Browsen in EconStor gesamt nach Autor:innen Lang, Matthias


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ErscheinungsjahrTitelAutor:innen
2010The fog of fraud: Mitigating fraud by strategic ambiguityLang, Matthias; Wambach, Achim
2011The fog of fraud: Mitigating fraud by strategic ambiguityLang, Matthias; Wambach, Achim
2013Communicating Subjective EvaluationsLang, Matthias
2014Legal uncertainty: A selective deterrentLang, Matthias
2014Communicating Subjective EvaluationsLang, Matthias
2015First-order and second-order ambiguity aversionLang, Matthias
2015Communicating Subjective EvaluationsLang, Matthias
2016Legal Uncertainty as a Welfare Enhancing ScreenLang, Matthias
2018Signaling versus costly information acquisitionBester, Helmut; Lang, Matthias; Li, Jianpei
2018Signaling versus Costly Information AcquisitionBester, Helmut; Lang, Matthias; Li, Jianpei
2018Communicating Subjective EvaluationsLang, Matthias
2020(Dis)honest Politicians and the Value of Transparency for Campaign PromisesLang, Matthias; Schudy, Simeon Andreas Dermot
2020Mechanism Design with NarrativesLang, Matthias
2021Stochastic Contracts and Subjective EvaluationsLang, Matthias
2021Signaling versus auditingBester, Helmut; Lang, Matthias; Li, Jianpei
2021Signaling versus AuditingBester, Helmut; Lang, Matthias; Li, Jianpei
2022Stochastic Contracts and Subjective EvaluationsLang, Matthias
2023Stochastic contracts and subjective evaluationsLang, Matthias
2023(Dis)honesty and the Value of Transparency for Campaign PromisesLang, Matthias; Schudy, Simeon