

Bofinger, Peter; Mayer, Eric

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Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction in the Euro Area with different assumptions on the Phillips curve

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CeGE-Discussion Paper

27

Peter Bofinger
Eric Mayer

Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction in the Euro Area with different assumptions on the Phillips curve



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The aim of this annual workshop is to offer a forum for young researchers from the field of International Economics to present and to discuss their current topics of research with other experts. The workshop also provides the opportunity to gain an overview of recent developments, problems and methodological approaches in this field.

Detailed information on past workshops and the planning for the 2005 workshop are available at <http://www.vwl.wiso.uni-goettingen.de/workshop>. Do not hesitate to contact Dr. Carsten Eckel, *CeGE* (carsten.eckel@wiwi.uni-goettingen.de) for further questions.

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by

Peter Bofinger, University of Würzburg and CEPR
and
Eric Mayer, University of Würzburg

April 2004
(Revised Version)

Universität Würzburg
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Geld
und internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen
Sanderring 2, D-97070 Würzburg
peter.bofinger@mail.uni-wuerzburg.de
Tel.: +49/931/31-2945

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Peter Bofinger, University of Würzburg and CEPR[^]
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Eric Mayer, University of Würzburg

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Abstract

In this paper we carry over a static version of a New Keynesian Macro Model to a monetary union. For a similar approach see Uhlig (2002). We will show in particular that a harmonious functioning of a monetary union critically depends on the correlation structure of shocks that hit the currency area. Additionally a high degree of integration in product markets is advantageous for the ECB as it prevents that national real interest rates can drive a wedge between macroeconomic outcomes across member states. In particular small countries are in a vulnerable and therefore in need for fiscal policy as an independent stabilization agent with room to breath.

Keywords: Monetary policy, inflation targeting, fiscal policy, policy coordination, free-riding.

JEL classification: E50 E60 H70

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1 INTRODUCTION

In this paper we apply a static version of a New Keynesian macromodel a la (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 1999) to a monetary union potentially describing EMU. Additionally the paper serves as a contribution to the optimal currency literature. It is a powerful alternative to the IS/LM-based Mundell Fleming (MF) model. The main advantage of the open economy BMW (Bofinger, Mayer, Wollmershäuser) model is its ability to discuss the role of country specific inflation rates while the Mundell-Fleming model is based on the assumption of fixed prices.

With the launch of the third stage of the common monetary policy the member states have delegated monetary policy to an independent central bank setting monetary conditions in line with the average macroeconomic environment in the union. The unique feature of a currency area is given by the fact that the different macroeconomic agents, the ECB, national governments and labour unions focus on different levels of target variables. The common central bank whose policy we assume to be conducted according to the notion of inflation targeting (Svensson 1999) focuses on union wide aggregates. It sets nominal interest rates for the currency area consistent with its inflation target while equally having a concern for economic activity. This means in particular that the interest rate policy of the ECB will be indifferent against mean preserving distributions of macroeconomic outcomes across member states. In contrast labour unions and in particular national governments basically focus on national aggregates. This constellation nests a free rider problematic that is well documented in literature (Dixit and Lambertini 2002). In particular we will be able to show that unsustainable policies that are not consistent with the inflation target of the ECB, e.g. unsustainable fiscal expansions, or overly ambitious wage demands lead to a boom in the home country whereas they inflict negative spill over effects for the rest of the union. This calls for stringent rules. The Maastricht treaty led to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) which superimposes some broad guidelines on fiscal policy such as the 3% deficit criterion (see (Bofinger 2003)). Our analysis will in particular focus on the sustainability of fiscal policy and provide a rationale for the 3% deficit criterion as well as for its suspension. Among the rich universe of aspects we analyze in particular whether fiscal policy should actively engage in stabilizing economic shocks or whether the fiscal stance should be state independently equal to neutral.

Throughout the paper we will focus in particular on two aspects. First we will show that life in a monetary union is easier if the law of one price holds. If product markets are highly integrated the currency area as whole shares one common real interest rate ($i - \pi$)

which prevents that a further wedge can be driven between macroeconomic outcomes in the vague of demand shocks. Second, we will analyze a scenario when all countries only produce non-tradables. Such a setting implies the existence of national inflation rates π_i which translate into national interest rates $(i - \pi_i)$ that amplify shocks. In line with (Dornbusch 1997), we can show that restrictions on the fiscal instrument might be harmful under such a setting (Chari and Kehoe 1998), (Beetsma, Favero, and Missale A. 2004).

2 MONETARY POLICY WITH A PASSIVE FISCAL POLICY

In this section we assume that monetary policy is the only macroeconomic player in a monetary union, i.e. national fiscal policies remain completely passive. This means in particular that only the central bank will respond with its instrument –the nominal interest rate- to shocks in order to stabilize economic activity.

We assume that monetary policy is guided by a loss function. The objective function of the central bank is given by:


$$L_{ECB} = (\pi - \pi_0)^2 + \lambda y^2 \quad (1.1)$$

The ECB tries to stabilize squared deviations of the inflation rate and the output gap from their target values respectively. The preference parameter λ depicts the weight monetary policy attaches to stabilize the output gap versus stabilizing the inflation rate. This loss function is commonly used to map the strategy of flexible inflation forecast targeting (Svensson 1999). Additionally Woodford has shown that it can be derived as a quadratic approximation to a households expected utility problem in the same (dynamic) New Keynesian Macro Model (Woodford 2002).

Hence it is the task of the common central bank to set the interest rate in response to exogenous disturbances and consistent with the structural equations of the model so that the loss function L_{ECB} is minimized. Note that the ECB only targets at euro wide averages, whereas it does not take care on the dispersion of goal variables across countries. In other words the ECB does not consider the spread as a problem as long as it is mean preserving. This means for example that the ECB is indifferent between the following two macroeconomic outcomes as depicted in Figure 1. This convention established in literature

(linear quadratic loss function in inflation and output) is to our understanding somewhat inconvenient. Nevertheless throughout the exposition we take it as granted that conventional wisdom says that the ECB should only take care of euro wide averages of the inflation rate and the output gap¹.

Figure 1: Mean Preserving Distribution of Macroeconomic Outcomes



2.1 THE LAW OF ONE PRICE HOLDS

Let us assume that in a monetary union only tradables are produced. Additionally we superimpose that the law of one price holds. Since we abstract from trade barriers or any other country specific features such as inhomogeneous preferences the law of one price will hold. Technically speaking this assumption means in particular that the currency area is only hit by a common supply shock. Additionally we reintroduce a common real interest rate $(i - \pi)$ for the whole area. Relying on these assumptions one can derive the common Phillips curve as follows. Each period all firms negotiate new wage contracts for one period. Workers are assumed to care about the current state of economic activity (y) as well as on the expected inflation rate π^e over the life of the contract. For the sake of simplicity we assume that monetary policy is credible ($\pi^e = \pi_0$). The nominal change in wages is then given by:

$$\Delta w = \pi_0 + dy \tag{1.2}$$

As firms are assumed to be monopolistic competitors which price their output at a constant markup over marginal costs, markup pricing translates wage inflation into price inflation.

$$\pi = \Delta w + mu \tag{1.3}$$

¹ Throughout the exposition we abstract from the problematic of a zero lower bound (Coenen Günter 2003).

Let us assume that the markup factor is equal to zero ($\mu=0$). By inserting equation (1.2) into equation (1.3) we get a static version of a Phillips curve as described by equation (1.4).

$$\pi = \pi_0 + dy + \varepsilon_2 \quad (1.4)$$

Obviously as monetary conditions measured in real terms $r = (i - \pi)$ are identical for all member countries i , we can specify the aggregate demand relationship for country i as follows:

$$y_i = a - b(i - \pi) + \varepsilon_{i,1} \quad (1.5)$$

Given this description of the economy the ECB solves the following optimisation problem.

$$L_{ECB} = (\pi - \pi_0)^2 + \lambda y^2 \quad (1.6)$$

s.t.:

$$y = a - b(i - \pi) + \varepsilon_1^2$$

$$\pi = \pi_0 + dy + \varepsilon_2$$

Inserting the Phillips curve into the loss function and solving the optimisation problem the output gap on average will be given by:

$$y = -\frac{d}{d^2 + \lambda} \varepsilon_2 \quad (1.7)$$

Inserting (1.7) into the Phillips curve we see that the euro wide inflation rate will only depend on supply shocks:

$$\pi = \pi_0 + \frac{\lambda}{d^2 + \lambda} \varepsilon_2 \quad (1.8)$$

² Note that the ECB solves its optimization problem subject to the average IS-curve and the average Phillips curve. Assuming that the different member states share an identical economic structure you can easily retrieve the average structural relationship by computing $y = (1/n) \sum_{i=1}^n y_i$ and $\pi = a + b(1/n \sum_{i=1}^n y_i)$ respectively.

The ECB can protect the union on average from demand shocks. Nevertheless across countries as we will see there can be a great dispersion in output, even if the law of one price holds. Inserting the reduced form expressions for the inflation rate and the output gap into the aggregate demand relationship yields the following reduced form for the interest rate:

$$i = \frac{a}{b} + \pi_0 + \frac{1}{b} \varepsilon_1 + \frac{(d + b\lambda)}{b(d^2 + \lambda)} \varepsilon_2 \quad (1.9)$$

Equation (1.9) nicely depicts that the reaction to demand shocks is not preference dependent whereas the reaction to supply shocks depends on preferences. With an increasing concern for output stabilization (increasing λ) the coefficient $\left(\frac{(d + b\lambda)}{b(d^2 + \lambda)}\right)$ will converge to one, which reflects that the Taylor Principle also holds for the “output junkie”. Inserting the inflation rate and the interest rate rule (1.9) into the national aggregate demand equation (1.5) one can easily determine the output gap for country i as follows:

$$y_i = (\varepsilon_{i,t} - \varepsilon_1) - \frac{d}{d^2 + \lambda} \varepsilon_2 \quad (1.10)$$

Equation (1.10) displays the key difference between a closed economy like the US and a monetary union like EMU. Even if the average output gap is equal to zero (see section 1.5), this can go hand in hand with a dispersion in national aggregates. Obviously non-synchronized demand shocks $corr(\varepsilon_{i,t}; \varepsilon_1) \neq 1$ can drive a wedge between country specific output gaps. This can in the long run undermine the very existence of a union as each country would need notably different monetary conditions which is of course impossible by the very definition of a monetary union itself (see also Uhlig (1999)). To clarify this statement let us make the assumption of uncorrelated shocks $corr(\varepsilon_{i,t}; \varepsilon_1) = 0$ and equally sized countries. What happens if only country i is hit by a shock at time t ? To illustrate this case let us assume that the GDP share of country i is α and $\varepsilon_2 = 0$. Then we can rewrite the aggregate demand shock as the following weighted average.

$$\varepsilon_1 = \alpha \varepsilon_{i,t} + (1 - \alpha) \varepsilon_{-i,t} \quad (1.11)$$

Since shocks are uncorrelated $corr(\varepsilon_{i,1}, \varepsilon_{-i,1}) = 0$ by assumption it holds that:

$$\varepsilon_1 = \alpha \varepsilon_{i,1} \quad (1.12)$$

Inserting equation (1.12) into (1.10), we see that output in country i will be given by:

$$y_{i,1} = (1 - \alpha) \varepsilon_{i,1} \quad (1.13)$$

whereas output in the rest of the union is equal to:


$$y_{-i,1} = -\alpha \varepsilon_{i,1} \quad (1.14)$$

Equations (1.13) and (1.14) depict potential conflicts which might prevail in a monetary union. As a consequence of the shock originating in country i, output will be above its potential whereas the rest of the union suffers from a somewhat depressed economic activity. Obviously equation (1.11) shows that asymmetric shocks are a major problem for small countries participating in a union as the real interest rate set by the ECB is not coined for a country with a low GDP weight unless $corr(\varepsilon_i; \varepsilon_{-i}) = 1$. In the limit, when the GDP share of an individual member country is almost zero, the shock will be passed through completely on the output gap if fiscal policy remains passive. Therefore as we will see in section (3.2) fiscal policy is in particular needed in small countries to squeeze the impact of shocks on the output gap and the inflation rate.

We can equally retrieve these results with the help of a graphical analysis (see Figure 2). Country i is hit by a demand shock and accordingly the aggregate demand curve shifts from $y_0^d(r)$ to $y_1^d(r)$. As we assume that fiscal policy remains completely passive over the cycle only the ECB reacts to the extent that the shock influences the global output gap. The demand shock in country i translates into a shift of the European demand curve from $y_0^d(r)$ to $y_1^d(r)$ of size $(1/n)\varepsilon_{1,i}$. The ECB will tighten monetary conditions from r_0 to r_1 in order to stabilize economic activity on average. Nevertheless, as Figure 2 shows this stabilization on the aggregate goes hand in hand with a dispersion of output across member states. Monetary conditions for country i will be too loose giving a boost to economic activity, output will be

above its potential ($y_i > 0$) whereas monetary conditions for the rest will be too high resulting in a somewhat depressed economic environment ($y_{-i} < 0$).

Figure 2: Uncorrelated Demand Shock in Country i: $\varepsilon_{1,i} = 3$



* Note that the figure maps the situation in which the monetary union consists of three countries of equal size. For the sake of illustration we have used concrete numerical values. As baseline calibration we have set $b=0.4$ and $d=0.34$.

For symmetric shocks one can make use of the graphs developed in (Bofinger, Mayer, and Wollmershäuser 2002). Table 1 summarizes the net reaction of all variables under consideration to a positive shock.

Table 1: Net Reaction of a Variable to a Positive Shock

	$\varepsilon_1^* > 0$	$\varepsilon_{1,i} > 0$	$\varepsilon_2 > 0$
Output gap (y_i)	↓*	↑	↓
Inflation Rate (π_i)	/	/	↑
Interest Rate (i)	↑	/	↑
Aggregate Output (y)	/	/	↓
Aggregate Inflation (π)	/	/	↑

* Throughout the exposition we assumed that the correlation of shocks is $\rho(\varepsilon_{1,i}; \varepsilon_1) = 0$

2.2 IDIOSYNCRATIC PHILLIPS CURVES

Let us now assume that the country specific output is not tradable. Accordingly the law of one price can be violated and each member state will be characterised by an idiosyncratic Phillips curve. Nevertheless as we take idiosyncratic supply shocks to be iid distributed with mean zero and a constant variance the conditional as well as the unconditional expectations of the

inflation rate of the individual member states are identical. Given this assumption our set of equations can be stated as follows:

$$\pi_i = \pi_0 + dy_i + \varepsilon_{i,2} \quad (1.15)$$

$$y_i = a - b(i - \pi_i) + \varepsilon_{i,1} \quad (1.16)$$

Assuming that the ECB only targets at averages its optimisation problem remains unaltered. In other words the aggregate values for the output gap and the inflation gap are identical to the previous scenario on average. Following this line of argumentation we can state in particular that the nominal euro wide interest rate is still given by:

$$i = \frac{a}{b} + \pi_0 + \frac{1}{b}\varepsilon_1 + \frac{(d + b\lambda)}{b(d^2 + \lambda)}\varepsilon_2 \quad (1.17)$$

The output gap of country i is now given by (1.18):

$$y_i = \frac{1}{1 - db}(\varepsilon_{i,1} - \varepsilon_1) + \frac{1}{(1 - bd)} \left[b\varepsilon_{2,i} - \frac{d + b\lambda}{(d^2 + \lambda)}\varepsilon_2 \right] \quad (1.18)$$

Equation (1.18) shows that an uncorrelated demand shock $corr(\varepsilon_{i,1}; \varepsilon_1) \neq 1$ can drive a wedge between national cycles. Additionally the dispersion across national outputs is amplified by a factor of $(1/(1 - bd))$ compared to a scenario where the law of one price holds (see (1.10)). As we will see below this can be explained by diverging monetary conditions $(i - \pi_i)$ across member states. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly equation (1.16) shows that supply shocks originating in country i can give a boost to domestic economic activity whereas union wide supply shocks depress economic activity. The argument goes as follows: A supply shock in country i (e.g., excessive wage demands) gives a push to inflation π_i that lowers its real interest rate $(i - \pi_i)$. This calls the ECB upon to act only insofar as the European inflation rate raises. Therefore, the expansionary impact of declining real interest rates in country i is not totally undone by subsequent raising nominal interest rates so that output will increase. Thus the ECB can not punish individual member states by rising average real rates

which clearly shows that stringent rules for labour unions as well as for national governments are a prerequisite for a well functioning monetary union, to prevent free rider behaviour and negative spill over effects for other member states. The inflation rate of country i is given by equation (1.19).

$$\pi_i = \pi_0 + \frac{d}{1-bd}(\varepsilon_{1,i} - \varepsilon_1) + \frac{1}{1-db} \left[\varepsilon_{2,i} - \frac{d(d+b\lambda)}{d^2 + \lambda} \varepsilon_2 \right] \quad (1.19)$$

The individual inflation rates in a monetary union- in sharp contrast to a closed economy- depend on demand shocks. Although the ECB will meet its inflation target on average this can go hand in hand with a significant dispersion in inflation rates across countries. In the case of symmetric supply shocks $\varepsilon_{2,i} = \varepsilon_2$ the inflation rate will again be described by equation (1.6).

To further illustrate the results let us analyze again the case of uncorrelated demand shocks. The real interest rate is given by: $r = i - \pi_i$. Making use of the reduced form of the inflation rate and the nominal interest rate in country i we can compute real monetary conditions for country i as follows:

$$r_i = (i - \pi_i) = \frac{a}{b} + \frac{\alpha - bd}{b(1-db)} \varepsilon_{i,1} \quad (1.20)$$

Monetary conditions for the rest of the union are given by

$$r_{-i} = \frac{a}{b} + \frac{1}{b(1-db)} \varepsilon_{i,1} \quad (1.21)$$

which translates into the following inflation rates:

$$\pi_i = \pi_0 + \frac{d}{1-db} (1-\alpha) \varepsilon_{1,i} \quad (1.22)$$

$$\pi_{-i} = \pi_0 + \frac{d}{1-db} (-\alpha \varepsilon_{1,i}) \quad (1.23)$$

With equations (1.22) and (1.23) at hand we can easily compute the corresponding output gaps:

$$y_i = \frac{1}{1-bd}(1-\alpha)\varepsilon_{i,1} \quad (1.24)$$

$$y_{-i} = \frac{-\alpha}{1-bd}\varepsilon_{i,1} \quad (1.25)$$


This set of equations depicts that if country i is hit by an uncorrelated shock and the ECB only cares on averages, then national outcomes may greatly diverge. Additionally compared to a scenario where the law of one price holds the degree of dispersion in output is amplified by a factor of $(1/1-bd)$ as a consequence of diverging monetary conditions across countries. Hence the previous two sections underline that from the perspective of monetary policy a higher degree of integration in product markets is favourable as the central bank can influence more directly the real interest rate in each country.

In a scenario without fiscal policy it essentially depends on the size of the individual member state whether idiosyncratic shocks will be stabilizing or destabilizing. According to the Taylor Principle uncorrelated demand shocks will be destabilizing if real interest rates $(i - \pi_i)$ will not be raised. This will only be the case if (see (1.20)).

$$\alpha - bd < 0 \Rightarrow \alpha < bd \quad (1.26)$$

Given our baseline calibration ($b=0,4$ and $d=0,34$) equation (1.26) indicates that idiosyncratic shocks will be destabilizing if the GDP share of the individual country under consideration is smaller than approximately 14%. An intuition for this result is easy to find. As the ECB is the only macroeconomic agent that stabilizes shocks, it only reacts to euro wide averages. The smaller the individual country in size the smaller the impact of an idiosyncratic shock on the currency area and hence the smaller the reaction of the ECB to this idiosyncratic shock. This underlines that by far most countries in EMU need fiscal policy as an independent institution in order to deal with asymmetric shocks (see Table 5). Some further intuition to these results can be given by taking a look at Figure 3 and Figure 4.

Figure 3: Idiosyncratic demand shock in country i: $\varepsilon_{1,i} = 3$




* Note that the figure maps the situation in which the monetary union consists of three countries of equal size. For the sake of illustration we have used concrete numerical values. As baseline calibration we have set $b=0.4$ and $d=0.34$.

Figure 3 depicts a scenario where country i is hit by a demand shock of size $\varepsilon_{1,i} = 3$. This translates into a shift of the aggregate demand curve from $y_0^d(i)$ to $y_1^d(i)$. In response to the boom in economic activity the ECB raises real interest rates from i_0 to i_1 inducing a change in economic activity that exactly compensates the impact of the initial demand shock on the euro wide economic activity. Hence we arrive at the result that demand shocks can be totally stabilized for the currency are on average. Nevertheless this goes hand in hand with a dispersion at the national level. The increase in nominal rates leads to a decreased economic activity in the rest of the union. As the inflation rate is a shift parameter in the $(i;y)$ -space the aggregate demand curve is shifted inwards in the rest of the union. In country i the boom in economic activity leads to an additional outward shift in aggregate demand. As we already indicated the size of shifts critically depends on the GDP share of country i .

Figure 4 depicts a currency area where country i is hit by a supply shock of size $\varepsilon_{2,i} = 3$. This translates into a shift of the aggregate inflation rate by a factor of $\varepsilon_2 = (1/n)\varepsilon_{2,i}$. Depending on preferences the ECB chooses its preferred stabilization mix on the aggregate level by setting nominal rates in line with its preferences. This increase in euro wide nominal rates partially stabilizes the inflation rate in country i . The rest of the union suffers from a deflationary environment. Figure 4 impressively underlines that national real interest rates –if existent- can drive a massive wedge between national outcomes and call for stringent rules that prevent unsustainable policies in individual member states which inflict negative spill over effects for the rest of the union. Additionally the figures display that we need fiscal

policy as an additional macroeconomic agent in order to squeeze idiosyncratic shocks. The impact of the negative spill-over effect depends again on the GDP share of country i.

Figure 4: Idiosyncratic Supply Shock in Country i: $\varepsilon_{2,i} = 3$



* Note that the figure maps the situation in which the monetary union consists of three countries of equal size. For the sake of illustration we have used concrete numerical values. As baseline calibration we have set $b=0.4$ and $d=0.34$.

Table 2 summarizes the reaction of the variables under consideration to positive shocks.

Table 2: Net reaction of the variable to a positive shock

	$\varepsilon_1^* > 0$	$\varepsilon_{i,1} > 0$	$\varepsilon_2 > 0$	$\varepsilon_{2,i} \geq 0$
Output gap (y_i)	↓*	↑*	↓*	↑
Inflation Rate (π_i)	↓*	↑*	↑	↑*
Interest Rate (i)	↑	/	↑	/
Aggregate Output (y)	/	↑*	↓	/
Aggregate Inflation (π)	/	↓*	↑	/

*Note that we implicitly assume that idiosyncratic demand and supply shocks are uncorrelated.

3 MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY INTERACTION

In the previous section we modelled a monetary union when monetary policy is the only macro economic agent that actively stabilizes shocks. We basically saw for two possible specifications of a Phillips curve that life in a monetary union is easier if shocks are correlated and product markets are integrated. In this section we introduce a fiscal authority in each member state that is guided by a loss function and which has g , the fiscal stance parameter as

its only instrument. The stance of fiscal policy is defined as expenditures minus revenues. Hence if $g > 0$ the fiscal stance is expansionary if $g < 0$ the fiscal stance is contractionary.

3.1 THE LOSS FUNCTION OF FISCAL AUTHORITIES

We assume that national fiscal authorities are guided by a loss function.

$$L_{G,i} = y_i^2 + \varphi g_i^2 \quad (1.27)$$

Each government is interested in stabilizing output around its potential. The second term in the loss function captures the notion that governments behaviour might be motivated for instance by the treaty of Maastricht that penalizes excessive (downward) movements in the fiscal stance parameter g . Additionally if g would be permanently larger than null the solution would exhibit some unpleasant debt arithmetic's as the fiscal balance exhibits a structural deficit⁴. φ scales the costs of using the fiscal policy instrument.

As a specific characteristic of a monetary union the common central bank targets at union wide aggregates whereas the individual governments focus on national aggregates. This setup nests possible conflicts as the ECB can only on average meet its targets which is likely to go hand in hand, depending on the correlation of country specific shocks, with a great dispersion in the individual target variables under consideration in each member state. The question we will answer now is to what extend fiscal policy can prevent national outcomes from diverging across the currency area⁵. Hence we will look to what extend national fiscal policies can mitigate asymmetric shocks.

3.2 THE LAW OF ONE PRICE HOLDS

Let us assume that the law of one price holds. Then the Phillips curve for all countries is given by:

$$\pi = \pi_0 + dy + \varepsilon_2 \quad (1.28)$$

³ Note that we implicitly assume that both macroeconomic agents have an identical output target. For diverging targets see (Dixit and Lambertini 2001).

⁴ For a paper that focuses more strongly on the political interaction between the national governments and a common central bank see (Demertzis 1999).

Hence the commodity bundles produced in each country are perfect substitutes with a common inflation rate π . The currency union has only one common real interest rate $r = i - \pi$. Additionally the union is hit only by a common supply shock. The second building bloc of the model is the IS-equation:

$$y_i = a - b(i - \pi) + \kappa g_i + \varepsilon_{i,1} \quad (1.29)$$

Aggregate demand now also depends on the fiscal stance parameter. We assume that $g = g^{\text{opt}}$. Hence g is set in order to minimize the loss function of fiscal policy.

Given the structure of the economy the ECB solves the following optimisation problem:

$$L_{CB} = (\pi - \pi_0)^2 + \lambda y^2 \quad (1.30)$$

s.t.

$$y = a - b(i - \pi) + \kappa g + \varepsilon_1 \quad (1.31)$$

$$\pi = \pi_0 + dy + \varepsilon_2 \quad (1.32)$$

Depending on the structural parameters of the economy and its preferences the ECB chooses the following stabilizattion mix:

$$\pi = \pi_0 + \frac{\lambda}{d^2 + \lambda} \varepsilon_2 \quad (1.33)$$

$$y = -\frac{d}{d^2 + \lambda} \varepsilon_2 \quad (1.34)$$

Equations (1.33) and (1.34) underline that the ECB is the dominating actor of the game as it can push its preferred bliss point through. In other words it can always completely offset the effects of fiscal policy on average. The inflation and output gap are identical to those we already know for the scenario without fiscal policies. The reaction function of the central bank is given by:

⁵ For a focus on automatic stabilizers see (Gali and Perotti 2003)

$$i = \frac{a}{b} + \pi_0 + \frac{1}{b} \varepsilon_1 + \frac{b\lambda + d}{b(d^2 + \lambda)} \varepsilon_2 + \frac{\kappa}{b} g \quad (1.35)$$

The reaction function specifies the optimal nominal interest rate if governments of the individual member states play $\left(\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n g_i = g\right)$ on average. It depicts the optimal response of the central bank to the average current stance of fiscal policy across the currency area. Equation (1.35) is characterised by the following features: In the absence of macroeconomic shocks $\varepsilon_1 = \varepsilon_2 = 0$ the ECB will set interest rates equal to their long run equilibrium value $i = (a/b) + \pi_0$ which corresponds to a union wide output gap of null and an inflation rate that is equal to the inflation target. The global response to demand shocks in a union compared to a scenario of a closed economy is on average unaltered and given by: $\Delta i = (1/b) \varepsilon_1$. Again the response to supply shocks depends on preferences.

Fiscal authorities in each member state solve the following optimisation problem⁶:

$$L_{G,i} = y_i^2 + \varphi g_i^2 \quad (1.36)$$

s.t.:

$$\text{s.t.: } y_i = a - b(i - \pi) + \kappa g_i + \varepsilon_{i,1} \quad (1.37)$$

Solving this optimisation problem we arrive at the following relationship depicting the way according to which fiscal policy is conducted:

$$g_i = \frac{-a\kappa}{\kappa^2 + \varphi} + \frac{b\kappa}{\kappa^2 + \varphi} (i - \pi) - \frac{\kappa}{\kappa^2 + \varphi} \varepsilon_{i,1} \quad (1.38)$$

It depicts the optimal reaction of the government to the current stance of monetary policy. The equation is characterised by the following features: The partial derivative of g with respect to r is $(\partial g / \partial r) = (\kappa b / (\kappa^2 + \varphi)) > 0$. Hence if monetary policy gets more restrictive the government will switch to a more expansionary stance. The higher the weight on stabilizing its instrument (φ), the lower will be the strategic interaction between the two

⁶ Note that we do not intend to model alliances between individual member states (see (Aarle et al. 2002)).

⁷ For an analysis that includes the real exchange rate in the strategic analysis between the central bank and the government see (Leitemo 2003).

macroeconomic agents. Given its objective function fiscal policy only reacts to demand shocks. Following e.g. a negative demand shock ε_1 fiscal policy will become more expansionary. Note that in contrast to monetary policy the government does not face a lower bound. Hence g can become negative ($g < 0$). The strategic interaction between fiscal and monetary authorities results from the fact that the ECB responds to union-wide averages:

$$\varepsilon_1 = \alpha \varepsilon_{i,1} + (1 - \alpha) \varepsilon_{-i,1} \quad (1.39)$$

Hence if only country i is hit by a demand shock, this triggers a feedback mechanism as all member countries have to share the adjustment burden of higher interest rates. The extend of the strategic feedback depends on the GDP share α of country i . Nevertheless to simplify the exposition we will assume symmetry in the following.

Given the reaction function of n fiscal authorities and the ECB we can easily compute the reduced form solution as we have $n+1$ unknowns ($g_1; \dots; g_n; i$) and $n+1$ reaction functions. Inserting (1.33) in (1.38), averaging and plugging the resulting expression into (1.35) we get the following reduced form equation for the interest rate:

$$i = \pi_0 + \frac{a}{b} + \frac{1}{b} \varepsilon_1 + \frac{b\lambda\varphi + d(\kappa^2 + \varphi)}{b(d^2 + \lambda)\varphi} \varepsilon_2 \quad (1.40)$$

In the absence of macroeconomic shocks ($\varepsilon_1 = \varepsilon_2 = 0$) the ECB will set interest rates equal to their long run equilibrium value $i = (a/b) + \pi_0$ which corresponds to a union wide output gap of null and an inflation rate that is equal to the inflation target. The global response to monetary shocks in a union compared to a scenario of a closed economy is on average unaltered and given by: $\Delta i = (1/b)\varepsilon_1$.

The reduced form for the fiscal stance parameter can be computed by inserting the inflation rate and the interest rate into the reaction function of the central bank.

$$g_i = \frac{\kappa}{\kappa^2 + \varphi} (\varepsilon_1 - \varepsilon_{1,i}) + \frac{\kappa d}{\varphi(d^2 + \lambda)} \varepsilon_2 \quad (1.41)$$

Equation (1.41) displays the difference between a closed and open economy setup of a static version of a New Keynesian macromodel. First we see that fiscal authorities have a stabilization task in response to demand shocks as long as these exhibit a degree of asymmetry.

Most importantly as individual shocks are assumed to be iid there is some positive probability $\left(\frac{\kappa^2 + \varphi}{\kappa} \int_{-\infty}^{-0.03} f(\varepsilon_i) d\varepsilon_i \right)$ that the 3% deficit criterion cannot be met. In other words if the size of the shocks is large (1.41) clearly demonstrates that even under an optimal and sustainable fiscal stance (defined as $g=0$ in the absence of shocks) the Maastricht deficit criterion is likely to be violated with some positive probability. Nevertheless as long as the violation stems from the size of exogenous shocks and not from a fiscal policy that is conducted in an unsustainable fashion ($g>0$), (see (Bofinger and Mayer 2003)) the violation of the Maastricht criterion is a necessary precondition to restore the overall optimal outcome. Exactly for that reason the 3% deficit criterion can be suspended if a country is hit by a large shock. The same holds of course true for large demand and supply shocks.

Inserting (1.40) and (1.41) into the aggregate demand equation we arrive at the following expression for the country specific output gap:

$$y_i = -\frac{d}{d^2 + \lambda} \varepsilon_2 + \frac{\varphi}{\kappa^2 + \varphi} (\varepsilon_{i,1} - \varepsilon_1) \quad (1.42)$$

Note given standard parameterisation ($\kappa = \varphi = 0,5$) uncorrelated demand shocks are likely to have a smaller impact on the overall economic activity compared to a scenario where fiscal policy remains passive. So indeed we can state that a Keynesian stabilization policy is able to dampen economic cycles compared to a policy that sets $g=0$ ⁸. Nevertheless the stabilization of shocks will not be perfect. The argument goes as follows. Assume that only one country is hit by a negative demand shock. Obviously, given the Nash equilibrium, monetary conditions measures in real terms ($i - \pi$) will be too tight for that country, too weak to restore an output in line with potential ($y_i < 0$). In contrast the monetary conditions for the rest of the union will be too loose giving a boost to economic activity ($y_{-i} > 0$). At first glance this result might seem at odds with intuition. One might ask why fiscal authorities do not use their instrument more rigorously in response to demand shocks in the equilibrium.


⁸ For a critical view that stresses that fiscal shocks itself might be a source of dispersion in output see for instance (Canova and Pappa 2003).

The key to this answer lies in the strategic interaction between the agents. A more expansionary fiscal policy triggers higher interest rates for the currency area so that the marginal costs of an expansionary fiscal policy outweigh the marginal benefits.

The degree of conflict potential can be summarized by the correlation between the idiosyncratic demand shocks versus the eurowide average $corr(\varepsilon_i; \varepsilon_{-i})$. Equation (1.42) depicts that in a union where demand shocks are perfectly correlated $corr(\varepsilon_i; \varepsilon_{-i})=1$ the output gaps of individual member states y_i are identical at each point in time. Obviously a maximum dispersion in output will be given if $corr(\varepsilon_i; \varepsilon_{-i}) = -1$. Then the individual output gaps y_i would exhibit a maximum dispersion which could potentially undermine the existence of the union in the long run as at each point in time country i finds it beneficial-evaluated in terms of $L_{G,i}$ - to leave the union as it requires significantly different monetary conditions. Therefore our simple static analysis clearly makes the prediction that if the law of one price holds life within a monetary union is easier if: Demand shocks are highly correlated and fiscal policy actively engages into stabilizing shocks. Additionally the exposition provided a rationale for the suspension of the 3% deficit criterion in the vague of large shocks as a necessary condition for fiscal policy to be conducted optimally.

It is important to note that if we set $\varphi = 0$ shocks can be completely stabilized. In other words if fiscal policy does not put any weight on smoothing its instrument it is possible to completely offset uncorrelated demand shocks. Nevertheless the smoothing objective is a common theme in literature.

Figure 5: Idiosyncratic Demand Shock in Country i: $\varepsilon_{i,1} = 3$



* Note that the figure maps the situation in which the monetary union consists of three countries of equal size. For the sake of illustration we have used concrete numerical values. As baseline calibration we have set $b=0.4$ and $d=0.34$.

We can present the same results with the help of a graphical analysis. Let us assume that country i is hit by an uncorrelated demand shock. The shock shifts the aggregate demand curve from $y_0^d(i)$ to $y_1^d(i)$. As a result the aggregate European demand curve shifts from $y_0^d(i)$ to $y_1^d(i)$. As the ECB can stabilize shocks on average, it will raise real interest rates from i_0 to i_1 which brings output back to its potential and the inflation rate to the inflation target. The new nominal rate depresses economic activity in the rest of the union so that fiscal policy becomes expansionary which leads to an outward shift of the aggregate demand curve. In country i the increase in nominal rates is too small so that fiscal policy will become contractionary leading to an inward shift of the $y_0^d(i)$ curve.

Table 3 summarizes the net reaction of the variables to a positive shock respectively.

Table 3: Net Reaction of the variable in response to a positive shock

	$\varepsilon_1 > 0$	$\varepsilon_i > 0$	ε_2
Fiscal stance (g)	↑	↓	↑
Output gap (y)	↓	↑	
Inflation rate (π)	/	/	↑
Interest rate (i)	↑	↑	↑

3.3 IDIOSYNCRATIC PHILLIPS CURVES

In this section we analyse the strategic interaction between fiscal and monetary authorities in a union if the law of one price does not hold. We will again focus on uncorrelated idiosyncratic demand and supply shocks. As already shown in section (2.2) the existence of country specific real interest rates drives a further wedge between macroeconomic outcomes compared to a scenario where the law of one price holds. Nevertheless fiscal policy has stabilizing effects on the performance of member countries.

Like in section (2.2) the Phillips curve can be specified as:

$$\pi_i = \pi_0 + dy_i + \varepsilon_{i,2} \quad (1.43)$$

This means in particular that each country only produces non-tradable commodities. Note that this assumption does not mean that the country specific inflation rates can diverge arbitrarily over time, as we take non autocorrelated shocks to be the workhorse throughout our exposition. The inflation rate in country i is driven by the country specific output gap (y_i)

and the idiosyncratic supply shock $\varepsilon_{i,2}$, e.g. non-sustainable wage policies. With equation (1.43) we effectively reintroduce country specific real interest rates.

The government in the individual member state (i) has to solve the following optimisation problem.

$$L_{G,i} = y_i^2 + \varphi g_i^2 \quad (1.44)$$

s.t.

$$y_i = a - b(i - \pi_i) + \kappa g_i + \varepsilon_{i,1} \quad (1.45)$$

The reaction function of fiscal policy can then be stated as follows:

$$g_1 = -\frac{\kappa a}{\kappa^2 + \varphi} + \frac{\kappa b}{\kappa^2 + \varphi} (i - \pi_i) - \frac{\kappa}{\kappa^2 + \varphi} \varepsilon_1 \quad (1.46)$$

In order to solve the game we impose symmetry, hence we assume that not only the coefficients in the country specific Phillips curves and the IS curves are identical but that additionally the countries are of equal size. Consequently averaging over the fiscal stance parameter results in:

$$\bar{g} = \frac{1}{n} [g_1 + g_2 + \dots + g_n] = g = -\frac{\kappa (a + b(i - \pi) + \varepsilon_1)}{\kappa^2 + \varphi} \quad (1.47)$$

Inserting (1.47) into (1.48) and solving for the interest rate yields:

$$i = \frac{a}{b} + \pi_0 + \frac{1}{b} \varepsilon_1 + \frac{b\lambda + d}{b(d^2 + \lambda)} \varepsilon_2 + \frac{\kappa}{b} g \quad (1.48)$$

Most notably equation (1.49) is identical to the reduced form we already saw under scenario 1. This cannot come as a surprise as the averages of the variables under consideration (output gap, fiscal stance parameter,...) from the perspective of the ECB are identical under both scenarios. Hence from the viewpoint of monetary policy it does not matter whether the supply side of the economy is characterized by only one or many Phillips curves as long as the ECB only cares on shocks and is indifferent between mean preserving spreads.

$$i = \frac{a}{b} + \pi_0 + \frac{1}{b}\varepsilon_1 + \frac{b\lambda\varphi + d(\kappa^2 + \varphi)}{b(d^2 + \lambda)\varphi}\varepsilon_2 \quad (1.49)$$

The fiscal stance parameter is given by:

$$g_i = q_1(\varepsilon_1 - \varepsilon_{1,i}) + q_2\varepsilon_{i,2} + q_3\varepsilon_2 \quad (1.50)$$

where:

$$q_1 = \frac{\kappa}{\kappa^2 + (1 - bd)\varphi} < 0$$

$$q_2 = -\frac{\kappa b}{\kappa^2 + (1 - bd)\varphi} < 0$$

$$q_3 = \frac{\kappa(b\lambda\varphi + d(\kappa^2 + \varphi))}{(d^2 + \lambda)\varphi(\kappa^2 + (1 - db)\varphi)} > 0$$

Fiscal policy exhibits a higher level of activity compared to a scenario where the law of one price holds as q_1 is larger than the corresponding coefficient in equation (1.41). This shows that fiscal policy needs to become more countercyclical as country specific real rates ($i - \pi_i$) amplify shocks that hit the individual economies. A negative demand shock originating in the own country leads to a fiscal expansion as a negative output shock in the other member states leads to a contraction in the own fiscal stance parameter which nicely depicts that the ECB will relax monetary conditions which would give a boost to output in country j if fiscal policy would not contract. This result clearly shows the macroeconomic assignment which is nested in the Nash equilibrium. Demand shocks are mainly stabilized by the ECB and not- as one might expect- by the individual member states. As expected a foreign inflation shock leads to a more expansionary fiscal stance since the government is only concerned about output and not about inflation. Therefore as a response to tighter monetary conditions for the whole area the fiscal stance becomes more expansionary. These results are qualitatively identical to those we already saw in section 3.2.

The output gap equation is given by:

$$y_i = q_5 (\varepsilon_{i,1} - \varepsilon_1) + q_6 \varepsilon_2 + q_7 \varepsilon_{i,2} \quad (1.51)$$

where:

$$q_5 = \frac{\varphi}{(\kappa^2 + (1 - bd)\varphi)} > 0$$

$$q_6 = -\frac{b\lambda\varphi + d(\kappa^2 + \varphi)}{(d^2 + \lambda)(\kappa^2 + (1 - bd)\varphi)} < 0$$

$$q_7 = \frac{b\varphi}{(\kappa^2 + (1 - bd)\varphi)} > 0$$

Note in particular given our standard calibration ($\kappa = \varphi = 0,5; d = 0,34, b = 0,4$) the stabilization of idiosyncratic demand shocks is only partial compared to a scenario where the law of one price holds. This underlines again that diverging real interest rates ($i - \pi_i$) amplify shocks. Accordingly by the very definition of a (stable) Nash equilibrium fiscal policy has no incentive to deviate from the final outcome of the game as otherwise monetary policy would have an incentive to raise real interest rates. Again we come to the result that a country specific supply shock, e.g. wage demands that are not consistent with the inflation target of the ECB ($\Delta w > \pi_0$) lead to an increase in domestic inflation and to a drop in national real interest rates. Thus the ECB cannot punish individual member states which calls for a wage policy that is consistent with the inflation target of the ECB. For a foreign and an aggregate supply shock we come to the same conclusions as in section 2.2. But again the analysis shows that fiscal policy as an independent agent is able to stabilize the impact of supply shocks. So indeed as in the case of demand shocks equation (1.47) clearly demonstrates the advantageous of a Keynesian stabilization policy as the impact of supply and demand shocks on the macroeconomic goal variables is significantly reduced. To complete the reduced form description of the economy we compute the inflation rate. The reduced form expression for the inflation rate is characterised by the following expression:

$$\pi_i = \pi_0 + q_8 (\varepsilon_{i,1} - \varepsilon_1) + q_9 \varepsilon_2 + q_{10} \varepsilon_{i,2} \quad (1.52)$$

⁹ Note if we set $\varepsilon_{i,1} = \varepsilon_1$ and $\varepsilon_{i,2} = \varepsilon_2$, hence if the currency area is hit by symmetric shocks then equation (1.51) simplifies to (1.34).

where:

$$q_8 = \frac{d\varphi}{(\kappa^2 + (1-bd)\varphi)} > 0$$

$$q_9 = -\frac{d(b\lambda\varphi + d(\kappa^2 + \varphi))}{(d^2 + \lambda)(\kappa^2 + (1-bd)\varphi)} < 0$$

$$q_{10} = \frac{(\kappa^2 + \varphi)}{(\kappa^2 + (1-bd)\varphi)} > 0$$


The reduced form inflation rate is characterized by the following features: In the absence of macroeconomic shocks that hit the euro area the individual inflation rate will be equal to the inflation target. Demand shocks will only have an impact on the idiosyncratic inflation rate to the extent that they are uncorrelated. Compared to a scenario where only monetary policy takes care of shocks the introduction of a Keynesian stabilization policy $g = g^{opt}$ reduces the impact of demand shocks on the inflation rate and the output gap. The same dramatic decrease (given our standard calibration) can be recorded following idiosyncratic supply shocks.

Let us illustrate the results of this section. Country i is hit by a positive demand shock of size $\varepsilon_{i,1} = 3$ which gives a massive boost to economic activity in that country given unchanged monetary conditions (π serves as a shift parameter) (see Figure 6). The aggregate demand curve in country i is shifted from $y_0^d(i)$ to $y_1^d(i)$. Nevertheless the idiosyncratic shock in country i translates into an average euro-wide shock of size $(1/n)\varepsilon_1$. This calls the ECB upon to act. As we already saw, in the case of demand shocks, the ECB can always maintain its bliss point. Accordingly it will tighten monetary conditions and raise real interest rates from i_0 to i_1 which induces a change in economic activity for the whole currency area that exactly compensates the initial demand shock. As output on average will be back to potential for the currency area, the inflation rate will equally return to the inflation target. Nevertheless the policy stance in country i will be too loose. On contrary for the rest of the

¹⁰ Note if we set $\varepsilon_{i,1} = \varepsilon_1$ and $\varepsilon_{i,2} = \varepsilon_2$, hence if the currency area is hit by symmetric shocks then equation (1.52) simplifies to (1.33).

union monetary conditions will be too tight resulting in a somewhat depressed economic activity. Accordingly the inflation rate in the country that was hit by the initial demand shock will be above the inflation target of the ECB whereas inflation in the rest of the union will be below the ECB's inflation target. But remember for the union as a whole inflation will be back to target. This result nicely depicts that the common central bank is indifferent when it comes to mean preserving macroeconomic outcomes. Given this global picture we still need to look at the behaviour of the individual member states in equilibrium. Obviously the government in country *i* initiates a fiscal contraction as output is above its potential shifting the aggregate demand curve inward. In the rest of the union the governments relax the fiscal stance in order to stabilize economic activity shifting the aggregate demand curve outward. The degree of strategic interaction critically depends on the size of country *i*. Compared to a scenario where monetary policy is the only stabilizing actor fiscal authorities succeed in partially stabilizing the output as depicted in Table 12. Given this battery of shifts and back shifts we arrive at a final policy outcome in response to the idiosyncratic demand shock that is described by the following features. In country *i* output will be above potential and the inflation rate will be higher than the inflation target. In the rest of the union the economic environment is characterized by the opposite picture: output will be below potential and inflation will be below its target level. As in the case of a closed economy the shock will be stabilized on average.

Figure 6: Idiosyncratic Demand: Shock in Country *i*: $\varepsilon_{i,1} = 3$ ¹¹




* Note that the figure maps the situation in which the monetary union consists of three countries of equal size. For the sake of illustration we have used concrete numerical values. As baseline calibration we have set $b=0.4$ and $d=0.34$.

¹¹ For an analysis within the classical AS/AD framework see (Hagen and Mundschenk 2002).

Figure 7 and Figure 8 depict what happens if country i is hit by an idiosyncratic supply shock. Assume that country i is hit by a supply shock of size $\varepsilon_{i,2} = 3$. As in the case of a closed economy the ECB determines the overall outcome of the game depending on preferences λ by setting the nominal interest rate accordingly. Equations (1.33) and (1.34) depict the union wide outcomes that will prevail given an aggregate supply shock of size $(1/n)\varepsilon_{i,2} = \varepsilon_{i,2}$. For λ equal to 0.5 we can see that the inflation rate will increase to 2,81% and the output gap will drop to a level of -0.55% . Now the interesting question is how this global outcome translates into national macroeconomic performances. Obviously the rest of the union will suffer from a recession as it will face higher real interest rates which translates into a negative output gap. Therefore we will move along the Phillips curve to a point that is characterized by a lower output and a lower inflation rate. In the rest of the union the fiscal stance is expansionary to (partially) unwind the effects of the contractionary monetary stance. For country i itself the massive increase in inflation by 3% leads to almost unchanged real rates so that fiscal policy is somewhat contractionary to prevent real interest rates from decreasing. Figure 7 nicely maps the ‘dynamics’ captured in a static version of a New Keynesian macromodel: Supply shocks are only contractionary in sum to the extent that monetary policy reacts to them. As the massive inflationary shock only translates by $(1/n)$ on the aggregate the reaction of the ECB for that individual country will be far too weak to contract economic activity. Within a monetary union labour unions can potentially hide behind the $(1/n)$ -effect as the ECB cannot ‘punish’ a particular country for a wage policy that is not in line with its inflation target.


Figure 7: Idiosyncratic Supply Shocks in Country i : $\varepsilon_{i,1} = 3$



* Note that the figure maps the situation in which the monetary union consists of three countries of equal size. For the sake of illustration we have used concrete numerical values. As baseline calibration we have set $b=0.4$ and $d=0.34$.

Of course we can equally look at the effects of a supply shock by mapping the strategic interaction between the agents in the (i,y) -space. Given that the policy of the ECB is conducted optimally we have to take into account that the inflation rate as well as the fiscal stance parameter serves as a shift factor in the (i,y) -space. Given the initial supply shock in country i the aggregate demand curve will shift due to the increase in economic activity by: $b\Delta\pi$. This shift in economic activity is translated into a shift of the aggregate demand curve by a factor of $(1/n)b\Delta\pi$. Now the ECB steps in and chooses its preferred stabilization mix taking the reaction of fiscal authorities appropriately into account. Given the ECB's preferences it will raise nominal interest rates and induce a stabilization recession in order to minimize its loss function. This move by the ECB triggers an expansionary fiscal stance in the rest of the monetary union and a somewhat contractionary stance in country i . The overall policy outcome is depicted in Figure 8.

Figure 8: Idiosyncratic Supply Shocks in Country i : $\varepsilon_{i,1} = 3$



* Note that the figure maps the situation in which the monetary union consists of three countries of equal size. For the sake of illustration we have used concrete numerical values. As baseline calibration we have set $b=0.4$ and $d=0.34$.

Finally to demonstrate the advantageous of a Keynesian stabilization policy we can compute real monetary conditions for individual member states in the vague of asymmetric demand shocks. Making use of the reduced form the real interest rate for country i that was hit by the shock can be written as:

$$(i - \pi_i) = \frac{a}{b} + \frac{\kappa^2 + (\alpha - bd)\phi\varepsilon_{i,1}}{b(\kappa^2 + (1 - db)\phi)} \quad (1.53)$$

With the help of equation (1.53) we can see that shocks will not be destabilizing unless:

$$\alpha \leq \frac{\varphi bd - \kappa^2}{\varphi} \quad (1.54)$$

Given our standard parameterisation this scenario can be virtually ruled out. Accordingly the analysis clearly demonstrates the advantageous of a Keynesian stabilisation policy that dramatically reduces the risk that shocks will be amplified.

Table 4 shows the reaction of all variables under consideration to a positive shock.

Table 4: Net Change in the Variable in Response to a Positive Shock

	$\varepsilon_1 > 0$	$\varepsilon_{i,1} > 0$	$\varepsilon_2 > 0$	$\varepsilon_{i,2} > 0$
Fiscal stance (g)	↑	↓	↓	↓
Output gap (y)	↓	↑	↓	↑
Inflation rate (π)	↑	↓	↑	↑
Interest rate (i)	↓	↑	↑	↑

4 CONCLUSIONS

In this paper we applied a static version of a New Keynesian macromodel a la (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 1999) to a currency union. We focussed in particular on the impact of asymmetric shocks and the integration of product markets and its implication for the well functioning of a currency union. Our results are very easy to state: Life within a monetary union is much easier if shocks are highly correlated and product markets are integrated. Under such a scenario shocks that hit the area are unlikely to be amplified across individual member states as the ECB can within an inflation targeting regime easily deal with global shocks. Additionally we find that in particular small countries are in a vulnerable position as the ECB almost neglects their idiosyncratic situations unless shocks are correlated. This is of course a strong argument for a Keynesian stabilization policy that actively fights shocks to stabilize economic activity. We showed that by this very argument one can provide a strong rationale for the suspension of the 3% deficit criterion in the vague of asymmetric demand and supply shocks that hit individual countries as a necessary precondition to restore optimal outcomes.

Our analysis showed that in order to avoid negative spill over effects stringent rules are necessary in order to prevent national governments as well as national labour unions to conduct a beggar-my-neighbour policy. Therefore the grandfathers of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) were right to implement rules that endorse a sustainable fiscal stance in each member state.

Appendix:

A1: PHILLIPS CURVE WITH TRADABLE AND NON-TRADABLE SECTOR

Let us now discuss a third scenario which nests the two previously derived solutions as corner cases. We assume that each country has a tradable and a non-tradable sector. Therefore the consumer price inflation is given by a weighted average of the two product bundles:

$$\pi_i^{CPI} = \alpha\pi^T + (1-\alpha)\pi_i^{NT} \quad (1.55)$$

In each sector- tradables and nontradables- the inflation rate is determined by the difference between increases in nominal wages minus productivity:

$$\pi_i = w_i - prod_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (1.56)$$

It is generally assumed that the productivity growth q_i in those sectors that face international competition is larger than in those sectors that only produce for domestic markets, hence $q_i > v_i$. To simplify the exposition we assume that in each sector wages are negotiated separately. Very much in line with a static version of Fuhrer and Moore (1995) we assume that the nominal wage is determined as:

$$w_i^T - q_i = \pi_0 + dy \quad (1.57)$$

$$w_i^{NT} - v_i = \pi_0 + dy_i \quad (1.58)$$

Hence the union in each sector negotiates wages above productivity that are consistent with the inflation target of the ECB. Additionally workers wages depend on the state of the cycle. It seems plausible to assume that wage changes depend on overall activity as the sector specific characteristics are already taken into account by q_i and v_i . Wage changes that face international competition are assumed to depend on the overall cycle in the union whereas wage demands for non-tradables are orientated on domestic markets.

$$\pi^T = \pi_0 + dy + \varepsilon_2^T \quad (1.59)$$

$$\pi_i^{NT} = \pi_0 + dy_i + \varepsilon_{i,2}^{NT} \quad (1.60)$$

Inserting leads to the following expression for the consumer inflation rate:

$$\pi_i^{CPI} = \pi_0 + \alpha dy + (1-\alpha) dy_i + \varepsilon_{i,2} \quad (1.61)$$

$$\text{with: } \varepsilon_{i,2} = \alpha \varepsilon_2^T + (1-\alpha) \varepsilon_{i,2}^{NT}$$

Note that this specification nests the two corner solutions discussed in section 3 and section 4. If the law of one price holds ($\alpha=1$), the Phillips curve is given by:

$$\pi_i^{CPI} = \pi_0 + dy + \varepsilon_2^T \quad (1.62)$$

If each country only produces a non-tradable commodity bundle ($\alpha=0$), the Phillips curve can be depicted as:

$$\pi_i^{CPI} = \pi_0 + dy_i + \varepsilon_{i,2}^{NT} \quad (1.63)$$

Now we turn to the specification of the aggregate demand side. The static version of the usual IS-equation can be specified as in the previous sections:

$$y_i = a - b(i - \pi_i^{CPI}) + \kappa g_i + \varepsilon_1 \quad (1.64)$$

In each member state the political party in power solves the following optimisation problem:

$$L_{G,i} = y_i^2 + \varphi g_i^2 \quad (1.65)$$

s.t.:

$$y_i = a - b(i - \pi_i^{CPI}) + \kappa g_i + \varepsilon_{1,i}$$

Solving gives the following reaction function:

$$g_i = -\frac{\kappa}{\kappa^2 + \varphi} \left(-a + b(i - \pi_i^{CPI}) - \varepsilon_{1,i} \right) \quad (1.66)$$

The union wide output gap is given by:

$$y = -\frac{d(\alpha\varepsilon^T - (\alpha-1)\varepsilon^{NT})}{d^2 + \lambda}$$

The union wide inflation rate is given by:

$$\pi = \pi_0 - \frac{d^2\alpha\varepsilon^T + (\alpha-1)\lambda\varepsilon^{NT}}{d^2 + \lambda} + \alpha\varepsilon^T \quad (1.67)$$

The reaction function of the interest rate is given by:

$$i = \pi_0 + \frac{a}{b} + \frac{\kappa}{b}g + \frac{(d - bd^2)\alpha + b\alpha(d^2 + \lambda)}{b(d^2 + \lambda)}\varepsilon_T + \frac{(1-\alpha)(d + b\lambda)}{b(d^2 + \lambda)}\varepsilon_{NT} + \frac{1}{b}\varepsilon_1 \quad (1.68)$$

which underlines that the interest rate setting behaviour is equal under the two scenarios previously considered. This result cannot come as a surprise as the ECB only reacts to euro-wide averages, which are identical under the two scenarios as the shocks are iid. This underlines that the behaviour of the ECB remains unaltered.

$$i = \pi_0 + \frac{a}{b} + \frac{d(\kappa^2 + \varphi - bd\varphi)\alpha + b\alpha(d^2 + \lambda)\varphi}{b(d^2 + \lambda)\varphi}\varepsilon_T + \frac{(1-\alpha)d\kappa^2 + (1-\alpha)d\varphi + (1-\alpha)b\lambda\varphi}{b(d^2 + \lambda)\varphi}\varepsilon_{NT} + \frac{1}{b}\varepsilon_1 \quad (1.69)$$

Applying the usual solving strategy we get the following reduced form equations:

$$\pi_i^{CPI} = \pi_0 + \frac{1}{(d^2 + \lambda)(\kappa^2 + (1 + bd(\alpha - 1))\varphi)} \left[\begin{array}{l} (-bd^3(\alpha - 1)\varphi + \lambda(\kappa^2 + \varphi))\alpha\varepsilon_T \\ -d(d^2 + \lambda)\varphi\varepsilon_1 + d(d^2 + \lambda)\varphi\varepsilon_1 \\ d^2\kappa^2\varepsilon_{NT} + d^2\varphi\varepsilon_{NT} + bd\lambda\varphi\varepsilon_{NT} - bd\alpha\lambda\varphi\varepsilon_{NT} \\ -d^2\kappa^2\varepsilon_{NTi} - \kappa^2\lambda\varepsilon_{NTi} - \kappa^2\lambda\varepsilon_{NTi} - d^2\varphi\varepsilon_{NTi} \\ -\lambda\varphi\varepsilon_{NTi} + bd\alpha(d^2 + \lambda)\varphi\varepsilon_T \end{array} \right] \quad (1.70)$$

Output gap:

$$y_i = \frac{1}{(d^2 + \lambda)(\kappa^2 + (1 + bd(\alpha - 1))\varphi)} \left[\begin{array}{l} (bd^2(\alpha - 2)\varphi - b\lambda\varphi + d(\kappa^2 + \varphi))\alpha\varepsilon_T \\ (d^2 + \lambda)\varphi(\varepsilon_{i,1} - \varepsilon_1) + (d\kappa^2 - d\alpha\kappa^2)\varepsilon_{NT} \\ +d\varphi\varepsilon_{NT} - d\alpha\varphi\varepsilon_{NT} + bd^2\alpha\varphi\varepsilon_{NT} - bd^2\alpha^2\varphi\varepsilon_{NT} \\ +b\lambda\varphi\varepsilon_{NT} - b\alpha\lambda\varphi\varepsilon_{NT} - bd^2\varphi\varepsilon_{NTi} + bd^2\alpha\varphi\varepsilon_{NTi} \\ -b\lambda\varphi\varepsilon_{NTi} - b\lambda\varphi\varepsilon_{NTi} + b\alpha(d^2 + \lambda)\varphi\varepsilon_T \end{array} \right]$$

Fiscal stance parameter, which nests the two corner solutions:

$$\mathcal{G}_i = \frac{1}{(d^2 + \lambda)\varphi(\kappa^2 + (1 + bd(\alpha - 1))\varphi)} \left[\begin{array}{l} \kappa((bd^2(\alpha - 2)\varphi - b\lambda\varphi + d(\kappa^2 + \varphi))\alpha\varepsilon_T) \\ -(d^2 + \lambda)\varphi\varepsilon_1 + (d^2 + \lambda)\varphi\varepsilon_3 + d\kappa^2\varepsilon_{NT} - d\alpha\kappa^2\varepsilon_{NT} \\ +d\varphi\varepsilon_{NT} - d\alpha\varphi\varepsilon_{NT} + bd^2\alpha\varphi\varepsilon_{NT} - bd^2\alpha^2\varphi\varepsilon_{NT} \\ +b\lambda\varphi\varepsilon_{NT} - b\alpha\lambda\varphi\varepsilon_{NT} + b\alpha(d^2 + \lambda)\varphi\varepsilon_T \end{array} \right] \quad (1.71)$$

A2: TABLES FOR FIGURES¹²

Table 5: GDP-Weights

Country	EU11
Belgium	3.3
Germany	29.9
Greece	2.6
Spain	10.9
France	20.5
Ireland	1.3
Italy	19.2
Luxembourg	0.3
Netherlands	5.4
Austria	3.2
Portugal	2.1
Finland	1.6

Data were taken from (ECB 2003)

Table 6: Monetary Policy: Many Prices: Demand Shock: $\varepsilon_{1,t} = 3$: Figure 2

	Country one	Country two	Country 3	Initial Levels
Interest Rate	7.5	7.5	7.5	5
Output Gap	2	-1	-1	0
Fiscal stance	/	/	/	0
Inflation Rate	2	2	2	2
Real Interest Rate	5.5	5.5	5.5	3

Table 7: Monetary Policy: Many Prices: Demand Shock: $\varepsilon_{1,t} = 3$: Figure 3

	Country one	Country two	Country 3	Initial Levels
Interest Rate	7.5	7.5	7.5	5
Output Gap	2.31	-1.16	-1.16	0
Fiscal stance	0	0	0	0
Inflation Rate	2.79	1.61	1.61	2
Real Interest Rate	4.71	5.89	5.89	3

¹² For the sake of illustration we have used concrete numerical values. As baseline calibration we have set $b=0.4$ $d=0.34$ and $\varphi = \kappa = 0.5$.

Table 8: Monetary Policy: Many Prices: Supply Shock: $\varepsilon_{2,i} = 3$: Figure 4

	Country one	Country two	Country 3	Initial Levels/Averages
Interest Rate	7.19	7.19	7.19	5
Output Gap	0.37	-1.02	-1.02	0
Fiscal stance	0	0	0	0
Inflation Rate	5.15	1.68	1.66	2
Real Interest Rate	2.07	5.53	5.53	3

Table 9: Fiscal Policy: Many Prices: Demand Shock: $\varepsilon_{1,i} = 3$: Figure 5

	Country one	Country two	Country 3	Initial Levels
Interest Rate	7.5	7.5	7.5	5
Output Gap	1.33	-0.66	-0.66	0
Fiscal stance	-1.33	0.66	0.66	0
Inflation Rate	2	2	2	2
Real Interest Rate	5.5	5.5	5.5	3

Table 10: Fiscal Policy: Many Prices: Demand Shock: $\varepsilon_{1,i} = 3$: Figure 6

	Country one	Country two	Country 3	Initial Levels
Interest Rate	7.5	7.5	7.5	5
Output Gap	1.46	-0.73	-0.73	0
Fiscal stance	-1.46	0.73	0.73	0
Inflation Rate	2.50	1.75	1.75	2
Real Interest Rate	5.00	5.75	5.75	3

Table 11: Fiscal Policy: Many Prices: Supply Shock: $\varepsilon_{2,i} = 3$: Figure 7/ Figure 8

	Country one	Country two	Country 3	Initial Levels
Interest Rate	7.88	7.88	7.88	5
Output Gap	0.03	-0.85	0.85	0
Fiscal stance	-0.46	0.42	0.42	0
Inflation Rate	5.01	1.71	1.71	2
Real Interest Rate	2.87	6.17	6.17	3

A3: TABLES FOR COMPARISON

Table 12: Comparison of Impact Coefficients in the Vague of Idiosyncratic Demand Shocks: $\varepsilon_{i,1}$

		Only Monetary Policy		Montary and Fiscal Policy	
		Law of one Price	Many Phillips Curves	Law of One Price	Many Phillips Curves
y_i	General	1 (1.10)	$\frac{1}{1-db}$ (1.18)	$\frac{\varphi}{\kappa^2 + \varphi}$ (1.42)	$\frac{\varphi}{\kappa^2 + (1-bd)\varphi}$ (1.51)
	Calibrated	1	1.16	0.67	0.73
g_i	General	/	/	$\frac{\kappa}{\kappa^2 + \varphi}$ (1.41)	$\frac{\kappa}{\kappa^2 + (1-bd)\varphi}$ (1.50)
	Calibrated	/	/	0.67	0.73
π_i	General	/	$\frac{d}{1-bd}$ (1.18)	/	$\frac{d\varphi}{\kappa^2 + (1-bd)\varphi}$ (1.52)
	Calibrated		0.40		0.25

Table 13: Comparison of Impact Coefficients in the Vague of Idiosyncratic Supply Shock: $\varepsilon_{i,2}$

		Only Monetary Policy		Monetary and Fiscal Policy	
		Law of one Price	Many Phillips Curves	Law of One Price	Many Phillips Curves
y_i	General	/	$\frac{b}{(1-bd)}$ (1.10)	/	$\frac{b\varphi}{(\kappa^2 + (1-bd)\varphi)}$ (1.51)
	Calibrated	/	0.4629	/	0.29
g_i	General	/	/	/	$-\frac{\kappa b}{\kappa^2 + (1-bd)\varphi}$ (1.50)
	Calibrated	/	/	/	-0.29
π_i	General	/	$\frac{1}{1-bd}$ (1.19)	/	$\frac{\kappa^2 + \varphi}{\kappa^2 + (1-bd)\varphi}$ (1.52)
	Calibrated		1.16		0.25

Table 14: Comparison of Impact Coefficients in the Vague of Global Supply Shocks: ε_2

		Only Monetary Policy		Monetary and Fiscal Policy	
		Law of one Price	Many Phillips Curves	Law of One Price	Many Phillips Curves
y_i	General	$-\frac{d}{d^2 + \lambda}$ (1.7)	$-\frac{d + b\lambda}{(1 - bd)(d^2 + \lambda)}$ (1.18)	$-\frac{d}{d^2 + \lambda}$ (1.34)	$-\frac{d}{d^2 + \lambda}$ (1.34)
	Calibrated	-0.55	-1.02	-0.55	-0.55
g_i	General	/	/	$\frac{\kappa d}{\varphi(d^2 + \lambda)}$ (1.41)	$\frac{\kappa d}{\varphi(d^2 + \lambda)}$ (1.50)
	Calibrated	/	/	0,55	0.55
π_i	General	$\frac{\lambda}{d^2 + \lambda}$ (1.8)	$\frac{\lambda}{d^2 + \lambda}$ (1.8)	$\frac{\lambda}{d^2 + \lambda}$ (1.33)	$\frac{\lambda}{d^2 + \lambda}$ (1.33)
	Calibrated	-0.81	-0.81	-0.81	-0.81

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