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## ADB Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration



### The People's Republic of China and India: Commercial Policies in the Giants

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Ganeshan Wignaraja

No. 83 | June 2011





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## **Abstract**

This paper analyses the link between commercial policies and exports through a comparative analysis of the Asian giants—the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and India. While the PRC has surged ahead of India to dominate world manufactured exports, India has acquired competitive capabilities in skill-intensive services. Favorable initial conditions such as large domestic markets and low-cost productive labor have laid the foundations for the giants’ export success. While the gradual switch to market-oriented commercial policies in the late 1970s drove trade-led growth in the giants, the PRC’s reforms were swifter and more coordinated. It has introduced an open door policy towards foreign direct investment (FDI), actively facilitated technological upgrading through FDI, steadily liberalized a controlled import regime, ensured a competitive exchange rate, and concluded more comprehensive free trade agreements (FTAs) with Asia’s developing economies. India has attempted to develop more effective commercial policies since 1991, especially to attract FDI and liberalize imports. Therefore, one might expect the gap in trade performance between the PRC and India to narrow over time. However, both giants face an uncertain world economic environment in the aftermath of the global financial crisis and future export success will depend on their evolving commercial policies. Critical issues that still to be resolved include how the giants will respond to the risk of protectionism, manage real exchange rates, promote the use of FTAs among businesses, and increase spending on infrastructure as well as research and development.

*Keywords:* FTAs, free trade agreements, People’s Republic of China, India, commercial policy, trade

*JEL Classification:* F13, P33, O24 and O53





## 1. Introduction

The rise of the two giant Asian economies—the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and India—will have profound implications for the world economy for decades to come. Until the late 1970s, the PRC and India were poor economies with inward-oriented trade and investment regimes, central planning, and lackluster export sectors. A shift in commercial policies saw their rise as huge global exporters. Already, they make up over one-third of the world’s population and about one-tenth of its exports. The giants’ exports increasingly comprise sophisticated manufactures and services, rather than simple labor intensive exports. Rapid trade-led growth has lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty in both economies. And the giants’ exports and growth have rebounded faster than many others following the global financial crisis. This success is remarkable among Asia’s newly industrializing economies and even large developed countries (Amsden 2001, Madison 2007, Gerhaeuser et al. 2010).

A growing body of literature has focused on the giants’ rise in world trade and the influence of commercial policies. Four major lines of research can be distinguished.

The first suggests that the PRC’s remarkable structural transformation to the production of manufactures for export beginning in the late 1970s was largely unforeseen. Informed analysts note that the PRC’s performance “already has been the largest growth surprise ever experienced by the world economy” (Winters and Yusuf 2007, p. 1) and project that the two giants will both be among the world’s largest trading economies within a couple of decades (Winters and Yusuf 2007, Madison 2007).

The second line of research differentiates between the giants and credits India with turning the corner beginning in the 1990s, but argues that its export performance is still not comparable to that of the PRC (Panagariya 2007). It is further argued that both countries started economic liberalization in the late 1970s, but the PRC was swifter with the launch of an open door policy toward foreign direct investment (FDI) in 1978, while India did not adopt a major reform package until 1991 (Lardy 2003, Panagariya 2006 and 2007, Kowalski 2010).

The third notes that freer trade and markets were pivotal to the giants’ export success, but that active industrial policies in the PRC played a complementary role in nurturing domestic capabilities in consumer electronics and other advanced areas that may not have developed in their absence (Amsden 2001, Rodrick 2006). Implicit in this third line of thinking is that the absence of any new industrial policies since 1991 may in part explain why India lags behind the PRC in advanced manufactured exports.

Fourth, concerns have been expressed that the giants’ recent pursuit of free trade agreements (FTAs) may be detrimental to exporting due to the shallow coverage of agreements and an Asian “noodle bowl” of overlapping FTAs (Baldwin 2008, Suominen 2009).

This paper explores the link between commercial policies and export performance through a comparative analysis of the PRC and India. Commercial policies are narrowly defined as international commercial policies that include the spectrum of trade and investment policies affecting imports, exports, and FDI. In the context of economic reforms, such policies encompass import liberalization, export promotion, real exchange rates, FDI policies, and FTAs. The domestic counterpart of commercial policy—notably competition policy that prevents and reduces the abuse of monopoly power—is excluded due to a lack of recent information. Existing research underlines the complexity of the giants' commercial policy mix and suggests further exploration of four interesting questions: (i) have the PRC's exports outpaced India's? (ii) what role has liberalization of trade and investment regimes played in the giants' export records? (iii) is the recent emphasis on FTAs detrimental to exports? (iv) what are the emerging commercial policy challenges in the post-global financial crisis era?

Building on existing research and using new data, the remainder of the paper tackles these questions. Section 2 looks at initial conditions influencing trade and trade performance. It examines the giants' export record by describing the evolution of trade flows at the aggregate and sectoral levels (focusing on growth and structural change in manufactured and services exports, as well as revealed comparative advantages). Section 3 explores the link between shifts in key commercial policies (e.g., import liberalization, World Trade Organization [WTO] accession, export promotion, and FDI policies) and trade flows. Section 4 examines whether FTAs have been detrimental to exporting. It evaluates FTA quality in terms of some simple criteria and provides evidence on the use of FTAs at the firm level. Section 5 explores emerging commercial policy challenges in the post-global financial crisis era. Section 6 concludes.

## **2. Initial Conditions and Trade Performance**

### **2.1 Initial Conditions**

Initial conditions often shape trade outcomes following economic liberalization. Three key initial conditions in both countries laid the foundation for subsequent trade patterns and performances following economic liberalization in the late 1970s.

One is that geographical proximity to a major developed economy can have spillover effects on its neighbors. The PRC's strategic location in East Asia and shared history with its neighbors meant that it was well placed to attract export-oriented manufacturing FDI from Japan, the Republic of Korea, and economies from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Geographical proximity, along with low-cost labor and large market size, may have also influenced the relocation of production networks and supply chains from ASEAN economies to the PRC. India is less well-placed geographically to attract FDI from East Asia, but is closer to Europe than the PRC and enjoys closer ties due to its legacy of British rule.

The second are the large and growing domestic markets that create a competitive advantage for any product with substantial economies of scale (e.g., automobiles,

electronics assembly) and lower barriers to entry. So how large are the Chinese and Indian markets? It is estimated that industrial producers in the PRC face a potential market of about \$1 trillion, while India's industrial producers face a potential market that is one-quarter to one-third of the PRC's size (Yusuf, Nabeshima, and Perkins 2007).

Third is an ample supply of low-cost, productive manpower to attract FDI and provide the basis for a comparative advantage in low technology, labor-intensive exports. Various competitiveness studies have suggested that the PRC's labor productivity is higher than India's and that this advantage underlies the PRC's entry into labor-intensive manufactures (World Economic Forum 2010). Meanwhile, the roots of India's relative success in information technology (IT) and business process outsourcing lie in other factors, including its exposure to English and a long period of British colonial rule; the establishment of Indian Institutes of Technology that provide a base of world class IT professionals and engineers; close links with a diaspora of professionals and business people who provided relevant contacts, information, and capital; and falling telecommunications costs that made it profitable to outsource services (Yusuf, Nabeshima, and Perkins 2007; Kowalski 2010).

### 2.1.1 Overall Trade Performance

To trace the link between economic liberalization and trade performance in the giants, Table 1 shows the expansion of aggregate exports and imports of goods and services between 1978 and 2009. The data are from the World Bank's *World Development Indicators* and the indicators are presented as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) and world trade. The ratios of exports and imports to GDP are often used as proxies for openness, although the latter also reflects the availability of foreign exchange. Using comparable WTO trade data for 2010, estimates for 2010 are also provided. Several noteworthy points are explained below.

First, the PRC's earlier and swifter adoption of trade liberalization is highlighted by a comparison between its ratio of exports of goods and services to GDP, and ratio of imports of goods and services to GDP, with India's comparable ratios. In 1978, the PRC and India were at similar low levels of openness—both had exports- and imports-to-GDP ratios of 6%–7%—reflecting a history of restrictive trade regimes and state control. With increasing trade liberalization in the PRC, its ratios of exports and imports to GDP more than doubled between 1978 and 1991, while India's ratios showed little change. In the aftermath of India's 1991 liberalization, a modest increase in its openness occurred between 1991 and 1998, and a significant increase took place between 1998 and 2008. The PRC maintained its openness throughout the 1990s and also saw a rise in exports- and imports-to-GDP ratios between 1998 and 2008. By 2008, in terms of exports (goods and services), the PRC was considerably more open than India, but there was little difference in terms of their imports-to-GDP ratios. The PRC's ratio of exports to GDP was 36.6% in 2008, compared with 22.7% for India. Yet, the ratios of imports to GDP in 2008 were much more similar to each other, with 28.5% for the PRC and 28.0% for India. Thus, the PRC was relatively more open than India over several decades, but the latter has made considerable progress, particularly since the late 1990s.

Second, as the PRC's GDP has expanded faster than India's since the 1970s, the trade-to-GDP ratios understate the spectacular growth of the PRC's trade. The respective dollar values of exports and shares of world exports give a better picture of the difference in export performance between the two giants. In 1978, the two giants had about the same level of exports of goods and services, as well as similar world shares of exports: the PRC exported \$9.8 billion worth of goods and services, compared with \$8.6 billion for India. These figures were both equivalent to about 0.6% of world exports of goods and services. By 2008, the PRC's exports of goods and services reached a staggering \$1.6 trillion, or 8.0% of world exports. The comparable figures for India were \$263 billion and 1.3%.

Third, the giants' trade was relatively resilient in the wake of the global financial crisis. Following the crisis, exports of goods and services in the PRC fell to \$1.3 trillion in 2009 while India's exports increased slightly to \$270 billion. In 2010, both experienced a sharp rebound in exports of goods and services, which rose to \$1.7 trillion in the PRC and \$326 billion in India. Interestingly, these levels were in excess of pre-crisis levels in both countries, underscoring the importance of large dynamic domestic markets, competitive export capabilities, and the growing importance of South–South trade cooperation (Wignaraja and Lazaro 2010).

Fourth, as developed countries experienced a greater fall in exports than the giants during the global financial crisis and a sluggish response thereafter, the world export shares of the PRC and India rose to 11.8% and 2.2%, respectively. According to the WTO, the PRC's 2010 share of global exports placed it among the leading exporters in the world. The United States (US) was the world's largest exporter in 2010 with a 12.1% global share. The PRC (11.8%) is next, followed by Germany (10.1%) and Japan (6.1%).<sup>1</sup> The PRC is also the leading exporter among the so-called club of large "BRIC" nations, which also includes Brazil (1.6%), the Russian Federation (3.0%), and India (2.2%). In 2010, the ratio of exports of goods and services to GDP rose to 31.8% for the PRC and 22.9% for India. A similar rise was visible in their respective imports-to-GDP ratios.

### 2.1.2 Growth of Manufactures and Services

The PRC's exceptional export performance since 1978 has been driven primarily by the production of manufactures for export. As Table 2 shows, the PRC's manufactured export growth rate of 26.7% (current US dollars) in 1995–2008 was nearly twice as fast as India's growth rate of 15.4%. Even more striking perhaps, the PRC increased its share of the world's manufactured exports from 0.5% to 10.8% between 1985 and 2008, while India's share only rose from 0.5% to 1.3% over the same period.

Further differences are visible in the composition of manufactured exports. Table 2 presents United Nations (UN) Commodity Trade data on manufactured exports for the two giants according to a technology-based classification system developed by Lall

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<sup>1</sup> In 2010, the People's Republic of China's (PRC) merchandise exports (\$1,580 billion) were larger than the US (\$1,280 billion). But the US is a larger services exporter (\$515 billion) than the PRC (\$170 billion). See WTO (2011).

(2001). This method distinguishes between resource-based, low-technology, medium-technology, and high-technology manufactures.

Resource-based products tend to be simple and labor-intensive (e.g., simple food or leather processing), although there are segments using capital-, scale-, and skill-intensive technologies (e.g., petroleum refining or modern processed food). Low-technology products tend to have stable, well-diffused technologies, primarily embodied in capital equipment (e.g., textiles, garments, and footwear). Medium-technology products, which consist of the majority of skill- and scale-intensive technologies used in capital goods and intermediate products, lie at the core of industrial activity in developed countries. High-technology products have advanced and fast-changing technologies, with large R&D investments and a focus on product design (e.g., electronic and electrical products, aircraft, precision instruments, and pharmaceuticals). Annual average growth rates in manufacturing, shares in manufactured exports, and shares of world exports by technological category in 1985–2008 are provided in Table 2. Further detail is provided below.

- Among the PRC's manufactured exports, high-technology exports grew the fastest and resource-based exports the slowest. Meanwhile, India's medium-technology exports grew the fastest and low-technology exports the slowest.
- Both giants have enjoyed a quickened pace to the technological upgrading of their manufactured exports since 1985, but the PRC's speed of technological sophistication has been quite striking. Between 1985 and 2008, the PRC's share of high-technology exports in its total manufactures increased more than five times to reach 27.7% in 2008. The PRC's medium-technology exports also rose by a factor of three to reach 37.0%. During the same period, India's shares of high-technology exports and medium-technology exports doubled to 8.3% and 24.9%, respectively. Nonetheless, India's manufactured exports are typically concentrated at the lower end of the technology spectrum, with resource-based products accounting for one-third of manufactures and low-technology products accounting for another third.
- The PRC has dominated world markets in low-technology products for well over a decade and in 2008 it accounted for 18.1% of the world's low-technology exports. It also accounts for 10.3% of the world's medium-technology exports and 14.3% of high-technology exports. This is why the PRC is viewed by many developing countries as the main competitive threat across the technological spectrum (Lall 2001). It is also seen as an outlier in terms of the sophistication of its exports: "its export bundle is that of a country with an income per capita level three times higher than [the PRC's]" (Rodrick 2006, p.4). Meanwhile, India accounts for less than 1% of the world's medium-technology and high-technology exports, and is perceived as less of a competitive threat in the developing world. Even more revealing about India's manufacturing capability is that it has a limited global presence in low-technology exports (2.5% in 2008) and resource-based exports (1.7% in 2008).

India's recent export expansion has been led by services rather than manufacturing. India has likewise kept pace with the PRC in services export growth. A profile of India and the PRC's services exports during 1985–2008 is shown in Table 3, including growth

in services exports (current US dollars), the composition of services exports by broad categories, and world market shares. India's services export grew 16.1% per year compared with 18.6% in the PRC during 1985–2008. In 1985, both giants were relatively small players in global services exports, with less than 1% shares each. By 2008, these shares had risen to 2.7% in India and 3.8% in the PRC. These figures may mask what India has typically excelled in: more sophisticated, skill-intensive services exports. India has done better in IT and business process outsourcing, as well as insurance and financial services. In 2008, India accounted for 4.7% of world IT and business processing outsourcing exports, compared with 4.1% for the PRC. Similarly, India accounted for 1.9% of world insurance and financial services exports, while the PRC's share was 0.6%.

### 2.1.3 Revealed Comparative Advantage

The revealed comparative advantage (RCA) index shows the specific sectors in which the PRC and India are gaining or losing advantage internationally. Following Balassa (1977), the RCA index is expressed as the share of a country's exports in world trade of sector  $j$  divided by that country's share of world trade in manufactures:

$$RCA_{ij} = (X_{ij} / X_{wj}) / (X_{im} / X_{wm}) \quad (1)$$

where  $X_{ij}$  = sectoral exports from the country

$X_{wj}$  = sectoral exports from the world

$X_{im}$  = total manufactured exports from the country

$X_{wm}$  = total manufactured exports from the world

Assuming that the commodity pattern of trade reflects inter-country differences in relative costs and no-price factors, this measure shows the comparative advantage of trading countries. The RCA index has a simple interpretation. An  $RCA_{ij} > 1$  means that the sector has a larger share in world trade than the country's total manufactures and that the country has an RCA in that sector.

Batra and Khan (2005) have conducted one of the most comprehensive studies of sector-level revealed RCA for goods exports on the PRC and India since the switch in commercial policies. Using the Balassa RCA index, they find that at the 2-digit HS level both countries have a comparable number of sectors (47 in the PRC and 41 in India) with an RCA in 2000–2003. They also report similarities in the pattern of specialization in primary products, resource-based manufactures, and labor-intensive manufactures in the PRC and India. However, important differences emerge in science-and-technology-intensive sectors. While India and the PRC are advantageously placed in the same commodity sectors with respect to science-based manufactures, “in absolute terms the PRC's science based industries are almost double the number of India” (Batra and Khan 2005, p. 49).

How has the pattern of RCA changed over time? Tables 4 and 5 show RCA indices for the PRC and India in 2009 at the 2-digit level of the HS classification. These were calculated using export data from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database. RCA estimates for goods exports in 2000 from Batra and Khan (2005) are also shown. Unfortunately, RCA indices for services exports are not available from WITS. Some comparisons are as follows.

The evidence suggests that the PRC's comparative advantage at the sector-level appears more robust than India's. The number of sectors with an RCA in both countries was approximately the same between 2000 and 2009. But in 2009, the PRC still had more sectors with an RCA than India and more visible relative strength in manufactured exports, particularly medium- and high-technology products. Out of 97 sectors at the HS 2-digit level in 2009, the PRC had 44 sectors with an RCA index above one while India had 37.

Low-technology manufactured products dominate the PRC's top 10 sectors according to RCA indices. Manufactures of plaiting material (HS 46) and umbrellas, walking sticks, and seat sticks (HS 66) are the two highest ranked RCA sectors in the PRC. Also prominent in the PRC are artificial flowers, human hair headgear, textiles, apparel, footwear, and leather articles. In contrast, India's top 10 RCAs comprise a mix of primary products, resource-based manufactures, and some low-technology manufactures. India's top two sectors are pearls, precious stones, metals, and coins (HS 71) and silk (HS 50). These are followed by carpets, other textile flooring, cotton, lac, gums, vegetable textile fibers, paper yarn, woven fabric, ores, slag, ash, vegetable plaiting materials, vegetable products, other textiles, bird skin, and feathers.

Furthermore, as indicated above, there has been a growing divergence between the giants in medium- and high-technology products since 2000 with respect to specialization as well as in absolute terms. Several examples tell the story. Crucial high-technology manufactured products like electrical and electronics products (HS 85) jumped from 43rd to 25th in the PRC's RCA rankings between 2000 and 2009, but is not visible in India's list of 37 products with an RCA of more than one. In addition, the PRC had an impressive world market share of 18.4% in electrical and electronics products in 2009. Another example is ships, boats, and floating structures (a medium-technology product). These were ranked 23rd and 22nd in their respective RCA lists. However, the PRC had one-fifth of the world market in ships, boats, and floating structures, while India had only 2.6%. Similar tales are visible in other medium- and high-technology products including machinery, nuclear reactors, boilers, explosives, pyrotechnics, iron, and steel. Interestingly, the PRC's RCA ranking for railway products and equipment slipped from 11th to 43rd between 2000 and 2009, but it retains a 11.2% world market share. India enjoys some success in organic chemicals which increased from 31 to 27 with a world market share of 2.4%.

Thus, the giants differ considerably in their trade performances. The PRC has surged ahead of India in world export markets, with the PRC's volume of exports of goods and services now over five times larger than India's. The PRC's success is linked to the rise of manufactured exports, which have been upgraded technologically over time, and the expansion of some services. Strong RCAs in a host of medium- and high-technology



manufactured sectors are visible in the PRC. Meanwhile, India has done better in skill-intensive services than manufactures. Compared with developed countries, the giants' export performances have been relatively resilient since the global financial crisis. While each country's initial conditions were influential, they cannot account for the entire story of exports from the PRC and India. Commercial policies have also played a major role in facilitating specialization and trade.

### **3. Shifting Commercial Policies and Exports**

A central question concerns the role that the liberalization of trade and investment regimes has played in the giants' export records. This section focuses on key commercial policies—import liberalization, export promotion measures, and FDI policies—at the heart of the PRC and India's reforms. The giants are each considered separately below, followed by some comparisons of their commercial policies and export outcomes. Table 6 provides an overview of commercial policies, including their features and the timing of implementation.

#### **3.1 The People's Republic of China's Commercial Policies**

##### **3.1.1 Inward-Oriented Strategy**

The PRC initiated reforms in 1978 to shift to a more open market-oriented economy. The previous inward-oriented centrally-planned strategy had caused multiple economic distortions that hampered exports and private sector activity. The inward-oriented strategy introduced in the 1950s fostered import-substituting industrialization using stringent protections and state control of resource allocation. During the Maoist period, private sector firms, including foreign-owned firms, were gradually taken over and private sector ownership was completely eliminated in 1958 during the Great Leap Forward. Instead, state-owned enterprises emerged at the forefront of the country's industrialization effort. A formal state-owned enterprise sector made up of large firms and a proletarian elite of workers with job security and generous welfare benefits co-existed with less-capitalized, small-scale industrial enterprises based mainly in rural areas where workers enjoyed less security and benefits (Maddison 2007).

Some of the economic distortions that arose from the PRC's inward-oriented strategy are listed below.

(i) Stringent quantitative restrictions and other import controls led to a bias towards inefficient capital intensive production by large, state-owned enterprises.

(ii) The exchange rate was fixed at an overvalued level to implicitly subsidize the import of high-priority capital goods that could not be produced domestically. A rigid system of exchange control also existed whereby exporters surrendered all their foreign exchange to the state.

(iii) FDI and technology transfer were shut out by tight controls on the entry of foreign enterprises, resulting in technological obsolescence relative to global best practices.

(iv) Virtually all commodity trade was determined by central planning primarily to ensure that state-owned enterprises could obtain cheap imports of capital goods and intermediates. A handful of foreign trade cooperatives, all of which were owned and controlled by the Ministry of Foreign Trade, was responsible for carrying out the trade plan. Each of the foreign trade cooperatives dealt with a limited range of commodities for which it was the sole trading company.

Not surprisingly, owing to these inefficiencies and distortions, the PRC witnessed lackluster export performance during much of the inward-oriented, centrally-planned era. By 1978, the volume of its exports of goods and services had stagnated at less than \$10 billion, which was 0.6% of world exports of goods and services. The composition of exports was dominated by primary products, resource-based manufactures, and some low-technology manufactures. The time was ripe for a change in commercial policies toward export promotion and the private sector.

### **3.1.2 Open Door Foreign Direct Investment Policy and Other Reforms**

The post-1978 reforms marked the start of a gradual and highly coordinated transition process in the PRC over the next 3 decades. The initial focus of reforms was to promote exports by attracting FDI. In 1979, an export processing law was passed that provided incentives for the processing and assembly of imported inputs. These incentives were expanded in 1987 to provide for the duty-free import of all raw materials, parts, and components used in export production. Monopoly state trading was liberalized starting in the late 1970s and replaced with a complex and highly restrictive set of tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and licenses. Reform of the complex import control regime was more cautious during the early transition years, but was strengthened from 1992 onward by extensive reforms that the PRC agreed to implement as a part of the WTO accession process. Accordingly, a dualistic trade regime existed from the mid-1980s onward that promoted exports via FDI alongside controlled liberalization of protected domestic sectors (Kowalski 2010).

To attract export-oriented FDI, the PRC implemented five main measures beginning in the late 1970s (Zhang 2009):

(i) the easing of regulations governing the entry and operation of foreign enterprises through a series of laws, notably the Sino–Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law of 1979, Sino–Foreign Cooperative Joint Venture Law of 1986, and the Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprise Law of 1988 to encourage the formation of joint ventures between foreign and local investors, technology transfers to local partners, and domestic sourcing of inputs; in later years, measures were introduced to facilitate the operation of wholly owned foreign enterprises;

(ii) providing efficient, cost-competitive infrastructure for export processing commencing with four special economic zones (SEZs) along the PRC's southern coast to enable

foreign producers to operate with good infrastructure and a minimum of undue interference;

(iii) introducing a complex system of tax incentives (including a 15% corporate tax rate, exemptions, and refunds) and facilitating the financing to channel FDI toward SEZs;

(iv) formalizing a duty drawback system beginning in 1987 to ensure duty-free access to all imported raw materials, parts, and components for export processing; and

(v) applying liberal labor regulations in the SEZs to ensure relatively low wages for an ample supply of skilled workers.

Two other policies were vital to export growth, especially among domestic enterprises (Lardy 2003). First, there was the liberalization of the system of export licensing and quotas. Only 8% of exports were subject to export licensing and quotas by 1999, compared with a peak of about 66% in 1991.

Second, reforms of the foreign exchange system were initiated starting with unification of dual exchange rates in 1994 (Hu 2010). As a significant incentive for exporting, exporters were allowed to retain a share of their foreign exchange earnings, which enabled them to finance imports without needing to seek official permission. Over time, the state also devalued the domestic currency and in 1997 moved toward currency convertibility on current account transactions, making it even easier for exporters to obtain foreign currency. In 2005, the PRC moved more systematically towards a managed floating exchange rate regime based on market supply and demand with reference to a basket of currencies.

Despite the various measures to attract FDI and promote exports, FDI flows into the PRC were modest in the first decade or so of reforms. As Table 7 shows, annual average FDI inflows amounted to \$1.6 billion a year during 1978–1990 and were largely destined for the four SEZs. From the early 1990s onward, however, the PRC attracted record levels of FDI with inflows amounting to \$54.0 billion per year during 1991–2010. Annual FDI inflows in 2003–2010 of \$81.5 billion were more than double that during 1991–2002. Cumulative FDI flows into the PRC reached an impressive \$1,098.7 billion during 1978–2010. As a result, the PRC became the world's second largest FDI recipient after the US. Interestingly, the global financial crisis did not significantly disrupt FDI inflows, which dropped modestly from a peak of \$108.3 billion in 2008 to \$95.0 billion in 2009. FDI inflows subsequently rebounded to pre-crisis levels of \$105.7 billion in 2010.

A strong regional element is visible in the host country origin of the PRC's FDI inflows. Much of the surge in FDI inflows into the PRC since the 1990s came from overseas Chinese investors—primarily based in Hong Kong, China; Taipei, China; and Macao, China—who collectively accounted for 42.0% of cumulative FDI inflows during 1997–2006 (Zhang 2009). Another 21.2% came from other East Asian countries—primarily Japan, the Republic of Korea, and ASEAN members. Meanwhile, among non-regional countries, the US accounted for 7.8% of FDI and the European Union (EU) comprised 8.6%. Interestingly, the share of overseas Chinese investors rose significantly to 56.9%

in 2008. Meanwhile, the shares of other East Asian countries (17.3%), the EU (6.7%), and the US (6.4%) all declined somewhat.<sup>2</sup>

FDI had a dramatic impact on the PRC's exports. The share of foreign enterprises accounting for PRC exports increased from 32% to 58% between 1995 and 2005, before declining slightly to 54% in 2010.<sup>3</sup> FDI inflows have been fundamental to the PRC's success in manufactured exports by linking the country into production networks in key industries. FDI brought not only capital, but more importantly, access to marketing channels, world class technologies, and organizational methods. In the early years of reforms, FDI was central to the rise of low-technology, labor-intensive exports like textiles, garments, and footwear. Subsequently, the surge in FDI in the 1990s drove the rapid technological upgrading from manufactures into more complex activities like electronics and automotives.<sup>4</sup> The PRC used policies to facilitate technology upgrading and domestic technological development. Entry and operational regulations for foreign firms required them to form joint ventures with domestic firms, promote technology transfer to their local partners, and source inputs locally (Rodrick 2006). Furthermore, the PRC also invested heavily in R&D, scientists, and engineers to absorb imported technologies. Its R&D-expenditure-to-GDP ratio more than doubled from 0.6% to 1.5% between 1996 and 2007 (Table 11). The number of R&E researchers per million also doubled from 448 to 1,071 during this period.

More recently, the PRC has become a notable outward investor in the world economy (Table 7). During 1995–2005, annual outward FDI from the PRC was relatively small at \$3.8 billion per year. Such flows increased more than five times to about \$22 billion in 2006 and 2007, and peaked at \$52.2 billion in 2008 on the eve of the global financial crisis. Following the global financial crisis, there was a modest drop in the PRC's outward investment to about \$48 billion in 2009. The bulk of outward FDI has been in the primary and tertiary sectors, with relatively little going into manufacturing (Davies 2010). Most has gone to countries in Asia, but FDI from the PRC is now spreading throughout the world. In part, the growth of outward FDI reflects a combination of large export surpluses; rising wages; a global search for commodities to fuel industrialization; and the emergence of large, home-grown multinational corporations looking for overseas investment opportunities.

The liberalization of import controls began slowly and cautiously in the PRC from the early 1980s onward.<sup>5</sup> Two parallel stages in import liberalization can be identified that led to significant cuts in overall import protection over time. First, to move away from the direct planning of all trade, a simplified system of import quotas and licensing was adopted in the early 1980s, and the number of products under import controls was

<sup>2</sup> [www.fdi.gov.cn](http://www.fdi.gov.cn)

<sup>3</sup> 1995 and 2005 figures are taken from Anantaram and Saquib (2010) while the 2010 (January to August) data are from [www.fdi.gov.cn](http://www.fdi.gov.cn).

<sup>4</sup> For recent micro-level studies of the relationship between imported technology (via FDI and foreign buyers) and innovation, and learning in Chinese manufacturing (e.g. electronics, automotives, and textiles), see Wignaraja (2008 and 2011). The evidence indicates that the impressive use of imported technologies efficiently underlies the PRC's export success.

<sup>5</sup> Zhang et al (1998) evaluated the structure of trade protection in the PRC and present estimates of static costs. They suggest that trade liberalization would lead to short-term costs in terms of lost domestic output and employment, but estimate long-run benefits to be in the range of about \$35 billion.

reduced. The share of imports under quotas and licensing fell from 46% to 18% between the late 1980s and 1992, and still further to about 9% in 1997 (Lardy 2002, p. 39). Second, more transparent price-based instruments—import tariffs—were introduced in the early 1980s to replace quotas and licenses, and tariff reduction subsequently commenced. In 1985, a new customs regulation was passed that rationalized the tariff schedule. More notable tariff cuts occurred following the adoption of a socialist market economy in 1992.

The process of tariff reduction was also facilitated by the significant reforms that the country agreed to implement as a part of its accession to the WTO in 2001. Achieved after 14 years of difficult negotiations with General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO members, which resulted in the PRC agreeing to significant reductions in agricultural tariffs, the PRC's WTO membership was hailed as a major milestone in the development of its economy and the multilateral trading system. WTO membership is considered to have brought numerous benefits such as deepened integration of the PRC with the global economy, increased trade and investment, and easier dispute settlement via a rules-based international trading system.

The PRC has generally followed through on its liberalization commitments made during WTO accession. The available tariff data indicate an overall move toward a more open and transparent import regime. Simple average import tariffs on all imports fell modestly from 55.6% to 43.2% between 1982 and 1992 (Lardy 2002, p. 34). Thereafter, the pace of tariff reform accelerated. Table 8 provides data from the WTO Integrated Database and the WTO Tariff Profiles on simple, average-applied, most favored nation (MFN) tariffs for agricultural products, non-agricultural products, and both agricultural and non-agricultural products between 1996 and 2009. Average import tariffs fell to 23.7% in 1996 and still further to 15.9% on the eve of WTO accession in 2001. The continuing process of tariff reduction resulted in average import tariffs of 9.6% by 2009. Accordingly, the PRC became one of the more open economies in the developing world. Non-agricultural products typically enjoyed less tariff protection than agricultural products and have experienced a swifter speed of tariff reduction. In 1996, average import tariffs for non-agricultural products (22.8%) were significantly lower than those for agricultural products (34.1%). By 2009, import tariffs for non-agricultural products had declined to 8.7% and those for agricultural products were 15.6%.

Table 9 provides the latest data on MFN applied tariffs and imports by product group for 2009. There is relatively little dispersion in import tariffs for non-agricultural products, which range from 4.4% for wood and paper to 16.0% for clothing. Within this general picture, major high-technology products have lower tariffs than less dynamic, low-technology products. Thus, import tariffs for electrical machinery, non-electrical machinery, and transport equipment are 8.0%, 7.8%, and 11.5%, respectively. This compares with import tariffs of 16.0% for clothing and 13.4% for leather and footwear. In contrast, a wider import tariff band applies to agricultural products ranging from 10.6% for oilseeds, fats, and oils to 27.4% for sugars and confectionary.

However, some have expressed concerns that the PRC's WTO accession has resulted in more challenges for the PRC, its trading partners, and the WTO itself. There are questions over whether more trade disputes have arisen since the PRC's accession and

if the WTO's relatively new dispute settlement mechanism has been over-stretched. Recent research (Bowen 2010) reports some interesting findings. Before 2001, exporters in the PRC were more likely to face antidumping charges than exporters from other countries. After 2001, there seems to be an increase in antidumping investigations against PRC exports by, for example, both the US and EU. The PRC invested significantly in learning about the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and preparing to become active in responding to cases against it as well in initiating cases against trading partners. Subsequently, the PRC appears to have become a leading user of antidumping investigations, which in some cases are possibly associated with industries that had the biggest reductions in tariffs during WTO accession. Nonetheless, the risk of overwhelming the capacity of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism has not materialized.

Exchange rate management has assumed more significance to Chinese exporters since the turn of the millennium. In essence, the People's Bank of China (PBOC) has pursued a managed floating exchange regime whereby the renminbi exchange rate is based on the supply and demand of the market, and adjusted with reference to a basket of currencies (Hu 2010). A key policy objective of the PBOC is to maintain a relatively stable and predictable nominal exchange rate. A standard measure of international competitiveness is the real effective exchange rate (REER)—the weighted average of a country's currency relative to an index or basket of other major currencies adjusted for the effects of inflation. Figure 1 charts monthly Bank of International Settlements (BIS) data on the REER for the PRC from January 2000 to January 2011. The base year for the REER series is 2005. The REER exhibited a U-shaped pattern during this period. After a short initial appreciation between January 2000 and April 2002, the REER remained depreciated between May 2002 and December 2007. Thereafter, the REER behaved somewhat erratically, with an appreciating tendency. Thus, for much of the past decade, the PRC's inflation has been below that of its trading partners and the rate of nominal exchange depreciation was sufficient to offset this inflation differential.

## **3.2 India's Commercial Policies**

### **3.2.1 Inward-Oriented Strategy**

The start of import substitution in India in the late 1950s introduced policy interventions on trade that evolved into one of the most highly protected and inward-oriented regimes in the developing world. The regime continued, with some minor changes, into the 1980s. Popular discourse often equates India's commercial policy reforms with the post-1991 period. Partial reforms, however, were attempted in the previous decade. Accordingly, three phases can be identified in the history of India's commercial policies (Panagariya 2004): (i) inward-oriented, state-controlled policies (1950–1975); (ii) partial liberalization (1976–1991), particularly since the mid-1980s; and (iii) major reforms from 1991 onward.

During phases (i) and (ii), balance of payment pressures in the 1950s led to comprehensive import controls to conserve foreign exchange. Such controls rapidly evolved into an explicit strategy to promote import-substituting industrialization behind

high and variable levels of import protection backed by central planning to allocate resources. A self-interested bureaucracy, famously dubbed the “License Raj” by Bhagwati and Desai (1970), implemented a plethora of controls and restrictions on private sector expansion and exporting. A strict and cumbersome system of licensing and quotas was applied to the import of capital goods, consumer goods, and other inputs. To this formidable battery of trade and investment controls were added policies to foster indigenous technology. Controls were applied at various stages to access foreign technology in the form of FDI and licensing agreements. For instance, under the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act of 1973, foreign ownership beyond 40% equity was usually not permitted. For licensing, the government imposed strict controls on payments permitted and life of the contract. Shielded from competition, a handful of large private firms and state-owned enterprises occupied monopoly positions in major industrial and service sectors.

There were attempts at partial liberalization of imports and exports in phase (ii). In 1979, India introduced an Open General Licensing list that permitted limited imports of machinery and raw materials not produced domestically. In the mid-1980s, a few new measures to promote exports were undertaken, including a passbook scheme for duty-free imports for exporters and the setting of the exchange rate at a more realistic level. Partial liberalization contributed to India’s export development in the second half of the 1980s. Albeit from a low base, India’s exports of goods and services rose modestly from \$8.6 billion to \$12.2 billion between 1978 and 1985. India’s share of world exports of goods and services, however, fell from 0.6% to 0.5% during the same period. The hallmark of the trade and investment regime during phases (i) and (ii) was an anti-export bias that held back export growth and diversification. Tight controls on technology imports meant that there was only a trickle of FDI inflows and few technology licenses were granted. Over-protection resulted in technological obsolescence and Indian industry rapidly fell behind world technology frontiers (Lall 1987).<sup>6</sup> Largely shut out from external markets and technology transfers, India’s economy grew unremarkably at the so-called “Hindu rate” of 3.5% per year during the period 1950–1980.<sup>7</sup>

### 3.2.2 Economic Reforms

In phase (iii), reforms to India’s import-substituting industrializing strategy were undertaken from the 1990s onward. A package of trade and investment reforms were introduced in 1991 and followed by deeper reforms over time, leading to four key changes.

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<sup>6</sup> Lall’s pioneering study of the acquisition of technological capabilities in Indian industry during the early 1980s concludes “...even the leading enterprises find themselves unable to undertake the development of major new products and process technologies. More interestingly, they find it difficult to copy many new advances in product technology (for sophisticated new equipment, for instance) on their own” (Lall, 1987, p. 238).

<sup>7</sup> “Hindu rate” refers to India’s low annual average growth rates of about 3.5% during the period of inward-oriented economic and commercial policies lasting from the 1950s until 1991. The term was first coined by Indian economist Raj Krishna and has since been used by other economists including Meghnad Desai and Deepak Lall.

First, in a sweeping liberalization on the trade front, import licensing on machinery and raw materials was abolished in 1991. Licensing on consumer goods was abolished in 2001. This meant that import tariffs became the main protective instrument after 1991.

Second, a gradual reduction in the dispersion of high and variable import tariffs, which had risen significantly in the 1980s, also began in 1991. Tariff reform focused on a gradual compression of the top tariff rates, with simultaneous rationalization of the tariff structure via a reduction in the number of tariff bands.

Third, a depreciated exchange rate was maintained to boost export competitiveness and better access to foreign exchange for exporting. The dual exchange rate was unified and current account convertibility commenced in 1994 in line with International Monetary Fund (IMF) Article VII obligations.

Fourth, restrictions on foreign ownership were gradually liberalized. A system of automatic clearance for FDI proposals fulfilling various conditions (e.g., ownership levels of 50%, 51%, 74%, and 100%) was adopted and new sectors (e.g., mining, banking, telecommunications, and various services) were opened up to foreign ownership. Subsequently, 100% foreign ownership was permitted in manufacturing with some exceptions, such as defense-related sectors. In 2005, a Special Economic Zones Act was passed to promote exports from both foreign and local enterprises more systematically.

The post-1991 reforms had a significant impact on India's profile as an international investment destination. Between 1978–1990 and 1991–2010, average annual FDI inflows increased from a tiny \$100 million to an unprecedented \$9.5 billion (Table 7). The annual averages mask the fact that most of the increase in FDI inflows took place in the second decade after the 1991 reforms, indicating a notable lag between the enactment of policy reforms and major FDI inflows. Annual average FDI inflows rose from \$2.5 billion to \$20 billion between 1991–2002 and 2003–2010, with inflows peaking at \$41.6 billion in 2008. But the global financial crisis exerted a significant negative effect on inward investment and FDI inflows fell from this peak level to \$34.6 billion in 2009 and remained depressed at \$21.0 billion in 2010. Cumulative FDI inflows amounted to \$191.3 billion in 1978–2010, with \$155.3 billion of inflows in the 1991–2010 period.

The attraction of significant FDI inflows into India is a major achievement of the 1991 reforms. The post-2003 surge in FDI flows is particularly encouraging and the figures for 2008 and 2009 were starting to match FDI inflows into the PRC in the 1990s. Nonetheless, cumulative FDI inflows are below the levels experienced by the PRC and other high-performing East Asian economies. For instance, cumulative FDI inflows into India during 1978–2010 are only one-sixth of the PRC's in the same period.

The entry of FDI into India brought new technologies, skills, and marketing connections, and began the process of making Indian manufacturing more internationally competitive. Thus far, India has yet to emulate East Asia's example in fully exploiting the potential for export-oriented FDI inflows into manufacturing. FDI into Indian manufacturing has largely focused on serving the large domestic market rather than exports. It is estimated that the share of multinational enterprises in India's exports is small at less than 10%, compared



with 54% in the PRC (Kumar and Sharma 2009, p. 37; [www.fdi.gov.cn](http://www.fdi.gov.cn)). Following a focus on domestic manufacturing, FDI flows have increasingly shifted toward services—particularly IT services and financial services. The US is the single largest source of FDI in India after Mauritius, making up about 16% of total FDI inflows during 1991–2006 (Kumar and Sharma 2009, p. 39). East Asian economies account for another 14% and EU countries comprise 24%.

Another aspect of India's post-1991 FDI reform story is the emergence of outward investment. India had limited outward investment in the first decade and a half of reform, but has seen a marked increase thereafter. India's average annual outward FDI increased from a relatively small base of \$1.0 billion to \$16.7 billion between 1995–2005 and 2006–2008 (Table 7). There was a fall in outward investment to \$14.9 billion in 2009, however, as a result of the global financial crisis. India's cumulative outward investment amounted to \$73.1 billion in 1995–2009, which is equivalent to about 40% of the PRC's during the same period.

Import tariffs, which became the main protective instrument following the abolition of licensing, steadily fell during the post-1991 period. On the eve of the 1991 reforms, India was reputed to have the highest import tariffs in the developing world, along with significant dispersion of import tariffs. In 1991, the simple average of all tariffs was 113%, with the highest tariff rate at 355% (Panagariya 2004, p. 7). A reduction occurred thereafter, with simple average tariffs falling from this peak to 38.7% in 1996 and still further to 12.9% in 2009 (Table 8). The main thrust of tariff reduction since 1991 has been on non-agricultural products rather than agricultural products. Tariffs on non-agricultural products fell somewhat modestly from 40.1% to 31.4% between 1996 and 2001, but the pace of tariff reduction accelerated in recent years with such tariffs falling to historic lows of 10.1% in 2008. In contrast, tariffs on primary products actually rose from 23.1% to 36.3% between 1996 and 2001, and were subsequently reduced somewhat to 31.8% in 2009. In spite of progress in tariff reduction, India's average import tariffs remain higher than the PRC's. While a narrow gap exists in the averages for non-agricultural tariffs, India's average import tariffs on agricultural products are double that of the PRC's.

The growing gap between agricultural and non-agricultural tariffs in India also raised dispersion in tariffs. As Table 9 shows, there is significant dispersion in tariffs for non-agricultural products, which range from 7.2% for electrical machinery to 29.8% for fish and fish products. The dispersion of tariffs is considerably higher, however, for agricultural products, ranging from 12.0% for cotton to 70.8% for beverages and tobacco. Accordingly, tariff dispersion seems higher in India than in the PRC.

Unification of the dual exchange rate, along with current account convertibility, increased the potency of the exchange rate as a trade policy instrument and improved foreign exchange availability for exporters. As Figure 1 shows, India maintained a stable and predictable REER between January 2000 and May 2005. Since mid-2005, however, the REER has tended to behave more erratically with short periods of sharp depreciation followed by sharp appreciation. More volatile REER behavior since-2005 reflects differences in inflation between India and its major trading partners. Particularly worrying is the emergence of an appreciating trend after March 2009 linked to rising inflation in

India. Accordingly, the REER supported export activity between 2000 and mid-2005, but has provided more mixed signals in recent years.

### 3.2.3 Comparing Commercial Policies and Export Outcomes

The PRC and India have each pursued distinctive commercial policies to shift to an outward-oriented, market-based economy after a long period of following inward-oriented, centrally-planned models. Contrary to the prevailing orthodoxy that emphasized the merits of “big bang” comprehensive reforms as pursued by the former Soviet Union during the 1990s, starting in the late 1970s the giants initiated gradual and incremental reforms over several decades. The giants’ interest in a gradualist approach reflects concerns about the (i) strength of the supply response of the private sector to reforms, (ii) long process of creating market institutions, and (iii) social consequences of economic adjustments. The PRC and India differ, however, in the process of implementing a gradual approach to reforms including timing, speed, stages, and specific measures adopted. Accordingly, differences in commercial policies have influenced the PRC’s rise as a massive global exporter of manufactures and India’s expansion into high-skill services exports alongside manufactures.

The PRC was swifter, more coordinated, and more credible in its overall reform process than India. It introduced an open door policy to FDI in 1978, while India’s major FDI reforms did not come until 1991. Attracting export-oriented FDI into the manufacturing sector became the cornerstone of the PRC’s commercial policies in the early years of reform and underlies its success in manufactured exports. The PRC evolved a comprehensive FDI policy that enabled it to attract record inflows of export-oriented FDI into manufacturing while technologically upgrading the sector over time (via joint ventures and by promoting technology transfer). Another FDI spillover has been growing outward PRC investment in Asia and the rest of the world. India was slower in adopting a comprehensive policy framework for export-oriented FDI. It initially focused on liberalizing restrictions on foreign ownership, which is perhaps insufficient in a highly competitive international environment for attracting export-oriented FDI. For instance, other measures like SEZ legislation only date to 2005. Nonetheless, an improvement in India’s investment climate in the second decade of reform (2000s) was accompanied by a surge in FDI inflows, particularly into services. If the FDI surge continues, India has the potential to become a significant global services hub with a respectable manufacturing export base.

Export promotion via FDI took place in the PRC alongside the controlled liberalization of a protected domestic sector. The PRC was cautious in reforming its import control regime during the early transition years, but the process was strengthened from 1992 onward by reforms needed to accede to the WTO. Steady progress in tariff reform continued and the PRC has emerged as one of the more open economies in the developing world. Increased import competition induced increased efficiency, industrial restructuring, and exporting in a formerly protected domestic enterprise sector. India dramatically abolished import licensing on machinery and raw materials in 1991 and tariff reform has resulted in a far more open import regime than ever before. Nonetheless, India’s average tariffs and their dispersion still remain higher than the PRC’s.

In an environment of gradual tariff reform, exchange rate management became a critical tool to encourage exporting activity in the giants. The PRC introduced currency convertibility on current account transactions, while India unified the dual exchange rate and commenced current account convertibility. Having gained improved access to foreign exchange, the giants both pursued managed floating exchange rate policies to maintain relatively stable and predictable nominal exchange rates. Both also had some success in maintaining a favorable REER for exporting activity during the 2000s, but the PRC seems to have done somewhat better than India in this regard.

## **4. Pursuit of Free Trade Agreement-Led Regionalism**

In another marked shift in commercial policy since the early 2000s, the giants have both pursued a variety of bilateral and regional trade agreements alongside trade multilateralism. These moves have promoted some concerns about the possible detrimental impact of FTAs on exporting for two reasons. One is the shallow coverage of FTAs, which are said to be quite liberalizing when it comes to the goods trade, with the exception of agriculture, but quite thin and vague in scope compared with most agreements formed in the Americas or across the Pacific (Suominen 2009). Second, there is the problem of the so-called Asian “noodle bowl” of FTAs. Informed by Jagdish Bhagwati’s (1995) famous insight of a “spaghetti bowl” of FTAs and applied to Asia, the noodle bowl description suggests that different tariffs and rules of origin in multiple FTAs have resulted in the problem of criss-crossing agreements that are characterized by excessive exclusions and special treatment (Baldwin 2008). Quite apart from a potential distortion of trade towards bilateral channels, firms may face large administrative burdens, such as the need to deal with multiple rules of origin, which results in low rates of FTA utilization. Are these concerns valid?

### **4.1 Motivations for Free Trade Agreements**

By April 2011, the giants were among the region’s leaders in FTA activity with 11 FTAs in effect each (Table 10). Looking at FTAs under negotiation and proposed FTAs suggests that such activity will rise in the future as the PRC has another 13 agreements in the pipeline and India another 20. Meanwhile, a relatively limited (goods only) Asia–Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) is the only FTA between the PRC and India.

The giants’ interest in FTAs may seem somewhat surprising as India is a founding WTO member and the PRC only joined the WTO in 2001. This interest can be attributed to three main causes: (i) the expansion of European and North American FTA-led regionalism, which highlight large economic gains (e.g., economies of scale, specialization, and inward investment) available from integrating fragmented regional markets; (ii) the lack of progress in the multilateral WTO Doha Round trade negotiations, which has encouraged FTAs to be considered as an alternative means of securing market access in goods and services as well as venturing into new trade issues not covered by the Doha Round; and (iii) increasing recognition that FTAs are a part of a

supporting policy framework for deepening production networks and supply chains formed by global multinational corporations and emerging Asian firms.<sup>8</sup>

Reflecting the PRC's relatively recent FTA experience, it has FTAs with trading partners in the developing world—ASEAN members; Hong Kong, China; Taipei, China; Macao, China; Pakistan; Chile; and Peru—but only one agreement with a developed economy—New Zealand. The PRC's FTA strategy appears driven by economic motivations related to its emergence as the global factory through a pivotal role in Asian production networks. The PRC views FTAs as supporting the functioning of Asian production networks in electronics and automobiles, and as a means of gaining preferential market access for manufactured exports. To this end, the ASEAN–PRC FTA, which is an important building block for an Asia-wide FTA, has effectively created the world's largest free trade zone, facilitating the parts and components trade in ASEAN economies and final assembly in the PRC. The agreements with Hong Kong, China; Taipei, China; and Macao, China are natural extensions of the free trade zone into the region. The impetus for such agreements to reduce trade barriers and costs has come from overseas Chinese investors who account for the bulk of inward investment into the PRC. The FTA with Pakistan provides initial access to the large and growing South Asian market. The FTA with New Zealand provided the PRC with the experience of negotiating comprehensive new age FTAs with developed countries, and has attracted FDI and technology transfer in the dairy industry. The FTAs with Chile and Peru are beachheads into the Latin American market and a means of fostering closer trans-Pacific cooperation.

The PRC's future FTAs consist of a mix of sub-regional and bilateral agreements. Prominent among the sub-regional FTAs is the agreement between the PRC, Japan, and Republic of Korea, which is critical to the formation of an Asia-wide FTA and the deepening of production networks. FTAs with the South African Customs Union and Gulf Cooperation Council facilitate access to commodity imports to fuel the PRC's rapid industrialization and to extra-regional markets for its manufactured exports. Unlike in the case of India, there is little sign of FTA discussions with the PRC's major trading partners in the developed world—notably the EU and US—which may reflect trading partners' concerns about the impact of the PRC's highly competitive manufactured exports on domestic employment. For the same reason, there has been little movement in official FTA discussions with India.

The PRC seems to be experimenting with alternative formats for FTAs in an attempt to eventually evolve a template akin to what the US uses for FTA negotiations. In earlier FTAs with ASEAN and Chile, the PRC has followed a gradual approach, whereby goods were liberalized first, followed by services and investment. A single undertaking, however, characterizes more recent bilateral FTAs with New Zealand and Singapore.

With a smaller manufacturing base and the relatively late adoption of trade liberalization, India's initial motivation for concluding FTAs appears to have been different from the PRC's. Motivated by a political commitment to the Non-Aligned Movement, India has long supported the expansion of South–South trade through agreements focused on

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<sup>8</sup> Kawai and Wignaraja (2011).

market access for the goods trade. In this vein, it was party to the region's first agreement (APTA) as early as 1976. Following a long period of negotiations, a spate of bilateral FTAs followed with smaller South Asian neighbors, including Afghanistan, Bhutan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka; a sub-regional South Asian Free Trade Area was created in an attempt to access markets in Bangladesh and Pakistan; and bilateral agreements were forged with Chile and MERCOSUR. The South–South thrust of India's FTA strategy continues with agreements under negotiation with several Latin American and African countries. India's FTA strategy evolved to encompass major trading partners as economic motivations and market access became more prominent after the 1991 economic reforms.

Recent extensions reflect India's "Look East" Policy of fostering economic ties with economically important East Asia and the needs of its growing services sector to access developed countries' markets. India has put into effect FTAs with ASEAN, Singapore, and the Republic of Korea as stepping stones toward an ASEAN+6 FTA comprising ASEAN members plus the PRC, India, Japan, Republic of Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. In early 2011, India signed FTAs with Japan and Malaysia. It is also engaged in active FTA negotiations with several developed countries, including the EU, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the four members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).<sup>9</sup> Developed country interest in negotiating FTAs with India reflects complementarities in factor endowments and trade patterns, as well as a recent surge in multinational investment focused on the large domestic Indian market.

## 4.2 Evaluating Free Trade Agreement Quality

What is the quality of the PRC and India's existing FTAs in relation to best practices? Evaluating FTA quality against best practices is difficult for two reasons. First, it requires detailed and often painstaking examination of the legal texts of FTAs. Second, an internationally accepted methodology for assessing the quality of FTA provisions against best practices is absent. One way forward is to attempt to evaluate the compatibility of the PRC and India's FTAs against existing (or future) global rules. Building on recent research, some simple legal and economic evaluation criteria were developed to gauge the giants' FTAs based on tariff elimination on the goods trade, coverage of services sectors, and coverage of trade issues beyond goods and services (Plummer 2007, Wignaraja and Lazaro 2010). The tariff elimination criteria reflected GATT Article 24. FTAs that eliminated tariffs on at least 85% of tariff lines (of either or all FTA partners) within 10 years were classed as WTO-compliant. The criteria for services liberalization relied on the coverage of sectors included in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). FTAs that covered five key sectors of the GATS were taken as "comprehensive," those with less than five sectors as "partial," and those without any coverage as "no provision." The four so-called Singapore issues<sup>10</sup> in the context of WTO

<sup>9</sup> These are Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Liechtenstein.

<sup>10</sup> The Singapore issues refer to four working groups set up during the WTO Ministerial Conference of 1996 in Singapore. These groups were tasked with exploring (i) transparency in government procurement, (ii) trade facilitation (customs issues), (iii) trade and investment, and (iv) trade and competition. The four Singapore issues were conditionally included in the work program for the Doha Development Round global trade talks, but were dropped at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun in 2004.

negotiations—investment, competition policy, government procurement, and trade facilitation—are convenient for examining trade issues beyond goods and services. FTAs, which covered all four Singapore issues, were classed as comprehensive and the remainder as either partial or no provision.

Table 10 presents the details of the classification system and the results for individual FTAs in the PRC and India. Legal texts from the ADB's FTA database were used for the empirical application of these criteria. The results are quite revealing about the quality of the PRC and India's FTAs in terms of existing or future global rules. The key findings are given below.

The overall quality of the PRC and India's trade agreements varies. Of the giants' 22 FTAs in effect, 10 are WTO-compliant in goods liberalization, three are comprehensive in services coverage, and one is comprehensive in coverage of the Singapore issues. The best FTAs are probably the PRC–Singapore FTA, which is WTO-compliant on goods and comprehensive in services coverage, and the India–Republic of Korea Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), which is comprehensive in both services coverage and Singapore issues in addition to being WTO-compliant on goods.

In terms of goods liberalization, the PRC's FTAs seem better than India's. Seven of the PRC's FTAs are WTO-compliant, compared with three for India. Some examples of WTO-compliant agreements are useful for highlighting differences in the giants' respective approach to dealing with trade partners. Under the PRC–Singapore FTA, 95% of the PRC's tariff lines were eliminated within 1 year. Singapore, of course, has virtually zero tariffs for most items and tariff elimination is not considered a major trade policy issue. The New Zealand–PRC FTA allows for immediate elimination of 35% of the PRC's tariff lines upon entry into force and 96% within 8 years. The ASEAN–PRC FTA allows for longer adjustment periods for LDCs and accordingly eliminates 90% of the tariff lines of the PRC and the ASEAN-6 economies within 5 years, while the economies of Cambodia, Myanmar, Lao People's Democratic Republic, and Viet Nam have 10 years. Meanwhile, the India–Republic of Korea FTA liberalizes 75% of India's tariff lines and 93% of the Republic of Korea's within 8 years. The India–Singapore FTA immediately eliminates tariffs on 80% of the value of India's imports from Singapore.

The coverage of services also seems better in the PRC's FTAs than India's. The PRC–Singapore FTA allows for comprehensive coverage of services, while another seven of the PRC's FTAs cover partial liberalization in services. The PRC–Singapore agreement significantly builds on the ASEAN–PRC FTA by allowing for the movement of natural persons. By comparison, and with the notable exceptions of the India–Republic of Korea CEPA and the India–Singapore FTA, India's FTAs seem more limited in services coverage. In a move to extend services coverage to the regional-level, a South Asian Trade in Services Agreement was signed in April 2010.

The four Singapore issues are selectively covered in the giants' FTAs. Seven of the PRC's FTAs cover one or two Singapore issues. For instance, investment and trade

facilitation<sup>11</sup> are both covered in the PRC–New Zealand FTA and the PRC–Peru FTA, while the PRC–Pakistan FTA and the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) covers only investment. More sensitive issues of government procurement and competition policy are absent from the PRC’s FTAs. Meanwhile, the India–Republic of Korea FTA comprehensively covers three Singapore issues. While there is no separate chapter on government procurement, there is a cooperation provision on government procurement that opens the door for liberalization in this difficult area. Another four of India’s FTAs, including the South Asia Free Trade Area (SAFTA), only cover trade facilitation, while the India–Singapore FTA covers both trade facilitation and investment. The PRC and India’s remaining FTAs exclude the Singapore issues altogether.

### 4.3 Are Free Trade Agreements as Used?

Unfortunately, neither the PRC nor India publishes official data on FTA use from certificates of origin or information on impediments to using FTAs. This is a major gap that needs to be addressed in the future. Nonetheless, it is possible to explore the issue of FTA utilization by looking at trade with FTA partners, which is indicative of potential use, as well as evidence from a survey of firms.

The giants’ increasing number of FTAs has been accompanied by trade with FTA partners gaining in importance in the 2000s. While the majority of international trade is still with non-FTA partners, about 27% of the PRC’s total trade and 23% of India’s was potentially covered by FTAs in 2008.<sup>12</sup> Encouragingly, these figures are up considerably from less than 5% in 2003.

The relatively high FTA use among firms in the PRC compared with other Asian countries was a key finding of a recent multi-country, multi-enterprise ADB survey.<sup>13</sup> About 45% of the firms surveyed in the PRC reported that they had used FTAs, with an additional percentage saying they planned to do so in the future.<sup>14</sup> FTA use in the PRC is higher than previously thought (Baldwin 2008). The ADB survey also highlights impediments to using FTAs at the firm level in the PRC. Interestingly, few firms seemed concerned by the Asian noodle bowl effect, with only 6% of the Chinese sample

<sup>11</sup> Trade facilitation refers to the simplification and harmonization of the customs procedures that regulate international trade to reduce cost burdens while safeguarding legitimate regulatory objectives.

<sup>12</sup> The number of FTAs is relatively easy to track over time, but by themselves the numbers do not indicate the importance of FTAs to economic activity or trade at the national level. It is informative to get an idea of how much of a country’s world trade is covered by FTA provisions. This is difficult to measure because of exceptions and exclusions contained in many agreements. Furthermore, official statistics on utilization rates of FTA preferences in Asia are hard to come by and published data on the direction of services trade do not exist. Nevertheless, by making the bold assumption that all goods trade is covered by concluded FTAs, indicative estimates can be obtained. I am grateful to Richard Baldwin for this point.

<sup>13</sup> The ADB survey provided data on the incidence of firms that use FTAs in six Asian countries (Kawai and Wignaraja eds. 2011). Use of FTAs is as follows: the PRC (45%), Japan (29%), Thailand (25%), Republic of Korea (21%), Singapore (20%), and the Philippines (20%).

<sup>14</sup> Use of FTAs is closely linked to innovation and learning processes at the firm-level in the PRC, thereby underlining the importance of technology-based approaches to trade. Econometric analysis of the decision to export among a sample of PRC firms reveals that FTA use, export experience, foreign ownership, and R&D expenditures all influence the probability of exporting (Wignaraja 2010).

expressing concerns about significant transactions costs arising from multiple rules of origin in overlapping agreements. As more FTAs come into effect, however, the noodle bowl remains a future risk for the region. Instead, the key impediments to FTA use in the PRC turned out to be a lack of information on FTA provisions and business impacts, non-tariff measures in overseas markets, small margins of preference, and the availability of alternative export incentives (e.g., export processing zone schemes and the Information Technology Agreement).

Unfortunately, information on use of FTAs is not yet available for Indian firms from the ADB survey or other sources. But discussions with the Federation of Indian Industry and Commerce (FICCI) suggested that its members were increasingly aware of the benefits of FTAs, such as the Indo–Sri Lanka FTA and the ASEAN–India FTA, and had begun to use them to facilitate the goods and services trade with FTA partners.<sup>15</sup> They also said that India's FTAs with Sri Lanka and ASEAN had facilitated an increase in intra-regional investment in manufacturing and IT services.

Thus, there seems little evidence of detrimental effects on exports of the PRC and India's FTAs. The giants' FTA strategies still appear to be in the formative stages. The PRC's FTAs with regional developing economies are geared towards supporting its role as the global factory and the deepening of production networks. From an initial focus on South–South trade, India has recently moved toward seeking market access to East Asia and major developed countries. The PRC's FTAs seem to have better coverage in terms of goods and services. FTA use, at least in the PRC, also seems higher than expected. Nonetheless, both countries can improve the coverage of Singapore issues in future FTAs and adopt best practices in designing rules of origin and in the administration of such rules.

## 5. Emerging Challenges since the Global Financial Crisis

Growth in the PRC and India has rebounded from the global financial crisis while the world economy remains sluggish (ADB 2011). The global financial crisis marked the end of a period of respectable world growth and expanding employment in major industrial economies. Unprecedented fiscal stimulus efforts coupled with low interest rates averted a 1930s style economic depression. Nonetheless, slow economic growth with high unemployment in much of the developed world appears to characterize the likely scenario in the medium-term. This somewhat pessimistic scenario is linked to unusually high levels of public debt, the crisis in the eurozone economies, lackluster private investment, and fragile consumer confidence. Some developed countries are in the process of making large cuts in public expenditures, which may accentuate the slowdown at least in the short-run. A lack of progress in the WTO Doha Round on the magnitude of reductions in agricultural subsidies and industrial tariffs continues to deprive the world economy of a major source of trade-led growth. Added to this are the risks generated by soft labor and housing markets in the US, vulnerable sovereign debt positions in the eurozone, the aftermath of the earthquake and tsunami in Japan, and

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<sup>15</sup> Meetings with FICCI officials, including Manab Majumdar (Assistant Secretary-General, FICCI) and Manish Mohan (Senior Director, FICCI) in New Delhi on 12 April 2010.



rising commodity prices (ADB 2011). While the pace of world economic growth in the medium-term is difficult to forecast, the consensus forecast is for a downward direction.

The new world macroeconomic era will pose several important commercial policy challenges for the PRC and India including (i) the risk of protectionism, (ii) exchange rate management, (iii) increased FTA use by businesses, and (iv) complementary policies.<sup>16</sup> How well the giants tackle these challenges will partly determine the continued pace of their trade-led growth.

*Risk of protectionism.* High unemployment in the wake of the global financial crisis has prompted influential industrial lobby groups in G-20 economies to call for the protection of domestic industries. Mass public sector redundancies induced by public sector expenditure cuts are likely to accentuate such calls in the future. The available evidence suggests a modest rise in protectionist measures in G-20 economies since 2008, with an emphasis on less transparent non-tariff measures (particularly sanitary and phytosanitary [SPS] and technical barriers to trade [TBT] measures),<sup>17</sup> public procurement, and local buy-back schemes, rather than more traditional industrial tariffs.<sup>18</sup> There has also been a rise in anti-dumping and safeguard measures with some targeting of highly-competitive, labor-intensive exports from the PRC and India. Concluding the WTO Doha Round offers the best insurance against rising protectionism and a modest deal would be better than no deal at all. The giants are well placed to steer WTO members towards a less ambitious Doha deal involving some reductions in agricultural subsidies and industrial tariffs as well as trade facilitation. Such a deal may be supported by increased aid for trade and enhanced special and differential treatment to mitigate negative effects on lesser-developed and small, vulnerable economies. In addition, the PRC and India need to improve surveillance of non-tariff measures in overseas markets, improve business support to cope with SPS and TBT measures affecting specific exports, and further upgrade legal capacity to deal with anti-dumping cases at the WTO.

*Exchange rate management.* The PRC is now under international pressure to revalue its currency. Section 3 discussed the PRC's exchange rate policy and export development.

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<sup>16</sup> Winters and Yusuf (2007) and Gerhaeuser et al, eds. (2010) comprehensively deal with other future economic policy challenges facing the giants including demographics, financial integration, the environment, and governance.

<sup>17</sup> During the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, member nations established the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) to address the emerging debate over the use of standards in international trade. Generally speaking, the SPS Agreement is a compromise that permits countries to take measures to protect public health within their borders as long as they do so in a manner that restricts trade as little as possible. Similarly, the TBT Agreement strikes a delicate balance between the policy goals of trade facilitation and national autonomy in technical regulations.

<sup>18</sup> OECD, WTO, and UNCTAD (2010) suggests that new import restricting measures introduced on 1 September 2009 covered 0.7% of G-20 imports and 0.4% of total world imports through mid-February 2010. Similar figures for October 2008–October 2009 were 1.3% and 0.8%, respectively. The joint report concludes that there is no indication of a significant increase of trade or investment restriction during the period under review, but notes that some G-20 members have continued to put in place measures that potentially restrict trade, either directly or indirectly. New trade restrictions tend to be concentrated in sectors that are relatively protected and also relatively labor-intensive, including minerals, textiles, and metal products.

Recent policy attention, particularly in the US, has been devoted to the links between the management of the renminbi, the PRC's trade surplus, and the US trade deficit. It has been suggested that the PRC's exchange rate does matter for global rebalancing.<sup>19</sup> These findings have led to influential voices calling in early 2010 for stepped-up multilateral initiatives in the IMF and the WTO to promote appreciation of the exchange rate of the renminbi (Bergsten 2010). On 19 June 2010, during the lead up to the G-20 meeting in Toronto, the PBOC announced that it would further reform the renminbi's exchange rate by shifting to a more flexible exchange rate policy (Hu 2010). In particular, the announcement indicated a continued emphasis on reflecting market supply and demand with reference to a currency basket, and maintaining wider exchange rate floating bands. Discussions in international fora and concerns about domestic inflation may lie behind the latest reforms. On 29 September 2010, the US House of Representatives passed legislation that would allow the US to use estimates of currency undervaluation to calculate countervailing duties on imports from the PRC and other countries. This move has sparked fears of a looming currency and trade war. A prolonged dispute over the currency issue could damage PRC–US trade and exert a negative impact on the two economies and the world economy. Accordingly, stepped up international diplomacy may be necessary to resolve the issue. As India becomes more prominent in world export markets, it is possible that its exchange rate management may also emerge as an international policy issue.

*Increased use of FTAs by businesses.* Section 4 suggested that the giants have pursued a variety of FTAs to liberalize the goods and services trade in the region, and that FTA use among PRC firms was higher than expected. Awareness of FTA provisions, however, varies among business in the PRC and other Asian countries. Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) seem less well-informed than large firms and tend to use FTAs less. Some firms also complain about cumbersome bureaucratic procedures associated with exporting through FTAs, such as stringent rules of origin and poor origin administration. Accordingly, both giants (particularly India) need adopt more proactive outreach measures to involve business associations in FTA negotiations and inform them of the benefits of FTAs through simple business guides and websites. They also need to adopt best practices in rules of origin in FTAs—co-equality of rules, regional cumulation, and origin administration by business associations—and enhance technical and other business support services to assist firms to make use of FTAs. In the medium-term, a move towards a broad and deep Asia-wide FTA would significantly enhance business use of FTAs. It could provide a common and predictable policy framework for businesses, enable the realization of economies of scale, and be attractive to inward investment (Chia 2010). Model-based studies suggest that an ASEAN+6 FTA covering goods, services, and trade facilitation would bring higher welfare gains than alternative FTA scenarios. The formation of an ASEAN+6 FTA is expected to realize world income gains of around \$260 billion (Kawai and Wignaraja 2011).

*Implementing complementary policies.* Maintaining export competitiveness and shifting to new areas of comparative advantage in the PRC and India in the new macroeconomic

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<sup>19</sup> A recent econometric study by Cline (2010), for instance, based on certain assumptions, estimates that on a 2010 scale a 10% real effective appreciation would reduce the PRC's current account surplus by \$170 billion–\$250 billion. The corresponding gain in the US current account balance would range from \$22 billion–\$63 billion.

era will require complementary supply-side support in addition to continuing with gradual commercial policy liberalization. The liberalization of trade and investment regimes provides incentives for firms to invest in competitive technological capabilities and link up to production networks, while supply-side support provides requisite inputs for the process.

Enhancing cross-border infrastructure investment is a key area. A joint ADB and ADB Institute (ADBI) study in 2009 identified a huge need for infrastructure investment in Asia, which was estimated at about \$750 billion annually in 2010–2020. The study also identified about 20 priority infrastructure projects, including several involving the giants. With large financial reserves emanating from export surpluses, the giants could play an enhanced role in financing large multi-modal, cross-border infrastructure projects involving neighboring economies. As Table 11 shows, the PRC spends more of its GDP on infrastructure than India. The PRC also fairs better than India on indicators of overall infrastructure quality as well as the quality of roads and electricity supply, according to opinion surveys of business people collected by the World Economic Forum.

Increasing industrial R&D efforts is another key area of importance. R&D is a prerequisite for maintaining competitiveness in medium- and high-technology industries, and ensuring technology spillovers from FDI to local firms. Table 11 shows two measures of R&D efforts in the PRC and India since 1996, R&D expenditures as a percentage of GDP and the number of R&D researchers per one million people. The data indicates India lags significantly behind the PRC in both measures. Strikingly, India's R&D expenditures are just under half that of the PRC's, while its ratio of R&D researchers is about one-tenth of the PRC's.

Reducing bureaucratic impediments to conducting business is a final area of complementary policies. Both giants scored relatively high on the World Bank's overall ease of doing business index in 2011, meaning that they still do less well compared with the world's top performers while the PRC seems better placed than India. The PRC does better, in particular, in registering property, enforcing contracts, and closing a business.

## **6. Conclusion**

This paper analyzed the role of commercial policies in the rise of the PRC and India in world trade over the last 3 decades. In a radical break with past economic policies, the PRC and India both adopted market-oriented commercial policies beginning in the late 1970s to boost exports and the private sector. More recently, the giants have pursued FTA-led regionalism alongside multilateralism. Few foresaw the huge impact the giants would collectively have on world trade patterns or the magnitude of adjustments required in rest of the world.

The trade performances of the PRC and India have been impressive by the standards of either developing countries or developed countries. Within a relatively short time span of roughly one generation, the giants have emerged as major players in world trade as well as notable outward investors. Following early entry into low-technology products, the giants have steadily upgraded into medium- and high-technology products, as well as

skill-intensive services. While the two are often compared, the PRC seems to have roared ahead in world trade in manufactures and is on the verge of challenging the US as the world's largest exporter. India's export expansion has been primarily driven by services and it is attempting to play catch up in a range of manufactured exports.

The foundation for the giants' successes lies in their respective initial conditions. These include the PRC's proximity to Japan, which facilitated inward investment and a large, dynamic domestic market. In addition, both India and the PRC had access to ample supplies of low-cost, productive manpower.

The switch in commercial policies has played a significant role in the trade performance of the PRC and India. The PRC, of course, was swifter and introduced an open door policy towards export-oriented FDI in the late 1970s alongside the controlled liberalization of imports. Further liberalization occurred in the PRC during the process of WTO accession. India introduced some reforms in the late 1970s, but the major reforms came after 1991. The differences in trade performance between the PRC and India, however, are not simply a matter of the timing of changes in commercial policies. Closer examination reveals that the PRC had a more comprehensive approach to attracting export-oriented FDI, actively facilitated the technological upgrading of exports through FDI, reduced import tariffs and the dispersion of tariffs in a more systematic manner, typically managed a more predictable and transparent REER, and pursued more comprehensive liberalization in goods and services provisions in its FTAs with Asia's developing economies. In recent years, India has attempted to put in place appropriate commercial policies, particularly with respect to attracting export-oriented FDI and liberalizing tariffs. India is also attempting ambitious FTA negotiations with developed countries, which could provide market access and FDI inflows among other benefits. Therefore, the gap in trade and investment performance between the giants may narrow over time, but the PRC's dominance in manufactures is likely to continue for at least the next decade.<sup>20</sup>

Both the PRC and India face a new and more uncertain world economic environment in the post-global financial crisis era. The effect of this new economic era on trade performance in the giants will depend on how each copes with the risk of protectionism, manages exchange rate issues, increases the use of FTAs by businesses, and implements complementary policies. Nevertheless, the giants seem well prepared to adapt commercial policies and other measures to successfully increase their dominance of world trade in the next decade.

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<sup>20</sup> Some popular accounts (The Economist, 2 October 2010) predict that India's growth may overtake the PRC's by 2013. Several factors are said to lie in India's favor including a relatively young and growing workforce, and a base of world class companies led by English-speaking bosses and democratic institutions. Weighed against this is a much larger export base in the PRC; much higher levels of investment in R&D, skills, and infrastructure; and better policy coordination and implementation. I am grateful to Alan Winters for clarifying this point about the giants' future prospects.

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
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**Figure 1: Real Effective Exchange Rate<sup>a</sup> of the People's Republic of China and India, January 2000–January 2011 (monthly)**



PRC = People's Republic of China.

Notes: <sup>a</sup> consumer price index (CPI)-based, 2005 = 100; increase = appreciation.

Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Bank for International Settlements (<http://www.bis.org/>) (accessed April 2011).

**Table 1: Exports and Imports of Goods and Services, 1978–2010**

	People's Republic of China							India						
	1978 <sup>/a</sup>	1985 <sup>/a</sup>	1991 <sup>/a</sup>	1998 <sup>/a</sup>	2008 <sup>/a</sup>	2009 <sup>/a</sup>	2010 <sup>/b</sup>	1978 <sup>/a</sup>	1985 <sup>/a</sup>	1991 <sup>/a</sup>	1998 <sup>/a</sup>	2008 <sup>/a</sup>	2009 <sup>/a</sup>	2010 <sup>/b</sup>
<b>% of GDP</b>														
Exports of goods and services	6.6	9.9	20.8	20.3	36.6	26.7	31.8	6.4	5.3	8.6	11.1	22.7	20.6	22.9
Goods exports	...	8.2	15.5	18.0	33.2	24.1	25.4	4.8	4.1	6.8	8.2	16.2	12.8	15.2
Services exports	...	1.0	1.8	2.3	3.4	2.6	3.1	1.2	1.5	1.8	2.8	8.9	6.9	7.7
Imports of goods and services	7.1	14.1	17.2	16.0	28.5	22.3	28.9	6.6	7.7	8.6	12.8	28.0	25.3	30.9
Goods imports	...	12.5	13.2	13.4	24.8	19.1	25.4	5.5	6.6	7.9	10.8	27.2	18.9	22.7
Services imports	...	0.8	1.1	2.6	3.7	3.2	3.5	1.2	1.7	2.2	3.5	4.9	6.2	8.2
<b>% of the World</b>														
Exports of goods and services	0.6	1.3	1.7	3.0	8.0	8.4	11.0	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.7	1.3	1.7	2.0
Goods exports	...	1.3	1.7	3.3	9.1	9.8	12.8	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	1.2	1.4	1.7
Services exports	...	0.7	0.8	1.7	3.8	3.7	4.9	0.6	0.8	0.5	0.8	2.7	2.6	3.2
Imports of goods and services	0.7	1.8	1.4	2.4	6.4	7.2	10.3	0.6	0.7	0.5	0.8	1.7	2.1	2.8
Goods imports	...	2.0	1.4	2.5	6.9	7.9	11.6	0.6	0.8	0.6	0.8	2.0	2.1	2.7
Services imports	...	0.6	0.4	1.9	4.5	4.9	5.9	0.5	0.9	0.6	1.0	1.6	2.5	3.6
Exports of goods and services (current \$, billion)	9.8	30.5	78.9	207.4	1581.7	1333.3	1748.0	8.6	12.2	23.0	46.4	262.8	269.7	326.0
Imports of goods and services (current \$, billion)	10.5	43.1	65.3	163.6	1232.8	1113.3	1587.0	9.0	17.8	23.0	53.4	324.8	330.8	440.0

Source: <sup>/a</sup> World Bank. *World Development Indicators*. <http://databank.worldbank.org/> (accessed April 2011); <sup>/b</sup> World Trade Organization (2011).

**Table 2: Manufactured Exports from the People's Republic of China and India, 1985 and 2008**

<b>Growth Rate, 1985–2008 (%)</b>		<b>Share of national manufactured exports, (%)</b>		
			<b>1985</b>	<b>2008</b>
<b>PRC</b>		<b>PRC</b>		
Manufactures	26.7	Resource-based	38.9	8.5
Resource-based	18.6	Low Tech	43.7	26.8
Low Tech	24.2	Medium Tech	12.2	37.0
Medium Tech	33.3	High Tech	5.2	27.7
High Tech	36.2			
<b>INDIA</b>		<b>INDIA</b>		
Manufactures	15.4	Resource-based	40.6	35.0
Resource-based	14.6	Low Tech	45.3	31.8
Low Tech	13.7	Medium Tech	10.0	24.9
Medium Tech	20.2	High Tech	4.1	8.3
High Tech	18.3	Resource-based	40.6	35.0
		<b>Share of World Manufactured Exports (%)</b>		
			<b>1985</b>	<b>2008</b>
		<b>PRC</b>		
		Manufactures	0.5	10.8
		Resource-based	0.8	3.5
		Low Tech	1.2	18.1
		Medium Tech	0.1	10.6
		High Tech	0.1	14.3
		<b>INDIA</b>		
		Manufactures	0.5	1.3
		Resource-based	0.9	1.7
		Low Tech	1.2	2.5
		Medium Tech	0.1	0.8
		High Tech	0.1	0.5

PRC = People's Republic of China.

Source: Author's calculations based on UN Comtrade. <http://comtrade.un.org/> (accessed December 2009).

**Table 3: Commercial Services Exports, 1985 and 2008**

<b>Growth Rate, 1985–2008 (%)</b>		<b>Share of National Commercial Services Exports (%)</b>		
		<b>1985</b>	<b>2008</b>	
<b>PRC</b>		<b>PRC</b>		
Commercial services	18.6	Computer, communications, and other services	15.3	44.7
Computer, communications, and other services	24.2	Insurance and financial services	6.7	1.2
Insurance and financial services	10.0	Transport services	44.5	26.2
Transport services	15.9	Travel services	33.5	27.9
Travel services	17.7			
<b>INDIA</b>		<b>INDIA</b>		
Commercial services	16.1	Computer, communications, and other services	55.6	72
Computer, communications, and other services	17.4	Insurance and financial services	1.3	5.5
Insurance and financial services	23.6	Transport services	15.7	11
Transport services	14.3	Travel services	27.4	11.5
Travel services	11.8			
		<b>Share of World Commercial Services Exports (%)</b>		
		<b>1985</b>	<b>2008</b>	
		<b>PRC</b>		
		Commercial services	0.7	3.8
		Computer, communications, and other services	0.4	4.1
		Insurance and financial services	1.2	0.6
		Transport services	1.0	4.2
		Travel services	0.8	4.1
		<b>INDIA</b>		
		Commercial services	0.8	2.7
		Computer, communications, and other services	1.5	4.7
		Insurance and financial services	0.3	1.9
		Transport services	0.4	1.2
		Travel services	0.7	1.2

PRC = People's Republic of China.

Source: Author's calculations based on World Bank, *World Development Indicators*. <http://databank.worldbank.org/> (accessed June 2010).

**Table 4: The People's Republic of China's Comparative Advantages by Sector, 2000 and 2009 (Revealed Comparative Advantage [RCA] >1)**

HS code	Product, Technical Classification	World Market Share, 2009 (%) <sup>/a</sup>	2009 <sup>/a</sup>		2000 <sup>/b</sup>	
			Rank (out of 44)	RCA	Rank (out of 47)	RCA
46	Manufactures of plaiting material, basketwork, etc. (LT)	71.2	1	8.0454	3	14.0000
66	Umbrellas, walking-sticks, seat-sticks, whips, etc (LT)	70.1	2	7.0228	1	15.0400
67	Bird skin, feathers, artificial flowers, human hair (P)	62.9	3	6.9969	2	14.7000
50	Silk (P)	46.4	4	4.6066	4	9.6500
65	Headgear and parts thereof (LT)	42.0	5	4.4085	7	6.3200
63	Other made textile articles, sets, worn clothing etc (LT)	40.0	6	4.1839	12	4.9800
61	Articles of apparel, accessories, knit or crochet (LT)	33.7	7	3.8745	16	4.4900
64	Footwear, gaiters and the like, parts thereof (LT)	33.6	8	3.5945	9	6.0400
58	Special woven or tufted fabric, lace, tapestry etc (LT)	34.6	9	3.3938	27	2.6100
42	Articles of leather, animal gut, harness, travel goods (LT)	35.3	10	3.3662	5	8.2800
95	Toys, games, sports requisites (LT)	32.4	11	3.3599	6	7.0200
62	Articles of apparel, accessories, not knit or crochet (LT)	29.7	12	3.2923	14	4.8800
60	Knitted or crocheted fabric (LT)	29.5	13	2.9969	25	2.8000
96	Miscellaneous manufactured articles (LT)	30.3	14	2.9786	22	2.9500
94	Furniture, lighting, signs, prefabricated buildings (LT)	27.0	15	2.6196	32	2.2400
52	Cotton (P)	23.2	16	2.4272	18	3.1400
92	Musical instruments, parts and accessories (LT)	23.5	17	2.4102	26	2.6200
53	Vegetable textile fibres nes, paper yarn, woven fabric (RB)	22.4	18	2.3962	13	4.9200
54	Manmade filaments (MT)	22.1	19	2.3010	44	1.1800
55	Manmade staple fibres (MT)	23.6	20	2.2968	19	3.0900
69	Ceramic products (RB)	24.3	21	2.2173	31	2.2900
59	Impregnated, coated or laminated textile fabric (LT)	22.4	22	2.1384	n.a.	n.a.
89	Ships, boats and other floating structures (MT)	19.7	23	1.9824	n.a.	n.a.
43	Fur skins and artificial fur, manufactures thereof (LT)	22.5	24	1.9136	20	2.9800
85	Electrical, electronic equipment (HT)	18.4	25	1.9036	43	1.2200
36	Explosives, pyrotechnics, matches, and pyrophorics (MT)	21.0	26	1.8795	15	4.5500
05	Products of animal origin, nes (RB)	18.5	27	1.8163	10	5.5000
83	Miscellaneous articles of base metal (RB)	17.3	28	1.6366	36	1.6300

HS code	Product, Technical Classification	World Market Share, 2009 (%) <sup>/a</sup>	2009 <sup>/a</sup>		2000 <sup>/b</sup>	
			Rank (out of 44)	RCA	Rank (out of 47)	RCA
81	Other base metals, cermets, articles thereof (RB)	17.0	29	1.5832	29	2.5200
51	Wool, animal hair, horsehair yarn and fabric thereof (P)	16.0	30	1.4933	30	2.4700
82	Tools, implements, cutlery, etc of base metal (LT)	15.9	31	1.4650	33	2.0700
16	Meat, fish and seafood food preparations nes (RB)	13.2	32	1.4577	21	2.9700
84	Machinery, nuclear reactors, boilers, etc (MT/HT)	16.2	33	1.4393	n.a.	n.a.
73	Articles of iron or steel (LT)	15.2	34	1.4230	39	1.5600
68	Stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica, etc articles (RB)	15.1	35	1.4072	41	1.3400
70	Glass and glassware (RB)	14.5	36	1.3880	n.a.	n.a.
57	Carpets and other textile floor coverings (LT)	12.9	37	1.3189	42	1.3200
03	Fish, crustaceans, mollusks, aquatic invertebrates nes (P)	9.8	38	1.1085	40	1.4500
56	Wadding, felt, nonwovens, yarns, twine, cordage, etc (RB)	11.7	39	1.1034	n.a.	n.a.
20	Vegetable, fruit, nut, etc food preparations (RB)	10.7	40	1.0935	38	1.5700
07	Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers (P)	10.2	41	1.0882	35	1.8400
13	Lac, gums, resins, vegetable saps and extracts nes (P)	12.0	42	1.0429	n.a.	n.a.
86	Railway, tramway locomotives, rolling stock, equipment (MT)	11.2	43	1.0227	11	5.1300
14	Vegetable plaiting materials, vegetable products nes (RB)	8.6	44	1.0027	28	2.5300

HT = high-technology manufactures, LT = low-technology manufactures, MT = medium-technology manufactures, P = primary, RB = resource-based manufactures.

Notes: n.a. = RCA rank not available from Batra and Khan (2005) but likely that product has RCA<1; technology-based classification using Lall (2001).

Source: <sup>/a</sup> estimates from World Bank. *World Integrated Trade Solution*. <http://wits.worldbank.org/wits/> (accessed April2011) <sup>/b</sup> estimates from Batra and Khan (2005) using the Balassa RCA index method.

**Table 5: India's Comparative Advantages by Sector, 2000 and 2009**  
(Revealed Comparative Advantage [RCA] >1)

HS code	Product, Technical Classification	World Market Share, 2009 <sup>/a</sup> (%)	2009 <sup>/a</sup>		2000 <sup>/b</sup>	
			Rank (out of 37)	RCA	Rank (out of 42)	RCA
71	Pearls, precious stones, metals, coins, etc (RB)	10.2	1	7.4000	6	9.1800
50	Silk (P)	9.8	2	6.5937	2	16.4300
57	Carpets and other textile floor coverings (LT)	8.5	3	5.8813	4	9.9800
52	Cotton (P)	7.7	4	5.4905	3	11.3400
13	Lac, gums, resins, vegetable saps and extracts nes (P)	8.4	5	4.9454	1	17.0100
53	Vegetable textile fibres nes, paper yarn, woven fabric (RB)	6.5	6	4.6826	8	7.5700
26	Ores, slag and ash (RB)	5.0	7	4.1648	24	2.4300
14	Vegetable plaiting materials, vegetable products nes (RB)	5.1	8	4.0449	10	6.1000
63	Other made textile articles, sets, worn clothing etc (LT)	5.5	9	3.9220	5	9.2800
67	Bird skin, feathers, artificial flowers, human hair (P)	5.1	10	3.8659	13	3.9000
09	Coffee, tea, mate and spices (P)	5.1	11	3.7800	7	8.3500
54	Manmade filaments (MT)	5.3	12	3.7222	22	2.5600
55	Manmade staple fibres (MT)	4.7	13	3.1297	18	3.0600
62	Articles of apparel, accessories, not knit or crochet (LT)	3.9	14	2.9342	11	5.4800
10	Cereals (P)	3.9	15	2.8040	19	2.9700
61	Articles of apparel, accessories, knit or crochet (LT)	3.2	16	2.5413	16	3.3400
79	Zinc and articles thereof (RB)	3.6	17	2.5257	n.a.	n.a.
25	Salt, sulphur, earth, stone, plaster, lime and cement (RB)	3.3	18	2.3930	15	3.6700
23	Residues, wastes of food industry, animal fodder (RB)	3.4	19	2.3592	17	3.1300
42	Articles of leather, animal gut, harness, travel goods (LT)	3.3	20	2.1459	9	7.1600
99	Commodities not elsewhere specified (LT)	1.4	21	2.0047	n.a.	n.a.
89	Ships, boats and other floating structures (MT)	2.6	22	1.7879	n.a.	n.a.
41	Raw hides and skins (other than fur skins) and leather (P)	2.7	23	1.7713	21	2.7400
24	Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes (RB)	2.6	24	1.7614	36	1.2400
68	Stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica, etc articles (RB)	2.6	25	1.6639	23	2.5100
03	Fish, crustaceans, mollusks, aquatic invertebrates nes (P)	2.0	26	1.5621	12	4.9100
29	Organic chemicals (RB)	2.4	27	1.4462	31	1.5700

HS code	Product, Technical Classification	World Market Share, 2009 <sup>/a</sup> (%)	2009 <sup>/a</sup>		2000 <sup>/b</sup>	
			Rank (out of 37)	RCA	Rank (out of 42)	RCA
64	Footwear, gaiters and the like, parts thereof (LT)	1.8	28	1.2919	26	2.2000
32	Tanning, dyeing extracts, tannins, derivs, pigments etc (RB)	2.1	29	1.2798	27	1.9800
27	Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products, etc (RB)	1.4	30	1.2738	n.a.	n.a.
36	Explosives, pyrotechnics, matches, pyrophorics, etc. (MT)	2.1	31	1.2671	39	1.1800
58	Special woven or tufted fabric, lace, tapestry etc (LT)	1.9	32	1.2661	14	3.8700
73	Articles of iron or steel (LT)	1.9	33	1.2282	30	1.6200
07	Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers (P)	1.7	34	1.2160	28	1.7700
08	Edible fruit, nuts, peel of citrus fruit, melons (P)	1.5	35	1.1570	20	2.9200
72	Iron and steel (RB)	1.6	36	1.1133	34	1.2900
74	Copper and articles thereof (RB)	1.5	37	1.0243	n.a.	n.a.

HT = high-technology manufactures, LT = low-technology manufactures, MT = medium-technology manufactures, P = primary, RB = resource-based manufactures.

Notes: n.a. = RCA rank not available from Batra and Khan (2005) but likely that product has RCA<1; technology-based classification using Lall (2001).

Source: <sup>/a</sup> estimates from World Bank. *World Integrated Trade Solution*. <http://wits.worldbank.org/wits/> (accessed April2011) <sup>/b</sup> estimates from Batra and Khan (2005) using the Balassa RCA index method.



**Table 6: Commercial Policies: Timing and Features**

People's Republic of China (PRC)	India
<b>Attracting export-oriented foreign direct investment (FDI)</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Passage of an export processing law (1979).</li> <li>• Adoption of a dualistic trade regime that promoted exports via FDI (mid-1980s)</li> <li>• Eased regulations on the entry and operation of foreign enterprises through the Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law of 1979, Sino-Foreign Cooperative Joint Venture Law of 1986, and the Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise Law of 1988</li> <li>• Creation of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) (1980s) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Introduction of tax incentives and facilitation of financing to channel FDI toward SEZs</li> <li>• Liberalization of labor regulations in SEZs ensuring relatively low wages and ample supply of skilled workers</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Formalization of a duty drawback system to ensure duty-free access to materials used in export processing (1987 onward)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Gradual liberalization of restrictions on foreign ownership through a system of automatic clearance for FDI proposals and the opening up of new sectors to foreign ownership (e.g., mining, banking, telecommunications) (1991 onward)</li> <li>• Permission of 100% foreign ownership in manufacturing sectors (1991 onward)</li> <li>• Passage of a Special Economic Zones Act to promote exports more systematically (2005)</li> </ul>
<b>Import liberalization</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Passage of a customs regulation to rationalize tariff schedules (1985)</li> <li>• Liberalization of the system of export licensing and quotas (from covering two-thirds of exports in 1991 to only 8% in 1999)</li> <li>• Implementation of tariff reductions implemented following the adoption of a socialist market (1992 onward)</li> <li>• Further reforms to import control regime implemented as part of World Trade Organization (WTO) accession in 2001</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Introduction of a package of trade and investment reforms (1991)</li> <li>• Abolition of import licensing on machinery and raw materials (1991)</li> <li>• India, as signatory to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), became a founding member of the WTO on 1 January 1995</li> <li>• Abolition of licensing on consumer goods (2001)</li> </ul>
<b>Exchange rate management</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Devaluation of domestic currency and move to currency convertibility of account transactions (1997)</li> <li>• Adoption of a managed floating exchange rate (mid-2005 onward)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unification of the dual exchange rate system and commencement of current account convertibility (1994)</li> <li>• Maintenance of a depreciated exchange rate</li> </ul>
<b>FTA strategies</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Accession to its first free trade agreement (FTA), the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (2001)</li> <li>• Signing of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-PRC FTA (2005)</li> <li>• 11 FTAs in effect as of April 2011 including bilateral agreements with Thailand; Hong Kong, China; Macao, China; Chile; New Zealand; Pakistan; Singapore; Peru; and Taipei, China</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Signing of its first FTA, the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (1976)</li> <li>• Signing of the South Asian FTA (2006)</li> <li>• 11 FTAs in effect as of April 2011 including bilateral agreements with Sri Lanka, Nepal, Afghanistan, Singapore, Bhutan, Chile, and Republic of Korea; and a plurilateral agreement with Latin American countries</li> </ul>

Source: Author's compilation.

**Table 7: Foreign Direct Investment** (current \$, billion), 1978–2010

	PRC	India
<b>Total FDI inflows</b> (current \$, billion)	1098.7	
<b>Annual average FDI inflows</b> (current \$, billion)		
1978–1990	1.6	191.3
1991–2010	54.0	0.1
1991–2002	35.6	9.5
2003–2010	81.5	2.5
2008	108.3	20.0
2009	95.0	41.6
2010	105.7 <sup>a</sup>	34.6
<b>FDI inflows</b> (% of GDP)		
1991–1995	3.8	0.2
2004–2010	2.6	2.0
2008	2.4	3.4
2009	2.0	2.8
2010	1.9	1.5
<b>Share of multinational companies in exports</b> (%), most recent estimate <sup>c</sup>	55	<10
<b>Total outward FDI</b> (current \$, billion) 1995–2009	182.0	73.1
<b>Annual average outward FDI</b> (current \$, billion)		
1995–2005	3.8	1.0
2006–2009	38.6	16.7
2008	52.2	18.5
2009	48.0	14.9

FDI = foreign direct investment, PRC = People's Republic of China.

Source: Author's calculations based on data from UNCTAD. *UNCTADStat*. <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/> (accessed April 2011); <sup>a</sup> estimates from the Government of the People's Republic of China's Ministry of Commerce. <http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/statistic/foreigninvestment/201101/20110107381641.html> accessed on April 2011 <sup>b</sup> estimates from the Government of India's Ministry of Commerce and Industry [http://dipp.nic.in/fdi\\_statistics/india\\_FDI\\_December2010.pdf](http://dipp.nic.in/fdi_statistics/india_FDI_December2010.pdf) (accessed April 2011); <sup>c</sup> estimates from Kumar and Sharma (2009).

**Table 8: Simple Average Applied Most Favored Nation Tariffs by Broad Sectors—1996, 2001, 2008, and 2009**

	People's Republic of China				India			
	1996	2001	2008	2009	1996	2001	2008	2009
All	23.7	15.9	9.6	9.6	38.7	31.9	13	12.9
Agricultural products	34.1	20.3	15.6	15.6	23.1	36.3	32.2	31.8
Non-agricultural Products	22.8	15.5	8.7	8.7	40.1	31.4	10.1	10.1

Source: World Trade Organization, *WTO Statistics Database-Tariff Profiles*. <http://stat.wto.org/TariffProfile/WSDBTariffPFHome.aspx?Language=E> (accessed April 2011).

**Table 9: Most Favored Nation Applied Tariffs and Share of Imports by Product, 2009**

Product Groups	People's Republic of China			India		Imports Share (%)
	MFN Applied Duties		Imports	MFN Applied Duties		
	Avg.	Max.	Share (%)	Avg.	Max.	
Animal products	14.8	25	0.2	33.1	100	0.0
Dairy products	12.0	20	0.1	33.7	60	0.0
Fruit, vegetables, plants	14.8	30	0.2	30.4	100	0.9
Coffee and tea	14.7	32	0.0	56.3	100	0.1
Cereals and preparations	24.2	65	0.2	32.2	150	0.0
Oilseeds, fats, and oils	10.9	30	3.3	18.2	100	1.3
Sugars and confectionery	27.4	50	0.0	34.4	60	0.1
Beverages and tobacco	22.9	65	0.2	70.8	150	0.1
Cotton	15.2	40	0.3	12.0	30	0.1
Other agricultural products	11.5	38	0.5	21.7	70	0.3
Fish and fish products	10.7	23	0.5	29.8	30	0.0
Minerals and metals	7.4	50	18.8	7.5	10	33.3
Petroleum	4.4	9	15.4	3.8	5	29.1
Chemicals	6.6	47	11.3	7.9	10	7.5
Wood, paper, etc.	4.4	20	2.5	9.1	10	1.6
Textiles	9.6	38	1.5	13.6	246	0.9
Clothing	16.0	25	0.2	16.1	68	0.0
Leather, footwear, etc.	13.4	25	1.6	10.2	70	0.7
Non-electrical machinery	7.8	35	11.8	7.3	10	9.1
Electrical machinery	8.0	35	20.1	7.2	10	7.7
Transport equipment	11.5	45	3.8	20.7	100	4.5
Manufactures	11.9	35	7.3	8.9	10	2.6

MFN = most-favored nation.

Source: World Trade Organization, *WTO Statistics Database-Tariff Profiles*. <http://stat.wto.org/TariffProfile/WSDBTariffPFHome.aspx?Language=E> (accessed April 2011).

**Table 10: Classification of People's Republic of China and India FTAs, April 2011**

Country/FTAs	Goods Liberalization <sup>a</sup>	Coverage of Services Sectors <sup>b</sup>	Coverage of Singapore Issues <sup>c</sup>
<b>PRC</b>			
1	Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (2001)	partial	no provision
2	PRC-Thailand FTA (2003)	partial	no provision
3	PRC-Hong Kong, China CEPA (2004)	WTO-compliant	no provision
4	PRC-Macao, China CEPA (2004)	WTO-compliant	no provision
5	ASEAN-PRC FTA (2005)	WTO-compliant	partial (investment)
6	PRC-Chile FTA (2006)	WTO-compliant	partial (trade facilitation)
7	New Zealand-the PRC FTA (2008)	WTO-compliant	partial (investment, trade facilitation)
8	PRC-Pakistan FTA (2007)	partial	partial (investment)
9	PRC-Singapore FTA (2008)	WTO-compliant	partial (trade facilitation)
10	PRC-Peru FTA (2009)	WTO-compliant	partial (investment, trade facilitation)
11	Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (2010) <sup>d</sup>	partial	partial (investment)
<b>India</b>			
1	Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (1976)	partial	no provision
2	India-Sri Lanka FTA (2001)	WTO-compliant	no provision
3	India-Nepal Treaty of Trade (2002)	partial	partial (trade facilitation)
4	India-Afghanistan PTA (2003)	partial	no provision
5	India-Singapore CECA (2005)	WTO-compliant	partial (investment, trade facilitation)
6	South Asian FTA (2006)	partial	partial (trade facilitation)
7	India-Bhutan Trade Agreement (2006)	partial	partial (trade facilitation)
8	India-Chile PTA (2007)	partial	no provision
9	India-MERCOSUR PTA (2009)	partial	no provision
10	India-Republic of Korea CEPA (2009)	WTO-compliant	comprehensive (government procurement cooperation only)
11	ASEAN-India FTA (2009)	partial	Partial (customs procedure cooperation only)

ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations, FTA = free trade agreement, PRC = People's Republic of China.

Source: Author's estimates based on ADB's *Asia Regional Integration Center Database*. <http://aric.adb.org> (accessed April 2011).

Notes: a/ An FTA is WTO-compliant, following GATT Article 24, where tariffs are eliminated on at least 85% of either or both FTA members' tariff lines (or goods traded) within 10 years. Otherwise, it has partial coverage. b/ Comprehensive coverage of an FTA covers the five key sectors of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS): business and professional services, communications services, financial services, transport services, and labor mobility/entry of business persons. No provision means there are no liberalization provisions for the services sector. Partial are those not otherwise classified as comprehensive or no provision. c/ Comprehensive are those which cover all of the Singapore issues: investment, competition policy, government procurement, and trade facilitation. Partial if only 1–3 Singapore issues are covered in the FTA. No provision means those without any provisions for Singapore issues. <sup>d</sup> This refers to the FTA between the PRC and Taipei, China, which came into effect on 12 September 2010.

**Table 11: Infrastructure, Business Regulation, and Technology**

Indicators	Year	PRC	India
Infrastructure spending (% of GDP) <sup>/a</sup>	2008	11	6
Quality of over-all infrastructure <sup>/b</sup>	2010–2011	72	91
Quality of roads <sup>/b</sup>	2010–2011	53	90
Quality of electricity supply <sup>/b</sup>	2010–2011	52	110
Ease of doing business index (1=most business-friendly regulations) <sup>/c</sup>	2010	79	134
Starting a business <sup>/c</sup>	2010	151	165
Registering property <sup>/c</sup>	2010	38	94
Enforcing contracts <sup>/c</sup>	2010	15	182
Closing a business <sup>/c</sup>	2010	68	134
R&D expenditure (% of GDP) <sup>/d</sup>	1996	0.6	0.7
	2007	1.5	0.8
Researchers in R&D (per million people) <sup>/d</sup>	1996	448	154
	2007/2005	1071	137

GDP = gross domestic product, PRC = People's Republic of China.

Source: <sup>/a</sup> estimates from the Government of India's Ministry of Finance, *Indian Economic Survey 2010–2011*. <http://indiabudget.nic.in/index.asp> (accessed April 2011); <sup>/b</sup> World Economic Forum (2010); <sup>/c</sup> World Bank and International Finance Corporation (2010); <sup>/d</sup> World Bank, *World Development Indicators*. <http://databank.worldbank.org/> (accessed April 2011).

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