DIIS REPORT

DANISH INTERESTS IN REGIONAL SECURITY INSTITUTIONS IN EAST AFRICA

Katja L. Jacobsen and Johannes R. Nordby

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Abstract

For the past decade peace and security in East Africa have gained increasing focus internationally. The region has experienced armed conflicts, civil wars, rebellion, drought and famine. Yet, at the same time, there is also an emerging ambition among a number of African states to handle security issues on the continent independently. Such ambitions have fostered a variety of military capacity building programmes supported by external donors. This report explores how Denmark up until now has sought to contribute to strengthening political and military security in East Africa. This has mainly been done through capacity building projects anchored in different regional security institutions. The report illuminates some of the risks that such capacity building projects might confront. Furthermore the report also points out some of the challenges that exist in the cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark and the Danish Ministry of Defence. Finally, the concluding section of the report discusses some lessons learned and presents some considerations for future capacity building programmes in Africa.
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<th>Description</th>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
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<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Forces</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>CEWARN</td>
<td>Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism</td>
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<td>CEWS</td>
<td>Continental Early Warning System</td>
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<tr>
<td>CGCC</td>
<td>Centre on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<td>EACWARN</td>
<td>EAC Early Warning Mechanisms</td>
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<td>EASF</td>
<td>East African Standby Force</td>
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<td>EASBRIG</td>
<td>East African Standby Brigade</td>
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<td>ECOWARN</td>
<td>Early Warning and Response Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EMP</td>
<td>Ecole de Maintien de la Paix</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>ICPAT</td>
<td>IGAD Capacity Building Programme against Terrorism</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>IGADD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPSTC</td>
<td>International Peace Support Training Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>KAIPTC</td>
<td>The Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>NACS</td>
<td>Nordic Advisory and Coordination Staff</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<td>ONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Organization in the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDC</td>
<td>Rapid Deployment Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPTC</td>
<td>Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSF</td>
<td>Regional Standby Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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Danish contributions mentioned in the report

Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre in Zimbabwe: 20 million DKK from 1997-2000. A new 50 million DKK donation was arranged in 2000 but later cancelled.


The Global Framework: Annual funding of 150 million DKK provided since 2009. The following projects were either planned or initiated in 2011:

- 103 million DKK for counter piracy and the stabilisation of Somalia. This funding is mainly used to support the UN Governance, Security and Rule of Law Programme in Somalia (45 million DKK) and to support capacity building of the Kenyan and Djiboutian Navy (48 million DKK).


- 26 million DKK for the development of rapid deployment capability in Rwanda.

Intergovernmental Authority on Development: From 2010 to 2013 Denmark has donated 42.5 million DKK to IGAD within the Global Framework

The East African Community: In 2007 EAC received Danish 7 million DKK in funding. In November 2011, a three-year agreement of 160 million DKK was made.
East Africa

Sudan

South Sudan

Eritrea

Djibouti

Ethiopia

Somalia

Uganda

Kenya

Rwanda

Burundi

Tanzania

Seychelles

Comoros

Madagascar

Mauritius

Indian Ocean

Read Sea
I. Introduction

This introductory section has two parts, each of which presents an important contextual aspect of the topic addressed in this report, namely Danish interests in regional security institutions in East Africa. The first part briefly introduces the relatively short history of Danish military engagements in Africa and the Danish policy context surrounding these engagements. The second part looks at the African context, more specifically, at the overarching African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) within which East African security institutions must be placed and understood. The section ends with a brief introduction to the region. Each of the following three sections of the report will present three different regional security institutions: the East African Standby Force (EASF), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the East African Community (EAC). The last two sections of the report provide a comparative analysis and, finally, a set of concluding remarks about Danish engagements in the region in relation to three aforementioned security institutions.

The findings in this report are based on interviews conducted in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Djibouti and Ethiopia with various representatives from each of the three security institutions that are the focus of this report as well as with officials at national policy level, with academic experts from the region and with staff at the Royal Danish Embassies in Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Uganda. We also conducted interviews with staff at the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and at the Danish Ministry of Defence.

Danish Military Engagements in Africa

Since the early 1960s the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has engaged in various development ventures ranging from the provision of clean water to diverse agricultural projects and assistance to local schools (Friis Bach et al. 2008). However, it is only more recently that the Danish Ministry of Defence has begun to focus on Africa as an area of interest in addition to participating in UN mandated operations. In 2000 a shift from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU) was interpreted as a sign that African states wanted to become more involved in handling security challenges on the continent (Besada 2012:17). The Danish government decided to support this goal by adding a focus on military capacity building to the traditional focus on development assistance.
Prior to this Danish-led engagement in defence projects in Africa, Danish military engagement in internationally-led projects related to peace and security in Africa can be traced back to the United Nations’ Operation in the Congo (ONUC) from 1960-1964, which was also the first UN peacekeeping operation in Africa. Denmark has since contributed to various UN missions in Africa.

In the 1990s, however, Denmark began to consider embarking on an engagement with military capacity building in Africa. In 1997 Denmark supported the development of a Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in Zimbabwe that had been tasked by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) with coordinating peacekeeping training in the region of Southern Africa. From 1997 to 2000 Denmark contributed 20 million DKK to this project as well as to the construction of the training centre. A new donation of 50 million DKK was agreed upon in 2000. Most of this, however, was cancelled as Denmark, in line with the responses of other donors, decided to withdraw from the RPTC in Zimbabwe by January 2002 due to the domestic political situation in Zimbabwe (Daniel 2008:104). Until then, the RPTC had trained more than 500 military observers and the Danish withdrawal was a severe setback for the centre (APSTA 2008). The Danish decision to withdraw was based on the deteriorating political situation in Zimbabwe combined with concerns over the administrative structure of the centre. In 2004 the RPTC was placed under the secretariat of SADC and operational costs were now to be paid by SADC. This change meant that the institutional control of the training centre was now placed within an institution comprised of several countries in the region rather than solely of Zimbabwe. In this way, a critical institutional uncertainty was removed; nevertheless, Denmark did not restart its funding since, in the meantime, the focus of Danish policy had started shifting to East Africa.

The RPTC in Zimbabwe was the first Danish attempt to assist in military capacity building in Africa on a larger scale. This arrangement, which used Danish military personnel and was funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, can been regarded as a predecessor to the ensuing Africa Programme for Peace.

An agreement was made for the Africa Programme for Peace to run from 2004-2009 with a budget of 248 million DKK (Danish Government, 2007). Its main purpose was to fund peace and security projects in Africa within the AU as well as within the framework of the following security institutions in three different regions: the IGAD in East Africa, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in West
Africa and SADC in Southern Africa. One of the goals of the programme was to include the Danish Defence Forces in regional peace and security projects. Initially, however, the Danish Defence Forces only focused on Africa to a limited extent due to the amount of resources being spent on Danish participation in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the Africa Programme for Peace initiated two major programmes that did involve the Danish Defence Forces, namely the *Ecole de Maintien de la Paix* (EMP) in Bamako, Mali, and the East African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) in Nairobi.

Danish participation in the EMP project began in 2005 when France approached Denmark to investigate the possibility for Danish support of the EMP in Mali. The overarching aim of the EMP was to train personnel to participate in peace support operations led by the UN, AU or a regional institution. In 2006 Denmark initiated its support for this project through the Africa for Peace Programme by granting approximately 3.7 million DKK over a two-year period. As part of this project, the Danish Defence Force deployed a military advisor to Bamako to serve as a trainer and consultant and to locate future projects which might be supported by Denmark. The programme was later extended until 2009.

Also within the Africa Programme for Peace, Denmark began supporting EASBRIG in 2006. To strengthen the development of the regional Brigade – later the EASF – a Danish military advisor was assigned to the Standby Force in 2008. Danish support for EASF continues and has been further developed.

Outside the framework of the Africa Programme for Peace, Danish Defence has been involved in two operations in East Africa, both concerned with piracy off the Horn of Africa. The first operation involved the deployment of the Danish patrol vessel *Thetis*, which was tasked with escorting merchant ships loaded with UN World Food Programme aid being shipped from Mombasa to Mogadishu in 2008. Later that same year, Denmark stepped up its involvement by providing a warship for the anti-piracy operation in the Indian Ocean, an undertaking which is still ongoing.

In 2010 a new Danish defence agreement entered into force. Alongside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Whole of Government Stabilisation Programme (2010), this new defence agreement entailed a closer level of cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence. With the new defence framework and the whole-of-government approach, a new overarching policy mechanism was defined.
named The Global Framework, or Globalrammen in Danish. The Global Framework is funded with 150 million DKK annually, half of which is paid by the Ministry of Defence and the other half by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At present, funding for peace and stability projects is now drawn from Global Framework. Tasked with the administration of this Global Framework, a Peace and Stabilisation Fund was created in 2011 as an inter-ministerial institution with a specific focus on East Africa and Afghanistan/Pakistan.

**The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)**

The emergence of APSA was a result of a transformation of the OAU into the AU. With APSA followed the establishment of five standby forces in Africa and the integration of the regional institutions into a security framework. For East Africa this meant the establishment of EASBRIG, later EASF, and including IGAD and EAC into the security architecture.

One of the most prominent issues for AU and its Peace and Security Council (PSC) is the ability to decide on security matters without approval or consultation with the UN Security Council. There seems to be a customary behaviour in recognising the fact that the AU is able to act on its own. However, as pointed out by an EASF political advisor, in cases where the AU has acted without prior UN approval, the UN has subsequently provided its approval, an act that has proven to be crucial for the funding of the given operation. To meet its responsibilities (which range from foreseeing upcoming conflicts to conducting peace building, peacemaking and authorising peace support operations), the APSA has several mechanisms at its disposal, including the African Standby Forces (ASF) and the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS).¹

The idea behind the African Standby Force (ASF) is that a continental-wide standby force should have the ability to participate in different scenarios ranging from advisory roles to intervention in cases of grave breaches of human security, such as genocide or ethnic cleansing. The ASF is not intended to be deployed as a whole, i.e. with all five standby forces (one from each of Africa’s five regions) deployed simultaneously. Rather, the idea is to deploy the ASF as regional capabilities, either within their own region or between the five regions. In relation to this idea, the division of Africa into five regions is both an important and a problematic issue. Five ASF have been established and reflect a geographical division into North, East, South, West and Central Africa. The goal was to
relate the standby forces to the five regions, preferably within already establish Regional Economic Communities (REC). This kind of construction was possible for South, Central, and West Africa. In East Africa the establishment of the EASF was initially coordinated by IGAD, but currently EASF is based on a memorandum of understanding which is not anchored in a REC.

What is more, some countries fall within one of the five regions but are active members of an REC in a different region. Tanzania, which is an example of this, belongs to the region of East Africa but is an active member of SADC in Southern Africa. This membership is potentially problematic as it implies that Tanzania is only formally a member of EASF and makes no significant contributions to this regional standby force. This pattern of membership also exemplifies that the African regions are not isolated subareas, but that states act across these regions either by themselves or through their membership in institutions.

Table 1. Africa by regions\(^2\) as defined by AU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>North</th>
<th>East</th>
<th>Southern</th>
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<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Comoros</td>
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<td>Mauritius</td>
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<td>Rwanda</td>
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The aim of the AU’s CEWS is to provide adequate warning about upcoming conflicts and threats on the African continent based on the assumption that this can help prevent the escalation of conflicts. The functionality of CEWS is based on data collection, analysis, issue of early warnings and close coordination with early warning systems developed within the different REC. As was stressed during interviews in Addis Ababa, the most successful aspect of regional early warning systems has arguably been the Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN) in West Africa. In East Africa, IGAD’s Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) is also fairly developed, although its focus has mainly been on pastoral conflicts and other non-state security issues at the expense of other areas like suppression of minorities in other IGAD member countries. During interviews in Addis Ababa and Nairobi it was also pointed out that the high dependency on the regional early warning systems has meant that CEWS’ ability to collect information has been significantly constrained by the slow development of some of these regional early warning systems. AU’s CEWS can thus be regarded as playing more of a liaising role in that it retrieves data and analyses from early warning systems within the different RECs and issues warnings that are forwarded to the AU PSC.

East Africa: A dynamic and diverse region
An agreed definition of “East Africa” does not exist, but this report defines East Africa as: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. Consequently, when speaking about regional institutions, we are referring to the institutions in the region of East Africa, as distinct from the AU as a regional institution of a different kind. This definition stems from the fact that each of these states has a membership in one or more of the three regional security institutions described in this report. Two of these states – namely Uganda and Kenya – are members of all three institutions. At the other end of the spectrum, Comoros, Seychelles and South Sudan only have membership in one institution (Seychelles and Comoros in EASF and South Sudan in IGAD). The remaining seven countries have memberships in two of the three institutions. This divergent institutional membership is interesting because it illustrates the complexity of the environment in which these security institutions operate.

Besides this definitional issue, another crucial point about this diversity that will become clear throughout the report is that the three institutions have exceedingly
different approaches to the issue of how best to enhance regional security. This diversity illustrates how states and institutions in the region differ considerably in their perception of security, including their understanding of what issues in the region represent the most pertinent threats and what their ideas about how best to overcome such threats are. This divergence in perceptions of security and threats is reflected in the three institutions this report describes: IGAD, EAC, and EASF.
2. The East African Standby Force (EASF)

Fact box

Established: 2004
Member states: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda
Headquarters: Nairobi, Kenya
Decision-making organ: Heads of States

Institutional history and structure
The EASF – formerly known as EASBRIG – was established in February 2004. IGAD was initially mandated to coordinate and initiate the establishment of EASF. At first it seemed obvious to have IGAD serve as the initiating institution since IGAD is the regional institution which – in terms of members – covers the majority of states in East Africa. Yet, it nevertheless proved impossible to reach a permanent agreement on integrating EASBRIG/EASF into an IGAD structure. Interviews in both Ethiopia and Kenya stressed that one of the main reasons for this was the issue of Ethiopian dominance in IGAD, which caused Kenya and other countries to oppose the suggestion that a strong military structure be embedded within IGAD. Instead, the EASF is now based on a memorandum of understanding written to ensure the necessary legitimacy and balance between members of the EASF.

Presently, this construction, however, means that the EASF is not anchored within a REC as initially intended. In an effort to compensate for this lack of institutional anchorage, ministers of defence as well as heads of the armed forces from the region meet regularly in EASF forums. The current practice is such that heads of state hold a summit every other year. However, EASF does not – as in the case of IGAD and EAC – have a permanent forum where foreign ministers meet regularly. Within the APSA, foreign ministers are commonly regarded as representing the highest institutional level; within the AU and REC, meetings at this level are conducted on a regular basis. Currently, EASF does not have an institutionalised foreign minister level, and this absence implies two things. One is that EASF cannot play the same political role in the region as can institutions like EAC and IGAD. Another thing is the aforementioned lack of clarity about EASF’s
answerability. Whereas many RECs in other regions in Africa have their own equivalent of a PSC that can negotiate when and how to deploy the Regional Standby Force (RSF) and serve as the political link to the AU, the EASF does not belong to a REC with a recognised PSC and consequently a mandate to deploy the EASF can only come from the AU or, alternatively, from a “coalition of the willing”. The EASF can, of course, still be deployed as an RSF, but this would require a consensus decision by all member states.

That said, the structural problems of placing the EASF within an REC in East Africa should not overshadow the success that the EASF has gained as an RSF. The EASF has conducted exercises both at staff level and with troops. In addition to these results in the area of capacity building, it must also be stressed that EASF has proven capable of serving another important role, namely as a much needed forum where the heads of the national armed forces can meet, talk and negotiate on a regular basis. It was pointed out in interviews at the EASF that this function is essential in a region where the military and the political level are closely related in an environment characterised by mistrust. Activities such as multi-national meetings, discussions and exercises between the different militaries in the region make an important contribution to the reduction of mistrust and the EASF is the only security institution in East Africa where such activities are carried out. Consequently, the EASF serves as the only security institution which contributes to an important dialogue on the political-military level within the whole region.

Project portfolio
The construction of the EASF is based on generic scenarios of situations in which the standby force could potentially be deployed. Overall there are six different scenarios which range from low level to high-end conflicts. The idea behind the EASF is that rather than having forces allocated permanently, this is instead done through a pre-defined structure where states allocate forces and from which EASF can subsequently request to have forces deployed.

Up until now, the Danish support for the EASF has mainly focused on the military part of EASF and involved providing military advisors, support for exercises and training and support for the RDC project in Rwanda. However, the EASF also has police and civilian components. The overall idea of having these two components is that during and after the eruption of conflict, there is often a critical need for ensuring law and order as well as the rebuilding of key components of a society. Danish support of the civilian component has comprised funding for training and education, mainly
at regional schools like the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) in Nairobi. By doing so Denmark has not only supported the training with EASF but also contributed to the regional training structure instead of using Danish training institutions. In the past few years, these police and civilian components have become an increasingly more integrated part of EASF which arguably reflects the great emphasis the AU places on the development of these police and civilian components and how this is now increasingly being institutionalised within ASF structures.

Furthermore, it has recently been decided to establish an early warning system within the EASF – a system that will ultimately exist alongside and parallel to the early warning systems that have already been developed within IGAD and within EAC. The EASF early warning system uses the same tools and software that are being used by the other regional early warning systems and, accordingly, it is questionable whether EASF’s early warning system will be able to deliver any additional information. It could be argued that EASF, to some extent, is “copying” systems that already exist and duplicating efforts. From a Danish perspective, it therefore becomes important to ask whether Denmark should support the establishment of an early warning system within the framework of the EASF. If Denmark wants to support a regional warning system focusing on one of the existing systems in IGAD or EAC might produce better results than supporting the development of a competing early warning system. This would also enforce the approach that Denmark does not favour one regional institution over another.

**Danish support and Friends of EASF**

The success of the EASF depends on funding and support. The daily expenses generated by the Standby Force are covered by the member states. Donors, however, normally fund exercises or other activities conducted by the Standby Force. Denmark has contributed to the funding of such activities. Denmark has allocated 15 million DKK to support the development of the EASF from 2011-2014. This funding may be used for a variety of activities, including exercises, courses, training and support for staff officers deployed to the current African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The support is coordinated within the group called Friends of EASF, which consists of a number of countries, including Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, the UK, the US and the Nordic countries. In addition to this, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Iceland and Norway have created the Nordic Advisory and Coordination Staff (NACS) in order to forge a Scandinavian approach to the EASF (MoD, November 2012). Denmark, Norway, and Finland have each taken a leading role, Denmark on the land component, Norway the maritime component, and Finland in the area of peace support courses and training.
Cooperation within NACS, however, still faces some important challenges as each nation continues to give donations to the EASF on a bilateral basis. As a result, NACS primarily serves as a coordination forum among the Nordic states. This coordination role has proven valuable in, for example providing education, support and the ability to find joint solutions. When deciding on bigger multilateral projects, on the other hand, the different countries’ regulations and decision processes often result prolonging the decision about what projects can be supported.

Military advice, strategic sealift, military education and the Kenya Navy
Since 2008 Denmark has had at least one military advisor at the EASF headquarters in Nairobi and since 2009 Denmark has provided support to the EASF during four major exercises, including the EASF’s first major exercise, where Denmark provided the 1,500 participating soldiers with a strategic sealift to move equipment from Sudan and Kenya to Djibouti (Nielsen 2009). Most recently Denmark has supported the EASF with training in command and control of maritime forces during search and rescue operations. Within the Global Framework Programme 2011-2014 Denmark has allocated 15 million DDK for capacity building in EASF and an additional 26 million DKK for the development of a rapid deployment capability (RDC) in Rwanda within the EASF framework. Furthermore Denmark has allocated 25 million DKK to the trust fund of the current AMISOM. Combined with other minor expenses, Denmark’s support for regional stability and regional capacity building in East Africa from 2011-2014 amounts to approximately 70 million DKK. In addition to supporting the EASF and the RDC in Rwanda, the Global Framework Programme 2011-2014 also allocates 103 million DKK to counter piracy and promote the stabilisation of Somalia. This allocation is mainly used to fund projects within two areas: Support of the UN Governance, Security and Rule of Law Programme in Somalia (45 million DKK) and capacity building in the Kenyan and Djiboutian Navies (48 million DKK). The latter involves Danish defence forces and is the largest single sub-component programme in the Global Framework Programme for the Wider Horn of Africa/East Africa 2011-2014.

In December 2011 the Danish Ministry of Defence made an agreement with the Kenya Navy (Sørensen, 2011) that included three major programmes:

- Provision of technical support, equipment and training
- Donation of test equipment for ship engines
- Support for the development of coastal radar surveillance
The first programme has already been completed, while the second one is in its final stages and the third is still under negotiation. In addition Denmark has recently decided – in agreement with Kenyan authorities – to provide a maritime advisor to the Kenya Navy with the purpose of continuing a dialogue on future projects.

The second largest sub-component programme, namely the RDC in Rwanda, was initiated after Denmark and Rwanda signed a Memorandum of Understanding and Status of Forces Agreement in June 2012 with the purpose of having Denmark assist Rwanda in the development of RDC. The initial idea was to support the development of this RDC within the framework of a broad Nordic approach. Norway, Sweden and Finland, however, were not interested in supporting the Rwandan RDC project. Their scepticism was mainly due to Rwanda’s past as well as Rwanda’s unclear role in the current unrest in neighbouring DRC. Denmark thus ended up engaging in the project as the leading donor nation, though with political support from the UK and the US.

The aim of an RDC is to have a capability that allows the deployment of a battalion-size unit under EASF and the AU. The idea is that the EASF should have three RDCs available for rotation if the EASF were to be deployed for an extended period. With an RDC already established in Uganda and Kenya, Rwanda pledged to initiate the third RDC in the region and it was this, combined with a Danish focus on East Africa, which resulted in Denmark deciding in June 2012 to support the Rwandan RDC project. Only three months later, however, Denmark put the support on hold due to allegations (mainly from a UN report on the topic) that Rwanda was supporting the M23 rebels in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The purpose of this move was to send a political signal to the Rwandan government that Denmark did not approve of Rwanda’s behaviour in the DRC. The suspension of support, however, was not simultaneously explained diplomatically to Rwanda, consequently leading to a misunderstanding and mistrust from the Rwandese toward the Danish project.

Challenges

Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC)

Whether a suspension of the capacity-building project in Rwanda was the right decision has been (and still is) disputed. Although the RDC project in Rwanda in a certain sense rested within a regional framework insofar as the RDC was part of the EASF, the difficulties surrounding the decision to suspend the project arguably illustrate some of the complexities and risks involved when making bilateral agree-
ments. On the one hand, the political sensitivity surrounding the Rwandan RDC project was evident from the outset. One indication of this high level of political sensitivity is the fact that, apart from Denmark, no other Scandinavian country was willing to support this RDC project in Rwanda because of the high political risks involved. The Netherlands also declined to participate when approached by Denmark with an invitation to become a partner in the project. Denmark nevertheless decided to continue negotiations with Rwanda on the basis that establishing an RDC would be in line with the Danish African strategy. And although the original risk assessment of the RDC project was based on the assumption that the project would be carried out as a joint Scandinavian venture, Denmark eventually decided to take on the leading role when it embarked on the project, sharing the political risk with the UK and the US.

In addition to risks stemming from the political sensitivity surrounding the project, another challenge (which seems to have been disregarded when deciding to place the RDC in Rwanda) is the fact that Denmark does not have any diplomatic representation in Rwanda and Rwanda is not a priority country within Danish development cooperation. The absence of other Danish programmes in Rwanda meant that if/when the situation in Rwanda would change in ways that would contradict Danish values and interests, Denmark would neither have the option of suspending development aid nor the ability of having a close diplomatic dialogue as an alternative means of pressure. These shortcomings soon haunt Denmark. At a time when the UK and the US had responded to allegations of Rwandan involvement in the conflict in the DRC by suspending or cutting funding for aid or other projects, Denmark decided to suspend its support for the RDC project as there seemed to be no other way in which to send a political signal to the international community and the Rwandan authorities. However, the decision to suspend the project may have important implications. First, if Denmark decides to continue with the RDC project in Rwanda (the project was suspended rather than terminated), this might not be accepted by Rwanda as key actors may well have felt insulted by the suspension of Danish support. Second, there is a risk that Denmark’s reaction to the situation could reduce Danish credibility as a reliable partner in the region more broadly simply because of a failure to use diplomacy to explain the suspension.

In these ways, the Rwandan RDC project illustrates the need to not only make a thorough risk analysis, but also to assure that programmes are shared with other donors and that programmes have the necessary political support at all ministerial levels and include diplomatic representation. The case of the RDC project in Rwanda
illustrates that being the leading donor of a country-level project is perhaps more complicated if this is the only project that the donor runs in the country in question. Had the RDC been based on a broad Scandinavian approach, there would have been a greater range of options for sending the desired political signal.

Kenya Navy
The single biggest project that Denmark runs is with the Kenya Navy. Supporting the Kenya Navy involves many of the same potential challenges as the RDC project in Rwanda in the sense that Denmark can never be completely sure how the Kenya Navy will choose to use the capabilities donated to it. Can Denmark, for example, be sure that the Kenya Navy will not compromise the human rights of suspected pirates captured at sea? The answer to this is no, but the difference is that Denmark is far more willing to take the political risks involved in this project and at the same time has tighter diplomatic connections. Denmark has extradited pirates to the Kenyan authorities on different occasions and has for the past few years cooperated with Kenya on the issue of piracy. Put differently, Denmark prioritises, and is already involved in, anti-piracy efforts and consequently there is greater domestic political agreement that make running the potential risks involved in supporting capacity building of the Kenya Navy worthwhile.

Summary
The role of the EASF as a forum that contributes to the reduction of mistrust between key actors in the region must not be underestimated. The EASF is the only military security initiative in the region that includes every state in East Africa and where military leaders meet on a regular basis. Moreover, the EASF has also demonstrated an ability to work with donors to enable the conduct of training and exercises. The more blurry construction concerning the issue of how the EASF relates to the larger APSA is certainly important but should not overshadow these important achievements. EASF is the only regional military security initiative. The Danish political objective behind the decision to support the development of the EASF is that having an RSF will help contribute to strengthening security in the region. Denmark also sees the EASF as a facilitator for localising new bilateral security programmes. Taking support to military security from a regional to a bilateral level will, however, entail a number of dangers, such as the risk of supporting military capabilities with little control of how they might subsequently be used. US lessons from Mali exemplify this. Consequently, bilateral projects must be thoroughly considered and weighed against the various political risks involved.
3. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

Fact box

Established: 1996

Member states: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda

Headquarters: Djibouti City, Djibouti

Decision-making organ: The Assembly of Heads of State and Government, which has a rotating chairperson

Institutional history and structure

From 1974-1984 numerous droughts affected countries in the Horn of Africa with severe implications for populations in the region. Pressured by aid donors and international agencies (El-Affendi 2001:582), political leaders in the region acknowledged the need for a regional institution devoted to the prevention of drought. In 1986 an agreement was made between Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda to establish what became known as the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD). In 1996 a change in leadership in nearly all the founding IGADD countries (El-Affendi 2001:582-583) created a renewed interest in the institution and led to a change in its name from IGADD to IGAD – the Intergovernmental Authority on Development – which was intended to signal a revival of the institution (Healy 2011). Conflict prevention and resolution were now declared to be top priorities.

Part of the financial support that Denmark has provided to IGAD – handled by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs – has been earmarked to strengthening the institution’s secretariat (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark, 22.05.2012). Together with the European Union, Denmark is the largest financial partner contributing to the work of IGAD. Besides providing the secretariat with financial support, Denmark has also provided support for activities directed at “promoting peace and security in the region” (Africa Programme for Peace, Phase II 2009:3). Recently, a focus on
financial support for anti-terror activities has been added to the list of IGAD projects that Denmark funds.

**Project portfolio**

Since 2010 Denmark has provided 42.5 million DKR in financial support to IGAD within the framework of the Africa for Peace Programme. This funding has been used for various projects within the IGAD’s Peace & Security Division, such as the IGAD Capacity Building Programme against Terrorism (ICPAT) and the CEWARN secretariat.

*The Conflict Early Warning Response Mechanism (CEWARN)*

Denmark has provided financial support to IGAD’s CEWARN since 2005 and since 2008 it has supported the steering committee of CEWARN’s Rapid Response Fund. Currently, Denmark is the donor representative in the steering committee, a position it has held since 2011 (Embassy of Denmark, Addis Ababa, 07 March 2012). The objective of CEWARN is to help prevent the outbreak of violent conflict in the region by gathering, sharing and analysing information about potentially critical developments in order to anticipate and respond to such developments (Wulf & Debiel 2009). Besides member states, various NGOs also contribute information to the database. CEWARN is a key component of the AU’s APSA structure.

The information currently being shared illustrates how IGAD member states perceive the relationship between CEWARN and state sovereignty. Since its inception in 2002, CEWARN has mainly focused on cross-border pastoral conflicts as member states agree to the importance of curtailing cross-border conflicts when they might spread and affect sovereign state borders. Recent developments, however, suggest that this might be changing.

In September 2012 officials from IGAD member states convened in Kampala to launch the new CEWARN Post-2012 Conflict Early Warning and Response Framework. In contrast to the previous focus on pastoral conflicts, the new framework entails a greater degree of cooperation among member states on conflict prevention related to other types of conflicts. The proposed areas of cooperation in the new strategy include prevention of land and border disputes as well as conflicts driven by e.g. food insecurity, ethnic identity, political processes and elections. It remains to be seen whether IGAD will be able to translate these new areas of cooperation into a more comprehensive early warning system.
Speaking from an Ethiopian perspective, Ms Misseret Tilaye (Program Officer, Political Affairs IGAD Secretariat) points out that besides this launch of a new framework, another reason for optimism about the future of CEWARN is that the mechanism has had an important effect in terms of socialisation and confidence building. The latter refers to how CEWARN has contributed to the emergence of an enhanced level of mutual trust between heads of state, many of whom previously held one another in deep mutual mistrust. In that sense, CEWARN has the same effect on its members as EASF in terms of reducing the level of suspicion. As a result, finding ways to incorporate IGAD’s CEWARN and EASF’s early warning system (instead of having two competing systems) might be a favourable way ahead and a development that Denmark, as a major IGAD donor, would be in a position to push for. Such an integration of early warning systems in different regional institutions could also have the effect of incorporating Ethiopia more into the EASF than what is currently the case, and this might potentially serve as a way to recognise Ethiopia as a regional player in the context of the EASF, a forum where Ethiopia currently feels overlooked.

Anti-Terrorism

Through ICPAT, launched in 2006, IGAD coordinates anti-terror activities in the region. The ICPAT programme revolves around five core components: enhancement of judicial measures, training, focus on border control, sharing of information and best practices, and augmentation of interdepartmental cooperation. The objective of IGAD’s ICPAT is to provide a genuine approach to regional anti-terrorism that focuses on preventive and legal measures rather than the ad hoc military actions that have occurred thus far (Tavares 2010:53).

ICPAT arguably exemplifies how IGAD might have a comparative advantage to external actors. It can be said, for example that in terms of regional anti-terror efforts, IGAD has demonstrated the value of its ability to deliver important insights about the regional dynamics that have a bearing on terrorism in East Africa as well as on how to design appropriate solutions (Tavares 2010).

In May 2012 IGAD convened the First Annual Convention of Counter-Terrorism Practitioners in Eastern Africa. The event was made possible by support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark and the Centre on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (CGCC). The convention provided an opportunity for counter-terrorism practitioners from across the region and beyond to look at the possibility of developing joint responses to evolving threats in the region and to build a stronger professional counter-terrorism network. The ICPAT is the only project of its kind
framed in a regional institution. As a result, Danish support for this project does not add to the institutional competition in the region. However, if ICPAT develops beyond the level of holding meetings to include, for example initiatives aimed at sharing data and relevant information, thoroughly revisiting Danish support for ICPAT would be a necessity in order to determine whether such data sharing practices are in accordance with Danish norms and international law.

**Political affairs: Democracy projects**

From a Danish perspective, a report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs notes that IGAD also wishes to include good governance more generally in relation to the efforts being carried out within peace and security. An example of this is the endeavours of IGAD’s Political Affairs Office ("Africa Programme for Peace, phase 2" 2009:4). Within the Peace & Security Division, the Office of Political Affairs initiates projects which could potentially have important security effects in the long term. The Office is currently in the process of developing a common memorandum and a set of agreed principles about how democracy should be understood and practiced. The idea is that this will have a preventive function by providing a set of principles that states can then be held accountable for upholding (interview, IGAD Political Affairs Division, Djibouti 2012). Only once members arrive at an agreed set of principles about democratic governance can they be held accountable if they fail to adhere to these principles. This is an ambitious initiative. Yet, it must be said that currently only a few of IGAD’s member states are democracies. This democratic initiative may be an expression not only of an idealistic IGAD vision and a desire to influence its members to take a more democratic turn but also of a donor-friendly project likely to be endorsed by donors who share the same values. It remains to be seen whether the results of such democratic efforts can counter the criticism that IGAD suffers from a lack of region-wide commitment to democracy (El-Affendi 2001:597). With this recent initiative, it seems that IGAD has recognised the need to confront this criticism and to recognise it as a task that the institution must actively try to tackle.

From a Danish perspective, this and other democracy projects within the framework of IGAD become important when recalling the desire for a closer level of cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark and the Danish Ministry of Defence. As expressed in “The Global Framework” the idea is that closer collaboration – a whole-of-government approach – can create synergies between various aspects of Danish engagements. Regional democracy projects might potentially create synergies insofar as strengthening democratic structures in the region will contribute to strengthening the political framework within which military capacity building projects are anchored. And
this, in turn, may help reduce some of the risks that military capacity building projects entail if left without a strong political structure to regulate it.

**Challenges**

*Weak secretariat*

One concern that critics have voiced about IGAD is that its secretariat is fairly weak (e.g. Terlinden 2004). Currently, the secretariat has limited human resources, which inhibits its ability to carry out larger projects. This was stressed in an interview at the secretariat in Djibouti, where the Head of IGAD’s Political Affairs Division explained the difficulty of realising a large project with only one person in the office and with sporadic funding available. Current lack of staff and funding should not be mistaken for a lack of ambition on behalf of IGAD. Yet, a considerable gap exists between the laudable goals of the IGAD staff and the means available to see the realisation of these goals. As mentioned above, Denmark has provided support specifically earmarked for “capacity development of the IGAD Secretariat” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 21 October 2009). It remains to be seen whether this will help strengthen the secretariat sufficiently.

*Lack of member state ownership*

Whilst more external funding and support is necessary for IGAD to realise its ambitious projects, Dr Kasaija Philip Apuuli, Makerere University, Kampala, points out that donors should simultaneously push IGAD members to assume greater ownership and give greater priority to the institution.

*National interests*

One challenge to IGAD’s mediation efforts is the problem of too much involvement as states use the institution to pursue national interests (El-Affendi 2001; Hentz et al. 2009). It has been said, for example that, “IGAD is one of the few RECs where member states are still fighting each other” and that the implication of this controversy ends up, “defeating the purpose of this regional security mechanism” (Rupiya & Nhema 2008:807). Even IGAD staff recognises that it could become problematic if IGAD took on a more direct mediation role in Somalia (Interview, IGAD, Djibouti 2012). Due to the perception that IGAD is heavily influenced by Ethiopian interests, the concerned parties in Somalia would not be confident that IGAD could arrive at an unbiased result. In this sense, IGAD arguably confronts a situation where its members herald the institution as the superior regional mediator in cases where they
have an interest in resolving a conflict, while also using the institution as an instrument through which to pursue their own struggles for power and regional hegemony (El-Affendi 2001:595). In an institution where this struggle continues, funding must either attempt to circumnavigate or reduce the conflicts. For Denmark, supporting ICPAT has been a means of circumnavigation as the programme does not have any competing institutional counterparts in the region. Furthermore the support CEWARN receives can be seen as an attempt to reduce the competition between states via information sharing. These programmes seem to represent a Danish attempt to strengthen IGAD where the coherence is greatest.

Summary
When contemplating the criticism levelled against IGAD it must be understood against the backdrop of an institution that, from its very inception, has been tasked with coordinating the settlement of conflicts and other security challenges of a particularly difficult nature that other institutions may also very well have failed to resolve. Despite severe criticism, there are examples of positive outcomes that IGAD has contributed to. The fact that IGAD helped push for a resolution of the situation in Somalia and played its part in establishing what later came to be an AU mission (AMISOM), is not only a sign of the influence of Ethiopia but also a sign of IGAD’s ability to bring different conflicting parties to the table – an achievement which should be valued, as should the institution’s in-depth knowledge of the dynamics that affect and play out in the various conflicts in the region. Nevertheless, it must at the same time be noted that donor support alone cannot move the institution forward to the necessary extent. For the institution to become capable of preventing the escalation of conflicts in the region and of contributing to the resolution of old as well as new threats, greater engagement and commitment by IGAD member states will be required.
4. The East African Community (EAC)

**Fact box**

*Established:* 2001  
*Member states:* Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda  
*Headquarters:* Arusha, Tanzania  
*Main decision-making organ:* The Council of Ministers is the main decision making body of the EAC

**Institutional history and structure**

The first initiative to establish a monetary union in East Africa was taken in 1967, but already the institution already collapsed ten years later (Mugomba 1978; Hazlewood 1979). In 1999 a new initiative to form a regional economic community in East Africa emerged, following ratification by the original three partner states – Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania in 2000. Rwanda and Burundi became full members in 2007 (EAC Council Decision). Somalia and South Sudan have recently applied for membership, but the EAC has recently decided to reject their applications. The hope is that the present EAC Treaty will provide not only an appropriate response for economic development and competitiveness considering the globalisation of trade and transnational corporations, but that it will also help foster regional peace and security.

Thus far, Danish interest in the EAC has focused on the financial aspects of the institution as Denmark has provided financial support to facilitate the role of EAC as a driver of regional economic integration. In 2007 EAC received Danish funding worth 7 million DKK to strengthen the EAC integration process (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 2007:25). And in November 2011, a three-year agreement worth 160 million DKK was made. This strategy of supporting regional integration is related to security based on the belief that regional integration can contribute to making East Africa a stronger and more stable region. Indeed, “regional integration is a part of Danida’s overall strategy for development” (The Royal Danish Embassy in Tanzania).
However, EAC is not only an economic institution. EAC also has defence and security aspects (Articles 124 and 125, EAC Treaty) and as the institution develops and grows stronger, so too might its ambitions in the realm of security. The following will focus on these features of the EAC in order to address issues such as how they might affect Danish interests in and funding of security projects in the region.

**Project portfolio**

The EAC envisions a four-step progress plan (from customs union, to common market, to monetary union, and to political federation), which reflects a central idea about how genuine cooperation among states can eventually transform these states and their relations with positive implications for security in the region. Since its establishment the EAC has accomplished a number of concrete initiatives. By 2005, EAC member states had established the EAC Customs Union and by 2012 the EAC Common Market had been established. The vision which EAC is now working toward is that its member states will enter into a monetary union, the ultimate aim of which is to become a political federation of East African states. Yet, regarding implementation at national level, there are still inadequacies that impede the process of domesticating the regional policies (interview, EAC Headquarters, Arusha 2012).

Regarding security, this development is significant insofar as economically driven cross-border engagements have had spill-over effects into the sphere of security. The electoral observation efforts of EAC are arguably one example of a project that illustrates how EAC member states are now economically interdependent to such a degree that they have a significant stake in one another’s stability. Most recently, EAC sent election observers to monitor the Kenya General Election in March 2013. The previous Kenyan general elections in December 2007 showed how a political crisis in one EAC country can negatively affect the economies of other members, both in terms of lost intra and extra-regional trade. From the perspective of the EAC, the link between economic measures that move the community toward a closer regional integration is thus almost inseparable from the issue of regional security.

From a Danish perspective it is worth noting that three of the five EAC members – namely Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda – are priority countries within Danish development aid programmes, in which emphasis is placed on providing support for e.g. business programmes and agriculture. The overall aim of Danish development aid to these three priority countries is to increase the state of human and economic security in each country and, over time, to assure self-sustainment. However, these Danish
development aid programmes make no significant mention of how programmes in these three countries might be linked to the broader aim of enhancing regional security. Denmark, for example has a long tradition of providing development assistance to Tanzania (measured in terms of funding, Tanzania is one of the three countries that receives the most development aid from Danish). Yet, at the same time, the neighbouring countries of Rwanda and Burundi are some of the most highly populated areas in Africa, causing significant economic and social problems in each of these countries. In relation to the EAC vision of free movement between member states, Tanzania fears that over time migration from Burundi and Rwanda will result in competition for land in Tanzania. Denmark has decided not to include Burundi and Rwanda as priority countries and therefore has not redirected some of its funding, for example from Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda, to these countries even though some of the security challenges in the region might come from Burundi and Rwanda.

As such development aid in EAC countries does not seem to have an institutional approach even though some of the problems that confront priority countries as well as their neighbours have an important regional dimension. To integrate and support an overall security development in East Africa, Denmark could consider supporting the EAC project of regional integration and perhaps supporting the development of the regional economy in East Africa instead of focusing on individual countries. EAC could very well be the framework for such a support.

The EAC defence protocol and joint training exercises

Security and defence also have their own focus within the EAC. The final two paragraphs of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community are devoted to matters of security and defence, with Article 125: Defence providing for cooperation in defence affairs. In fulfilment of the Treaty provision that calls for developing a common defence policy, the heads of state eventually signed the EAC Protocol on Co-operation in Defence at a summit in Arusha, Tanzania on 28 April 2012. The summit directed that once the defence protocol had been ratified, negotiations on the mutual defence pact must begin immediately thereafter (Communiqué of the 10th Extraordinary Summit of EAC Heads of State). The EAC’s objective in the area of defence and security with this new protocol is to have the community function as a defence alliance comparable to Article 5 in the North Atlantic Treaty (Interviews, EAC Headquarters, Arusha 2012). Especially Tanzania, however, has been reluctant to approve of this protocol due to concerns that it remains unclear under what circumstances such a protocol can be activated. Considering these developments, the EAC is arguably in a formative moment concerning the establishment
of its role in defence. Moreover, from the perspective of prospective security projects and partnerships in the region, the EAC is becoming an increasingly more interesting regional player in the field of security and defence.

The first joint military exercise was held in Tanzania in 2005. Since then, five additional exercises have been conducted in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. In 2012 the military exercise was held in Rwanda for the first time. The focus of the exercise was on the evaluation of interoperability between the member states’ armed forces, on enhancing the readiness of these forces to respond to complex security challenges and on revalidating the EAC’s operating procedures for peace support operations, disaster management and counter terrorism as well as on testing the standing procedures on counter-piracy activities. The EAC stresses that the joint military exercises carried out under the auspices of the institution aim “to help [participants] in the planning and conduct of Peace Support Operations, Disaster Management, Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Piracy activities with the purpose of improving the capabilities of the partner states’ armed forces to combat complex security challenges” (East African News Agency 21 October 2012). In other words, the EAC has already made progress in matters related to defence and security.

This is a development that could have implications for Danish interests in and funding of security projects in the region for two main reasons. The first reason has to do with the issue of whether cooperation of this nature might become a competitive factor over time against the EASF? The second reason is that the experience gained from carrying out joint military exercises with other EAC member states derives not only from EAC exercises alone, but also from the countries’ participation in exercises within the framework of the EASF. Consequently, the EASF might be the originating platform for joint military cooperation within the EAC and Danish support for EASF might therefore indirectly and over time support the development of defence cooperation within the EAC. Similar effects can be expected with the present Danish support of the Kenya Navy and the Rwanda RDC.

EAC and early warning

Another EAC project is to institutionalise, “regional mechanisms and programmes for early warning and disaster preparedness” (EAC 4th Development Strategy 2011: 34). In March 2012 experts from EAC states held a meeting in Uganda aimed at adopting a roadmap for the operationalisation of the EAC Early Warning Mechanisms (EACWARN). The objective of the EAC’s early warning system is to anticipate and ensure early response to critical situations that are likely to affect peace and security
in the EAC Community. The EAC’s goal of developing its own early warning system becomes interesting from a Danish perspective in light of the support Denmark gives to EASF as it raises question about the extent to which they might become competitors or whether useful synergies can be developed between EACWARN and the new EASF early warning system.

**Challenges**

*Devolution of authority*

Even though the EAC has already made considerable steps to strengthen trade and cross-border investments between its member states, as well as having taken a number of initiatives in the security domain, the institution nonetheless still confronts a variety of significant challenges. One challenge is that there is too little devolution of power and authority to EAC organs. There are inadequate national level capacities to domesticate regional policies. This concern was raised in interviews with individuals on the donor-end of EAC relations who stressed that if, for example initiatives within the security sector were not fully supported by the EAC member states’ governments, it would have negative implications on the efficacy of donor resources in the security sector. A related challenge concerns decision-making procedures. As long as decision-making procedures are consensual, it remains difficult to make joint decisions and, ultimately, take collective action. A comprehensive institutional review has been carried out and there are on-going efforts to reform the decision-making procedures and to turn the secretariat into a commission with right of legislative initiative. Altering already established institutional settings, however, is a slow, difficult process.

*Overlapping membership*

Another critical issue for donors to think about is the issue of whether overlapping membership in different regional institutions might represent a challenge to the effectiveness of each institution (e.g. unhelpful levels of competition for funding and legitimacy). Some scholars have argued that the phenomenon of dual membership represents “a significant structural defect” that must be resolved (Rupiya & Nhema 2008:801). Yet, most of the people we interviewed stressed that IGAD and the EAC can work in synergy if they have their respective, well-defined niches to operate within. This issue is important for donors to be aware of as decisions to fund a specific project might feed into this dynamic.15
A risk-prone region
Despite progress there is still a great need to strengthen security in the region. Yet, when responding to this need, donors must also realise that doing so is not a risk-free enterprise. Whilst this is a general point about most defence projects in East Africa, the EAC is prone to specific risks stemming from its member state composition. One example is of when Rwanda’s Minister of Defence, James Kabarebe, was opening a joint EAC military field training exercise in Rwanda (New Times 19 October 2012) while simultaneously being accused by UN experts of being the de facto commander of militia in the DRC blamed for committing rape and other atrocities (The Guardian 18 October 2012). This case is just one instance, but all EAC member states (perhaps with the exception of Tanzania) have various issues with executive officers who are said to have been involved in actions that donors cannot readily accept.16

Such examples of controversial action clearly represent a paradox for external partners – including Danish defence and development – contemplating involvement in the defence and economic aspects of EAC. Even if one decides to establish a project within the framework of the EAC and thereby presenting it as a regional rather than a bilateral project, an important point to bear in mind – certainly in a region as troubled as East Africa – is the need to make sure that any project is anchored in a significantly broader multilateral framework with a shared approach to what level of risk a partner is willing to run and how such risk can then be managed in the best possible manner.

Summary
The EAC appears to be a strong institution that external partners could favourably engage with because the engagement and commitment that member states show would lessen the likelihood that it might simply become dependent and reliant on external support and, as such, lose its credibility in the eyes of local, regional as well as international actors. Yet, on the other hand, this promising aspect of the EAC must be weighed against the fact that the EAC member states are part of a troubled region in which the development of a number of conflicts might represent a risk to the involvement of external partners – and in which external partners might run a risk of contributing to increasing the potential north-south cleavage in the region. This point will be elaborated further in the comparative analysis that follows this section. In isolation, the EAC only has little capacity in the realm of military security. Instead, the EAC has its strength in that it is one of many tools available to improve economic security in the region – an improvement which may well have positive spill-over effects into the areas of security and broader stability in the region.
5. Comparative analysis

There are certain limitations to a straightforward comparison of the three institutions described in this report. From a Danish perspective, a comparison is nevertheless still useful, since it remains important to provide information about the political risks involved in deciding to prioritise supporting one rather than another of these regional security institutions. As a result this analysis explores what we refer to as four clusters of risks, namely a risk of duplication, risks that emerge when institutions are used as tools to pursue national interests, a risk of non-intervention and risks that stem from a set of complex relationships. The analysis ends with a donor perspective on risk.

Four clusters of risks

Risk of duplication: Who does what and why?
What becomes clear from this comparison is that in the realm of training, the three institutions all appear to have very similar ambitions that might lead to a situation in which donors need to be highly alert to the risk of duplication of efforts. This could occur, for example if IGAD received funding to build a separate civilian training centre when this is an activity that the EASF also wants to carry out – indeed, a training centre of this kind already exists outside of but in cooperation with EASF.17 Funding-related decisions by donors thus come down to being cautious of this situation to avoid funding a programme likely to duplicate an existing effort within a different institution. Making such decisions might entail having to decide upon which institution is believed to be most appropriate for the given project. Here, various arguments can be made. It could, for example, be said that IGAD should focus on the political level of mediating, negotiation and early warning as this is arguably where the institution has its main comparative advantage and that it therefore might be more appropriate to have training activities placed within the framework of the EASF. Yet, on the other hand, one could also argue that there might be problems related to having training projects anchored in the EASF given that this institution does not have the same political foundation as IGAD (or any other REC). In short, duplication, comparative advantage and institutional structure are some of the key issues that donors need to consider when contemplating whether and how to support specific training programmes. This, on the other hand, also means that countries like Denmark could approach the region through a multilateral institutional approach.
As shown, IGAD, EAC and EASF are regional institutions that represent three different security perspectives. For Denmark all three institutions encompass opportunities for different projects that can potentially contribute to stabilising and increasing security in the region. The more challenging question is how Denmark can support these different institutions in ways that will not increase institutional competition in the region in counterproductive ways. Both IGAD and EAC would like to expand into additional security areas and this could potentially entail a degree of overlap and produce duplication as well as fierce competition for funding. Although traditionally focused on drought and development, IGAD has placed increasingly more focus on peace and security issues since the beginning of the millennium, especially in the areas of early warning and anti-terror. Within the framework of the EAC, its member states have conducted a number of combined military exercises. At the same time, both IGAD and EAC have similar security structures, although these elements are arguably more developed within IGAD than within EAC. To further complicate this, EASF also has a nascent early warning system.

One issue that makes EASF important is the fact that the institution covers all the states in the region, including members of IGAD and EAC. Therefore, if the development of IGAD and EAC unfolds in ways that add to a division of the region into north and south, then EASF will be the only regional institution that can act as a bridge in matters concerning political and military security. In that role, the EASF can potentially become increasingly important as a forum where attempts are made to resolve disputes and conflicts before they break out. Insofar as EASF takes on such a role, EASF could well be a preferred institution for Denmark to support in situations where Denmark would like to support military security projects in East Africa within a region-wide institutional framework, given that EASF is the only military security institution in the region which enjoys region-wide legitimacy and membership. This does not mean Denmark should support every initiative within the EASF. For instance, the development of EASF’s early warning system can be seen as a result of a military-level desire for the institution to have its own early warning system instead of having to rely on those of IGAD or EAC. However, it can also be perceived as producing competition between two political levels insofar as it represents a duplication of the early warning systems already in place in AU, IGAD and EAC. As the EASF’s goals concerning an early warning system might also be viewed as an effort aimed at strengthening its political body, the early warning system is still a delicate matter as may turn into the political area in which the game of hegemony between Kenya and Ethiopia is played out. Accordingly, the EASF’s lack of a solid political position might also be one of its strengths and a situation which might be challenged in the years to come.
Institutions as instruments for pursuing national interests

Institutions in East Africa might be used as ‘tools’ through which specific states pursue their own national security projects ‘disguised’ as regional security. This dynamic represents a risk in the sense that donors might then (implicitly) support the national security agenda of a specific country, which is different from supporting a move toward regional security.

IGAD: Ethiopia and Kenya

For IGAD, the prevalence of this risk has been a problem it has confronted since its inception. Today the most important dynamics concerning this problem of states using the institution as a tool through which to pursue national security interests are the role of Ethiopia and to a lesser degree perhaps also Kenya (and Uganda vis-à-vis Somalia). The dynamics of the border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea have, for example made it difficult for IGAD to act as a neutral mediator in this longstanding conflict (Healy 2011:107). Similar asymmetrical patterns of influence have also been evident in the case of Sudan, where IGAD mediations broke down partly because IGAD’s role as a neutral mediator was called into question in relation to the influence of Ethiopia. Similarly, concerning the situation in Somalia, even IGAD staff admits that they doubt that IGAD is the right institution to resolve this conflict given Ethiopia’s major impact combined with its interest in a specific outcome.

Therefore, when supporting and strengthening military capacity in East Africa through the framework of IGAD, it is important to be aware of and make arrangements to avoid the potential risk that such capacity might be used to pursue the national interests of dominant states in the institution rather than to pursue genuinely regional security projects. Therefore the Danish approach towards IGAD that favours supporting projects that include all member states seems to be a sensible approach. Insofar that the Danish focus on the peace and security aspects of IGAD might increase in the years to come, a multilateral approach would only gain even greater resonance. Pushing IGAD to interact more with, for example EASF and its early warning system could be one of many possible approaches.

EAC: Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda

This risk might also become a problem for them. Kenya could, for example have an interest in trying to use the EAC as a driver for national purposes. Moreover, both Uganda and Rwanda could push forward to make EAC a political union and both heads of state see themselves as future presidents of such a union. It can therefore be questioned whether Uganda and Rwanda seek such a political union for the common
good or more as an individual or national ambition. Regardless of how the high the level of ambition toward the EAC is in Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda, it is questionable whether this will contribute to lessening the Tanzanian scepticism and mistrust towards the vision these countries have for the EAC. Recognising that Denmark cannot change this situation, it might nevertheless still be possible for Denmark to emphasise a more multilateral approach when engaging with these states because this type of approach could potentially foster a greater sense of coherence among states in the region, and thereby indirectly reduce the existing level of scepticism.

**EASF: Rapid deployment capability (RDC) and military capacity building**

For the EASF, the risk of the national interests of member states having a counter-productive effect on institutional developments might also become a problem. For the EASF to be able to act, the existence of components such as military capabilities is necessary. As a result the construction of three RDCs in the region seems to make good sense, especially when the purpose is to be able to prevent e.g. genocide and war crimes on short notice. This is the main reason why Denmark decided to support the RDC project in Rwanda. However, the RDC in Rwanda is almost solely made up of Rwandese soldiers as opposed to being comprised of soldiers from various states in the region. In an institutional context, the RDC might thus be regional, yet in content it remains national. This point has also been made in a 2010 report (COWI 2010), which presented a risk analysis of the RDC project in Rwanda on behalf of the Ministry of Defence. This does not simply mean that military capacity building is a bad idea. Rather it seems to suggest that the political risks involved in such projects must reflect the political will and strategic ends of the donor state, in this case Denmark. Support for the Kenya Navy is based on a high level of political will to counter piracy in the Indian Ocean. There is a connection between this support and related anti-piracy initiatives. Although that project also entails political risks, an important difference is that the political will to sustain and develop it is considerably higher and therefore better matches the risks involved.

The support for the Kenya Navy stands somewhat in contrast to backing the Rwandan RDC. There was clearly a political risk involved in supporting the RDC in Rwanda. The challenge of finding co-donors is in itself illustrative of this risk. What is more, the political will behind the project was not as clear as for other projects, an aspect that also partially contributed to the decision to suspend the project. It thus seems fair to suggest that because military capacity building can have unintended effects, such projects must have a clear political aim to ensure a match between the political will and the level of risk involved. Whether to engage in such projects or not depends on
the political will to run the risks involved, on the one hand, and the political will to contribute to security in the ways described, on the other. The connection between the risk and the will can be interpreted as a matter of how high the issue is being prioritised. The art of countering a risk in a given project is very much a question of reducing the probability of the event happening. Diminishing the likelihood of certain events occurring can involve diplomatic means, economic pressure and agreements or selecting a project which is of crucial importance for the receiving country. Along with this, the political will can be increased through partnerships with other donors or by linking the project to other political undertakings. Crucially, given the nature of military capacity building there is a great need to address the issue of how such political risks can be managed. Only once this matter is given due attention and careful consideration, can it be advisable to regard military capacity building as representing an alternative to non-military capacity projects.

Risks of non-intervention in internal affairs
One of the tasks of regional institutions in East Africa is to prevent, manage and resolve violent conflict in the region. Yet, at the same time existing institutions are currently unable to act on potential issues of conflict when and where these are defined as the ‘internal affairs’ of one of their members. This situation represents a risk to external partners in the sense that it might limit the kinds of conflicts that regional institutions are able to act upon unless these conflicts are within the definition of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. Also, when it concerns ‘small’ states, this might also entail the risk of tilting the balance in favour of already strong states in the region, as they have a much larger degree of influence on what issues they wish to define as ‘internal’ affairs. This limitation represents a risk when the security situation in a region is so fragile that it could be destabilised as a result of ‘internal affairs’ that this type of regional engagement and capacity building is unable to act upon given the institutional limitations.

Complex relationships
The fact that there is no generally acknowledged hegemon in East Africa is ‘good’ in the sense that there is less of a risk that one member state will have the political and functional capacity to appropriate an institution to advance its national interests under an apparently legitimate facade. This risk has, for example been referred to in the 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (also referred to as the Brahimi Report), which warned that a regional institution that is dominated by one of its members might serve as an impediment to short-term conflict prevention strategies. Yet, even if this risk is lower in a region with no single hegemon, this does
not mean an absence of risks related to the delegation of power to regional bodies and the issue of hegemony. Rather it comes with a different set of complications in that the different regional security institutions in East Africa risk becoming the subject of competition between the different states using them to display their power and status in the region. This has produced complications in the case of EASF, which was first anchored within IGAD, but later this caused too much objection from states other than Ethiopia.

As an example, changing dynamics and relative power relations between Kenya and other states in the region might have a considerable impact on the regional institutional dynamics and might determine whether Kenya decides to put the most effort into its EAC membership or into its IGAD membership – or to act unilaterally (as was initially the case when Kenyan troops entered southern Somalia). Similar examples can be made with Ethiopia, Uganda and Rwanda. Foreseeing the direction of these dynamics is impossible, which is why they are important for external partners to follow closely.

**Risk seen from a donor perspective: A whole-of-government approach as a risk-reduction strategy**

All of these risks are on the part of the regional context, but risks also exist on the ‘donor’ end. From a Danish perspective an interesting point that this analysis brings out is an internal inconsistency regarding the logic of military projects. Rather than thinking of defence projects as solutions in and of themselves, the current policy is that a whole-of-government approach, or *samtænkning* in Danish, between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark and the Danish Ministry of Defence is a prerequisite for success. As described in the introductory section, a number of policy framework documents and initiatives have been developed to facilitate this kind of combined thinking between ministries. In an interview at the International Office of the Danish Ministry of Defence, it was pointed out that the whole-of-government approach is understood by metaphorically looking at policy as having two legs (humanitarian aid/development and defence/military) rather than one, and, as such, is more stable and more likely to succeed.

Specifically – and as already mentioned – this metaphor applies to the military capacity building project in Rwanda. On the one hand, the RDC project in Rwanda was understood as being two-legged with reference to its anchorage in the EASF framework and its regional character – a region in which Denmark has various
development projects (the “other” leg). On the other hand, however, the Danish presence in Rwanda within the area of development aid is extremely limited and there is no diplomatic representation. Consequently, insofar as the military project had no national development counterpart, one could argue that, in an important sense, the RDC project effectively only had a military component (i.e. one rather than two legs).

Insofar as a whole-of-government approach is the political starting point for Danish military engagement in East Africa, the above seems to illustrate that it is necessary to pay careful attention to how this approach translates when implemented in specific projects. Notably, it seems important to avoid the emergence of contradictions as a result of diverse interpretations of whether or not a project is whole-of-government in a regional or in a national sense. Here it would seem insufficient to interpret a specific initiative as comprehensive and truly whole-of-government in its approach, if only one of the two aspects only exist at the regional level. That said, the idea of a whole-of-government approach is not without problems, and to say that it might provide some level of risk-reduction to have both of the ministries involved in a regional security project is not to say that this in itself is the recipe for risk-free engagement. One issue that needs attention within this “combined thinking” logic is the at times divergent understandings and different histories of international engagement that exist in the two ministries.

The interviews carried out in Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Uganda and Tanzania made it clear that the two ministries differ culturally. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark largely has a tradition of thinking about development based on a bilateral approach, while the Danish Ministry of Defence chiefly has a tradition of considering defence projects from a more multilateral or institutional approach. In the context of Danish engagements in the region of East Africa, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs mainly work on a national level, while Ministry of Defence primarily works on an institutional level.

Without speaking in favour of the approach in one ministry as opposed to the other, the point is that a more streamlined approach would provide a stronger basis for a coherent Danish approach to engagements in East Africa, whether of a developmental or a military nature, or a combination of the two. One noticeable example of this is the approach taken in the case of Danish engagements in Kenya, where bilateral military capacity building is only one of many Danish programmes in the country, thus providing Denmark with a range of instruments that can be used to minimise
the risk that the military capacity being developed will not be used for ends that contradict the aim of strengthening regional security and stability.
6. Conclusions and recommendations

A question of utmost relevance for future Danish engagements in regional security projects is how institutions can be a part of security projects, and when they are, how this influences the relations between them. One of the findings of this report is that regional institutions might be the right way to support military and political security, especially if the Danish presence within the country is limited. Bilateral projects, on the other hand, should only be conducted with states where Denmark already has a strong presence. A whole-of-government approach within capacity building does not only mean using this approach within the area of security, it also means that Denmark retains a variety of options when the need arises to send a political signal. This does not mean that supporting a regional institution cannot become problematic and the decision on which regional security project to support and how must be decided case by case.

An institutionally divided landscape

IGAD and EAC would both like to expand into additional security areas and such expansion could potentially entail overlaps and duplications as well as fierce competition for funding. Although traditionally focused on drought and development, IGAD has been placing increasingly more focus on peace and security efforts in recent years, especially within early warning and anti-terrorism. The EAC’s scope has similarly expanded from primarily being an economic community to a situation in which its member states are now conducting various combined military exercises. Moreover, the two institutions have similar security structures.

That said, there are also a number of features that set the two institutions apart and which seem to suggest that they have different comparative advantages. The above-mentioned institutional elements (PSC and CEWS) are somewhat more developed within IGAD than within the much newer EAC. On the other hand, the EAC has recently been able to conduct military exercises and IGAD has not.

Both institutions also confront a critical shortcoming vis-à-vis the issue of regional legitimacy. The EAC arguably lacks a solid regional legitimacy due to its composition of only five member states. This issue of legitimacy as a genuinely East African regional security institution only becomes more pertinent when taking into consideration the fact that Tanzania looks more to the south. IGAD has a considerably larger number of East African member states; however, Ethiopian dominance is to some extent a hindrance to the institution’s ability to gain more regional legitimacy. In addition
the institution is still in a situation where important countries in the region (such as Tanzania and Rwanda) are not members. This obviously affects its status as a genuinely regional institution. Therefore, it must be emphasised that any Danish support for the EASF that overlooks the EAC and IGAD could be favourable in certain cases insofar as it does not favour one region above the other. The complexity of the situation grows, however, once the indirect link between continuing military development and the EASF is recognised, given that knowledge and operational training in the EASF can spill over into the EAC. If such interdependence becomes more pronounced, the EASF might slowly lose its support from the northern part of East Africa, which would in turn affect its regional legitimacy. This does not mean that Denmark should not support the EASF. However, it does mean that with the likely development of a stronger defence profile within the EAC, it is important that Denmark avoids supporting a path that entails a slow fusion where the EASF unofficially becomes a military part of EAC. The problem of the answerability of the EASF should preferably be resolved in a more explicit manner and in dialogue with all of the significant institutional players in the region.

From this discussion, we arrive at another important conclusion of this report, namely that we see what can be referred to as a north-south divide in the institutional landscape of East Africa. Where EAC countries are more focused on issues in the southern part of the region, IGAD pays most attention to security issues in the north and the Horn. For Denmark, bearing this divide in mind is important when considering whether to support regional security initiatives through one or the other of these institutions. This fractured institutional landscape is also indicative of political differences in the region as well as of why there seems to be a competing culture – notably between Ethiopia and Kenya – that reflects the kinds of decisions that can be made within IGAD and the EAC.

In terms of membership the EASF has an advantage compared to IGAD and the EAC, as the EASF is the only regional security institution whose composition of member states covers the entire region, thus providing it with a considerable degree of regional legitimacy. However, institutional membership composition is not the only indicator of legitimacy. Indeed, the EASF has other drawbacks that are less of an issue for IGAD and the EAC as the EASF does not have the same regional political body. This is a notable difference with regard to how the regional standby forces are organised in Western and Southern Africa. On the other hand, the lack of profound political institutionalisation means that the EASF is not exposed to the same political competition. One of the EASF’s objectives appears to be increasing its political role, which could potentially become a delicate matter. Such an increase might hamper
the legitimacy of the EASF within the region, which means that constructing a more solid political level within the EASF must not only take into account the balance between the region’s bigger countries but also the minor states to prevent them from being forced to choose sides within the EASF.

Where does this leave Denmark and military capacity building? Should Denmark support military capacity building in Africa and if so how? This leads back to the questions, “Why do we do it?” and “What does Denmark want to gain from it?” What these questions suggest is that moving from one type of military engagement to another (from having soldiers on the ground to training regional troops to be on the ground) is not simply a shift to a more risk-free type of military engagement abroad that no longer involves a danger of external parties suffering casualties. Instead, this shift is accompanied by a new set of risks that must be carefully considered when deciding which security-related projects to support in East Africa and how to do so. To provide a better overview of some of the new risks that emerge in the context of regional security cooperation in East Africa, the following section will conclude by listing three hazards that are closely related to this new type of engagement.

**Recommendations**

**The EASF and bilateral military capacity building**

With EASF being the only regional security institution with deployable military capacities, it seems likely that in conflict situations where military capacity is deemed necessary, EASF will come to play a potentially important role in this and/other regions in the future. Consequently, an important issue for donors contemplating how best to provide support to further develop the EASF is that of choosing the more appropriate elements from among the range of possible contributions that a donor can chose to make. The present support through advisors and support for exercises seems to be a good way to assure the continuing development of the EASF. Without donors the EASF would not be where it is today and should it lose all its donations, it would return to an institution without any purpose.

When supporting an institution such as the EASF at least two areas are important to keep in mind. First, it must be taken into account whether the support will in anyway push the political agenda in the region or whether it will cultivate a culture of competition with the EAC and/or IGAD. And, second, if choosing a military capability project on a bilateral basis it is vital to allow for the risks involved, to
estimate their plausibility, to incorporate them in an overall development strategy and to consider how to counter or reduce risks in the event that they materialise. The fewer donor partners and the more bilateral a programme is, the more a donor must be aware of the risks but also consider beforehand which actions to take should these risks eventually occur.

**Intergovernmental Authority on Development and Danish support for defence projects**

From the perspective of Danish defence engagements in regional security projects in East Africa, it is important to recognise that IGAD does not have many traditional defence projects at the hard end of the spectrum. If Denmark wishes to further its engagement in and commitment to strengthening regional security in East Africa through projects with a harder defence profile, IGAD may not be the best institution with which to locate projects that a Danish military advisor could contribute to. This does not mean, however, that Denmark should not be involved in security projects. IGAD has different projects which are not covered in the same degree by EASF and EAC, notably an early warning system and anti-terrorism programmes, both of which are regionally based. Denmark has a long tradition of supporting IGAD, which means that developing this support based on previous Danish experience could be a way forward. A further development of the early warning system and an attempt to incorporate it into the EASF could be a substantial contribution in terms of assuring that the EASF does not become a project for the southern part of East Africa only.

**The East African Community and Danish support for defence projects**

Regarding the EAC, it is first of all important to be aware that, in a certain sense, the strength of the institution is also its weakness. With very few member states, the EAC has more drive than IGAD but, on the other hand, it only has limited regional legitimacy. It is not unlikely that some form of support for the EAC – in its niche of economic integration – could prove valuable as a way to ensure peace and stability within the region. Supporting EAC projects within the defence area, however, could be more problematic. The EAC does not have any defence projects not already covered mainly by the EASF, which means that Danish support of the defence part of the EAC might amplify north-south competition within the region. Furthermore, the defence profile of the EAC is so new that there is still uncertainty among member states with regard to which direction future EAC defence cooperation should move. As all EAC members are also formal members of the EASF, supporting defence and security in the EAC region might seem more legitimate if done not through the EAC but through the EASF.
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- Peace and Security Division, Djibouti
- Political Affairs, Djibouti

**EAC**
- Ministry of EAC, Dar es Salaam – Tanzania
- EAC Headquarters, Arusha – Tanzania

**EASF**
- Headquarters, Nairobi – Kenya

**Embassies**
- Embassy of Denmark, Addis Ababa – Ethiopia
- Embassy of Denmark, Kampala – Uganda
- Embassy of Denmark, Dar es Salaam – Tanzania
- Royal Norwegian Embassy, Addis – Ethiopia

**Other**
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kampala – Uganda
- Makerere University, Kampala – Uganda
- EU Somalia Training Mission, Kampala – Uganda
- Danish Defence Command – Denmark
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark– Denmark
- Danish Ministry of Defence – Denmark
Endnotes

1 The PSC also has a Panel of the Wise, which has a counsellor role; a Military Staff Committee (MSC), which gives military advice; and a Peace Fund, which serves the crucial purpose of financing actions within the area of peace and security taken by either the PSC or The Assembly

2 (ISS, Profile: African Union (AU))

3 http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/3468~v~Memorandum_of_understanding_on_the_establishment_of_the_EASBRIG.pdf

4 Both mainly supported by the UK


8 http://www.africom.mil/Newsroom/Article/10234/general-ham-at-howard-university

9 http://www.eac.int/council_decisions/index.php

10 “EAC Locks Out South Sudan and Somalia” (Business Daily Africa, 26 November 2012)

11 EAC “Establishment of the East African Court of Justice” (http://www.eacj.org/establishment.php)

12 Spliid, Ulandsnyt, 26 February 2012


14 EAC, Peace and Security

15 Though this report focuses on East Africa, it is still important to mention Tanzania’s SADC membership. In case of interstate conflict in DRC, Tanzania may, for example, be forced to decide whether to support SADC (which includes the government of DRC) or the EAC and thereby Rwanda and Uganda, who have been accused of supporting the ‘M23’ rebels that oppose the government of DRC

16 Other examples are: the Kenyan unit on Mount Elgon in 2008, the Kenya Navy off Lamu in 2011, the Ugandan units’ actions against the Lord’s Resistance Army and in Ituri, and the Burundian COIN operations inside the DRC against FDD/FLN

17 One example is the Peace Support Training Centre in Nairobi, Kenya

18 Risk is understood here as the probability that a certain event will happen
Defence and Security Studies at DIIS

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