the population no longer saw “the point in voting”. In fact, a close examination of the reasons for not voting and the profile of those who did not vote shows that this hypothesis is not central to explaining the political exclusion process. This process is due first and foremost to central government shortcomings and the consequences of economic and social exclusion of which the marginalised populations – the poorest, the country dwellers and the least educated – are victim. These groups are also those who discuss politics least with their entourage and are the least informed about political life, the parties’ manifestos, etc.

**Figure 13: Rates of non-voting in the 2002 municipal elections by income quartile (Peru)**



Sources: ENAHO 2003-2004, Democracy module, INEI, Peru,our own calculations.  
 Note: This diagram concerns the municipal elections held in November 2002. Quartile I is the poorest and quartile IV is the richest.

The rate of non-participation decreases sharply as the income scale rises. It falls from 20% for the poorest quartile to less than 10% for the richest (Figure 13). It concerns mainly the rural population (18% as opposed to 11% for urban dwellers), the youngest and the oldest (19% and 20% respectively). The less educated are particularly affected: nearly one-third of those who have received no schooling did not vote, representing 16% of all non-voters whereas they only represent 7% of the total population at voting age.

Moreover, the analysis of reasons shows that not voting in the elections does not reflect mainly distrust or the expression of discouragement with the political system. It is mainly due to the inadequacy of the public institutions responsible for the electoral register and the national identity register (Table 20). A full 70% of those who did not vote were simply unable to fulfil their electoral duty because: either they did not have the voter’s ID card (“*libreta electoral*”) or they were not registered on the electoral registers. In other words, the State’s incompetence rather than a rejection of the elections explains most of the cases of non-voting in Peru. Even more serious is the fact that not all citizens are equal in the eyes of the State. The non-participation of the poorest half of the population was due to a process of political exclusion triggered by the State’s failings. Over three-quarters of the non-voting individuals in this population were not registered, as opposed to “only” 40% for the richest quartile. Not having the national ID document not only prevents individuals from exercising their fundamental right to vote, but it also reduces the citizens’ access to economic opportunities. Without a national ID document, it is not possible to obtain a loan, conduct land transactions, travel abroad, etc.

Economic factors (cost of transport and remoteness from the polling stations) rank second among the reasons for not voting. They concern more the most mobile populations. Note, to conclude, that only a tiny minority consider that “voting serves no purpose” (less than 2% of those who did not vote and approximately 0.2% of the potential voters). Despite its stern criticism of the entire political class and its lack of confidence in the government and the institutions, the Peruvian population remains deeply attached to the values of democracy and votes en masse in elections (note that, in the case in point, the municipal elections are not compulsory). The State, brought into question by the survey’s findings, should endeavour to remedy this inequitable situation. Moreover, following civil society action in this area, in particular with the *Mesa de Concertacion de Lucha contra la Pobreza* and action by the *Comisión de Trabajo por los Indocumentados* » (*Cotrain*) – comprising a large number of NGOs and the public body in charge of the ID register (*RENIEC*) – the current government waived the need for a service record from and provided identity documents free of charge to the poorest populations.

**Table 20: Reasons for not voting by income quartile (Peru)**

Why didn't you vote?	Quartile I	Quartile II	Quartile III	Quartile IV	Total
High transportation cost	2.1%	2.6%	3.2%	0.7%	2.3%
Was far from the polling station	9.7%	9.5%	11.1%	18.0%	11.1%
<b>Did not have an election card</b>	<b>63.1%</b>	<b>64.6%</b>	<b>55.0%</b>	<b>35.9%</b>	<b>57.9%</b>
<b>Was not registered</b>	<b>11.5%</b>	<b>12.3%</b>	<b>7.4%</b>	<b>4.5%</b>	<b>9.9%</b>
To vote is pointless	2.0%	0.6%	1.3%	3.2%	1.7%
Other	11.5%	10.5%	21.9%	37.7%	17.2%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>
% of non voters	19.7	14.6	10.3	7.8	13.1

Sources: ENAHO 2003-2004, Democracy module, INEI, Peru, our own calculations.  
Note: we have excluded "was minor" and recalculated the percentages.

## CONCLUSION

The experiment conducted in Africa and Latin America to append modules to the household surveys shows that such an approach is not only justified from the point of view of the current main development policy guidelines, but that it can also be implemented in practice in the wide variety of political and institutional contexts found in the developing countries. These modules have technical properties that satisfy the conditions required to be incorporated into an efficient national statistical data mechanism: reliability of the information provided, pertinence of the indicators for policy definition and monitoring, and ownership of the tool by the local institutions. There are hence two advantages to tracking governance, democracy and citizen participation indicators. Public policies, such as those designed to make the public institutions more efficient and reduce the frequency of corruption, can be monitored and assessed. Secondly, time series can be built to address the causal relations between phenomena and consequently identify the most efficient policy instruments, as illustrated by the Madagascan case in terms of the reforms to be introduced to reduce corruption.

This pilot experiment opens up a number of important prospects. In the very short term, it builds on the existing databases by producing a certain number of analyses: the main findings of the surveys designed to be widely disseminated on the ground (at national level, but also at regional level when the survey so permits); in-depth policy-oriented analyses looking at the definition, monitoring and evaluation of policies, and also academic analyses. In the medium term, the aim is to consolidate the method. Firstly, the survey should be repeated in other geographic areas (inclusion of new countries) and especially rolled out over time. The launch of time series (already underway in Madagascar and Peru) will lay the foundations for a fully-fledged system to track governance and democracy indicators. It will also test the robustness of the indicators. Secondly, in terms of policy processes, the methods for institutionalising this mechanism within the official statistical data systems should be improved. Such a programme should give rise to these types of surveys and indicators being systematically included in the national development strategy monitoring and assessment systems. More generally speaking, it will enable international recommendations to be formulated for measuring governance and democracy by means of surveys, especially as part of national statistical development strategies promoted by Paris21 and backed by the United Nations.

In addition to their specific interest for each country and the possibilities of South-South co-operation, such statistical surveys on governance and democracy finally make it reasonably feasible, for the first time, to hope that methodological transfers will not take the traditional road from North to South, but will travel from South to North. To date, only a few NSIs in the developed countries have taken steps down this road. Granted, a certain number of innovative surveys have been conducted in this field (see, for example, the French NSI recent work on the Multiple dimensions of poverty, social exclusion, electoral participation and political choices). Yet the official statistical information mechanisms are still holding their traditional course, focusing mainly on economic and social statistics. Nonetheless, the reasons for and merits of the approach presented here are no less relevant to the North than the South. A good example of the judiciousness of this subject can be found by looking

at the recent debate surrounding the referendum on the European Constitution, which covered a combination of economic policy lines, governance, human rights and democracy – in short, different aspects involving society's choices. These are all good reasons for progressing down this road, wherein the expertise acquired by statisticians in the developing countries could be usefully harnessed by their counterparts in the North<sup>13</sup>.

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<sup>13</sup> By way of comparison, a parallel could be drawn with the measurement of the informal sector. Although the methodologies (two-phase surveys) were first developed in the South, as were the modules presented here, the possibilities of applying them in the North remain limited in that the weight of the informal sector is marginal (except maybe in certain French overseas *départements* and territories). This is clearly not the case when it comes to the issues of governance and democracy.

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