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DatumTitelAutoren
2005 Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules in allotment economiesMizobuchi, Hideyuki; Serizawa, Shigehiro
2005 Vickerey allocation rule with income effectSaitoh, Hiroki; Serizawa, Shigehiro
2005 Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulationSerizawa, Shigehiro
2006 An impossibility theorem in matching problemsTakagi, Shohei; Serizawa, Shigehiro
2006 Strategy-proof and anonymous allocation rules of indivisible goods: A new characterization of Vickrey allocation ruleSerizawa, Shigehiro
2007 Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies of homogeneous indivisible objectsHatsumi, Kentaro; Serizawa, Shigehiro
2009 An experimental study of Japanese procurement auctions with endogenous minimum pricesAkai, Kenju; Saijo, Tatsuyoshi; Serizawa, Shigehiro
2009 Auctions with endogenous price ceiling: Theoretical and experimental resultsVeszteg, Robert F.; Akai, Kenju; Saijo, Tatsuyoshi; Serizawa, Shigehiro
2009 Auctions for public construction with corner-cuttingAkai, Kenju; Saijo, Tatsuyoshi; Serizawa, Shigehiro
2010 Characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agentsMorimoto, Shuhei; Serizawa, Shigehiro; Ching, Stephen
2011 A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice modelHatsumi, Kantaro; Berga, Dolors; Serizawa, Shigehiro
2012 Strategy-proofness and efficiency with nonquasi-linear preferences: A characterization of minimum price Walrasian ruleMorimoto, Shuhei; Serizawa, Shigehiro
2015 Notions of anonymity for object assignment: Impossibility theoremsKondo, Hikaru; Serizawa, Shigehiro
2015 Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi demand preferencesKazumura, Tomoya; Serizawa, Shigehiro
2015 Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: a characterization of minimum price Walrasian ruleSerizawa, Shigehiro; Morimoto, Shuhei
2016 Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear common-tiered-object preferences: Characterization of minimum price ruleZhou, Yu; Serizawa, Shigehiro
2017 Strategy-proof multi-object auction design: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastageKazumura, Tomoya; Mishra, Debasis; Serizawa, Shigehiro
2017 Mechanism design without quasilinearityKazumura, Tomoya; Mishra, Debasis; Serizawa, Shigehiro
2019 Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment marketZhou, Yu; Serizawa, Shigehiro
2019 A strategy-proof mechanism should be announced to be strategy-proof: An experiment for the Vickrey auctionMasuda, Takehito; Sakai, Toyataka; Serizawa, Shigehiro; Wakayama, Takuma