Browsen in EconStor gesamt nach Autor:innen Rilke, Rainer Michael
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Erscheinungsjahr | Titel | Autor:innen |
2011 | Lying and team incentives | Conrads, Julian; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Rilke, Rainer Michael; Walkowitz, Gari |
2013 | Self-Serving Use of Equity Rules in Bargaining with Asymmetric Outside Options | Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Rilke, Rainer Michael; Walkowitz, Gari |
2020 | When Too Good Is Too Much: Social Incentives and Job Selection | Reggiani, Tommaso G.; Rilke, Rainer Michael |
2020 | Two field experiments on self-selection, collaboration intensity, and team performance | Fischer, Mira; Rilke, Rainer Michael; Yurtoglu, B. Burcin |
2020 | Two field experiments on self-selection, collaboration intensity, and team performance | Fischer, Mira; Rilke, Rainer Michael; Yurtoglu, B. Burcin |
2020 | Two Field Experiments on Self-Selection, Collaboration Intensity, and Team Performance | Fischer, Mira; Rilke, Rainer Michael; Yurtoglu, B. Burcin |
2023 | Corrupted by algorithms? How AI-generated and human-written advice shape (dis)honesty | Leib, Margarita; Köbis, Nils; Rilke, Rainer Michael; Hagens, Marloes; Irlenbusch, Bernd |
2023 | Corrupted by Algorithms? How AI-Generated and Human-Written Advice Shape (Dis)Honesty | Leib, Margarita; Köbis, Nils; Rilke, Rainer Michael; Hagens, Marloes; Irlenbusch, Bernd |
2023 | When, and why, do teams benefit from self-selection? | Fischer, Mira; Rilke, Rainer Michael; Yurtoglu, B. Burcin |
2023 | Designing Donation Incentive Contracts for Online Gig Workers | Reggiani, Tommaso; Rilke, Rainer Michael |