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Research Report

Collaborative capacity building as an approach to more effective development cooperation: Lessons from the nation building experience in Burundi (2002-2008)

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BRIEFING PAPER 7

COLLABORATIVE CAPACITY BUILDING AS AN APPROACH TO MORE EFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

Lessons from the Nation Building Experience in Burundi (2002-2008)

Simon Hartmann

MARCH 2013

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IMPRINT

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Abbreviations

BLTP	Burundi Leadership Training Program
EZA	Entwicklungszusammenarbeit
FORSC	Forum pour le Renforcement de la Société Civile
FRODEBU	Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi
FROLINA	Front de Libération Nationale
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HDI	Human Development Index
HIK	Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
ÖFSE	Österreichische Forschungsstiftung für Internationale Entwicklung / Austrian Research Foundation for International Development
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UPRONA	Union pour le Progres national

German Summary

Kapazitätsentwicklung ist eine wichtige Entwicklungsstrategie und -methode der bi- und multilateralen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Bei Kapazitätsentwicklung handelt es sich in der Regel um Programme von Gebern, die westliche Demokratien als Blaupausen für ideale Entwicklungsstrategien für Entwicklungsländer sehen. Davon werden sogenannte *best practice*-Maßnahmen abgeleitet, die beispielsweise darauf abzielen Demokratie oder kompetitive Märkte in Entwicklungsländern zu etablieren. Die Wirksamkeit dieser Ansätze ist bislang nicht überzeugend. Dies hat insbesondere zwei hervorzuhebende Ursachen. Erstens, das Oktroyieren von *best practice* untergräbt die *ownership* von eigenen Entwicklungsstrategien der Partnerländer. Dabei gilt: Was in einem Kontext funktioniert oder gewollt ist, muss nicht in einem anderen Kontext funktionieren oder gewollt sein. Zweitens haben empirische Untersuchungen gezeigt, dass Geber in der Vergangenheit zu viel Augenmerk auf die Entwicklung von kompetitiven Institutionen (z.B. Wahlen) gelegt haben und dabei die notwendigen kooperativen Aspekte, die ein entwicklungsfreundliches institutionelles Umfeld benötigt, vernachlässigt haben. Diese blinden Flecken der Kapazitätsentwicklung sind problematisch, wenn man bedenkt, dass sehr viele Entwicklungsländer bereits stark unter internen, häufig gewalttätigen Konflikten leiden.

Ein Ansatz der diese Schwächen der bestehenden Kapazitätsentwicklungs-Ansätze ausmerzt und der sich dabei bereits praktisch bewährt hat ist *collaborative capacity building*. Er wurde aus den Erfahrungen in Burundi von 2002 bis 2007 von beteiligten ExpertInnen in Form von allgemeinen *lessons learned* in mehreren Aufsätzen und Reports aufgearbeitet. Das Kernstück von *collaborative capacity building* ist, dass es eine neue Rolle für Geber vorsieht. Dabei geht es nicht darum entwicklungspolitische Programme den Partnerländern vorzugeben, sondern als Geber vorübergehend unterstützend für die fehlenden kooperativen Institutionen in diesen Ländern einzuspringen. Die neue Rolle ist die eines Moderators von Entwicklungsprozessen, bei denen Teams aus ExpertInnen in Konfliktlösung (*trainers*) und kontexterfahrene ExpertInnen (*diplomats*) zum Einsatz kommen.

Mit diesem Ansatz wird versucht sowohl die Herausforderung der *ownership* für Partnerländer zu adressieren, als auch die Defizite im Bereich kooperativer Institutionen zu überwinden. Damit ist *collaborative capacity building* geeignet, das politische Umfeld in Entwicklungsländern einerseits zu stabilisieren. Andererseits wird das Entstehen von eigenen lokalen und regionalen Entwicklungsprozessen in Entwicklungsländern dadurch weitaus wahrscheinlicher, als bei den herkömmlichen *Kapazitätsentwicklungsansätzen*. Der Erfolg hängt von den nationalen Interessen der bestehenden Eliten in den Partnerländern (z.B. die Bereitschaft Macht zu teilen), einem glaubhaften Bekenntnis der Geber diese Prozesse über Jahre hinweg zu begleiten und zu unterstützen, der Größe des Entwicklungslandes (kann ein *collaborative capacity building*-Ansatz auch in sehr großen Ländern wie Democratic Republic of the Congo oder Sudan funktionieren?), der *de facto* Neutralität von Gebern (sind sie bereit eine neutrale Rolle einzunehmen), und unvorhersehbaren Ereignissen wie externer Schocks (Krisen) ab.

„Democratic nation-building is not simply a matter of persuading political leaders to subordinate their parochial interests to those of the nation. Real transformation requires not greater altruism from leaders and citizens, but rather a new recognition that their self-interest can be more effectively advanced through collaboration and inclusive political processes.”

Wolpe/McDonald 2006: 127

1. Introduction

Democracy and good governance programs are overwhelmingly based on Western liberal-democratic principles which focus on states with pluralistic and competitive politics. This usually means the establishment of electoral systems based on multiple parties, civil societies, and private businesses in accordance with human rights. Capacity building is the overarching term which summarizes the instruments and activities of development cooperation supposed to support improvements in the political environments in partner countries. Practically it often means not more than establishing and fostering plurality in order to enable political competition (i.e. more than one political group taking part in an election). In recent years a high and rising number of violent conflicts have occurred in places with intensive donor engagement¹ and there are a considerably high number of post-conflict regions which permanently run danger falling back into turmoil. The existing bi- and multilateral donor approaches to capacity building usually follow conventional wisdoms of problem solving by transferring Western institutions to developing countries.

The promotion of democracy has not yet delivered convincing evidence for being reasonably effective, especially in deeply divided societies.² Wolpe and McDonald (2006: 130-131) criticize donor activities in these countries and claim that, firstly, donors put too little weight on supporting cooperation and nourishing trust among key factions within societies and that, secondly, the strategies behind the capacity building process are usually donor driven. Successes of approaches to promote partner country ownership are ambiguous (see for example Whitfield 2009; Barder 2009) and conventional capacity building programs have not resulted in significant improvements³ or, as some argue, had even negative effects on developing countries.⁴ Donors assume that peace-building and democratization is „rational and structural”, that it works according to „Western liberal-democratic principles” and that „moral and political pressure, combined with the threat of legal sanctions, is the most effective means of deterring bad behaviour” (Wolpe/McDonald 2008: 138-139). Hence, empirical evidence points us to the following conceptual problem: Donors tend to overvalue

¹ For Sub-Sahara Africa, the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIC) counted a rise in conflict number to a total of 91 cases in the year 2011 (HIIC 2011). This is actually a high figure with an average of more than one conflict per country. Conflicts and decentralized despotism is not a recent phenomenon in African history and it is said to be closely related to the colonial experience (Mamdani 1996).

² Societies can possibly be divided along various cleavages like ethnicity, ideology, religion, ...

³ For example Morrissey (2012) argues that aid has at least no consistent negative effect on tax income.

⁴ Knack (2001) run empirical tests, and found out that aid dependence weakens accountability, encourages rent-seeking and let corruption flourish and thus undermines the quality of governance and public sector institutions. But not only cross country empirical work but also single case studies come to a similar result. Bergamaschi (2009) points out that strongly aid dependent Mali have not developed state capacity to create or implement development policy on its own. Bräutigam (2001) earlier presented many more cases, where high scale aid inflows undermined local ownership, accountability, democratic decision-making, and harmed efforts of domestic resource mobilization (like tax share GDP). For an overview of the negative effects see Moss et al. (2008).

competitive elements over the strengthening of collaborative components in their capacity building approaches and are not very successful in promoting partner country ownership.

The collaborative capacity building approach addresses exactly these shortcomings. Overcoming them requires a perception of capacity building as being a domestic approach where donors withdraw from interfering with development strategies of partner countries in order to enhance their ownership. The priority has to be bringing a wide array of actors on the same table and involving them in discussion. This paper identifies guidelines for developing and operating conflict-sensitive development assistance based on a collaborative capacity building approach. Overall this is particularly valuable for actors who are interested in peace-, nation- and state-building but the approach is also fruitful for improving existing capacity building approaches because it addresses the issue of strengthening ownership. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the approach, outlines the role for donors and discusses its value for capacity building approaches in developing countries in general. Section 3 assesses how the approach was used in Burundi and what can be learnt from this case for development cooperation. Section 4 identifies the advantages and limits of the approach.

2. What is collaborative capacity building and what is the role of donors?

Convincing empirical evidence exists that there are blind spots in donor capacity building programs with respect to cooperative aspects. Wright and Winters (2010: 64-65) confirm that political competition has been more rewarded by donors between the 1960s and 1990s while inclusiveness has not earned support. Particularly during the 1990s, donors focused mostly on imposing „more elections and/or perhaps more competitive elections“ (Wright/Winters 2010: 65) on partner countries. Recent research has concluded that this has created serious risks for increasing levels of violence in developing countries (Collier/Rohner 2008; Collier 2009; North et al. 2009). One necessary (although not sufficient) ingredient to achieve more sustainable solutions for peace building processes is promoting collaborative capacity building though the available evidence suggests that this dimension has been inadequately addressed so far. This is likely to originate from donors' obsession with general, one-size-fits all best practice schemes of democracy and capacity building. Such programs, in fact, have only proven the ability to increase the overall number of elections in developing countries. But the introduction of elections alone does not tell us anything about the quality of the electoral process, the legitimacy, and the actual capacity and power of political leaders.⁵

The challenge of capacity building in divided societies is clearly not to aggravate competition but to motivate belligerents to cooperate and get viable policies going (e.g. economic policy, providing public goods, law enforcement). In fact cooperation is an important factor to accomplish political goals. Societies which are already divided lack cooperative elements which is problematic because cooperation is a necessity for sustainable development strategies. Especially divided societies face fragmentation and conditions in which

⁵ Collier (2009) agrees that there are more elections held in developing countries but the electoral process is often still at a very low quality and thus not the number but the quality of election is a much better proxy for the emergence of democracy. Van de Walle (2002: 76) concludes that the quality of political competition and the relative strength of oppositional forces determine the quality of democracy. In case of African democracy, he points out that there were some important developments in past but that they put forth hybrid regimes what „means that their legitimacy and stability will remain in doubt“ and let him raise doubts about their future democratic outcomes. Herbst (2011) argues in the same direction: „[Autocrats] understand what pushes Western buttons, which makes it easier for those involved in conflicts to adroitly play Western audiences. [They] are quick to embrace elections and other symbols familiar to Washington, Paris, and Berlin because they know that such contests give them a certain amount of legitimacy, even if the actual execution of the political contests leaves much to be desired.“ Van de Walle (2012) by looking at how democracy spread and foreign aid coincide in Mali, concludes that donors spent too much effort on elections and the promotion of civil and political rights (vertical accountability) rather than supporting judicial and legislative bodies and parties (horizontal accountability).

establishing the monopoly on violence and territorial control becomes exceedingly difficult. They require very special treatment and priorities (for an overview see Guelke 2012) compared to for example emerging and well-settled cohesive societies.⁶

Most of the existing capacity building approaches misunderstand this. A common conflict resolution strategy is putting huge pressures on belligerent parties to sign peace agreements. This alone does not change „the rules of the game” of the underlying problem of divided societies and thus conflicts often are perpetuated. Signing peace agreements is not a sufficient condition to make conflict parties see each other any differently. Donors usually enter these countries with to-do-checklists in order to create political stability. They include independent electoral commissions, systems of checks-and-balances, free media or rule of law. These programs are to a large extent self-referential, normative and idealized in the sense of what works in their own countries and they do not address what works in divided societies. They miss out that the main features of viable political systems are promoting „pluralism” and „political competition” by recognizing „the attitudinal dimensions of divided societies”. Donors assume that a lack of „democratic values” is the fundamental problem of developing countries. They overlook that there are divided societies, where groups of people do not see themselves as part of the same „national community” (Wolpe/McDonald 2008: 139).⁷

One of the most important and probably also the most effective aspects of a functioning democracy is that they disperse power within a politically concentrated (i.e. monopoly of violence) and relatively balanced political environment (i.e. plurality with segmental autonomy, proportionality and minority rights, Lijphart 1977: 25-52; Eckstein 1998: 4). But it is not a process towards predefined goals (i.e. the Millennium Development Goals – MDGs). More balance implies more involvement of sub-state actors (Non-Governmental Organizations – NGOs, business actors, secret societies, and others) in the political process. Development approaches should address strengthening cooperation between key factions in a society to stabilize the political environment which enables competition, discovery and learning mechanisms (in the sense of „trial-and-error”) for more sustainable economic performance (see the recent work in political economy like for example, North et al. 2009; Acemoglu/Robinson 2012). Therefore substantial improvements of the political process can only evolve if there is already a cooperative frame which enables political actors to compete for popular support, ideas and viable policy strategies. Neither political centralization nor plurality works on its own and without having a cooperative social environment.

Collaborative capacity building exactly aims to overcome these barriers. Conflicts are often wrongly mistaken as conflicts over differences in values rather than competition over political and economic interests. To overcome this bias, Wolpe and McDonald (2008: 140) suggest four imperatives for successful adjustment of existing capacity building approaches:

1. Changing the „winner-take-all mentality” in politics (as transformation from conflict to peace is not a zero-sum game);
2. Establishing trust among key leaders;

⁶ The latter are more likely to have already the capacity to proceed with promotion of common interests and delivering public goods (Besley/Persson 2011).

⁷ Such a system needs both political centralization but also plurality (as for example argued by Acemoglu/Robinson 2012) or embedded in a political environment which makes responsiveness to the non-elites necessary (Evans 1995). Without control there is no enforcement of rules or provision of public goods and without checks and balances there is an insufficient amount of accountability of elites towards non-elites. Bayart et al. (1999) put forth African state which exercises only weak control of their society and therefore there are not only criminal state actors but also criminal non-state actors simultaneously in place. It is often limited to strategic important areas and it is not always lack of capacity but also part of a strategy of political survival.

3. Forming „a new consensus” on the organization of power and decision-making (who is invited to discuss how power is going to be shared); and
4. Finding common ground for solutions and improving negotiation skills.

These points suggest that donors have to adapt to a new role which means withdrawing from interfering with partner country development goals and taking over a new role as facilitator of development processes which are owned by the partner countries. It means that donors temporarily step in for missing cooperative institutions to provide an enabling environment in order to mitigate the conflicts and start negotiations between belligerent parties. Donors as facilitators need both knowledge about the political, economic and cultural environment and skills in conflict resolution and building and strengthening a collaborative environment. The skills donors provide are on the one hand organizational which has to come from trainers specialized in the techniques of institutional and conflict transformation. On the other hand specialists in context are for example well informed and experienced diplomats. In cooperation with local actors, the role of the specialists in context is to identify key leaders and domestic stakeholders which have to be involved in the process (see Wolpe/McDonald 2008: 141-145). An additional benefit of having trainers facilitate the process is that the whole process appears more „technical” and therefore less political and therefore actors who would otherwise never come together in the same room are more easily persuaded to participate.

For instance, the Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP) effectively included a selection of a group of 95 Burundian key leaders of mixed ethnical origin who initially participated in the capacity building initiative for 18 months.⁸ They were picked from the political class (including political parties, the army, and the rebel groups) but also civil society (members of churches, women’s organizations, academia, the media, business and youth). The goal was to overcome political and ethnic differences in order to enable cooperation for the reconstruction of Burundi, to start the transition from a post-conflict society to a more inclusive democratic society, and, in the longer run, to establish a „new political culture”.

3. The Burundian nation building experience: Lessons learned from an exemplary case

Burundi is of the poorest countries in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita and human development indicators and suffered from several major violent events like the genocide in 1972 and the war between 1993 and 2005 with approximate death tolls of approximately 250,000 (Leitenberg 2006: Table 1) and over 300,000 respectively and displacement of 1.2 million people (Ngaruku/Nkurunziza 2005). The BLTP was established in the context of the war between 1993 and 2005. USAID increasingly committed to the peace process in 2000 and in 2002 the BLTP started and continued until 2008.

The most important aspect of the program was cooperation of two different kinds of specialists on behalf of the donor: „Neither diplomat nor ‘trainers’ can by themselves implement effective leadership interventions. Diplomats have access to national leaders and usually see the ‘big picture’ fairly clearly, but typically have little training in or understanding of techniques of institutional and conflict transformation. Trainers generally have scant access to national leaders and little knowledge of the larger political and diplomatic dynamics that affect divided societies. Yet diplomats and trainers working together – as they did in Burundi – can add up to more than the sum of their parts and in the process give a badly

⁸ The National Liberation Front (in French Front de Libération Nationale – FROLINA) did not participate in the process due to security considerations but welcomed the BLTP.

needed boost to the cause of democracy.” (Wolpe/McDonald 2006: 130-131) Beside their skills the advantage of trainers is that they are not involved in politics but as experts in conflict transformation, they are more likely to be seen as relative neutral actors by the conflict parties. In the end, by „[w]orking together, diplomats and trainers are a powerful synergy, capable of addressing in a holistic way the fundamental challenges of peace and democracy-building in all divided societies” (Wolpe/McDonald 2008: 144). „To assemble opponents” which are already „so demonized” in the same room and making it look like an apolitical technical seminar (like for example calling it individual capacity training for leaders) is a good way to get belligerents involved in the process (ibid.).

Considering perceptions of different people is important for understanding conflicts over values. Wolpe and McDonald (2006: 131) wrote:

„The problem of African democratization does not primarily lie in the absence of democratic values. Many African societies have traditionally embraced ways of making decisions that call for broad participation and strive for consensus. Rather, the problem is that members of many culturally plural African nation-states simply do not define themselves as 'citizens first'. Even in states that once had unifying identities and institutions – such as the traditional monarchies of Rwanda and Burundi – the new modes and orders of colonialism and postcolonialism engendered new patterns of political mobilization and competition that shattered traditional bonds.”

Hence it is not that Africa has a shortage of democrats, it is more the opposite; people do not appreciate having autocrats that limit their participation. US-President Obama, in his 2009 speech to the Ghanaian parliament, is right when he says that „Africa doesn't need strongmen, it needs strong institutions” (Obama 2009). Development has a lot to do with how a country deals with economic, political and social conflicts. The problem is that most conflicts are either primarily destructive or suppressed and therefore room for political and economic changes or social mobility, which includes upward and downward mobility, is lacking. Real collaborative institutions are missing in many partner countries. Transformation of societies to more stability must take into account that an essential component of even following „self-interest” is „collaboration and inclusive political processes”. The role of donors may not be limited to diplomatic actions but in providing professional skills in conflict transformation. Making a difference relies on the involvement of high level political actors because otherwise it will be very unlikely to generate enough credibility and convince conflict parties that the process will not be undermined by donors. Summarizing the lessons of the Burundi peace process, Wolpe lists the following receipts to progress for collaborative capacity building (discussed in Wolpe 2011: 69-73):

1. Wolpe (2011: 69) points out that all „parties with destabilizing capabilities need to be at the negotiating table.” This part of the process is very difficult because it requires identifying and taking into account all formal (national and local rulers, representatives of civil society, high-ranking military ...) and informal (powerful kin groups, secret societies, battle groups, etc.) power. The absence of even one group could have very negative effects on the whole process. In the case of Burundi major armed groups were not involved in the Arusha peace negotiations and therefore despite a signed peace agreement, violence perpetuated. Their exclusion made the agreement illegitimate to some of the belligerent parties because there were de facto only members of the existing political class invited.
2. Careful and close listening and observation of unexpressed communication (body language, eye contact, etc.) are essential for proper interpretation of what is going on and helps to identify problems in the process (for example it is widely known by trainers in conflict resolution that angry people might not listen „accurately”). Careful listening and

respectful behavior by the facilitators could increase trust and abolish reservations against the involvement of donors. In the case of Burundi, there were additional conflict lines among various domestic facilitators of South Africa and Tanzania, between rebel movements and facilitators and finally even within rebel organizations. This makes trust building a really challenging task and illustrates why the integration of all relevant actors is so important.

3. The statement „African Solutions to African Problems” has turned out as a problem because „regional sponsorship” of the process is not seen as objective due to the geographical closeness. Therefore conflict parties give non-regional actors more credit in terms of neutrality and credibility.
4. Facilitators must speak with one voice (it is essential that they do not play each other out or are played out against each other by conflict parties) and must be patient in the process. Donors must avoid „fatigue” because this might lead to ending up with unfinished and unsustainable agreements which are at the end nothing more than costly.
5. Diplomats must be immune to ideological bias from the political environment of their home countries. The person which is responsible for proper understanding of the regional context must not be „... led ... by sitting ambassadors but instead by persons with the freedom to move between state capitals and comprehend a broader regional perspective” (Wolpe 2011: 72).
6. The wrong timing of the negotiation or/and missed opportunities often seriously delay the process or make the whole process more difficult. In Burundi hesitation by big donors like USAID became a problem because they failed to provide necessary financial resources at time. This was unfavorable for the process because the resources were important for the credibility of the facilitators to proceed with the process and bring about quick improvements. According to Wolpe’s (2011: 72) experience, it is important that „... [t]he operative language effectively prohibits assistance even to governments transitioning to democracy.”
7. The emergence of democratic systems goes far beyond the electoral process, and is intimately concerned with more fundamental agreements on how political systems work (participation, accountability, balancing and checking mechanisms, protection of minorities, etc.) but also with negotiating and accepting compromises. Therefore the initial steps in such processes must focus on building „common ground” rather than strengthening competition. Wolpe (2011: 73) summarizes from the Burundian experience: „The Arusha negotiations were difficult, but in the end, Hutu leaders recognized the need for a pragmatic accommodation to Tutsi fears – and accepted a series of institutional checks and balances that give to the Tutsi community effective institutional power out of proportion to their numbers. This was understood by Burundians as the price that had to be paid for an end to Tutsi hegemony and the civil war, and for the restoration of the country’s constitutional democracy.” Roeder (2011) makes a similar argument claiming that power sharing among key actors of a diverse range of groups in a society is a necessary condition to achieve more viable management of conflicts in divided societies.


One of the most important factors was to convince participants that the BLTP was introduced as a recurrent process of leadership development and networking every two or three months. It originally started with three groups which finally were brought together in one single „leadership network“. The program also brought up 20 „master trainers” of Burundian origin which taught more than 4,000 local leaders in a grassroots training program, among them refugees, displaced and former fighters, to enable their reintegration. Participation was not restricted to literates. Learning materials were adopted and teaching was provided in the

domestic language (Kirundi). The initiative came from former participants of the BLTP projects who forwarded activities down to the community level (Wolpe/McDonald 2006). As follow up, the Woodrow Wilson Centre and the BLTP (funded by the Ministry of Education and USAID) tested and developed a curriculum in conflict resolution which addressed 1,100 students at secondary schools in a pilot project. It aims to establish a „culture of non-violent problem solving in the youth of Burundi” and they fathom the expansion of the project to all secondary schools in the country (see Woodrow Wilson Centre⁹).

3.1 How has Burundi developed since then?

Burundi has still one of the lowest levels of GDP per capita in the world (see Penn World Tables).¹⁰ But in recent years the Human Development Index (HDI) has shown considerable improvements and according to the Polity IV-dataset of the Centre for Systemic Peace, the fragility indicator improved from extreme to high. This may not sound like a fantastic success but the improvement means that the region has become less fragile (Polity IV: sfi-fragility index years 2000 until 2010). Security and stability are indeed necessary but – as many other determinants – not sufficient conditions for economic and human development. The collaborative capacity building approach does not directly address the economic problems but is thought to provide stabilization and collaboration in order to enable a more viable environment for economic and human development in the longer run. Executive constraints substantially and sustainably improved after the transition period in the early 2000s to the second highest value in the Polity IV ratings.¹¹

Figure 1: GDP per capita (1960-2009) and Human Development Index (1980-2010)



Source: GDP: Penn World Tables, PPP Converted GDP Per Capita (Chain Series), at 2005 constant prices (International Dollar), Human Development Index, Average of Low HDI and HDI Burundi according to UNDP.

⁹ See: <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/the-burundi-leadership-training-program#> (4.3.2013)

¹⁰ Lemarchand (2006) lists lack of diversification of the economy (mainly primary export of coffee and tea makes the country vulnerable to price shocks), an underdeveloped industrial sector and widespread corruption as the major problems of the Burundian economy and broader range of historical, political, economic ecological and international root and proximate causes of the multiple crises in the appendix of Lemarchand’s paper.

¹¹ The indicator for executive constraints (= Polity IV xconst-Variable) moved from 3 to 6.

Burundi is today classified as a democracy by researchers (as for example recently Geddes et al. 2012) and NGOs like for example the African Elections Database. The peace process had the objective of a more inclusive government.¹² This transition was part of the peace agreement and it was conditional to dismantling economic sanctions from the international community. There are still cases of electoral and other forms of political violence. The central government still attempts to suppress the emergence of various opposition groups (for example the Union pour le Progres National – UPRONA, Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi – FRODEBU, Forum pour le Renforcement de la Société Civile – FORSC, etc.) which led to violent upheavals. The Front de Libération Nationale (FROLINA) still challenges national power which has recurrently culminated in violent events. Besides successes in conflict resolution and peace building, there are still severe limits to press freedom (e.g. not free, journalists imprisoned) and impunity is still a problem which makes it very difficult to limit violence. The regional context is a prevailing challenge because the Eastern Congo is not part of the peace building strategy (conflict system Great Lakes) but violent actions are planned and conducted from FROLINA operating in the „lawless” areas of the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and the high number of Burundian refugees in Tanzania (see Lemarchand 2009) are all indicators for much fragility in the current situation.

Hence, the record is ambiguous. When looking at past regime transitions in Burundi there are substantial improvements. In all 10 regime transitions which took place since Burundi gained independence in 1962, at least six had been violent (five coups and one assassination). One incredibly important effort for stability in recent years was the distribution of power and to some degree even sharing of power between Hutu and Tutsi. A major effort was the Constitution in 2005 which established proportionality in representation. It reserved 40 percent of all seats in the parliament to Tutsi, and fifty-fifty in the senate and the military and it included veto to minorities and granted a certain amount of autonomy to grassroots communities. In recent years Burundi even participated in African Union peacekeeping missions in other conflict regions in Africa, i.e. in Somalia.

Nonetheless there are conflict lines which remain. Elections were not without controversies, however they were relatively peaceful compared to past political transitions. Despite all the severe ongoing problems mentioned above, the trend to improvements in stability, human development and the significant lower level of death tolls provide evidence, that there is some, although slow, positive development.

3.2 Insights from the Burundi Leadership Training Program for development cooperation in general

In general, the question about how to establish effective partnership between donors and partner countries is misdirected and has to be put differently: What is an effective role for donors in international development? It is not the role as a partner because it de facto undermines ownership of the development process by partner countries but it is more the role of a facilitator in a collaborative capacity building process. This fundamental change in the approach to development cooperation implies a reconsideration of the qualifications of the personnel on which aid agencies rely on in their operative work. Beside diplomats they need people with conflict resolution skills and sensitivity towards facilitating inclusive

¹² Compromises from the political elites were needed and thus President Pierre Buyoya with Tutsi descent handed over to the Hutu descent Vice-President Domitien Ndayizeye in April 2003. Similar to Buyoya, Ndayizeye withdrew from office in 2005 but was arrested due to accusation of planning a coup against the then newly elected Pierre Nkurunziza in the year 2006. Nkurunziza was elected in an indirect presidential election where he was the only candidate by the Members of the National Assembly and Senate and has been re-elected in the year 2010, again in elections where he was the sole candidate and his party, the Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie–Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie gained 91 percent of votes.

development processes. Donors have to revoke gradually from their traditionally dominant role and slip into their new role, which is likely to appear to be more neutral. They themselves have to stay flexible and avoid impatience as making these processes work sustainably usually takes years or even decades. Revoking from discussing ideologies and normative development approaches makes effective ownership by actors in the partner countries a more realistic scenario because of the strict non-interference position of the donor. Partner countries are supposed to decide exclusively and without external interference about leadership, development strategies, and choices of development paradigms. This is an adequate process to improve development country ownership. Additionally with establishing training programs donors create new spaces which possibly enable collaborative activities. Success also implies to abandon the conventional wisdoms, check lists and Western-shaped institutions, and it requires stepping back from the obsession of solving problems by strictly following „best practices“. Best practices are not effective because they are not context specific; tailor-made solutions and even compromises have often shown much more progress. Table 1 shows a relatively detailed overview of possible shared treatment strategies of major „causes“ in capacity building. Most importantly in environments with high levels of conflict potential, the role of facilitators provides a huge potential for effective conflict sensitive engagement.

Table 1: Conflict-sensitive development assistance: Shared causes of Aid and Diplomacy

Cause	Development assistance	Diplomacy/track II
Social, economic, ethnic and regional cleavages	Public expenditure review, monitoring and evaluation using peace and conflicts indicators; investments targeted to assist disadvantaged groups; leadership training with particular emphasis on techniques of conflict management and mitigation	Inter-group elite facilitation and mediation
Differential social opportunities (e.g. education, health)	Sector programs with explicit social equity objectives	Negotiation with elites
Bridging/bonding social capital, group identity-building & myth-making	Bricks-and-mortar inter-group projects; peace-building media projects; promotion of fair and professional media	Training in conflict management and mitigation
History of violence and impunity	Training in conflict management and mitigation; support for judicial system reform and capacity-building; support for truth and reconciliation processes	Training in conflict management and mitigation; International Criminal Court, support for truth and reconciliation processes
Governance and institutions	Budget support, capacity-building training initiatives	Negotiation with elites
Links between government and citizens	Budget support, capacity-building training initiatives	Negotiation with elites
Human rights	Support for human rights advocacy groups, support for judicial system reform and capacity-building support for security sector reform	Negotiation with elites; ending impunity (governance; war crimes tribunal)
Militarization of society and small arms proliferation	Financial and technical support for demobilization and reintegration programs	Facilitating negotiation of regional arms control regimes; continued conditionality of IFI programs requiring reduction in military expenditures
Economic structure and performance	Support for community-based development and social protection programs; expansion of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative; promotion of economic diversification and transformation Industries; support for employment projects; technical assistance for land reform	Facilitating the negotiation of new regional economic compacts and institutions
Environment and natural resources (including land)	Natural resource management	Negotiation of regional environmental compacts regarding water and other resources
External forces; regional conflicts; role of kindred groups outside country; role of diasporas	Developmental programs, with clear incentives for regional cooperation and integration; support and technical assistance for regional trade and investment agreements; facilitation of regional networking among professional and other social sectors; facilitating diaspora involvement with development projects	International arms embargoes; the negotiation of a new regional security architecture; the engagement of international monitors and peacekeepers

Source: Brachet/Wolpe (2005): Conflict-Sensitive Development Assistance: The Case of Burundi, Table 3.

4. Advantages and Limits of the Approach

Finally we discuss the limits of the approach and point to open questions. It is problematic to think that donors can immediately adapt to their new role without any problems of practical implementation. First, the approach is more likely to work in fragmented societies and weak states rather than effectively centralized authoritarian states, because leaders in control of their country are probably not willing to share their power. Therefore they are unlikely to participate in this kind of training processes. Second, the approach is not capable of solving all underlying collective choice problems immediately. All participants will have to prove patience to work on overcoming problems step by step. Third, it is not said that the problem of identifying relevant actors and understanding the context of fragmented societies can easily be applied. It is questionable whether such an approach could be effective in large and complex conflict situations like for example in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is likely to be much more difficult to implement the approach in larger countries because territorial control needs a large variety of capacities and fragmentation often becomes an even more difficult problem to solve. Fourth, there is a danger to oversee that development is not only about domestic processes but also about the global environment. Global factors could potentially enable or constrain development. Development policy is only one small activity among many others, often much more powerful policies (trade policy, economic policy, etc.). Transformation does not only rely on funds but viable local, regional and global rules. Fifth, when considering the politics of international aid, it is at least doubtful whether donors can be neutral actors in development. Sixth, it is also important to keep in mind that the process of facilitating a cooperative environment is vulnerable and that it could be harmed by unforeseeable events like for example military victories. They could be a „game changer“ at any time (see for example Wolpe 2011: 70). Finally, adaption to (unexpected) changes and flexibility of the facilitators are very important challenges which donors have to prove to be capable to address.

Finally we argue that the benefits of the collaborative capacity building approach outpace its limitations: First, the approach aims at building collaborative capacities and stabilizes the political environment of partner countries, which conventional capacity building programs insufficiently address. Second, the collaborative capacity approach suggests a new role for donors as facilitators. This is suitable to establish partner country ownership of development strategies. These two points indicate the major difference between the collaborative capacity building approach and existing approaches. Conventional approaches have normatively imposed institutions on partner countries which the new approach does not. Third and probably the most convincing argument is that it has already proven to be viable in terms of practical implementation and has shown to be capable of stabilizing a political environment in a deeply divided society. Benefits from strengthening collaborative aspects of the political environment and partner countries' ownership have been clearly shown during and after the BLTP in Burundi. The consensual nature of collaborative capacity building has turned out as an important feature to close a gap of many existing capacity building approaches. Addressing these blind spots by integrating beneficial features of the collaborative capacity building approach in order to adjust existing capacity building programs of donors is obviously a promising way to make them more effective.

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