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**Working Paper**

## China's CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from power generating stations: A first exploration

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## **Working Papers**

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### **China's CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions from Power Generating Stations – A First Exploration**

by **Limin Du,  
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**No. 1934 | June 2014**

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## **China's CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions from Power Generating Stations – A First Exploration\***

Limin Du<sup>1</sup>, Aoife Hanley, and Katrin Rehdanz

### **Abstract**

Our analysis is the first of its kind to explore patterns of subsidization and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in China's electricity producing sector. Applying data for all power plants across China and controlling for the age, capacity and location of generating stations, we find that plants attracting a higher government subsidy are also worryingly the plants generating a disproportionate share of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. This distortion is incongruent with China's aspiration for a greener economy but may be eliminated if China delivers on its November 2013 announcement to review many industry subsidies on its way to a fully-fledged market economy (Bloomberg News, 28.02.2014).

**Keywords:** CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, China, energy sector, plant-level data

**JEL:** Q53 Q48

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## 1. Background

The Chinese power sector is one of the biggest systems in the world. By the end of 2011, its total installed power capacity is 1,063 GW, the lion's share of which (circa 72%) was produced by fossil fuel fired power plants. Unavoidably, the power sector has become one of the major pollution sources in China. According to an IEA (2013) report, CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from electricity and heat production account for almost 50 percent of total emissions from combustion in 2011 in China. Since China is currently the world's number one CO<sub>2</sub> emissions polluter, putting a lid on emissions from China's power plants is meaningful for overall emissions reduction.

The issue now turns to policy. Which steps have China's administrators taken towards this sector which might have an impact on CO<sub>2</sub> emissions? One possibility is the effect of power subsidies.<sup>1</sup> Though these subsidies are generally not targeted towards the achievement of environmental goals, it is reasonable that a profitable plant is in a better position to tackle emissions than a struggling plant. In China many power plants appear to be struggling. This is because of a misalignment between the unregulated market for input prices which are free to rise in response to spiraling demand (e.g. coal) and regulated on-grid energy price (Liu et al., 2013). This price mismatch has motivated Government subsidies to, at least in the short-run, prevent any struggling plants from cutting off supply.

To our knowledge, no study, up to now, asks whether policy efforts such as subsidies have helped China's fossil fuel fired power plants to cut back on CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Although several papers tackle the *operational efficiency* of China's energy sector - rather than the *emissions efficiency* - of China's electricity generating stations, ours is the first exploration of the subsidization of China's fossil fuel fired power stations, while controlling for other variables which explain the variation in environmental emissions (plant age, capacity, region and plant type). This is the novelty of our paper. To tackle this question we apply a data cross-section for more than 600 plants in 2008. We find that generating stations attracting a higher Government subsidy are also worryingly the plants generating a disproportionate share of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions.

## 2. Environmental Impacts, Subsidies and Reforms

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<sup>1</sup> China's fossil fuel fired stations are subsidized in two main ways by Central and Local Government. One of the most visible subsidies is the higher on-grid price permitted to generating stations which have installed SO<sub>2</sub> scrubbers on the basis of the May 2007 Government initiatives to reduce SO<sub>2</sub> emissions (see Xu (2010) for a fuller discussion). A less formalized subsidy is the power outage subsidy, generally applied at the local level (regularly reported in local media) attenuates the costs incurred by power firm costs during peak periods by compensating them for rising coal prices.

This question of how reform of the thermal power sector has impacted on the environment has been asked and answered for other countries (not for China). Examples include Newbery and Pollitt (1997) for the UK and a recent study by Chan et al. (2013) for the US. Specifically, Chan et al. conclude that market reform in the US led to an emissions drop of approximately 7.6 percent CO<sub>2</sub> reduction per plant where their approach allowed them to identify the installation of ‘scrubbers’ in US plants, a device to reduce SO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Apart from these exceptions, plant-level studies on the effect of reforms on emissions are still scarce with no evidence at all, for China.

What we do have for China is good coverage in the literature of input (not environmental) efficiency as a result of the reforms which unbundled production (generating and transmission) of the State-owned power generating stations (Gao and Van Biesebroeck, 2014; Zhou and Ma, 2013; Du et al., 2009). Zhou and Ma (2013) examine the efficiency of a balanced panel of 34 large power plants for the period 1997–2010. In the earliest study, Du et al. (2009) follow the Difference-in-Differences approach used by Fabrizio et al. (2007) and assess the production labour and fuel efficiency improvements for two years of data for China’s fossil fuel fired stations. Du et al (2009) find no evidence of fuel efficiency gains. Additionally, Zhou and Ma (2013) find no differences in the efficiency gains between previously State-owned generating stations and those in private hands. If we consider that the market deregulation measures were expected to mostly affect the State-owned generating stations, we can conclude that the latter did not demonstrate any greater post-reform efficiencies than generating plants in the control group (privately held generating stations). Finally, in a recent study, Gao and Van Biesebroeck (2014) apply data for a panel set of generating stations. In their analysis they do uncover some evidence of post-reform input efficiencies.

What all of these studies have in common is their focus on the *operational efficiency* rather than *emissions efficiency* of the reforms on China’s generating stations. This is a gap that this initial study makes a first step towards addressing the deficit.

### **3. Analysis**

The firm-level data we use is the 2008 wave of the Chinese Power Enterprises Dataset. This cross-section includes surveys of all the Chinese power plants and captures information such as installed capacity, fuel usage, power production and other such variables. We highlighted above that many of China’s power generating stations are experiencing negative profits because of the misalignment between the fuel prices and the on-grid price of electricity. It therefore comes as no surprise that circa 37 percent of the power plants in our sample are subsidized by China’s Government. Table 1 supplies a summary of key variables in the data. There is wide variation in the size of fossil-fuel generating plants, as evidenced by the high standard deviation. Our calculations reveal an average subsidy size of 50 Yuan per KW per plant. Some

plants receive no subsidy but others, possibly struggling plants, receive considerably more than this average (maximum value is 7320 Yuan per KW).

**Table 1: Summary Statistics**

Variable	Description	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
intensity	Carbon intensity (ton/10,000 KWh)	9	2	0.0004	19
capacity	Installed capacity at the end of the year (KW)	537,588	737,118	2,100	10,000,000
age	Age of the plant (years)	14	14	2	104
state	Dummy; 1 if the plant is state-owned; 0 otherwise	0.21	0.41	0	1
coal	Dummy; 1 if the plant is coal-fired; 0 otherwise	0.96	0.19	0	1
oil	Dummy; 1 if the plant is oil-fired; 0 otherwise	0.02	0.16	0	1
thermo	Dummy; 1 if the plant co-generates heat and power, 0 otherwise	0.43	0.50	0	1
subsidy	Subsidy per KW (1,000 Yuan/KW)	0.05	0.33	0	7.32
east	Dummy; 1 if the plant is located in Eastern region of China; 0 otherwise	0.56	0.50	0	1
west	Dummy; 1 if the plant is located in Western region of China; 0 otherwise	0.17	0.37	0	1
state_east	Region/State-Owned generator interaction term	0.08	0.27	0	1

Note: Own presentation based on 2008 wave of Chinese Power Enterprises dataset. The number of observations is 606.

In order to deduce a pattern between the subsidy cover and the overall carbon emissions of the generating plant, we estimate a simple regression model as follows which controls for the *subsidy* and other sources of plant-level heterogeneity:

$$\ln(intensity)_i = \alpha + \beta * subsidy_i + \gamma_n * Z_{ni} + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where  $Z$  is a vector of  $n$  control variables,  $\varepsilon$  is the error term,  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$  and  $\gamma$  are parameters and the subscript  $i$  denotes each individual plant.

The results for our OLS regression model are summarized in Table 2. When interpreting the associations between the covariates and our measure of carbon intensity (the ratio of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and electricity output)<sup>2</sup>, we should bear in mind that positive coefficient values are associated with elevated carbon intensity rates while negative values reduce carbon intensity rates. Therefore, regression (1) demonstrates, unsurprisingly that older thermal generating plants are less environmentally efficient (*ln\_age*). Additionally, both *coal* as well as *oil* fired plants are less environmentally efficient than plants in the base category (gas-fired plants). Due to the effects of scale economies in production, larger plants are more

<sup>2</sup> CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are calculated on the basis of power plants' energy consumption (coal, oil and gas). The calculation formula is  $CO_2 \text{ emissions} = \sum_i energy_i * emission \ factor_i$ , where  $i$  represents coal, oil and gas. The emission factors used are 2.773 for coal, 3.064 for oil and 21.67 for gas, respectively.

environmentally efficient (*ln\_capacity*). Slightly worrying is the fact that the most heavily subsidized plants are also those plants which are associated with the lowest environmental efficiency, measured as CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Increasing the *subsidy* by 1,000 Yuan/KW increases carbon *intensity* on average by 2 percent. Regression (2) includes provincial dummy variables to check for the possibility that plants in the less well-developed Western region are not driving the results. We find evidence of a strong and significant region effect where the generating stations which are located in the Eastern provinces (*east*) perform better when it comes to environmental efficiency.

**Table 2: Carbon Emissions and Subsidies (OLS Regression)**

Variable	y: carbon intensity ( <i>ln_intensity</i> )		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>ln_capacity</i>	-0.058*** (0.005)	-0.060*** (0.005)	-0.061*** (0.005)
<i>ln_age</i>	0.011* (0.007)	0.011* (0.006)	0.011* (0.007)
<i>state</i>	0.018* (0.011)	0.009 (0.011)	-0.010 (0.014)
<i>coal</i>	9.890*** (0.042)	9.881*** (0.035)	9.884*** (0.035)
<i>oil</i>	9.488*** (0.044)	9.502*** (0.036)	9.508*** (0.037)
<i>thermo</i>	-0.083*** (0.016)	-0.071*** (0.016)	-0.071*** (0.016)
<i>subsidy</i>	0.020*** (0.008)	0.023*** (0.007)	0.020*** (0.007)
<i>east</i>		-0.045*** (0.013)	-0.054*** (0.015)
<i>west</i>		0.006 (0.012)	0.008 (0.012)
<i>state_east</i>			0.048** (0.021)
constant	-6.930*** (0.078)	-6.882*** (0.075)	-6.871*** (0.075)
Number of obs	606	606	606
F	7952.33	9603.01	8473.49
Prob > F	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
r <sup>2</sup>	0.9835	0.9839	0.9840

Notes: \*, \*\* and \*\*\* denotes significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent respectively; dependent variable: *ln\_intensity*; robust standard errors in

Plants located in the Western region (*west*) do not perform significantly different from plants in the base category (Central region). Although plants which are under State ownership generally perform worse than non-state-owned generating stations (*state*), the effect is only marginally significant. In a last step, we

estimate regression (3) which controls for the possibility that there is an environmental performance premium to generating stations in areas of high population density or power usage (Eastern region). What we find is that state-owned generating stations located in the East perform environmentally worse, despite the comparative better performance of generating stations in the more advanced Eastern region (*state\_east*).

#### **4. Conclusion**

Overall what can be said about the environmental efficiency of China's subsidized generating stations? Subsidization is negatively associated with environmental goals. In terms of the economic impact, most of the variation in environmental efficiency is attributed to plant capacity – larger plants are more environmentally efficient. However, the direction of the coefficient on plant subsidy indicates that generating stations which attract a higher subsidy are also worryingly the plants which generate a disproportionate share of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Our analysis, the first of its kind to examine patterns of subsidization and emissions in China's electricity producing sector, concurs with the view that China's continued subsidization of electricity generating stations is incongruent with China's goals for a greener economy.

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