

Martinez-Zarzoso, Inmaculada; Nowak-Lehmann D., Felicitas; Rehwald, Kai

Working Paper

Is aid for trade effective? A quantile regression approach

cege Discussion Papers, No. 210

Provided in Cooperation with:

Georg August University of Göttingen, Department of Economics

Suggested Citation: Martinez-Zarzoso, Inmaculada; Nowak-Lehmann D., Felicitas; Rehwald, Kai (2014) : Is aid for trade effective? A quantile regression approach, cege Discussion Papers, No. 210, University of Göttingen, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research (cege), Göttingen

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/98158>

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.

Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

Terms of use:

Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.

You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.

If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.

IS AID FOR TRADE EFFECTIVE? A QUANTILE REGRESSION APPROACH

Inmaculada Martinez-Zarzoso, Felicitas Nowak-Lehmann D. ,
Kai Rehwald

GEORG-AUGUST-UNIVERSITÄT GÖTTINGEN

Is Aid for Trade Effective?

A Quantile Regression Approach

By

Inmaculada Martínez-Zarzoso*¹, University of Goettingen and University Jaume I

Felicitas Nowak-Lehmann D.*², University of Goettingen

Kai Rehwald**³, University of Aarhus

Abstract

This paper investigates whether Aid for Trade (AfT) improves export performance, i.e. does AfT lead to greater exports? Using panel data and panel quantile regression, our results suggest that overall AfT disbursements promote the export of goods and services mainly for the .50 and .75 quantiles. Our results also show that for some types of AfT this effect essentially vanishes at the lower tail of the conditional distribution of exports. Hence, countries that export more in volume are those benefiting most from AfT. We also investigate which types of AfT are effective. In particular, we find that aid used to build production capacity is effective. This type of aid is associated with higher exports for almost all quantiles, with the effect increasing at the upper tail of the conditional distribution. Aid used to build infrastructure is also found to affect exports at the upper tail of the distribution. In contrast, aid for trade policy and aid disbursed for general budget support (an untargeted type of aid) are not associated with greater export levels. This finding holds true irrespective of the quantile.

Key Words: development aid; North-South trade; aid for trade; panel data; aid effectiveness

JEL Codes: F10

* Department of Economics, University of Goettingen, Platz der Goettinger Sieben 3, 37073, Goettingen, Germany. Tel: 0049551399770.

**Department of Economics, University of Aarhus, Nordre Ringgade 1DK-8000 Aarhus.

¹ The author acknowledges the support and collaboration of Project ECO2010-15863 financed by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation. We also would like to thank the participants of the research seminar held at the University of Bochum and the International Economics Workshop held in Goettingen for their helpful comments and suggestions, which have been incorporated to the paper.

Is Aid for Trade Effective?

1. Introduction

Aid for Trade (AfT) became a buzz word in aid policy only a few years ago, but is far from being a new concept in development policy (Evenett, 2009). Dating back to the 1986-1994 Uruguay Round, developing countries began demanding financial compensation for concessions made in trade liberalization negotiations² as well as an increase in development aid to help facilitate integration into the world trading system. Aid that serves the latter objective is usually considered AfT. As trade liberalization negotiations became more difficult in the late 1990s and early 2000s given that the “easier” concessions had already been made on both sides (developed and developing countries), WTO members separated the AfT initiative from the Doha Round negotiations and established a WTO ‘Aid for Trade Task Force’ in July 2006. According to the WTO task force on AfT, “[AfT] is about assisting developing countries to increase exports of goods and services, to integrate into the multilateral trading system, and to benefit from liberalised trade and increased market access. Effective [AfT] will enhance growth prospects and reduce poverty, as well as complement multilateral trade reforms and distribute the global benefits more equitably across and within developing countries.” (Cited in OECD/WTO, 2011: 9.)

In essence, the objectives of the AfT initiative were to promote growth and development through trade across developing countries, especially in the least developed countries (LDCs); and through their integration into the world trading system. This was to be achieved through more trade-related infrastructure, developing greater production capacity and capabilities and by supporting negotiations concerning trade policy regulation and trade liberalization. As AfT is considered an important instrument of development aid, the European Union, the United States, and Japan made non-binding concessions to increase AfT disbursements. However, the means

² Compensation payments for trade liberalization were the original type of AfT.

for AfT have not increased substantially (García, 2008; Luke, 2009; Huchet-Bourdon et al., 2009; Karingi, 2009). In the period from 2002 to 2009, AfT ranged from a meager 20 to 30% of total official development assistance (ODA). While AfT increased during these years, other types of aid increased even faster (Karingi, 2009). In Africa, the AfT share shrank from 29% in 2002 to 21% in 2006. In real terms, 2010 AfT commitments were extremely high at US\$ 48 billion, declining by 14 percent to US\$ 41 billion in 2011. Meanwhile, AfT disbursements were less affected by the 2011 decline in ODA; disbursements declined only by 3.7% to US\$ 33.5 billion (see Figure A.1).

In recent years, development economists have become more aware of the challenges of overall ODA in promoting trade and economic growth in developing countries (Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2008; Rajan and Subramanian, 2008; Nowak-Lehmann D. et al., 2012; Nowak-Lehmann D. et al., 2013). Many existing studies find that ODA is ineffective, in that it no significant impact on per capita income and recipient country exports. However, these studies fail to differentiate³ among different types of aid, such as: AfT, technical assistance, humanitarian aid, sector-specific aid, etc. This could explain why the authors were unable to find a positive impact of aid.

Given the objectives of AfT, our question remains: Is AfT effective? In particular, we investigate whether AfT is associated with higher exports of goods and services. To the best of our knowledge, the existing literature on AfT-effectiveness is scarce, as pointed out by Vijil and Wagner (2012), and most of the work consists of case studies at the country level.

The effectiveness of AfT is currently assessed using one of two approaches. The first approach investigates whether AfT reduces the cost of trading or other impediments to trade. The second approach, which is used in this paper, analyses whether AfT is associated with improved export performance (measured by the value of exports of goods and services). Most existing studies have found a positive relationship between AfT or some of its components, and

³ Rajan and Subramanian (2009) investigated different types of aid but could not establish significant differences between these types.

trade-related outcomes. Among these studies, Bearce et al. (2013) find that AfT issued by the US government has a positive effect on the recipient country's export performance; Vijil and Wagner (2012) suggest that aid to trade-related infrastructure⁴, as part of overall AfT, has a positive impact on exports as a ratio to GDP; and Cali and Te Velde (2011: 725) find that AfT has an overall positive and significant effect on exports and also lowers trade costs. Both Vijil and Wagner (2012) and Cali and Te Velde (2011) emphasize that the infrastructure channel is the main driver of AfT effectiveness. However, Helble, Mann and Wilson (2012) find that aid for trade policy and regulations (which is another AfT category) is also effective. The authors find that a 1% increase in aid towards trade policy and regulation increases trade volume by around US\$ 347 million. Hühne et al. (2013) have investigated the impact of AfT on both donor and recipient countries. Regarding recipient countries, they find total AfT and its components (infrastructure-related aid, aid for building and improving productive capacity and aid for trade policy and regulation) to be effective. However, when splitting the sample into groups, by income and region, the results become mixed. AfT tends to favor richer developing countries and countries in Asia and Latin America.

The main contribution of this paper to the existing literature is our approach in taking a closer look at the mixed results. To do this, we use a methodology, panel-quantile regression, which allows us to investigate whether AfT has a different effect for different quantiles of the distribution of exports, and thus, favors countries that already possess certain export advantages. This is an important step in trying to investigate whether AfT is only fostering exports for countries that have already developed some exporting capacity.

The main results show that AfT disbursements promote exports of goods and services mainly for the .50 and .75 quantiles of the conditional distribution of exports. However, this effect essentially vanishes for some types of AfT at the lower tail of the distribution. Hence, countries that export more also benefit more than other countries from AfT. In particular, aid

⁴ Through this paper, we refer to this type of aid as “aid for economic infrastructure”.

used to build production capacity is found to be effective. This type of AfT is associated with higher exports for all quantiles but the first, with the effect increasing at the upper tail of the conditional distribution. Also, aid used to build infrastructure is found to positively affect exports at the upper tail of the distribution. In contrast, aid for trade policy and regulations; and aid disbursed to general budget support (for comparison), which is considered as an untargeted component of aid, are not associated with higher exports. This holds true irrespective of the quantile.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical model that we use to analyse AfT effectiveness. Section 3 discusses the variables, data and descriptive statistics. Regression results are presented and evaluated in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes.

2. Empirical Model

2.1 Baseline model

As a framework for analysis, we estimate the model proposed by Cali and Te Velde (2011) using the most recent AfT data. The authors identify the types of AfT that can help address governance failures in developing countries by associating the main aid categories, as classified by the OECD statistics, with a number of goals that are related to trade performance, e.g. aid for trade policy and regulations should improve weak institutions. They also refer to the complexity of the economic channels through which AfT affects export performance. This includes Dutch disease effects as well as direct and indirect competitiveness effects. The authors claim, however, that causality is less complex than for the aid-economic growth link. The OECD distinguishes between five categories of AfT: (1) technical assistance for trade policy and regulations (e.g. helping countries develop trade strategies, negotiating trade agreements and implementing their outcomes); (2) trade-related infrastructure (e.g. building roads, ports and telecommunication networks to connect domestic markets to the global economy); (3) productive capacity building, including trade development (e.g. supporting the private sector exploit their comparative advantages and diversify their exports); (4) trade related adjustments

(e.g. helping developing countries finance the costs associated with trade liberalization, such as tariff reductions, preference erosion, or declining terms of trade) and (5) other trade-related needs, if identified as trade-related development priorities in partner countries' national development strategies (OECD, 2014). For reasons of data availability, we limit our analysis to the first three categories of AfT.

The empirical model used to analyse AfT effectiveness is an export demand equation augmented with aid for trade variables and is given by,

$$Exp_{it} = \beta_0 + \sum_k \beta_k X_{kit} + \sum_l \beta_l D_{lt} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

where Exp_{it} denotes exports of country i in year t , X_{kit} variables are observed explanatory (such as AfT) and control variables, D_{lt} variables are time dummies and ε_{it} is the error term. However with a (*pooled*) *OLS regression* as in (1) we are not controlling for country-specific unobserved heterogeneity. To capture these unobserved effects, the model is specified as,

$$Exp_{it} = \beta_0 + \sum_k \beta_k X_{kit} + \sum_l \beta_l D_{lt} + \alpha_i + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

where α_i denotes country-specific unobserved heterogeneity, and ε_{it} is the error term. The unobserved effect α_i is country-specific and time-invariant and can be treated as *fixed* or *random* to fit the model. The baseline is the following static unobserved effects model,

$$\ln(Exp_{it}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 POP_{it} + \beta_2 \ln(MP_{it}) + \beta_3 GE_{it} + \beta_4 \ln(CPI_{it}) + \sum_h \beta_h \ln(AfT_{hit-x}) + \sum_l \beta_l D_{lt} + \alpha_i + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (3)$$

in which \ln denotes natural logs. We regress exports (Exp_{it}) on lagged proxies for AfT (AfT_{hit-x}) while controlling for population size (POP_{it}), market potential (MP_{it}), government effectiveness

(GE_{it}) and the consumer price index (CPI_{it}). Furthermore, time dummies (D_{it}) and the country-unobserved effects (α_i) are included.

Model (3) is a generalized version of the model used by Cali and Te Velde (2011: 730). The main differences are twofold. First, we use exports of goods and services as a dependent variable, whereas the authors use merchandise exports. Second, the authors use only two proxies of AfT, while we consider three.

The reasons for our choice of dependent and explanatory variables are as follow. First, there is no reason to limit the scope of analysis to merchandise exports. Service exports, for example, could also be fostered by AfT. AfT is neither aimed at merchandise exports only nor would we expect the export performance of service sectors to be unaffected by AfT.⁵ Consequently, we use *exports of goods and services* as the dependent variable in our regressions. Second, when analysing the effect of AfT on exports, a specific measure of AfT must be selected (i.e. selecting which AfT categories to include in the estimations). Cali and Te Velde (2011) use aid disbursed for economic infrastructure and aid disbursed to production capacity. In contrast to their study, we make use of three AfT proxies: aid to trade policies and regulation (*TPR*), aid to economic infrastructure (*EI*) and aid to building production capacity (*BPC*). Our choice of AfT proxies allows us to avoid an omitted variable bias that could be present when only two AfT categories are used. To give one example example, aid disbursed to TPR—which is omitted in Cali and Te Velde (2011)—has, say, a positive effect on exports, as found by Helble, Mann and Wilson, (2012) and is positively correlated with, for instance, aid disbursed to EI (which is included in their regressions), then the effect of aid disbursed to EI would be overestimated.

To put our results into perspective, we compare the impact of AfT with the impact of aid to general budget support (*GBS*), which might be used by recipients for trade development but

⁵ Aid for economic infrastructure (which is part of overall AfT and is, among others, used to build roads and ports), may have an impact on the tourism sector (which, especially in developing countries, may account for a substantial portion of total exports).

which is not counted as AfT. Lastly, we experiment with three alternative measures of market potential. The concept of market potential dates back to Harris (1954). Cali and Te Velde (2011: 730) calculate the market potential⁶ of country i at time t as the sum of the (inverse) bilateral distance (d_{ij}) weighted GDPs of *all* other countries, i.e.

$$MP_{it} = \sum_j \frac{GDP_{jt}}{d_{ij}} \quad (4)$$

Generally, as explained in Overman, Redding and Venables (2001: 12), market potentials can also be computed as:

$$MP_{it} = \sum_j GDP_{jt} d_{ij}^\gamma \quad (5)$$

where γ serves as a “distance weighting parameter”. By varying the size of the distance weighting parameter, we obtain different measures of market potential:

$$\begin{aligned} MP1 &= MP_{it}(\gamma = -1) = \sum_j \frac{GDP_{jt}}{d_{ij}} \\ MP2 &= MP_{it}(\gamma = -0.5) = \sum_j \frac{GDP_{jt}}{\sqrt{d_{ij}}} \\ MP3 &= MP_{it}(\gamma = -2) = \sum_j \frac{GDP_{jt}}{d_{ij}^2} \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

Note that we would expect greater market potential to be (*ceteris paribus*) associated with higher exports.

2.2 Quantile regression model

⁶ Note that the market potential of country i at time t is calculated as the sum of the (inverse) bilateral distance weighted GDPs of *all* other countries and *not only* of all countries for which we analyse the effect of AfT on exports - which are, of course, mostly developing countries.

A novel specification we considered in this paper is the application of a quantile regression for panel data. Recently, Canay (2011) proposed a simple transformation to exclude fixed effects, assuming that these effects are location shifters. Canay proposes a two-step approach that consists of estimating country fixed effects (FE) using a within FE model in a first step. In a second step the consistently estimated FE are used to demean the dependent variable (log of exports) and this transformed variable is taken as a dependent variable in a quantile regression.

The model estimated in the first step is given by equation (3) above. Then the estimated α_i are used to transform $\ln(X_{it})$ into $\tilde{X}_{it} = \ln(X_{it}) - \hat{\alpha}_i$.

The quantile regression is estimated as,

$$\hat{\beta}(\tau) = \arg \min_{\beta \in \Theta} (nT)^{-1} \sum_{T=1}^T \sum_{i=1}^n \rho_{\tau}(\tilde{X}_{it} - X'_{it}\beta) \quad (7)$$

3. Variables, Data and Descriptive Statistics

In this section, we discuss the data and present variable descriptions and sources, as well as descriptive statistics. The panel dataset used in our empirical analysis covers the period from 2000 to 2011 and comprises 162 countries (see Table A.1 in the Appendix).⁷ Figure A.2 shows the regional distribution. It is worth noting that 19% of the countries are landlocked. Limited data availability influenced the time and country dimensions of the panel. Data coverage on AfT—our key explanatory variable—for the years before 2000 is incomplete, and 2011 is the last year available.

Table A.2 presents a description of the variables used in the analysis, the corresponding abbreviations, and the sources of the data.

⁷ While data on AfT is available for 179 countries, there are only 168 countries for which we have data on both AfT and exports, our dependent variable. For six of these 168 countries, we are not able to calculate market potentials—an important control variable—because data on bilateral distances is missing. We confine the analysis *ex ante* to those 162 countries for which data on exports, AfT and bilateral distances (market potentials) are available (which does not mean that the data for these 162 countries is complete).

Data on AfT—our key explanatory variable—stems from the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) (OECD, 2013a).⁸ According to the OECD (2013b), “[t]he objective of the CRS Aid Activity database is to provide (...) data that enables analysis on where aid goes, what purposes it serves and what policies it aims to implement (...).” Data on commitments and disbursements of official development assistance (ODA) is available by sector, policy objective, type of aid and purpose code. We use data on disbursements of ODA (in constant 2011 US\$) by sector for the 162 countries included in our analysis for the 2002-2011 period. Using data on ODA by sector, we calculated AfT proxies as illustrated in Table A.3.

Data on the export of goods and services (in constant 2005 US\$) is from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) database (World Bank, 2013a). From the same database, we obtained data on *Population* (in millions) and data on the *CPI* (with 2005 as the base year). Data on GDP (in constant 2005 US\$), which we need to compute market potentials, also comes from the WDI database. Data on bilateral distances—which, as explained in Section 2, is also needed to calculate market potentials—stems from CEPII (2013a/b). Data on government effectiveness (*GE*), which is another important control variable in our baseline model, comes from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project (World Bank, 2013b). *GE* indicates the strength of governance performance. Finally, data on the strength of legal rights index (*SOLR*), which “measures the degree to which (...) laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending” (World Bank, 2013a), comes from the WDI database (World Bank, 2013a). The *SOLR* dataset is not part of our baseline model (see Section 2), but is used as an alternative to the government effectiveness (*GE*) index in some regressions.

Table 1 contains summary statistics of the main variables used in the empirical analysis. The first part of Table 1 contains summary statistics for the AfT proxies. For each proxy, commitment and disbursement data is available. Proxies for “total” AfT commitments

⁸The CRS database is maintained by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which is part of the OECDs Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD).

(*C_TOTAL*) and “total” AfT disbursements (*D_TOTAL*) are calculated as the sum of the proxies for commitments and disbursements, respectively.

Table 1: Summary statistics for the AfT-proxies, dependent variable and controls

Target Variables	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Commitments					
C_TPR	1312	4.631	17.779	0.000	461.053
C_EI	1623	123.562	288.600	0.000	3787.111
C_BPC	1692	80.110	152.452	0.000	1989.448
C_GBS	810	87.058	159.957	0.000	1730.520
C_TOTAL	1704	242.184	450.746	0.000	5375.200
Disbursements					
D_TPR	1204	3.360	15.781	0.000	403.724
D_EI	1391	84.550	185.843	0.004	2107.355
D_BPC	1421	63.535	114.457	0.003	1179.496
D_GBS	742	70.240	122.008	0.000	1066.810
D_TOTAL	1425	185.302	325.919	0.006	3042.281
Dependent Variable					
Exports	1228	29051.210	108752.000	15.785	1677840.000
Control Variables					
Population	1788	35.552	142.991	0.009	1344.130
MP1	1728	7907.086	3447.210	3291.178	24758.810
GE	1628	-0.464	0.679	-2.454	1.590
CPI	1562	296.858	7418.968	0.288	293318.000
MP2	1728	558266.100	103877.000	354308.800	966380.700
MP3	1728	4.273	8.793	0.329	93.052
SOLR	1075	4.805	2.342	0	10

Notes: *C_TOTAL* is calculated as the sum of *C_TPR*, *C_EI*, *C_BPC* and *C_GBS*. If data on some of the four components was missing, *C_TOTAL* was calculated as the sum of the others. In essence, when calculating the sum over all corresponding proxies, missing values were set equal to 0 as long as not all values were missing. Similarly for *D_TOTAL*, values are in constant 2011 US\$ millions. Exports = exports of goods and services (constant 2005 US\$ millions). Population = total population (in millions). MP1 = market potential (with simple distances). GE = government effectiveness (-2.5 = weak to 2.5 = strong gov. performance). CPI = consumer price index (2005 = 100). MP2/3 = market potential 2/3 (with square root/squared distances). SOLR = strength of legal rights index (0 = weak to 10 = strong). Also see Table 2.

In what follows, we discuss the data of our AfT-proxies in detail.⁹ Descriptive statistics for all other variables will be presented thereafter. First, note that the number of observations for AfT commitments is significantly larger than for AfT disbursements (see Table 1). This is mostly due to the fact that data on disbursements is completely missing for the years before 2002 (e.g. in our case, for 2000 and for 2001).


Second, the average size of AfT commitments and disbursements is notable. The mean value of AfT commitments for economic infrastructure (C_EI), which is the average commitment on aid to economic infrastructure per country per year, is about US\$ 124 million. The fact that AfT is quite sizeable can best be seen when expressed relative to GDP. The ratio of the sum of all AfT proxies (C_TOTAL or D_TOTAL) to GDP has a median value of 1.4% for commitments and 1% for disbursements. The 75th percentile is about 5% for commitments and 4% for disbursements. The largest AfT-to-GDP-ratio is actually larger than 1 for commitments (Kiribati, 2011) and larger than 0.5 for disbursements (Liberia, 2008).

Third, AfT commitments tend to be larger and more volatile than AfT disbursements. As seen in Table 1, mean commitments are strikingly larger than mean disbursements. The correlation coefficient between total commitments (C_TOTAL) and total disbursements (D_TOTAL) is “only” about 87% (p-value: 0.000). Figure 1 shows a scatter plot for C_TOTAL and D_TOTAL . The majority of observations (59%) lie well below the 45° line. The average shortfall of “total” disbursements below commitments amounts to US\$ 67 million. This indicates that on average, donor countries do not fully match their commitments with actual disbursements.¹⁰

Figure 1: Scatter plot of AfT commitments and AfT disbursements

⁹ This is - next to our primary analysis (the analysis of AfT-effectiveness) - also the main contribution that this paper makes to the literature.

¹⁰ This gap between commitments and disbursements is also pointed out by Adhikari (2011: 9).




Source: Own illustration based on own calculations. **Data:** OECD (2013a). **Notes:** Due to illustration purposes, the range is limited to [0, 2100].

Fourth, the distribution of AfT commitments (or disbursements) seems to be skewed to the right (positive skewness). While this cannot be seen in Table 1, it can be inferred from the scatter plot in Figure 1. The Figure shows many observations with relatively small AfT commitments, and few observations with high commitments. In other words, the mass of the distribution lies to the left. The skewness can also be seen in Figure 2, which depicts a Kernel density function, an estimate of the density function for D_TOTAL for the year 2009. In Figure 2, it is obvious that the estimated distribution is skewed to the right. The bulk of the countries receive relatively little AfT, while some countries receive significantly more.¹¹ Another way to illustrate this fact is to compute percentiles for the distribution of C_TOTAL and D_TOTAL , as done in Table A.4. While the median value of D_TOTAL is smaller than US\$ 65 million, the 90th percentile is almost ten times as large.

¹¹ That “[AfT] (...) is relatively concentrated” is also discussed in OECD/WTO (2011: 14).

Figure 2: Kernel density estimate for AfT disbursements (D_TOTAL) for the year 2009.



Source: Own illustration based on own calculations. **Data:** OECD (2013a). **Notes:** Kernel = Epanechnikov; bandwidth = 53.3482.

The second part of Table 1 reports summary statistics on the dependent variable and control variables. It is worth noting here that the *CPI* (base year: 2005) ranges between 0.288 and 293318. The outliers belong to Zimbabwe, which recently experienced a period of hyperinflation (see, e.g., Hanke, 2008). The outlier inflates the standard deviation and the mean, and is hence eliminated from the final regression. When excluding the observations for Zimbabwe, the mean (standard deviation) of the *CPI* drops from above 300 (7,800) to around 100 (25).

After having presented the empirical model in Section 2; and data, data sources and descriptive statistics in this section, we discuss the results of the regression analysis in the following section.

4. Main Results

In this section, we fit the model specified in Section 2 by using data for 162 countries over the period 2000 to 2011 (2002 to 2011 for AfT disbursements) and using several estimation techniques: (i) a *(pooled) OLS regression with time fixed effects and regional dummy variables* (as a benchmark), (ii) a *fixed (or random) effects regression* and (iii) a *panel-quantile approach*. The choice between using fixed or random effects ultimately depends on our assumption about the correlation between the unobserved effect and the explanatory variables (see, e.g., Wooldridge, 2001: 288). We run a Hausman test in order to determine whether it is more appropriate to use fixed effects or random effects. The test results indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis (the unobserved effects are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables), indicating that fixed effects should be used.¹²

Table 2 reports the results of the regression analysis. When running the OLS regressions (OLS1 and OLS2), we include time and region fixed effects. In the fixed effects regressions (FE1 and FE2), time dummies are also included. We also perform some regression diagnostics. For the *OLS-regressions*, the residuals are close to normal and homoscedastic. There is also no multicollinearity problem. In the *fixed effects models*, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation was present. Consequently, we use standard error estimates that are robust to these disturbances (Hoechle, 2007: 285). We now discuss our results in some detail.

Table 2: *Regression results. Dependent variable: ln (exports of goods and services in constant 2005 US\$ millions). Key explanatory variables: log AfT disbursements*

	OLS1	OLS2	FE1	FE2
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
L2_ln_D_TOTAL	0.064**		-0.002	
	(0.03)		(0.01)	
L2_ln_D_TPR		0.192***		-0.010
		(0.02)		(0.01)
L2_ln_D_EI		0.012		0.010
		(0.04)		(0.02)
L2_ln_D_BPC		0.349***		0.050*

¹² We assume that the requirements and assumptions of the Hausman test are fulfilled. A discussion of these issues goes well beyond the scope of this paper.

		(0.07)		(0.03)
L2_ln_D_GBS		-0.213***		-0.003
		(0.02)		(0.00)
Population	0.004***	0.003***	0.005***	0.003***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
ln_MPI	-0.110	-0.268*	0.338	0.786
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.52)	(0.83)
GE	0.908***	0.639***	0.022	0.106
	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.14)
ln_CPI	0.055	-0.077*	-0.034*	-0.040***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Africa Dummy	-1.066***	-0.237		
	(0.19)	(0.20)		
America Dummy	-0.045	0.403**		
	(0.18)	(0.20)		
Asia Dummy	-0.186	0.102		
	(0.17)	(0.18)		
Pacific Dummy	-2.814***	-1.587***		
	(0.57)	(0.59)		
Constant	9.057***	5.896***	4.772	1.633
	(1.59)	(1.93)	(4.77)	(8.06)
Obs	724	356	724	356
R-sqr(within)	0.398	0.533	0.996	0.994

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Year and region dummies are included in the OLS regressions, in columns (1) and (2). Coefficients for these dummies are not reported. Standard error estimates in columns (3) to (4) are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (see Hoechle, 2007: 285). Time dummies are also included in columns (3) and (4).

In columns (1) and (2), we run *OLS-regressions*. In (1), we regress the log of exports of goods and services on the log of “total” AfT disbursements lagged by two years while controlling for *Population* size, the log of *MPI*, government effectiveness and the log of the *CPI*. Year and region dummies are included. In (2), we make use of our four “defined” aid categories (three AfT categories and GBS) and regress the log of exports on the logs of aid disbursed to TPR, to EI, to BPC and to GBS (all lagged by two years) and on our baseline controls. In column (1), the coefficient of *L2_ln_D_TOTAL*—the log of “total” AfT-disbursements lagged by two years—is positive and statistically significant. Hence, the results of the (*pooled*) *OLS regression* suggest that larger “total” AfT disbursements are, *ceteris paribus* and on average, associated with higher exports of goods and services in the future. The

coefficients of our lagged and logged AfT proxies in (2) are statistically significant and positive for aid disbursed to TPR and BPC; and negative for GBS (used for contrasting the results obtained for AfT). The coefficient of aid disbursed for GBS is statistically significant but has a negative sign, which is plausible when recipient countries do not stress trade development. The coefficients of our baseline controls in (1) and (2) have the expected signs except for the log of market potential (which has a negative but statistically insignificant coefficient). The coefficients of *Population* and *GE* are statistically significant at the one percent level. To conclude, most coefficients—except for the coefficients of (logged and lagged) aid disbursed to GBS and the coefficient of (the log of) *MPI*—have the expected signs. “Total” AfT-disbursements, aid disbursed to TPR and aid disbursed to BPC seem to be effective. The effect of aid disbursed to EI cannot be distinguished from zero and aid disbursed to GBS may even be counter-productive. However, these findings should be taken with caution since we did not fully control for unobserved (time-invariant) heterogeneity in these regressions given that we use regional fixed effects but not country fixed effects.

Columns (3) and (4) in Table 2 present the results obtained by estimating (country) *fixed effects regressions*. B of the logs of aid disbursed to PC, *Population* and of the *CPI* are statistically significant in all specifications in which they are included. In (3), the coefficient of total AfT disbursements is not statistically significant. A larger population and smaller *CPI* are, *ceteris paribus* and on average, associated with higher exports. The coefficients of *GE* and market potential are positive but insignificant. The main finding of (3) is that “total” AfT disbursements seem to be ineffective. In (4), only the coefficient of aid disbursed to BPC is positive and statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The coefficients of all other AfT proxies cannot be distinguished from zero.

To conclude, the main finding of (4) is that aid disbursed to BPC is associated with higher future exports. Other AfT disbursements seem to be ineffective. We also experimented with alternative controls. We substituted the log of *MPI* by the logs of *MP2* and *MP3*,

respectively. The coefficient of market potential was positive and not statistically significant when using fixed effects irrespective of the size of the distance weighting parameter (see Section 2). The size of all other coefficients does not change much and the coefficient of *GE* stays statistically insignificant. Finally, we use *SOLR* instead of *GE* to control for institutional quality. This leaves all other coefficients almost unaffected. The coefficient of *SOLR* has a positive sign, as expected, but is statistically insignificant. Note that the coefficient of (the log of lagged) aid disbursed to BPC is positive and statistically significant, whereas the coefficients of all other AfT proxies cannot be distinguished from zero. Based on these results, it can be said that aid disbursed to PBC is effective. If aid disbursed to BPC increases by 100%, we would expect exports of goods and services to be about 5 percent higher two years later.

In short, the FE regression results indicate that “total” AfT disbursements are not effective because they are not associated with higher exports of goods and services in the future. When controlling for country heterogeneity and using our three original AfT proxies, we find that aid disbursed to BPC is associated with higher future exports. Other AfT disbursements seem to be ineffective. These results are in line with those of Vijil and Wagner (2012) and Cali and Te Velde (2011). It is notable that things do not change if we run the regressions shown with AfT disbursements lagged by one year instead of two years¹³. It could also be that the effectiveness of AfT depends on the level of exports. To investigate this hypothesis, in what follows, we present the results obtained when using quantile regressions.

Table 3: Panel-quantile regression results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	M1(Q.1)	M2(Q.25)	M3(Q.5)	M4(Q.75)

¹³ We also run all regressions presented thus far with commitments instead of disbursements. Results, which are available upon request, are far from being satisfactory. When running the regressions with commitments (lagged by one and two years), the coefficients of the vast majority of AfT proxies are statistically insignificant. It seems that data on AfT commitments has very little explanatory power for export performance.


l2_ln_D_TOTAL	-0.006 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.007*** (0.00)	0.006* (0.00)
Population	0.005*** (0.00)	0.005*** (0.00)	0.005*** (0.00)	0.005*** (0.00)
ln MP1	0.501*** (0.03)	0.491*** (0.01)	0.475*** (0.01)	0.483*** (0.02)
GE	0.041*** (0.01)	0.021** (0.01)	-0.00100 (0.00)	-0.020* (0.01)
ln CPI	-0.025*** (0.00)	-0.034*** (0.00)	-0.042*** (0.00)	-0.0100 (0.26)
d2005	0.128*** (0.04)	0.087*** (0.02)	0.037*** (0.01)	-0.00400 (0.02)
d2006	0.173*** (0.05)	0.117*** (0.02)	0.098*** (0.02)	0.057* (0.03)
d2007	0.256*** (0.05)	0.186*** (0.03)	0.150*** (0.02)	0.103** (0.04)
d2008	0.263*** (0.05)	0.224*** (0.03)	0.187*** (0.02)	0.139** (0.07)
d2009	0.208*** (0.06)	0.153*** (0.04)	0.138*** (0.02)	0.113 (0.08)
d2010	0.293*** (0.05)	0.225*** (0.03)	0.191*** (0.03)	0.172* (0.10)
d2011	0.316*** (0.05)	0.247*** (0.03)	0.248*** (0.03)	0.250*** (0.09)
cons	3.709*** (0.27)	3.849*** (0.14)	3.990*** (0.08)	3.864*** (1.26)
Nobs	724	724	724	724
R2	0.983	0.984	0.984	0.984

Notes: Dependent variable: $\ln(\text{Exports of goods and services in constant 2005 US\$ millions})$. The FE used to transform exports are from Table 2, column 3. Key explanatory variables: 2nd lag of logged AfT disbursements.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure 4. Panel-quantile regression results for AfT



Our main findings can be summarised as follows. The regression results indicate that “total” AfT disbursements are effective only for higher levels of exports. For the 50 and 75 percentiles of the conditional distribution of exports, they are associated—*ceteris paribus* and on average—with higher exports of goods and services two years later (i.e. in the medium run). An increase of “total” AfT disbursements by 100% is associated with a 0.6% increase of exports of goods and services two years later (see Table 3). For the lower tail of the distribution of exports, the effect of “total” AfT disbursements cannot be distinguished from zero (see Table 3).

We also find that only specific types of AfT are effective. Aid disbursed to EI is associated with higher exports in the two upper quartiles. All other things equal, if aid disbursed to EI increases by 100%, we would expect exports of goods and services to be on average about 1% higher two years later (see Table 4). Also, aid given to enhance production capacity appears to be effective in the medium run (aid to TPR effectiveness decreases with the volume of exports), while aid disbursed to GBS does not promote export performance.

Table 4. Panel-quantile regression results for specific types of aid

	(1) M1(Q.1)	(2) M2(Q.25)	(3) M3(Q.5)	(4) M4(Q.75)
l2_ln_D_TPR	-0.010**	-0.009*	-0.006	-0.016***

	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
l2_ln_D_EI	0.0180	0.00600	0.007**	0.013***
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
l2_ln_D_BPC	0.0180	0.037***	0.044***	0.050***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
l2_ln_D_GBS	-0.00600	-0.008***	-0.003	-0.002
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Population	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
ln MP1	1.007***	0.949***	0.912***	0.915***
	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
GE	0.101***	0.090***	0.088***	0.074***
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ln CPI	-0.030**	-0.047***	-0.045***	-0.051***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)
d2005	0.180***	0.122***	0.0700	0.0400
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
d2006	0.230***	0.155***	0.115**	0.076**
	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.04)
d2007	0.304***	0.231***	0.172***	0.130***
	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)
d2008	0.310***	0.253***	0.210***	0.190***
	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)
d2009	0.317***	0.281***	0.206***	0.175***
	(0.11)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)
d2010	0.375***	0.300***	0.252***	0.243***
	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
d2011	0.402***	0.374***	0.293***	0.297***
	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
cons	-1.612***	-0.969***	-0.798***	-0.814***
	(0.46)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.18)
Nobs	356	356	356	356
R2	0.946	0.949	0.951	0.950

Notes: Dependent variable: $\ln(\text{Exports of goods and services in constant 2005 US\$ millions})$. The FE used to transform exports are from Table 2, column 4. . Key explanatory variables: 2nd lag of logged AfT disbursements. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

There are two issues concerning our empirical analysis that should be mentioned. First, in the regression analysis, we implicitly assumed that AfT is exogenous. However, it may well be that AfT is endogenous, i.e. that exports affect AfT (“reverse causality”). If this were the case, our analysis would be subject to an endogeneity problem and our estimates are likely to be biased or inconsistent. However, we mitigate the endogeneity problem by working with lagged values of AfT. Cali and Te Velde (2011) also came across an endogeneity problem, and

employed instrumental variable estimators to overcome this issue. Controlling for endogeneity changes the size of the coefficients, but the main conclusion about AfT effectiveness does not change. Second, in our static model, we did not allow for any “dynamics”. Cali and Te Velde (2011: 731) stress “exports are fairly persistent over time, as they tend to depend on previous exports.” To deal with this issue, they test some dynamic specifications. We leave these extensions for further research.

5. Conclusion

It is widely recognized that one of the main objectives of AfT is to promote exports of goods and services. Given this aim, this paper investigates the extent to which AfT is effective in promoting trade. In particular, we analysed whether AfT and its different components are associated with higher exports of goods and services, quantify the effects and investigate whether these effects depend on the conditional distribution of exports.

We find that total AfT disbursements are only slightly effective at the upper tails of the distribution of exports (.50 and .75 quantiles), where they promote exports of goods and services in the medium run. All things equal, an increase of “total” AfT disbursements by 100% is associated on average with almost a 1% increase in exports two years later. However, “total” AfT disbursements appear to have no impact on export performance on the lower tails of the distribution (.10 and .25 quantiles).

We also find that only specific types of AfT are effective. We find stronger evidence for the effectiveness of aid disbursed to building production capacity (BPC). This type of AfT is associated with higher exports for the .25, .50 and .75 exports quantiles. The quantile regression results indicate that if aid disbursed to BPC increases by 100%, we would expect exports of goods and services to be about 4-6% higher two years later. Effectiveness of aid for EI is also only found in the upper quantiles. A doubling of infrastructure-related aid in these quantiles leads to an increase of exports of about 1%. Other types of AfT disbursements do not seem to

have a discernible or even a negative impact on exports. For comparison, aid disbursed under GBS is in general not associated with higher exports.

In conclusion, we find that on the one hand, and contrary to some studies (see, e.g., Cali and Te Velde, 2011), aid disbursed to BPC is the only category of AfT that seems to be effective independently of the export amount. On the other hand, our results indicate that certain types of AfT are only effective in the upper tails of the export distribution, whereas others are not.

Further research should investigate the topic of AfT effectiveness in greater detail. To date, we know that some types of AfT are effective in promoting exports, whereas others are not. An important question for further research will be to investigate the reasons for why some types of AfT are ineffective. Additionally, the relationship between AfT and a number of social outcomes (such as poverty rates) should also be investigated as increased trade is only a means to an end and not an end in itself.

References

- Adhikari R (2011). Evaluating Aid for Trade Effectiveness on the Ground: A Methodological Framework. Aid for Trade Series, Issue Paper No. 20, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva, Switzerland.
- Bearce D Finkel S E, Pérez Liñán A, Rodríguez-Zepeda J, Surzhko-Harned L (2013). Has Aid for Trade Increased Recipient Exports? The Impact of US AfT Allocations 1999-2008. *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 57 (1), pp.163-170.
- Cali M and Te Velde D (2011). Does Aid for Trade Really Improve Trade Performance? *World Development*, Vol. 39(5), pp. 725-740.
- Canay, I. (2011). A Simple Approach to Quantile Regression for Panel Data” *The Econometrics Journal* 14, 368-386.
- CEPII (2013a). CEPII’s Databases. Distances (geo_cepii, dist_cepii). <http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/bdd.htm>. Accessed: 20/09/13.
- Doucouliafos, H and Paldam, M (2008) Aid effectiveness on growth: A meta study. *The European Journal of Political Economy*, 24(1), pp. 1-24.
- Foreign Policy (2011). The Failed States Index 2011. Available online: <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/failedstates>. Accessed: 20/09/13.
- García, M (2008) Monitoring Aid for Trade, London, CUTS, 5th June 2008, <http://www.cuts-london.org/events/documents/CUTS05jun.pdf>.
- Hanke S (2008). Zimbabwe: From Hyperinflation to Growth. The Cato Institute. *Development Policy Analysis*, 2008, No. 6. Available online: http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=9484. Accessed: 20/09/13.
- Harris C (1954). The Market as a Factor in the Localization of Industry in the United States. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 44(4), pp.315-348.
- Helble M, Mann C and Wilson J (2012). Aid for Trade Facilitation. *Review of World Economics* 148 (2), 357-376.
- Hoechle D (2007). Robust Standard Errors for Panel Regressions with Cross-sectional Dependence. *The Stata Journal*, Vol. 7(3), pp. 281-312.
- Huchet-Bourdon, M, Lipchitz, A and Rousson, A (2009) Aid for Trade in Developing Countries: Complex Linkages for Real Effectiveness. *African Development Review*, 21(2), 243-290.
- Hühne, P., Meyer, B. And Nunnenkamp, P. (2013) Who Benefits from Aid for Trade? Comparing the Effects on Recipient versus Donor Exports. Kiel Working Paper No. 1852. Kiel Institute for the World Economy. Kiel.
- Karingi, S (2009) Towards the Global Review of Aid for Trade 2009. Issues and State of Implementation in Africa. UN Economic Commission for Africa. <http://www1.uneca.org>. Accessed 28/01/14.
- Luke, D (2009) Africa and Aid for Trade: What are the Trends? What are the Issues? AFRICAVIEWPOINT No. 11, August 2009. Regional Bureau for Africa. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). <http://www.undg.org/Africa/africaviewpoint/2009-august.pdf>
- Lutz W and KC S (2010). Dimensions of Global Population Projections: What Do We Know About Future Population Trends and Structures? *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B*, Vol. 365, pp. 2779-2791.
- Nowak-Lehmann D., F, Dreher, A, Herzer, D, Klasen, S and Martínez-Zarzoso, I (2012). Does foreign aid really raise per capita income? A time series perspective. *Canadian Journal of Economics*, 45(1), 288-313.
- Nowak-Lehmann, F, Martínez-Zarzoso, I, Herzer, D, Klasen, S and Cardozo, A (2013). Does foreign aid promote exports to donor countries? *Review of World Economics*, 149(3), 505-535.
- OECD/WTO (2011). Aid for Trade and LDCs: Starting to Show Results.

Formatiert: Deutsch (Deutschland)

Available online: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/53/47706423.pdf>. Accessed: 20/09/13.

OECD (2013a). Creditor Reporting System (CRS) Database.
<http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRSNEW>. Accessed: 20/09/13.

OECD (2013b). Creditor Reporting System (CRS) Database. Metadata. Database Specific. Abstract.
<http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRSNEW>. Accessed: 20/09/13.

OECD (2013c). Aid-for-Trade Proxies.
 Available online: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/1/39880833.pdf>. Accessed: 20/09/13.

OECD (2014) Aid for Trade. <http://www.oecd.org/dac/aft/aid-for-tradestatisticalqueries.html>
 Accessed 28/01/14.

Overman H, Redding S and Venables A (2001). The Economic Geography of Trade Production and Income: A Survey of Empirics. Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR). Discussion Paper (2978).

Rajan, R and Subramanian, A (2008) Aid and growth: What does the cross-country evidence really show? *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 90(4), 643-665.

Vijil M and Wagner L (2012). Does Aid for Trade Enhance Export Performance? Investigating on the Infrastructure Channel. *World Economy* 35 (7), 838-868.

Wooldridge J (2001). *Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Wooldridge J (2003). *Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach*, 2nd ed. Cincinnati, OH: South-Western College Publishing.

World Bank (2013a). World Development Indicators (WDI).
<http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do>. Accessed: 20/09/13.

World Bank (2013b). Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI).
<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp>. Accessed: 20/09/13.

Table A.1. *List of countries*

Afghanistan	Equatorial Guinea	Pakistan
Angola	Grenada	Panama
Albania	Guatemala	Peru
Argentina	Guyana	Philippine
Armenia	Honduras	Palau
Antigua and Barbuda	Croatia	Papua New Guinea
Azerbaijan	Haiti	Paraguay
Burundi	Indonesia	Rwanda
Benin	India	Saudi Arabia
Burkina Faso	Iran, Islamic Rep.	Sudan
Bangladesh	Iraq (no exports)	Senegal
Bahrain	Jamaica	Solomon Islands
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Jordan	Sierra Leone
Belarus	Kazakhstan	El Salvador
Belize	Kenya	Sao Tome and Principe
Bolivia	Kyrgyz Republic	Suriname
Brazil	Cambodia	Slovenia
Barbados	St. Kitts and Nevis	Swaziland
Bhutan	Lao PDR	Seychelles
Botswana	Lebanon	Syrian Arab Republic
Central African Republic	Liberia	Chad
Chile	Libya	Togo
China	St. Lucia	Thailand
Cote d'Ivoire	Sri Lanka	Tajikistan
Cameroon	Lesotho	Turkmenistan
Congo, Rep.	Morocco	Tonga
Colombia	Moldova	Trinidad and Tobago
Comoros	Madagascar	Tunisia
Cape Verde	Maldives	Turkey
Costa Rica	Mexico	Tanzania
Cuba	Macedonia, FYR	Uganda
Djibouti	Mali	Ukraine
Dominica	Malta	Uruguay
Dominican Republic	Mongolia	Uzbekistan
Algeria	Mozambique	St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Ecuador	Mauritania	Venezuela, RB
Egypt, Arab Rep.	Mauritius	Vietnam
Eritrea	Malawi	Vanuatu
Ethiopia	Malaysia	Samoa
Fiji	Namibia	Yemen, Rep.
Gabon	Niger	South Africa
Georgia	Nigeria	Congo, Dem. Rep.
Ghana	Nicaragua	Zambia
Guinea	Nepal	Zimbabwe
Gambia, The	Oman	

Table A.2: List of variables, abbreviations, description and sources

	Variable	Variable description	Source
Key explanatory variables (A4T-proxies)	C_TPR	A4T proxy for Trade Policy and Regulations; Commitments*	own calculations; CRS
	C_EI	A4T proxy for Economic Infrastructure; Commitments*	own calculations; CRS
	C_BPC	A4T proxy for Building Productive Capacity; Commitments*	own calculations; CRS
	C_GBS	A4T proxy for General Budget Support; Commitments*	own calculations; CRS
	C_TOTAL	A4T proxy Total; Commitments*	own calculations; CRS
	D_TPR	A4T proxy for Trade Policy and Regulations; Disb. gross*	own calculations; CRS
	D_EI	A4T proxy for Economic Infrastructure; Disb. gross*	own calculations; CRS
	D_BPC	A4T proxy for Building Production Capacity; Disb. gross*	own calculations; CRS
	D_GBS	A4T proxy for General Budget Support; Disb. gross*	own calculations; CRS
	D_TOTAL	A4T proxy Total; Disbursements gross*	own calculations; CRS
Dependent variable and important controls	Exports	Exports of goods and services (constant 2005 US\$ millions)	WDI
	Population	Population, total (in millions)	WDI
	MP1	Market Potential 1 (with simple distances)	own calc.; WDI, CEPII
	GE	Government Effectiveness (-2.5=weak to 2.5=strong gov. performance)	WGI
	CPI	Consumer price index (2005 = 100)	WDI
Other controls	MP2	Market Potential 2 (with square root distances)	own calc.; WDI, CEPII
	MP3	Market Potential 3 (with squared distances)	own calc.; WDI, CEPII
	SOLR	Strength of legal rights index (0=weak to 10=strong)	WDI

Notes: * constant 2011 US\$ millions. CEPII: Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales, CEPII (2011a/b); CRS: Creditor Reporting System, OECD (2013a); Disb.: Disbursements; Gov.: government or governance; own calc.: own calculations; WDI: World Development Indicators, World Bank (2011a); WGI: World Governance Indicators, World Bank (2011b).

Table A.3: Composition of AfT proxies (AfT categories). AfT proxies are calculated as the sum of ODA for the corresponding sectors.

Sector-number	Sector	AfT-proxy	Abbr.	A4T_TOTAL
331	Trade Policy and Regulations	Trade Policy and Regulations (TPR)	A4T_TPR	
210	Transport and Storage	Economic Infrastructure (EI)	A4T_EI	
220	Communications			
230	Energy Generation and Supply			
240	Banking and Financial Services	Building Productive Capacity (BPC)	A4T_BPC	
250	Business and Other Services			
311	Agriculture			
312	Forestry			
313	Fishing			
321	Industry			
322	Mineral Resources and Mining			
332	Tourism			
510	General Budget Support	General Budget Support (GBS)	A4T_GBS	


Notes: Illustrations are based partly on OECD (2013c). AfT proxies are calculated as the sum of ODA for the corresponding sectors as shown in the table. For example, EI is calculated as the sum of ODA for the three sectors, “Transport and Storage”, “Communications” and “Energy Generation and Supply”. If data on ODA for some sectors was missing, the AfT proxy was calculated as the sum of ODA for the other sectors, i.e. when calculating the sum over all corresponding sectors, missing values are set equal to 0 as long as not all values are missing (in which case the AfT proxy would be missing too). Abbr.: Abbreviations.

Table A.4: Percentiles for *C_TOTAL* and *D_TOTAL* (in constant 2011 US\$ millions)

Percentiles	1%	5%	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%	95%	99%
Aid Disb	0.130	1.458	3.681	15.775	73.078	259.225	679.976	1075.387	2160.135
Aid Com	0.257	1.887	3.949	15.848	63.060	199.951	510.998	809.857	1598.119

Source: Own calculations with data from Creditor Reporting System, OECD (2013a).


Figure A.1. Evolution over time of AfT commitment and Disbursements



Note: AfTtot denotes total AfT commitments and AfTtotD refers to disbursements figures.

Source: Creditor Reporting System, OECD (2013a).

Figure A.2: Regional distribution of countries included in our analysis



Notes: Figures based on own calculations. Data are from CEPII (2011a). Shares add up to 1.