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Blue Helmets and Grey Zones:
Do UN Multidimensional Peace
Operations Work?

DIIS Report 2013:29
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List of Abbreviations Used

AFISMA  African-led International Support Mission to Mali
AMISOM  African Union Mission in Somalia
AU      African Union
CIC     Center on International Cooperation
Civcap  Civilian Capacity
DDR     Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DFID    Department for International Development
DFS     Department of Field Support
DPA     Department of Political Affairs
DPKO    Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC     Democratic Republic of the Congo
DSS     Department of Safety and Security
ECOWAS  Economic Community of West African States
ICG     International Crisis Group
IPI     International Peace Institute
M23     23 March Movement
MINUSMA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MONUC   United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NATO    North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPV     Net Present Value
OCHA    Office for Coordination of Humanitarian affairs
OECD    Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OHCHR   Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
OROLSI  Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions
PBC     Peacebuilding Commission
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>PBF</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Fund</td>
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<td>PBSO</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Support Office</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SCR</td>
<td>Security Council Report (Organization)</td>
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<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UNISFA</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Security Force in Abyei</td>
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<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan</td>
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<td>UNMIT</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Mission in East Timor</td>
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<td>UNMOGIP</td>
<td>United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>UNSG</td>
<td>United Nations Secretary-General</td>
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<td>UNSMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Support Mission in Libya</td>
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<td>UNSMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria</td>
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<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
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<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>United Nations Truce Supervision Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>WDR</td>
<td>World Development Report</td>
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Abstract

Multidimensional peace operations have emerged as one of the key instruments for addressing and managing the complex challenges related to violent conflict and state fragility in the Global South. Based on a reading of existing literature, this study provides an overview of what we know about the UN’s ability to assist war-torn societies in laying the foundations for lasting peace. The basic message is that *peacekeeping works, but statebuilding fails*. In general, multidimensional UN-led peace operations have been successful at preventing the resumption of war, yet they have not succeeded in establishing effective and legitimate institutions of governance. The report also concludes that, while the system is far from perfect, the UN peacekeeping apparatus has been reformed and strengthened considerably in recent decades. Outstanding challenges relate to contextualising interventions and ensuring local ownership, as well as to maintaining the normative consensus on the role of UN peace operations.
Resumé

Multidimensionelle fredsoperationer er et af de væsentligste instrumenter, det internationale samfund råder over i forhold til håndteringen af de mangeartede udfordringer og trusler, der forbindes med voldelige konflikter og skrøbelige stater. Rapporten giver – på baggrund af eksisterende litteratur – en oversigt over hvad vi ved om FN’s evne til at bistå krigshærgede lande med at bygge en varig fred. Rapporten konkluderer, at fredbevarelse virker, men statsbygning slår fejl. FN-ledede fredsoperationer har generelt vist sig i stand til at forebygge, at krige bryder ud igen, men det er ikke lykkedes at etablere effektive og legitime statsstrukturer. Rapporten konkluderer videre, at selvom FN’s system langt fra er perfekt, er organisationen blevet reformeret og styrket betydeligt på det fredsbevarende område i løbet af det seneste årti. Udestående udfordringer handler især om at sikre, at indsatserne tilpasses lokale politiske dynamikker, samt om at bevare den normative enighed om FN’s fredsoperationers rolle i fremtiden.
Introduction

For the past twenty years, shifting UN Secretaries-General have been singing the praises of UN peacekeeping as an indispensable tool for maintaining international peace and security, securing justice and human rights and promoting sustainable development. This report provides an overview of how well founded such praise is. Drawing on the growing body of literature on the impact of UN-led peace operations, it seeks to establish whether UN-led peace operations have indeed been able to assist war-torn societies in laying the foundations for lasting peace as promised in the seminal ‘Agenda for Peace’ outlined by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992 (UNSG 1992).

While the purpose is straightforward, it is in fact quite difficult to ascertain the extent to which multidimensional peace operations ‘work’. The difficulties reflect the nature of the beast: successful peacebuilding (however defined) is basically a non-scientific enterprise. In the words of William J. Durch, it is perhaps best understood as ‘a matter of art’: ‘the art of diplomacy, the art of (selective) war, the art of reconciliation and the art of law and politics’ (Durch et al. 2012: 97). Ideally, a multidimensional peace operation is supposed to bring all of these ‘arts’ together in a way that provides for the establishment of sustainable peace. In reality, however, most multidimensional peace operations are struggling to overcome and balance the mismatch between mandates and resources, the plethora of competing or downright contradictory policy objectives, and the troubled divide between the universal concepts of peacebuilding and the particular contexts in which UN peacekeepers are deployed. In light of this, it is unsurprising that the outcomes of multidimensional peace operations are commonly described as ‘mixed’, with progress in some areas, while other areas remain woefully wanting.

The title Blue Helmets and Grey Zones hints directly at the blurred results of multidimensional peace operations. The analysis and discussion that follow are based on the pragmatic observation that most if not all multidimensional peace operations are neither entirely successful, nor complete failures. They tend to fall into a grey zone where assessments of outcome and impact are as much a reflection of the particular standards of success against which a given operation is measured as they are reflections of ‘objective’ empirical facts on the ground. In the context of multidimensional peace operations that engage virtually every aspect of social and human life, the choice of appropriate or relevant standards of success is far from being a given. It is essentially a value choice that informs us whether, for example, order and
stability are privileged over equality, justice, and/or welfare (Call 2008, 2012).

In keeping with the trend that has dominated academic and policy-related discussions over multidimensional peace operations in the past decade, this report focuses on two distinct, yet related criteria that are deemed important for the establishment of lasting peace. First, is the war over – has the violence actually ended? Secondly, have effective and legitimate institutions of governance been established? The latter criterion in particular illustrates that it is not merely the outcomes of multidimensional peace operations but also their everyday practices that belong to the grey zones alluded to in the title of the report.

The logic of trying to build peace by building states (Call and Wyeth 2008) provides multidimensional peace operations with an inherent paradox in using outside intervention to establish self-governance (Chesterman 2004; Paris and Sisk 2010). In the daily workings of multidimensional peace operations, it is often difficult to ascertain where international imposition ends and national ownership begins. This only adds to the predicament of determining the extent to which UN-led peacekeeping ‘works’: who is to blame when things go wrong: the national actors who did not buy whole-heartedly into the peace process, or the international actors who failed to provide their assistance in a relevant and timely manner?

The importance of knowing and understanding the particular dynamics on the ground is increasingly acknowledged in both the literature and among practitioners. Most if not all experiences and ‘lessons learned’ from different missions are unique, and one must be careful not to overgeneralise on the basis of distinct cases. At the same time, there is something ‘unreasonable, if not perverse’ in concluding that each of these experiences is so particular that they cannot shed any light on the challenges that are likely to confront multidimensional peace operations elsewhere (Caplan 2012: 311). The report is thus situated in the troubled position of trying to identify the overall track record of multidimensional peacekeeping while acknowledging that each mission – despite any similarities in mandates – has worked under such diverse conditions and in such distinct local contexts that comparisons are likely to disguise as much they reveal. This tension is not unique to this specific report but rather emblematic of the entire field. Instead of providing clear answers to the simple question of ‘what works and what does not work’, the collective insights from scholarly studies may at best provide policymakers and practitioners with a deeper understanding of the dilemmas, paradoxes and contradictions that most of them already know from their daily work.
The most basic message of the report is that in general multidimensional UN peace operations have been successful at preventing the resumption of war, yet they have not succeeded in establishing effective and legitimate institutions of governance: peacekeeping works, but statebuilding fails. This conclusion is based on a reading of the vast body of literature that explores and compares UN peace operations: their different forms, their various types of effects, and the shifting global and local conditions that have shaped UN-led peacekeeping in the past twenty years.

Underpinning the report is the suggestion that the form and functions of UN peacekeeping are as much a reflection of the Zeitgeist as they are responses to the specific crisis situations that a given operation is seeking to address. This suggests that the ongoing diffusions of global power are likely to lead to changes in UN peacekeeping in the same manner that the end of the Cold War enabled the ascendancy of liberal peacebuilding in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Both in policy and academic debates, the focus is shifting towards more pragmatic or realistic models of intervention that are more concerned with stabilising conflict areas than with promoting democratic governance and inclusive politics. In light of this, the report provides an overview of the evidence-based track record of the past twenty years, focusing on what we have learned after two decades of multidimensional peace operations, as well as a more open-ended discussion of where UN peacekeeping may go from here. The report thus falls into three parts.

Part 1 outlines the evolving concepts and architecture of multidimensional peace operations. It does so by first discussing what a multidimensional peace operation is and how it can be distinguished from other forms of military operations. Subsequently, it explores the fragmented, yet elaborate system that has evolved within the UN to implement multidimensional peace operations, and it discusses in what ways this system has managed to become a ‘learning organisation’. Part 2 turns towards the question of impact and discusses the different standards of success, including the difficulties of measuring how the UN has contributed to achieving (or not) a particular objective. The third and final part discusses the future direction of UN peacekeeping and identifies what the UN has learned so far, and what the world organisation – and its member states – are still struggling to learn regarding the complex challenges of building lasting peace after lengthy conflicts.

The report is a desk study that seeks to capture and draw out a few of the many aspects that relate to the grand question of how to build sustainable peace in the
aftermath of violent conflict. Considering the empirical and theoretical size of that question, it is clear that the report provides only a selective glimpse of the many issues and topics that are relevant to understanding the impact and dynamics of multidimensional peace operations. Readers who are interested in a more comprehensive and wide-ranging overview are advised to consult the following books:

- *Understanding Peacekeeping* by Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams (Polity Press, 2010)
- *Political Economy of Statebuilding: Power after Peace* by Mats Berdal and Dominik Zaum (Routledge 2013)
Part I.

The concepts and architecture of multidimensional UN peace operations
Chapter 1. What is a multidimensional peace operation?

Striving for peace is and has always been considered an honourable endeavour. Over the course of history, countless aggressors have sought to derive legitimacy from labelling their endeavours with terms such as ‘peacekeeping’, ‘peace operation’, ‘peace mission’ or ‘peace force’. The concept of a ‘peace operation’ is, accordingly, highly contested and quite difficult to set apart from other forms of human activity that involve the use of armed personnel, including war (Bellamy and Williams 2010: 14–18). This study focuses on interventions that: 1) are conducted under United Nations command, and 2) have a mandate to assist in laying the foundations for a sustainable peace. Such operations are widely referred to as ‘multidimensional’ because they draw upon a mixture of civilian and military instruments and work at the interface between security and development in order to fulfil their mandates.

The UN does not hold a monopoly on multidimensional peace operations. A wide and growing range of actors is actively engaged in multidimensional peace operations, and many of them are deliberately working to strengthen their capacity to conduct such missions in the future. This includes in particular regional and sub-regional organisations such as NATO, the African Union, the European Union and ECOWAS and SADC. It also includes individual member states of the United Nations such as the USA, France and Australia, who have all, at one point, been authorised by the Security Council to lead a military intervention in a foreign country. Historically, the Security Council has turned to such delegated missions in situations that demanded peace enforcement, whereas UN-led missions have been mandated ‘only’ to work on the challenges of post-conflict transition (sometimes in the wake of a delegated mission). This division of labour between UN-led and delegated missions reflects the basic proposition that the UN does not wage war but ‘merely’ keeps the peace and/or lays the foundation for building the peace. Recent years, however have seen a tendency towards what – for lack of a better word – are called hybrid missions, where UN troops are deployed alongside regional or bilateral troops operating under different command structures and with different mandates. This clearly blurs the distinction between delegated and UN-led missions, the most recent intervention in Mali being a clear example that involves an offensive French-led operation (Serval) alongside a UN-led operation (MINUSMA) that has taken over from an ECOWAS-led operation (AFISMA).
The move towards hybrid missions – or peacekeeping partnerships, as the UN prefers to call them – is quite strong and has been with us for a while (Andersen 2007). We do not, however, have any systematic knowledge of the possible impacts of the simultaneous deployment of UN and non-UN troops on the effectiveness of a multidimensional peace operation. For this reason, and for reasons of brevity, this study focuses only on the UN contribution to multidimensional peace operations.

From traditional to multidimensional peacekeeping

To situate UN-led multidimensional peace operations within the Security Council’s repertoire of peace and security activities, it is helpful to begin by outlining the key concepts of peace-making, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuilding. Initially these concepts were understood as clearly distinct from each other:

- **Peace-making** included mediation and other diplomatic efforts aimed at bringing hostile parties to agreement.
- **Peacekeeping** included the deployment of military and/or police personnel to oversee the implementation of a peace agreement or truce (often reached through peace-making efforts).
- **Peacebuilding** was defined as action on the far side of conflict aimed at identifying and supporting structures that could prevent the recurrence of violence.
- Finally, **peace enforcement** was understood as involving a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force, to restore peace and security.

In multidimensional peace operations, the boundaries between these four tools are transcended. This is particularly manifest in the gradual erosion of the boundaries between military and civilian tools. The most pronounced symptom of this transcendence is manifested in the preference of the Security Council to call for peacebuilding efforts (reduce the risk of relapses into conflict by strengthening local capacities) when mandating missions of peacekeeping (originally techniques designed to preserve and enforce ‘existing’ peace; DPKO 2008: 18). Figure 1 below provides an overview of how the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations currently sees the relationship between the Security Council’s four ‘peace’ tools.

When describing the gradual merger of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, both scholars and practitioners present the history of UN peace operations in evolution-
ary terms: as somehow moving towards higher levels of complexity and sophistication. Such a chronological framework is overly simplistic, as it ignores the great variety that has always existed between individual UN missions (Bellamy and Williams 2010: 17). Distinguishing between different generations of UN peace operations is, however, a useful heuristic tool for understanding how multidimensional peace operations came to be the Security Council’s preferred tool for engaging in complex political emergencies, as well as for identifying why the use of the instrument remains troubled by tensions between the traditional peacekeeping principles upon which it is built and the complex, intra-state type of conflict it is meant to solve. In order to set the scene for the subsequent analysis of whether and how well UN-led multidimensional peace operations work, therefore, the section below briefly outlines the three generations of peace operations that have dominated UN peacekeeping from 1948 till today.

**Three generations of UN peacekeeping**

The UN Charter does not provide explicitly for the deployment of military troops under UN command. There is no reference to the concept of peacekeeping in the Charter. This has not inhibited its development, as is evident from the current position of peacekeeping as the ‘flagship activity’ of the UN. It may even be argued that

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**Figure 1. Spectrum of peace and security activities**

![Spectrum of peace and security activities](image)

From DPKO 2008: 19.
the lack of an express mention in the Charter has in fact helped establish peacekeeping as a flexible response to international crises (Murphy 2007: 5).

The first generation of UN peacekeeping dates back to the late 1940s and the deployment of military observers mandated to monitor the truce in Palestine\(^1\) and to oversee the ceasefire between Pakistan and India in Kashmir.\(^2\) Both missions remain ongoing. Over the following four decades, the Security Council launched a number of similar missions that were characterised by two things relative to the current state of play: the missions were deployed to conflicts between states, not to conflicts within states; and they were given limited mandates that primarily consisted in monitoring and observing that a given peace agreement, ceasefire or truce was being respected (Dobbins et al. 2005: xvi). The most notable exception to this rule was the mission in Congo from 1960 to 1964, which in fact bore quite a number of resemblances to the multidimensional peacekeeping operations we see today (Ches-terman 2004).

During the Cold War, the larger purpose of peacekeeping was to create the political space that was necessary for the warring states to negotiate a political solution, and – equally importantly – to contain local conflicts and prevent them from escalating into global crises, or worse, nuclear war (Bellamy and Williams 2010: 8; Annan 2012: 32). This illustrates that the ‘design’ of peacekeeping operations has always been a product of its time: the Cold War political dynamics rarely allowed the Security Council to reach agreement, and when it did, it was primarily in the Middle East, where both superpowers recognised the potential for escalation, but neither was prepared to wage war in order to defend its claims and allies in the region (Bellamy and Williams 2010: 85). The UN accordingly conducted no more than fifteen peace operations between 1945 and 1987.

To guide the first generation of UN peacekeeping, a set of principles gradually emerged which in 1973 were formally codified. According to these, UN peacekeepers should:

- only be deployed with the consent of the parties to the dispute
- be strictly impartial in their deployment and activities

\(^1\) UNTSO, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, see www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/untso/

• only use force in self-defence
• be mandated and supported by the Security Council in their activities
• rely on the voluntary contribution of member states for military personnel, equipment and logistics (Annan 2012: 33).

The move towards the second and third generations of UN peacekeeping has involved a reinterpretation, rather than a replacement, of these basic principles. As will be outlined in subsequent chapters, this has in many cases added to the predicament in which UN peacekeepers have found themselves when trying to implement ambitious multidimensional mandates.

With the end of the Cold War, political realities and the normative environment changed; a new optimism surrounded the UN’s role as international society’s main tool to promote peace and security in a rapidly globalising world. Partly owing to the fact that these developments coincided with a peak in the number of intra-state violent conflicts (Bellamy and Williams 2010: 2), UN-led peacekeeping moved into its second generation. The Security Council now began to intervene in civil wars and humanitarian disasters and provided peacekeeping missions with wider ranging mandates that aimed not merely at keeping the peace, but rather at building or laying the foundations for lasting peace. This radically new role for UN peacekeeping was captured in the seminal report ‘An Agenda for Peace’ that was issued in 1992 by the then- Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Underpinning the new agenda was the idea that, in order to establish lasting peace in war-torn societies, outside intervention was needed to support the ‘transformation of deficient national structures and strengthening new democratic institutions’ (UNSG 1992: paragraph 59).

Typical examples of second-generation missions are the interventions in Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique and Namibia launched between 1989 and 1992, which all contained mandates and resources to organise elections, foster processes of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants, and encourage political reconciliation (Dobbins et al. 2005: xvi-xvii). The number of missions also grew drastically. Between 1988 and 1993 alone, the UN launched a total of twenty new peace operations, five more than during the preceding forty years (Bellamy and Williams 2010: 98). Of these, at least eight were of the multidimensional type that contained both peacekeeping and peacebuilding tasks (Paris and Sisk 2009a: 5).

As a result of these qualitative and quantitative changes in the mandating practice of the Security Council, the number of UN peacekeepers grew rapidly from 11,000 in
1989 to 75,000 in 1994.\(^3\) Often, however, the UN failed to respond properly to the overwhelming increase in demand and responsibilities. In too many cases, the UN was not institutionally, militarily, logistically or managerially capable of fulfilling the ambitious mandates set out by the Security Council. These shortcomings came to have a significant impact on the reputation of UN peacekeeping, as they led to several high-profile failures, most notably the operations in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda. As a direct result of these failures, the Security Council lost its appetite for UN-led peace operations and turned increasingly instead to regional organisations and delegated missions. The latter half of the 1990s saw a historic low of peacekeeping missions, very much in contrast to what had looked like a ‘golden age of peacekeeping’ just a few years earlier (Bellamy and Williams 2010: 93–120; Dobbins et al. 2005: xvi–xviii).

In response to this existential crisis, the new Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, asked experienced Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi (now Special Envoy to Syria) to head a high-level panel tasked with developing recommendations for the future of UN peacekeeping. The panel’s report, known as the ‘Brahimi Report’, coincided with a newly found interest in the Security Council for using UN interventions as a tool to assist in rebuilding fragile and conflict-affected states. This paved the way for the rise of a third generation of UN peace operations: missions were provided with more robust mandates that allowed them to use force, not just in self-defence but also in defence of the mission. Missions were requested to apply more integrated working methods to ensure coherence between the military and civilian aspects of the engagement. And missions were deployed to countries for considerably longer periods than during the 1990s. While the overall objective remained the same – to assist in laying the foundations for lasting peace – third-generation missions are thus more intrusive than second-generation missions in providing for the greater, deeper and longer involvement of international actors in transforming domestic arrangements in war-torn societies.

As was the case in the early 1990s, the qualitative changes were followed by a quantitative upsurge in UN-led peace operations. Between 1999 and 2010 UN peace operations as a whole grew by a factor of eight in terms in personnel and by a factor of ten in terms of budget (Benner et al. 2011: 3). These figures reflect not only an increased number of missions, but also an increased number of operational elements.

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\(^3\) DPKO homepage, 2013, see http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/surge.shtml
This once again challenged the UN peacekeeping apparatus to its absolute limits and led the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping to warn publicly of the dangers of ‘overloading’ the UN peacekeeping system.

Figure 2 below provides a graphic illustration of the drastic ups and downs of the 1990s and the long period of growth and consolidation that the UN peacekeeping system has experienced in the first decade of the 21st century.

**Figure 2. Number of uniformed UN peacekeeping personnel 1991-present**

![Graph](image)


**Multidimensional peace operations today**

In January 2013 the Security Council, for the first time in ten years, adopted a resolution on peacekeeping. Resolution 2086 is an explicit attempt to outline how the Council understands multidimensional peacekeeping (UNSC 2013a), and it provides a long, but non-exhaustive, enumeration of elements that can be included in multidimensional peacekeeping mandates. To those familiar with debates on peacebuilding, the resolution contains little news. It outlines a wide range of issues that multidimensional peacekeeping operations may be mandated to address, including ‘basic safety and security’, ‘disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration’, ‘security sector reform’, ‘demining’, ‘peace consolidation and inclusive political processes’, ‘humanitarian assistance’, ‘human rights’ and ‘protection of civilians’ (UNSC
2013a: paragraph 8). And it underlines the importance of ‘national ownership’ and of ensuring that ‘the mandate of each mission is specific to the needs and situation of the country concerned’ (UNSC 2013a: preamble and paragraph 7) As such, there are no surprises in the resolution. To the extent that it does anything, it captures what has transpired as conventional wisdom on the role of UN peace operations, including in particular ‘the importance of grasping the challenges of peacebuilding from the inception of a peacekeeping mission’ (UNSC 2013a: paragraph 4).

As always with political texts, however, it is not only what is in the text that is important, but also what has been excluded from it. Compared to the 1992 Agenda for Peace, the 2013 resolution is remarkably silent on the relationship between democratic governance and lasting peace, apart from the broad reference to ‘inclusive political processes’. Whether or not this indicates a move towards a fourth generation of peace operations, possibly aimed at stabilisation rather than transformation, is beyond the remit of the present report. However, we return to this question in the final part of the report which explores the most recent mandating practice of the Security Council and the role of emerging powers such as China, India and Brazil in shaping the future outlook of UN peace operations. For now, though, and throughout most of the report, the focus remains on the experiences of the past, rather than the outlook for the future.

The next chapter provides an overview of how the UN as an organisation has for the past twenty years been trying to adapt its institutional structures and working methods to enable it to implement better the ambitious and complex tasks that it is entrusted with when leading multidimensional peace operations.
Chapter 2. Learning to build peace?

In any analysis of the UN, it is vital to distinguish between ‘the First UN’, which consists of the member states and the key organs in which they meet (the Security Council, the General Assembly etc.) and ‘the Second UN’, which comprises the Secretariat and the multiple departments, agencies, programmes and commissions mandated to work on specific issues. The activities of the Second UN are highly dependent on the political will and financial resources of member states, especially in the realm of peace and security. Nevertheless, the Second UN, headed by the Secretary-General, does possess some degree of moral authority, political autonomy and bureaucratic culture that sets the UN as an administrative apparatus apart from the UN as an intergovernmental ‘club’ of member states. It is the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy that makes multidimensional operations work in the field. This chapter focuses on how this administrative apparatus and its bureaucracy have evolved over time in response to and in tandem with the growing complexity of peacekeeping mandates.

In recent years, the scholarly literature has paid increasing attention to the role of the UN bureaucracy (see, e.g., Benner et al. 2011; Bellamy and Williams 2010; Winckler 2012; Dijkstra 2012: Junk 2012; Lipson 2012). One of the key messages of these studies is the importance of information and knowledge (Winckler 2012: 88). The claim of ‘knowing’ what it takes to build lasting peace constitutes a major source of authority for the civilian and military personnel who are deployed to multidimensional peacekeeping operations. In the words of a recently retired UN civil servant:

... essentially, UN Agencies don’t have a lot of money. Instead, an important role of the UN Agencies [engaged in development work] lies in the knowledge they can bring to bear on a situation. (Glovinsky 2012: 189)

Especially in the early years of multidimensional peace operations, there were few if any efforts at organization-wide learning. Experience travelled between missions in an ‘unsystematic and dangerous way’, as peacekeepers took their template from the last mission they had served in and used it in their next assignment: ‘Unsurprisingly reality often proved this “copy & paste” logic wrong’ (Benner et al. 2011: 2). In the past decade, however, the UN bureaucracy has been struggling to become a ‘learning organisation’ (Benner et al. 2011). This move was prompted by the operational
failures of the 1990s and the general peacekeeping crises of the late 1990s. Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda in particular initiated a hitherto unforeseen process of critical self-reflection that culminated in the Brahimi Report and the initiation of a still ongoing process of reforms and organisational restructuring. The process includes significant, yet mundane efforts to professionalise the UN peacekeeping system in areas such as command and control arrangements, personnel management (including recruitment and training), financial management, force generation and reimbursement procedures (see Fréchette 2012; Bellamy and Williams 2013; IPI 2013a), as well as a doctrinal rethinking of questions concerning the role and identity of UN-led multidimensional peace operations.

Continuing the process that began with the Brahimi Report, the UN system has most recently explored that question through the elaboration of three key documents: The ‘Capstone Doctrine’ of 2008 that paved the way for a reinterpretation of the principles of peacekeeping (DPKO 2008); the ‘New Horizon’ process, resulting in a report released in 2009 by the UN Secretariat that shed light on the dilemmas of peacekeeping and outlined a strategic direction for stronger partnerships with actors outside the UN system (DPKO 2009); and finally, in 2011, an extensive investigation of how to improve the use of civilian capacities in the aftermath of conflict, the so-called ‘CivCap’ report (UN 2011). Taken together, these UN initiatives have helped to move both the practice and the concept of peacekeeping at least some of the way from a mindset of quick fixes to involving a comprehensive strategy (Paris and Sisk 2009a; 2009b), and from having an ad hoc-based planning culture to being a learning organisation (Benner et al. 2011). The next sections explore this process through two steps: first, by outlining the elaborate yet fragmented architecture for multidimensional peacekeeping that has evolved within the UN in the past two decades; and secondly, by discussing two key topics that have shaped the UN’s ‘learning processes’ since the Brahimi Report (integration and the use of force).

The elaborate, yet fragmented system for UN multidimensional peace operations
As noted, peacekeeping was not invented when the UN was established in 1945. The UN bureaucracy was thus born without a specific organisational ‘home’ for peacekeeping operations. The missions that were mandated between 1948 and 1992 were all effectively assembled and managed on an ad hoc basis, albeit since 1962 under the auspices of a small section in the Secretary-General’s Office for Special Political Affairs (Bellamy and Williams 2010: 52). In 1992, Secre-
tary-General Boutros-Ghali transformed this small section into a new Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and regrouped the other political functions into a new Department of Political Affairs (DPA) (Fréchette 2012: 8). This was a first example of organisational learning – a bureaucratic response to the increasing demands and changing nature of UN peacekeeping. Another and more recent example is the identification of a ‘key institutional gap’ in the UN peace architecture, namely the lack of a ‘place in the United Nations system explicitly designed to avoid State collapse and the slide to war or to assist countries in their transition from war to peace’ (UN 2004: paragraph 261). To fill this gap, in 2005 the World Summit established the so-called UN peacebuilding architecture, consisting of the inter-governmental Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Secretariat entity the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and a multi-donor trust fund, the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). The intention of the architecture was 1) to bring together all of the relevant actors, including international donors, the international financial institutions, national governments, troop contributing countries; (2) to marshal resources; and (3) to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery and, where appropriate, highlight any gaps that threaten to undermine peace.

So far, however, these aspirations have not been met (SCR 2013). The PBC and the PBSO play only minor roles in relation to multidimensional peace operations, either practically or strategically. The stovepipes that have characterized the UN’s work on security and development since its founding have not been overcome, and the UN system for conducting multidimensional peace operations remains elaborate yet fragmented. The system is centred around, albeit not directed by, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, DPKO.

Initially established as a small department with only fifty staffers in New York directing and supporting 80,000 blue helmets across the globe (Benner et al. 2011: 30), the size of DPKO has increased somewhat. Today, approximately 430 people work for the DPKO in New York. The figure below illustrates how these are allocated between the four different offices that have existed within the DPKO since 2007. It follows from the distribution of staff that questions related to organizational learning (policy, evaluation and training) are now prioritized on a par with operational questions. DPKO’s first ‘lessons learned unit’ consisted of two staffers, one head of section and one research assistant (Annan 2012). Similarly, the establishment of a dedicated office for rule of law and security institutions (OROSLI) signals the emphasis and priority given to this area. Security-sector reform and the
Figure 3. Proposed staffing of DPKO 1 July 2013–30 June 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office of the Under-Secretary General</th>
<th>Office of Operations</th>
<th>Office of Military Affairs</th>
<th>Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions</th>
<th>Policy, Evaluation and Training Division</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>74 posts (temporary)</td>
<td>73 posts (0 temporary)</td>
<td>28 posts (2 temporary)</td>
<td>94 posts (3 temporary)</td>
<td>62 posts (1 temporary)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total: 431 posts (14 temporary)**


The rebuilding of national security institutions has increasingly come to be understood as the main exit strategy for UN peacekeeping operations (see DPKO 2008).

OROLSI is also interesting because it illustrates the blurring of conventional distinctions between civilian and military instruments in multidimensional peace operations. In addition to engaging in questions regarding legitimate and effective security governance, the military branch of the UN has also taken on a wider range of civilian tasks, including delivering medical services and rebuilding physical infrastructure. At the same time, the civilian side of the UN (the specialised UN agencies, bureaus and programmes that are mandated to work on development and humanitarian issues) have increasingly been enlisted in – or joined – the implementation of multidimensional peacekeeping mandates. In the early, second-generation years of multidimensional peacekeeping, there were few if any attempts at linking the UN’s development efforts directly with its role in maintaining international peace and security. This has since changed radically. An inventory from 2006 identified no less than 31 distinct UN entities with an interest in and capacity for post-conflict peacebuilding (UNSG 2006). These include in particular the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Other specialised agencies worth highlighting are UN Women, mandated to work on

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4 Excluding the Office to the African Union (54 posts).
gender issues, UNICEF, mandated to work for children’s rights, and OHCHR, mandated to work on human rights. Furthermore, the World Bank – which is formally part of the UN family, despite maintaining a much more independent role than other agencies – has become a key partner of the peacekeeping system. Today, a large part of UN knowledge production on how to assist fragile and conflict-affected states in reconstruction and peacebuilding is conducted in close cooperation with the World Bank.

Figure 4 below provides a schematic overview of the main UN agencies that play a role in the implementation of multidimensional mandates:

Figure 4. The UN peacekeeping system

*No agency left behind?*
It follows from the presentation above that it is difficult, if not outright impossible, to identify the exact contours of the UN bureaucracy for multidimensional peace operations. In principle, there are no limits to the number of agencies and entities that can be seen as somehow contributing to the fulfilment of multidimensional mandates. This has led some observers to suggest that the UN has followed a ‘no agency left behind’ approach to post-conflict peacebuilding (Call and Cousens 2008), essentially throwing in everything but the kitchen sink when outlining what it would take to build lasting peace after civil war.
However, the expansion of the peacebuilding agenda in the 1990s and the accompanying growth in the number of agencies involved can also be seen as the result of a learning process. As experiences were gained from early multidimensional peacekeeping operations in Mozambique, Namibia and Cambodia, practitioners and scholars alike became increasingly aware of the complexity of post-conflict transitions and the multiple, simultaneous needs of post-conflict societies (Call and Cousens 2008: 3). Everything seemed to matter in terms of laying the foundations for lasting peace: from building schools and health clinics and securing livelihoods to improving the participation of marginalised groups, including women and children, disarming former combatants and revitalising the economy while reforming the constitution, holding free and fair elections and promoting transitional justice and national reconciliation. Increasingly, such a broad understanding of peacebuilding and the type of ‘laundry list’ or ‘Christmas tree’ mandates it has inspired have come to be seen as problematic, not just by scholars and observers outside the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy, but also by leading figures within it. In combination with the fragmented nature of the UN peacekeeping system, it is seen as having given rise to two distinct, yet related, problems.

First, there is the inability to ‘deliver as one’ because the system is not a unitary actor but is made up of a wide range of bureaucratic entities with different mandates, interests and understandings of what it takes to build lasting peace (Barnett et al. 2007). The fact that these entities are all subjected to distinct sets of rules, regulations and bureaucratic procedures adds further to the predicament. Secondly, and in direct relation to this, there is an inability to prioritise and focus on those tasks that matter most to the establishment of lasting peace in that particular context. The next section will explore how the UN peacekeeping system has been trying to find organisational solutions – or ways of managing – these two structural problems through the use of integrated missions.

**Learning to work together**

In response to the need for coherence and shared strategies, the UN peacekeeping system has invented the concepts of ‘integration’ and ‘integrated missions’.6 It is an

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5 The term ‘Christmas tree mandates’ is borrowed from the former SRSG to Liberia, Ellen Margrethe Løj, who, on several occasions, has spoken publicly and to the Security Council on the difficulties of translating mandates containing long lists of cross-cutting and generic tasks into effective peacekeeping action in specific countries.

6 Integration is the UN equivalent of member states’ focus on Whole of Government and/or Comprehensive Approaches. For an overview of this debate, see the DIIS report by Finn Stepputat published in the same ReCom series as this report.
organisational attempt to remedy some of the problems that relate to the fragment-
ed nature of the UN peacekeeping system, including the detrimental effects of agen-
cies working at cross purposes and/or duplicating one another’s work and thereby
wasting scarce resources. The term ‘integration’ was formally introduced by the Sec-
retary-General in 1997 (Metcalfe et al. 2011: 1), but the concept was only properly
defined in the Brahimi Report (UN 2000: paragraphs 198–217). Since then, inte-
gration has become the guiding policy for the UN’s engagement in all conflict and
post-conflict settings where the UN has a Country Team and a multidimensional
peacekeeping operation (or a country-specific political mission).

An integrated mission is headed by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative
(SRSG), who holds overall responsibility not only for the peacekeeping mission,
but also for the wider UN and international effort, and for bringing together the
various stakeholders and coordinating the overall peacebuilding process (de Coning
2010: 2). The SRSG is supported by a ‘triple-hatted’ deputy who leads the coordina-
tion efforts for humanitarian, development and recovery activities, and serves as the
principal interface between the (civilian) country team and the military component
of the peacekeeping mission, normally led by a Force Commander (UNDP 2013:
9). The concept is widely regarded as having facilitated some progress, in particular
through the integrated mission planning processes. Practitioners, however, suggest
that integration efforts in the field would be far more successful if integration were
also introduced at headquarters. The diverse sets of rules, regulations and bureau-
cratic procedures that the distinct UN entities are subject to and which are man-
aged from their headquarters continue to make it difficult for the UN to ‘deliver as
one’ in the field.

Recent studies furthermore suggest that the concept of UN integration remains
poorly understood and contested in the field, especially among humanitarian and
development agencies (Metcalfe et al. 2011; UNDP 2013). On the humanitarian
side, the fear is that integration arrangements endanger the neutrality of humani-
tarian space and actors (Metcalfe et al. 2011). On the development side, resistance
to integration relates to the inherent tension between the time-bound nature and
approach of DPKO as opposed to the longer-term development agenda pursued
by agencies such as UNDP (UNDP 2013: xvii). This serves to illustrate that inte-
gration is only a matter of organisational arrangements on the surface; at its core,
it is a matter of politics in the sense that it requires managing, negotiating and ul-
timately choosing between competing priorities. Given the absence of clear man-
dates in particular, and of unified directions from New York, this also underlines
the importance of competent leadership in the field. In practice, it is often up to
the SRSG to balance and prioritise the many tasks that the mission is charged with.
This includes figuring out how to ensure that generic tasks related to, for example,
capacity-building and the reconciliation and protection of civilians are operational-
ised so that they work together in a manner that is appropriate to the local context
and the resources available to the mission. While one should obviously be careful
not to overstate the importance of one individual, in this instance the SRSG, it is
worthwhile noting that the UN system has, in recent years, been paying more atten-
tion to the appointment and training of competent leadership (de Coning 2010).

Learning to Protect
From the outset in 1948, UN peacekeeping missions have been bound by the prin-
ciple of the ‘non-use of force’. Maintaining this principle was thought of as a way
of protecting the blue helmets by allowing them to remain neutral. When engag-
ing in modern civil wars, however, the principle turned out to be ‘a dangerous trap’
(Benner et al. 2011: 17). The failures to prevent the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and
the 1995 massacre in Srebrenica had left UN peacekeeping – and the principle of
the non-use of force – severely discredited. The principle was further challenged by
events unfolding in Sierra Leone in May 2000, when rebels detained more than 400
UN peacekeepers and stripped them of their weapons and equipment, including a
helicopter (Benner et al. 2011: 17). The Brahimi Report that was being worked on
at the time took this into account and argued that ‘United Nations military units
must be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mis-
sion’s mandate. Rules of engagement should be sufficiently robust and not force UN
contingents to cede the initiative to their attackers’ (UN 2000: x).

The concept of robust peacekeeping has led to heated debates within the UN
peacekeeping system and among member states. The debate has been defined by
a fundamental rift between those who advocated humanitarian intervention and
the emerging concept of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and who pushed for a more
proactive doctrine on the use of force as a ‘progressive, morally enlightened pol-
icy’, and those who saw it as a frontal assault on the fundamental norms of state
sovereignty and the right to non-intervention—norms that were understood as a
last line of defence for many post-colonial states who remained distrustful of the
benign intentions behind the interventionist policies of Western powers (Benner
et al. 2011: 18). Neither the debate nor the rift has been resolved, yet over the years
the de facto point of reference for the use of force in peace operations has effectively
been changed on a pragmatic mission-by-mission basis (Benner et al. 2011: 19–21). Today, multidimensional peacekeeping operations are routinely provided with robust mandates and rules of engagement that allow them to use ‘all means necessary’, including conducting offensive operations for the protection of civilians.\footnote{Most recently, the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) has been supplemented by a new and even more aggressive kind of force: the UN Intervention Brigade, mandated to ‘neutralize and disarm’ rebel groups in the country (IPI 2013b). This development is, however, so new that it is more appropriately dealt with in the discussion on trends and perspectives, rather than as part of the lessons learned from previous experiences.}

The new standard is captured in the Capstone Doctrine, which reinterpreted rather than replaced the traditional principles of peacekeeping – consent, impartiality and non-use of force (DPKO 2008). The doctrine provided some clarification of how the UN bureaucracy sees the role of UN peacekeeping: what it can and especially what it cannot do (including waging wars). It outlines a narrow, tactical approach to ‘robust peacekeeping’ that aims at enabling peacekeepers to implement their mandate by relying on their robustness in posture, equipment and the ability to use force (Tardy 2011: 154). This, however, has not solved the wider strategic and normative issues raised by the concept of robust peacekeeping. Two aspects in particular have proved difficult for the UN to tackle in the field: how to ensure the safety and security of peacekeepers, and how to translate civilian protection mandates into effective action on the ground.

The Brahimi Report envisioned robust peacekeeping as a way of ensuring that peacekeepers were able to protect themselves and their mandates. This notion is still the most widely accepted. However, within both the peacekeeping bureaucracy and among member states, especially the troop-contributing countries, voices of dissent do argue that robust peacekeeping is, in effect, putting peacekeepers in harm’s way. Violence targeting peacekeepers has indeed become a common theme in many multidimensional missions. Violence and attacks are, however, not only or even primarily directed against UN peacekeepers. Civilian personnel, including development and humanitarian workers, are also increasingly being targeted.

The safety and security of the people working for the UN clearly matters in its own right, yet the move towards robust peacekeeping – and towards providing the missions with the necessary equipment and tools to sustain those mandates – has primarily been justified by reference to the need to protect civilians. Since 1999, twelve UN peacekeeping operations have been provided with mandates to protect civilians.
under imminent threat of physical violence. The UN peacekeeping system is acutely aware that civilian protection mandates have become ‘the yardstick by which the international community, and those whom we endeavour to protect, judge our worth as peacekeepers’. In recent years the Secretariat has therefore paid special attention to developing operational policy and guidance material for missions. Training courses have been held, and a new position of ‘Protection of Civilians Coordination Officer’ has been established within DPKO to strengthen the Secretariat’s capacity to provide support to missions with protection mandates (SCR 2012: 14). Underpinning these efforts is the suggestion that effective protection demands:

...proactive, well-trained and appropriately resourced peacekeepers who can use a full spectrum of tools – military, police, justice, corrections and human rights – in cohesive fashion. Additionally, peacekeeping missions and other partners must continue to strengthen national institutions so that they are able to discharge their primary responsibility for enhancing security and the rule of law by the time the mission leaves. (UNSG 2011)

This quote illustrates two generic points that sum up the past two decades of organizational learning: first, that peacekeeping tasks are no longer primarily military in nature; and secondly, that the building of national capacity is the key to a successful exit for UN peacekeepers.

To provide for a discussion of whether the UN is indeed becoming better at implementing multidimensional mandates, the next part of the report moves away from the organisational UN’s navel-gazing towards a concern with the impact on the ground: to what extent have multidimensional peace efforts fulfilled their ambitious and complex mandates?

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8 DPKO webpage, see http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/civilian.shtml
Part II.

Assessing results on the ground
Chapter 3. Standards for success

The complexity of multidimensional peace operations and the inherent tensions between their time-bound nature and the long-term agenda of social transformation they engage in makes it very difficult to pinpoint exactly when a peace operation can be understood as successful. Often the mere notion of ‘success’ provides for what could be called a relativity problem: how can one even talk about success when even the best of missions still leave behind poverty, inequality, violence and living conditions that rank among the worst in the world? Notwithstanding such ethical questions, this part of the report focuses on the more practical difficulties of determining the effectiveness of multidimensional peace operations.

The combination of ambitious mandates containing a laundry list of broad mission objectives and tasks with the lack of clear operational indicators gives rise to the peculiar situation that a peacekeeping mission can be regarded as a reasonable success even when most of the tasks remain unfulfilled or ‘work in progress’. Neither the Security Council nor the UN peacekeeping system has shown a significant appetite for detailing general criteria or standards for success. However, if we are to assess the crucial questions of whether multidimensional peace operations ‘work’ and how the instrument might be improved, it is imperative to have some sort of common understanding of, first, what constitutes an effective peace operation, and secondly, how we can assess whether the criteria or standards for success have been met in a given situation: what are the ultimate goals, when is a mission a relative success and how do we know? Despite the complexities and difficulties, including their inherently political nature, the literature on peacekeeping has sought to answer these questions with increasing intensity (Maley 2012: 199). This chapter provides a brief overview of the discussion, focusing on the main reasons why it is so difficult to provide ‘hard facts’ in the form of evidence-based, causal explanations concerning the impact of multidimensional peace operations. The subsequent two chapters provide a more substantial discussion of impact in terms of 1) the missions’ ability to keep the peace, and 2) the distinct quality of the peace that is ‘kept’.

Methodological challenges

Evaluating or assessing the outcome of peacekeeping entails a number of methodological challenges that must be taken into account. Most of these challenges relate to one of the most fundamental insights in science: there can be no generalizable scien-
tific finding without comparison and control (e.g. Sartori 1991). Without systematic, scientific comparison between peacekeeping missions, including controlling for the effect on other variables that affect the outcome, we can only make conclusions about individual cases and must refrain from conclusions about peacekeeping in general. This logic constitutes a problem for peacekeeping scholarship because the field suffers from at least four (related) challenges when it comes to the exercise of systematic comparisons and control.

First, by statistical standards there is a very small \( n \), that is, a very few cases of peacekeeping. Because statisticians operate with varying thresholds of \( n \) for statistical analysis to make sense, some scholars have questioned whether there are enough cases for quantitative studies of peacekeeping success to be valid (e.g. Carvalho and Aune 2010). Secondly, there is a large degree of heterogeneity between the cases, meaning that peacekeeping missions are so different both in type and over time that it can be questioned whether they are in fact the ‘same thing’ (e.g. Maley 2012: 199–200; see also Carvalho and Aune 2010). This, in turn, can lead to the methodological problem of ‘concept stretching’ (see Sartori 1991), which not only applies to the peacekeeping missions themselves, but also to the different types of outcome, as there are enormous differences between the types of peace being established. Thirdly, it is very difficult to compare the success rate of cases with intervention to cases of non-intervention. This is down to the extreme variety in context (type and stage of conflict, culture, parties, etc.), as well as the simple fact, pointed out by several scholars, that peacekeeping missions tend to be deployed only in the ‘hard cases’ (e.g. Fortna 2008). Fourthly, a crucial part of quantitative analysis is controlling for the effect of contextual variables when determining if \( x \) does in fact lead to \( y \), that is, if peacekeeping missions actually create peace. Because both multidimensional peacekeeping in itself and the context in which it takes place are such complex phenomena, it is also extremely difficult to isolate the effect of peacekeeping in itself from contextual variables (Fortna 2008).

**The peace continuum**

Through the years, peacekeeping scholars have come up with a plethora of standards for success, some of them focusing on sub-fields such as economic development, or even narrower, context-specific fields such as protection of women and children in post-conflict environments (e.g. Diehl and Druckman 2012a, 2012b). Others have tried to identify a few overarching, generic factors that can be used across missions to determine whether they are successful or not (e.g. Call 2008). Although it is
beyond the scope of this study to present a complete picture of this research and its inherent debates, Figure 4 below provides an overview of some of the most important standards of success proposed, focusing primarily on macro-level indicators and foregoing some of the more detailed and very sector-specific standards.

Figure 5. Standards of success for peacekeeping

SECURITY
- Minimize military casualties
- Mitigate systematic violence
- Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration

HUMANITARIAN
- Protection of civilians
- Prevent war recurrence
- Protect and promote human rights
- Foster return of refugees
- Foster growth in per capita GDP
- Reconstruct economic infrastructure

SOCIAL
- Address social root causes of war
- Fight corruption
- Redress past crimes
- Restore rule of law
- Strengthen local governance
- Create legitimate and effective political institutions
- Facilitate and organize democratic elections

ECONOMIC

POLITICAL

There is an emerging consensus in the recent literature on two key standards of success. The first and least controversial of these focuses on whether or not the war is over: has violent conflict ended, and is the fighting unlikely to reignite? This is referred to in the literature as ‘prolonged absence of armed conflict’, ‘no war recurrence’ or simply ‘sustained peace’. We take this crucial aspect as the starting point for the discussion in Chapter 4 that provides evidence for claiming that peacekeeping works. The second and infinitely more complex standard focuses on whether or not the peace is self-sustainable because structures have been established to ensure the peaceful resolution of future conflicts. We refer to this aspect here as effective and legitimate institutions of governance, and while it is touched upon briefly in Chapter 4, we will discuss it in more detail in Chapter 5.

It is assumed here that factors discussed by scholars under other labels such as ‘goals of peacekeeping’, ‘measures of progress’, ‘measures of outcome’ or ‘concept of success’ are all essentially (or can be translated into) ‘standards of success’.
Most scholars argue, either directly or indirectly, that the absence of war recurrence is the most essential and important indicator of success for multidimensional peacekeeping (e.g., Call 2008; Fortna 2008: 102; Van der Lijn 2009 and others). Whether expressed and operationalized as ‘no war recurrence,’ ‘no systematic armed violence’ or ‘no relapse into conflict within a given period,’ the end goal essentially involves the same thing.

It may seem self-evident that the success of peace operations should be judged primarily by their ability to prevent armed conflict from breaking out again. In tandem with the move to second- and third-generation peace operations, however, the focus has been broadened to be concerned also with the kind of peace being established, often drawing explicitly or implicitly on Norwegian peace researcher Johan Galtung’s seminal distinction between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ peace (1969). Figure 6 below provides an overview of the peace continuum that shapes both the scholarly and policy-related discussion.

**Figure 6. Peace continuum**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Negative peace</th>
<th>Growing structural and social conditions for consolidated peace and harmony</th>
<th>Positive peace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absence of war (direct violence)</td>
<td>Absence of social injustice (indirect violence), sense of confidence among people</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From Galtung, 1969; UN, 1992

The methodological challenges of identifying where on the peace continuum a given situation should be placed and the extent to which this position is related to the presence or absence of a peace operation add a degree of uncertainty to all attempts to evaluate the success or failure of multidimensional peacekeeping, regardless of the appropriateness of the standards used. This does not mean that practitioners, policymakers and scholars should refrain from asking whether or how peacekeeping works. There are certainly ways to mitigate and confront these challenges, such as being context-sensitive and allowing for nuanced conclusions. Methodological problems should not prevent us from asking questions, but only remind us to inter-
pret results with caution and nuanced curiosity rather than deterministic conviction. Any serious and well-researched analysis will help us to better understand the field, its subjects, objects and contexts – and complexities (Diehl and Druckman 2010, 2012a, 2012b). Moreover, the debate over standards is interesting in itself because it reflects value choices and tells us which factors or aims are considered the most important. If the absence of war is considered sufficient to classify an intervention as a success, it implies that order and stability are privileged over equality, for example, or justice, empowerment or welfare (Call 2008: 189). The remainder of the report draws on such studies to provide an overview of what we know so far of how and why multidimensional peace operations work in the sense that they provide for establishing negative peace, yet too often fail to achieve the ambitious goals of ensuring a positive peace for all.
Chapter 4. Peacekeeping works

‘The answer to the question of whether peacekeeping works is a clear and resounding yes’ (Fortna 2008: 173)

American scholar Virginia Page Fortna’s quote launches this chapter because it effectively communicates the most important message there is to convey here: that when measured against the most basic standard of success – no war recurrence – the clear conclusion is that peacekeeping works. As will be shown below, there is more peace where peacekeepers are deployed. When taking into account the difficulty of the task in hand, the political and organisational challenges that the UN is facing, and last but not least the fact that UN peacekeepers tend to be deployed to the ‘hard cases’ where no one else wishes to go (Fortna 2008: 172), one might be genuinely surprised how effective peacekeeping actually can be. As one scholar notes, when it comes to the question of whether the UN should engage in peacekeeping or not, it seems safe to say that the world is at least better with it than without it (Maley 2012: 204).

The statement that peacekeeping works is, however, not a universal truth—it is contingent on a number of factors, some related to the specific conflict, its history and dynamics, others more broadly related to external issues that shape the overall international engagement. Although the literature has not provided a consensus view on what it takes to ensure success, the following factors are often highlighted as particularly crucial (van der Lijn 2009):

- Consent, willingness and sincerity
- Impartiality and the non-use of force
- Co-operation from important outside actors
- Clear, appropriate and achievable mandates
- Competent leadership and personnel
- Coordination and cooperation.

It follows from the list that it is not the technical design of specific programmes and projects that determines whether a multidimensional mission is successful or not; what matters is the overall political climate and will of the actors involved on all sides – factors that are inherently difficult to quantify and measure. The statistical findings presented in this chapter, however, provide support to the macro-claim
that UN peace operations work, albeit in general and not per se. The chapter focuses first, on the extent to which UN peacekeepers have indeed been able to keep the peace – provide negative peace; and secondly, on the claim that, despite its shortcomings, the UN has certain comparative advantages in addressing the diverse challenges of multidimensional peace operations.

**UN peacekeeping reduces the risk of relapsing into conflict**

A substantial body of academic literature is tackling the question of whether peacekeeping works. The field has grown in both quality and quantity over recent years. A stronger emphasis on the correlation between input and output (e.g. Dobbins et al. 2005; Adebajo 2011), a more nuanced perspective on the dilemmas, pitfalls and grey areas within both theory and practice (e.g. Paris and Sisk 2009b; Martin-Brûlé 2012; Suhrke 2012), and the gradual emergence of more sophisticated and more finely tuned frameworks for evaluation (e.g. Diehl and Druckman 2010; 2012b) have been particularly constructive trends. This has been coupled with a number of quantitative studies of hitherto unseen quality (e.g. Fortna 2008; Call 2008; 2012; Doyle and Sambanis 2010).

A few years ago, one particular figure attracted quite a lot of attention, both among scholars and policymakers: the claim that peacekeeping was only successful in keeping the peace 50% of the time (Suhrke and Samset 2007). The debate has since moved on and been refined considerably. A recent study suggests that numbers detailing the success rate of UN peacekeeping can, of course, be sliced in a number of ways to reveal different patterns. For instance, Call notes that success rates are higher for conflicts that ended in outright victories rather than negotiated settlements (Call 2008: 187). It seems easier to keep the peace if there is a clear winner to the conflict – a correlation that may indicate that the best way to achieve a lasting peace is simply to ‘give war a chance’ (Luttwak 1999).

Using a far more conservative and static measure that indicates success in binary terms as either peace or war two years after the end of civil war, a study by Doyle and Sambanis compared multidimensional and traditional peace operations and found that the five multidimensional peacekeeping missions included in the study were all successes, whereas the eight ‘traditional’ peacekeeping missions were all failures (Doyle and Sambanis 2010: 90). Furthermore, the authors found that ‘(...) for these vital, messy jobs, no one does it better than the UN’ (Doyle and Sambanis 2010: 351). This last finding has been supported by another study comparing missions led
by the UN and the US respectively. The study examined sixteen cases using both quantitative and qualitative methods, and found that, whereas seven out of eight UN-led missions resulted in ‘sustained peace’, only four out of eight US-led missions achieved the same thing (Dobbins et al. 2005: xxv; 234). Hence, across the cases examined, the study accredits UN peacekeeping with a success rate of almost 90%.

While the findings reported above support each other, they suffer from at least two of the previously mentioned methodological problems, namely how to compare cases with UN intervention systematically with cases of non-intervention, and how to control for the effect of contextual factors. Therefore, it is worth once again highlighting the study by Fortna (2008) referred to at the beginning of this chapter, as these two problems are here mitigated very well.

Fortna controls for contextual factors and intervention/non-intervention across several statistical models, while juggling with different variables and operationalizations of peace. For example, she finds that contextual factors such as contraband financing for rebels (negative effect) as well as the length and cost of the preceding war (short and costly wars make peacekeeping less successful) are powerful indicators of peacekeeping success. Such controls are critical in making statistical findings as robust and valid as possible. It is therefore particularly reassuring that the results reported above are by and large confirmed by Fortna. Depending on the conservatism of the models used and reporting both time-varying and constant effects, Fortna finds that a UN peacekeeping operation reduces the risk of relapse into conflict by 50-85% (Fortna 2008: 125). What is particularly interesting to note is that it is the models that take into account the peace that holds after the peacekeepers have been withdrawn that show the highest success rates. As Fortna rightly notes, this must be the ultimate standard of success because a self-sustaining peace is the end goal of peacekeeping (Fortna 2008: 111–113). It is also worth noting that Fortna replicates the finding that multidimensional peacekeeping missions are the most effective of all. In fact, using a less conservative, time-constant model correcting a negative bias from the time-varying model, these are accredited with a striking success rate of 94% in creating sustained peace (Fortna 2008: 111–113).

The figure below provides an overview of some of the most important quantitative studies of peacekeeping success when it comes to mitigating war recurrence. Note that different results from the same studies are included in order to emphasise the effect of differences in the standards of success, cases and types of mission chosen.
This once again underlines how any quantitative results in this area – especially in the form of simplified success rates – must be interpreted with much caution.

Figure 7. Quantitative evidence for peacekeeping success in mitigating war recurrence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Standard of success</th>
<th>Success rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Doyle and Sambanis 2010</td>
<td>Peace two years after the end of civil war</td>
<td>50 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call 2008 – review</td>
<td>Different measures of ‘absence of war recurrence’ from ‘full literature’</td>
<td>50-82 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fortna 2008 – compilation of models and types of missions</td>
<td>The reduced risk of relapse into conflict from having peacekeeping missions</td>
<td>50-85 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call 2008 – own analysis</td>
<td>No armed conflict for 5 years after successful Security Council-mandated UN peace operation</td>
<td>60 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heldt and Wallensteen 2007</td>
<td>Proportion of peacekeeping operations deployment months without on-going war</td>
<td>80 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dobbins et al 2005</td>
<td>Sustained peace [qualitative assessment] (8 missions reviewed)</td>
<td>87.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fortna 2008 – only multidimensional peacekeeping missions, time constant model</td>
<td>The reduced risk of relapse into conflict from having multidimensional peacekeeping missions</td>
<td>94 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to these primarily quantitative studies, several comparative studies drawing on qualitative methods have found an increasing tendency for multidimensional peace operations to be successful in preventing war recurrence. One such study examined fifteen cases of UN-led peacekeeping in Africa, the continent hosting the most UN missions since the end of the Cold War. It found that, while the contexts and hence the factors for success differed greatly, UN missions had been somewhat successful in preventing war recurrence in most of them. When they failed, this was often the result of a mixture of factors at the domestic, regional and external levels, including the presence of ‘peace spoilers’ among local elites, incompetent mission leadership or lack of coordination and cooperation between regional partners (Adembajo 2011). In her study, Fortna also controlled the validity of the statistical results by interviewing both peacekeepers and the ‘peacekept’, and found that her conclusion that peacekeeping works also holds when digging deeper into the mechanisms and causal chains (Fortna 2008). As already mentioned, such findings should be
interpreted with much caution. They do not imply that peacekeeping will always work everywhere, but they do add to the emerging consensus in the literature that peacekeeping – in particular, of the multidimensional kind – is able to reduce the risk of relapse into conflict.

**The UN’s comparative advantage in building effective and legitimate states**

In January 2013, Ban Ki-Moon referred to multidimensional peace operations as the ‘flagship activity of the United Nations’, boldly claiming that ‘no other international tool is as effective in combining political, security, rule of law and human rights efforts’ (UNSG 2013a). Notwithstanding the Secretary-General’s obvious institutional interest in promoting ‘his’ organisation, three key arguments support the claim that the United Nations is especially well-suited to assisting war-torn countries in healing the social wounds of extended violent conflict.

First and foremost are considerations of legitimacy. For the present purpose, these considerations extend beyond questions of legality concerning the use of force (DIIS 2005) and relate to more practical questions concerning local acceptance of the international engagement. The active involvement of ‘outsiders’ in domestic, political and social processes is politically sensitive and bound to be contested. The UN is not above being accused of imperialism and neo-colonialism in that regard, yet in general the organisation is less susceptible to allegations of pursuing narrowly defined interests and more widely seen as working for ‘the greater good’ than regional organisations, for example, or great powers. Often, but not always, the UN has been more easily and widely acceptable to local, national and regional actors as a neutral ‘facilitator’ or partner in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction.

Secondly, in theory the UN is able to engage comprehensively with the challenges of post-conflict reconstruction. In contrast to most other international organisations and multilateral settings, the United Nations has a mandate – and a range of specialised agencies – that allow it to work on both security and development issues and to combine civilian and military instruments in so doing. As noted in the discussion above on integrated missions, the UN has not been able to fully translate this into concerted action on the ground, yet the aim of ‘bringing to bear the full force of the United Nations system in support of countries emerging from conflict’ (UNSG 2009: paragraph 24) has guided the past twenty years of organisational reforms and doctrinal revisions.
Thirdly, the UN is cost-effective. The UN is often portrayed as an ineffective and expensive organ, but recent studies suggest that UN-led peace operations are in fact quite cost-effective. It is telling that the yearly budget for UN peace operations amounts to slightly less than what the US Department of Defence spent per month in Iraq in 2005, or in Afghanistan in 2011 (Dobbins et al. 2005; CRS 2011). Similarly, it is worth noting that, compared to NATO, the ratio between headquarters staff and troop deployment remains very high for the UN. A study indicates that NATO has a ratio of 1:18, while the UN’s ratio is 1:100 (CIC 2009: 42), while other studies suggest an even higher UN ratio (see e.g. Bellamy and Williams 2010: 53). NATO, the Pentagon and DPKO are clearly not immediately comparable, yet the figures do suggest that the UN is able to conduct peace operations at quite a low cost.

‘Cost-effectiveness’ does not necessarily imply that the UN is a ‘lean’ organisation, or even that it is leaner than NATO and the Pentagon: it may just as well indicate that the UN is forced to operate on the cheap due to the widely acknowledged gap that exists between ambitious mandates and inadequate resources, and that if only peacekeeping missions were equipped with more resources they would be able to achieve better results. According to one oft-cited study, there is a direct correlation between ‘how much peace’ one wants and the number of troops needed for the mission (Dobbins et al. 2007). This logic is, however, increasingly questioned, as scholars are instead pointing to the context-sensitivity of mission requirements (e.g. Call 2008, 2012; Martin-Brûlé 2012; Diehl and Druckman 2010) and hence the need to have the right resources, rather than just more resources. Several case studies have highlighted the detrimental effects of UN missions lacking troops that are well trained for the job, for example, qualified mission leadership and/or appropriate material such as vehicles and helicopters that can allow the peacekeepers to leave the barracks (e.g. Bellamy and Williams 2013; Adebajo 2011; Martin-Brûlé 2012). Others have pointed to the need for UN personnel to know and understand the particular historical, political and cultural context of the conflict and country they are working in (Sending 2010). Along the same lines, a very comprehensive, recent study looked into the process of force and resource generation for UN peacekeeping missions and found that the most pressing challenge was not to attract more resources, but to attract the right resources, that is, forces with appropriate military capacities and key civilian specialists for multidimensional missions (Bellamy and Williams 2013).

That the UN, despite its shortcomings, has some comparative advantages over NATO and the Pentagon when it comes to conducting multidimensional peace op-
erations unfortunately does not say much. Even the most United Nations-friendly observers, including the UN peacekeeping system itself, do not consider the UN’s track record to be any better than, at best, ’mixed’. And harsher critics have no trouble in suggesting that the UN has either failed completely in delivering on its ’promise of a liberal peace for all’ (Richmond 2009) or has ’fallen short of the ambitious goal of creating the good society’(Barnett and Zürcher 2009: 24). Some even go so far as to suggest that the impact of UN involvement in post-conflict statebuilding has on the whole been negative and resulted in the production of ’phantom states’, whose governing institutions lack social and political legitimacy (Chandler 2006). To assess these claims, the next chapter turns to the critical question of the quality of the peace that the UN has succeeded in keeping and building through its multi-dimensional peace operations.
Chapter 5. But statebuilding fails ...

The preceding chapter outlined the statistical evidence for claiming that UN peace operations ‘work’. Despite the different methodological caveats pointed out there, the basic conclusion is that, five years down the line, a war-torn country will in general be better off with a peacekeeping mission than without one (Call 2008). In this chapter, the focus shifts towards the more difficult and arguably substantial discussion of how well multidimensional peacekeeping works: what are the wider effects of UN-led peace operations, including their possible unintended consequences? This is essentially a matter of exploring the quality of the peace that UN missions may be successful in keeping or bringing about. Scrutinising this is key to assessing the impact of multidimensional peacekeeping operations, as these – in contrast to traditional peacekeeping missions – aim explicitly at building a peace that is characterized by more than the absence of violent conflict and which is self-sustaining because it ‘advances a sense of confidence and well-being among people’, as Boutros-Ghali put it back in 1992 (UNSG 1992: paragraph 55).

As also indicated in the discussion of ‘standards for success’, the exact understanding of sustainable, or positive, peace – what it looks like and how it can be best achieved – remains evolving and contested. Since the seminal 1992 Agenda for Peace, however, the UN approach has rested fairly consistently on the belief that:

...there is an obvious connection between democratic practices – such as the rule of law and transparency in decision making – and the achievement of true peace and security in any new and stable political order. (UNSG 1992: paragraph 59)

In the scholarly debate, this belief, along with the model of intervention it has inspired, is widely referred to as Liberal Peacebuilding, or simply the ‘Liberal Peace’. It outlines an ambitious agenda of political, economic and social reform centred around the introduction of multiparty elections, market-based economic growth, and various measures of ‘good governance’, including the rule of law and human rights (Paris 2004; Bellamy and Williams 2010: 23–25; Zaum 2012). In recent years, the focus has shifted towards the need for effective and legitimate state institutions as a core foundation for peace, security and democratic governance. Theoretically, this shift reflects a (re)discovery of institutions as a key determinant for trajectories of social development (Krasner 2011). Politically, it is related to al Qa-
Aeda’s attacks on the USA in 2001 and the ensuing fear of so-called ‘failed states’ as potential or real safe havens for transnational terrorists.

Over the years the underlying logic of multidimensional peace operations has thus been changed, as is also indicated by the distinction between second- and third-generation peace operations. In the 1980s and early 1990s, freedom (political and economic) was seen as the key foundation for sustainable peace and development, and post-conflict reforms and reconstruction were aimed accordingly at ‘rolling back the state’ in order to liberate the productive forces of civil society and the market (Paris 2004). Today, the term ‘statebuilding’ has become increasingly popular among policy-makers and scholars alike as a convenient shorthand for international efforts aimed at stabilising peace and rebuilding war-torn societies. There are multiple tensions and contradictions between the logic of building states and that of promoting liberal forms of governance. Statebuilding is concerned with establishing effective state structures, while democratisation is a way of curbing or controlling the power of the state. Yet, as the UN’s approach to post-conflict peacebuilding has evolved, it has become increasingly clear that multidimensional peace operations, in particular of the contemporary third-generation type, are best understood as an attempt to ‘build peace by building states’ (Call and Wyeth, 2008).

The Capstone Doctrine codifies this understanding by describing peacebuilding in terms that are basically synonymous with a common-sense understanding of statebuilding:

Peacebuilding measures address core issues that affect the functioning of state and society. In this regard they seek to enhance the capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions. (DPKO 2008: 18)

It is the UN’s track record in fulfilling this complex ambition that is the focus of the present chapter. However, the shift from ‘liberalisation’ to ‘institutionalisation’ as the main driver of change makes it difficult to compare the transformational agenda and impact of the early – second-generation – years of multidimensional peacekeeping with the past decades’ more comprehensive and longer-lasting – third-generation – focus on building national capacity. For this reason, the chapter looks primarily at the experiences of the past decade, when efforts have been increasingly directed towards institution-building and where other peacebuilding objectives, such as justice, freedom and equality, have come to be understood as secondary to, or dependent upon, the establishment of effective and legitimate state institutions.
The title of the chapter boldly claims that the UN ‘fails’ in its statebuilding efforts. This is a claim that comes with strong connotations, as it suggests that things have gone badly wrong. This is not the intent here. An intervention may fail to produce state structures that adhere to ‘international’ standards yet can still be regarded as a success in other ways. For example, if the intervention succeeds in ending the armed conflict and/or improving living conditions for the general population, it surely cannot be considered a total failure. In many ways, any such intervention would be considered a success. Drawing on the growing body of in-depth case studies, this chapter will nevertheless maintain that – in general and so far – the UN has not fulfilled its self-declared statebuilding ambitions of fundamentally transforming the relationship between state and society. In order to support that claim, the chapter first provides a brief overview of the empirical evidence that is emerging from in-depth case studies before turning to the more principled discussion of why it is so difficult for the UN to assist in building effective and legitimate states in the aftermath of violent conflict.

Evidence from the field
In recent years, several UN interventions have been presented as statebuilding ‘successes’ or at least ‘partial successes’. At the time of writing, Liberia is celebrating the tenth anniversary of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended fourteen years of civil war. While UN officials are praising the government and the people of Liberia for the achievement, the UN mission to the country, UNMIL, is widely understood as having been a pivotal contributor to the peace and statebuilding process. Among the achievements associated with UNMIL are the supervision of two democratic elections, the training of civilian police and national military, the re-establishment of government and the rebuilding of the country’s infrastructure (Martin-Brülé 2012: 241). UNMIL remains, however, deployed to Liberia, and it is thus premature to determine whether the results will indeed prove to be self-sustainable once the mission has completed its ongoing withdrawal.

The drawdown of UNMIL is explicitly linked to the existence of a functioning security and justice sector, and considerable efforts have gone into reforming and rebuilding the armed forces and the police. Regaining public trust in the formal security and justice institutions remains, however, a huge challenge in Liberia – not least considering that local communities have, over time, come to equate security with the presence of UNMIL (Sharif and Maina 2013). This indicates a clear risk of a security vacuum arising in the aftermath of UNMIL’s exit.
In neighbouring Sierra Leone, the UN peacekeeping mission was concluded in 2005 and replaced by a civilian ‘integrated office’ mandated to assist in the peace-consolidation process. The office, which is now managed by the PBC/PBSO, is scheduled to be withdrawn by March 2014. In particular, the holistic approach to security-sector reform that has guided efforts in Sierra Leone is seen as one example of relative success in the peacebuilding process (Albrecht and Jackson 2009; Jackson and Albrecht 2011). Other sectors, however, cannot boast the same degree of success: the country’s social indicators are still some of the worst in the world. Youth unemployment is at a staggering 60 per cent, poverty and inequality are widespread, and the destabilising effects of organised crime and drug trafficking are a real concern (Twort 2013). Compared to the situation before and during the civil war, there is little doubt that real progress has been made in Sierra Leone (UNSG 2013b), but serious doubts remains as to the extent to which this has trickled down to Sierra Leoneans’ everyday lives or strengthened civil society to be robust enough to continue positive change once international support is reduced (Twort 2013).

The older case of UNTAET’s withdrawal from East Timor in 2005 illustrates the dangers of focusing too narrowly on key benchmarks that have been set by the international community and declaring success too early. At the time of its withdrawal, UNTAET was widely regarded as a success story because of achievements such as the drafting of a constitution, the holding of elections, the demobilisation of former guerrillas and the creation of formal institutions (Bowles and Chopra 2008: 271). However, in 2006, just a year after the last UN peacekeeper had left the newly independent state, the government had to call on its international partners again and ask them to send troops back in to restore order in the capital (Bowles and Chopra 2008: 271). The UN has since then deployed three consecutive, multidimensional peace operations to East Timor/Timor Leste, the last of which – UNMIT – was withdrawn as recently as December 2012.

According to the DPKO, by the time it withdrew UNMIT had completed its mandate, which among other things included ‘consolidating stability and enhancing a culture of democratic governance’. A recent report from the International Crisis Group, however, warned about the sustainability of stability (ICG 2013). The ICG’s findings suggested that: 1) elections have centralised power in the hands of a few, and the broader policy and legislative development processes remain somewhat anaemic; and 2) stability has not come through institutional reforms within the

10 DPKO webpage, see http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmit/
security sector: policing capacity remains weak, the army’s role is still not clearly defined, and broader institutional arrangements providing a clearer division of labour among the state’s security forces need to be formalised (ICG 2013).

These examples illustrate that, when one digs a bit deeper into the specifics of individual cases, the statebuilding results often turn out to be rather superficial and uneven. Other, arguably more disturbing details about the shallowness of results could have been drawn from cases such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Haiti (Autessere 2090; Muggah 2013). The point here is not to dwell on the failures, but rather to argue that, even in the most successful cases, statebuilding results rarely extend to rural areas or urban shanty towns, where everyday life tends to carry on fairly unaffected by the formal statebuilding processes. And even at the heart of the state’s machinery, where most of the reform efforts tend to focus, the ways in which national elites maintain control over resources, territory and people often remain fairly similar to the ‘old’ patrimonial ways that reigned before or during the conflict (Barnett and Zürcher 2008; Berdal and Zaum 2013).

Instead of transforming war-torn societies into functioning democracies, more often than not the polities in question have remained troubled by corruption, violence, ethnic tension, poverty and inefficient and unaccountable governance structures. This is the one clear message coming out of the literature that draws on in-depth case studies to explore some of the fundamental challenges confronting international efforts to build sustainable peace after civil war (see e.g. Paris and Sisk 2009a; Call and Wyeth 2008; Chandler 2011; Caplan 2012; Suhrke and Berdal 2012; Berdal and Zaum 2013).

To understand why this is so, the literature provides two different types of explanation: one focusing on the specific modalities of statebuilding, the other exploring the general dilemmas of statebuilding. The remaining part of the chapter discusses these distinct, yet related explanations in turn.

The modalities of intervention: statebuilding models
Over the years, the UN has experimented with different statebuilding models, ranging from the extensive transitional administrations in the Balkans and East Timor to the current, very light footprint in Libya. In principle the models are incompatible, as they are based on contradictory assumptions about how to build peace. The ‘light footprint’ model holds that peace can be built only by the local actors themselves and that the role of external actors is to support those actors in a non-in-
trusive manner. The ‘transitional administration’ model, in contrast, is based on the assumption that ‘local actors can build stable peace only once they have the institutional capacity, political culture and economic infrastructures ready to sustain it’ (Bellamy and Williams 2010: 230). In practice, however, the difference has often turned out to be less radical than one might think (Andersen 2011).

Even in the few exceptional cases where the UN has held formal sovereign responsibilities, mission leaders have not been able to simply run the country as they saw fit. In order to ensure some form of sustainability, legitimacy and impact, the political will, interests and needs of local actors, including in particular the local elites, have had to be taken into consideration. And, in the much more frequent cases where the international footprint has been supposed to be light and merely support a nationally owned process, international actors, including the UN, have often acquired a stronger and more direct role, standing in for the state and fulfilling basic state functions in order to compensate for the limited national capacity and/or will to undertake actions that were considered necessary for post-conflict reconstruction.

A typical third-generation peace operation tends to fall somewhere in between the extreme cases of Kosovo and Libya. It operates in a grey zone between imposition and ownership. This makes it inherently difficult to discuss or assess whether one of the ideal-typical statebuilding models is ‘better’ or more effective than the other. We simply do not have any form of established or consolidated knowledge of how and in what ways – or even whether – different levels of international control impact on the ‘end result’ of statebuilding. Drawing on lessons learned from previous interventions, however, a broad international consensus has emerged over how good statebuilding should be conducted in principle. This consensus leans heavily towards the ‘light footprint model’ and holds that the international intervention should be: i) ‘considered in a country-specific context’, ii) based on an ‘integrated approach’ and iii) ‘nationally owned’ (UNSC 2010). While these three requirements in themselves are not sufficient to guarantee success, they are widely understood as being almost certain to guarantee failure if they are not taken sufficiently into account when designing and implementing a multidimensional peace operation. In particular, the notion of ‘national ownership’ has emerged as the sine qua non for successful peacebuilding – and perhaps also as a convenient fall-back explanation for why international efforts often fall short of fulfilling their stated objectives: ‘We tried, but they failed’. Both practitioners and scholars do, however, agree that the concept is problematic and often difficult to apply in practice. What does ‘national ownership’ mean in the context of fragile and conflict-affected states?
As a policy concept, national ownership simply implies that the transition from war to peace should be driven by national actors: ‘Only national actors can address their society’s needs and goals in a sustainable way’, as the UN Secretary-General has noted (UNSG 2009: 4). The emphasis placed on national ownership reflects a mixture of practical and principled motives. In practical terms, it reflects the basic development lesson that results are unlikely to be sustained unless there is someone who feels responsible for and interested in sustaining them. The Capstone Doctrine thus underlines that:

Effective approaches to national and local ownership not only reinforce the perceived legitimacy of the operation and support mandate implementation, they also help to ensure the sustainability of any national capacity once the peacekeeping operation has been withdrawn. (DPKO 2008: 39)

As a matter of principle, national ownership reflects deeper international norms of state sovereignty, self-government and independence. The roles of the UN and the wider international community are thus formulated as a matter of ‘supporting’ or ‘aligning with’ national actors and their priorities. The underlying suggestion is that legitimate state structures cannot be imposed upon societies, they must be built from within. Experiences of multiple interventions, however, show that it has been far from easy for the UN – or the wider statebuilding community – to ensure that reform processes are genuinely ‘owned’ by the host society that is going to live with and sustain the results. The next section explores the deeper background for why it remains so difficult to move from widely agreed dogmas to effective practice when implementing multidimensional statebuilding mandates.

‘You, the people’: The dilemmas of internationally assisted statebuilding

The theoretical debate on statebuilding has coalesced around the suggestion that there is something inherently paradoxical about the use of outside intervention to establish effective and legitimate structures for self-governance (Chesterman 2004; Paris 2004; Chandler 2006; Zaum 2007; Paris and Sisk 2009b; Caplan 2012). Implicit in this suggestion is the claim that the lack of success is not simply the result of ‘technical’ shortcomings, such as bureaucratic incompetence, poor coordination, insufficient resources or even a lack of political will. They are more appropriately seen as expressions of deeper and more fundamental contradictions that are embedded in the very idea of externally assisted statebuilding and the use of outside
intervention to foster self-government (Chesterman 2004; Paris and Sisk 2009b). No matter how well-meaning the engagement is, international statebuilding interventions involve the exercise of some form of power, influence or authority that is both intrusive and unaccountable. This gives rise to a number of genuine policy dilemmas; that is, problems that defy easy solutions because they present choices between multiple, conflicting imperatives (Paris and Sisk 2009b: 306).

While the exact content of these dilemmas differs from country to country and over time, they tend to revolve around some general, and very tough, questions that must be addressed either by the UN Security Council when mandating multidimensional missions, or by the fragmented UN peace system when translating those mandates into action on the ground. These generic dilemmas tend to come in five different forms:

1. **Footprint dilemmas**: how to determine the intrusiveness of the intervention, including the size of the international presence, the breadth of tasks that are included in the mandate, and the assertiveness of the UN in pursuing these tasks?
2. **Duration dilemmas**: how to determine when to disengage without jeopardising the results achieved thus far, and also without outstaying the welcome?
3. **Participation dilemmas**: how to identify the right local partners and strike a balance between engaging elites that may have the power to disrupt the process and including the wider population in political processes?
4. **Dependency dilemmas**: how to avoid the comparatively large influx of resources and capacities from standing in the way of building up systems and structures that can stand on their own after the mission has ended?
5. **Coherence dilemmas**: how to ensure coordination between the many actors involved in statebuilding and the different objectives that motivate their engagement, and how to ensure that the normative values that underpin international statebuilding policies are adapted to the specific context? (Paris and Sisk 2009b: 306).

Although not systematically organised around these five dilemmas, the UN’s bureaucratic learning process that was described in Chapter 2 can be seen as a way of coping with this complexity. By formulating a variety of tools and guidance documents and organisational procedures for coordination and planning, they seek to provide answers to the many everyday predicaments that practitioners find themselves confronted with in multidimensional peace operations. The problem is, however, that such technical ‘solutions’ may widen the gap that often exists between
the universal concepts of peace- and statebuilding and the specific contexts of host societies. In doing so, they may inadvertently contribute to rather than solve the inherent ‘difficulties of defining statebuilding policies that are appropriate, effective and legitimate not only in the eyes of the interveners but also in the eyes of local elites and masses’ (Paris and Sisk 2009b: 305–6).

The potential for tension, or outright conflict, between the local and the international cannot simply be wished away: it is embodied in the very idea of intervention and is manifest in the simultaneous moves towards robust mandates and the principle of national ownership. As noted above, the Security Council continues to emphasise consent and neutrality when mandating multidimensional peace operations. Even when acting under Chapter VII, UN peace operations have so far only been deployed with the explicit consent of the host state, represented by the government, or upon invitation by the parties to a peace agreement. The assumption behind this practice is that the government – whether elected or formed through a peace agreement – is able to speak on behalf of the entire population and territory of the state. This assumption is, however, troublesome. Societies that have just been undergoing a civil war are almost by definition divided. Identifying the direction for change in societies shattered by years of violent conflict is bound to be complicated. Fundamental questions regarding citizenship, the role of the state and the relationship between the centre and the periphery tend to remain unresolved, and institutional capacity and mechanisms for addressing such issues in a non-violent manner tend to remain weak. One might even argue that if national ownership of the peace- and statebuilding process were possible, there would be no need for the international intervention to begin with (Chesterman 2004: 239–44; Paris and Sisk 2009b: 305).

Being a state-based organisation, it is only natural that the UN is biased towards working with state-like structures. The implicit suggestion, however, is that the fragmentation of public authority that characterises fragile and conflict-affected states is simply a ‘fixable’ deviation from a universal norm of effective Weberian statehood. And this suggestion is increasingly understood by both UN practitioners and scholarly observers to be problematic, part of the reason why the statebuilding results often remain meagre and shallow. The bias towards the state – or rather the central government – complicates meaningful engagement with the non-state, the local and the informal (Berdal and Zaum 2013: 117). Yet we know from case studies and fieldwork that these elements and structures can matter tremendously to everyday life and politics in war-torn societies.
The importance of an ‘inclusive’ approach that engages non-state and informal structures is increasingly acknowledged and understood by leading policy-makers as being essential to both short-term stabilisation and long-term transformation (see e.g. WB 2011). For the UN peacekeeping system, however, it constitutes a particular challenge. Notwithstanding the UN’s role as a normative entrepreneur in promoting people-centred concepts of human security, human development and human rights, the UN remains a state-based, and thus state-centric, organisation, committed to working with governments rather than ‘people’. The UN is limited by a set of normative blinders that means it automatically associates legitimate authority with the central government, even though the latter may enjoy considerably less local legitimacy and/or leverage than other political structures and institutions in the country. This predicament is understood by some policy-makers working within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy (see e.g. Ebo 2010): it is possible to detect signs of a more people-centred and less state-centric approach to, for example, security-sector reform and civil affairs within the DPKO (Andersen 2012; Karlsud and Costa 2012). In general, however, there are as many or more signs pointing towards an even stronger focus on ensuring that the central government is (once again) able to successfully control the territory of the state and maintain law and order within its borders. To reflect on this, the third and final part of the report asks where UN peacekeeping may be heading in the future.
Part III.

Looking to the future
Chapter 6. Trends and perspectives

The theory and practice of peacekeeping is a moving target. From its inception in 1948, it has continually evolved in response to the changing nature of violent conflict and the shifting political dynamics and climate at the global level. The past two decades’ experiences with multidimensional peace operations illustrate this more than anything.

Since the end of the Cold War, the ‘blue helmets’ have moved back and forth between being asked to do too much – the danger of overstretch – and being asked to do too little – the danger of irrelevance. Yet somehow, through it all, the UN peace architecture has been fairly consistently expanded, upgraded and strengthened. In the past twenty years the doctrines, organisational structure and bureaucratic practices of UN-led peace operations have been considerably reworked and refined (Fréchette 2012). This indicates two things: first, crises are a more or less permanent feature of the UN peacekeeping system, and one should avoid being alarmist when speaking of the ‘crisis of the day’. Secondly, crises are apparently what drive the development of UN peace operations. Whatever shifts and changes have been made with regard to the conduct of peace operations in the past twenty years, they have primarily come about as responses to failures of the past.

The purpose of this third and final part of the report is to provide for a discussion of the possible future direction(s) for multidimensional UN peace operations and to sum up what we have learned so far. To do so, the present chapter focuses on the broad, yet visible trends that are likely to shape tomorrow’s conditions for UN intervention. The next chapter concludes the report by providing an overview of 1) what we now know after twenty years’ experience of multidimensional peace operations, and 2) what we still don’t know or are struggling to learn.

Trends in the Security Council

When looking at the most recent mandating practice of the Security Council, one can see signs of both a crisis in and a revival of UN peace operations. The deadlock that has descended upon the Security Council is not as bad as during the Cold War, yet relations among the Permanent Members are increasingly strained. The Council is in particular divided over how to respond to the unfolding tragedy in Syria, including most recently the use of chemical weapons. The impasse is in some
ways (but far from exclusively) related to the UN-mandated intervention in Libya in 2011 and the perception among non-Western member states that NATO abused its mandate in order to impose regime change. Against this backdrop, the future of UN intervention not just in Syria but in general may look bleak (Murray and Hehir 2012). Also in this respect, however, it may be important to distinguish between UN-led peace operations and delegated military missions. On the whole, UN-led peace operations have caused much less controversy in the Council than delegated missions, such as the US- and NATO-led missions in Afghanistan and Libya. In general UN peacekeeping is not a strongly contested area, but rather an area dominated by consensus-seeking. This is illustrated by the fact that the Security Council, despite the ongoing deadlock over Syria, has been as interventionist as ever in the past two years.

Between 2007 and 2011 the Council routinely extended the mandates of all ongoing missions, but it did not establish any new UN-led operations, nor did it authorise other organisations or alliances to use force. Since June 2011, however, the Council appears to have regained its taste for intervention. In addition to authorising others to use force in Libya (NATO) and Mali (France and ECOWAS), it has established a number of new UN-led operations. In the past two years, four new peacekeeping missions have been established, three of which remain active:

- UNISFA: The United Nations Interim Security Force in Abyei, established in June 2011 and still active
- UNMISS: The United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan established in July 2011 and still active
- UNSMIS: The United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria, established in April 2012 but withdrawn in August 2012
- MINUSMA: The United Nations Multidimensional Stabilisation Mission in Mali, established in April 2013 and under deployment.

In addition to these new peacekeeping missions, the Security Council has established a civilian support mission in Libya, UNSMIL, with a mandate to assist in extending state authority. The Council has also sanctioned a military operation in

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11 In 2010 the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, MONUC, was formally transformed into a new mission, with a new acronym, MONUSCO, but the mandate remained largely the same, albeit with a stronger focus on protecting civilians.

12 As is the case for most UN political and peacebuilding missions, UNSMIL is managed by DPA and not DPKO. Only the political mission in Afghanistan, UNAMA, is managed by DPKO.
Côte d’Ivoire (undertaken by the UN mission with the support of French forces) to oust the former president Laurent Gbagbo, who refused to step down from power after being defeated in the presidential elections (UNSC 2011). And, most recently, it has extended the mandate of MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo to include the UN’s first offensive combat force: a 3000 troop-strong ‘Intervention Brigade’ mandated to carry out targeted operations to ‘neutralize and disarm’ the notorious 23 March Movement (M23), as well as other Congolese rebels and foreign armed groups in strife-riven eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (UNSC 2013b).

Only two of these initiatives – UNMISS in South Sudan and MINUSMA in Mali – are of the large, multidimensional type that is the topic of this report. The mandates and means of the other missions differ considerably both from this model and among each other. UNISFA, the interim security force for Abeyi, is tasked with monitoring the contested border between South Sudan and Sudan. UNSMIL, the support mission in Libya, does not have any military troops to assist in fulfilling its statebuilding mandate. And UNSMIS, the supervision mission in Syria, which was withdrawn after a few unsuccessful months, was, as the name suggests, only mandated to supervise the situation. While not multidimensional in nature, each of these missions looks like something that the UN has done before. They remind us that sometimes UN peacekeepers are deployed for more limited reasons than the multidimensional model prescribes. The aim is not always to transform failed states into stable democracies: sometimes it is simply to contain a spreading conflict or perhaps help major powers save face (Gowan 2012: 25). This has always been the case, but it is easily overlooked in broad stroke analyses (such as the present one) of the trends and trajectories of UN peace operations. This underlines that specific decisions in the Council of when and how to intervene are driven overwhelmingly by politics rather than principles.

However, the mandate for the intervention brigade in DRC – and to some extent also the operation in Côte d’Ivoire – stands out and is thus worth discussing in more detail (UNSC 2013b). This is the first time that UN troops have explicitly been requested to take an active part on one side of an ongoing armed conflict. This challenges the basic proposition that the UN does not wage war but merely keeps and builds the peace. As such it may mark a shift towards a further reinterpretation of, or possibly even a break with, the basic principles of UN peacekeeping that could provide for a stronger UN role in peace enforcement. To avoid such a ‘doctrinal effect’, a number of Security Council members, including the permanent members Russia
and China, were adamant in underlining the exceptional nature of the brigade. In the mandate it is thus clearly stated that the Intervention Brigade is not a precedent for the future of peacekeeping operations (UNSC 2013b).

At the time of writing, it is too soon to assess the brigade’s impact on the situation on the ground and possibly on the future doctrinal development of UN peace operations. According to one analysis, the new initiative could improve UN efforts to protect civilians on the ground in the Kivus, yet it also raises a number of risks and challenges, ranging from safeguarding the security of individual peacekeepers and other UN staff in DRC to maintaining the general reputation of UN-led peace operations on a worldwide scale (IPI 2013b) The deployment of the brigade makes the UN a party to the conflict, which many member states fear will (further) taint global perceptions of UN neutrality (IPI 2013b). However, the establishment of the brigade can also be seen as a testimony to the unique role and continued relevance of UN-led peace operations (Economist 2013). It may reinforce the image of UN peacekeeping as being the best – and often only – available solution to the forgotten and overlooked conflicts of the world, an image the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy takes some pride in:

UN peacekeeping missions operate in the most dangerous and difficult environments in the world, dealing with conflicts – or their aftermath – which others cannot or will not address. We can achieve what others can’t, but success is never guaranteed.13

Whether or not the intervention brigade in the DRC will provide a model for future and more robust, enforcement-like UN peace operations remains to be seen. So far, the brigade is exceptional. In most other situations that have been calling for a strong mandate for civilian protection and/or peace enforcement, the Security Council has either not been able to agree at all, has only been able to agree on more limited mandates, or has mandated other actors to perform the task, as is the case with the African Union’s mission to Somalia. Once again, this underlines the fact that the mandating practice of the Security Council tends to be determined more by the political dynamics of the day than by fundamental principles or specific conditions and needs on the ground. In light of this, the next section discusses how the ongoing changes in the global landscape, including in particular the current diffusion of power ‘from the West to the rest’, may affect the future of multidimensional peace operations.

The changing global landscape
As is evident from the mixed messages that are currently coming out of the Security Council, UN peacekeeping is once again at a crossroads. Well-known tensions between the need to ‘do something’, figuring out and agreeing on ‘what to do’, and committing the necessary political, financial and military resources actually to ‘do it’ seem well on their way to becoming not just classic, but chronic. The context in which the UN faces these familiar challenges is, however, rapidly changing, as global economic and political power relations are shifting (Pape 2012; Walton 2009). Of the five permanent members of the UN, China is now the biggest provider of peacekeepers to UN missions, and other ‘emerging’ powers from the Global South are becoming actively engaged in the normative and operational debates over UN peace operations, while different forms of South–South cooperation are replacing or supplementing conventional donor-dominated ‘partnerships’. The new actors are coming to the field with a different set of standards, experiences and objectives that question some of the fundamental assumptions of multidimensional peace operations, including in particular the direct linkage between liberal democracy and sustainable peace. At the same time, the ‘old’ Western powers – which since the end of the Cold War have been instrumental in pushing forward the multidimensional peace agenda – have begun questioning the strategic value and operational effectiveness of promoting ambitious processes of social transformation to address localised conflicts in the periphery. What does this imply for the design, shape and purpose of future UN-led peace operations?

The old distinction between developing states, which provide boots on the ground, and Western states – which, by virtue of ‘paying the piper’, also get to ‘call the tune’ – is rapidly losing its meaning, as major troop- and police-contributing countries from the Global South are gaining increasingly assertive voices and greater influence over both mandates and doctrines for UN peace operations. However, this group of countries does not constitute a bloc: neither as a group, nor individually, have they formulated an alternative – non-liberal or non-Western – model for UN peacekeeping. It is thus difficult to forecast how they will seek to influence the future direction of UN peace operations. The distinct perspectives brought to the field by China, India and Brazil, however, do provide a useful overview of the broad range of ‘non-Western’ positions that are gaining a stronger voice in both normative and operational debates.

First, the importance of consent. China remains the strictest defender of the traditional peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality and the non-use of force,
but India and Brazil are also sceptical of ‘robust’ peacekeeping, including attempts to enforce peace (Tardy 2012). All three are adamant that the role of UN peace operations is to assist national authorities and that the UN should not become a party to conflicts, nor engage in any kind of regime change. At the same time, scholars and observers are noting that, despite the deadlock over Syria, even China is moving towards a more flexible interpretation of intervention and the use of force (Hiromo and Lateigne 2011; Bates and Huang 2013). Alongside India, China had reservations about the recent establishment of the intervention brigade in DRC, but it chose not veto it.

Secondly, the value of South–South cooperation. India and Brazil in particular argue that harnessing the expertise and capacity of the Global South will provide for stronger national ownership (Kenkel 2013; Banerjee 2013). The underlying argument is that Southern experts come to the field with more relevant knowledge and a deeper understanding of the challenges involved than experts with a Western background. While it questions the universality of Western models and institutions, this point of view is increasingly echoed by development agencies and experts, who see a stronger input of civilian capacity from the Global South as one way of ‘contextualising’ the international engagement (see e.g. WB 2011). This is further supported by the previously mentioned CivCap process, which aims at strengthening and mobilising more civilian capacity for UN peace operations.

Thirdly, the importance of socio-economic development as a key element in addressing the root causes of conflict. Multidimensional peace operations should bring a tangible peace dividend to the people in the form of development, poverty reduction, improved service delivery and economic revitalisation. This argument, which Brazil in particular has voiced, draws attention to global inequalities and structural injustices as part of the equation and points toward a more developmentalist approach than the current focus on governance, institutions and ‘security first’ (Kenkel 2013).

Despite these significant nuances, including in particular the emphasis placed on the importance of consent, there is little in the Chinese, Brazilian and Indian approaches to peacekeeping to suggest that the emerging powers will push UN peacekeeping away from multidimensional engagement in future civil wars. A reshaping rather than outright contestation of the norms underpinning multidimensional peace operations seems most likely (Tardy 2012).
The changing nature of violence
In the past two decades, all (or most) shifts in peacekeeping policy and practice have been interpreted as adaptations to shifting contexts and/or reflections of improved knowledge. This has enabled the UN peacekeeping system to maintain that the overall vision remains the one outlined by Boutros-Ghali in 1992. When reading DPKO’s historical account of UN peacekeeping, it seems almost as if a straight line runs from the 2010 Capstone Doctrine back to the 2000 Brahimi Report and ‘An Agenda for Peace’. As is evident from the discussion above, the reality is, however, that the normative bases of UN peace operations have changed over the years: the multidimensional peace operations of today are not what they were in the early 1990s. When looking at the types of issues that UN peacekeepers are sent to address, this is not necessarily a problem. As the nature of armed conflict and organised violence has changed, it is only to be expected that the responses should change with it.

According to the 2011 World Development Report, ‘21st century conflict and violence are a development problem [that] does not fit the 20th century mold’ (WB 2011: 2). This claim was based on an extensive review of quantitative studies indicating that:

- The number of civil wars is declining, and so are the numbers of battle-related deaths from these conflicts
- Few countries are truly ‘post-conflict’: 90% of the last decade’s civil wars occurred in a country that had already had a civil war in the last thirty years
- New forms of conflict and violence threaten development, including in particular organised criminal violence and high rates of homicide
- Different forms of violence are linked to each other: political movements may be financed by criminal activities, and criminal gangs may support political and election-related violence.

According to the World Bank, this picture indicates that the conventional distinctions between ‘war’ and ‘peace’, between ‘criminal violence’ and ‘political violence’, are no longer appropriate. The new forms of violence bring together local political conflict, organised crime and internationalised disputes in ways that the international system has not been built to address (WB 2011: 2–6). The Bank’s conclusion resonates well with scholarly findings that focus explicitly on peace operations (as opposed to the World Bank’s focus on development cooperation). A recent study thus argues that, while the presence of international peacekeepers is likely to re-
duce the chances of renewed war as defined by battle-related deaths, the role of military peacekeepers or observers in preventing or reducing other forms of post-war violence is more uncertain: ‘peacekeepers are few in number, thinly stretched and without clear authorisation to stop mob violence, riots or violence against civilians carried out by men with guns and political connections’ (Suhrke 2012: 13). Perspectives from three ongoing missions: Mali, Democratic Republic of Congo and Liberia, illustrate some of the challenges and dilemmas well:

- In Mali, the organised trafficking of drugs and the complicity of certain elements of the state played a key role in breaking down public trust in the government and corrupting the military forces. The mandate for the UN peace operation, however, makes only a vague mention of organised crime, and it is unclear how this part of the mandate should be fulfilled (Batmanglich and Høyer 2013: 8).
- In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the population’s perspective on unofficial economic activities is one of ambivalence: the activities are deemed illegal, but they are viewed as necessary for survival. The cross-border trafficking of illicit goods, including minerals, takes place in an environment of aggression and fundamental insecurity, yet some of the networks that cross state borders have huge potential and could contribute to managing the economic and political dynamics of the informal economy for the benefit of the Congolese people (Batmanglich and Høyer 2013: 20).
- In Liberia, armed violence and related insecurity remain major concerns for people, especially in the capital Monrovia, despite the end of the civil war. The young, including children who were orphaned or abandoned during the war, are often cited as responsible for the violence. With unemployment rates close to 80%, a burgeoning regional drug trade and some former combatant networks still loosely in place, Liberia is highly vulnerable to becoming more involved in the trafficking underway elsewhere in West Africa (Batmanglich and Høyer 2013: 15).

To some extent, the changing nature of violence and the interlinkages and overlapping between organised crime, political violence and everyday insecurity reinforce the logic that has shaped the past decades’ evolution of multidimensional peace operations. They underline the continued need for overcoming a ‘silo mentality’ and working in an integrated and holistic manner. In this sense, these challenges contribute further to blurring the boundaries between security and development, between civilian and military engagement, and between peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and development cooperation. At the same time, however,
the amorphous nature of violence and the complex and transnational linkages be-
tween criminal networks, political leaders, armed groups and business communities
suggest that there is a need to do things differently. Or, as suggested by the World
Bank, to ‘fundamentally rethink the approaches of international actors to manage
global risks collectively – as equal partners’ (WB 2011: 38). By way of conclusion –
and to open up a wider discussion of how to ensure the future relevance and ef-
ficacy of UN peace operations – the last chapter provides an overview of what
we have learned so far, what we are still struggling to learn, and what we are only
beginning to understand that we need to learn in order successfully to lay the foun-
dations for lasting peace.
Chapter 7. Conclusion

Whatever happens, UN peacekeeping will still be there, because let’s face it, not only has it had its successes but also, I think, it represents a matter for large consensus within the international community [that] it is also good value for money.¹⁴

Speaking at a seminar on the future of UN peacekeeping, Herve Ladsous, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, showed few signs of worry. The strong air of confidence he expressed in the quote above may be strategic and intended to convince his audience that it is politically sound to invest in the future of UN peacekeeping. It may, however, also reflect the fact that UN peace operations, especially in the past ten years, have proved themselves to be a relevant and appropriate response to complex political emergencies that defy easy solutions. On the whole, multidimensional peace operations have emerged as a useful tool for assisting war-torn societies in laying the foundations for lasting peace.

The reading of the vast body of peacekeeping literature that underpins this report suggests unmistakably that multidimensional UN peace operations have been largely successful at preventing the resumption of war. In many instances, they have been able to establish or maintain some form of stability that has permitted a gradual rebuilding of economic and social infrastructure. This is by no means a small or insignificant achievement, and it should be duly recognised when assessing the impact of multidimensional UN peace operations. At the same time, however, the reading makes it equally clear that, on the whole, UN peace operations have not succeeded in fundamentally transforming the relationship between state and society. Efforts to establish democratic forms of governance and build effective and legitimate state institutions have achieved some results, including the holding of democratic elections and the building of administrative capacity in central ministries. Yet, in many instances, the underlying political dynamics and problems have remained largely intact. When taken together, the overall conclusion of the report is thus that peacekeeping works, but statebuilding fails.

The UN has had some success in preventing wars from reigniting once a peace agreement has been reached, but it has so far not been equally successful in build-

¹⁴ http://www.ipinst.org/events/panel-discussions/details/431.html?tmpl=component&print=1
ing legitimate and effective national institutions of governance. What is more, the ongoing human tragedy unfolding in the Democratic Republic of Congo illustrates with brutal clarity that the UN sometimes remains very far not only from fulfilling lofty aspirations for social transformation, but also from providing basic protection to civilians living in extremely insecure conditions. Although arguably more successful than some of the other instruments available to the international community, UN peace operations remains a blunt instrument that is in dire need of fine tuning to ensure that the assistance provided matches local needs and dynamics. It is well documented in both the scholarly literature and evaluations that unless the state- and peacebuilding processes are locally owned, their achievements will not be sustainable.

Notwithstanding this truism, the report argues that the UN peacekeeping system has, on the whole, learned from its past experiences and has, to some extent, been able to transform itself into a learning organisation. The UN peacekeeping system of today is not the same as it was in the early days of complex peacekeeping. In addition to having strengthened and professionalised many of its internal procedures, including its arrangements for control and command, the UN has been instrumental in identifying the three dogmas – context, integration and ownership – that now stand as conventional wisdom on how to engage in complex political emergencies. These dogmas were not revealed to the UN through divine intervention but have emerged through a gradual and dynamic interchange between practice and policy. The knowledge that has been produced within and by the UN is captured in numerous reports from the Secretary-General and ‘high-level panels’ that have been asked to come up with recommendations for improved actions. It is also increasingly located in and produced by inter-agency task forces that are charged with identifying shared approaches to common problems. In contrast to the early days of multidimensional peace operations, the problem today is therefore no longer that practitioners on the ground are ‘flying blind’ in their efforts to assist countries ravaged by war (Benner et al. 2011: 2). Today UN peacekeepers, whether civilian or in uniform, are guided by an overwhelming set of guidance notes, handbooks, instruments and tools that are meant to help them translate the ambitious mandates into effective action. The question, however, remains whether this helps them overcome ‘the chronic inability of international actors to adapt their assistance to the political dynamics of the war-torn societies they seek to support’ that was identified as a key shortcoming almost ten years ago (Tschirgi 2004: i).
The troubled divide between the universal concepts of multidimensional peace operations and the particular contexts of fragility and violent conflicts reminds us that global challenges are always localised: events are happening and dynamics unfolding in specific places with distinct historical trajectories. If international standards and norms, such as those underpinning multidimensional peace operations, are to have effects on the ground, they must be translated and adapted to the particular contexts, as is also recognised in the growing emphasis on the need for contextualisation and national ownership. Part of the problem, however, is that these dogmas do not provide a consistent push in one direction. On the contrary, they may often push the UN in divergent directions, on the one hand underlining the need to assist the formal representative of the state – the internationally recognised regime – in establishing itself as the highest authority in the country, while on the other hand stressing the need to engage with and include a variety of non-state actors that may enjoy considerable local legitimacy and power. As briefly noted in Chapter 5, this presents a state-based organisation such as the UN with particular challenges. One of the points to be made here in the conclusion is, however, to underline that the UN bureaucracy ‘knows’ this very well. After twenty years of multidimensional operations in fragile situations, it has ‘learned’ that this is the complex reality which it has to navigate on the ground to build some kind of sustainable peace. The problem is translating this knowledge into practice.

If the past is anything to go by, it is to be expected that the challenges of moving from sound policies to effective action will only increase as the nature of violence becomes more amorphous and global power diffuses to emerging powers from the Global South, regional actors and non-state actors. This raises questions concerning both the normative underpinnings of multidimensional peace operations and operational arrangements in the field. It suggests that we may, in the near future, see the ambitious agenda for peace that was outlined in 1992 becoming increasingly more pragmatic and ‘realistic’. The focus may increasingly shift to ‘stabilisation’ as opposed to ‘emancipation’ or ‘transformation’. At the operational level, the diffusion of power suggests that the efforts to strengthen and improve ‘peacekeeping partnerships’ with regional organisations will continue and be further vitalised. It appears increasingly unrealistic to imagine a UN-led multidimensional peace operation that does not, in some way, depend on regional actors for political support and/or operational involvement. This, however, does not in itself suggest or imply that multidimensional UN-led peace operations will soon become a thing of the past. On the contrary, it may just as well be taken to underline the continued relevance of a truly
global framework for addressing those very thorny and complex threats to international peace and security for which no other international actors are able or willing to take responsibility. To paraphrase an old saying, if UN-led peace operations did not exist, they would have to be invented.
References


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**Annex 1. UN-led Peace Operations 1988-2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name (mandating SCR)</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Mandate</th>
<th>Maximum troops/Military Observers/Civilian Police</th>
<th>Chapter VII</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNGOMAP (622)</td>
<td>Afghanistan / Pakistan</td>
<td>May 1988 - Mar 1990</td>
<td>Assist in ensuring the implementation of the settlement agreements related to Afghanistan and in this context to monitor non-interference and non-intervention in each other's affairs by the parties, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the return of refugees.</td>
<td>50/-/-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIMOG (619)</td>
<td>Iran / Iraq</td>
<td>Aug 1988 - Feb 1991</td>
<td>Verify, confirm, and supervise the cease-fire and the withdrawal of all forces the internationally recognized boundaries, pending a comprehensive settlement.</td>
<td>-/400/-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAVEM I (626)</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Dec 1988 - May 1991</td>
<td>Verify withdrawal of Cuban troops.</td>
<td>-/70/-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAG (632)</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>Apr 1989 - Mar 1990</td>
<td>Support free and fair elections.</td>
<td>4,493/-/1,500</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUCA (644)</td>
<td>Central America</td>
<td>Nov 1989 - Jan 1992</td>
<td>Verify compliance by the governments of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua in ceasing aid to irregular forces and insurrectionist movements in the region.</td>
<td>800/260/-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIKOM (689, 806)</td>
<td>Iraq / Kuwait</td>
<td>Apr 1991 - Oct 2003</td>
<td>Monitor demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait, deter violations of the boundary, observe hostile actions between the two countries. In February 1993 the mandate was expanded to include capacity to take physical action to prevent violations.</td>
<td>933/254/-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINURSO (690)</td>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>Apr 1991 -</td>
<td>Monitor ceasefire between Morocco and Frente POLISARIO, organize referendum to decide territory's future status.</td>
<td>183/202/26</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAVEM II (696)</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>May 1991 - Feb 1995</td>
<td>Verify peace agreement between government of Angola and UNITA, monitor ceasefire and Angolan police, observe and verify elections.</td>
<td>-/171/122</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUSAL (693, 729)</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Jul 1991 - Apr 1995</td>
<td>Verify implementation of all agreements between government of El Salvador and FMLN, including cease-fire, reduction of armed forces, new police force, judicial and electoral reforms and other economic and social reforms.</td>
<td>-/368/315</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIC (717)</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Oct 1991 - Mar 1992</td>
<td>Assist parties to maintain cease-fire prior to and during the deployment of UNTAC, and initiate mine-awareness training for civilians. Later the mandate was expanded to include a larger mine-training program.</td>
<td>1,090/-/-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR (743, 776, 795, 982)</td>
<td>Former Yugoslavia</td>
<td>Feb 1992 - Mar 1995</td>
<td>Initially established in Croatia to cover demilitarization of designated areas. Expanded to support delivery of humanitarian relief, monitor no-fly zones and safe areas in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Again expanded to preventive monitoring in border areas of Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.</td>
<td>38,332/684/803</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15 The table draws on Appendix I in Malone (2004). The update is based on information drawn from DPKO's website, including the 'Facts and Figures' pages for each operation (latest accessed July 2013). Operations in italics were ongoing at the time of writing.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name (mandating SRs)</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Mandate</th>
<th>Maximum troops/Military Observers/Civilian Police</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNTAC (745)</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Mar 1992 - Sep 1993</td>
<td>Ensure implementation of Paris Peace Accords, including human-rights monitoring, organization of elections, maintenance of law and order, repatriation and resettlement of refugees and IDP’s, rehabilitation of infrastructure.</td>
<td>15,991/ -/3,359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOSOM I (751)</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Apr 1992 - Mar 1993</td>
<td>Monitor cease-fire in Mogadishu, escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies. Extended to include protection of humanitarian convoys and distribution centers throughout Somalia. Later worked with UNITAF to establish safe environment for delivery of humanitarian assistance.</td>
<td>893/54/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUMOZ (797, 898)</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Dec 1992 - Dec 1994</td>
<td>Help implement general peace agreement, monitor cease-fire and withdrawal of foreign troops, provide security in transport corridors, provide technical assistance, monitor electoral process.</td>
<td>6,576/-/1,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMUR (846)</td>
<td>Rwanda / Uganda</td>
<td>Jun 1993 - Sep 1994</td>
<td>Monitor border between Rwanda and Uganda, verify that no military assistance provided across it.</td>
<td>-/-80/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMIG (849,858)</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Aug 1993 - Jun 2009</td>
<td>Verify compliance with cease-fire agreement between government of Georgia and Abkhaz authorities. Mandate expanded after signing of agreement between parties in 1994 on e.g. separation of forces</td>
<td>-/-134/16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMIL (866)</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Sep 1993 - Sep 1997</td>
<td>Exercise good offices in support of ECOWAS efforts to implement peace agreement, investigate alleged cease-fire violations, assist in demobilization of combatants, support humanitarian assistance and investigate human rights violations.</td>
<td>65/260/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIH (867)</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Sep 1993 - Jun 1996</td>
<td>Help implement provision of the Governor’s Island Agreement. Mandated later expanded to include assisting the democratic government in various peace, stability and electoral tasks.</td>
<td>6,000/-/850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIR (872)</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Oct 1993 - Mar 1996</td>
<td>Help implement peace agreement. Mandate was later extended a number of times in response to various events related to the genocide and the changing situation.</td>
<td>5,147/295/80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNASOG (915)</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>May 1994 - Jun 1994</td>
<td>Verify withdrawal of Libyan administration and forces from the Aouzou strip in accordance with ICJ decision.</td>
<td>-/9/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOT (968,1138)</td>
<td>India / Pakistan</td>
<td>Dec 1994 - May 2000</td>
<td>Monitor cease-fire agreement between governments of Tajikistan and United Tajik Opposition. Mandate expanded to help monitor implementation of 1997 peace agreement.</td>
<td>-/40/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name (mandating SCRs)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCRO (981)</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Mar 1995 - Jan 1996</td>
<td>Replacing UNPROFOR in Croatia. Perform functions envisaged in 1994 cease-fire agreement, facilitate implementation of economic agreement, monitor borders, facilitate humanitarian assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina through Croatian territory, monitor demilitarization of Prevlaka Peninsula.</td>
<td>6,581/290/296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPREDEP (983)</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
<td>Mar 1995 - Feb 1999</td>
<td>Monitor and report from border areas.</td>
<td>1,120/35/26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIBH (1035)</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Dec 1995 - Dec 2002</td>
<td>Law enforcement activities and police reform, as well as coordinate other UN activities in the country, e.g., humanitarian relief, refugees, demining, human rights, elections and economic reconstruction.</td>
<td>3/-/2,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAES (1037)</td>
<td>Eastern Slovenia</td>
<td>Jan 1996 - Jan 1998</td>
<td>Supervise and facilitate demilitarization, monitor return of refugees, contribute to maintenance of peace and security, establish temporary police force, undertake tasks related to civil administration and public services, organize elections.</td>
<td>4,791/100/453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOP (1038)</td>
<td>Prevlaka Peninsula</td>
<td>Feb 1996 - Dec 2002</td>
<td>Monitor the demilitarization of the Prevlaka Peninsula.</td>
<td>-/28/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSMIH (1063)</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>July 1996 - July 1997</td>
<td>Assist GoH in professionalization of the police and the maintenance of peace and security.</td>
<td>1,287/-/267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUGUA (1094)</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Jan 1997 - May 1997</td>
<td>Verify ceasefire agreement.</td>
<td>-/132/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUA (1118)</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>June 1997 - Feb 1999</td>
<td>Assist in consolidating peace and reconciliation.</td>
<td>3,026/253/361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTMIH (1123)</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Aug 1997 - Nov 1997</td>
<td>Assist GoH in the professionalization of the Haitian National Police.</td>
<td>1/-/156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIPOHUH (1141)</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Dec 1997 - Mar 2000</td>
<td>Assist GoH in the professionalization of the Haitian National Police.</td>
<td>1/-/284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMSIL (1181)</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>July 1998 - Oct. 1999</td>
<td>Monitor military and political situation, disarmament and demobilization, assist in monitoring respect for international law.</td>
<td>1/192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK (1244)</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>June 1999</td>
<td>Establish an interim civilian administration that performs the whole spectrum of essential administrative functions and services. Following declaration of independence in 2008 and handover of peace-building, judicial and capacity-building activities to EU, the mandate and configuration of UNMIK has been modified / reduced.</td>
<td>-/37/4,519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMET (1246)</td>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>June 1999 - Sep. 1999</td>
<td>Organize and conduct referendum.</td>
<td>-/50/271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMSIL (1270, 1289)</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Oct. 1999 - Dec. 2005</td>
<td>Originally DDR. In 2000 mandate revised to include provision of security at key locations, including all sites of DDR program and facilitation of free flow of people, goods and humanitarian assistance.</td>
<td>17,105/261/54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAET (1272)</td>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>Oct. 1999 - May 2002</td>
<td>Administer the territory and exercise legislative and executive authority.</td>
<td>8,950/200/1640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC (1279)</td>
<td>Dem. Republic of Congo</td>
<td>Nov 1999 - May 2010</td>
<td>Monitor implementation of ceasefire agreement, investigate violations, facilitate humanitarian assistance, demining.</td>
<td>18,653/760/391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMEE (1312, 1430)</td>
<td>Ethiopia-Eritrea</td>
<td>July 2000 - July 2008</td>
<td>Establish a mechanism for verifying the ceasefire.</td>
<td>3,940/219/240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIEET (1410)</td>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>May 2002 - May 2005</td>
<td>Provide assistance to core administrative structures, provide interim law enforcement and public security.</td>
<td>3,742/111/730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUCI (1479)</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>May 2003 - Apr. 2004</td>
<td>Facilitate implementation of peace agreement.</td>
<td>-/25/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL (1509)</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Sep. 2003 -</td>
<td>Support the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and peace process, protect UN staff, facilities and civilians, support humanitarian and human rights activities; assist in national security reform. Mandate amended in 2012, tasks now are to assist government in consolidation of peace and stability, and to protect civilians.</td>
<td>14,750/250/1,495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCI (1528 and 1709 )</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>Apr. 2004</td>
<td>Monitor cessation of hostilities and movements of armed groups, support DDR and SSR, electoral support, protect UN personnel, monitor arms embargoes, support humanitarian assistance.</td>
<td>8,539/200/1502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH (1542)</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>June 2004</td>
<td>Ensure a secure and stable environment, assist in police reform and DDR, protect UN personnel and civilians under imminent threat, support the constitutional and political process, electoral assistance, promote human rights. Following earthquake of 2010, the mandate was expanded to include relief and support activities in relation to the disaster.</td>
<td>7,036/-/-/2630</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>ONUB</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>June 2004 - Dec 2006</td>
<td>Ensure respect of ceasefire agreements, carry out and monitor disarmament and demobilization, electoral support, protect UN personnel, support border monitoring and security-sector reform.</td>
<td>5,400/168/97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIS (1590)</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Mar 2005 - Jul 2011</td>
<td>Support implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement, monitor and verify ceasefire agreement, assist in DDR, support police reforms, rule of law, human rights protection, protect UN personnel. Mandate expanded in August 2006 to cover implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (observe and monitor).</td>
<td>9,304/598/702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIT (1704)</td>
<td>Timor-Leste (East Timor)</td>
<td>Aug 2006 - Dec 2012</td>
<td>Support government to consolidate stability, support electoral process, ensure restoration and maintenance of public security, support security sector reform, facilitate provision of relief and recovery assistance.</td>
<td>-/33/1,641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIL (425, 426 and 1701)</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>[Mar 1978] Aug 2006 -</td>
<td>Monitor cessation of hostilities, accompany and support Lebanese armed forces deploy throughout the South, help ensure humanitarian access.</td>
<td>13,251/-/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMID (1769)</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>July 2007 -</td>
<td>Protection of civilians, provide security for humanitarian efforts, monitor and verify implementation of agreements, assist in creating inclusive political process, promote rule of law and human rights, and monitor and report from the border areas.</td>
<td>14,085/342/4,721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINURCAT (1778)</td>
<td>Central African Republic/Chad</td>
<td>Sep 2007 - Dec 2010</td>
<td>Protection of civilians, promote human rights, rule of law and regional peace.</td>
<td>3,531/24/259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUSCO (1925, 2098)</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>Jul 2010 -</td>
<td>Took over from MONUC — original mandate included protection of civilians and humanitarian personnel and support the government in its stabilization and peace consolidation efforts. The mandate was on an exceptional basis expanded in March 2013 to include an intervention brigade tasked with fighting Congolese rebel groups.</td>
<td>17,260/516/1,416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNISFA (1990)</td>
<td>Disputed area of Abyei, Sudan</td>
<td>Jun 2011 -</td>
<td>Monitor the border area, authorized to use force to protect civilians and humanitarian workers.</td>
<td>3,829/113/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMISS (1996)</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Jul 2011 -</td>
<td>Support peace consolidation and state-building efforts, support government of South Sudan in conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution, in protecting civilians, and in developing security and judicial capacity.</td>
<td>6,806/146/649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSMIS (2043)</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Apr 2012 - Aug 2012</td>
<td>Monitor cessation of violence, and monitor and support the implementation of the envoy's six-point plan.</td>
<td>-297/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSMA (2100)</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Apr 2013 -</td>
<td>Stabilize key population centres, support the reestablishment of state authority, support implementation of transitional roadmap, protection of civilians and UN personnel, promotion and protection of human rights, support for humanitarian assistance, cultural preservation and justice.</td>
<td>11,200/-1,440</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16 UNIFIL was established in 1978 to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon and to assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area (Resolutions 425 and 426). The mandate and size of the operation was substantially expanded in 2006 and is therefore included in the table.