Browsen in EconStor gesamt nach Autor:innen Rilke, Rainer Michael


Zeige Ergebnisse 1 bis 11 von 11
ErscheinungsjahrTitelAutor:innen
2011Lying and team incentivesConrads, Julian; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Rilke, Rainer Michael; Walkowitz, Gari
2013Self-Serving Use of Equity Rules in Bargaining with Asymmetric Outside OptionsHennig-Schmidt, Heike; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Rilke, Rainer Michael; Walkowitz, Gari
2020When Too Good Is Too Much: Social Incentives and Job SelectionReggiani, Tommaso G.; Rilke, Rainer Michael
2020Two field experiments on self-selection, collaboration intensity, and team performanceFischer, Mira; Rilke, Rainer Michael; Yurtoglu, B. Burcin
2020Two field experiments on self-selection, collaboration intensity, and team performanceFischer, Mira; Rilke, Rainer Michael; Yurtoglu, B. Burcin
2020Two Field Experiments on Self-Selection, Collaboration Intensity, and Team PerformanceFischer, Mira; Rilke, Rainer Michael; Yurtoglu, B. Burcin
2023Corrupted by algorithms? How AI-generated and human-written advice shape (dis)honestyLeib, Margarita; Köbis, Nils; Rilke, Rainer Michael; Hagens, Marloes; Irlenbusch, Bernd
2023Corrupted by Algorithms? How AI-Generated and Human-Written Advice Shape (Dis)HonestyLeib, Margarita; Köbis, Nils; Rilke, Rainer Michael; Hagens, Marloes; Irlenbusch, Bernd
2023When, and why, do teams benefit from self-selection?Fischer, Mira; Rilke, Rainer Michael; Yurtoglu, B. Burcin
2023Designing Donation Incentive Contracts for Online Gig WorkersReggiani, Tommaso; Rilke, Rainer Michael
2023Designing Donation Incentive Contracts for Online Gig WorkersReggiani, Tommaso; Rilke, Rainer Michael