Browsing All of EconStor by Author Wilkening, Tom
Showing results 1 to 12 of 12
| Year of Publication | Title | Author(s) |
| 2012 | The lure of authority: Motivation and incentive effects of power | Fehr, Ernst; Herz, Holger; Wilkening, Tom |
| 2012 | The lure of authority: Motivation and incentive effects of power | Fehr, Ernst; Herz, Holger; Wilkening, Tom |
| 2012 | The lure of authority: Motivation and incentive effects of power | Fehr, Ernst; Herz, Holger; Wilkening, Tom |
| 2014 | Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation | Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom |
| 2014 | Handing out guns at a knife fight: Behavioral limitations of subgame-perfect implementation | Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom |
| 2014 | Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation | Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom |
| 2015 | The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation: An Empirical Investigation | Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; Wilkening, Tom |
| 2015 | The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation: An empirical investigation | Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; Wilkening, Tom |
| 2015 | The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation - An Empirical Investigation | Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; Wilkening, Tom |
| 2017 | Land Trade and Development: A Market Design Approach | Bryan, Gharad; de Quidt, Jonathan; Wilkening, Tom; Yadav, Nitin |
| 2020 | Behavioral constraints on the design of subgame-perfect implementation mechanisms | Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom |
| 2021 | Behavioral Constraints on the Design of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanisms | Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom |
