Browsen in EconStor gesamt nach Autorinnen & Autoren Wilkening, Tom

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DatumTitelAutoren
2012 The lure of authority: Motivation and incentive effects of powerFehr, Ernst; Herz, Holger; Wilkening, Tom
2012 The lure of authority: Motivation and incentive effects of powerFehr, Ernst; Herz, Holger; Wilkening, Tom
2012 The lure of authority: Motivation and incentive effects of powerFehr, Ernst; Herz, Holger; Wilkening, Tom
2014 Handing out guns at a knife fight: Behavioral limitations of subgame-perfect implementationFehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom
2014 Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect ImplementationFehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom
2014 Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect ImplementationFehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom
2015 The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation - An Empirical InvestigationAghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; Wilkening, Tom
2015 The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation: An Empirical InvestigationAghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; Wilkening, Tom
2015 The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation: An empirical investigationAghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; Wilkening, Tom
2017 Land Trade and Development: A Market Design ApproachBryan, Gharad; de Quidt, Jonathan; Wilkening, Tom; Yadav, Nitin