Ben Jebli, Mehdi; Ben Youssef, Slim

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Timing of Adoption of Clean Technologies, Transboundary Pollution and International Trade

Mehdi Ben Jebli and Slim Ben Yousef

Abstract
The authors consider a symmetric model composed of two countries and a firm in each country. Firms produce the same good by means of a polluting technology which uses fossil energy. However, these firms can adopt clean technology which uses renewable energy, having lower costs. Interestingly, opening markets to international competition increases the per-unit emission-tax and decreases the per-unit production subsidy. The socially optimal adoption date under a common market better internalizes transboundary pollution than that under autarky. In autarky (resp. a common market), firms adopt the clean technology earlier (resp. later) than what is socially optimal and, therefore, regulators induce clean technology adoption at the socially optimal adoption date by firms postponing (resp. speeding up) adoption subsidies. Opening markets to international trade speeds up socially optimal adoption dates and reduces global flow of pollution.

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Keywords Regulation; adoption date; renewable energy; transboundary pollution; common market

Authors
Mehdi Ben Jebli, University of Tunis El Manar, FSEG de Tunis, Tunisia and University of Jendouba, ISI du Kef, Tunisia, benjebli.mehdi@gmail.com
Slim Ben Yousef, Manouba University, ESC de Tunis, Tunisia, slim.benyoussef@gnet.tn

1 Introduction

This paper investigates the relationship that might exist between the timing of adoption of clean technologies, transboundary pollution and opening markets to international competition. Typical examples of clean production technologies are those using renewable energy such as solar energy, whereas polluting production technologies usually use fossil energy.

Our paper differs from the existing literature by the fact that we try to find out how the adoption dates of clean technologies may be affected when markets are opened to international competition, and how the regulator might change his behavior with respect to firms being regulated. Also, in the present paper, we study the relationship between the adoption of clean technologies and transboundary pollution. These questions have not been tackled by previous literature.

We consider a symmetric model composed of two countries and a monopolistic firm operating in each country. Firms produce the same homogeneous good by using a polluting technology which uses fossil energy. However, these firms can adopt a new and clean production technology by incurring an investment cost. This clean technology does not pollute at all, uses renewable energy and therefore has a lower unit production cost. Each non-cooperating regulator looks for static and dynamic social optimalities. A per-unit emission-tax is used when a firm uses the polluting technology, a per-unit production subsidy, which can be considered as a fiscal incentive, is used when a firm uses the clean technology, and an adoption subsidy is used to induce the firm to adopt the clean technology at the socially optimal date. Before the beginning of the game, at date -1, regulators announce their per-unit emission-tax and subsidy, and their adoption subsidies. Then, at date 0, firms choose their instantaneous production quantities and adoption dates. We study and compare the case where each firm operates in a separate home market, and the case where there is international trade and firms compete in the same market formed by consumers of the two participating countries.

In autarky, since our model is symmetric, firms adopt clean technology simultaneously. However, in a common market, and because of the competition between firms, we impose a condition on model’s parameters to avoid a complicated case where firms adopt clean technology at different dates, and we show that clean technology adoption is simultaneous.
When markets are opened to international competition, the per-unit emission-tax increases when polluting technology is used, and the per-unit production subsidy decreases when clean technology is used. These results are interesting because it is naturally expected that, to give a competitive advantage to its domestic firm, each regulator is tempted to reduce the per-unit emission-tax and to increase the per-unit production subsidy, when markets are opened to international trade. We did not obtain these expected results because regulators look for static (and dynamic) social optimality, i.e., first-best outcome.

Interestingly, the socially optimal adoption date under a common market better internalizes transboundary pollution than that under autarky. This result is of great interest because this paper is the first attempt to link the adoption of clean technologies with transboundary pollution.

The intervention of regulators on how to induce firms to adopt clean technology at the socially optimal adoption date completely changes when markets are opened to international competition. Indeed, in autarky (resp. a common market), firms adopt earlier (resp. later) than what is socially optimal. Therefore, in autarky, regulators induce the adoption of clean technology at the socially optimal date by giving firms a subsidy for the postponement of the adoption. However, in a common market, regulators induce firms to adopt clean technology at a socially optimal date by giving them a speed up adoption subsidy.

The instantaneous social welfare gain from the adoption of clean technology increases with market opening, leading to an earlier socially optimal adoption date under a common market. Consequently, international trade leads to less global flow of pollution. These results are new and interesting because the impact of opening markets to international competition on the timing of adoption of clean technologies has not been previously studied.

Our paper enriches previous literature on renewable energies and clean technologies by providing a theoretical study of the effect of international trade on both clean technology adoption and transboundary pollution. Indeed, many theoretical studies have been concerned with renewable energies and clean technologies such as those of Wirl and Withagen (2000), Fischer et al. (2004), Soest (2005), Nasiri and Zaccour (2009) and Fujiwara (2011). Dosi and Moretto (1997) studied the regulation of a firm that can switch to clean technology by incurring an irreversible investment cost. To bridge the gap between the firm’s and the policy-maker’s
desired timing of innovation, they recommended that the regulator stimulates inno-
vation through subsidies and by reducing the uncertainty related to the profitability
of clean technology by appropriate announcements. Moreover, Dosi and Moretto
(2010), extended the previous study to oligopolistic firms and studied benefits of
not being the first firm adopting clean technology. Ben Youssef (2010) showed that
the instantaneous regulated monopoly adopts clean technology earlier than what
is socially optimal, while the non-regulated monopoly adopts it later than what is
socially optimal. The regulator can induce monopoly to adopt clean technology at
a socially optimal date by subsidy for postponement adoption. Reichenbach and
Requate (2012) considered a model with two types of electricity producers and
showed that a first-best policy requires tax in the fossil-fuel sector and an output
subsidy for the renewable energy sources sector. Many empirical studies have also
been interested in clean technologies (Whitehead and Cherry 2007, Varun et al.

It is important to notice that many papers, not concerned with renewable
energies, have studied the impact of international trade on pollution (Péchoux and
that uncoordinated regulation of pollution at a national level and free trade do not
necessarily raise welfare.

Other studies, not concerned with renewable energies, have focused on trans-
and Tulkens (1992) showed that non-cooperating behavior of countries is not
Pareto-optimal. Mansouri and Ben Youssef (2000) proved the necessity of cooper-
ation between countries to effectively internalize all transboundary pollution, and,
at the same time, reach the first best.

There is rich literature on the timing of adoption of new technologies charac-
terized by a lower production cost. We can cite Riordan (1992), Dutta et al. (1995),
even in the case of identical firms and complete information, there is diffusion of
innovation over time because one firm innovates before the other and gains more.
Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) suggested less severe conditions on the payoffs of
firms, compared to Reinganum (1981), that showed that under certain conditions
there is diffusion of new technology adoption, whereas under other conditions,
firms adopt new technology simultaneously. Since non-simultaneous adoption is not the principal focus of the present paper, we have imposed conditions on model’s parameters to eliminate the complicated case of non-simultaneous adoption of new and clean technology.

This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 deals with autarky case. Section 3 deals with common market case, and Section 4 compares these two market regimes. Section 5 concludes and an Appendix contains some proofs.

2 Autarky

We consider a symmetric model consisting of two countries and two firms. Firm $i$ located in country $i$ is a regional monopoly and produces good $i$ in quantity $q_i$ sold in the domestic market with an inverse demand function: $p_i = a - 2q_i, a > 0$. Thus, the market size of each country is $a/2$.

The consumption of $q_i$ engenders consumers’ surplus in country $i$ equal to:

$$CS_i^a(q_i) = \int_0^{q_i} p_i(z)dz - p_i(q_i)q_i = q_i^2$$

At the beginning of the game, i.e., at date 0, firms produce goods by using old and polluting production technology using fossil fuels and characterized by a positive emission/output ratio $e > 0$. The pollution emitted by firm $i$ is $E_i = eq_i$.

We suppose that pollution crosses borders and that damages in country $i$ are due to domestic pollution and foreign pollution: $D_i = \alpha E_i + \beta E_j$, where $\alpha > 0$ is the marginal damage cost of domestic pollution and $\beta > 0$ is the marginal damage cost of foreign pollution. Thus, we use a simple and linear damage function. However, we think that our main results remain valid with a non-linear and convex damage function.

When firm $i$ uses polluting technology, its unit production cost is $d > 0$ and its profit$^1$ is $\Pi_{id}^a = p_i(q_i)q_i - dq_i$.

Each firm $i$ functions for an infinite horizon of time and can adopt a new and clean production technology within a period of time $\tau_i$. This clean technology

---

$^1$ In what follows, the subscripts $d$ and $c$ refer to the polluting and clean technologies, respectively. The superscripts $a$ and $cm$ refer to the autarky and common market cases, respectively.
does not pollute at all, uses renewable energy and therefore has a lower unit cost of production $c$ verifying $0 < c < d$. For example, we can consider that polluting technology uses fossil energy, whereas clean technology uses solar energy. The per-unit energy-production cost for clean technology is for maintaining the solar production technology, and we can reasonably assume that it is lower than the per-unit energy-production cost when fossil energy is used. Thus, the profit of firm $i$ is $\Pi_{ic}^a = p_i(q_i)q_i - cq_i$.

We suppose that the marginal damage of production $\alpha e$ is neither too small nor too high and verifies the following condition:

$$\frac{d - c}{3} < \alpha e < d - c \quad (1)$$

The instantaneous social welfare of country $i$ is equal to consumers’ surplus, minus damages plus the profit of the domestic firm:

$$S_i^a(q_i, q_j) = CS_i^a(q_i) - D_i(q_i, q_j) + \Pi_i^a(q_i) \quad (2)$$

To get new and clean production technology, an investment cost is necessary. This investment cost could comprise of the R&D cost or the cost of acquisition and installation of clean technology.

The cost of adopting clean technology by firm $i$ at date $\tau_i$ actualized at date 0 is:

$$V(\tau_i) = \theta e^{-mr\tau_i} \quad (3)$$

with $\theta > 0$ is the cost of immediate adoption of the clean technology, $r > 0$ is the discount rate, and the parameter $m$ denotes that the cost of adoption decreases more rapidly when it is greater. We assume that $m > 1$.\(^2\)

\(^2\) This assumption is necessary to obtain a decreasing current adoption cost function. Moreover, it guarantees that the optimal adoption dates are positive and the second-order conditions are verified (see the Appendix).
As many studies (Fudenberg and Tirole 1985, Hoppe 2000, Milliou and Petrakis 2011), we assume that the current cost of adoption reduces overtime at a decreasing rate due to technical progress, i.e., \((V(\tau_i)e^{r\tau_i})' < 0\) and \((V(\tau_i)e^{r\tau_i})'' > 0\).

Let’s remark that \(\tau_i = +\infty\) signifies that firm \(i\) will never adopt clean technology.

Before the beginning of the game, at date -1, regulators announce their per-unit emission-tax when polluting technology is used, their per-unit production subsidy when clean technology is used, and their adoption subsidy to push firms to adopt clean technology at the socially optimal adoption date. Then, at date 0, firms choose their instantaneous production quantities before and after the adoption of clean technology, and their adoption date.

2.1 Instantaneous regulation

Being regional monopolies, firms are regulated at any period of time. First, we start by determining the socially optimal production quantities for each regulator. Then, we determine the regulatory instruments inducing these socially optimal production quantities in each country.

When both firms use polluting technology, the instantaneous social welfare of country \(i\) is:

\[
S^a_{idd}(q_i, q_j) = CS^a_i(q_i) - D_i(q_i, q_j) + \Pi^a_{idd}(q_i)
\]  

Maximizing the expression given by (4) with respect to \(q_i\) provides the socially optimal production level with polluting technology for each regulator \(i = 1, 2\):

\[
\hat{q}^a_{idd} = \frac{a - d - \alpha e}{2}
\]

We assume the first inequality of the following condition to obtain positive production quantities. Also, the second inequality is assumed to avoid studying the complicated case of non-simultaneous adoption of clean technology in the common market case. Moreover, the second inequality of (1) assures that there is no contradiction in inequality (6):

\[
d + \alpha e < a < 2d - c
\]
Therefore, the maximum willingness to pay for the good must be higher than the marginal cost of production plus the marginal damage of production.

Since each firm is a polluting monopoly, it is regulated. With polluting technology there are two market failures, which are monopoly and environmental externalities. As the levels of pollution and production are proportional, an emission-tax per-unit of pollution $t_{idd}^a$ is sufficient to correct the two market failures and induce socially optimal levels of production and pollution.

The instantaneous net profit of firm $i$ is:

$$U_{idd}^a(q_i) = \Pi_{idd}^a(q_i) - t_{idd}^a E_i(q_i)$$

(7)

The socially optimal per-unit emission-tax that induces firm $i$ to produce $\hat{q}_{idd}^a$ is:

$$t_{idd}^a = \frac{a - d - 4\hat{q}_{idd}^a}{\epsilon}$$

(8)

Using the expression of $\hat{q}_{idd}^a$, we can show that:

$$t_{idd}^a > 0 \iff a < d + 2\alpha e$$

(9)

When $\alpha e > \frac{d-c}{2}$, i.e., the marginal damage of pollution is high enough, the above condition is always satisfied and the emission-tax is positive. When $\alpha e < \frac{d-c}{2}$ and $a < d + 2\alpha e$, the emission-tax is positive. However, when $\alpha e < \frac{d-c}{2}$ and $a > d + 2\alpha e$, i.e., the marginal damage of pollution is low enough, the emission-tax is negative meaning that each regulator subsidizes production to deal with monopoly distortion. Therefore, the emission-tax, which is used to correct monopoly and environmental externalities market failures, is positive when environmental externalities are high and is negative when environmental externalities are low.

If both firms use the clean technology, the instantaneous social welfare of country $i$ is:

$$S_{icc}^a(q_i) = CS_i^a(q_i) + \Pi_{icc}^a(q_i)$$

(10)
Maximizing the expression given by (10) with respect to $q_i$ gives the socially optimal production level with the clean technology for regulator $i$:

$$\hat{q}_{icc}^a = \frac{a - c}{2} > 0$$

(11)

We have $\hat{q}_{icc}^a > \hat{q}_{idd}^a$ because $d > c$. Therefore, the clean technology enables to produce more without polluting the environment.

With clean technology, there is only one market failure (monopoly), which is corrected by a subsidy $s_{icc}^a$ for each unit produced. This latter can be considered as a fiscal incentive to encourage the use of clean technology. One may think about the production of electricity. A per-unit production subsidy can be given by a regulator when the production process is clean (using solar energy, for example). Reichenbach and Requate (2012) considered a model with two types of electricity producers and showed that a first-best policy requires a tax in the fossil-fuel sector and an output subsidy for the renewable energy sector.

This per-unit subsidy is chosen to induce a socially optimal level of production. Indeed, the instantaneous net profit of firms $i$ is:

$$U_{icc}^a(q_i) = \Pi_{icc}^a(q_i) + s_{icc}^a q_i$$

(12)

The socially optimal per-unit subsidy that induces firm $i$ to produce $\hat{q}_{icc}^a$ is:

$$s_{icc}^a = c - a + 4\hat{q}_{icc}^a > 0$$

(13)

If we consider the case in which one of the two firms, for example firm 1, has adopted clean technology, whereas firm 2 still produces using polluting technology, then the profits of firms are $\Pi_{1cd}^a(q_1)$ and $\Pi_{2cd}^a(q_2)$, respectively. The instantaneous social welfare of regulators 1 and 2 are:

$$S_{1cd}^a(q_1, q_2) = C\Pi_{1cd}^a(q_1) + \Pi_{1cd}^a(q_1) - D_1(q_2)$$

(14)
\[ S_{2cd}^a(q_1, q_2) = CS_2^a(q_2) + \Pi_{2cd}^a(q_2) - D_2(q_2) \] (15)

Regulator \( i \) maximizes his social welfare function with respect to \( q_i \) to obtain socially optimal production quantities:

\[ \hat{q}_{1cd}^a = \frac{a - c}{2} > 0, \quad \hat{q}_{2cd}^a = \frac{a - d - \alpha e}{2} > 0 \] (16)

We can easily verify that \( \hat{q}_{1cd}^a > \hat{q}_{2cd}^a \) meaning that it is socially preferred that the firm using clean technology produces more than that using polluting technology.

Since \( \hat{q}_{1cd}^a = \hat{q}_{1cc}^a \), regulator 1 can induce firm 1 to produce a socially optimal production quantity by an appropriate subsidy \( s_{1cd}^a = s_{1cc}^a \). As \( \hat{q}_{2cd}^a = \hat{q}_{2dd}^a \), a per-unit emission-tax \( t_{2cd}^a = t_{2dd}^a \) is needed to induce firm 2 to produce the socially optimal quantity.

In the Appendix’s subsection 6.1.2, we show that:

\[ 0 < S_{1cd}^a - S_{1dd}^a < U_{1cd}^a - U_{1dd}^a \] (17)

Thus, we can establish the following proposition:

**Proposition 1** Under autarky, instantaneous gain from using clean technology is greater for the first adopter firm than for its regulator, when a per-unit emission-tax and a production subsidy are used.

Indeed, under autarky, because of the monopoly power, the instantaneous net profit of a firm is very high even when it uses polluting technology. Moreover, when a firm adopts clean technology, it no longer pays the pollution tax, receives production subsidies and its unit production cost decreases. This increases significantly its instantaneous net profit. The instantaneous social welfare level increases due to the absence of local environmental damage and the lower production cost. However, this increase in instantaneous social welfare is lower than the increase in instantaneous net profit.
2.2 Optimal adoption dates

In this section, we will determine optimal adoption dates. We still suppose that, in case where firms adopt clean technology at different dates, the first adopter is firm 1 and the second adopter is firm 2. Thus, in the following expressions, we suppose $\tau_1 \leq \tau_2$.

Since $\hat{q}_{1cd}^a = \hat{q}_{1cc}^a$ and $\hat{q}_{2cd}^a = \hat{q}_{2dd}^a$, then $U_{1cd}^a = U_{1cc}^a$ and $U_{2cd}^a = U_{2dd}^a$. This implies that the intertemporal net profit of firm $i$ can be written as depending only on $\tau_i$. However, as $S_{1cd}^a \neq S_{1cc}^a$ and $S_{2cd}^a \neq S_{2dd}^a$ because of crossborder pollution, the intertemporal social welfare of regulators 1 and 2 depend on $\tau_1$ and $\tau_2$.

Each regulator chooses a socially optimal adoption date that maximizes his intertemporal social welfare function. Each firm chooses an optimal adoption date that maximizes its intertemporal net profit.

The intertemporal social welfare of regulators 1 and 2, and the intertemporal net profit of firm $i$ are, respectively:

$$IS_1^a(\tau_1, \tau_2) = \int_0^{\tau_1} S_{1dd}^a e^{-rt} dt + \int_{\tau_1}^{\tau_2} S_{1cd}^a e^{-rt} dt + \int_{\tau_2}^{+\infty} S_{1cc}^a e^{-rt} dt - \theta e^{-mr\tau_1}$$

$$IS_2^a(\tau_1, \tau_2) = \int_0^{\tau_1} S_{2dd}^a e^{-rt} dt + \int_{\tau_1}^{\tau_2} S_{2cd}^a e^{-rt} dt + \int_{\tau_2}^{+\infty} S_{2cc}^a e^{-rt} dt - \theta e^{-mr\tau_2}$$

$$IU_i^a(\tau_i) = \int_0^{\tau_i} U_{idd}^a e^{-rt} dt + \int_{\tau_i}^{+\infty} U_{icc}^a e^{-rt} dt - \theta e^{-mr\tau_i}$$

In order to obtain positive adoption dates, we need the following condition, which can be always verified by choosing $\theta$ and/or $m$ high enough: \(^3\)

$$0 < U_{icc}^a - U_{idd}^a < \theta mr$$

\(^3\) Notice that the left expression of (21) is independent of parameters $\theta$, $m$ and $r$. 

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The above condition means that the cost of immediate adoption of clean technology $\theta$ is sufficiently high. It prevents firms from immediately adopting clean technology (at date 0).

In the Appendix’s subsection 6.1.3, we determine the optimal adoption dates which show that firms adopt the clean technology simultaneously:

$$\hat{\tau}_a = \frac{1}{(1-m)r} \ln \left( \frac{S_{1cd}^a - S_{1dd}^a}{\theta mr} \right) > 0$$ (22)

$$\tau^*_a = \frac{1}{(1-m)r} \ln \left( \frac{U_{icc}^a - U_{idd}^a}{\theta mr} \right) > 0$$ (23)

Inequality (17) and the fact that $m > 1$, enable us to make the following ranking:

$$0 < \tau^*_a < \hat{\tau}_a$$ (24)

We can state the following proposition:

**Proposition 2** Under autarky, the optimal adoption date for firms is earlier than the socially optimal adoption date.

The above proposition shows that socially optimal instantaneous regulation may not be dynamically optimal relative to the adoption of clean technologies. This is due to the greater adoption incentives for firms compared to those for regulators, under autarky. This is clearly demonstrated by the inequalities in (17). This result is similar to that established by Ben Youssef (2010) who used a model comprising a regulator and a monopolistic firm.

Paradoxically, to incite firms to delay their adoption to socially optimal adoption date, regulators must compensate firms for the losses incurred. If the intertemporal net profits of firm $i$ are $IU_i(\tau^*_a)$ and $IU_i(\hat{\tau}_a)$ when the adoption dates are $\tau^*_a$ and $\hat{\tau}_a$, respectively, then the postpone adoption subsidy (compensation) is:

$$\hat{g}^a = IU_i(\tau^*_a) - IU_i(\hat{\tau}_a) > 0$$ (25)
3 Common market

When markets are opened to international trade (competition), the inverse demand function of the perfect substitute goods produced by firms becomes \( P = a \) — \((q_i + q_j)\). The size of the common market is \(a\).

The total consumers’ surplus is equally divided between the two symmetric countries:

\[
CS_{cm}^i(q_i, q_j) = \frac{1}{2} \left[ \int_0^{q_i+q_j} P(z)dz - P(q_i + q_j)(q_i + q_j) \right] = \frac{1}{4} (q_i + q_j)^2
\]

The emission-tax per-unit of pollution is \(t_{cm}^i\) and the per-unit production subsidy is \(s_{cm}^i\).

When firm \(i\) uses polluting technology, its profit is given by \(\Pi_{cm}^i = p(q_i, q_j)q_i - dq_i\), and when it uses clean technology, its profit is given by \(\Pi_{ic}^i = p(q_i, q_j)q_i - cq_i\).

The instantaneous social welfare of country \(i\) is equal to consumers’ surplus, minus damages plus the profit of the domestic firm:

\[
S_{cm}^i(q_i, q_j) = CS_{cm}^i(q_i, q_j) - D_i(q_i, q_j) + \Pi_{cm}^i(q_i, q_j)
\]

3.1 Instantaneous regulation

When both firms use polluting technology, the instantaneous social welfare of regulator \(i\) is:

\[
S_{idd}^i(q_i, q_j) = CS_{idd}^i(q_i, q_j) + \Pi_{idd}^i(q_i, q_j) - D_i(q_i, q_j)
\]

Maximizing the expression given by (27) with respect to \(q_i\) gives the socially optimal production level with the polluting technology for regulator \(i\):

\[
q_{idd}^{cm} = \frac{a - d - \alpha e}{2} > 0
\]
Since firm \( i \) constitutes a duopoly with firm \( j \) and produces with pollution, it is regulated. A per-unit emission-tax is sufficient to induce the socially optimal level of production. Indeed, the instantaneous net profit of firm \( i \) is:

\[
U_{cm}^{idd}(q_i, q_j) = \Pi_{idd}^{cm}(q_i, q_j) - t_{idd}^{cm}E_i
\]  

The socially optimal per-unit emission-tax that induces firm \( i \) to produce \( \hat{q}_{idd}^{cm} \) is:

\[
t_{idd}^{cm} = \frac{a - d - 3\hat{q}_{idd}^{cm}}{e} > 0
\]  

Therefore, under a common market, the emission-tax, which is used to correct duopoly and environmental externalities market failures, is always positive because the duopoly market failure is less important than the environmental externalities market failure.

When both firms use clean technology, the instantaneous social welfare of country \( i \) is:

\[
S_{icc}^{cm}(q_i, q_j) = CS_{cm}^{i}(q_i, q_j) + \Pi_{icc}^{cm}(q_i, q_j)
\]  

Maximizing the expression given by (31) with respect to \( q_i \) gives the socially optimal production level with the clean technology for each regulator \( i \):

\[
\hat{q}_{icc}^{cm} = \frac{a - c}{2} > 0
\]  

Since the production process is clean, each regulator gives his firm a per-unit production subsidy \( s_{icc}^{cm} \), which is chosen to induce the socially optimal level of production. Indeed, the instantaneous net profit of firms \( i \) is:

\[
U_{icc}^{cm}(q_i, q_j) = \Pi_{icc}^{cm}(q_i, q_j) + s_{icc}^{cm}q_i
\]
The socially optimal per-unit production subsidy that induces firm $i$ to produce $\hat{q}_{icc}^m$ is:

$$s_{icc}^m = 3\hat{q}_{icc}^m + c - a > 0 \quad (34)$$

Considering that firm 1 has adopted clean technology and firm 2 still produces using polluting technology, the instantaneous social welfare of regulators 1 and 2 are, respectively:

$$S_{1cd}(q_1, q_2) = CS_{1cd}(q_1, q_2) - D_1(q_2) + \Pi_{1cd}^m(q_1, q_2) \quad (35)$$

$$S_{2cd}(q_1, q_2) = CS_{2cd}(q_1, q_2) - D_2(q_2) + \Pi_{2cd}^m(q_1, q_2) \quad (36)$$

Maximizing the expressions given by (35) and (36) respectively with respect to $q_1$ and $q_2$ gives:

$$\hat{q}_{1cd}^m = \frac{2a + d - 3c + \alpha e}{4} > 0 \quad (37)$$

$$\hat{q}_{2cd}^m = \frac{2a + c - 3d - 3\alpha e}{4} < 0 \quad (38)$$

Because of the second inequality of (6) and the first inequality of (1), $\hat{q}_{2cd}^m < 0$. This suggests a boundary solution with $\hat{q}_{2cd}^m = 0$. Thus, considering non-simultaneous adoption will lead to one active firm and one inactive firm. The latter will never choose non-simultaneous adoption, and the two firms will adopt clean technology simultaneously. Let’s notice that we have assumed the first inequality and the second inequality of conditions (1) and (6), respectively, to prevent the study of the complicated case where firms adopt the clean technology at different dates. Indeed, even if it is possible to determine the optimal adoption dates when adoption is non-simultaneous, comparing these two dates is very difficult in the
common market case. Moreover, studying the case of non-simultaneous adoption is not the principal focus of the present paper. Non-simultaneous adoption of new and less-costly production technologies has been extensively studied by literature on industrial organization (Reinganum 1981, Fudenberg and Tirole 1985, Hoppe 2000).

In the Appendix’s subsection 6.2.2, we show that:

\[ 0 < U_{cm}^{cm} - U_{idd}^{cm} < S_{icc}^{cm} - S_{idd}^{cm} \]  

(39)

These inequalities enable us to establish the following proposition:

**Proposition 3** Under a common market, the instantaneous gains from using the clean technology are greater for regulators than for firms, when a per-unit emission-tax and a production subsidy are used.

The reasons explaining the benefit from clean technology are the same as for the autarky case. However, when firms compete in a common market, their instantaneous net profits increase, due to the adoption of the clean technology, is less important than the increase of instantaneous social welfare levels. This result is different from that obtained under autarky because the monopoly power induces that the instantaneous net profit of a firm is higher than under a common market where there is a duopoly. This holds whether firms use polluting or clean technology\(^4\).

### 3.2 Optimal adoption dates

When both firms adopt clean technology at the same date \( \tau \), the intertemporal social welfare of regulator \( i \) and the intertemporal net profit of firm \( i \) are, respectively:

\[
IS_i^{cm}(\tau) = \int_0^\tau S_{idd}^{cm} e^{-rt} \, dt + \int_\tau^{+\infty} S_{icc}^{cm} e^{-rt} \, dt - \theta e^{-mr \tau}
\]  

(40)

\(^4\) By using (7), (8), (12), (13), (29), (30), (33) and (34), we can easily verify that \( U_{idd}^a > U_{idd}^{cm} \) and \( U_{icc}^a > U_{icc}^{cm} \).
In the Appendix’s subsection 6.2.3, we determine the socially optimal adoption date for regulators and the optimal adoption date for firms, which are respectively:

\[
\hat{\tau}_{cm} = \frac{1}{(1 - m) r} \ln \left( \frac{S_{icc}^{cm} - S_{idd}^{cm}}{\theta m r} \right) > 0
\]  (42)

\[
\tau_{*cm} = \frac{1}{(1 - m) r} \ln \left( \frac{U_{icc}^{cm} - U_{idd}^{cm}}{\theta m r} \right) > 0
\]  (43)

Inequality (39) and the assumption \( m > 1 \), enable us to make the following ranking:

\[ 0 < \hat{\tau}_{cm} < \tau_{*cm} \]  (44)

Thus, we can state the following proposition:

**Proposition 4** When markets are opened to competition, the socially optimal adoption date is earlier than the optimal adoption date for firms.

The above proposition shows that, even in a common market, socially optimal instantaneous regulation may not be dynamically optimal relatively to the adoption of clean technologies. This is due to the fact that, under a common market, the incentives to adopt the clean technology are greater for regulators than for firms. This is clearly demonstrated by the inequalities in (39).

To incite firms to accelerate their adoption to the socially optimal adoption date, regulators must compensate firms for the losses they will incur by an earlier adoption. If the intertemporal net profits of firm \( i \) are \( IU_i(\tau_{*cm}) \) and \( IU_i(\hat{\tau}_{cm}) \) when adoption dates are \( \tau_{*cm} \) and \( \hat{\tau}_{cm} \), respectively, then the earlier adoption subsidy (compensation) is:

\[
\hat{g}_{cm} = IU_i(\tau_{*cm}) - IU_i(\hat{\tau}_{cm}) > 0
\]  (45)
4 Autarky versus common market

Based on expressions (22) and (42), we can show that:

\[
\hat{\tau}_a = \frac{1}{(1-m)r} \ln \left( \frac{d-c+ac}{\theta_m} \left( \hat{q}_{icc} + \hat{q}_{idd} \right) \right), \quad \hat{\tau}_{cm} = \frac{1}{(1-m)r} \ln \left( \frac{d-c+ac}{\theta_m} \left( \hat{q}_{cm} + \hat{q}_{idd} \right) + \beta e \hat{q}_{idd} \right)
\]

The above expression relative to the autarky case does not comprise of parameter \( \beta \) explaining transboundary pollution. Thus, the socially optimal adoption date under autarky does not completely internalize transboundary pollution. However, the above expression relative to the common market case comprises of parameter \( \beta \), and shows that, under a common market, the socially optimal adoption date internalizes transboundary pollution. This is due to the fact that damage function in our paper is linear with respect to total pollution. Indeed, socially optimal productions do not completely internalize transboundary pollution.\(^5\) This result is of great interest because this paper is the first attempt to link the adoption of clean technologies with transboundary pollution. Using a very different model than the present one, Ben Youssef (2009) showed that R&D spillovers and the competition of firms in the common market help non-cooperating countries to better internalize transboundary pollution. Moreover, the investment in absorptive R&D helps non-cooperating countries to better internalize transboundary pollution (Ben Youssef 2011). We can state the following proposition:

**Proposition 5** The socially optimal adoption date under a common market better internalizes transboundary pollution than that under autarky.

Let us notice that if there is no transfrontier pollution between countries, i.e., \( \beta = 0 \), then from expressions (54) and (55), we deduce that the optimal adoption date for firms and the socially optimal adoption date coincide under a common market \((\tau^{*cm} = \hat{\tau}_{cm})\). Indeed, since the instantaneous social welfare gain from using the clean technology internalizes transboundary pollution causing a speedup in technology adoption, the absence of transboundary pollution delays the socially

\(^5\) If damage functions were not linear with respect to total pollution nor separable with respect to the pollution remaining at home and the one received from other countries, then transboundary pollution would be partially internalized by socially optimal production quantities. We think that our main analytical results will not change.
optimal adoption date to the optimal adoption date for firms. However, under autarky, the optimal adoption date for firms still remains earlier than socially optimal date because the latter does not internalize transboundary pollution.

Socially optimal productions are the same under the two market regimes ($d_{idd}^c = d_{idd}^a, q_{icc}^c = q_{icc}^a$) because they maximize the instantaneous social welfare independently whether firms compete or not. Competition between firms in the common market incites them to overproduce with polluting technology compared to what is socially optimal, and this pushes regulators to increase their emission-tax ($t_{idd}^c > t_{idd}^a$). With clean technology and under autarky, the optimal production for firms is lower and very far from the socially optimal production, implying a great production subsidy; when markets are opened to international competition, the optimal production for firms increases and the subsidy decreases ($s_{icc}^a > s_{icc}^c$). These results are interesting because one may think that, to give a competitive advantage to its domestic firm, each regulator reduces the per-unit emission-tax and increases the per-unit production subsidy, when markets are opened to international competition. Our results are different because regulators look for first-best outcome. Ben Youssef (2009) found similar results with a different model in which regulatory instruments are a per-unit emission-tax and a per-unit R&D subsidy, and has showed that international trade increases the per-unit emission-tax and decreases the per-unit R&D subsidy.

**Proposition 6** Opening markets to international competition increases the per-unit emission-tax when polluting technology is used, and decreases the per-unit production subsidy when clean technology is used.

In the Appendix (subsection 6.3), we show that the instantaneous social welfare gain from using clean technology is greater under a common market than under autarky. Thus, opening markets to international trade speeds up the socially optimal adoption date ($\tau_{cm}^c < \tau_{cm}^a$). This is due to the fact that the socially optimal adoption date, under a common market, better internalizes transboundary pollution than that under autarky. Consequently, we have less flow of pollution with market opening.

**Proposition 7** International competition increases instantaneous social welfare gain from using clean technology, leading to an acceleration of the socially optimal adoption date and a reduction in the global flow of pollution.
The above results are new and interesting because the impact of opening markets to international trade on the timing of adoption of clean technologies has not been previously studied.

Let us notice that if there is no transfrontier pollution between countries, i.e., $\beta = 0$, then from expressions (46) and (54), we deduce that the socially optimal adoption dates are the same under both market regimes ($\hat{\tau}^{cm} = \hat{\tau}^{a}$).

5 Conclusion

In this paper, we consider two countries and a monopolistic firm operating in each country. Firms produce the same homogeneous good by using polluting technology that uses fossil energy. These firms can adopt a new and clean production technology by incurring an investment cost. This clean technology uses renewable energy and therefore has a lower per-unit production cost. Non-cooperating regulators look for static and dynamic social optimalities. A per-unit emission-tax is applied when a firm uses polluting technology. A per-unit production subsidy, which can be considered as a fiscal incentive, is applied when a firm uses clean production technology. An adoption subsidy is used to induce the firm to adopt clean technology at the socially optimal adoption date. We study and compare the case where each firm operates in a separate domestic market, and the case where firms compete in a common market formed by the consumers of the two countries.

Our results show that international competition increases the per-unit emission-tax when polluting technology is used, and decreases the per-unit production subsidy when clean technology is used. These results are interesting because one may expect that, with market opening, each regulator is tempted to give a competitive advantage to its domestic firm by reducing the emission-tax and increasing the production subsidy.

In autarky both firms adopt clean technology simultaneously due to our symmetric model. However, in a common market, because of the competition between firms, non-simultaneous adoption may occur. We impose conditions on the model’s parameters to avoid the complicated case where firms adopt clean technology at different dates, and we show that this adoption is simultaneous. Indeed, al-
though the determination of optimal adoption dates is possible, their comparison is theoretically very difficult when adoption is not simultaneous.

Under autarky, the instantaneous gain from using clean technology is greater for firms than for regulators. Consequently, firms adopt earlier than what is socially optimal. Therefore, in autarky, regulators induce firms to adopt at the socially optimal adoption date by giving them subsidies for the adoption postponement. Interestingly, the behavior of regulators completely changes when markets are opened to international competition.

Indeed, under a common market, the instantaneous gain from using clean technology is greater for regulators than for firms. Consequently, the socially optimal adoption date is earlier than the optimal adoption date for firms. Therefore, in a common market, regulators induce firms to adopt clean technology at the socially optimal adoption date by giving them speed up adoption subsidies. Interestingly, the socially optimal adoption date under a common market better internalizes transboundary pollution than that under autarky.

Finally, the instantaneous social welfare benefit from the adoption of the clean technology is greater under a common market, implying an earlier socially optimal adoption date compared with that under autarky. Consequently, with market opening, we have less global flow of pollution.

Let us notice that some of our interesting results are not due to pollution and can be added to the rich literature related to industrial organization which considered that new technology is characterized by a lower per-unit production cost. However, some other important results are due to pollution and/or transboundary pollution: i) the comparison of the per-unit emission-taxes in the two market regimes, ii) the better internalization of transboundary pollution by the socially optimal adoption date under a common market, iii) the socially optimal adoption date is lower under a common market than under autarky. It is also lower compared with the optimal adoption date for firms.

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6 Appendix

6.1 Autarky

6.1.1 Instantaneous gains from using the clean technology

i) Social optimum

Using expressions (4) and (14):
\[ S_{1cd}^a - S_{1dd}^a = \left[ a - (\hat{q}_{1cd}^a + \hat{q}_{1dd}^a) - c \right] (\hat{q}_{1cd}^a - \hat{q}_{1dd}^a) + (d - c) \hat{q}_{1dd}^a + \alpha e \hat{q}_{1dd}^a \]

By using expressions of \( \hat{q}_{1dd}^a \) and \( \hat{q}_{1cd}^a \), we get:
\[ S_{1cd}^a - S_{1dd}^a = \frac{d - c + \alpha e}{2} (\hat{q}_{1cd}^a + \hat{q}_{1dd}^a) > 0 \quad (46) \]

Using expressions (10) and (15):
\[ S_{2cc}^a - S_{2cd}^a = \left[ a - (\hat{q}_{2cd}^a + \hat{q}_{2cc}^a) - c \right] (\hat{q}_{2cc}^a - \hat{q}_{2cd}^a) + (d - c) \hat{q}_{2cd}^a + \alpha e \hat{q}_{2cd}^a \]

By using expressions of \( \hat{q}_{2cc}^a \) and \( \hat{q}_{2cd}^a \), we get:
\[ S_{2cc}^a - S_{2cd}^a = \frac{d - c + \alpha e}{2} (\hat{q}_{2cc}^a + \hat{q}_{2cd}^a) > 0 \quad (47) \]

Given that \( \hat{q}_{icc}^a = \hat{q}_{1cd}^a \) and \( \hat{q}_{idd}^a = \hat{q}_{2cd}^a \), we have:
\[ S_{1cd}^a - S_{1dd}^a = S_{2cc}^a - S_{2cd}^a \quad (48) \]

ii) Regulated firms

Since \( \hat{q}_{icc}^a = \hat{q}_{1cd}^a \), then by using expressions (7) and (12):
\[ U_{1cd}^a - U_{1dd}^a = U_{icc}^a - U_{idd}^a = \left[ a - 2(\hat{q}_{icc}^a + \hat{q}_{idd}^a) \right] (\hat{q}_{icc}^a - \hat{q}_{idd}^a) + (s_{icc}^a - c) \hat{q}_{icc}^a + d \hat{q}_{idd}^a + t_{idd}^a e \hat{q}_{idd}^a \]

By changing the emission-tax \( t_{idd}^a \) and the production subsidy \( s_{idd}^a \) by their expressions in function of \( \hat{q}_{idd}^a \) and \( \hat{q}_{icc}^a \), we obtain:
\[ U_{1cd}^a - U_{1dd}^a = U_{icc}^a - U_{idd}^a = 2[(\hat{q}_{icc}^a)^2 - (\hat{q}_{idd}^a)^2] = (d - c + \alpha e)(\hat{q}_{icc}^a + \hat{q}_{idd}^a) > 0 \quad (49) \]
6.1.2 Comparison of instantaneous gains

Using expressions (46) and (49), we have:

\[ U_{1cd}^a - U_{1dd}^a - (S_{1cd}^a - S_{1dd}^a) = [2(\hat{q}_{1cd}^a - \hat{q}_{1dd}^a) - \frac{d-c+ae}{2}] (\hat{q}_{1cc}^a + \hat{q}_{1dd}^a) \]

By using expressions of \( \hat{q}_{1cd}^a \) and \( \hat{q}_{1dd}^a \) in the above bracketed expression, we show that:

\[ 0 < S_{1cd}^a - S_{1dd}^a < U_{1cd}^a - U_{1dd}^a \]  \hspace{1cm} (50)

The instantaneous gain from using the clean technology is higher for the first adopter firm than for its regulator.

6.1.3 Optimal adoption dates

We suppose that \( \tau_1 \leq \tau_2 \), meaning that, in case of non-simultaneous adoption, firm 1 is the first adopter and firm 2 is the second.

i) Regulated firms

Firm \( i \) maximizes its intertemporal net profit \( IU_i^a(\tau_i) \) given by (20) with respect to \( \tau_i \):

\[ \frac{\partial IU_i^a(\tau_i)}{\partial \tau_i} = (U_{idd}^a - U_{icc}^a)e^{-r\tau_i} + \theta mre^{-mr\tau_i} = 0 \]  \hspace{1cm} (51)

Equation (51) is equivalent to:

\[ U_{idd}^a - U_{icc}^a + \theta mre^{(1-m)r\tau_i} = 0 \iff \tau_i^{*a} = \tau_i = \frac{1}{(1-m)r} \ln \left( \frac{U_{icc}^a - U_{idd}^a}{\theta mr} \right) \]

Because of \( m > 1 \) and condition (21), \( \tau_i^{*a} > 0 \).

We have:

\[ \frac{\partial^2 IU_i^a(\tau_i)}{\partial \tau_i^2} = r(U_{icc}^a - U_{idd}^a)e^{-r\tau_i} - \theta (mr)^2 e^{-mr\tau_i}. \]

Using the first-order condition given by (51), we get:
The second-order condition of optimality is verified.

**ii) Social optimum**

Each regulator maximizes his intertemporal social welfare function $\text{IS}_1^a(\tau_1, \tau_2)$ and $\text{IS}_2^a(\tau_1, \tau_2)$, given by (18) and (19), with respect to $\tau_1$ and $\tau_2$, respectively:

\[
\frac{\partial \text{IS}_1^a(\tau_1, \tau_2)}{\partial \tau_1} = (S_{1dd}^a(\hat{q}_{1dd}^a) - S_{1cd}^a(\hat{q}_{1cd}^a)) e^{-r \tau_1} + \theta mre^{-mr \tau_1} = 0 \tag{52}
\]

\[
\frac{\partial \text{IS}_2^a(\tau_1, \tau_2)}{\partial \tau_2} = (S_{2cd}^a(\hat{q}_{2cd}^a) - S_{2cc}^a(\hat{q}_{2cc}^a)) e^{-r \tau_2} + \theta mre^{-mr \tau_2} = 0 \tag{53}
\]

Equations (52) and (53) are respectively equivalent to:

\[
S_{1dd}^a(\hat{q}_{1dd}^a) - S_{1cd}^a(\hat{q}_{1cd}^a) + \theta mre^{(1-m)r \tau_1} = 0 \iff \hat{\tau}_1^a = \frac{1}{(1-m)r} \ln \left( \frac{S_{1cd}^a(\hat{q}_{1cd}^a) - S_{1dd}^a(\hat{q}_{1dd}^a)}{\theta mr} \right)
\]

\[
S_{2cd}^a(\hat{q}_{2cd}^a) - S_{2cc}^a(\hat{q}_{2cc}^a) + \theta mre^{(1-m)r \tau_2} = 0 \iff \hat{\tau}_2^a = \frac{1}{(1-m)r} \ln \left( \frac{S_{2cc}^a(\hat{q}_{2cc}^a) - S_{2cd}^a(\hat{q}_{2cd}^a)}{\theta mr} \right)
\]

Because of $m > 1$, condition (21), inequalities (50), equalities (48) and (49), we get $\hat{\tau}_1^a > 0$ and $\hat{\tau}_2^a > 0$.

We have:
\[ \begin{align*}
\frac{\partial^2 IS_a^1(\hat{\tau}_a, \tau_2)}{\partial \tau_1^2} &= r(S_a^a cd(q_{1cd}^a) - S_a^a dd(q_{1dd}^a))e^{-r\tau_1} - \theta(mr)^2 e^{-mr\tau_1} \\
\frac{\partial^2 IS_a^2(\tau_1, \hat{\tau}_a)}{\partial \tau_2^2} &= r(S_a^a cc(q_{2cc}^a) - S_a^a cd(q_{2cd}^a))e^{-r\tau_2} - \theta(mr)^2 e^{-mr\tau_2}
\end{align*} \]

Using first-order conditions given by (52) and (53), we get:

\[ \frac{\partial^2 IS_a^1(\hat{\tau}_a, \tau_2)}{\partial \tau_1^2} = (1 - m)m \theta r^2 e^{-mr\hat{\tau}_a^1} < 0; \quad \frac{\partial^2 IS_a^2(\tau_1, \hat{\tau}_a)}{\partial \tau_2^2} = (1 - m)m \theta r^2 e^{-mr\hat{\tau}_a^2} < 0 \]

Thus, the second-order condition of optimality is verified for each regulator. Because of equality (48), we have: \( \hat{\tau}_1^a = \hat{\tau}_2^a = \hat{\tau}_a \).

6.1.4 Comparison of adoption dates

Inequality (50), the fact that \( U_{1cd}^a - U_{1dd}^a = U_{icc}^a - U_{idd}^a \) and \( m > 1 \), enable us to make the following ranking:

\[ 0 < \tau^{+a} < \hat{\tau}_a \]

Under autarky, firms adopt earlier than what is socially optimal.

6.2 Common market

6.2.1 Instantaneous gains from using the clean technology

i) Social optimum

Using expressions (27) and (31):

\[ S_{icc}^{cm} - S_{idd}^{cm} = [a - (\hat{q}_{icc}^{cm} + \hat{q}_{idd}^{cm}) - c](\hat{q}_{icc}^{cm} - \hat{q}_{idd}^{cm}) + (d - c)\hat{q}_{idd}^{cm} + (\alpha + \beta)e\hat{q}_{idd}^{cm} \]

By using the expressions of \( \hat{q}_{idd}^{cm} \) and \( \hat{q}_{icc}^{cm} \), the above bracketed expression is equal to \( \frac{d - c + \alpha e}{2} \). Therefore, we have:

\[ S_{icc}^{cm} - S_{idd}^{cm} = \frac{d - c + \alpha e}{2}(\hat{q}_{icc}^{cm} + \hat{q}_{idd}^{cm}) + \beta e\hat{q}_{idd}^{cm} > 0 \] (54)

ii) Regulated firms

Using expressions (29) and (33):
By changing the emission-tax $t_{idd}^{cm}$ and the production subsidy $s_{icc}^{cm}$ by their expressions in function of $\hat{q}_{idd}^{cm}$ and $\hat{q}_{icc}^{cm}$, we obtain:

$$U_{icc}^{cm} - U_{idd}^{cm} = [a - 2(\hat{q}_{icc}^{cm} + \hat{q}_{idd}^{cm})](\hat{q}_{icc}^{cm} - \hat{q}_{idd}^{cm}) + (\delta_{icc}^{cm} - c)\hat{q}_{icc}^{cm} + d\hat{q}_{idd}^{cm} + t_{idd}^{cm}e\hat{q}_{idd}^{cm}$$

$$U_{icc}^{cm} - U_{idd}^{cm} = d - c + \alpha e(\hat{q}_{icc}^{cm} + \hat{q}_{idd}^{cm}) > 0 \quad (55)$$

6.2.2 Comparison of instantaneous gains

Using expressions (54) and (55), we obtain:

$$S_{icc}^{cm} - S_{idd}^{cm} - (U_{icc}^{cm} - U_{idd}^{cm}) = \beta e\hat{q}_{idd}^{cm} > 0$$

Thus, we have the following ranking:

$$0 < U_{icc}^{cm} - U_{idd}^{cm} < S_{icc}^{cm} - S_{idd}^{cm} \quad (56)$$

Under a common market, the instantaneous gain from using clean technology is more important for regulators than for firms.

6.2.3 Optimal adoption dates

i) Regulated firms

Each firm $i$ maximizes its intertemporal net profit $IU_{i}^{cm}(\tau)$ given by (41) with respect to $\tau$:

$$\frac{\partial IU_{i}^{cm}(\tau)}{\partial \tau} = (U_{idd}^{cm} - U_{icc}^{cm})e^{-r\tau} + \theta mre^{-mr\tau} = 0 \quad (57)$$

Equation (57) is equivalent to:

$$U_{idd}^{cm} - U_{icc}^{cm} + \theta mre^{(1-m)r\tau} = 0 \iff \tau^{*cm} = \frac{1}{(1-m)r} \ln \left(\frac{U_{icc}^{cm} - U_{idd}^{cm}}{\theta mr} \right)$$
Because of $m > 1$, equalities (49), (55) and inequalities (21), $r_{cm} > 0$.
We have: $\frac{\partial^2 U_{cm}(\tau)}{\partial \tau^2} = r(U_{icc}^{cm} - U_{idd}^{cm})e^{-r\tau} - \theta (mr)^2 e^{-mr\tau}$.

Using the first-order condition given by (57), we get:
$$\frac{\partial^2 U_{cm}(\tau^{cm})}{\partial \tau^2} = (1-m)m\theta r^2 e^{-mr\tau^{cm}} < 0$$

Thus, the second-order condition of optimality is verified.

**ii) Social optimum**
Each regulator $i$ maximizes his intertemporal social welfare $IS_{cm}^{i}(\tau)$ given by (40) with respect to $\tau$:
$$\frac{\partial IS_{cm}^{i}(\tau)}{\partial \tau} = (S_{idd}^{cm} - S_{icc}^{cm})e^{-r\tau} + \theta m re^{-mr\tau} = 0 \quad (58)$$

Equation (58) is equivalent to:
$$S_{idd}^{cm} - S_{icc}^{cm} + \theta m e^{(1-m)r\tau} = 0 \iff \hat{\tau}^{cm} = \frac{1}{(1-m)r} \ln \left( \frac{S_{icc}^{cm} - S_{idd}^{cm}}{\theta mr} \right)$$

Using expressions (54) and (49), we show that:
$$S_{icc}^{cm} - S_{idd}^{cm} - (U_{icc}^{a} - U_{idd}^{a}) = \frac{d-c+\alpha e}{2} (\hat{q}_{icc}^{cm} + \hat{q}_{idd}^{cm}) + \beta e \hat{q}_{idd}^{cm} - (d-c+\alpha e)(\hat{q}_{icc}^{a} + \hat{q}_{idd}^{a})$$

Since $\hat{q}_{icc}^{cm} = \hat{q}_{icc}^{a}$ and $\hat{q}_{idd}^{cm} = \hat{q}_{idd}^{a}$, then:
$$S_{icc}^{cm} - S_{idd}^{cm} - (U_{icc}^{a} - U_{idd}^{a}) = \frac{-d-c+\alpha e}{2} (\hat{q}_{icc}^{cm} + \hat{q}_{idd}^{cm}) + \beta e \hat{q}_{idd}^{cm}$$

Suppose that $\beta = \alpha$, and using the second inequality of (1), then:
$$S_{icc}^{cm} - S_{idd}^{cm} - (U_{icc}^{a} - U_{idd}^{a}) = \frac{-d-c+\alpha e}{2} \hat{q}_{icc}^{cm} + \frac{\alpha e - c - d}{2} \hat{q}_{idd}^{cm} < 0$$
Therefore:

\[ S_{icc}^{cm} - S_{idd}^{cm} < U_{icc}^{a} - U_{idd}^{a} \]  \hspace{1cm} (59)

Because of \( m > 1 \), inequalities (59) and (21), \( \hat{\tau}^{cm} > 0 \).

We have:

\[ \frac{\partial^2 I^{cm}(\tau)}{\partial \tau^2} = r(S_{icc}^{cm} - S_{idd}^{cm})e^{-r\tau} - \theta (mr)^2 e^{-mr\tau}. \]

Using the first-order condition given by (58), we get:

\[ \frac{\partial^2 I^{cm}(\hat{\tau}^{cm})}{\partial \hat{\tau}^2} = (1 - m)m\theta r^2 e^{-mr\hat{\tau}^{cm}} < 0. \]

Thus, the second-order condition of optimality is verified.

6.3 Autarky versus common market

From expressions (46) and (54), we show that:

\[ S_{1cd}^{a} - S_{1dd}^{a} < S_{icc}^{cm} - S_{idd}^{cm} \]  \hspace{1cm} (60)

This implies that \( \hat{\tau}^{cm} < \hat{\tau}^{a} \).

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