

Raff, Horst; Ryan, Michael; Stähler, Frank

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# Firm Productivity and the Foreign-Market Entry Decision

by Horst Raff, Michael Ryan and Frank Stähler

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Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel

Department of Economics

*Economics Working Paper*

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# Firm Productivity and the Foreign-Market Entry Decision<sup>1</sup>

Horst Raff<sup>2</sup>, Michael Ryan<sup>3</sup> and Frank Stähler<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Corresponding author, Department of Economics, University of Kiel, Wilhelm-Seelig-Platz 1, D-24098 Kiel, Germany, email: raff@econ-theory.uni-kiel.de

<sup>3</sup>Department of Economics, Western Michigan University, 1903 W. Michigan Ave., Kalamazoo, MI 49008, USA, email: michael.ryan@wmich.edu

<sup>4</sup>Department of Economics, University of Otago, P.O. Box 56, Dunedin, New Zealand, email: fstaehler@business.otago.ac.nz

## Abstract

We use Japanese firm-level data to examine how a firm's productivity affects its choice of foreign-market entry strategy. We study a sequence of decisions, starting with the choice between exporting and foreign direct investment (FDI). In the case of FDI, the firm faces two options: greenfield investment or merger and acquisition (M&A). If it selects greenfield investment, it has two ownership choices: whole ownership or a joint venture. Controlling for industry- and country-specific characteristics, we find that the more productive a firm is, the more likely it is to choose FDI rather than exporting, greenfield investment rather than M&A, and whole ownership rather than a joint venture. We also find that the assumed sequence of decisions fits the data better than alternative specifications.

**JEL-Classification:** F12, F15.

**Keywords:** Foreign direct investment, merger and acquisition, joint venture, greenfield investment, firm heterogeneity, productivity

# 1 Introduction

In this paper we use data on Japanese manufacturers for the period 1985 to 2000 to examine which strategies a firm will use to enter a foreign market. Will it export goods produced at home or will it produce goods in the foreign country? If it chooses to produce abroad, will it set up a new production facility or will it acquire an existing firm? If it establishes a new facility, how will it own it: will it choose whole ownership or create a joint venture where it shares ownership with a local firm? Our objective is to study (i) whether there exist systematic links between these strategic choices and observable firm characteristics, such as productivity, and (ii) whether these choices are interdependent. Our data set is uniquely suited for this task, since it allows us to distinguish between different foreign direct investment (FDI) and ownership modes, and also has enough detail on parent companies to enable us to study the impact of firm-specific determinants.

It is a commonplace nowadays that foreign direct investment (FDI) has replaced international trade as the main driving force behind the global integration of product markets. According to UNCTAD (2004), aggregate sales by foreign affiliates have exceeded world exports for more than two decades. The literature on this phenomenon has traditionally focused on country- and industry-level determinants of trade and FDI, such as factor endowments, market size and economies of scale (see Markusen, 2002, for a recent survey), while treating firms within an industry as homogeneous. However, empirical evidence shows that there also exists significant heterogeneity within industries regarding firms' participation in exporting and FDI. Recent studies therefore examine which firm characteristics drive FDI and exporting decisions. They indicate that only firms whose productivity exceeds a certain threshold level tend to become exporters and only the most productive firms within an industry engage in FDI.<sup>1</sup> Firm characteristics thus appear to play a significant role in exporting and foreign investment in addition to country-

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<sup>1</sup>See, e.g., Melitz (2003) and Helpman *et al.* (2004) for papers on firm heterogeneity. Girma *et al.* (2005) examine the effect of productivity on the FDI-versus-exporting decision of UK firms, Head and Ries (2003) do this for Japanese firms. A recent survey of the literature is provided by Greenaway and Kneller (2005).

and industry-specific factors.

The novelty of our paper is to examine in much more detail than has been done previously the different decisions involved in undertaking FDI, and in which of these decisions firm characteristics come into play. For instance, does productivity affect the choice between greenfield FDI and merger and acquisition (M&A)? Does it influence the choice between one of these FDI modes and exporting? Does productivity also determine the choice of ownership structure of an affiliate?

Our paper is motivated by two empirical observations. First, there is considerable variation in the way firms enter foreign markets that goes beyond the simple binary choice between FDI and exporting. Classifying FDI strategies by investment mode (greenfield investment versus M&A) and ownership mode (whole ownership of the subsidiary versus a joint venture), we find evidence that both investment modes as well as both ownership modes are empirically important. For example, in our data on Japanese manufacturers, greenfield investment into wholly owned subsidiaries accounts for 44.1% of investment projects, greenfield investment into joint ventures for 38.6%, and M&As for 17.3%.<sup>2</sup> These market-entry options are seen by the firms themselves and by the public as quite distinct strategies with very different implications, for instance, for market structure and competition (see UNCTAD, 2000, p. 161).

Second, a look at the raw data suggests that the choice of market-entry strategy may be correlated with firm productivity, size and other firm characteristics. In particular, we observe that the choice of market-entry strategy varies both across and *within* industries with respect to firms' total factor productivity (TFP) and total assets. An ANOVA test of differences in the mean TFP or mean size (measured by total assets) of the firms choosing different entry strategies reveals that there are significant differences. The firms

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<sup>2</sup>M&As are much more important if one looks not at a count of investment projects but at their value. In this, Japanese FDI follows a worldwide trend. Global cross-border M&As in value terms have replaced greenfield investment as the main mode of FDI over the past decade. In 1999, for instance, the value of cross-border M&As amounted to 80% of total world FDI flows (UNCTAD, 2000, p. xx). World cross-border M&A sales peaked at \$1.14 trillion in 2000 (UNCTAD, 2004, p. 411).

choosing greenfield investment, either in a wholly owned subsidiary or a joint venture, are on average more productive and also bigger than firms choosing M&A, whereas the latter are on average more productive than exporters (more on this in the section on descriptive statistics and in Table 3).

It would be premature, of course, to conclude from these simple correlations that there is indeed a systematic and statistically significant influence of firm productivity or size on the market entry mode. To see if such an influence truly exists, we have to carry out a proper regression analysis that addresses the following two issues. First, we have to control for other potential determinants of the market-entry mode, specifically industry- and country-level influences, as well as for the possibility that productivity may interact with these other determinants. Second, we have to account for the fact that the different market-entry choices may be interdependent. For instance, whether a firm will choose FDI over exporting may depend on how profitable it expects greenfield investment or M&A to be. Whether a firm would choose M&A and how much it would offer to pay a potential target firm should depend on how much it would expect to earn if it instead invested in a wholly owned greenfield project or formed a joint venture with a local firm. This suggests that one cannot just compare the different choices as if they were made simultaneously. Rather, one should investigate empirically whether these decisions are interdependent and, if they are, what the relevant structure of the firm's decision tree is.

To provide some guidance for our empirical investigation, we develop a simple model, in which the possible sequential nature of the decision process is made explicit and in which we examine the influence of productivity as well as industry- and country-specific factors on the market-entry decision. Specifically, we show that the trade-offs between different strategy options vary with the firm's productivity. This allows us to generate testable predictions regarding the firm's market-entry decision that we then take to the data.

Our paper is linked to several strands of literature. First, it ties into the recent literature on firm heterogeneity in international trade and FDI (see Footnote 1). This literature suggests that firm productivity complements the

more traditional country- and industry-level determinants of trade and FDI, such as factor endowments, market size and economies of scale. The specific contribution of our paper is to take into account that there is not just one way to do FDI. We show that productivity is also crucial for the choice between greenfield FDI and M&A, and between whole ownership and joint venture.

Second, we provide empirical evidence that a more comprehensive treatment of firms' market-entry options matters. For instance, we find that the choice between greenfield FDI and M&A indeed depends on the profitability of the ownership modes (whole ownership versus joint venture), and that a sequential model of market-entry decisions provides a better fit with the data than alternative specifications. Previous papers have typically concentrated on the choice between just two of the market-entry options (FDI versus exporting, greenfield FDI versus M&A, joint venture versus whole ownership). Theoretical models of horizontal cross-border mergers are provided by Bjorvatn (2004), Horn and Persson (2001) and Neary (2003), among others. Nocke and Yeaple (2004) build a theoretical model of international mergers, in which firms trade assets in an international merger market. Görg et al. (2007) examine empirically the rise in cross-border M&As, whereas Iranzo (2004) and Tekin-Koru (2004) provide empirical studies of the choice between greenfield investment and M&A. Another empirical paper, Bertrand *et al.* (2003), studies the location of cross-border M&As. The literature on international joint ventures has tended to focus on identifying factors determining their success or failure (see Caves, 1996). Interesting exceptions are Asiedu and Esfahani (2001) and Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) who investigate the ownership choices of multinational firms; these two papers also provide a detailed survey of the joint venture literature.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the theoretical framework. Section 3 presents the descriptive statistics, Section 4 contains the empirical analysis, and Section 5 concludes. Proofs and a detailed description of the data are provided in the Appendix.



## 2 Theoretical Framework

In this section we develop a simple model of horizontal FDI by considering a firm that wants to sell in a foreign market the same good that it produces at home. This allows us to be clear about the interaction of firm-, industry- and country-specific determinants of the firm's strategy without having to consider the additional issue of horizontal versus vertical motives for this choice.<sup>3</sup> We build our model around two key ingredients, namely imperfect competition and an explicit role for productive assets. Imperfect competition arises because the firm faces Cournot competition from local firms in the foreign market. In this respect the model draws on the industrial organization literature on horizontal mergers and joint ventures, including the work of Perry and Porter (1985), Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983), and Yi (1998). We also assume that firms own productive assets, *e.g.*, technology, management skills, specialized intermediate inputs, that determine their productivity (see, for instance, Farrell and Shapiro, 1990). If a firm chooses exporting or establishes a wholly-owned subsidiary, it has to rely on its own productive assets. M&A implies that the firm acquires the assets of a local target firm and combines them with its own assets. If two firms form a joint venture, they, too, share their assets, but remain independent in other decisions, specifically their choice of output.<sup>4</sup>

We denote the home country by  $h$  and the host country by  $f$ , and assume that markets in the two countries are segmented. The relevant market for our analysis is the one in  $f$ , where quasi-linear preferences give rise to a linear inverse demand function  $p = a - bQ$ , with  $p$  denoting the equilibrium price for an aggregate supply of  $Q$ . When the home firm enters  $f$  it faces Cournot

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<sup>3</sup>This focus is also justified by the stylized facts, especially since we want to give the firm the option to choose M&A: The World Investment Report (UNCTAD, 2000, p. 101) finds that around 70% of cross-border M&As are of the horizontal and less than 10% of the vertical type, the remainder being classified as conglomerate.

<sup>4</sup>This setup is consistent with the stylized facts. For instance, among the main motives for the choice of cross-border M&As, according to UNCTAD (2000, p. 143), are gaining market power, taking advantage of scale economies and acquiring assets. The report (*ibid*, p. 127) also finds that industries characterized by significant M&A activity have typically experienced rising concentration ratios.

competition from a fixed number  $n - 1$  of incumbents. We label the home firm as firm 1 and the local firms as firms  $2, \dots, n$ . Hence  $Q = \sum_{i=1}^n q_i$ , where  $q_i$  is the output of an individual firm. The marginal cost of production of firm  $i$  when it produces in country  $j = h, f$  is given by  $c_{ij} \equiv w_j - \alpha_i$ , where  $w_j$  denotes the country- $j$  wage and  $\alpha_i$  represents the firm's productive assets. Hence, the more assets a firm has the more productive it is. If the home firm serves  $f$  through exports from its home-country plant, an additional unit trade cost of size  $t$  arises. We assume that  $t < (a - n(w_h - \alpha_1) + \sum_{i=2}^n (w_f - \alpha_i))/n$  so that the profit from exporting is positive. Building a plant in the foreign country in the case of greenfield investment involves a sunk cost  $F$ .

If the home firm wants to acquire a local firm (and its production plant), it makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer that the latter accepts or rejects. After the merger, the two firms combine their assets and the home firm decides how much output to produce in the acquired plant. We assume that firm 2 is the most suitable acquisition target, and refer to the merged firm as firm 1.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, we assume that the home firm is able to manage a merger, because its assets are not smaller than any local firm's assets, that is,  $\alpha_1 \geq \alpha_2$ . How well the assets of the two firms complement each other is measured by a parameter  $\gamma \leq 1$ . In particular, we let the marginal cost of the merged firm be given by  $w_f - \gamma(\alpha_1 + \alpha_2)$ . If  $\gamma = 1$ , the assets of the two firms complement each other perfectly; if  $\gamma < 1$ , some of the assets overlap or are otherwise difficult to combine.<sup>6</sup>

Once the home firm has paid the sunk cost of  $F$  to establish a greenfield presence, it may operate a wholly owned subsidiary or offer to enter into

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<sup>5</sup>Modelling the selection of an acquisition target is beyond the scope of the current paper, simply because we do not have any data on the characteristics of actual and potential target firms. Still, it would be a worthwhile to investigate this issue in the future if only in a theory paper. For example, if one assumed that the selection process took the form of an auction with foreign firms announcing at which price they would be willing to be taken over, then one could show that the home firm would pick the most productive foreign firm as its target.

<sup>6</sup>Note that we could also accommodate the case where  $\gamma > 1$ . Another reasonable extension would be to assume that after the merger firm 1 is less efficient at using the assets of firm 2 than that firm on its own. In this case we would have  $c_{1f} \equiv w_f - \gamma(\alpha_1 + \beta\alpha_2)$  for  $\beta < 1$ .

a joint venture with a local partner.<sup>7</sup> There are many reasons why firms may enter into a joint venture. A key benefit is that a joint venture allows the two firms to share assets, for instance, by exchanging technology and marketing know-how, sharing R&D or specialized inputs, while remaining independent in other respects (see Yi, 1998). We assume specifically that the joint venture partners continue to choose output independently. A key problem arising in joint ventures is how the partners are compensated for the assets they contribute, especially if it is difficult to determine *ex ante* the value of specific assets, such as technology, R&D or specialized inputs, that the partners will share. The value of the assets contributed by each partner may also be unverifiable to outside parties *ex post* and hence non-contractible. We capture this in a simple way, namely by assuming that there are no (side-) payments between the joint venture partners *ex ante* and that partners cannot be prevented from using each other's assets *ex post*.

Which foreign firm would the home firm pick as its partner? Given that the home firm wanted to acquire the assets of firm 2 in the case of a merger, it seems reasonable to assume that it would also benefit most from sharing its assets with this firm in case of a joint venture; and it would not be subgame perfect for the home firm to deny the joint venture to firm 2, only because the latter turned down its merger offer. Hence, let firm 2 be the potential joint venture partner.<sup>8</sup> The marginal cost of partner firm  $i = 1, 2$  in a joint venture then is  $w_f - \gamma(\alpha_1 + \alpha_2)$ .

We represent the overall decision-making process by the following sequential game: in stage one, firm 1 chooses between exporting and making a take-it-or-leave-it offer to acquire firm 2. In stage two, firm 2 decides whether to accept or reject the offer. If it rejects the offer, we come to stage 3, in which firm 1 chooses whether to invest greenfield. In stage 4, if it has selected greenfield investment, the firm may choose between whole ownership

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<sup>7</sup>The assumption that  $F$  is paid by the home firm is made for simplicity; not much would change, if we assumed that this cost was shared by the joint venture partners.

<sup>8</sup>If the home firm picked a joint venture partner other than firm 2, we would have to modify the merger offer that the home firm makes to firm 2. In particular, the home firm could potentially reduce its merger offer, which would make M&A a more attractive option relative to greenfield FDI. However, the main results of the model would still hold.

and making a joint-venture proposal to firm 2. In stage 5, firm 2 has the option of accepting or rejecting this proposal. In stage 6, all firms choose output noncooperatively. Note that in this setup, firm 1 can always make an unacceptably low merger offer to firm 2, if it prefers greenfield investment or a joint venture. Hence moving the M&A decision to stage 2 does not reduce firm 1's choices, but allows us to make explicit that greenfield investment, either through a wholly owned subsidiary or in the form of a joint venture, is firm 1's outside option if firm 2 refuses the acquisition offer. Also note that we will examine below whether this sequence of moves is in fact consistent with our data.

Solving the game backwards, we begin with the choice of ownership mode (whole ownership versus joint venture) in the case of greenfield investment. We obtain the following result:

**Result 1** *The home firm is more likely to prefer whole ownership to a joint venture with a foreign firm the more productive it is and the more concentrated is the foreign industry.*

Proof: see Appendix A.1.

The reason for this is the following: a joint venture allows both partners to reduce their costs and take market share away from the other firms; at the same time, the joint venture partner with fewer assets (namely the foreign firm) experiences a larger drop in its marginal cost and hence gains market share relative to the partner with more assets (the home firm). Hence if the home firm has a lot more assets than its foreign partner, a joint venture would mean that it would lose more market share to its partner than it can gain from the  $n - 2$  other firms, making the joint venture an unattractive option. This problem is even more severe if  $n$  is small.

Next, consider the home firm's choice between M&A and greenfield investment. If a joint venture is the preferred ownership mode for greenfield FDI, then we have to compare the home firm's profit from M&A with its profit in case of a joint venture. We can show:

**Result 2** *If the home firm prefers a joint venture to a wholly owned subsidiary, it is more likely to prefer greenfield FDI to a merger the more productive it is, the smaller is the sunk cost of investment, the bigger is the foreign market, and the lower is the foreign wage rate.*

Proof: see Appendix A.2.

This result is due to the so-called merger paradox: the price increase associated with the merger gives the independent firms an incentive to raise their output. The merged firm responds by cutting its own output, thus losing market share to the independent rivals and making the merger unprofitable in the absence of cost savings. By contrast, the joint venture partners face no such problem, as they continue to choose output independently. On the contrary, the cost advantage offered by sharing assets in a joint venture leads to a larger market share and higher profits for the joint venture. This advantage of the joint venture becomes more pronounced, *ceteris paribus*, the more assets the home firm has, the smaller is the sunk cost of investment, the larger is the foreign market and the lower is the foreign wage.<sup>9</sup>

Now suppose that the home firm's preferred ownership mode in the case of greenfield FDI is whole ownership. We then have to compare the potential M&A profit to the profit of running a wholly owned subsidiary. We find:

**Result 3** *If the home firm prefers a wholly owned subsidiary to a joint venture, it is more likely to prefer greenfield FDI to a merger the more productive it is, the smaller is the sunk cost of investment, the bigger is the foreign market, and the lower is the foreign wage rate.*

Proof: see Appendix A.2.

The intuition for this result is similar to that for the previous result. Namely, the merger paradox is more harmful to a productive firm operating in a large market where labor costs are low. Obviously, a small sunk cost favors greenfield FDI.

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<sup>9</sup>Note that the effect of market structure is ambiguous because an increase in the number of foreign rivals reduces not only the operating profit of the merged firm and the joint venture, but also the acquisition price in the case of the merger. A similar ambiguity also occurs in subsequent comparisons of entry modes.

The connection between productivity and choice of investment and ownership modes is illustrated in Figure 1. The last stage of the decision process concerns the choice of ownership mode: whole ownership or joint venture. According to Result 1, whole ownership is the preferred option in regions  $M_2$  and  $W$ , whereas a joint venture is chosen in regions  $M_1$  and  $JV$ . The prediction is that the home firm will choose whole ownership if it owns sufficiently many productive assets. The dividing line between the two areas depends on the number of foreign firms. The more concentrated is the industry, the more likely whole ownership becomes.

Next, consider the choice between greenfield FDI and M&A, taking into account the home firm's anticipated choice of ownership mode. If the home firm anticipates that greenfield FDI will take the form of a joint venture, then Result 2 tells us that M&A is chosen in region  $M_1$  and greenfield FDI in region  $JV$ . We show in Appendix A.2 that the dividing line between the two region is a straight line with a slope of  $(-1)$ . If the home firm's preferred ownership mode is whole ownership, then the region labelled  $M_2$  represents the parameter values for which firm 1 will choose M&A (see Result 3); in region  $W$ , it will opt for greenfield investment. The clear prediction is that given the home firm's anticipated choice of ownership mode, the more productive assets the home firm owns, the more likely it is to choose greenfield FDI (both wholly owned and joint venture) rather than M&A. A large host market and low host wage both favor greenfield FDI relative to M&A.

[Insert Figure 1 about here]

Finally, we examine the trade-off between FDI and exports, taking into account the different options the home firm has in choosing its investment and ownership mode. More precisely, we have to compare export profits with those of the firm's preferred combination of investment and ownership modes. This comparison yields the following result:

**Result 4** *The home firm is more likely to prefer FDI to exporting the more productive it is, the larger is the foreign market, the greater is the home*

*relative to the foreign wage, the higher is the transportation cost, and the smaller is the sunk cost of investment.*

Proof: see Appendix A.3.

The reasons for this result are straightforward: first, FDI is more profitable relative to exporting the lower are production costs in the foreign country; second, the larger are the home firm's sales in the foreign country (large foreign market, or high productivity of the home firm) the more attractive it is to save transportation costs.

### 3 Data and Descriptive Statistics

Our dataset consists of Japanese foreign direct investments in 21 developed countries during the period 1985 to 2000.<sup>10</sup> We restrict our sample to investments in developed countries for two reasons: First, we only consider host countries that did not impose local ownership requirements, *i.e.*, rules typically forcing foreign investors into joint ventures with local partners. This eliminates many developing countries, simply because they impose such requirements. Second, we want to be consistent with our theoretical analysis which concentrated on horizontal investment—and this type of investment takes place mostly between developed countries.<sup>11</sup>

Table 1 details the 759 investments that comprise this study. 285 Japanese manufacturing multinational enterprises (MNEs) were responsible for 578 investments into manufacturing affiliates, for an average of 2 investments per parent firm. Wholly owned subsidiaries accounted for over 44% of all manufacturing affiliates, with joint ventures and M&As totaling 39% and 17%, respectively. Since we do not have destination-specific export data for our sample firms, we cannot directly observe which firms supplied our sample of host countries through exporting. However, we are able to determine which

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<sup>10</sup>See Appendix A.4 for a description of the data and data sources.

<sup>11</sup>Most of the cross-border M&A activity in the world takes place between developed countries. Between 1988 and 2003, the ratio of cross-border M&As between developed countries to world cross-border M&As never dropped below 77%, reaching a peak in 1988 at over 97% (UNCTAD, 2004, p. 411).

Japanese manufacturers established wholesale/retail affiliates in a particular country. We let these firms represent the exporters in our sample, although we realize that there are exporters that use independent distributors to sell their products abroad, for instance, by going through a trading company within the same keiretsu (*i.e.*, business group).<sup>12</sup> The sample contains 181 wholesale and retail affiliates established by 100 Japanese manufacturers that do not have manufacturing affiliates in the sample countries.

[Insert Table 1 about here]

Our model suggests that firm productivity plays an important role in the market-entry decision. One way to capture productivity is by computing a firm’s TFP. We calculate two measures of TFP: one using the Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) approach (*TFP*), and an “Approximate Total Factor Productivity” (*ATFP*) using the approach of Grilliches and Mairesse (1990).<sup>13</sup> In addition to the TFP measures, we also observe several other variables that are positively correlated with firm productivity, such as the firm’s R&D intensity (*R&D*), total assets (*Size*) and total sales (*Sales*). Other parent-specific characteristics, such as market capitalization (*Mkt. Cap*), global export percentage (*Exports*), age (*FirmAge*), and keiretsu membership (*Keiretsu*), vary in their degree of correlation to productivity but can serve as further controls.

[Insert Table 2 about here]

Table 3 gives the mean values for each of these variables across all Japanese parents, with each variable measured with a one-year lag from the investment date. Table 2 provides the correlation matrix of the major firm-specific characteristics. Note that *Size* and *Sales* are highly correlated (0.958), as are the *ATFP* and *TFP* measures (0.826), while *Size* and *Sales* are also somewhat correlated with our TFP measures. Relatively low pair-wise correlation exists between the remaining variables.

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<sup>12</sup>We do, however, control for keiretsu membership.

<sup>13</sup>Data descriptions and sources are provided in Appendix A.4.



[Insert Table 3 about here]

As indicated at the top of Table 3 for the whole sample of firms, firms that establish wholly-owned subsidiaries tend to have higher TFP levels and be larger (both in *Size* and *Sales*) on average than those engaging in joint ventures, and these in turn tend to be larger and more productive than firms that opt for M&A; the latter are bigger and more productive on average than firms that only export. The pattern looks somewhat different for the other firm-specific characteristics. For instance, firms establishing affiliates via M&A have the highest export ratio at the time of investment.

We perform ANOVA analysis to test the hypothesis that the mean values for the firm-specific characteristic are equivalent across each investment type.<sup>14</sup> The top section of Table 3 reveals significant heterogeneity among the parent firms in regard to our productivity measures (*TFP*, *Size*, *Sales*). However, since this heterogeneity may arise simply from the inclusion of the firms that only export, we re-ran the ANOVA tests only for parents with manufacturing affiliates. We find that the heterogeneity in all of our productivity measures remains, although this is not true for keiretsu membership, suggesting the heterogeneity in this measure did result from the inclusion of the exporter firms.<sup>15</sup>

We also perform similar ANOVA analysis for each of the three largest investing industries separately, namely chemicals and related products (based on U.S. *SIC 28*), industrial equipment and machinery (*SIC 35*), and electronic and electric equipment (*SIC 36*); see Table 3. The results from the ANOVA analysis suggest that for each industry significant heterogeneity exists among investment-mode choices in regard to *TFP* and *Size*. For the chemical industry, the choice of entry strategy also appears to be significantly different depending on the firms' market capitalization. In both the industrial machinery and electronics industries, we find significant heterogeneity across nearly all firm-level characteristics. To eliminate the influence

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<sup>14</sup>ANOVA is employed to avoid the increased likelihood of Type-I error associated with the use of multiple pairwise t-tests, although a drawback is that the test cannot indicate which mean value(s) significantly differ(s) from the others.

<sup>15</sup>These results are available upon request.

of the export-only parents in the latter two industries, we carried out an ANOVA analysis only for firms with manufacturing affiliates abroad. The results confirm that there exists significant firm-level heterogeneity in the investment- and ownership-mode choices of manufacturers.

Our model indicates that we should also control for country- and industry-specific determinants, specifically market size, wage rates and industry concentration. Therefore, we include as regressors several variables capturing host-specific characteristics, which are typically measured at the industry level. *Ind. Production* measures industry-level production. *Ind. Concentration* measures production concentration, and is calculated as a host's share (%) of total employment within a particular industry. In regard to wage rates, we determine both *Foreign Wages*, as measured by the host's industry-specific wage rate, and the *Relative Wage*, measured as the difference between the Japanese and the host's wage rate. We also proxy for transportation costs with *Distance*, measured as the great-circle distance between Tokyo and host's capital city. Finally, as these variables do not control for all industry-level differences, we also include dummy variables for each host, affiliate industry, and year.

While the model suggests that sunk costs play a role in the ownership choice sequence, directly measuring sunk costs (*Sunk Costs*) is difficult. Therefore, we proxy sunk costs by exit costs, suggesting that the greater the exit costs faced by firms, the less likely firms will leave the market. The primary measure we use to proxy for exit costs is the OECD's (1999) Employment Protection Legislation index, which measures the strictness of a host's labor market policies for individual dismissals for both regular and temporary workers.<sup>16</sup>

We also wish to control for country characteristics that influence the firm's choice, but do not explicitly appear in the model, including corporate taxes, and exchange-rate effects that could affect the price of assets denominated in the local currency. The respective proxies are the corporate tax rates (*TaxRates*), and the Yen per local currency exchange rate

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<sup>16</sup>See Gross and Ryan (2007) for a link between FDI activity and this EPL index.

(*Exchange Rates*). We control for a firm's previous investment experience by creating variables indicating a firm's previous manufacturing investment into each host (*PrevFDI Host*) as well as the rest of the countries in the sample (*PrevFDI Sample*). We are also able to control for a firm's previous ownership choice decisions, namely the previous amount of WOS investments (*PrevWOS Sample* and *PrevWOS Host*, for use in the WOS-JV decision) as well as the previous amount of greenfield investment (*PrevGR Sample* and *PrevGR Host*, for the greenfield-M&A choice).

## 4 Empirical Framework and Results

In our theoretical framework we explored a firm's sequential decision problem, where it first has to decide between FDI and exporting. If it opts for FDI, it has to choose between M&A and greenfield investment. If it decides to enter via greenfield investment, it faces the choice between a wholly owned subsidiary and a joint venture. The firm's choice at each stage obviously depends upon the profits associated with each alternative. We can write the profit for firm  $i$  of choosing a particular strategy  $j$  to enter industry  $r$  in country  $k$  as

$$\Pi_j^{ikr} = X_j^i \beta + Y_j^k \phi + Z_j^k \varphi + W_j^r \lambda + \epsilon_j^{ikr}, \quad (1)$$

where  $X_j^i$  is a vector containing firm  $i$ 's firm-specific characteristics,  $Y_j^k$  is a vector of host country's specific characteristics,  $Z_j^k$  is a vector of host-country dummy variables,  $W_j^r$  is a vector of affiliate-industry dummies, and  $\epsilon_j^{ikr}$  serves as the random component. While this profit is generally unobservable, we do observe the firm's actual choice at each stage. That is, we can work with an indicator variable  $y_j^i$  that takes on the following values:

$$y_j^{ikr} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \Pi_j^{ikr} = \max\{\Pi_1^{ikr}, \Pi_2^{ikr}, \dots, \Pi_J^{ikr}\}, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

In a sequential decision structure the probability of firm  $i$  choosing a particular market-entry mode  $j$  will be determined as the product of the conditional probabilities at each decision stage. We denote the probability of a firm choosing strategy  $f = 1, 2$  at stage 1 by  $P_f$ , where  $f = 1$  denotes

FDI, and  $f = 2$  denotes exporting. The conditional probability of choosing strategy  $m = 1, 2$  at stage 2 given that the firm has chosen FDI is  $P_{1m}$ , where  $m = 1$  indicates greenfield investment, and  $m = 2$  indicates M&A. Finally, at stage 3 the probability of selecting ownership mode  $l = 1, 2$  conditional on the firm having chosen greenfield FDI is  $P_{1l}$ , where  $l = 1$  stands for whole ownership and  $l = 2$  for joint venture. Therefore, for firm  $i$ ,

$$P_{fml}^i = P_{l|fm}^i * P_{m|f}^i * P_i^i.^{17}$$

If we let the variables  $\mathbf{x}_{fml}$ ,  $\mathbf{y}_{fm}$ , and  $\mathbf{z}_f$  be vectors of explanatory variables specific to each stage, then (following Greene, 2003) we can write the conditional probability of selecting a particular ownership structure  $l$  in stage 3 ( $P_{l|fm}^i$ ) as

$$P_{l|fm}^i = \frac{\exp(\mathbf{x}_{fml}\beta)}{\sum_n \exp(\mathbf{x}_{fmln}\beta)}$$

and the inclusive value at this stage as

$$IV_{fm} = \ln \{ \sum_n \exp(\mathbf{x}_{fmln}\beta) \}.$$

where the inclusive value is sum of the profits across all choices within the stage, and represents the firm's expected profits based on the characteristics of possible choices at this stage.<sup>18</sup> As this value affects the choice of greenfield versus M&A, we include it in the probability of choosing alternative  $m$  in the middle stage, which is defined as

$$P_{m|f}^i = \frac{\exp(\mathbf{y}_{fm}\alpha + \theta_{fm}IV_{fm})}{\sum_k \exp(\mathbf{y}_{fk}\alpha + \theta_{fk}IV_{fk})}$$

with the inclusive value at this stage determined by

$$IV_f = \ln \{ \sum_k \exp(\mathbf{y}_{fk}\alpha + \theta_{fk}IV_{fk}) \}.$$

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<sup>17</sup>Thus, the probability of entry through greenfield investment in a wholly owned subsidiary is  $P_1^i * P_{11}^i * P_{111}^i$ .

<sup>18</sup>Inclusive values are often called 'dissimilarity parameters', as they indicate the degree of dissimilarity between alternatives within an individual nest. When all the IV parameter values equal one, the model collapses into a conditional logit model.

Finally, for the first stage, the probability of choosing alternative  $f$  is

$$P_f^i = \frac{\exp(\mathbf{z}_f\varphi + \gamma_f IV_f)}{\sum_d \exp(\mathbf{z}_d\varphi + \gamma_d IV_d)}$$

The sequential decision tree suggests the use of a 3-level nested logit model. Our structure is characterized as 'partially degenerate' as some, but not all, of our upper level nests have multiple lower level alternatives. For instance, the firm has only a single alternative if it chooses to export in the first stage or M&A in the second stage, whereas choosing FDI in the first stage, and greenfield investment in the second stage, both provide the firm multiple alternatives. As a result, we use the non-normalized nested logit specification of Ben-Akiva (1973), which has been shown to be consistent with McFadden's (1978, 1981) random utility maximization specification when the inclusive value parameters are restricted to equality (Koppelman and Wen, 1998). Hunt (2000) shows this condition holds when partially degenerate nests exist within the model structure. We impose the IV equality restriction in our estimation.

#### 4.1 3-Stage Nested Logit Results

Table 4 provides the results of our estimation procedures, with the independent variables divided by stage. Coefficients for variables affecting the WOS-JV decision ( $3^{rd}$  stage) are at the bottom of the table, coefficients for variables in the M&A-Greenfield decision ( $2^{nd}$  stage) stage are in the middle of the table, and coefficient estimates for the Export-FDI ( $1^{st}$  stage) decision nest are at the top. Columns (1)-(4) of the table are regressions that correspond to our base model as predicted by the above theory, with the differences across columns arising from how we measure productivity ( $TFP$ ,  $ATFP$ ,  $R\mathcal{E}D$ ). In columns (5) and (6), we provide coefficient estimates from our extended model, which includes variables not explicitly accounted for in our theory. In all regressions, positive coefficient estimates signal an increased likelihood of WOS ( $3^{rd}$  stage), Greenfield investment ( $2^{nd}$  stage) and FDI ( $1^{st}$  stage). To save space, we do not report the coefficients on the industry, host-country, or time-specific dummy variables.

[Insert Table 4 about here]

#### 4.1.1 Base Model Results

In the regressions characterizing our base model, our empirical estimations generally confirm our theory at each investment stage. We focus first on the productivity measure, as this variable is the only variable that appears in each stage. Regardless of the measure ( $TFP$ ,  $ATFP$ ,  $R\&D$ ), increased firm productivity leads to a greater likelihood of FDI in stage 1. However, the coefficients on  $ATFP$  (both 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> stages) and  $R\&D$  (3<sup>rd</sup> stage) have the correct sign but are insignificant. This is not surprising, as while the three measures are positively correlated with one another, in several cases this correlation is quite low (see Table 2). As increased R&D expenditures lead to greater likelihood of FDI and Greenfield investment, it is a bit surprising to find an insignificant R&D measure in the ownership choice stage (stage 3). However, as we cannot control for characteristics of the actual JV partner that the Japanese firm may take, it may be the case that R&D synergies exist between the Japanese parent and a local firm such that choosing entry via a joint venture may occur. Finally, we include both  $TFP$  and  $R\&D$  in the regression (column (4)), with no significant impact on the results.

Turning to stage-specific variables in the base model, we find that increased *Ind. Concentration* leads to greater whole ownership (Stage 3) of the affiliate, regardless of the productivity measure, suggesting that a greater number of potential JV partners (lower industry concentration) increases the JV likelihood. Like in our model, market size has no effect on the choice of ownership mode. In stage 2, larger host markets (*Industrial Production*), smaller *Sunk Costs*, and increases in exchange rate (*Exchange Rate*) lead to increased Greenfield investment. In stage 1, larger host country size (*Ind. Production*) and *Distance* (as a proxy for transportation costs) both lead to greater FDI. In addition, the larger the difference between the industry-level Japanese and host country wage rate (*Relative Wage*), the more attractive is foreign production. Finally, in accordance with our theory, we find that greater employment protection, our measure of sunk costs (*Sunk Costs*), decreases FDI.

### 4.1.2 Extended Model Results

While the results from our base case (columns 1-4) suggest that our theory withstands the scrutiny of empirical investigation, there are numerous other variables that we do not explicitly account for that may also affect investment and ownership choice at each investment stage. Therefore, in columns (5) and (6), we extend our base model to include numerous other firm- and host-specific explanatory variables. While we added these variables separately to best capture their individual affect, we limit our reporting of the extended model to these two additional columns.<sup>19</sup>

In column (5), we include a firm's global export sales percentage (*Export*), its age (*Firm Age*), its market capitalization (*Mkt. Cap*), the Yen/local currency exchange rate (*Exchange Rate*), and the host's top corporate tax rate (*Tax Rates*). In the third stage, only *Exports* has a significant impact on the WOS-JV choice. In the second stage, only the Yen/local currency exchange rate affects the Greenfield-M&A choice. The positive coefficient on the *Exchange Rate* variable suggests that the cost of acquiring a local firm's assets through M&A grows with increases in the Yen/host country exchange rate, leading to a greater likelihood of Greenfield investment. In the first stage, only *Firm Age* affects the FDI/export decision, as older firms were more likely to undertake FDI. Interestingly, previous *Export* sales do not affect the FDI/export decision, a result that is in part driven by the fact that we can only control for global export sales, and not host-specific exports.

In column (6), we add the firm's keiretsu status (*Keiretsu*), measured as a dummy variable with the value 1 taken by firms that are keiretsu members. The coefficient estimates for *Keiretsu* are not statistically significant in each stage. In addition, we include two 'previous investment history' variables at each stage: the first measures previous investment into the group of sample countries, with the second measuring previous investment into the particular host county. In stage 3, positive and significant coefficient estimates are found for both the firm's previous number of WOS affiliates in the entire host

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<sup>19</sup>The entire set of extended model regressions are available from the authors upon request. In general, these two columns best represent each variable's impact.

country sample (*Prev. WOS Sample*) as well as for the particular host (*Prev. WOS Host*) are noted, suggesting some hysteresis in ownership choice exists throughout a firm’s investment sequence. This hysteresis exists for both the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> stages as well, as in each case, both of the previous investment history variables are positive and significant. In all three stages, the coefficients on the two history variables are nearly identical, indicating similar impacts on entry and ownership strategies, even if investments occurred in different countries. This suggests that, at least for the (primarily) European countries that comprise our sample, overall investment experience is as important as experience within a given host.

#### 4.1.3 Robustness Tests for the Three-stage Model

Table 5 outlines the results when we test several additional sunk costs proxies.<sup>20</sup> While the OECD’s (1999) EPL index has a longer time frame than other hiring/firing cost measures (such as the Global Competitiveness Report) and provides data on our entire host country sample, a drawback is that it only covers individual dismissals. To check the robustness of these results, we use the OECD’s (1999) ”Collective Dismissals Index”, which is a better representation of firm shutdown/exit than individual dismissals. However, this data is only collected for the late 1990s period, and restricting the sample to include only the late 1990s leaves us with very few observations. Therefore, we apply the CDI index for the entire sample period, recognizing that we lose significant time series variation in doing so. Not surprisingly, the estimated coefficients on the *Sunk Cost* variable are still significant, but now only at the 10% level.

[Insert Table 5 about here]

An additional measure of sunk costs is the ’Death Rate’ data found in the OECD’s (2007) *Business Demography Indicators*.<sup>21</sup> This data set captures

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<sup>20</sup>We restrict the table to just the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> stages, as these are the stages where, according to the model, sunk costs matter.

<sup>21</sup>Eurostat also publishes a death rate statistic. As its correlation with the OECD measure is high (0.879), we omit the Eurostat results.



annual sector-level death rates in several of our host countries beginning in 1995, although no data is provided for France, Germany, and Canada, reducing our dataset by almost 40% (from 759 to 455 observations). In column (2) we employ only the manufacturing sector death rate data, and find that the coefficient estimates on the sunk costs variable are not statistically significant, likely the result of the significant drop in observations. Using the national-level death rate (column 3), we find a similar result. As the correlation between the manufacturing-sector and national-level death rates is 0.928, the similar results in these two columns are expected.<sup>22</sup>

#### 4.1.4 A Two-stage Model

A problem with sequential models, as noted by Greene (2000), is the ad hoc partitioning of the choice set which may lead to results which might depend on the defined branches. We wish to investigate whether our three-stage sequential model is robust to changes in the firm's decision sequence. For instance, it may be the case that a firm does not view the investment decision as a three-stage sequence, as assumed in our model, but rather as a two-stage process, in which the first stage (FDI versus exporting) remains the same, but the second and third stage are merged into a single stage. In this new second stage, the firm would then choose between entry via M&A, WOS, or JV.

As a result, we reestimate our model using a two-stage nested logit model, where the partial degeneracy of the export branch remains. We maintain our imposed IV equality restriction in this estimation. The results of this estimation are in Table 6, where the top portion indicates the 1<sup>st</sup> stage FDI versus export choice, and the bottom portion reflects the 2<sup>nd</sup> stage FDI en-

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<sup>22</sup>Other variables' robustness was also examined; however, as these changes did not affect the qualitative results, we do not include them in Table 5. Such changes include: for *Exchange Rate*, a switch from a Yen/local currency measure to a Yen/\$ measure; for *Firm Age*, we move the birthdate of the firm to 1970, the first year that Japanese firms could invest abroad without prior approval of the Japanese government (see Mason, 1994); and for *Exports*, we interact it with an industry-level Japanese export sales percentage (data source: World Bank's *Trade and Production Database*), which would indicate that if a particular host receives 10% of a Japanese industry's exports, all firms within that industry sent 10% of their global exports to that host.

try/ownership choice decision. Column (1) reflects our base case estimation, while column (2) provides the full extended model. In both cases, entry via WOS serves as the comparison group in the second stage; therefore, positive (negative) coefficient estimates signal an increased (decreased) likelihood of entry in that mode as compared to WOS entry.

[Insert Table 6 about here]

The two-stage model provides similar estimation results to the three-stage model for our base variables, especially for the first stage, where no qualitative differences in the results are noted between the two- and three-stage models. In the second stage, the variable estimates in the M&A comparison are qualitatively similar to the stage 2 results in our base three-stage model. More productive firms enter via wholly owned FDI, and greater sunk costs lead to greater entry via M&A.

Interestingly, however, is that the WOS-JV comparison in the two-stage model does provide slightly different qualitative results. We find insignificant coefficient estimates on the TFP variable, which is different than the significant (but only at the 10- level) TFP coefficient in the three-stage model. This result may arise from the inclusion of *Sunk Costs*, *Industry Production*, and *Foreign Wage* to this set of estimations, variables that were not part of the third stage in our three-stage base estimations. Note, however, that none of these additional variables significantly impacted the WOS-JV relationship, as was predicted in our theory, and thus excluded from our three-stage estimations.

As both the three-stage and two-stage models yield similar results, a test to determine the optimal tree structure is appropriate. While there is no well-defined testing procedure for discriminating among tree structures (Greene, 2003), we can nevertheless assess the relative goodness of fit of the two models via both the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC). To do so, we compare similar first-stage regressions in both the 3-stage and 2-stage models (*e.g.*, columns 4 and 6 in Table 4 with column 1 and 2 in Table 6). Both the AIC and SIC criteria yield lower values for the 3-stage models than the 2-stage models, suggesting

that the 3-stage model is the preferred estimation model. Thus, while both the three-stage and two-stage frameworks produce similar estimation results, given its close relation to our theoretical set-up and the AIC/SIC criteria tests, we believe that the three-stage model is the better model in which to examine the market-entry decision.<sup>23</sup>

## 5 Conclusions

The paper examined how a manufacturer supplies goods to a foreign market, representing this decision as a three-stage process. In the first stage, the manufacturer decides whether to export or to invest in the foreign country. In the second stage, the manufacturer chooses the investment mode: greenfield investment or M&A. If he opts for greenfield investment, the third-stage decision is whether to establish a wholly owned subsidiary or to form a joint venture with a local partner. We constructed a model to show how these choices are interrelated and how they are determined by total factor productivity and other firm-specific characteristics, as well as by industry- and country-level variables. We then confronted the model with firm-level Japanese data and found that its main predictions were confirmed. In particular, we found that, controlling for industry- and country-specific factors, the higher is a firm's total factor productivity, the more likely it is to choose whole ownership rather than a joint venture, greenfield investment rather than M&A, and FDI rather than exporting. These results indicate that firm-specific characteristics play an important role in determining the pattern of FDI and that we hence should observe considerable heterogeneity in the investment and ownership mode choices of firms even within the same industry. This suggests that a consideration of firm-level determinants adds a significant new dimension to the FDI literature, that has traditionally relied only

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<sup>23</sup>We also analyze a single-staged multinomial logit model with four possible alternatives (M&A, WOS, JV, Exporting). Hausman tests indicate the IIA assumption fails in this set-up (test results are omitted for space considerations, but available from the authors). In addition, this model does not fit our theoretical framework as there is no outside alternative in case a firm's M&A offer is rejected. For these reasons, we omit discussion of these estimations.

on industry- and country-specific factors to explain FDI patterns.

The selection of different firms within an industry into different investment and ownership modes should also be taken into account when analyzing the effects of FDI, for instance, on local firms, market structure and social welfare (see, for instance, Aitken and Harrison, 1999). For example, there is widespread public concern that cross-border M&As may be less beneficial than greenfield FDI or may even have negative effects on host-country welfare. M&As are often seen simply as a transfer of ownership, whereas greenfield FDI is perceived as adding to the capital stock of the host country and creating jobs. More importantly, M&As are seen as reducing competition in the host market (UNCTAD, 2000, p. 14, 15). By providing an explanation for which firms are likely to choose one strategy rather than the other our paper provides a potentially important input into the analysis of these issues.

## Appendix

### A.1 Whole Ownership versus Joint Venture

Greenfield investment implies that the home firm, firm 1, makes an investment in the host country at a cost of  $F$ . All  $n$  firms hence have plants in the host country. If firm 1 operates a wholly owned subsidiary, denoted by the superscript  $W$ , Cournot competition implies that it produces output

$$q_1^W = \frac{A + n\alpha_1 - \alpha_2}{(n+1)b}, \quad (\text{A.1})$$

and earns a profit of

$$\Pi_1^W = \frac{(A + n\alpha_1 - \alpha_2)^2}{(n+1)^2b} - F, \quad (\text{A.2})$$

where  $A = a - w_f - \sum_{k=3}^n \alpha_k$ .

In case of a joint venture, denoted by the superscript  $J$ , the market structure does not change as all firms remain independent. The equilibrium output of firm 1 is

$$q_1^J = \frac{A + (n-1)\gamma(\alpha_1 + \alpha_2)}{(n+1)b}, \quad (\text{A.3})$$

and the equilibrium profit is

$$\Pi_1^J = \frac{(A + (n-1)\gamma(\alpha_1 + \alpha_2))^2}{(n+1)^2b} - F. \quad (\text{A.4})$$

If firm 1 can obtain a positive profit under both investment options, *i.e.*,  $\min\{\Pi_1^W, \Pi_1^J\} \geq 0$ , then a comparison between (A.2) and (A.4) reveals that firm 1 prefers whole ownership to a joint venture with firm 2 if

$$\alpha_1 \geq \frac{1 + (n-1)\gamma}{n - (n-1)\gamma} \alpha_2. \quad (\text{A.5})$$

Since we assume that  $\alpha_1 \geq \alpha_2$ , (A.5) implies that a joint venture is possible only if  $\gamma > 1/2$ . The choice between whole ownership and joint venture also depends on market structure, since for  $\gamma > 1/2$  the right-hand side of (A.5) is increasing in  $n$ . That is, the smaller is  $n$  (and hence the more concentrated is the industry), the more likely the home firm is to choose whole ownership. This proves Result 1.

## A.2 M&A versus Greenfield Investment

In case of a merger, denoted by the superscript  $M$ , the merged firm competes with  $n - 2$  independent firms. Its equilibrium output is

$$q_1^M = \frac{A + (n-1)\gamma(\alpha_1 + \alpha_2)}{nb}, \quad (\text{A.6})$$

and its equilibrium profit, gross of the acquisition price, is

$$\Pi_1^M = \frac{(A + (n-1)\gamma(\alpha_1 + \alpha_2))^2}{n^2b}. \quad (\text{A.7})$$

The acquisition price of a successful merger depends on the choice firm 1 would make if firm 2 turned down its offer. Suppose that  $\Pi_1^J \geq \Pi_1^W$ , so that firm 1 would propose a joint venture in case firm 2 rejected the merger offer. Firm 2 would have to be offered an acquisition price of at least  $\Pi_2^J$ , namely the profit firm 2 would receive by rejecting the offer. If, on the other hand,  $\Pi_1^J < \Pi_1^W$ , firm 2 would have to be paid a price of  $\Pi_2^W$ .

If  $\Pi_1^J \geq \Pi_1^W$ , firm 1 prefers a joint venture to a merger, if  $\Pi_1^J - F \geq \Pi_1^M - \Pi_2^J$ , or

$$\frac{(A + (n-1)\gamma(\alpha_1 + \alpha_2))^2}{(n+1)^2b} - F \geq \frac{(A + (n-1)\gamma(\alpha_1 + \alpha_2))^2}{n^2b} - \frac{(A + (n-1)\gamma(\alpha_1 + \alpha_2))^2}{(n+1)^2b},$$

or, still simpler,

$$\frac{(n^2 - 2n - 1)(A + (n-1)\gamma(\alpha_1 + \alpha_2))^2}{n^2(n+1)^2b} - F \geq 0. \quad (\text{A.8})$$

The left-hand side of (A.8) is increasing in  $\alpha_1$  and decreasing in  $b$ ,  $w_f$  and  $F$ . This proves Result 2.

If  $\Pi_1^J < \Pi_1^W$ , firm 1 will choose a wholly owned greenfield investment rather than a merger, if  $\Pi_1^W \geq \Pi_1^M - \Pi_2^W$ . This inequality can be rewritten as  $\Pi_1^W + \Pi_2^W \geq \Pi_1^M$ , or

$$\frac{(A + n\alpha_1 - \alpha_2)^2}{(n+1)^2b} + \frac{(A - \alpha_1 + n\alpha_2)^2}{(n+1)^2b} - F \geq \frac{(A + (n-1)\gamma(\alpha_1 + \alpha_2))^2}{n^2b}. \quad (\text{A.9})$$

The indifference curve between greenfield FDI and M&A in  $(\alpha_1, \alpha_2)$ -space must lie everywhere on or below a line with a slope of  $-1$ . If we increase  $\alpha_1$  and reduce  $\alpha_2$  by the same amount, *i.e.*,  $d\alpha_1 = -d\alpha_2$ , the right-hand side of (A.9) remains unchanged. To keep the left-hand side unchanged we require

$$\frac{d\alpha_2}{d\alpha_1} = -\frac{2(n-1)A + 2(n^2+1)\alpha_1 - 4n\alpha_2}{2(n-1)A + 2(n^2+1)\alpha_2 - 4n\alpha_1}. \quad (\text{A.10})$$

Note that if  $\alpha_1 = \alpha_2$ , then  $\frac{d\alpha_2}{d\alpha_1} = -1$ . If  $\alpha_1 > \alpha_2$ , then the numerator of (A.10) is positive and  $\left|\frac{d\alpha_2}{d\alpha_1}\right| > 1$ . Hence starting at  $\alpha_1 = \alpha_2$  and increasing  $\alpha_1$  by increments  $d\alpha_1$  means that  $\alpha_2$  has to fall by more than  $d\alpha_1$  to keep the left-hand side of (A.9) constant. As one continues to raise  $\alpha_1$ , the denominator of (A.10) may become negative; this implies that the line representing the combinations of  $\alpha_1$  and  $\alpha_2$  for which the left-hand side of (A.9) stays constant first becomes vertical and then bends backward so that both  $\alpha_1$  and  $\alpha_2$  have to fall to keep the left-hand side of (A.9) the same. The indifference curve between greenfield investment and M&A must have a slope that lies between

$-1$  (the value that keeps the right-hand side of (A.9) unchanged) and (A.10). Hence greenfield FDI is preferred if  $\alpha_1$  is sufficiently big.

Note that (A.9) is also affected by the other parameters of the model. An increase in host-country market size (lower  $b$ ) makes greenfield FDI more attractive as does a lower  $F$  and a smaller  $\gamma$ . The impact of a reduction in the host-country wage (higher  $A$ ) is ambiguous. In particular, we have

$$\text{sign} \left\{ \frac{\partial(\Pi_1^W + \Pi_2^W - \Pi_1^M)}{\partial A} \right\} = \text{sign} \left\{ (n^2 - 2n - 1)A + (n - 1)(\alpha_1 + \alpha_2)(n^2 - \gamma(n + 1)^2) \right\}.$$

The derivative is positive if  $A$  is sufficiently large and/or  $\gamma$  is small; in this case, a reduction in the host-country wage makes greenfield investment more likely relative to M&A. This proves Result 3.

### A.3 FDI versus Exporting

If firm 1 exports to the host country, denoted by the superscript  $E$ , it produces

$$q_1^E = \frac{A + n\alpha_1 - \alpha_2 - n(w_h - w_f + t)}{(n + 1)b}, \quad (\text{A.11})$$

and earns a profit of

$$\Pi_1^E = \frac{(A + n\alpha_1 - \alpha_2 - n(w_h - w_f + t))^2}{(n + 1)^2 b}. \quad (\text{A.12})$$

To determine the firm's choice between FDI and exporting, we have to compare  $\Pi_1^E$  with  $\max\{\Pi_1^M, \Pi_1^W - F, \Pi_1^J - F\}$ . This comparison yields Result 4.

### A.4 Data

The FDI data employed in this study is compiled from several issues of Toyo Keizai Inc.'s *Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyō Soran*. This dataset provides the date and location of initial investment into (or acquisition of) the foreign affiliate. We focus on those investments for which (1) the affiliate was in an industry

for which no local ownership requirements existed at that time (UNCTC), (2) the principal Japanese investor held an equity ownership share of at least 10%, (3) all of the relevant ownership characteristics are known (as described below), and (4) the investment occurred during the period between 1985 and 2000 in one of the sample countries.

For a consistent and detailed determination of the foreign affiliate's industry affiliation, we collected the firm's primary 4-digit SIC code for the year of initial investment (acquisition). Affiliate main business line information was located in numerous publicly available European sources, as well as from the main offices of most national foreign investment agencies (*e.g.*, STATEC [Luxembourg], Invest in France Agency, Invest in Sweden Agency) for those affiliates too small in size to gain entry into the published corporate listings. Main business lines reported in earlier SIC revisions (1972, 1977) or in the European NACE format were converted to the 1987 SIC equivalent by standard classification concordances.

A wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS) is defined as an affiliate of a single Japanese investor not established via M&A (with the parent company holding at least a 95% equity share in the affiliate). A joint venture (JV) is an affiliate not created through M&A, in which none of the investors holds greater than a 95% equity stake (lowering this to a 90% threshold does not affect our results). Finally, an M&A investment occurs when the foreign affiliate is established via merger or acquisition. For the purposes of this paper, any investment through a merger/acquisition is considered an M&A, regardless of the number of investing parents. Note that 88% of the M&As in the sample were established by a single Japanese parent, with an average ownership percentage of 91%. Less than 10% of M&As had Japanese parents with less than 50% ownership.

#### **A.4.1 Parent-Specific Characteristics**

For each investment, the Japanese firm with the largest equity ownership share is considered the primary investor. In the case (rare in our data) where there is a 50-50 joint venture between Japanese partners, we consider the primary investor to be the firm listed first by Toyo Keizai for that



investment. Parent 4-digit SIC codes were located in Dun and Bradstreet's *Principal International Businesses*, National Register's *Directory of Corporate Affiliations*, and other publicly available sources. Various issues of Toyo Keizai's *Japan Company Handbook* as well as the Pacific-Basin Capital Markets Database (PACAP) (2003) provided the information used to calculate a firm's *TFP*, *ATFP*, R&D intensity ( $R\&D$ , measured as R&D expenditure as a percentage of total sales), *Sales* (as shown in Table 3), *Exports*, *Firm Age*, and *Mkt. Cap*, which is calculated as the year end stock price multiplied by the number of available common shares. Dodwell Marketing's *Industrial Groupings in Japan* was used to determine the investing firm's keiretsu membership (*Keiretsu*) status. The variables used to calculate a firm's previous investment totals are derived from the Toyo Keizai *Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyō Soran*.

The *Japan Company Handbook* and PACAP database also were used to determine a firm's "Approximate Total Factor Productivity" (*ATFP*), calculated as  $ATFP = \ln Q/L - s \ln K/L$ , where  $Q$ ,  $L$  and  $K$  denote output, employment and capital, respectively, with  $s = 1/3$ . This follows Griliches and Mairesse (1990). A concern in regard to calculating *ATFP*—or any total factor productivity measure for that matter—is the simultaneity bias associated with its computation. This bias arises, because the firm can observe its output and change its factor input mix, yielding biased OLS estimates of the production function and, therefore, biased productivity estimates. As our dataset provides information on firm-level intermediate input purchases, we can correct for this bias by employing Levinsohn and Petrin's (2003) estimation technique and the accompanying STATA program. While highly correlated with the *ATFP* measure (as noted in Table 2), the Levinsohn-Petrin TFP (*TFP*) measure is the more econometrically consistent of the two measures.

#### **A.4.2 Country-Specific Characteristics**

The countries included in this sample are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-

land, and the UK. Data for *Ind. Production* and *Ind. Concentration* are found in the OECD STAN (2005) dataset. Data for industry-level wage rates (*ForeignWages*) and the *RelativeWage* variables are from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 'Hourly Compensation Costs for Production Workers in Manufacturing' data, which is reported U.S. dollars. *Tax Rates*, measured as the host's top corporate tax rate, is courtesy of the University of Michigan's Office of Tax Policy Research. Exchange rates are determined from the IMF's *International Financial Statistics* CD-ROM.

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


Figure 1: Joint venture vs M&A vs wholly-owned subsidiary

Table 1: FDI Data Description

Affiliate Type	Number of Investments
Manufacturing Investments	
Merger/Acquisitions	100
Greenfield Investments	255
Joint Ventures	223
Wholesale/Retail Investments	181
Parent Information	
# w/ Manuf. Invst.	285
Avg. per Parent	2.02
# w/ Whlsle/Retl Invst.	100
Avg. per Parent	1.81

Notes: \* - percentage of manufacturing investments

Table 2: Correlation of Firm-Specific Characteristics

	TFP	ATFP	Size	Sales	MktCap	Export	R&D	KeiretsuMember
TFP	1							
ATFP	0.826	1						
Size	0.558	0.542	1					
Sales	0.571	0.408	0.958	1				
Mkt. Cap	0.022	0.037	-0.005	0.013	1			
Exports	0.030	0.035	0.079	0.100	-0.074	1		
R&D	0.115	0.217	0.207	0.173	-0.050	0.048	1	
Keiretsu	0.356	0.377	0.270	0.255	-0.110	0.003	0.191	1

Table 3: Means of Firm-Specific Characteristics

<i>All Firms</i>	M&A	WOS	Joint Venture	Whlsale/ Retail	ANOVA	
					F-stat	p-value
TFP	3.329	3.397	3.352	3.180	8.15	2.45e-5*
Size <sup>a</sup>	402,158	697,752	485,211	122,044	18.192	2.11e-11*
Sales <sup>a</sup>	352,687	742,073	494,970	101,861	17.514	5.34e-11
Mkt. Cap <sup>b</sup>	2.03e+7	1.75e+7	1.79e+7	2.87e+7	0.551	0.648
Export <sup>c</sup>	26.39	23.83	17.82	23.01	1.789	0.148
R&D	3.83	4.38	4.41	4.12	0.905	0.438
Keiretsu <sup>c</sup>	0.606	0.655	0.679	0.436	10.068	1.65e-6*
<i>SIC 28</i>						
TFP	3.328	3.401	3.349	3.174	1.117	0.096***
Size <sup>a</sup>	500,438	363,568	308,876	126,813	7.611	1.10e-4*
Sales <sup>a</sup>	395,733	297,521	304,239	98,284	6.023	7.65e-4
Mkt. Cap <sup>b</sup>	7.89e+6	6.96e+6	1.42e+7	7.03e+7	2.372	0.074***
Export <sup>c</sup>	10.17	8.03	12.15	11.20	1.819	0.148
R&D <sup>c</sup>	4.80	5.47	5.30	5.94	0.448	0.719
Keiretsu <sup>c</sup>	0.684	0.692	0.824	0.800	0.862	0.462
<i>SIC 35</i>						
TFP	3.322	3.382	3.371	3.201	2.188	0.073***
Size <sup>a</sup>	414,426	732,571	536,858	74,501	8.915	1.79e-5*
Sales <sup>a</sup>	340,882	765,330	535,699	57,908	7.843	6.75e-5*
Mkt. Cap <sup>b</sup>	1.31e+7	9.19e+5	6.70e+6	1.51e+7	2.786	0.043**
Export <sup>c</sup>	18.94	27.76	21.69	25.14	1.515	0.213
R&D <sup>c</sup>	3.37	4.51	4.55	3.03	3.859	0.011**
Keiretsu <sup>c</sup>	0.556	0.694	0.724	0.310	7.875	6.49e-5*
<i>SIC 36</i>						
TFP	3.332	3.403	3.347	3.177	4.193	0.007*
Size <sup>a</sup>	269,801	669,471	612,553	73,536	3.623	0.015**
Sales <sup>a</sup>	220,013	662,941	618,850	59,044	3.396	0.020**
Mkt. Cap <sup>b</sup>	1.72e+7	3.57e+6	6.80e+6	5.43e+7	2.944	0.036**
Export <sup>c</sup>	24.42	35.49	24.45	28.49	2.596	0.055***
R&D <sup>c</sup>	4.87	4.51	4.23	4.87	0.367	0.777
Keiretsu <sup>c</sup>	0.750	0.706	0.546	0.171	10.856	2.13e-6*

Notes: a - Millions of Yen, b - Billions of Yen, c - Measured as a dummy variable (1= keiretsu member, 0 otherwise); \*, \*\*, \*\*\* - significant at the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-level.



Table 4: Nested Logit Estimates of Partially Degenerate Three-Stage Model of Ownership Choice and Entry Decisions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
TFP	0.914 <sup>a</sup> (0.212)	.	FDI vs. Export (Stage 1)	.	0.903 <sup>a</sup> (0.210)	0.894 <sup>a</sup> (0.207)
ATFP	.	0.686 <sup>a</sup> (0.304)	.	.	.	.
R&D	.	.	0.754 <sup>c</sup> (0.401)	0.738 <sup>c</sup> (0.400)	0.721 <sup>c</sup> (0.400)	0.717 <sup>c</sup> (0.398)
Sunk Costs	-0.172 <sup>b</sup> (0.083)	-0.173 <sup>b</sup> (0.084)	-0.171 <sup>b</sup> (0.086)	-0.170 <sup>c</sup> (0.091)	-0.169 <sup>c</sup> (0.091)	-0.169 <sup>c</sup> (0.092)
Ind. Production	1.321 <sup>c</sup> (0.717)	1.317 <sup>c</sup> (0.721)	1.324 <sup>c</sup> (0.714)	1.324 <sup>c</sup> (0.713)	1.319 <sup>c</sup> (0.719)	1.319 <sup>c</sup> (0.720)
Relative Wage	0.617 <sup>c</sup> (0.331)	0.615 <sup>c</sup> (0.330)	0.618 <sup>c</sup> (0.333)	0.618 <sup>c</sup> (0.333)	0.614 <sup>c</sup> (0.331)	0.614 <sup>c</sup> (0.331)
Distance	0.216 <sup>c</sup> (0.114)	0.216 <sup>c</sup> (0.114)	0.218 <sup>c</sup> (0.116)	0.216 <sup>c</sup> (0.117)	0.214 (0.124)	0.214 (0.124)
Exports	.	.	.	.	0.005 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)
Firm Age	.	.	.	.	0.021 <sup>a</sup> (0.008)	0.019 <sup>a</sup> (0.009)
Mkt. Cap	.	.	.	.	1.213 (1.112)	1.209 (1.108)
Exchange Rate	.	.	.	.	0.004 (0.012)	0.006 (0.100)
Tax Rates	.	.	.	.	2.286 (3.184)	2.252 (3.172)
Prev. FDI Sample	.	.	.	.	.	0.171 <sup>a</sup> (0.070)
Prev. FDI Host	.	.	.	.	.	0.181 <sup>a</sup> (0.079)
Keiretsu	.	.	.	.	.	0.807 (0.578)
TFP	0.231 <sup>c</sup> (0.121)	.	Greenfield vs M&A (Stage 2)	.	0.230 <sup>c</sup> (0.122)	0.228 <sup>c</sup> (0.122)
ATFP	.	0.117 (0.317)	.	0.231 <sup>c</sup> (0.121)	.	.
R&D	.	.	3.101 <sup>b</sup> (1.428)	3.079 <sup>b</sup> (1.411)	3.067 <sup>b</sup> (1.387)	3.066 <sup>b</sup> (1.388)
Sunk Costs	-0.142 <sup>b</sup> (0.067)	-0.141 <sup>b</sup> (0.066)	-0.141 <sup>b</sup> (0.066)	-0.141 <sup>b</sup> (0.066)	-0.139 <sup>b</sup> (0.067)	-0.139 <sup>b</sup> (0.068)
Ind. Production	1.412 <sup>b</sup> (0.647)	1.406 <sup>b</sup> (0.651)	1.405 <sup>b</sup> (0.651)	1.403 <sup>b</sup> (0.651)	1.401 <sup>b</sup> (0.655)	1.400 <sup>b</sup> (0.655)
Foreign Wage	0.472 <sup>c</sup> (0.255)	0.469 <sup>c</sup> (0.257)	0.468 <sup>c</sup> (0.255)	0.453 <sup>c</sup> (0.258)	0.455 <sup>c</sup> (0.261)	0.455 <sup>c</sup> (0.261)
Exports	.	.	.	.	0.006 (0.006)	0.006 (0.006)
Firm Age	.	.	.	.	0.004 (0.009)	0.001 (0.008)
Mkt. Cap	.	.	.	.	0.296 (0.642)	0.294 (0.643)
Exchange Rate	.	.	.	.	0.017 <sup>c</sup> (0.009)	0.018 <sup>c</sup> (0.010)
Tax Rates	.	.	.	.	-3.712 (4.412)	-3.686 (4.137)
Prev. GR Sample	.	.	.	.	.	0.418 <sup>c</sup> (0.201)
Prev. GR Host	.	.	.	.	.	0.411 <sup>c</sup> (0.221)
Keiretsu	.	.	.	.	.	-0.079 (0.088)
TFP	0.335 <sup>c</sup> (0.168)	.	WOS vs JV (Stage 3)	.	0.331 <sup>c</sup> (0.169)	0.331 <sup>c</sup> (0.170)
ATFP	.	0.261 (0.157)	.	0.334 <sup>c</sup> (0.169)	.	.
R&D	.	.	0.172 (0.972)	0.171 (0.971)	0.168 (0.964)	0.167 (0.967)
Ind. Concentration	0.452 <sup>b</sup> (0.211)	0.461 <sup>b</sup> (0.214)	0.458 <sup>b</sup> (0.213)	0.453 <sup>b</sup> (0.211)	0.449 <sup>b</sup> (0.211)	0.447 <sup>b</sup> (0.212)
Exports	.	.	.	.	0.022 <sup>a</sup> (0.007)	0.021 <sup>a</sup> (0.007)
Firm Age	.	.	.	.	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.007)
Mkt. Cap	.	.	.	.	0.347 (1.011)	0.344 (1.009)
Exchange Rate	.	.	.	.	0.004(0.003)	0.004 (0.003)
Tax Rates	.	.	.	.	4.918 (3.542)	4.574 (3.182)
Prev. WOS Sample	.	.	.	.	.	0.389 <sup>b</sup> (0.193)
Prev. WOS Host	.	.	.	.	.	0.371 <sup>b</sup> (0.178)
Keiretsu	.	.	.	.	.	-0.058 (0.258)
Obs.	759	759	759	759	759	759
Log-Likelihood	-527.676	-520.154	-518.623	-511.147	-502.489	-496.317
LR test	142.8	140.8	138.8	144.71	147.81	151.3
Prob > $\chi^2$	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Time, country, and industry dummy variables included. <sup>a</sup>, <sup>b</sup>, <sup>c</sup>-significant at the 1%, 5% and 10%-levels, respectively.

Table 5: Robustness Test of Sunk Cost Estimates in Three-Stage Nested Logit Model

	(1)	(2)	(3)
FDI vs. Export (Stage 1)			
TFP	0.907 <sup>a</sup> (0.211)	0.907 <sup>a</sup> (0.210)	0.907 <sup>a</sup> (0.210)
R&D	0.738 <sup>c</sup> (0.400)	0.737 <sup>c</sup> (0.400)	0.737 <sup>c</sup> (0.399)
Sunk Costs_Collective Dismissal	-0.147 <sup>c</sup> (0.075)	.	.
Sunk Costs_Manufacturing Exits	.	0.123 (0.077)	.
Sunk Costs_Country Exits	.	.	0.103 (0.627)
Ind. Production	1.323 <sup>c</sup> (0.713)	1.320 <sup>c</sup> (0.719)	1.319 <sup>c</sup> (0.720)
Relative Wage	0.618 <sup>c</sup> (0.333)	0.615 <sup>c</sup> (0.331)	0.616 <sup>c</sup> (0.331)
Distance	0.216 <sup>c</sup> (0.117)	0.216 <sup>c</sup> (0.118)	0.216 (0.119)
Greenfield vs M&A (Stage 2)			
TFP	0.231 <sup>c</sup> (0.121)	0.230 <sup>c</sup> (0.122)	0.230 <sup>c</sup> (0.122)
R&D	3.079 <sup>b</sup> (1.411)	3.070 <sup>b</sup> (1.387)	3.069 <sup>b</sup> (1.388)
Sunk Costs_Collective Dismissal	0.083 <sup>c</sup> (0.043)	.	.
Sunk Costs_Manufacturing Exits	.	0.078 (0.052)	.
Sunk Costs_Country Exits	.	.	0.081 (0.051)
Ind. Production	1.403 <sup>b</sup> (0.651)	1.403 <sup>b</sup> (0.655)	1.402 <sup>b</sup> (0.655)
Foreign Wage	-0.453 <sup>c</sup> (0.258)	-0.455 <sup>c</sup> (0.261)	-0.454 <sup>c</sup> (0.261)
Obs.	759	455	470
Log-Likelihood	-511.147	-318.124	-324.317
LR test	144.71	58.18	61.21
Prob > $\chi^2$	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parenthesis. Time, country, and industry dummy variables included. <sup>a</sup>, <sup>b</sup>, <sup>c</sup>-significant at the 1%, 5% and 10%-levels, respectively.

Table 6: A Two-Stage Model of Ownership Choice and Entry Decisions

	(1)		(2)	
First Stage (FDI vs Export)				
TFP	0.712 <sup>a</sup> (0.259)		0.710 <sup>a</sup> (0.247)	
R&D	0.444 <sup>b</sup> (0.216)		0.442 <sup>b</sup> (0.218)	
Sunk Costs	-0.118 <sup>c</sup> (0.061)		-0.118 <sup>c</sup> (0.061)	
Ind. Production	0.989 <sup>c</sup> (0.513)		0.986 <sup>c</sup> (0.511)	
Relative Wage	0.342 <sup>c</sup> (0.175)		0.342 <sup>c</sup> (0.177)	
Distance	0.189 <sup>c</sup> (0.101)		0.188 <sup>c</sup> (0.101)	
Exports	.		0.009 (0.006)	
Firm Age	.		0.008 <sup>b</sup> (0.004)	
Mkt. Cap	.		0.547 (0.441)	
Exchange Rate	.		0.007 (0.022)	
Tax Rates	.		0.972 (1.113)	
Prev. FDI Sample	.		0.099 <sup>a</sup> (0.042)	
Prev. FDI Host	.		0.094 <sup>a</sup> (0.041)	
Keiretsu	.		0.407 (0.511)	
Second Stage (WOS vs. M&A vs. JV)				
	<u>M&amp;A</u>	<u>JV</u>	<u>M&amp;A</u>	<u>JV</u>
TFP	-0.638 <sup>b</sup> (0.309)	0.027 (0.287)	-0.636 <sup>b</sup> (0.311)	0.027 (0.289)
R&D	-0.717 <sup>b</sup> (0.354)	0.114 (0.101)	-0.714 <sup>b</sup> (0.361)	0.118 (0.103)
Sunk Costs	0.171 <sup>b</sup> (0.084)	0.109 (0.142)	0.171 <sup>b</sup> (0.086)	0.110 (0.137)
Ind. Production	1.386 (0.811)	0.571 (0.611)	1.371 (0.789)	0.571 (0.614)
Ind. Concentration	-0.214 <sup>c</sup> (0.111)	-0.408 <sup>c</sup> (0.211)	-0.212 <sup>c</sup> (0.112)	-0.408 <sup>c</sup> (0.213)
Foreign Wage	-0.387 <sup>c</sup> (0.201)	0.214 (0.178)	-0.385 <sup>c</sup> (0.201)	0.212 (0.181)
Exports	.	.	0.011 (0.008)	-0.019 <sup>c</sup> (0.010)
Firm Age	.	.	0.142 (0.099)	-0.046 (0.033)
Mkt. Cap	.	.	0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.003)
Exchange Rates	.	.	-0.032 <sup>b</sup> (0.015)	0.008 (0.007)
Tax Rates	.	.	-1.117 (1.060)	2.104 (1.873)
Prev. WOS Sample	.	.	-0.643 <sup>b</sup> (0.314)	-0.318 <sup>b</sup> (0.145)
Prev. WOS Host	.	.	-0.589 <sup>b</sup> (0.287)	-0.299 <sup>b</sup> (0.141)
Keiretsu	.	.	-0.109 (0.478)	0.346 (0.442)
Obs	759		759	
LR test	123.27		129.47	
Prob $\hat{\lambda}$ $\chi^2$	0.032		0.021	

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Time, country, and industry dummy variables included. <sup>a</sup>, <sup>b</sup>, <sup>c</sup>-significant at the 1%, 5% and 10%-levels, respectively.