Browsen in EconStor gesamt nach Autor:innen Wilkening, Tom


Zeige Ergebnisse 1 bis 12 von 12
ErscheinungsjahrTitelAutor:innen
2012The lure of authority: Motivation and incentive effects of powerFehr, Ernst; Herz, Holger; Wilkening, Tom
2012The lure of authority: Motivation and incentive effects of powerFehr, Ernst; Herz, Holger; Wilkening, Tom
2012The lure of authority: Motivation and incentive effects of powerFehr, Ernst; Herz, Holger; Wilkening, Tom
2014Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect ImplementationFehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom
2014Handing out guns at a knife fight: Behavioral limitations of subgame-perfect implementationFehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom
2014Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect ImplementationFehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom
2015The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation: An Empirical InvestigationAghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; Wilkening, Tom
2015The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation: An empirical investigationAghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; Wilkening, Tom
2015The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation - An Empirical InvestigationAghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; Wilkening, Tom
2017Land Trade and Development: A Market Design ApproachBryan, Gharad; de Quidt, Jonathan; Wilkening, Tom; Yadav, Nitin
2020Behavioral constraints on the design of subgame-perfect implementation mechanismsFehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom
2021Behavioral Constraints on the Design of Subgame-Perfect Implementation MechanismsFehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom