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Regular prices and sales

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Abstract

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We study the properties of a profit-maximizing monopolist's optimal price distribution when selling to a loss-averse consumer, where (following Köszegi and Rabin (2006)) we assume that the consumer's reference point is her recent rational expectations about the purchase. If it is close to costless for the consumer to observe the realized price of the product, then - in a pattern consistent with several recently documented facts regarding supermarket pricing - the monopolist chooses low and variable "sale" prices with some probability and a high and sticky "regular" price with the complementary probability. Realizing that she will buy at the sale prices and hence that she will purchase with positive probability, the consumer chooses to avoid the painful uncertainty in whether she will get the product by buying also at the regular price. If it is more costly for the consumer to observe the realized price, then - in a pattern consistent with the pricing behavior of some other retailers (e.g. movie theaters) - the monopolist chooses a sticky price and holds no sales. In this case, a sale is less tempting and hence less effective in generating an expectation to purchase with positive probability. We also show that ex-ante competition for loyal consumers leads to sticky pricing while ex-post competition leads to marginal-cost pricing, and discuss several other extensions of the model.

Keyword(s): reference-dependent utility, gain-loss utility, loss aversion, sticky prices, sales, supermarket pricing

JEL Classification: D11, D43, D81, L13

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1 Introduction

Consumer retail prices exhibit a systematic combination of stickiness and flexibility. The stickiness of prices—that they can remain unchanged for many months despite changing cost or demand circumstances—has long been considered a stylized fact in industrial organization and macroeconomics. Yet more recent research on supermarket pricing has qualified this stylized fact by documenting that although regular prices do change rarely, there are also frequent sales, and sale prices are much more variable than regular prices. At the same time, this qualification does not seem to apply to many other types of retailers—such as movie theaters or restaurants—which simply have sticky prices and few non-cyclical sales.¹

While existing theories have clearly identified many important considerations in retailer pricing decisions, to our knowledge there is no micro-founded model that convincingly explains in one framework the above puzzling combination of stickiness and flexibility. In this paper, we develop a potential explanation for all the above patterns by introducing consumer loss aversion into a simple classical environment of monopolistic pricing. We assume that a risk-neutral profit-maximizing monopolist sells a single product to a representative consumer with known valuation, and the consumer’s reference point for evaluating her purchase is her recent rational expectations about the purchase. If the consumer automatically finds out the product’s price—such as at a supermarket she visits whether or not she buys this particular product—the monopolist charges low sale prices with some probability and a high regular price with the complementary probability. The sale prices are chosen such that it is not credible for the consumer not to buy at these prices. Then, because the consumer expects to purchase with positive probability and dislikes uncertainty in whether she will get the product, she chooses to buy also at the regular price. In contrast, if the consumer would not automatically know whether the product is on sale—such as for a movie theater she visits only if she is going to watch a movie—a sale is less tempting and hence less effective in making not buying non-credible for her, so that the monopolist always chooses a regular price, holding no sales. In either case, because the consumer dislikes uncertainty in how much she pays, to get her to choose to buy at the regular price the monopolist makes the regular price sticky.

¹ We review evidence for these claims in Section 2.
After reviewing the key empirical evidence on pricing in Section 2, in Section 3 we present our basic model of supermarket pricing, which uses the framework of K˝ oszegi and Rabin (2006) to incorporate consumer loss aversion into a simple model of first-degree price discrimination. There is a single product and a single representative consumer. If the consumer gets the product, she derives consumption utility $v$ from it, and she also derives additive consumption disutility from any money she pays. In addition, the consumer derives gain-loss utility from the comparison of her consumption utility in the product and money dimensions to a reference point equal to her lagged expectations regarding the same outcomes, with losses being more painful than equal-sized gains are pleasant. Suppose, for example, that the consumer had been expecting to buy the product for either $5 or $7. If she buys it for $6, she experiences no gain or loss in the product dimension and “mixed feelings” in the money dimension consisting of a loss relative to the possibility of paying $5 and a gain relative to the possibility of paying $7, with the weight on the loss equal to the probability with which she had been expecting to pay $5. If she does not buy, she experiences a loss in the product dimension and (paying $0) a gain in the money dimension relative to both prices $5 and $7. To determine expectations and behavior with these preferences, we assume that the consumer must form credible purchase plans: given the expectations induced by her plan of which prices to buy at, buying at exactly those prices must be optimal. Among credible plans, the consumer chooses one that maximizes her ex-ante expected utility, which we call a preferred personal equilibrium or PPE.

The above consumer interacts with a risk-neutral profit-maximizing monopolist with deterministic production cost. In period 0, the monopolist commits to a price distribution. This commitment assumption captures, in a reduced form, the idea that a patient firm would have the incentive to develop a reputation for playing the long-run optimal price distribution. The consumer observes the price distribution while forming expectations about her own price-contingent behavior. In period 1, a price is drawn from the distribution, and the consumer decides whether to buy a single item of the good. For technical reasons, we assume that the price distribution must be discrete with atoms at least $\Delta > 0$ apart, and look for the limit-optimal price distribution as $\Delta$ approaches zero.

We analyze our basic model in Section 4. In Section 4.1, we show that for any loss-averse
The figure graphs the limit-optimal price distribution when the monopolist sells to a single consumer with known consumption value \( v \) for the product, and—to be consistent with experimental evidence suggesting two-to-one loss aversion—loss-aversion parameters are \( \lambda = 3 \) and \( \eta = 1 \) (see Section 3 for a definition of these variables). In this case, the regular price is charged about 62% of the time. Although the location of the prices and the weight placed on the regular price is typically different, the limit-optimal price distribution has the same qualitative features (a region of continuously distributed low prices and an atomic high price) for any \( \lambda > 1 \) and \( \eta > 0 \).

preferences by the consumer, the monopolist’s limit-optimal price distribution consists of a region of continuously distributed low sale prices and a single (atomic) high regular price (see Figure 1). We explain the intuition in three parts.

First, despite a loss-averse consumer’s dislike of uncertainty—in fact, by exploiting this dislike—the monopolist can earn greater profits by charging uncertain prices than by charging a deterministic price. If the monopolist uses a deterministic price \( p \), then it cannot earn revenue of more than \( v \).\(^2\) But consider instead the strategy of sometimes charging sale prices low enough to make not buying at these prices non-credible, and at other times charging a high regular price. Realizing that she

\(^2\) In this case, any rational expectations match actual behavior, so in PPE gain-loss utility must be zero. As a result, the consumer prefers to maximize consumption utility, not buying if \( p > v \). And such a plan is credible: once the consumer makes her preferred plan not to buy, she would experience paying for the product as a painful loss, so that she would especially not like to buy.
will buy at the sale prices, would the consumer also buy at the regular price? With a plan not to do so, she expects to get the product with an interior probability, so she feels a pleasant gain if she gets it and an unpleasant loss if she does not get it. Due to loss aversion, she feels the loss more heavily, so that she receives negative expected gain-loss utility in the product dimension. Hence, she prefers to eliminate uncertainty in whether she will get the product, and is therefore willing to buy at all prices even if the regular price exceeds \( v \) somewhat. Going further, by exploiting a type of time inconsistency to push the consumer’s expected utility below zero, the firm can lead her to pay an average price exceeding \( v \). When the consumer decides to buy at a sale price in period 1, she does not take into account that this increases her period-0 expectations to consume and spend money, lowering her expected utility. In this sense of leading the consumer to choose outcomes she does not like ex ante, the monopolist’s pricing strategy is manipulative.

Second, the profit-maximizing way to execute the above “luring sales” is to put a small weight on each of a large number of sale prices. If the consumer had expected not to buy, she would experience paying for the product as a loss and getting the product merely as a gain, creating a low willingness to pay for the product. To make not buying non-credible, then, the monopolist puts a small weight on a low price \( p \) chosen such that even if the consumer expected not to buy, she would buy at \( p \). Given that the consumer realizes she will buy at \( p \), she experiences not getting the product partially as a loss rather than a foregone gain, and paying for it partially as a foregone gain rather than a loss, increasing her willingness to pay. As a result, not buying at a slightly higher price is also non-credible, allowing the monopolist to charge higher prices at all other times. Continuing this logic further, the monopolist needs to charge each sale price with only a low probability.

Third, the regular price is sticky because the firm wants to induce the consumer to buy at the regular price in addition to the sale prices, and—just as she dislikes uncertainty in whether she gets the product—the consumer dislikes uncertainty in the regular price. If the regular price was uncertain, the consumer would experience a gain if it turned out relatively low and a loss if it turned out relatively high. Due to loss aversion, she would feel the loss more heavily, making her less willing to buy at an uncertain regular price.

To demonstrate some robustness of our prediction that the regular price is sticky in an environ-
ment that with classical consumers would generate price variation, in Section 4.2 we study pricing when consumers have heterogeneous consumption values and the firm has uncertain marginal cost. Although we are not able to solve for the fully optimal price distribution, in a simple restricted class of distributions we show that if the firm’s cost is sufficiently narrowly distributed, the firm still chooses a sticky regular price and substantially lower and variable sale prices.

While the bulk of our paper is devoted to explaining the combination of stickiness and flexibility in supermarket prices, our framework also allows us to make predictions on the pricing of different kinds of retailers by considering natural alternatives to our basic assumptions. In Section 5.1, we provide a potential explanation for the difference in the frequency of sales at supermarkets and some other retailers (such as movie theaters) based on the ease with which a consumer observes whether a product is on sale. Once a consumer is at the supermarket to buy her usual supplies, she automatically sees which other items are on sale that day and will be tempted to buy them. As a result, a sale is an effective way to make a plan of not buying non-credible. But since a moviegoer does not go to the theater other than to watch a movie, before she decides to go she would not as easily know whether a movie is on sale that day, making a sale less tempting. As a result, a sale is less effective in making a plan of not buying non-credible, so that a movie theater is less likely to use it in its pricing strategy. We formalize this distinction by showing that when the consumer must pay a high-enough monetary or effort cost to learn the price realization in period 1, the monopolist chooses a sticky price and holds no sales. In Section 5.2, we consider perfect ex-ante competition for consumers: two firms simultaneously announce their price distributions in period 0, and in the same period the consumer decides which firm to visit in period 1. In this case, firms compete for consumers by offering a sticky price. This prediction may explain, for instance, why restaurants—typically facing strong local competition—have far fewer sales than supermarkets. In contrast, perfect ex-post competition—where consumers buy a cheapest product on the market—generates marginal-cost pricing, potentially explaining, for instance, why economy-class airline tickets have highly variable prices. We also discuss many other variants of our main model, including the possibility that gain-loss utility is lower in money than in the product, that consumers enter the market with non-rational initial expectations, and that the monopolist faces
a competitive fringe.

In Section 6, we summarize the behavioral-economics and pricing literatures most related to our paper. While we believe many other theories capture realistic aspects of firm pricing, we argue that none explain the pattern of regularities our model does, so that consumer loss aversion is also likely part of the story. We conclude the paper in Section 7 by pointing out some pricing patterns that our model cannot explain.

2 Summary of Evidence

In this section, we summarize some of the key evidence on the price patterns of consumer retail products.

2.1 (Regular) Retail Prices are Sticky

The notion that consumer retail prices are sticky has long been an accepted stylized fact in industrial organization. In a classic study, Cecchetti (1986) finds that the time between magazine price changes is typically over a year and sometimes over a decade. For a selection of goods in a mail-order catalog, Kashyap (1995) observes an average of 14.7 months between price changes. MacDonald and Aaronson (2006) document that for restaurant prices, the median duration between price changes is around 10 months. Even at the lower end of the stickiness spectrum, Bils and Klenow (2004) find a median price duration of 4.3 months for non-shelter items in the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data underlying the Consumer Price Index. Finally, at supermarkets regular prices change about once a year (Kehoe and Midrigan 2008, Eichenbaum, Jaimovich and Rebelo 2009).

In a classical reference-independent model, any change in the firm’s cost or elasticity of demand creates an incentive to change prices. From this perspective, it is likely that changes in the economic environment are far too rapid to justify the above lags between price changes. As suggestive evidence for this observation, Eichenbaum et al. (2009) document that conditional on the weekly price being constant and equal to the regular price, the standard deviation of quantities sold is 42%.
2.2 Prices at Supermarkets Feature Frequent Sales with Variable Prices

Although regular prices at supermarkets are quite stable, posted prices change every two or three weeks on average, typically by moving away from the regular price and then quickly returning to it (Chevalier, Kashyap and Rossi 2003, Kehoe and Midrigan 2008, Eichenbaum et al. 2009). Furthermore, most of these temporary price changes are sales (price decreases rather than increases), with the mean deviation being -22% of the regular price (Kehoe and Midrigan 2008).

Not only are sales frequent, sale prices are less sticky than regular prices. Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) document that it is more likely for a sale price to change from one promotion to the next than for a regular price to change when interrupted by a sale. Nakamura and Steinsson (2009) find that for the median product category, the sale price changes in 48.7 percent of the weeks during a multi-week sale, while the regular price changes in only 6.1 percent of weeks. Similarly, the number of unique prices as a fraction of total weeks spent on sale is 0.434, while the same number for regular prices is 0.045.

2.3 At Many Retailers, Sales are Less Common than in Supermarkets

The frequency of sales that has been observed at supermarkets does not seem to be a general feature of consumer retail prices—many retailers simply charge a sticky price and rarely have non-cyclical sales. Movies, for instance, largely sell at the same price for extended periods of time (Einav and Orbach 2007). Similarly, many previous studies of price stickiness, including the Cecchetti (1986) study on newspapers and the MacDonald and Aaronson (2006) study on restaurants mentioned above, do not seem to find frequent sales. And while Eichenbaum et al. (2009) report that sale prices constitute about 30% of price observations at supermarkets, Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) find that overall they constitute only 8% of non-food price observations.

Of course, some retailers have cyclical sales: for instance, movie theaters have matinees and clothes retailers have clearance sales. In these situations, unlike in supermarkets, sales are responses to obvious substantial changes in demand predicted by most consumers long in advance. Since consumer expectations play a central role in our theory, this means that such situations are qualitatively different from those for a typical supermarket product. As we discuss in Section 5.3,
in such situations we can think of the low-demand and high-demand periods as different pricing problems, and our model often predicts a sticky sale price.

3 Model

In this section, we introduce our basic model of pricing with a loss-averse consumer. A risk-neutral profit-maximizing monopolist is looking to sell a single product with deterministic production cost $c$ to a single representative consumer. The interaction between the monopolist and the consumer lasts two periods, 0 and 1. In period 0, the monopolist commits to a price distribution $\Pi(\cdot)$ for its product. The consumer learns the price distribution and (in a way detailed below) forms stochastic beliefs regarding her purchase. In period 1, a price $p$ is drawn from $\Pi(\cdot)$, and after observing the price, the consumer decides whether to buy a single item of the product, choosing quantity $b \in \{0, 1\}$. For technical and expositional reasons, we assume that any indifference by the consumer in period 1 is broken in favor of buying.

Our assumption that the firm can commit to the price distribution captures, in a static reduced form, a patient firm’s dynamic incentives to forego possible short-term profits to manage consumers’ price expectations. One can provide micro-foundations for this assumption based on Fudenberg and Levine (1989), in which the firm can develop a “reputation” for playing the optimal committed price distribution. More generally, it seems plausible to assume that a patient firm realizes that over time, consumers will learn the distribution of prices and incorporate it into their expectations.

Our model of consumer behavior follows the approaches of Köszegi and Rabin (2006) and Heidhues and Köszegi (2008), but it adapts and simplifies these theories to fit the decision of whether to purchase a single product. The consumer’s utility function has two components. Her consumption utility is $(v - p)b$, so that the consumption value of the product is $v$. Consumption utility can be thought of as the classical notion of outcome-based utility. In addition, the consumer derives gain-loss utility from the comparison of her period-1 consumption outcomes to a reference point given by her period-0 expectations (probabilistic beliefs) about those outcomes. Let $k^v = vb$

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3 In Section 4.2 we allow for consumer heterogeneity and cost uncertainty, and in Section 5.2 we consider competition between sellers.

4 A formal argument is available from the authors upon request.
and \( k^p = -pb \) be the consumption utilities in the product and money dimensions, respectively. For a riskless consumption outcome \((k^v, k^p)\) and riskless expectations \((r^v, r^p)\) defined over the two dimensions of consumption utility, total utility is

\[
\begin{align*}
    u(k^v|r^v) + u(k^p|r^p) &= k^v + \mu(k^v - r^v) + k^p + \mu(k^p - r^p).
\end{align*}
\]

We assume that \( \mu \) is two-piece linear with a slope of \( \eta > 0 \) for gains and a slope of \( \eta \lambda > \eta \) for losses. By positing a constant marginal utility from gains and a constant and larger marginal disutility from losses, this formulation captures prospect theory’s (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Tversky and Kahneman 1991) loss aversion, but ignores prospect theory’s diminishing sensitivity. The parameter \( \eta \) can be interpreted as the weight attached to gain-loss utility, and \( \lambda \) as the coefficient of loss aversion.

Beyond loss aversion, our specification in Equation 1 incorporates two further assumptions. First, the consumer assesses gains and losses in the two dimensions, the product and money, separately. Hence, if her reference point is not to get the product and not to pay anything, for instance, she evaluates getting the product and paying for it as a gain in the product dimension and a loss in the money dimension—and not as a single gain or loss depending on total consumption utility relative to the reference point. This is consistent with much experimental evidence commonly interpreted in terms of loss aversion.\(^5\) It is also crucial for our results: if gain-loss utility was defined over total consumption utility—as would be the case, for example, in an experiment with induced values—then for any reference point the consumer’s willingness to pay for the product would be \( v \), so that the firm would set a deterministic price equal to \( v \). Second, since the gain-loss utility function \( \mu \) is the same in the two dimensions, the consumer’s sense of gain or loss is directly related to the intrinsic value of the changes in question. In Section 5, we argue that this assumption is not as crucial for our results.

Although our model does not explicitly allow for the consumer to buy other goods, it is equiv-

\(^5\) Specifically, it is key to explaining the endowment effect—that randomly assigned “owners” of an object value it more highly than “non-owners”—and other observed regularities in trading behavior. The common and intuitive explanation of the endowment effect is that owners construe giving up the object as a painful loss that counts more than money they receive in exchange, so that they demand a lot of money for the object. But if gains and losses were defined over the value of the entire transaction, owners would not be more sensitive to giving up the object than to receiving money in exchange, so no endowment effect would ensue.
alent to a specification in which the consumer spends her leftover money on a divisible alternative product, and evaluates gains and losses in the alternative product separately from gains and losses in the firm’s product. Once again, however, if the consumer integrates the gains and losses—for instance because the products satisfy very similar hedonic desires—the firm can never sell its own product more expensively than the alternative’s price, so that a different model results.

Since we assume below that expectations are rational, and in many situations such rational expectations are stochastic, we extend the utility function in Equation 1 to allow for the reference point to be a pair of probability distributions $F = (F^v, F^p)$ over the two dimensions of consumption utility. In this case, total utility from the outcome $(k^v, k^p)$ is

$$U(k^v|F^v) + U(k^p|F^p) = \int_{r^v} u(k^v|r^v)dF^v(r^v) + \int_{r^p} u(k^p|r^p)dF^p(r^p).$$

In evaluating $(k^v, k^p)$, the consumer compares it to each possibility in the reference lottery. If she had been expecting to pay either $15 or $20 for the product, for example, paying $17 for it feels like a loss of $2 relative to the possibility of paying $15, and like a gain of $3 relative to the possibility of paying $20. In addition, the weight on the loss in the overall experience is equal to the probability with which she had been expecting to pay $15.

To complete our theory of consumer behavior with the above belief-dependent preferences, we specify how beliefs are formed. Still applying K˝ oszegi and Rabin (2006), we assume that beliefs must be consistent with rationality: the consumer correctly anticipates the implications of her period-0 plans, and makes the best plan she knows she will carry through. While the formal definitions below are notationally somewhat cumbersome, the logical consequences of this requirement are intuitively relatively simple. Note that any plan of behavior formulated in period 0—which in our setting amounts simply to a strategy of which prices to buy the product for—induces some expectations in period 0. If, given these expectations, the consumer is not willing to follow the plan, then she could not have rationally formulated the plan in the first place. Hence, a credible plan in period 0 must have the property that it is optimal given the expectations generated by the plan. Following original definitions by K˝ oszegi (2009) and K˝ oszegi and Rabin (2006), we call such a credible plan a personal equilibrium (PE). Given that she is constrained to choose a PE plan, a rational consumer chooses the one that maximizes her expected utility from the perspective of
period 0. We call such a favorite credible plan a *preferred personal equilibrium* (PPE).

Formally, notice that whatever the consumer had been expecting, in period 1 she buys at prices up to and including some cutoff (recall that the consumer’s indifference is broken in favor of buying). Hence, any credible plan must have such a cutoff structure. Consider, then, when a plan to buy up to the price $p^*$ is credible. This plan induces an expectation $F^v(\Pi, p^*)$ of getting consumption utility $v$ from the product with probability $\Pi(p^*)$, and an expectation $F^p(\Pi, p^*)$ of spending nothing with probability $1 - \Pi(p^*)$ and spending each of the prices $p \leq p^*$ with probability $Pr_{\Pi}(p)$. The plan is credible if, with a reference point given by these expectations, $p^*$ is indeed a cutoff price in period 1:

**Definition 1.** The cutoff price $p^*$ is a personal equilibrium (PE) for price distribution $\Pi$ if for the induced expectations $F^v(\Pi, p^*)$ and $F^p(\Pi, p^*)$, we have

$$U(0|F^v(\Pi, p^*)) + U(0|F^p(\Pi, p^*)) = U(v|F^v(\Pi, p^*)) + U(-p^*|F^p(\Pi, p^*)).$$ 

Now utility maximization in period 0 implies that the consumer chooses the PE plan that maximizes her expected utility:

**Definition 2.** The cutoff price $p^*$ is a preferred personal equilibrium (PPE) for price distribution $\Pi$ if it is a PE, and for any PE cutoff price $p^{**}$,

$$E_{F^v(\Pi, p^*)}[U(k^v|F^v(\Pi, p^*))] + E_{F^p(\Pi, p^*)}[U(k^p|F^v(\Pi, p^*))] \geq E_{F^v(\Pi, p^{**})}[U(k^v|F^v(\Pi, p^{**}))] + E_{F^p(\Pi, p^{**})}[U(k^p|F^v(\Pi, p^{**}))].$$  

(3)

The monopolist is a standard risk-neutral profit-maximizing firm, trying to maximize expected profits given the consumer’s behavior. To be able to state the monopolist’s problem simply as a maximization problem rather than as part of an equilibrium, we assume that the consumer chooses the highest-purchase-probability PPE. With this assumption, the monopolist solves

$$\max_{\Pi} \{\Pi(p^*)E_P[p|p \leq p^*] - \Pi(p^*)c \mid p^* \text{ is the highest PPE for } \Pi(\cdot)\}.$$  

(4)
To make our statements and proofs easier, we make one more technical assumption: we suppose that the monopolist must choose a discrete price distribution in which neighboring atoms are at least $\Delta > 0$ apart. Together with the assumption that indifference by the consumer is broken in favor of buying, this ensures the existence of an optimal price distribution. Even without these assumptions, price distributions close to what we find would approximate the least upper bound on profits arbitrarily closely. In Appendix A, we identify properties of the optimal price distribution for $\Delta > 0$, but in the text we state these results in a more transparent form, in the limit as $\Delta$ approaches zero:

**Definition 3.** The price distribution $\Pi(\cdot)$ is limit-optimal if there exist a sequence $\Delta_i \to 0$ and optimal price distributions $\Pi_i(\cdot)$ for each $\Delta_i$ such that $\Pi_i \to \Pi$ in distribution.

### 4 The Optimal Price Distribution

In this section, we identify the monopolist’s optimal pricing strategy, showing that it is consistent with the facts on supermarket pricing discussed in Section 2.

#### 4.1 Basic Results

Our main proposition identifies the features of the monopolist’s limit-optimal price distribution:

**Proposition 1.** Fix any $\eta > 0$ and $\lambda > 1$. If the firm can profitably sell to the consumer, then the profit-maximizing price distribution induces purchase with probability one. Furthermore, in that case for any limit-optimal price distribution $\Pi(\cdot)$ there is an $s$ satisfying $0 < s < 1$ and prices $p^l_{\text{sale}} = p = (1 + \eta)v/(1 + \eta\lambda), p^h_{\text{sale}}, p_{\text{reg}}$ satisfying $p^l_{\text{sale}} < p^h_{\text{sale}} < p_{\text{reg}}$ such that (i) $\Pi(\cdot)$ puts weight $s$ on the interval $[p^l_{\text{sale}}, p^h_{\text{sale}}]$, where it is continuously distributed with density $\pi(p) = (1 + \eta\lambda)/[\eta(\lambda - 1)(v + p)]$; and (ii) $\Pi(\cdot)$ puts weight $1 - s$ on $p_{\text{reg}}$. The monopolist’s expected revenue is strictly greater than $v$.

Proposition 1 says that the limit-optimal price distribution has two parts (as illustrated in Figure 1): an interval of continuously distributed low prices, and a single atomic high price. Furthermore, there is a gap between the low price interval and the price atom. Thinking of the low prices as
the non-sticky sale prices and the high isolated pricing atom as the sticky regular price, this price distribution is broadly consistent with the evidence on supermarket pricing summarized in Section 2.

We break down the explanation of Proposition 1 into five steps, arguing in turn that (1) the optimal deterministic price is \( v \); (2) the firm can earn more than \( v \) with a stochastic price distribution for which it is not credible for the consumer not to buy at low (sale) prices; (3) it is optimal to use variable sales prices; (4) it is suboptimal to rely solely on these “forcing” sale prices; and (5) the high (regular) price is sticky.

**Step 1.** We start by considering what the monopolist can achieve with a deterministic price \( p \). To identify the consumer’s behavior—the PPE—with such a price, we first identify the PE by solving for conditions under which the consumer is willing to follow respective plans not to buy and to buy.\(^6\) Suppose that the consumer had expected not to buy the product. If she buys, her consumption utility is \( v - p \), and her gain-loss utility—consisting of a gain of \( v \) in the product and a loss of \( p \) in money—is \( \eta v - \eta \lambda p \). If she does not buy, both her consumption utility and (as her outcomes conform to her expectations) her gain-loss utility are zero. Hence, she is willing to follow a plan not to buy, and therefore not buying is a PE, if and only if

\[
p > \frac{1 + \eta}{1 + \eta \lambda} \cdot v \equiv p^c.
\]

Note that in addition to saying that not buying is a PE for deterministic prices \( p > p^c \), the above considerations imply that for any price distribution, not buying for prices less than or equal to \( p^c \) is not credible.

Similar calculations show that buying at a deterministic price \( p \) is a PE if and only if

\[
p \leq \frac{1 + \eta \lambda}{1 + \eta} \cdot v \equiv p^b.
\]

These observations in turn mean that there are three pertinent ranges of the monopolist’s price. For \( p > p_b \), the unique PE is not to buy. For \( p \leq p_b \), the unique PE is to buy. But for the range in-between, the consumer’s expectations are self-fulfilling: she buys if and only if she had been

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\(^6\) This is essentially the same analysis as that in Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, Section IV). The only difference is that unlike in Kőszegi and Rabin (2006), in the current setting there is no mixed-strategy PE because we have assumed that whenever the consumer is indifferent between buying and not buying, she buys with probability 1.
expecting to. Intuitively, the consumer’s expectation to get the product both generates a loss from not getting it and eliminates the loss from paying for it, so that she has a higher reservation price than if she had no expectation to get it. More generally, if the consumer had expected to get the product with higher rather than lower probability, she experiences not getting it as more of a loss and paying for it as less of a loss, increasing her willingness to pay for it. This “attachment effect” (Kőszegi and Rabin 2006) generated by the expectation to buy will feature numerous times in our analysis below.

When there is a unique PE, it is also the PPE. But when there are multiple PE—for \( p \in (p, \bar{p}] \)—the PPE is determined as the consumer’s favorite PE from the perspective of period 0. Since in each PE the consumer gets the outcome she expects, her gain-loss utility in each PE is zero. With total utility equal to consumption utility, the PPE is to maximize consumption utility—to purchase if and only if \( p \leq v \). This implies that the highest revenue the monopolist can earn with a deterministic price is \( v \).

**Step 2.** Surprisingly, due to the loss-averse consumer’s dislike of uncertainty, the monopolist can get her to buy at prices above \( v \) by using uncertain prices. To see why this is the case, suppose that the monopolist charges the price \( \underline{p} \) with probability \( s \) and a price \( p > \underline{p} \) with probability \( 1 - s \). Then, as we have noted above, in any PE the consumer buys at \( \underline{p} \). Given this, when would she prefer a plan of buying also at \( p \)? First, consider making and following through a plan to buy only at \( \underline{p} \). If the price turns out to be \( \underline{p} \), the consumer’s consumption utility is \( v - \underline{p} \), and her gain-loss utility is \((1 - s)\eta v - (1 - s)\eta \lambda \underline{p}\): relative to the possibility of not buying, which the consumer expected to occur with probability \( 1 - s \), buying at \( \underline{p} \) generates a gain of \( v \) in the product and a loss of \( \underline{p} \) in money. If the price turns out to be \( p \), the consumer’s consumption utility is zero, and her gain-loss utility is \(-s\eta \lambda v + s\eta p\): relative to the possibility of buying at price \( \underline{p} \), which the consumer expected to occur with probability \( s \), not buying generates a loss of \( v \) in the product and a gain of \( p \) in money. Overall, the consumer’s expected utility is

\[
s(v - p) - \eta(\lambda - 1)s(1 - s)(v + \underline{p}). \tag{5}
\]

Notice that expected gain-loss utility is negative. For an intuition, take for instance the product dimension. If the consumer gets the product, she experiences this as a gain relative to the ex-ante
expected possibility of not getting it; and if she does not get the product, she experiences this as a loss relative to the ex-ante expected possibility of getting it. Due to loss aversion, the latter feeling is stronger, so that expected gain-loss utility is negative. More generally, a decisionmaker with rational-expectations-based loss aversion dislikes uncertainty in consumption utility because she dislikes the possibility of a resulting loss more than she likes the possibility of a resulting gain (Kőszegi and Rabin 2007, Macera 2009, Herweg, Müller and Weinschenk 2010). In our case, the consumer faces uncertainty both in whether she gets the product and in how much she will pay, so her gain-loss disutility is proportional to $v + p$.

If the consumer makes and follows through a plan to buy at both prices, her expected utility is

$$v - sp - (1 - s)p - \eta(\lambda - 1)s(1 - s)(p - \overline{p})$$

Once again, expected gain-loss utility is negative due to uncertainty—but in this case, the uncertainty is only in whether the consumer will pay $p$ or $\overline{p}$, not in whether she gets the product. Comparing the above two expressions, the consumer prefers to buy at both prices if

$$p \leq v + \frac{2\eta(\lambda - 1)sp}{1 + \eta(\lambda - 1)s}.$$ 

Because the strategy of buying at both prices eliminates the uncertainty in whether she gets the product, the consumer is willing to buy at a price exceeding $v$. In fact, simple arithmetic shows that for a sufficiently small $s > 0$, the consumer buys at both prices even if the average price exceeds $v$ somewhat.

The intuition for this last, crucial, point is that the monopolist exploits a novel type of time inconsistency that arises in our model despite a rational consumer’s attempt to maximize a single well-defined utility function. That beliefs-based preferences can generate time-inconsistent behavior has been pointed out by Caplin and Leahy (2001) and Kőszegi (2009), and explored in more detail by Kőszegi (2009) and Kőszegi and Rabin (2009).
the reference point (formed in period 0) as given, and therefore ignores this negative effect. As a result, the monopolist can push the consumer’s expected utility below zero, so that it can charge an average price greater than \( v \).\(^8\)

**Step 3.** Having illustrated the profitability of using low “sale” prices to make not buying non-credible for the consumer, we next discuss how to choose such “forcing” sale prices. In the above example, the monopolist achieves that the consumer buys with probability \( s \) in any PE by charging \( p \) with probability \( s \). But the monopolist can achieve the same with a higher profit by using more sale prices. In particular, consider a distribution which puts weights of \( q \) and \( s - q \) on \( p \) and \( p' > p \), respectively, where \( 0 < q < s \). Once again, not buying at price \( p \) is not credible. Moreover, we show that for a sufficiently small \( p' > p \), neither is it a PE for the consumer to buy only at price \( p \). If the consumer expected to buy only at \( p \), her consumption utility from buying at \( p' \) would be \( v - p' \), and her gain-loss utility would be \((1 - q)\eta v - (1 - q)\eta \lambda p' - q\eta \lambda (p' - p)\): relative to the possibility of not buying, which the consumer expected to occur with probability \( 1 - q \), buying at price \( p' \) generates a gain of \( v \) in the product and a loss of \( p' \) in money; and relative to the possibility of buying at price \( p \), which the consumer expected to occur with probability \( q \), buying at \( p' \) generates no gain or loss in the product and a loss of \( p' - p \) in money. In the same situation, the consumer’s utility from not buying would be \(-q\eta \lambda v + q\eta p\): relative to the possibility of buying at price \( p \), which the consumer expected to occur with probability \( q \), not buying generates a loss of \( v \) in the product and a gain of \( p \) in money. Comparing the above two expressions, the consumer buys at price \( p' \) if

\[
p' \leq p + \frac{q\eta (\lambda - 1)(v + p)}{1 + \eta \lambda}.
\]

(6)

Since the above cutoff is greater than \( p \), if \( p' \) is sufficiently close to \( p \) it is not credible for the consumer not to buy at \( p' \). In this case, the consumer buys at both prices in any PE.

\(^8\) This intuition is somewhat incomplete: because paying a stochastic price generates negative expected gain-loss utility for the consumer, the fact that she has negative expected utility does not immediately imply that she has negative expected consumption utility—which is what is necessary for her to pay an average price above \( v \). For a complete intuition, therefore, we must argue that the consumer’s total disutility exceeds that from paying the stochastic price. To see this, note that if the firm charges a high price of approximately \( v \) (which is the case for small \( s \)), then the gain-loss disutility from price uncertainty is proportional to \( \eta (\lambda - 1)(v - p) \). This is smaller than the consumer’s total disutility \( \eta \lambda v - \eta p \): facing a loss and a gain of \( v - p \)—which is the consumer’s disutility from facing uncertainty of \( v - p \) in how much she will pay—is lower than facing a loss of \( v \) and a gain of \( p \)—which is the disutility the consumer imposes on herself through time-inconsistent behavior.
Intuitively, due to the attachment effect discussed above, the consumer’s realization that she will buy at $p$ raises her willingness to pay for the product, so that she buys at somewhat higher prices as well. Taking this logic further, the monopolist needs to charge each sale price only with sufficient probability such that not buying at the next lowest possible sale price becomes non-credible. For very small $\Delta$, such a distribution of sale prices approximates the continuous distribution identified in Proposition 1.

**Step 4.** While choosing sale prices to make not buying non-credible is a central part of the monopolist’s strategy, it is suboptimal to make always buying the only credible plan. Suppose by contradiction that such a “forcing” distribution is optimal. By Step 2, its average price must then be greater than $v$. To get a contradiction, we argue that the consumer will still buy at all prices if the monopolist raises the highest price $p$ in the distribution to some $p' > p$ while leaving the rest of the distribution unchanged. By the definition of forcing, $p$ is such that the consumer buys at $p$ if she had been expecting to buy at prices less than $p$. Then, because the attachment effect implies that expecting to buy at $p'$ raises the consumer’s willingness to pay for the product, there is a range of $p' > p$ such that buying at all prices remains a PE (albeit not the only one). Now notice that expecting to buy at $p'$ has a positive effect on utility when buying: besides generating gains in money, it eliminates losses in money and gains in the good, and since the average price is greater than $v$, the elimination of losses dominates. This means that for $p'$ sufficiently close to $p$, the consumer prefers a plan to buy at all prices rather than only at prices below $p$, so that buying at all prices is the PPE.

**Step 5.** Since making always buying the only credible strategy is not optimal, it must be the case that the consumer prefers the plan of buying at the monopolist’s high prices rather than only at the forcing sale prices. To conclude our exposition of Proposition 1, we argue that it is optimal to choose these high “regular” prices to be sticky. Just as she dislikes uncertainty in whether she gets the product, the consumer dislikes uncertainty in the regular price: she experiences a gain if the regular price turns out to be lower than it could have been and a loss if the regular price turns out to be higher than it could have been, and due to loss aversion she feels the loss more heavily. If the regular price was variable rather than sticky, therefore, the consumer would still buy only
if she was compensated with a lower average price. This creates a strong incentive for the firm to
eliminate variation in the regular price.\footnote{It is worthwhile to note why the same reasoning does not imply that the monopolist should choose a sticky sale price. Although the consumer dislikes variation in sale prices, since she buys at these prices in any PE, she cannot avoid the variation. As a result, the monopolist has no incentive to reduce variation in sale prices.}

Beyond the shape of the optimal price distribution, the observation in Step 2 that the consumer buys at an expected price exceeding $v$ has an immediate welfare implication:

**Proposition 2.** For any $\eta > 0, \lambda > 1$, and $\Delta < v - p$, the consumer would be better off expecting and following through a strategy of never buying than expecting and following through her actual strategy of buying at all prices.

Proposition 2 identifies a sense in which the firm’s sales are manipulative: they lead the consumer to buy the product even though she would prefer not to.\footnote{Although we model neither multi-product retailers nor the wholesaler-retailer relationship, Proposition 2 suggests that retailers may benefit less from sales than wholesalers: if welfare-reducing manipulative sales induce some consumers to avoid visiting the retailer, they lower profits from other wholesalers’ products. One would then expect wholesalers to encourage the use of sales in their contracts with downstream retailers.} Several caveats regarding this result are in order. First, the extreme version of the result—that the firm does only harm to the consumer by selling to her—clearly relies on our assumption that the firm knows the consumer’s preferences perfectly. Consumers with much higher valuation than the range of possible prices would clearly be better off buying than not buying. Nevertheless, Proposition 3 below shows that even with consumer heterogeneity, some consumers who buy with positive probability would be better off making and following through a plan of never buying. Second, it matters what the consumer would do with the money if she did not buy from this firm. Given that we assume linear consumption utility in money, the implicit assumption in our model is that the consumer would spend her money on an alternative divisible product which is available on the market at a deterministic price. But if she would be manipulated into buying something else from another firm, she might be better off buying from this firm. Third, alternatives to our rational-expectations assumption, such as that discussed in Section 7, might affect the welfare implications of the consumer’s behavior—even if they do not qualitatively change the optimal price distribution.
4.2 Consumer Heterogeneity and Cost Uncertainty

One of our main points in the paper is that consumer loss aversion generates a sticky (atomic) regular price. But so far, we have shown this only for a (for the firm) deterministic environment, where a classical monopolist would choose a deterministic (and hence also sticky) price. To investigate the robustness of our stickiness result, we analyze a variant of our model in which consumers have heterogeneous consumption values $v$ and the firm faces cost shocks—assumptions that in a classical reference-independent setting would generate price variation. While we cannot solve for the fully general optimal price distribution, we illustrate the robustness of the stickiness of the regular price (as well as the optimality of stochastic prices and the variability of sale prices) by restricting the space of price distributions from which the firm can choose.

Specifically, suppose that there is a continuum of consumers whose consumption value $v$ is distributed on the interval $[0, v]$ with a differentiable cumulative distribution function that is strictly increasing and weakly convex.\footnote{This assumption ensures that for deterministic prices, the demand curve is decreasing and weakly concave (a property that is typically assumed in industrial-organization models).} The firm’s marginal cost is continuously distributed on the interval $[c_L, c_H]$, with $0 < c_L \leq c_H < v$.\footnote{The condition that $c_H < v$ ensures that the firm can profitably sell to the consumer. For example, if the firm charges the price $(v + c_H)/2$ with probability one, then (applying our analysis from Section 4.1, Step 1) all consumers with valuation greater than this price buy the good, so that for any realized marginal cost the firm earns positive profits.} We think of the firm as choosing the price distribution the consumer faces; given any chosen price distribution, it is then optimal to charge lower prices in lower-cost states.

We first argue that the monopolist can still make higher profits with a stochastic price distribution than with a deterministic one. As we have shown (Section 4.1, Step 1), for a deterministic price $p$ consumers maximize consumption utility, buying the product if and only if $p \leq v$. Hence, for deterministic prices the monopolist faces a classical downward-sloping demand curve. Let a profit-maximizing deterministic price be $p^*$. Now suppose that the firm chooses the price distribution (identified in Section 4.1) that would be optimal when there is a representative consumer with $v = p^*$. It is easy to see that consumers with consumption utility $v < p^*$ will not buy the product for any price, and consumers with consumption utility $v \geq p^*$ will buy the product at all

prices. Hence, the firm sells the same amount for a higher average price and the same average cost, increasing profits.

To illustrate the robustness of our other basic findings, we restrict attention to price distributions in which the prices $p_L - \alpha_L$, $p_L + \alpha_L$, $p_H - \alpha_H$, and $p_H + \alpha_H$ are charged with probabilities $s/2$, $s/2$, $(1 - s)/2$, and $(1 - s)/2$, respectively. Constrained by the exogenous bound $\bar{\alpha} > 0$, the firm chooses $s \in [0, 1)$, $p_L$, $p_H$, $\alpha_L$, and $\alpha_H$ satisfying $p_H > p_L + 2\bar{\alpha}$ and $0 \leq \alpha_L, \alpha_H \leq \bar{\alpha}$. While restrictive, this class of price distributions allows us to reconsider each of the features of the optimal price distribution we have found above. Whether the monopolist chooses $s > 0$ answers whether it would like a distribution of the sales-and-regular-prices structure; whether it chooses $\alpha_L > 0$ answers whether it would like variable sale prices; and whether it chooses $\alpha_H > 0$ answers whether it would like a variable regular price.

As a point of comparison, consider first what happens when consumers are not loss averse. Fixing any $\bar{\alpha} > 0$, if $c_H - c_L$ is positive but sufficiently small, the firm sets $s = 0$ and $\alpha_H > 0$—it does not engage in a strategy of significantly different sales and regular prices, but it does respond to small cost shocks by varying its price a little bit. And if $c_H - c_L = 0$, then the firm sets $s = 0$ and $\alpha_H = 0$—it chooses a deterministic price. In contrast, with loss-averse consumers the firm engages in a sales-and-regular-prices strategy and uses variable sale prices whether or not $c_H - c_L > 0$, yet it chooses not to respond to small cost shocks by varying its regular price:

**Proposition 3.** Fix any $\eta > 0, \lambda > 1$. Then, if $\bar{\alpha}$ is sufficiently small, the optimal price distribution has a single regular price ($\alpha_H = 0$). If in addition $c_H - c_L$ is sufficiently small, sales prices are flexible ($\alpha_L = \bar{\alpha}$), and a positive measure of consumers would be strictly better off making and following through a plan of never buying than making and following through their PPE plan.

The reason that the firm chooses a regular-prices-and-sales strategy is the same as in our basic model: to manipulate some consumers into buying at an average price above their valuation. This pricing strategy makes the affected marginal consumers worse off relative to following a strategy of never buying. The reason that the optimal sale prices are variable is also the same as in our basic model: once a consumer knows she will buy at a price $p$ with some probability, it is not credible for her to forego buying at slightly higher prices, allowing the firm to sometimes charge higher prices.
The most interesting novel prediction in Proposition 3 is that even with some cost uncertainty—and despite the fact that the overall price distribution is highly uncertain—the monopolist does not respond to small cost shocks by varying the regular price. Intuitively, loss-averse consumers respond very differently to variation in the regular price than do classical consumers. In a classical model, the monopolist sells more at lower prices, so varying the price allows it to save on production costs by shifting more sales into lower-cost states. With loss aversion, however, small amounts of regular-price variation decrease demand at both the high and the low regular price. Because it eliminates uncertainty in whether she will get the product at the cost of paying only a slightly higher price, for small $\alpha_H$ any consumer who buys at price $p_H - \alpha_H$ also buys at price $p_H + \alpha_H$. But because consumers dislike uncertainty in the regular price, they are less likely to choose to buy at these prices if $\alpha_H > 0$ than if $\alpha_H = 0$. As a result, a slightly variable regular price reduces demand without shifting more production into lower-cost states, so that for sufficiently small cost shocks the firm does not vary the regular price.

5 Extensions and Modifications

While the bulk of our paper is devoted to explaining the combination of stickiness and flexibility in supermarket prices, in this section we discuss a number of further predictions of our framework that may help understand differences in pricing patterns between supermarkets and other retailers.

5.1 Costly Price Discovery

In this section we analyze pricing in our model when the consumer does not automatically observe whether the product is on sale. Suppose that to see the price realization in period 1, the consumer must pay a monetary or effort cost $\phi$ satisfying $0 < \phi < v$. We assume that gain-loss utility in the price-discovery cost is evaluated separately from the product and money, but it will be apparent from our argument that the results would be the same if the cost was on the same dimension as money. Note that since the consumer decides whether to pay $\phi$ before she knows the price realization, this decision cannot be made contingent on whether she ends up purchasing. We assume that the monopolist must choose a price distribution over the non-negative reals.
Proposition 4 identifies the features of the limit-optimal price distribution in this case:

**Proposition 4.** For any \( \eta > 0 \) and \( \lambda > 1 \), there is a \( \phi^* \) satisfying \( 0 < \phi^* < p \) such that:

I. If \( \phi < \phi^* \) and the firm can profitably sell to the consumer, then for any limit-optimal price distribution \( \Pi(\cdot) \) there is an \( s \) satisfying \( 0 < s < 1 \) and prices \( p_{sale}^l = (1 + \eta + \eta(\lambda - 1)\phi/p)v/(1 + \eta\lambda), p_{sale}^h, p_{reg} \) satisfying \( p < p_{sale}^l < p_{sale}^h < p_{reg} \) such that (i) \( \Pi(\cdot) \) puts weight \( \phi/p \) on zero; (ii) \( \Pi(\cdot) \) puts weight \( s \) on the interval \([p_{sale}^l, p_{sale}^h]\), where it is continuously distributed with density \( \pi(p) = (1 + \eta\lambda)/[\eta(\lambda - 1)(v + p)] \); and (iii) \( \Pi(\cdot) \) puts weight \( 1 - s - \phi/p \) on \( p_{reg} \). The monopolist’s expected revenue is strictly greater than \( v - \phi \).

II. If \( \phi > \phi^* \) and the firm can profitably sell to the consumer, then the limit-optimal price distribution puts probability one on \( v - \phi \).

The first part of Proposition 4 says that if \( \phi \) is relatively small, the limit-optimal price distribution is very similar to that with no price-discovery costs (Proposition 1), with one crucial difference: the monopolist charges a price of zero with some probability. Intuitively, the “free sample” is part of the monopolist’s scheme to make not buying non-credible for the consumer. If the consumer had expected not to buy, she will pay \( \phi \) to check the price realization only if she has a chance of getting the product at a price below \( p \), and in this range she saves at least \( \phi \) in expectation relative to \( p \). The profit-maximizing way to give away these savings is to sometimes offer free samples.\(^{13,14}\)

More interestingly, if \( \phi \) is relatively large, the limit-optimal price distribution is deterministic—the price is completely sticky. This is easiest to see when \( \phi > p \). In that case, if the consumer had expected not to buy, the monopolist cannot get her to check the price realization even if it charges

\(^{13}\)To see this, suppose that the expected price below \( p \) is positive. The firm could then redistribute the same weight on zero and \( p \) leaving the average price at or below \( \bar{p} \) unaffected, maintaining the property that in any PE the consumer pays the price-discovery cost and buys at both of these prices. Furthermore, since \( p \) is the highest price at which the consumer prefers to buy in period 1 if she had expected to buy with probability zero, but she actually expects to “purchase” with positive probability at a price of zero, the attachment effect implies that in any PE she strictly prefers to buy at \( p \) in period 1. Hence, the firm can move the atom at \( p \) to a slightly higher price, while still maintaining the property that in any PE the consumer pays the price-discovery cost and buys at both prices. Since this does not undermine the firm’s ability to sell at higher prices, it increases profits.

\(^{14}\)Although our model provides a novel potential explanation for why firms sometimes offer free samples of their products, this prediction is not particularly robust to natural variations of our model. Since there is only one consumer who buys at most one item, our model presupposes that the firm’s free offer cannot be exploited using resale or storage, and will not be used by consumers who do not intend to buy at higher prices. If these additional considerations are important, the firm will put the atom at a higher price, or switch to a deterministic pricing strategy as explained below.
a price of zero with probability one. Hence, manipulating the consumer into buying against her will is impossible, so that there is no point in using sales. But going further, even if it is possible to manipulate the consumer into buying against her will, for a range of $\phi$ it is suboptimal to do so. Intuitively, if the consumer expects to pay lower prices for the product, she experiences paying higher prices as more of a loss, and is therefore less willing to buy at those prices. Hence, if the firm sometimes offers very low sale prices, it must lower its prices at the high end as well. This makes using stochastic prices relatively less attractive.

While we are not aware of a systematic empirical analysis on the relationship between price-discovery costs and the frequency of sales, our theoretical prediction on this relationship provides a potential explanation for why sales are much more common at supermarkets than at many other kinds of retailers. A typical consumer at a supermarket visits to make some planned purchases of supplies, but is also willing to consider additional products to buy. Once at the supermarket, the consumer’s cost of learning the price realization of many additional products is very close to zero, so that the optimal price distribution involves stochastic sales. In contrast, for many other types of goods—e.g. movies—a typical consumer will not visit the retailer unless she buys the core and primary product sold by the retailer. Without being at the retailer by default, the consumer’s price-discovery costs for the core product are non-trivial, so that the optimal price distribution is deterministic.\footnote{The internet has, of course, made it much less costly to find out information about retailers, likely decreasing price-discovery costs. For example, if a movie theater were to use the regular-prices-and-sales strategy, it could post up-to-date price information on the internet. Even so, a consumer’s price-discovery cost would clearly be higher than at a supermarket, and could still be non-trivial relative to a marginal consumer’s value of the product. Furthermore, because a marginal consumer is made worse off when the firm uses a regular-prices-and-sales strategy, she would not want to make it easy for herself to check the price realization.}

5.2 Competition

Our main analysis focuses on the case of a monopolistic retailer. While the general question of how competition affects pricing is beyond the scope of the current paper, we discuss three simple forms of competition. First, we consider perfect ex-ante competition for consumers, as for example when consumers decide which supermarket or restaurant to frequent. Suppose that there is a mass of consumers whose consumption value is distributed continuously on the interval $[0, v]$, with
positive density everywhere. Two retailers simultaneously commit to their price distribution. After observing the distributions, consumers decide which retailer to visit, and form expectations about their consumption outcomes. We assume that if indifferent consumers choose one of the two retailers randomly with equal probability. Finally, a price is drawn from each retailer’s price distribution, and consumers decide whether to buy at their previously chosen retailer’s price. The two retailers have identical cost distributions uniformly distributed on the interval $[c_L, c_H]$ with density $d$, where $0 < c_L < c_H < \overline{v}$. Then:

**Proposition 5.** Fix any $\eta > 0$, $\lambda > 1$, and $(c_L + c_H)/2 > 0$. If $d$ is sufficiently large, then for any $\Delta > 0$ the unique symmetric equilibrium with ex-ante competition is for each firm to choose the deterministic price $(c_L + c_H)/2$.

Proposition 5 says that if the firms’ costs are sufficiently densely distributed, the unique symmetric equilibrium is for each firm to choose the deterministic price equal to average cost. Intuitively, because a loss-averse consumer dislikes price uncertainty, to attract her a firm has an incentive to eliminate price variation. This strategy is reminiscent of some retailers’ (most notably Walmart’s) promise to have “Everyday Low Prices” rather than fluctuating prices. More systematically, Proposition 5 may explain why restaurants—often facing stiff local competition for patrons—do not seem to have frequent sales like supermarkets (MacDonald and Aaronson 2006).

Note that sticky pricing is not an equilibrium in the above model when consumers have classical reference-independent preferences, even if these consumers are risk-averse with respect to the surplus from the transaction or the price to be paid for the product. If a firm charges the deterministic price equal to average cost, its competitor can profitably deviate by offering lower prices when its costs are lower, profitably attracting some consumers whose value is below the average cost.

The implications of perfect ex-post competition for consumers differ markedly from those of perfect ex-ante competition. Suppose that the two firms have identical cost realizations in all states of the world, the two products are perfect substitutes for consumers, and consumers decide which product to purchase after seeing the realized prices. For simplicity, suppose also that $\overline{v}$ is

\[16\] The assumption that costs are uniformly distributed simplifies our calculations, but is not crucial: sticky pricing would result so long as the cost distribution is sufficiently dense everywhere on $[c_L, c_H]$. 

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sufficiently high for demand to be positive for any realized marginal costs. The Nash equilibrium is then the same as with reference-independent utility: prices always equal marginal cost.\textsuperscript{17} Hence, if costs are volatile, so too will be prices. This situation is consistent, for instance, with the market for economy-class airline tickets, in which many consumers shop around among a number of very competitive retailers before each purchase—and in which prices are indeed very volatile.

Finally, we discuss a form of imperfect competition. Suppose the monopolist faces a competitive fringe: there is a competitive industry producing a substitute product that has a lower consumption value \( v_f < v \) on the same dimension as the monopolist’s product, the consumer is interested in buying at most one of the products, and she decides which one to buy after seeing both prices. The competitive fringe charges a low price \( p_f \leq (1 + \eta)v_f/(1 + \eta\lambda) \). In this case, whatever the consumer had expected, she prefers to buy the fringe’s good to not consuming. Hence, in any PE she buys one of the products, getting intrinsic utility of at least \( v_f \). As a result, the firm’s problem can be thought of as choosing the distribution of the price premium \( p - p_f \) it charges for the incremental consumption value \( v - v_f \). Therefore, the optimal price distribution is the same as that of a monopolist who sells a product of value \( v - v_f \), shifted to the right by \( p_f \)—it has the same shape and probability of sales as the optimal price distribution in our basic model, but it is more compressed.

\section{5.3 Further Extensions and Modifications}

Our model assumes that when forming plans in period 0, the consumer can choose any plan at no immediate cost, in a sense starting from a reference-free position. It is plausible, however, that the consumer enters the marketplace in period 0 with some initial (and not necessarily rational) expectations already in her mind, and changing these expectations generates gain-loss utility in period 0. The initial expectations can be thought of as what she expects before she makes rational plans regarding the current purchase. In this alternative theory, the definition of PE is the same as in our basic model, and the PPE is the PE that maximizes total expected utility in periods 0 and 1 (see Kőszegi and Rabin 2009, Web Appendix). We have shown that for any initial expectations by the

\textsuperscript{17} Even if marginal costs are not perfectly correlated (but observable to firms), the set of Nash-equilibrium prices is the same as in a reference-independent model.
consumer, the limit-optimal price distribution is still some combination of continuously distributed sale prices and a sticky regular price. One of these two components of the price distribution, however, could be empty. Most interestingly, if the consumer enters the market expecting to get the product and pay money, and the weight on her period-0 gain-loss utility is relatively high, then the optimal price distribution is deterministic. Intuitively, since the consumer expects to buy the product to begin with and finds this expectation painful to give up, it is not necessary to manipulate her into buying. Hence, the sales region in the price distribution loses its purpose. Assuming that a large share of consumers initially expects to buy products by popular brands, this result predicts that such brands should not have sales. Indeed, based on casual observation it seems that some brands (e.g. Apple) rarely hold sales.

In our basic model, we have taken the representative consumer’s consumption value $v$ to be deterministic. Suppose instead that $v$ is uncertain. We can distinguish two cases, depending on whether the consumer knows $v$ in advance (in period 0). If she does not, then (although we have not analyzed such a model in detail) the same forces as with cost uncertainty are likely to operate, so that a qualitatively similar price distribution likely results. If the consumer does know $v$ in advance, then from the perspective of our model each $v$ can be thought of as a different pricing situation, in each of which the monopolist chooses the optimal price distribution we have derived for that $v$. For example, as we have discussed, if price-discovery costs are high our theory predicts a sticky price for each $v$. But if $v$ changes in a way that is predictable by consumers in advance, the optimal sticky price changes. This prediction is consistent with matinees in movie theaters and cyclical sales of many products for which the sale price is also sticky. At the same time, our model does not explain why prices do not seem to change in response to some other predictable changes in demand.

Following Kőszegi and Rabin (2006), our model assumes that the loss-aversion parameters $\eta$ and $\lambda$ are the same in the product and money dimensions. As argued by Novemsky and Kahneman (2005) and Kőszegi and Rabin (2009), however, it might be that reference dependence and loss aversion are weaker in the money than in the product dimension.\footnote{In Kőszegi and Rabin (2009), in particular, the decisionmaker derives gain-loss utility from changes in beliefs about present and future consumption utility, with news about future consumption utility less heavily felt. Then,} To capture this, suppose that
the weight on gain-loss utility is $\eta^v$ in the product dimension and $\eta^p \leq \eta^v$ in the money dimension, with the coefficient of loss aversion $\lambda$ still being the same in the two dimensions. We argue that unless $\eta^p$ is much lower than $\eta^v$, this modification does not fundamentally change our results.

Assuming $\eta^p < \eta^v$ in fact strengthens the logic behind the optimality of stochastic prices. For an illustration, consider the extreme case of $\eta^p = 0$. Then, not buying is a credible plan if and only if prices are strictly greater than $\bar{p} \equiv (1 + \eta^v)v$, so $\bar{p}$ is both the highest price at which the consumer buys if she had not been expecting to do so, and the highest deterministic price at which she buys. In addition, as in our basic model, if the consumer had been expecting to buy at price $\bar{p}$ with some probability, due to the attachment effect she buys at slightly higher prices as well. Hence, a stochastic price dominates a deterministic one.

While the monopolist wants to use a stochastic price distribution and variable sale prices for any $\eta^p \leq \eta^v$, it does not want to have a regular price if $\eta^p$ is much lower than $\eta^v$. Intuitively, as we explain in Step 4 of our discussion of Proposition 1, the consumer’s motive to buy at a high regular price $p'$ is that this turns buying into more of a gain in money (relative to paying $p'$) rather than a loss in money (relative to paying nothing). But if the consumer’s reference-dependent utility in money carries little weight, she does not care much about this effect, so that she is not willing to buy at a high regular price. In this case, the optimal price distribution is a distribution akin to the sale prices in our basic model above. If $\eta^p$ is not much lower than $\eta^v$, however, the same logic as in our basic model holds, and the optimal price distribution includes an isolated atom at the top.\(^\text{19}\)

An interesting possibility arises in our basic model when $c > \bar{p}$, yet the monopolist can profitably sell to the consumer. In this case, the monopolist’s cost is higher than some of the prices it charges, providing a non-predatory rationale for potential below-marginal-cost pricing of a single-product firm. If below-marginal-cost pricing is prohibited—as is the case in some countries—sales disappear altogether: since the firm cannot manipulate the consumer into buying against her will, it chooses a sticky price.

Relatedly, the firm’s opportunity cost of delivering the product could sometimes be greater than

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\(^{19}\) Straightforward (but long) arithmetic shows that a sufficient condition for this is $\eta^p \lambda + (\eta^p)^2 (\lambda^2 - 1) \geq \eta^v$. 

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the highest possible price.\textsuperscript{20} In a classical setting, the firm would not sell to the consumer in these contingencies. But in our theory, not getting the product in some states reduces the consumer’s willingness to pay in other states, so the monopolist may commit to selling even in situations in which it makes losses from doing so.

6 Related Literature

In this section, we discuss the literatures most closely related to our paper beyond the key evidence on pricing summarized in Section 2.

6.1 Loss Aversion

Loss aversion is a natural explanation for the endowment effect, small-scale risk aversion, and other widely observed patterns in individual behavior, and seems to contribute to consumer behavior in the marketplace.\textsuperscript{21} Beyond this extensive evidence on the phenomenon of loss aversion in general, more recent evidence lends support to Kőszegi and Rabin’s (2006) particular, expectations-based, model of reference-dependent preferences and loss aversion. In Abeler, Falk, Götte, and Huffman’s (forthcoming) experiment, subjects work on a boring task for a piece-rate, and can choose when to stop. When they are done, a coin flip determines whether they receive what they earned or a predetermined amount, where the predetermined amount is set to be 3.50 Euros for one group and 7.00 Euros for another group. A significant number of subjects stop working when they earned exactly the predetermined amount, suggesting that this expected amount became (part of) their reference point for earnings. In a simple exchange experiment, Ericson and Fuster (2009) find that subjects are more likely to keep an item they had received if they have been expecting a lower

\textsuperscript{20} This could occur either because the firm itself faces high costs, or because it has another consumer with high valuation.

\textsuperscript{21} Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990, 1991), for instance, find in a series of experiments that randomly assigned owners of an object value it more highly than non-owners, presumably because owners construe giving up the object as a loss. In addition, as argued by Rabin (2000), Rabin and Thaler (2001), Barberis, Huang and Thaler (2006), and other researchers, the most significant source of aversion to risk over modest stakes is loss aversion. And research in marketing suggests that consumers are loss averse in their evaluation of market prices (Erickson and Johansson 1985, Winer 1986, Kalwani and Yim 1992, Hardie, Johnson and Fader 1993), with their “reference price” determined at least partly by expectations (Jacobson and Obermiller 1990).
probability of being able to exchange it, consistent with the idea that their expectations affected their reference point.\footnote{In an alternative experiment, Ericson and Fuster (2009) find that—consistent with the attachment effect—subjects are willing to pay 20-30 percent more for an object if they had expected to be able to get it with 80-90% rather than 10-20% probability. In a similar experiment, however, Smith (2008) does not find the same effect.} Crawford and Meng (2008) propose a model of cabdrivers’ daily labor-supply decisions in which cabdrivers have rational-expectations-based reference points (“targets”) in both hours and income. Crawford and Meng show that by making predictions about which target is reached first given the prevailing wage each day, their model can reconcile the controversy between Camerer, Babcock, Loewenstein and Thaler (1997) and Farber (2005, 2008) in whether cabdrivers have reference-dependent preferences.\footnote{The plausibility of Kőszegi and Rabin’s (2006) framework as a generally applicable model of consumer behavior is also bolstered by theoretical applications that explain puzzles in a number of important economic settings outside pricing, especially contracting. Because loss-averse decisionmakers strongly dislike variation in monetary outcomes, the theory often predicts less sensitivity of contracts to information than classical models. Using this basic insight, Herweg et al. (2010) show that the optimal way to provide incentives to exert effort while minimizing wage variation is often to use a “bonus contract” consisting of two possible wage levels. Based on a dynamic extension of Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) proposed by Kőszegi and Rabin (2009), Macera (2009) demonstrates that principals will often use future payments to generate current incentives, thereby eliminating variation in the current wage. And Herweg (2010) finds that flat-rate contracts are often the optimal two-part tariffs for services even when firms have positive marginal costs.}

There are also several papers investigating firm pricing with consumer loss aversion. In Heidhues and Kőszegi (2008), we consider a model of oligopolistic competition with differentiated products, and show that due to consumer loss aversion, demand is more elastic at higher than at lower market prices, leading firms to reduce or eliminate price variation. This can explain why competitors often sell differentiated goods at identical prices—even in environments that are not perfectly symmetric.\footnote{Karle and Peitz (2009) qualify Heidhues and Kőszegi’s (2008) prediction of reduced price variability by showing that in some asymmetric duopolistic environments—specifically, when consumers observe prices but not how much they will like each product before their expectations-based reference point is set—consumer loss aversion can actually increase price differences.} In earlier unpublished work (Heidhues and Kőszegi 2005), we have argued that consumer loss aversion generates price stickiness, but could not simultaneously explain the stickiness of regular prices and the prevalence of variable sales. Using a somewhat different, sampling-based, model of how consumers form reference points in money and ignoring loss aversion in the product dimension, Spiegler (2010) replicates Heidhues and Kőszegi’s (2005) main finding of price stickiness.\footnote{Deviating from the expectations-based model, Zhou (2009) assumes that consumers take the first or most prominent price they see as the reference point for money outlays. Because the leading firm benefits a lot from having a lower price than its competitor and is hurt less by having a higher price, it has an incentive to avoid charging the same price, so that in a simultaneous-move game it sets a random price.}
6.2 Classical Theories of Pricing

In this section, we discuss other theories that explain some of the same price patterns as our model. While we identify other differences below, the most important difference is that (at least without additional assumptions) none of these theories provide a robust micro-founded explanation for the combination of facts we have emphasized: that (i) at supermarkets, the regular price is sticky, while there are frequent sales with variable prices; and (ii) at many other types of retailers, sales are less common and prices are simply sticky. In particular, previous theories have explained all or part of the patterns in (i), but not the combination together with (ii). Furthermore, they do not make many of the additional predictions in Section 5 on the effects of competition and other forces.

We begin with papers that can account for all the patterns in point (i) above even in an uncertain environment that generates incentives to change regular prices. Kehoe and Midrigan (2008) assume that there are two distinct kinds of prices, regular prices and sale prices, and that there is both a menu cost associated with changing the regular price, and a different and lower menu cost associated with having an item on sale. Then, the regular price is sticky because it is costly to change, but sale prices are not sticky because (conditional on having a sale) they are costless to change. While Kehoe and Midrigan’s theory makes many of the same predictions as ours and can be incorporated tractably into macroeconomic theories for simulating the effects of monetary policy and other questions, it leaves unanswered why there would be two different kinds of prices with different menu costs. Our theory can be thought of as providing micro-foundations for these reduced-form assumptions. These micro-foundations allow us to explain without additional assumptions why many other retailers have much less frequent sales, and to make further predictions on the effect of competition and other forces.

Nakamura and Steinsson (2009) analyze a repeated price-setting game between a monopolist with privately known cost and a consumer with habit formation. Because the consumer is more willing to consume the firm’s product and develop a habit if she believes future prices will be low, the monopolist would like to commit to relatively low future prices. As a result, the monopolist’s

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26 Some models of sales we discuss below make this set of predictions in a deterministic environment. To our knowledge, no previous theory can account for all the patterns in point (i) in both deterministic and uncertain environments, as ours does.
favorite Markov-perfect equilibrium is one in which it never selects prices above a price cap. At the cap the price is unresponsive to cost, but below the cap the price is fully responsive to cost. While Nakamura and Steinsson (2009) do not analyze this possibility, it seems that there could well be higher-profit non-Markov equilibria in which the firm compensates consumers for high current prices by charging lower prices in the future. Furthermore, unless pass-through is very high, their model (unlike ours) predicts frequent sales of considerable magnitude only when there are frequent and considerable changes in marginal costs. And because the price distribution is essentially the distribution of short-run profit-maximizing prices censored at the price cap, their model does not naturally predict a gap between the regular price and sale prices, as our model does.

Many other papers can account for part of the patterns in point (i) above, but without additional assumptions cannot explain why some retailers have sales and others do not. There is a considerable industrial-organization literature investigating why firms engage in sales. The most important and most common explanation is based on firms’ incentive to price discriminate between groups of consumers. In Conlisk, Gerstner and Sobel’s (1984) model of a durable-goods monopolist, for example, a new cohort of heterogeneous consumers enters the market in each period, and each consumer decides whether to buy the good immediately or after some delay. In most periods the monopolist sells to high-valuation buyers only, but in some periods it lowers its price to sell to the accumulated low-valuation consumers.\(^{27}\) Intertemporal-price-discrimination models clearly capture a realistic and important feature missing from our model, and in this sense we view them as complementary to our theory. But these models do not explain the stickiness of the regular price for most products or the existence of random sales for perishable goods with stable demand and cost characteristics.\(^{28}\)

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\(^{28}\) One feature of intertemporal-price-discrimination models that distinguish them from our theory is that they predict higher profits at low than at high prices. Intuitively, a low price today decreases future profits by inducing some consumers to buy now rather than later, so that a firm is willing to set such a low price only if compensated by immediate profits. We are not aware of systematic empirical evidence on profits in sale periods relative to regular-price periods. One suggestive paper is Slade (1999), who investigates the prices set for saltine crackers by grocery stores in a small US town. She allows own past prices to have either a negative or a positive effect on current demand. The negative effect allows for the price discrimination effects that we have discussed in the sales literature.
There is also a set of models in industrial organization in which the oligopolistic environment leads firms to play mixed strategies.\textsuperscript{29} In all of these papers, each firm is left with a “captive” group of consumers who will not buy from a cheaper rival, and a “non-captive” group for which firms engage in price competition. In equilibrium, firms randomize between charging the monopoly price for the captive consumers and competing for the non-captive consumers. These theories either do not predict a sticky regular price, or this prediction is not robust to cost shocks when the demand of captive consumers is downward-sloping.

7 Conclusion

For both analytical convenience and methodological discipline, we have followed Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) as well as classical economic methodology in assuming that the consumer fully understands the firm’s pricing strategy and immediately solves for the PPE. While we are not aware of and have not worked out a full formal model, for repeated decisions it seems that far less than full rationality is sufficient for the consumer to eventually play PPE, and hence to give the firm similar incentives as when it faces a fully rational consumer. Suppose, for instance, that the consumer initially comes into the market not expecting to buy the product or spend money, and she repeatedly faces purchase decisions with prices drawn from a distribution like the monopolist’s optimal price distribution in the fully rational model above. Whenever the price is \( p \), she will end up purchasing the product. She will then learn that she sometimes gets the product, and build this into her expectations. If she sees the price \( p \) sufficiently often, therefore, the attachment effect will mean that she buys at a slightly higher price as well. Continuing this logic further, she will buy at all sale prices. Then, if she understands at least partly that a plan to buy at the regular price will reduce the sense of loss from paying money, she will also be willing to buy at a high regular price.

While our model provides a potential explanation for a number of pricing patterns, there are some patterns it cannot convincingly explain. For instance, at many establishments Persian rugs

and furniture seem to be perpetually “on sale” from an essentially fictitious “regular price” that is almost never charged. For these products, consumers are unlikely to know the price distribution, and the perpetual-sale strategy probably aims to manipulate consumers’ perceptions about typical prices and quality. In addition, given that volume is for some items much higher during sales than when the regular price is charged, it is likely that storage on the part of consumers and intertemporal price discrimination on the part of firms plays an important role in sales. An important agenda for future research is to investigate how loss aversion interacts with these other forces. For instance, it seems that loss-averse consumers’ dislike of running out of the product or paying a lot for it could strengthen the storage motive.

References


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A Proofs

First, we introduce some notation we will use throughout our proofs. For any market price distribution $\Pi$, let $p_1$ be the lowest price, $p_2$ the second lowest, etc. . . Let $q_l$ be the probability that $p_l$ is charged. For notational convenience, let $Q_l = \sum_{l'=1}^l q_{l'}$ and $P_l = E[p_{l'} | l' \leq l]$. For future reference, observe that the ex-ante expected utility when facing a market price distribution $\Pi$ and buying at all prices less or equal to $p_l$ is:

$$EU(p_l; \Pi) = Q_l v - Q_l P_l - \eta(\lambda - 1) Q_l (1 - Q_l) v - \eta(\lambda - 1) \sum_{l'=1}^l \sum_{l''=1}^{l'} q_{l''} q_{l'} (p_{l''} - p_{l'})$$.

Finally, buying for all prices less or equal to $p_l$ is a personal equilibrium if the given that the consumer expects to buy for all prices less than or equal to $p_l$, she prefers to buy at price $p_l$ and prefers not to buy at $p_{l+1}$, where we set $p_{l+1} = \infty$ if $p_l$ is the highest price in the market price distribution. Hence, $p_l$ is a personal equilibrium cutoff if and only if

$$p_l \leq \frac{1 + \eta(1 - Q_l) + \eta \lambda Q_l}{1 + \eta \lambda} v + \frac{\eta(\lambda - 1)}{1 + \eta \lambda} Q_l P_l < p_{l+1}$$.

A.1 Discrete Version of Proposition 1

To establish Proposition 1, which is stated for the limit-optimal distribution, we begin by stating and proving a version of the proposition for $\Delta > 0$ (that is, not in the limit). To state the proposition as well as later results, we define

$$q^*(p) = \frac{A \Delta}{(v + p)}$$,

where $A \equiv (1 + \eta \lambda)/(\eta(\lambda - 1))$.

We first prove the following proposition: 30

**Proposition 6.** For any $\eta > 0$, $\lambda > 1$, and $\Delta$ satisfying $0 < \Delta < v - p$, if the firm can profitably sell to the consumer, then a profit-maximizing price distribution exists, and induces purchase with

30 Proposition 6 is stated for any $\Delta > 0$. For sufficiently small $\Delta > 0$, we know somewhat more about the structure of the optimal price distribution. In particular, using the notation of the proposition, in that case $p_1 = 2$, $p_{l+1} - p_l = \Delta$ for any $l < z$, and $q_z \leq A \Delta/(v + p_z)$. 39
probability one. In addition, for any profit-maximizing price distribution, there exists a \( z > 0 \) such that the distribution has atoms at \( p_1, p_2, p_3, \ldots, p_z, \) and \( p_{z^*} > p_z \), where \( p - 2\Delta < p_1 \leq p_z \) and for \( 2 \leq l \leq z, p_l - p_{l-1} < 2\Delta \). For \( l < z \), the weight on atom \( p_l \) is \( q_l = A(p_{l+1} - p_l)/(v + p_l) \), the weight on atom \( p_z \) is \( q_z < 2A\Delta/(v + p_z) \), and the weight on atom \( p_{z^*} \) is the complementary probability \( 1 - \sum_{l=1}^{z} q_l \).

It is useful to first outline the broad steps in our proof. There are two major steps, and several substeps.

Step I. We show that any profit-maximizing price distribution has the properties identified in the proposition. We do so by showing that for any other distribution, there is a distribution satisfying these properties that yields higher profits.

Step II. We show that among price distributions satisfying the properties of the proposition, a profit-maximizing price distribution exists.

**Proof.** Step I. Let \( Q_z \geq 0 \) the probability such that in any PE, the consumer buys the product with at least probability \( z \). Furthermore, let \( Q_{z^*} \geq Q_z \) be the probability with which she buys the product. Let the corresponding cutoff prices (defined as the highest atoms on the price distribution at which the consumer buys) be \( p_z \) and \( p_{z^*} \), respectively, and let \( F \) be the optimal price distribution.

First, we show that there must be a single atom on the interval \((p_z, p_{z^*}]\) because otherwise, the monopolist could replace the stochastic prices with a single higher average price without eliminating the PPE, increasing revenues. To see this formally, suppose by contradiction that the optimal price distribution \( F \) puts positive weight on more than one atom in \((p_z, p_{z^*}]\). Consider a new pricing distribution \( F' \) constructed from \( F \) by replacing the original prices \( p_{z+1} \) through \( p_{z^*} \) with the average price \( p_a = \left( \sum_{l=z+1}^{z^*} p_l q_l \right) / \left( \sum_{l=z+1}^{z^*} q_l \right) \), and putting the rest of the weight on a single atom \( p_{a+1} \) above over \( \bar{p} = (1 + \eta\lambda)/(1 + \eta) \). Define \( Q_a \) and \( P_a \) correspondingly to the notation above. Then, by construction \( Q_{z^*} = Q_a \) and \( Q_{z^*} P_{z^*} = Q_a P_a \). Using that for the market price distribution \( F, p_{z^*} \) satisfies equation 8, one has

\[
p_a < p_{z^*} \leq \frac{1 + \eta(1 - Q_{z^*}) + \eta \lambda Q_{z^*}}{1 + \eta \lambda} v + \frac{\eta(\lambda - 1)}{1 + \eta \lambda} Q_{z^*} P_{z^*} \leq p_{z^*+1},
\]
and since \( p_a < p_z^* \), this implies

\[
p_a < \frac{1 + \eta(1 - Q_a) + \eta \lambda Q_a}{1 + \eta \lambda} v + \frac{\eta(\lambda - 1)}{1 + \eta \lambda} Q_a P_a < p_a + 1.
\]

Hence, when facing the price distribution \( F' \) buying up to the price \( p_a \) is a personal equilibrium. Furthermore, it is easy to show using Equation 7 that \( EU(p_z^*; F) < EU(p_a; F') \), and by construction, \( EU(p_l; F) = EU(p_l; F') \) for any \( l < z^* \). Thus buying for any price less or equal to \( p_a \) is the PPE strategy of the consumer when facing \( F' \). Continuity of both ex-ante and ex-post utility with respect to \( p_a \) implies that if the monopolist increases \( p_a \) slightly the PPE still involves the consumer buying for all prices less than or equal to \( p_a \). This increases profits, a contradiction.

Second, we show by contradiction that \( Q_{z^*} = 1 \). Suppose \( Q_{z^*} < 1 \). If the monopolist can profitably sell to the consumer, it must make a profit at the highest price \( p_z^* \) at which the consumer buys in PPE. Now consider the distribution \( F' \) constructed from \( F \) by moving the probability weight \( 1 - Q_{z^*} \) from the prices above \( p_z^* \) to \( p_z^* \). We show that the consumer buys for all prices in the PPE for \( F' \), and, hence, this change increases profits, yielding a contradiction. If \( z = z^* \), it follows from Equation 8 that buying at all prices is the unique PE with \( F' \). If \( z^* > z \), the above implies that \( z^* = z + 1 \). In addition, it follows from Equation 8 that buying at all prices is a PE after the price change. Now using Equation 7 and the fact that with price distribution \( F \) the consumer prefers the PE in which she buys up to \( p_z^* \), one has

\[
EU(p_z^*; F) = Q_z v - Q_z P_z - \eta(\lambda - 1)Q_z(1 - Q_z)v \\
- \eta(\lambda - 1)Q_z(1 - Q_z)P_z - \eta(\lambda - 1) \sum_{l' = 1}^{z} \sum_{l'' = 1}^{z'} q_{l'\nu} q_{\nu}(p_{l'} - p_{l''}) \\
\leq Q_z v - Q_z P_z + q_z^*(v - p_z^*) - \eta(\lambda - 1)(Q_z + q_z^*)(1 - Q_z - q_z^*)v \\
- \eta(\lambda - 1)(1 - Q_z - q_z^*)(Q_z P_z + q_z^* p_z^*) \\
- \eta(\lambda - 1) \left( \sum_{l' = 1}^{z} \sum_{l'' = 1}^{z'} q_{l'\nu} q_{\nu}(p_{l'} - p_{l''}) + q_z^* \sum_{l = 1}^{z^*} q_l(p_z^* - p_l) \right) \\
= EU(p_z^*; F).
\]

Rewriting using that

\[
q_z^* \sum_{l = 1}^{z^*} q_l(p_z^* - p_l) = q_z^* (Q_z p_z^* - Q_z P_z)
\]
gives

\[ 0 \leq q_z^*(v - p_z^*) - \eta(\lambda - 1) \left( (q_z^*(1 - Q_z) - q_z^*Q_z - q_z^{2*})v + (1 - q_z^*)q_z^*p_z^* - 2q_z^*Q_zP_z \right). \]

Dividing by \( q_z^* \), one has

\[ 0 \leq v - p_z^* - \eta(\lambda - 1) \left( (1 - 2Q_z - q_z^*)v + (1 - q_z^*)p_z^* - 2Q_zP_z \right). \] (9)

As the right hand-side is increasing in \( q_z^* \) and we construct \( F' \) by moving the probability weight \( 1 - Q_z \) from the prices above \( p_z^* \) to \( p_z^* \), which increases \( q_z^* \), it follows that \( EU(p_z; F') \leq EU(p_z^*; F') \).

This completes the proof that \( Q_z^* = 1 \).

Summarizing, so far we have shown that the optimal price distribution has the following structure. The monopolist charges the prices \( p_1 \) through \( p_z \) with a total probability of \( Q_z \), and the price \( p_z^* \) with probability \( 1 - Q_z \), where either \( z^* = z \) or \( z^* = z + 1 \). In addition, if \( z^* = z \), there is exactly one PE, and if \( z^* = z + 1 \), there are exactly two PE: one in which the consumer buys up to price \( p_z \), and one in which she buys at all prices. Finally, in the PPE the consumer buys at all prices. Our next goal is to show that in the optimal price distribution, we have \( 0 < Q_z < 1 \), so that \( z^* = z + 1 \) and \( z > 0 \). We establish this by showing that the monopolist can earn greater revenue with \( z^* = z + 1 \) and \( z > 0 \) than with either \( z = 0 \) or \( z^* = z \).

First, consider \( z = 0 \). In that case, the monopolist charges a single deterministic price, and we have already shown in the text that the optimal deterministic price is \( v \).

Now consider the case \( z > 0 \). Note that if \( z^* = z + 1 \), then for the consumer to be willing to buy at all prices, it must both be a PE to buy up to price \( p_z^* \), and this strategy must be preferred to the PE of buying only up to price \( p_z \). By Equations 8 and 9, the highest \( p_z^* \) at which this holds is

\[ p_z^* = \min \left\{ \frac{v + \frac{2\eta(\lambda - 1)Q_zP_z}{1 + \eta(\lambda - 1)q_z^*}v + \frac{2\eta(\lambda - 1)Q_zP_z}{1 + \eta(\lambda - 1)Q_z}}{1 - \frac{\eta(\lambda - 1)Q_zP_z}{1 + \eta(\lambda - 1)Q_z}}, v \right\}. \] (10)

Notice that that holding \( Q_z \) fixed (which also fixes \( q_z^* = 1 - Q_z \)), \( p_z^* \) is increasing in \( Q_zP_z \). Hence, whether or not \( z^* = z \) or \( z^* = z + 1 \), in order to maximize profits the monopolist must maximize \( Q_zP_z \) subject to the constraint that the consumer buys with probability \( Q_z \) in any PE. We next consider the implications of this maximization problem.
Notice that for any price \( p_l < p_z \) on the support of the distribution, we show by contradiction that it is optimal to charge \( p_l \) with the lowest possible probability such that the consumer is just willing to buy at the next price if she had been expecting to buy at prices up to \( p_l \). Suppose this is not the case, and consider shifting a little bit of weight from \( p_l \) to \( p_l + 1 \). For a sufficiently small shifted weight, Equation 8 implies that it will still be the case that in any PE the consumer buys at all prices up to \( p_z \).

We now solve for the weight the monopolist must put on each price for the above property to hold for all \( l < z \). That the consumer is just willing to buy at price \( p_l \) if she had been expecting to buy at prices up to \( p_l - 1 \) is equivalent to

\[
v - p_l + \eta(1 - Q_{l-1})v - \eta\lambda(1 - Q_{l-1})p_l - \eta\lambda Q_{l-1}(p_l - P_{l-1}) = -\eta\lambda Q_{l-1}v + \eta Q_{l-1}P_{l-1},
\]

or

\[
(1 + \eta + \eta(\lambda - 1)Q_{l-1})v - (1 + \eta\lambda)p_l + \eta(\lambda - 1)Q_{l-1}P_{l-1} = 0.
\]

The corresponding equation for the consumer to just be willing to buy at price \( p_{l+1} \) is

\[
(1 + \eta + \eta(\lambda - 1)Q_l)v - (1 + \eta\lambda)p_l + \eta(\lambda - 1)Q_lP_{l-1} = 0.
\]

Subtracting the latter equation from the former one and rearranging yields

\[
q_l = \frac{(1 + \eta\lambda)(p_{l+1} - p_l)}{\eta(\lambda - 1)(v + p_l)} = \frac{A(p_{l+1} - p_l)}{v + p_l}.
\]

This completes the claim in the proposition regarding the weights \( q_l \) for \( l < z \).

Next, we establish that \( \Pr_F(p_z) < 2A\Delta/(v + p_z) \). Suppose by contradiction that \( \Pr_F(p_z) \geq 2A\Delta/(v + p_z) \). Then, if the monopolist set \( p_{z^*} = p_z + 2\Delta \), it would be a unique PE for the consumer to buy at all prices. Hence, the optimal price distribution must have \( p_{z^*} > p_z + 2\Delta \). Hence, the monopolist could construct a new distribution \( F' \) from \( F \) in the following way. Let \( z' = z + 1 \), \( z'^* = z^* + 1 \), with the distribution \( F' \) created from \( F \) by shifting up the weight \( \Pr_F(p_z) - A\Delta/(v + p_z) \) from \( p_z \) to \( p_{z+1} = p_z + \Delta \). Then, by the above calculation, with \( F' \) the consumer buys up to \( p_{z+1} \) in any PE. Since \( Q'_{z'}P'_{z'} > Q_zP_z \), this contradicts that \( Q_zP_z \) maximizes profits subject to the constraint that the consumer buys with probability \( Q_z \) in any PE.
Now we show that up to $p_z$ the atoms of the optimal price distribution are spaced at intervals of less than $2\Delta$. Suppose by contradiction that this is not the case for the optimal price distribution $F$, so that for some $l \leq z - 1$, $p_{l+1} - p_l \geq 2\Delta$. We construct the distribution $F'$ from $F$ in the following way. We let $z' = z + 1$ and $z' = z^* + 1$, we put an extra atom at $p_l + \Delta$, and let $q'_l = A\Delta/(v + p_l)$ and $q'_{l+1} = q_l - A\Delta/(v + p_l)$, with the weights and positions of the other atoms remaining the same. Since $q'_{l+1} = A(p'_{l+2} - p'_{l+1})/(v + p_l) > A(p'_{l+2} - p'_{l+1})/(v + p'_{l+1})$, this maintains the property that in any PE the consumer buys at all prices up to $p_z = p'_z + 1$. And since $Q'_z P'_z > Q_z P_z$, this contradicts that $Q_z P_z$ maximizes profits subject to the constraint that the consumer buys with probability $Q_z$ in any PE.

Next, we show that $p - 2\Delta < p_1 \leq p$. Clearly, if $p_1 > p$, there is a PE in which the consumer does not buy. We are left to show that $p_1 > p - 2\Delta$. Suppose otherwise. Then, since $p_2 - p_1 < 2\Delta$, we must have $p_2 < p$. Now we construct the price distribution $F'$ from $F$ by moving the atom at $p_1$ to $p_2$. This ensures that the consumer buys for all prices up to $p_z$ in any PE, and has $Q'_z P'_z > Q_z P_z$, a contradiction.

We now establish that if $\Delta < v - p$, the firm charges at least two prices with positive probability, so that $z > 0$. Recall that the optimal deterministic price is $v$. To prove that the firm charges at least two prices with positive probability, we construct a hybrid distribution with which the monopolist earns expected revenue greater than $v$. Consider the distribution that puts weight $\epsilon > 0$ on $p$ and weight $1 - \epsilon$ on $p_z^*$ as defined in Equation 10. Note that for a sufficiently small $\epsilon$, the minimum in Equation 10 is determined by the second argument in the minimum function. Hence, with this pricing distribution the firm’s revenue is:

$$\begin{align*}
(1 - \epsilon)v + (1 - \epsilon) \frac{2\eta(\lambda - 1)}{1 + \eta(\lambda - 1)} \epsilon p + \epsilon p.
\end{align*}$$

For $\epsilon = 0$ the revenue is equal to $v$. Taking the derivative with respect to $\epsilon$ and evaluating it at $\epsilon = 0$ yields

$$-v + p(2\eta(\lambda - 1) + 1) = \frac{\eta(\lambda - 1) + 2\eta^2(\lambda - 1)}{1 + \eta \lambda} \cdot v > 0.$$ 

Now, we have established that $Q_z > 0$. We are thus left to rule out that $Q_z = 1$. To do so, we prove that any pricing distribution for which the unique PE is to buy with probability one earns revenues less than $v$, and hence is suboptimal.
Consider the continuous distribution with support \([p_1, p_{\text{max}}]\) and density

\[
h(p) = \frac{1 + \eta \lambda}{\eta(\lambda - 1)(v + p)} = \frac{A}{v + p},
\]

where \(p_{\text{max}}\) is chosen so that the density integrates to one. We have shown above that in an optimal price distribution for which \(Q_z = 1\), \(q_l = A(p_{l+1} - p_l)/(v + p_l)\) for any \(l < z\). Hence, the above continuous price distribution first-order stochastically dominates any optimal price distribution for which \(Q_z = 1\).

To complete the proof, we show that

\[
\int_{p_1}^{p_{\text{max}}} ph(p)dp = \left[\frac{2 + \eta + \eta \lambda}{\eta(\lambda - 1)} \left( \exp \left( \frac{\eta(\lambda - 1)}{1 + \eta \lambda} \right) - 1 \right) - 1 \right] \cdot v < v. \tag{12}
\]

First, we calculate \(p_{\text{max}}\), which solves

\[
\frac{1 + \eta \lambda}{\eta(\lambda - 1)} \int_{p_1}^{p_{\text{max}}} \frac{1}{v + p} dp = 1.
\]

This gives

\[
\ln \left( \frac{v + p_{\text{max}}}{v + p} \right) = \frac{\eta(\lambda - 1)}{1 + \eta \lambda},
\]

or

\[
\frac{p_{\text{max}}}{v} = \exp \left( \frac{\eta(\lambda - 1)}{1 + \eta \lambda} \right) \left( 1 + \frac{1 + \eta}{1 + \eta \lambda} \right) - 1.
\]

Now the expected revenue with price distribution \(h(\cdot)\) is

\[
\frac{1 + \eta \lambda}{\eta(\lambda - 1)} \int_{p_1}^{p_{\text{max}}} \frac{p}{v + p} dp = \frac{1 + \eta \lambda}{\eta(\lambda - 1)} \int_{p_1}^{p_{\text{max}}} \left( 1 - \frac{v}{v + p} \right) dp = \frac{1 + \eta \lambda}{\eta(\lambda - 1)} (p_{\text{max}} - p) - v.
\]

Plugging in for \(p_{\text{max}}\) and rearranging gives the expression in Equation 12.

We are left to establish that

\[
\frac{2 + \eta + \eta \lambda}{\eta(\lambda - 1)} \left( \exp \left( \frac{\eta(\lambda - 1)}{1 + \eta \lambda} \right) - 1 \right) < 2.
\]

Let \(x \equiv \eta(\lambda - 1)/(1 + \eta)\) and note that \(x \in (0, 1)\). Then the above is equivalent to

\[
\left( \frac{2}{x} - 1 \right) (e^x - 1) < 2, \tag{13}
\]

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which in turn is equivalent to $e^x(x - 2) + x + 2 > 0$. Because at $x = 0$ the statement holds with equality, it suffices to show that the derivative with respect to $x$ is positive for all $x \in (0, 1)$. Taking the derivative yields $e^x(x - 1) + 1$, which again is zero for $x = 0$. To show that the derivative is positive over $(0, 1)$, we differentiate again with respect to $x$, and get $xe^x$, which is positive for all $x \in (0, 1)$. Hence for all $x \in (0, 1)$, $e^x(x - 1) + 1 > 0$ and thus also $e^x(x - 2) + x + 2 > 0$.

**Step II.** Suppose by contradiction that a profit-maximizing pricing distribution does not exist. Then, since the firm’s profits are bounded, there must be a sequence of price distributions $F^n$ such that the corresponding profits converge to the supremum profit level $\pi^*$. By the logic of Step I, for any pricing distribution there is a corresponding pricing distribution with at least as high profits that satisfies the properties of the proposition, and for which the highest price is given by Equation 10. Hence, we can choose $F^n$ so that it satisfies these properties.

Define by $z^n$ and $z^{n*}$ for each $F^n$ as above. Since pricing atoms must be at least $\Delta$ apart, and the consumer does not buy for any price about $\bar{p}$, $z^n$ and $z^{n*}$ both come from a finite set. Therefore, $F^n$ must have a subsequence for which $z^n$ and $z^{n*}$ is constant. With slight abuse of notation, we assume that $F^n$ already has this property. Then, by the diagonal method, it is easy to show that $F^n$ has a subsequence in which the locations of all atoms and all their weights converge. With another slight abuse of notation, we assume that $F^n$ already has this property.

Now consider the limiting distribution of the sequence $F^n$, $F$. By construction, in any PE the consumer buys for any price up to $p_z$. In addition, by Equation 10, which is continuous in $p_l$ and $q_l$, in PPE the consumer is willing to buy also at $p_z^*$. Hence, when facing $F$, the PPE is for the consumer to buy at all prices, so that the firm achieves profit level $\pi^*$—a contradiction.

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A.2 Proofs of Propositions in Text

**Proof of Proposition 1.**

Consider a sequence $\Delta^n \rightarrow 0$ such that a sequence of corresponding optimal pricing distributions $F^n$ converge in distribution. Define $z^n$, $p^n_l$, $q^n_l$, and $Q^n_{2z}$ analogously to Proposition 6. Assume first that $Q^n_{2z}$ converges to some $s$; we will establish this below.

Trivially, as $\Delta$ decreases the optimal profits must weakly increase since the firm could always
choose the same distribution as it did for a higher value of $\Delta$. Also, the profits the monopolist can earn are bounded, so that there is a limiting profit strictly greater than $v$. By the proof of Proposition 6, if we had $s = 0$, then the limiting profit would be $v$, and if we had $s = 1$, the limiting profits would be less than $v$. Hence, we can conclude that $0 < s < 1$.

As in Proposition 6, consider the distribution on $[p, p_{\text{max}}]$ with density

$$h(p) = \frac{1 + \eta \lambda}{\eta(\lambda - 1)(v + p)} = \frac{A}{v + p}.$$ 

Let the corresponding cumulative distribution function be $H$, and define $p_{\text{max}}(s)$ so that $H(p_{\text{max}}(s)) = s$. We now establish that for $x \leq p_{\text{max}}(s)$, $F_n(x) \rightarrow H(x)$ as $n \rightarrow \infty$; that is, in that part of the real line $F_n$ converges in distribution $H$.

Since $p - 2\Delta^n < p_{\text{z}}^n \leq p$, we have $p_{\text{z}}^n \rightarrow p$. We prove that $p_{\text{z}}^n \rightarrow p_{\text{max}}(s)$. We have

$$Q_{\text{z}}^n = \sum_{l=1}^{z^n} q_{\text{z}}^n = q_{\text{z}}^n + A \sum_{l=1}^{z^n} \frac{p_{\text{z}}^n - p_{\text{z}}^{n+1}}{v + p_{\text{z}}^n} = q_{\text{z}}^n + A \sum_{l=1}^{z^n} \frac{p_{\text{z}}^n}{v + p_{\text{z}}^n} \left( \int_{p_{\text{z}}^n}^{p_{\text{z}}^{n+1}} \frac{1}{v + p} dp + \int_{p_{\text{z}}^{n+1}}^{p_{\text{z}}^n} \left( \frac{1}{v + p_{\text{z}}^n} - \frac{1}{v + p} \right) dp \right) \tag{14}$$

We work on the sum of the underbraced term:

$$\sum_{l=1}^{z^n} \int_{p_{\text{z}}^n}^{p_{\text{z}}^{n+1}} \left( \frac{1}{v + p_{\text{z}}^n} - \frac{1}{v + p} \right) dp = \sum_{l=1}^{z^n} \int_{p_{\text{z}}^n}^{p_{\text{z}}^{n+1}} \frac{p - p_{\text{z}}^n}{(v + p_{\text{z}}^n)(v + p)} dp.$$ 

Notice that this is positive and (since $p_{\text{z}}^{n+1} - p_{\text{z}}^n < 2\Delta^n$) it is less than

$$\sum_{l=1}^{z^n} \int_{p_{\text{z}}^n}^{p_{\text{z}}^{n+1}} \frac{2\Delta^n}{(v + p_{\text{z}}^n)(v + p)} dp < \sum_{l=1}^{z^n} \frac{2(p_{\text{z}}^{n+1} - p_{\text{z}}^n)\Delta^n}{v^2} = \frac{2(p_{\text{z}}^n - p_{\text{z}}^{n+1})\Delta^n}{v^2},$$

which approaches zero as $n \rightarrow \infty$. Taking the limit of Equation 14, plugging in that the sum of the underbraced terms approaches zero, and using that $q_{\text{z}}^n \rightarrow 0$ as $n \rightarrow \infty$, we get

$$s = \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} A \int_{p_{\text{z}}^n}^{p_{\text{z}}^n} \frac{1}{v + p} dp = \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} A \int_{p}^{p_{\text{z}}^n} \frac{1}{v + p} dp.$$ 

This implies that $p_{\text{z}}^n \rightarrow p_{\text{max}}(s)$ as $n \rightarrow \infty$.

Next, we show that for a sufficiently large $n$, we have $p_{\text{z}}^{n+1} > p_{\text{max}}(s)$. We know that $p_{\text{z}}^n$ satisfies the condition that if the consumer expected to buy up to price $p_{\text{z}}^{n-1}$, she would just be
indifferent to buying at $p_{z_n}^n$. This is equivalent to

$$p_{z_n}^n = \frac{(1 + \eta + \eta(\lambda - 1)Q_{z_{n-1}}^n)v + \eta(\lambda - 1)Q_{z_{n-1}}^{n-1}P_{z_{n-1}}^n}{1 + \eta \lambda} \leq \frac{(1 + \eta + \eta(\lambda - 1)Q_{z_n}^n)v + \eta(\lambda - 1)Q_{z_n}^nP_{z_n}^n}{1 + \eta \lambda}$$

Given that $p_{z_n}^n \to p_{\text{max}}(s)$ and $Q_{z_n}^n \to s < 1$, this and Equation 10 imply that for a sufficiently large $n$, we have $p_{z_{n+1}}^n > p_{\text{max}}(s)$.

Clearly, for any $x \leq p$, $H(x) = \lim_{n \to \infty} F^n(x) = 0$. Now take any $x$ satisfying $p < x < p_{\text{max}}(s)$. So long as $p_{z_n}^n > x$, which holds for $n$ sufficiently large, we have

$$F^n(x) = \sum_{l, p_l^n \leq x} q_l^n = A \sum_{l, p_l^n \leq x} \frac{p_{l+1}^n - p_l^n}{v + p_l^n} = A \sum_{l, p_l^n \leq x} \left[ \int_{p_l^n}^{p_{l+1}^n} \frac{1}{v + p} \, dp + \int_{p_l^n}^{p_{l+1}^n} \left( \frac{1}{v + p} - \frac{1}{v + p_l^n} \right) \, dp \right].$$

By the same argument as above, the sum of the underbraced term approaches zero as $n \to \infty$, and we must have $\max\{p_l^n | p_l^n \leq x\} \to x$ as $n \to \infty$. Hence, taking the limit of Equation 15, we have

$$\lim_{n \to \infty} F^n(x) = A \int_p^x \frac{1}{v + p} \, dp = H(x).$$

Finally, since for $n$ sufficiently large $p_{z_{n+1}}^n > p_{\text{max}}(s)$, $\lim_{n \to \infty} \Pr_{F^n}(p_{\text{max}}(s)) = 0$. This completes the proof that for $x \leq p_{\text{max}}(s)$, $F^n(x) \to H(x)$ as $n \to \infty$.

Next, notice that in order for $F^n$ to converge in distribution, the sequence $p_{z_{n+1}}^n$ must converge. Let the limit be $p$. Applying Equation 10, $p > p_{\text{max}}(s)$. We have shown that the limiting distribution has the properties in the proposition.

To conclude the proof, it remains to show that $Q_{z_n}^n$ converges. Suppose by contradiction that it does not. Then, the sequence $F^n$ must have two subsequences $F^{n_1}$ and $F^{n_2}$ such that $Q_{z_{n_1}}^{n_1}$ and $Q_{z_{n_2}}^{n_2}$ both converge, but to different limits $s_1$ and $s_2$, respectively. Then, the above arguments imply that $F^{n_1}$ and $F^{n_2}$ converge in distribution to different distributions: the limit of $F^{n_1}$ is distributed continuously on $[p, p_{\text{max}}(s_1)]$ and has an isolated atom, while the limit of $F^{n_2}$ is distributed continuously on $[p, p_{\text{max}}(s_2)]$ and has an isolated atom. But this means that the sequence $F^n$ does not converge in distribution, a contradiction. □
**Proof of Proposition 2.** From the proof of Proposition 6, for $\Delta < v - p$ the consumer buys the product with probability one at an expected price strictly greater than $v$. Hence, her consumption utility is negative. Furthermore, in any PE expected gain-loss utility is non-positive. If she follows through a plan of never buying, both her consumption utility and her gain-loss utility are zero. □

**Proof of Proposition 3.** We begin by establishing the existence of a solution.

**Lemma 1.** An optimal restricted price distribution exists.

*Proof.* In our model the firm chooses a mapping from marginal cost to price. Let $\bar{p}$ be the maximum price for which it is a PE for the consumer with the highest consumption valuation to buy the good. We think of the firm as choosing (up to) four prices $p_L - \alpha_L, p_L + \alpha_L, p_H - \alpha_H,$ and $p_H + \alpha_H$, and a probability of sales $s \in [0,1]$ with the interpretation that $p_L - \alpha_L$ is charged with probability $s/2$, etc... (Note that any profits in case $s = 1$ can also be obtained by setting $s = 0$ and letting the former sales prices $p_L - \alpha_L$ and $p_L + \alpha_L$ become the regular prices $p_H - \alpha_H$ and $p_H + \alpha_H$. Hence, optimizing over $s \in [0,1]$ is equivalent to optimizing over $s \in [0,1]$.) That is for any exogenously given $\bar{\alpha}$ the firm chooses a pricing distribution $(p_L - \alpha_L, p_L + \alpha_L, p_H - \alpha_H, p_H + \alpha_H, s)$, which is an element of the set

$$\left\{ \bigcup_{k=1}^{4} [0,\bar{p}]^4 \times [0,1] \mid p_2 \leq p_1 + 2\bar{\alpha}, p_3 \geq p_2 + 2\bar{\alpha}, p_4 \leq p_3 + 2\bar{\alpha}, q_1 = q_2 = s/2 \wedge q_3 = q_4 = 1 - s/2 \right\}.$$  

(16)

Observe that if $\alpha_H = 0, p_3 = p_4$. We refer to this as the firm choosing a single regular price $p_H$. Similar, if $\alpha_L = 0, p_1 = p_2$ and the firm chooses a single sales price.

Note that the above set is a bounded subset of the Euclidian space; furthermore, if each element of a pricing sequence satisfies the constraints and converges in distribution, then its limit also satisfies the constraints. Thus, this subset of the Euclidean space is also closed and therefore compact.

Let $D(p_l \mid F)$ be the firm’s demand when price $p_l$ from the price distribution $F$ is drawn. Let $\Omega$ be the marginal cost’s cumulative distribution function. Let $c_0 = c_L$ and for any pricing
distribution define \( c_l \) implicitly through \( \Omega(c_l) = Q_l \). For any given price distribution, whenever the price \( p_l \) is charged for all marginal costs that fall in the interval \( (c_{l-1}, c_l) \), the firm minimizes its costs. Hence for any given price distribution \( F \), the resulting profit function is

\[
\sum_{l=1}^{k} D(p_l \mid F)(p_l - \int_{c_{l-1}}^{c_l} d\Omega)q_l. 
\]

(17)

Now consider a sequence of distribution functions \( F^n \to F \). Clearly, this implies that \( p^n_l \to p_l \) and that \( q^n_l \to q_l \), which in turn implies that \( c^n_l \to c_l \). Thus to prove the continuity of the profits function it remains to show that \( D(p^n_l \mid F^n) \to D(p_l \mid F) \), i.e. the set of valuations for which it is a preferred personal equilibrium to buy converges.

Consider the limit distribution \( F \) and the set of consumers \( v \) for whom it is a personal equilibrium to buy at the price \( p_l \), i.e. that satisfy

\[
p_l \leq \frac{1 + \eta(1 - Q_l) + \eta \lambda Q_l}{1 + \eta \lambda} v + \frac{\eta(\lambda - 1)}{1 + \eta \lambda} Q_l E(p_{l'} \mid l' \leq l) \leq p_{l+1}. 
\]

(18)

Continuity of \( \Phi_l \) in \( v \) implies that for each price \( p_1, \ldots, p_k \) in the limit distribution there is at most one consumer for whom \( p_l = \Phi_l \) and another for whom \( p_{l+1} = \Phi_l \). When calculating the firms profit it is convenient to ignore this set of measure zero of consumers. Note also that as \( F^n \to F \), \( \Phi^n_l \to \Phi_l \). Hence the set of consumers for whom it is a personal equilibrium to buy at \( p_l \) converges.

Similarly, it follows from equation 7 that for any two limit prices \( p_l \neq p_l' \) there is at most one consumer \( v \) for whom \( EU_{v_i}(p_l, F) = EU_{v_i}(p_{l'}, F) \). Thus to calculate overall demand we can ignore the set of agents who are from an ex-ante point of view indifferent between any two cutoff rules. Furthermore, as \( F^n \to F \), \( EU_{v_i}(p^n_l, F^n) \to EU_{v_i}(p_l, F) \). Thus the set of consumer for whom it is a PPE to buy at \( p_l \) converges, which shows that the profit function is continuous. Thus, an optimal price distribution exists.

We now begin to characterize properties of the optimal pricing distribution. First, we show that—indeed of the distribution of marginal cost—the firm relies on a sales-and-regular price structure.

**Lemma 2.** For sufficiently small \( \bar{\alpha} \), the probability of sales \( s \) in an optimal pricing distribution is bounded away from zero or one.
Proof. First, consider the optimal pricing distribution for the limit case in which \( \bar{\alpha} = 0 \). Suppose \( s = 0 \) (respectively \( s = 1 \)) in the optimal pricing distribution. Then it follows from Step I in Section 4.1 that in the PPE a consumer \( i \) buys if and only if \( v_i \geq p_H \) (respectively \( v_i \geq p_L \)). Let \( v \) be the lowest consumption-valuation consumer who buys. It follows from Step II in Section 4.1 that there exists a pricing distribution that puts positive weight on the prices \( p(v) = \frac{1+\eta}{1+\eta \lambda} v \) and a regular price \( p > v \), and for which the consumer with consumption valuation \( v \) always buys the good, pays an average price greater than \( v \), has a negative expected utility from buying, and is indifferent between buying at \( p \) only and always buying.

Next, we show that all consumers with valuations \( v_i > v \) always buy in the PPE when facing such a pricing distribution. First, in any PE these consumers buy at \( p(v) \) because their utility of buying at \( p(v) \) when expecting never to buy is greater than that of the consumer with valuation \( v \) while their utility of not buying when expecting not to buy is the same. Hence if the pricing distribution forces the consumer with consumption valuation \( v \) to buy in an any PE, consumers with a higher consumption valuation \( v_i \) must buy in any PE at \( p(v) \). Furthermore, the consumer with valuation \( v \) (weakly) prefers always buying to buying only at \( p(v) \) if and only if

\[
p \leq v + \frac{2\eta(\lambda - 1)s p}{1 + \eta(\lambda - 1)s}.
\]

Because the right hand side is increasing in the consumption valuation, any consumer with a higher consumption valuation \( (v_i > v) \) strictly prefers always buying to buying only at \( p(v) \).

We now argue that for such a pricing distribution, all consumers with consumption valuation \( v_i < v \) do not buy the good in their PPE. First, by essentially the same argument as above, from an ex ante perspective all consumer with consumption valuation \( v_i < v \) prefer to buy at \( p \) only to always buying. It thus suffices to argue that not buying is a PE and that from an ex ante perspective consumers with lower consumption valuation than \( v \) prefer not buying to buying at \( p \). Since the lowest price that forces a consumer \( v_i \) to buy is \( \frac{1+\eta}{1+\eta \lambda} v_i \) it is obvious that not buying is a PE. If a consumer would weakly prefer buying at \( p(v) \) only to not buying, one would have that

\[
s(v_i - p(v)) - \eta(\lambda - 1)s(1-s)(v_i + p(v)) = sv_i[1-\eta(\lambda-1)(1-s)] - sp(v)[1+\eta(\lambda-1)(1-s)] \geq 0.
\]

Because when the above expression is positive it is increasing in \( v_i \), this contradicts the fact that
from an ex-ante perspective a consumer with valuation \( v \) strictly prefers not buying to buying at \( p(v) \) only. Hence, the above pricing distribution yields strictly greater revenue and the same sales (and hence costs) as that in which the firm sets a deterministic price of \( v \). Thus it also yields strictly greater profits. We conclude that in the optimal pricing distribution \( s \in (0, 1) \). Denote the optimal sales probability by \( s^* \) and the optimal profits by \( \pi^* \).

Now since the firm’s profits are continuous in the pricing distribution, for any sequence of \( \bar{\alpha} \to 0 \), profits are bounded away from \( \pi^* \) if \( s(\bar{\alpha}) \not\to s^* \) and, hence, for sufficiently small \( \bar{\alpha} \) the firm earns lower profits than \( \pi^* \) when \( s(\bar{\alpha}) \to 0 \) or \( s(\bar{\alpha}) \to 1 \). This contradicts the fact that profits must be weakly increasing in \( \bar{\alpha} \) since the firm can always choose the optimal pricing distribution of a lower \( \bar{\alpha} \).

To characterize the optimal pricing distribution further, we prove some preliminary facts about consumers demand when facing an optimal price distribution.

**Lemma 3.** For any two cutoff prices \( p_l \) and \( p_h > p_l \), there exists a single critical \( \tilde{v} \) such that all consumers with a consumption valuation \( v_i < \tilde{v} \) prefer buying up to the lower and all consumers with a higher consumption valuation \( v_i > \tilde{v} \) prefer buying up to the higher cutoff price.

**Proof.** Using Equation 7 shows that \( EU_{v_i}(p_h; \Pi) \geq EU_{v_i}(p_l; \Pi) \) if and only if

\[
v_i \{[Q_h - Q_l] - \eta(\lambda - 1)(Q_h(1 - Q_h) - Q_l(1 - Q_l))\} \geq Q_hP_h - Q_lP_L + \eta(\lambda - 1)(1 - Q_h)Q_hP_h - (1 - Q_l)Q_lP_l + \eta(\lambda - 1) \sum_{l' = l+1}^{h} \sum_{l'' = 1}^{l'} q_lq_{l''}(p_{l'} - p_{l''}).
\]

If the LHS of the above inequality is non-positive, \( Q_h(1 - Q_h) > Q_l(1 - Q_l) \) in which case the RHS is strictly positive and all consumers therefore strictly prefer the lower cutoff price from an ex ante perspective. Otherwise, the LHS is linearly increasing in \( v_i \) while the RHS is constant. Hence, there exists a single critical consumer. Thus if some consumer prefers a higher cutoff price from an ex ante perspective so do all consumers with a higher valuation. And if a consumer prefers the lower cutoff price, so do all consumers with a lower valuation. Furthermore, mere inspection of 21 shows that if \( \tilde{v} \) is positive for a fixed \( p_l \), \( \tilde{v} \) is increasing in \( p_h \).  

\[ \square \]
**Lemma 4.** If the consumer weakly prefers not buying at \( p \) ex post when expecting to buy up to \( p \), then \( EU_{v_1}(p_l, F) < 0 \).

**Proof.** Since the consumer weakly prefers not buying at \( p \) ex post,
\[ p_l \geq \frac{1 + \eta + \eta(\lambda - 1)Q_l}{1 + \eta\lambda} v + \frac{\eta(\lambda - 1)}{1 + \eta\lambda} Q_l P_l. \]

On the other hand rewriting shows that \( EU_{v_1}(p_l, F) < 0 \) if
\[ p_l > \frac{1 - \eta(\lambda - 1)(1 - Q_l)}{1 + \eta(\lambda - 1)(1 - Q_l)} v - \frac{\eta(\lambda - 1)}{1 + \eta(\lambda - 1)(1 - Q_l)} \sum_{l'=1}^{l} \sum_{l''=1}^{l'} q_{l'} q_{l''}(p_{l'} - p_{l''}). \]

Using that
\[ \frac{1 + \eta + \eta(\lambda - 1)Q_l}{1 + \eta\lambda} > \frac{1 - \eta(\lambda - 1)(1 - Q_l)}{1 + \eta(\lambda - 1)(1 - Q_l)}, \]

(22)

it is clear that the former equation implies the latter.

**Lemma 5.** For low enough \( \bar{\alpha} \), (i) for any consumer for whom it is PE to buy at the lower regular price, it is also a PE to always buy; (ii) for any consumer for whom it is a PE to buy at the lower sales price, it ex post optimal to buy at the higher sales price when expecting to buy up to the higher sales price.

**Proof.** If \( p_l \) is a PE-cutoff then the consumer must prefer to buy the object ex post at the price \( p_l \) when expecting to buy at prices up to \( p_l \). This requires that
\[ v_i - p_l - \eta \lambda \sum_{l'=1}^{l} q_{l'}(p_l - p_{l'}) - \eta \lambda (1 - Q_l)p_l + \eta(1 - Q_l)v \geq \eta \sum_{l'=1}^{l} q_{l'} p_{l'} - \eta \lambda Q_l v, \]

or equivalently
\[ g(v_i, p_l) \equiv v[1 + \eta(1 - Q_l) + \eta \lambda Q_l] - [1 + \eta \lambda] p_l + \eta(\lambda - 1) \sum_{l'=1}^{l} q_{l'} p_{l'} \geq 0. \]

(23)

Hence,
\[ g(v_i, p_{l+1}) - g(v_i, p_l) = \eta(\lambda - 1) q_{l+1}(v + p_{l+1}) - [1 + \eta \lambda](p_{l+1} - p_l), \]

(24)

which for any given \( q_{l+1} > 0 \) is positive whenever \( p_{l+1} \) is sufficiently close to \( p_l \). Since as \( \bar{\alpha} \rightarrow 0 \) the probability of sales is bounded away from zero or one, the Lemma follows.
The following Lemma establishes that—when facing the optimal price distribution—any consumer who buys at the lower regular price, always buys.

**Lemma 6.** For sufficiently small \( \alpha \), if buying up to \( p_H - \alpha_H \) is a PE, then always buying is a PE and is preferred to buying up to \( p_H - \alpha_H \).

**Proof.** That always buying is a PE follows from Lemma 5. Rewriting shows that

\[
EU_{v_i}(p_H + \alpha_H, F) - EU_{v_i}(p_H - \alpha_H, F) > 0
\]

which holds for sufficiently small \( \alpha \) whenever

\[
1 + \eta(\lambda - 1)s < \eta(\lambda - 1)^{\frac{1-s}{2}}< v
\]

In this case \( EU_{v_i}(p_H + \alpha_H, F) - EU_{v_i}(p_H - \alpha_H, F) > 0 \), whenever

\[
p_H < \frac{1 + \eta(\lambda - 1)^{\frac{1+s}{2}}}{1 + \eta(\lambda - 1)^{\frac{3s-1}{2}}} v_i + \frac{\eta(\lambda - 1)^{\frac{1-s}{2}}}{1 + \eta(\lambda - 1)s - \eta(\lambda - 1)^{\frac{1-s}{2}}} sp_L - \frac{1 + \eta(\lambda - 1)^{\frac{1+s}{2}}}{1 + \eta(\lambda - 1)^{\frac{3s-1}{2}}} \alpha_H
\]  

(25)

If, however, \( p_h - \alpha_H \) is a PE-cutoff for consumer \( i \), then Equation 8 implies that

\[
p_H \leq v_i + \frac{\eta(\lambda - 1)}{1 + \eta\lambda - \eta(\lambda - 1)^{\frac{1-s}{2}}} sp_L + \alpha_H
\]  

(26)

Because for \( \alpha_H = 0 \), the RHS of Inequality 26 is strictly less than that of 25, for sufficiently small \( \alpha_H \) the consumer prefers always buying whenever \( p_H - \alpha_H \) is a PE-cutoff.

The following Lemma establishes that if a consumer is forced to buy at the lowest price, she buys at both sales prices.

**Lemma 7.** For sufficiently small \( \bar{\alpha} \), any consumer who is forced to buy at the lowest price (i.e who has no PE of not buying) is also forced to buy at the higher sales price \( p_L + \alpha_L \) (i.e. has no PE of buying up to \( p_L - \alpha_L \)).

**Proof.** Since not buying is not a PE,

\[
p_L - \alpha_L \leq \frac{1 + \eta}{1 + \eta\lambda} v_i.
\]
Buying up to \( p_L - \alpha_L \) is not a PE if the consumer prefers to buy at \( p_L + \alpha_L \) ex post when expecting to buy up to \( p_L - \alpha_L \), i.e., when

\[
p_L + \alpha_L < \frac{1 + \eta (1 - \frac{s}{2}) + \eta \lambda \frac{s}{4} v_i}{1 + \eta \lambda} + \frac{\eta (\lambda - 1) s}{2} (p_L - \alpha_L).
\]

Since for \( \alpha_L = 0 \) the former Inequality implies the latter, the lemma holds for sufficiently small \( \bar{\alpha} \).

**Lemma 8.** For sufficiently small \( \bar{\alpha} \), if \( EU_{v_i}(p_L - \alpha_L, F) \geq 0 \) then \( EU_{v_i}(p_L + \alpha_L, F) \geq EU_{v_i}(p_L - \alpha_L, F) \).

**Proof.** One has

\[
EU_{v_i}(p_L - \alpha_L, F) = \frac{s}{2} (v - p_L) - \eta \lambda (1) \left( \frac{s}{2} - \frac{s^2}{4} \right) (v + p_L) + \alpha_L \left( \frac{s}{2} + \eta \lambda (1) \left( \frac{s}{2} - \frac{s^2}{4} \right) \right) \geq 0 \tag{27}
\]

and

\[
EU_{v_i}(p_L + \alpha_L, F) = s (v - p_L) - \eta \lambda (1) s (1 - s) (v + p_L) - \eta \lambda (1) \frac{s^2}{2} \alpha_L. \tag{28}
\]

Thus,

\[
EU_{v_i}(p_L + \alpha_L, F) - EU_{v_i}(p_L - \alpha_L, F) = \frac{s}{2} (v - p_L) - \eta \lambda (1) \left( \frac{s}{2} - \frac{3s^2}{4} \right) (v + p_L) - \alpha_L \left( \frac{s}{2} + \eta \lambda (1) \left( \frac{s^2}{4} + \frac{s}{2} \right) \right). \tag{29}
\]

Hence, for sufficiently small \( \bar{\alpha} \), \( EU_{v_i}(p_L + \alpha_L, F) - EU_{v_i}(p_L - \alpha_L, F) > EU_{v_i}(p_L - \alpha_L, F) \geq 0 \).

**Lemma 9.** For sufficiently low \( \bar{\alpha} \), the lowest consumption valuation consumer \( v_H \) who buys at a regular price has a PE of buying up to \( p_L + \alpha_L \).

**Proof.** Let \( v_H \) be the consumer with the lowest consumption valuation who buys at \( p_H - \alpha_H \) and thus, by Lemma 6 the lowest consumption valuation consumer who always buys. Now suppose that \( v_H \) has no PE of buying up to \( p_L + \alpha_L \) because she prefers not buying ex post when expecting to buy up to \( p_L + \alpha_L \). Then no consumer with a lower consumption valuation has a PE of buying up to \( p_L + \alpha_L \), and by Lemma 5 no consumer with a lower consumption valuation can have a PE of buying up to \( p_L - \alpha_L \). Thus, no consumer with a consumption valuation below \( v_H \) buys the good, and consumer \( v_H \) must have a no-buying equilibrium. Thus, \( EU_{v_H}(p_H + \alpha_H, F) \geq 0 \)
and together with Lemma 4 this implies that $EU_{v_H}(p_H + \alpha_H, F) - EU_{v_H}(p_L + \alpha_L, F) > 0$ and $EU_{v_H}(p_H + \alpha_H, F) - EU_{v_H}(p_L - \alpha_L, F) > 0$. But then by Lemma 3 and Lemma 6 all player with consumption valuation above $v_H$ prefer always buying to any other cutoff rule. Furthermore, since always buying is a PE for consumer $v_H$ it is also a PE for all consumer with a higher consumption valuation, and therefore all consumers with consumption valuation above $v_H$ always buy and all consumer with a lower consumption valuation never buy. Furthermore, since $EU_{v_H}(p_H + \alpha_H, F) \geq 0$ and $s \in (0, 1)$, the firm charges an average price strictly below $v_H$. But in this case the firm could charge the deterministic price $v_H$ without affecting demand and hence cost, and thereby increase revenues. This is a contradiction and hence $v_H$ prefers buying ex post at the higher sales price when expecting to buy up to $p_L + \alpha_L$.

Suppose now $v_H$ has no PE of buying up to $p_L + \alpha_L$ because she prefers buying up to $p_H - \alpha_H$ when expecting to buy up to $p_L + \alpha_L$. Equation 8 implies that in this case

$$\left( p_H - \alpha_H \right) \leq \frac{1 + \eta(1-s) + \eta\lambda s}{1 + \eta\lambda} v_H + \frac{\eta(\lambda - 1)}{1 + \eta\lambda} sp_L.$$  \hfill (30)

Recall from above, however, that the consumer $v_H$ has a PE of always buying as long as

$$p_H + \alpha_H \leq v_H + \frac{\eta(\lambda - 1)}{1 + \eta\lambda} (sp_L + (1-s)p_H)$$

or equivalently

$$p_H \leq \frac{1 + \eta\lambda}{1 + \eta\lambda s + \eta(1-s)} v_H + \frac{\eta(\lambda - 1)}{1 + \eta\lambda s + \eta(1-s)} sp_L - \frac{1 + \eta\lambda}{1 + \eta\lambda s + \eta(1-s)} \alpha_H.$$ \hfill (31)

Furthermore she prefers always buying to buying up to $p_L + \alpha$ if

$$EU_{v_H}(p_H + \alpha_H, F) = s(v_H - p_L) + (1-s)(v_H - p_H) - \eta(\lambda - 1) \left[ \frac{s^2}{2} \alpha_L + (1-s)s(p_H - p_L) + \frac{(1-s)^2}{2} \alpha_H \right]$$

is greater than

$$EU_{v_H}(p_L + \alpha_L, F) = s(v_H - p_L) - \eta(\lambda - 1)s(1-s)(v_H + p_L) - \eta(\lambda - 1) \frac{s^2}{2} \alpha_L.$$  

Rewriting shows that the consumer prefers always buying to buying up $p_L + \alpha_L$ as long as

$$p_H \leq v_H + \frac{\eta(\lambda - 1)2s}{1 + \eta(\lambda - 1)s} p_L - \frac{\eta(\lambda - 1)(1-s)}{1 + \eta(\lambda - 1)s} \alpha_H.$$ \hfill (32)
Now observe that for sufficiently small $\bar{\alpha}$ the right-hand side of Inequality 30 is less than that of Inequalities 31 and 32. Hence Inequality 30 implies Inequalities 31 and 32.

Hence all consumers in the neighborhood of $v_H$ prefer always buying to buying up to $p_L + \alpha_L$ and always buying is a PE for them. Thus consumers with valuation slightly below $v_H$ either don’t buy or buy up to $p_L - \alpha_L$. We now rule out that consumers with a valuation slightly below $v_H$ buy up to $p_L - \alpha_L$. In case they have no no-buying equilibrium, by Lemma 7 they have no equilibrium of buying up to $p_L - \alpha_L$ either, contradicting the assumption that they buy up to $p_L - \alpha_L$. Thus they must have no-buying equilibrium and hence $EU_{v_i}(p_L - \alpha_L, F) \geq 0$ for consumers $v_i$ sufficiently close but below $v_H$. But then Lemma 8 implies that $EU_{v_i}(p_L + \alpha_L, F) \geq EU_{v_i}(p_L - \alpha_L, F)$ and since furthermore always buying is preferred to buying to $EU_{v_i}(p_L - \alpha_L, F)$ and is a PE for consumer sufficiently close to $v_H$, we have a contradiction. Thus consumers with a consumption valuation slightly below $v_H$ prefer not buying to always buying and hence also to buying up to $p_L + \alpha_L$. But then By Lemma 3 all consumers with valuation below $v_H$ prefer not buying to buying up to $p_L + \alpha_L$ and all consumers must have such a no buying equilibrium. Hence if the firm slightly raises $p_H$ no consumer with consumption valuation below $v_H$ will start buying, and all consumer above $v_H$ will continue to always buy. Thus this price change raises revenue without affecting demand and hence cost. This contradicts that the firm chooses an optimal price distribution. Hence, the marginal consumer $v_H$ who buys at the regular price(s) has a PE of buying up to $p_L + \alpha_L$.

**Lemma 10.** For sufficiently low $\bar{\alpha}$, $\alpha_H = 0$.

*Proof.* We now prove the lemma by contradiction. Suppose $\alpha_H > 0$. Consider the marginal consumer $v_H$ who buys at the regular prices, and recall that all consumers with valuation above $v_H$ always buy. Note that for this consumer either the PE constraint for always buying (Inequality 31) binds or the consumer is from an ex ante perspective indifferent between always buying and a lower PE-cutoff (not buying, or buying up to $p_l \in \{p_L - \alpha_L, p_L + \alpha_L\}$). Observe that setting $\alpha_H = 0$ increases the expected ex ante utility of always buying and relaxes the PE constraint 31. Hence, the firm can set $\alpha_H = 0$ and increase $p_H$ until one of these constraints is binding again. In this case, all consumers with valuation above $v_H$ will continue to always buy.

We now argue that all consumers with a lower valuation will not change their buying behavior.
If the PE constraint 31 is binding after the price change, no consumer with consumption valuation below \( v_H \) has a PE of always buying and because the comparison between PEs with cutoff values below \( p_H \) remains unaltered, their purchase behavior remains the same. If the PE constraint is not binding then either (i) \( EU_{v_H}(p_H, F) = 0 \) and the consumer \( v_H \) has a no-purchase equilibrium or (ii) \( EU_{v_H}(p_H, F) - EU_{v_H}(p_l, F) = 0 \) for some PE cutoff \( p_l \in \{p_L - \alpha_L, p_L + \alpha_L\} \). In case (i) not buying is a PE for all consumers with a lower consumption valuation and by Lemma 3 preferred to always buying by all such consumers. Hence, in this case the consumers with valuation below \( v_H \) will not change their purchasing behavior. In case (ii) Lemma 3 implies that all consumers with consumption valuation \( v_i < v_H \) prefer the \( p_l \) cutoff to always buying. If this cutoff is a PE cutoff, they will thus again not change their purchasing behavior. If \( p_l \) is not a PE cutoff, then it must be that the consumer prefers not buying when expecting to buy up to \( p_l \) ex post—otherwise the consumer and all higher consumer would have to be forced at \( p_l \); in that case however, the consumer would have a PE of buying up to \( p_L + \alpha_L \) since consumer \( v_H \) does. Since the consumer prefers not buying ex post, Lemma 4 implies that \( EU_{v_i}(p_l, F) < 0 \), and hence by Lemma 3 \( EU_{v_i}(p_H, F) < 0 \).

By Lemma 5 it cannot be that it is ex post optimal to buy at \( p_L - \alpha_L \) when expecting to buy up \( p_L - \alpha_L \) for this consumer \( v_i \). Hence she has a no buying equilibrium and this is preferred to always buying or buying at sales prices. Again therefore the consumer with valuation below \( v_H \) do not change their purchase behavior.

Since all consumers above \( v_H \) continue to always buy and consumers below \( v_H \) do not change their purchasing behavior, this price increase doesn’t affect demand or cost, and hence we have the desired contradiction. \( \square \)

**Lemma 11.** For sufficiently densely distributed marginal cost and for sufficiently low \( \bar{\alpha} \), in the optimal pricing distribution the lowest valuation consumers who buy the product with positive probability have negative expected utility from buying.

**Proof.** Suppose not. Thus if no consumer below \( v_H \) buys, \( EU_{v_H}(p_H + \alpha_H, F) \geq 0 \). In this case the firm could charge the deterministic price \( v_H > p_H \), increasing revenue without affecting demand—a contradiction. Hence some consumers with valuation below \( v_H \) must buy. Furthermore, sales below \( p_H - \alpha_H \) must be profitable on average because otherwise the firm could charge a deterministic
price of $v_H$, eliminating the loss-making sales and making higher profits when setting the regular price.

Recall that $v_H$ has a PE of buying up to $p_L + \alpha_L$ and that $\alpha_H = 0$. Hence

$$p_H > \frac{1 + \eta(1 - s) + \eta s}{1 + \eta \lambda} v_i + \frac{\eta(\lambda - 1)}{1 + \eta \lambda} s p_L,$$

for all consumers with valuation $v_i < v_H$. Thus Lemma 5 implies that any consumer with valuation below $v_H$ who has a PE of buying up to $p_L - \alpha_L$ also has a PE of buying up to $p_L + \alpha_L$. Furthermore, if the lowest consumption valuation consumer $v_L$ that buys with positive probability would choose the cutoff $p_L - \alpha_L$, then by assumption of the proof $EU_{v_i}(p_L - \alpha_L, F) \geq 0$. Thus, by Lemma 8 this consumer prefers buying up to $p_L + \alpha_L$, a contradiction. Hence, the lowest consumption valuation consumer $v_L$ who buys, buys at both sales prices. Next we observe that any consumer with valuation below $v_H$ that buys with positive probability, buys up to $p_L + \alpha_L$. If the consumer $v_L$ does not have a PE of buying up to $p_L - \alpha_L$ then by Lemma 4, $EU_{v_i}(p_L + \alpha_L, F) - EU_{v_i}(p_L - \alpha_L, F) > 0$. If she does have a PE of buying up to $p_L - \alpha_L$ the fact that she chooses to buy up to $p_L + \alpha_L$ implies that $EU_{v_i}(p_L + \alpha_L, F) - EU_{v_i}(p_L - \alpha_L, F) \geq 0$. Hence, by Lemma 3 all consumers $v_i \in (v_L, v_H)$ buy at both sales prices.

Consider consumer $v_L$. By Lemma 4 if it is not a PE to buy up to $p_L + \alpha_L$ then the ex ante utility of buying up to $p_L + \alpha_L$ is strictly negative, and hence it must be that $EU_{v_L}(p_L + \alpha_L, F) = 0$. Now reducing $\alpha_L$ relaxes this constraint, and hence increase the firm’s sales at the sales prices. Furthermore, because $EU_{v_H}(p_H + \alpha_H, F) - EU_{v_H}(p_L + \alpha_L, F)$ is independent of $\alpha_L$ and the PE-constraint for always buying is also independent of $\alpha_L$, this change does not affect sales when setting a regular price. Because sales at sales prices must be profitable on average, therefore, the firm must use a two-point pricing distribution if it does not force any consumers.

Now consider the optimal two-point distribution in which $p_L$ is charged with probability $s$. Since no consumer is forced, the lowest consumer $v_L$ who buys has an ex ante expected utility of zero

$$sv_L - sp_L - \eta(\lambda - 1)s(1 - s)(v_L + p_L) = 0.$$

The lowest consumer $v_H$ who buys at the regular price must be indifferent between buying at the
low price only and buying at both prices, so that
\[
v_H - (s p_L + (1 - s) p_H) - \eta (\lambda - 1) s (1 - s) (p_H - p_L) = s v_H - s p_L - \eta (\lambda - 1) s (1 - s) (v_H + p_L). \tag{35}
\]
Rewriting yields
\[
(1 - s) v_H - (1 - s) p_H = \eta (\lambda - 1) s (1 - s) (p_H - v_H - 2 p_L).
\]
Adding the above and equation 34 yields
\[
(s v_L + (1 - s) v_H) - (s p_L + (1 - s) p_H) = \eta (\lambda - 1) s (1 - s) ((p_H - p_L) - (v_H - v_L)).
\]
Below we illustrate that $p_H - p_L > v_H - v_L$, which implies that the average consumer with valuation $\tilde{v} = s v_L + (1 - s) v_H$ strictly prefers to buy at the average price $\tilde{p} = s p_L + (1 - s) p_H$. Thus, charging the average price leads to a strict increase in revenue if
\[
(\tilde{p} - c)[1 - \Psi(\tilde{v})] > s (p_L - c)[1 - \Psi(v_L)] + (1 - s) (p_H - c)[1 - \Psi(v_H)],
\]
or equivalently
\[
(1 - s) (p_H - c)[\Psi(v_H) - \Psi(\tilde{v})] > s (p_L - c)[\Psi(\tilde{v}) - \Psi(v_L)].
\]
A sufficient condition is that
\[
(1 - s)[\Psi(v_H) - \Psi(\tilde{v})] \geq s [\Psi(\tilde{v}) - \Psi(v_L)],
\]
or equivalently that
\[
(1 - s) \Psi(v_H) + s \Psi(v_L) \geq \Psi(s v_L + (1 - s) v_H),
\]
which follows from the convexity of $\Psi$.

We are left to show that $p_H - p_L > v_H - v_L$. Rewriting 34 yields
\[
v_L = p_L + p_L \frac{2 \eta (\lambda - 1) (1 - s)}{1 - \eta (\lambda - 1) (1 - s)}
\]
and rewriting 35 yields
\[
v_H = p_H - p_L \frac{2 \eta (\lambda - 1) s}{1 + \eta (\lambda - 1) s}. \tag{36}
\]
Hence,

\[ v_H - v_L = (p_H - p_L) - p_L \left[ \frac{2\eta(\lambda - 1)s}{1 + \eta(\lambda - 1)s} + \frac{2\eta(\lambda - 1)(1 - s)}{1 - \eta(\lambda - 1)(1 - s)} \right] . \]

Recall from 34 that \( 1 - \eta(\lambda - 1)(1 - s) > 0 \) and hence the above implies that indeed \( p_H - p_L > v_H - v_L \).

Since \( p_H - p_L \geq 2\bar{\alpha} \) there exists a strictly positive lower bound for the revenue increase. Now note that \( c_H - c_L \to 0 \), the costs savings from selling more when marginal costs are lower go to zero, and thus for sufficiently densely distributed marginal cost the revenue increase dominates. This contradicts Lemma 2.

**Lemma 12.** For sufficiently densely distributed costs and sufficiently small \( \bar{\alpha} \), \( \alpha_L = 0 \).

**Proof.** Observe that for given \( v_H \), Equation 36 implies that \( p_H \) is an increasing function in \( p_L \). Also, since the lowest consumption valuation consumer is forced by Lemma 11, she is forced to buy at both sales prices by Lemma 7. If \( \alpha_L < \bar{\alpha} \), the firm could hold the lowest price \( p_L - \alpha_L \) and \( s \) fixed but increase \( p_L \), still forcing all consumers \( v_i \geq v_L \) to buy at both sales prices. Furthermore, the firm could then increase \( p_H \) to hold \( v_H \) fixed. These price increases raise revenues without affecting demand and hence costs.

The proposition follows directly from the above Lemmata.

**Proof of Proposition 4.** Note: this proof relies heavily on the proof of Proposition 1.

We first state a version of our result for \( \Delta > 0 \). As in the proposition, let \( p' = (1 + \eta + \eta(\lambda - 1)\phi/p)\frac{v}{1 + \eta\lambda} \).

**Lemma 13.** Fix any \( \phi > 0, \eta > 0, \lambda > 1 \). Then, for a sufficiently small \( \Delta > 0 \), if the firm can profitably sell to the consumer, then a profit-maximizing price distribution exists, and induces purchase with probability one. Furthermore, there is a unique cutoff \( \phi^c(\Delta) < p \) such that for \( \phi > \phi^c(\Delta) \), the unique price distribution puts probability one on \( v - \phi \); and for \( \phi < \phi^c(\Delta) \), there exists a \( z > 0 \) such that the distribution has atoms at \( p_0, p_1, p_2, p_3, \ldots, p_z, \) and \( p_{z^*} > p_z \), where \( p_0 = 0 \) and \( q_0 = \phi/p, p' - 2\Delta < p_1 \leq p' \), and for \( 2 \leq l \leq z \), \( p_l - p_{l-1} < 2\Delta \). For \( l < z \), the weight...
on atom \( p_l \) is \( q_l = A(p_{l+1} - p_l)/(v + p_l) \), the weight on atom \( p_z \) is \( q_z < 2A\Delta/(v + p_z) \), and the weight on atom \( p_z^* \) is the complementary probability \( 1 - \sum_{l=0}^{z} q_l \).

Proof. By essentially the same proof as in Proposition 6, the profit-maximizing price distribution induces purchase with probability one, and the highest revenue the monopolist can earn with a deterministic price distribution is \( v - \phi \). Next, we establish some properties that an optimal price distribution must have for it to earn revenue strictly greater than \( v - \phi \). Then, we complete the proof by showing that there is a cutoff such that the latter type of distribution earns revenues less than \( v - \phi \) for \( \phi \) above the cutoff, while it earns revenues greater than \( v - \phi \) for \( \phi \) below the cutoff.

Since the price distribution features an average price greater than \( v - \phi \), the consumer’s expected consumption utility in a PE in which she buys at all prices is negative. Since her gain-loss utility is less than or equal to zero, this means that she would prefer to make and follow through a plan not to buy. Hence, in order for her to buy at all prices, a strategy of never buying must not be credible. Let \( q_0 = \Pr(p \leq \underline{p}) \)—that is, \( q_0 \) is the probability that the monopolist’s price is less than \( \underline{p} \). Similarly, let \( p_0 = E[p|p \leq \underline{p}] \). If the consumer had expected not to buy, if she checks the price she will buy if \( p \leq \underline{p} \). Hence, she will check the price if

\[
q_0(1 + \eta)v - q_0(1 + \eta\lambda)p_0 - (1 + \eta\lambda)\phi \geq 0,
\]

or

\[
q_0 \geq \frac{\phi}{\underline{p} - p_0}.
\]  

(37)

Now, slightly modifying the proof of Proposition 6, we consider two cases.

Case I. The consumer has a PE in which she buys only up to price \( \underline{p} \). In this case, by the same logic as in the proof of Proposition 6, there is a single price above \( \underline{p} \) that the monopolist charges with positive probability. Clearly, for a sufficiently small \( \Delta > 0 \) this price atom is above \( \underline{p} + 2\Delta \).

Case II. The consumer has no PE in which she buys up to price \( \underline{p} \). Then, by the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 6, the (truncated) price distribution above \( \underline{p} \) has the same qualitative properties as with no price-discovery costs: there exists a \( z > 0 \) such that (i) the distribution has atoms at \( p_1, p_2, p_3, \ldots, p_z \), and \( p_z > p_z^* \); (ii) for \( 2 \leq l \leq z \), \( p_l - p_{l-1} < 2\Delta \); (iii) for \( l < z \), the weight on atom \( p_l \) is \( q_l = A(p_{l+1} - p_l)/(v + p_l) \), and the weight on atom \( p_z \) is \( q_z <
2AΔ/(v + p_\zeta); and (iv) the weight on atom \( p_\zeta^* \) is the complementary probability \( 1 - \sum_{i=0}^\zeta q_i \).

Furthermore, again by the same logic as in the proof of Proposition 6, \( p_1 \) is within \( 2\Delta \) of the highest price at which the consumer would buy if she had expected to buy up to \( p_\zeta \). This means that \( p_1 > [(1 + \eta + \eta(\lambda - 1))q_0v + \eta(\lambda - 1)q_0p_0]/(1 + \eta \lambda) - 2\Delta \). Therefore, since by Equation 37 \( q_0 \) is bounded away from zero, for a sufficiently small \( \Delta > 0 \) we have \( p_1 > p_\zeta + 2\Delta \).

Next, we show that \( p_0 = 0 \) and \( q_0 = \phi/p_\zeta \). By Equation 37, we already know that \( q_0 \geq \phi/p_\zeta \). Suppose by contradiction that \( p_0 > 0 \) or \( q_0 > \phi/p_\zeta \). Then, Equation 37 implies that we cannot have \( p_0 > 0 \) and \( q_0 = \phi/p_\zeta \), so that we must have \( q_0 > \phi/p_\zeta \). Hence, we can construct a new price distribution that puts weight \( \phi/p_\zeta \) on the price of zero, and weight \( q_0 - \phi/p_\zeta \) on a price of \( p_\zeta + \epsilon \). For a sufficiently small \( \epsilon > 0 \), it is not credible for the consumer to buy only at price zero, so that she buys at both prices. In addition, for a sufficiently small \( \Delta > 0 \) and \( \epsilon < \Delta \), the new price distribution does not violate the constraint that price atoms must be at least \( \Delta \) apart. Furthermore, with this alternative price distribution, the expected price in this range is \( (q_0 - \phi/p_\zeta)(p_\zeta + \epsilon) > q_0p_\zeta - \phi \). By Equation 37, with the original distribution the expected price is \( q_0p_0 \leq q_0p_\zeta - \phi \), so that the change increases the expected price in this range. Finally, notice that with the increase in the expected price in this range, the consumer still buys at all higher prices, so that the monopolist earns greater profits overall, a contradiction.

Now suppose that we are in Case I above. Let the single price atom be \( p_{reg} \). The consumer’s expected ex-ante utility if she buys only at the zero price is

\[ q_0v - q_0(1 - q_0)\eta(\lambda - 1)v - \phi, \]

whereas if she buys at both prices it is

\[ v - (1 - q_0)p_{reg} - q_0(1 - q_0)\eta(\lambda - 1)p_{reg} - \phi. \]

Hence, in order for her to prefer to buy at both prices it must be the case that \( p_{reg} \leq v \). This means that the monopolist’s expected revenue is \( (1 - \phi/p_\zeta)v < v - \phi \). Therefore, with such a pricing strategy the monopolist cannot earn revenue greater than \( v - \phi \). This establishes that the monopolist either chooses a price distribution from Case II above, or chooses the deterministic price \( v - \phi \).
To complete the proof, we establish the existence of the cutoff $\phi_c(\Delta)$ specified in the proposition. Notice that by essentially the same proof as in Proposition 6, if $\phi$ is sufficiently small, the stochastic price distribution earns revenue greater than $v$, so that is what the monopolist will choose. Conversely, it is easy to show that for $\phi < p$ sufficiently close to $p$, the stochastic price distribution from Case II earns revenues less than $v - \phi$. To see this, notice that the consumer will never buy at a price greater than $p$, so that the monopolist’s revenue is at most
\[
\left(1 - \frac{\phi}{p}\right) p = v + (p - v) - (p - p) \frac{\phi}{p},
\]
which, since $p < v$, is strictly less than $v - \phi$ for $\phi$ sufficiently close to $p$.

Now, to complete the proof it is sufficient to establish that if the monopolist prefers the stochastic price distribution for some $\phi$, it strictly prefers a stochastic price distribution for $\phi' < \phi$. Take the optimal price distribution for $\phi$, and construct a new price distribution that puts $\phi'/p$ on the price of zero and $(\phi - \phi')/p$ on the price of $p + \epsilon$. This increases the monopolist’s revenues by more than $\phi - \phi'$, and for a sufficiently small $\epsilon > 0$, maintains the properties that atoms are at least $\Delta$ apart and that the consumer buys at higher prices. Hence, for $\phi'$ the monopolist must prefer this new distribution to the deterministic one, completing the proof.

To prove Proposition 4 from Lemma 13, we can follow the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 1.

**Proof of Proposition 5.** Note that in any symmetric equilibrium firms make zero expected profits.

We first prove that there is no equilibrium in which a firm chooses a stochastic price distribution. Suppose by contradiction that firm 1 chooses a stochastic price distribution, in which it charges the prices $p_1$ through $p_I$ ordered from lowest to highest with probabilities $q_1$ through $q_I$, respectively. It is clearly optimal to associate lower costs with lower prices; hence, let the associated average costs be $c_1$ through $c_I$, respectively, which are also increasing. We suppose that a positive measure of consumers buy the product at all prices; a slight modification of the proof below covers the other case. Let $p^* = (c_L + c_H)/2$ and $W = \eta(\lambda - 1)\left(\sum_{i,i'} q_i q_{i'} |p_i - p_{i'}|\right)/2$. The variable $W$ is the expected gain-loss disutility from price variation for a consumer who buys at all prices at firm 1.
We consider the response by firm 2 of setting the deterministic price \( p^* \). We show that a positive measure of consumers with \( v > p^* \) strictly prefer to go to firm 2 over firm 1. This yields a contradiction because for a sufficiently small \( \epsilon > 0 \), if firm 1 charges \( p^* + \epsilon \) with probability 1, it still attracts a positive measure of consumers and earns positive profits.

Suppose by contradiction that the measure of consumers who strictly prefer firm 2 is zero. For those who would buy the product at all prices at firm 1 to prefer firm 1, we must have \( E[p] + W \leq p^* \), so that \( E[p] < p^* \) and \( W \leq p^* - E[p] \).

We now show by contradiction that if \( d \) is sufficiently large and firm 2 set a deterministic price \( p^* \), firm 1 cannot sell profitably to any consumer with \( v \leq p^* \) by choosing a price distribution such that \( E[p] < p^* \). Clearly, it is sufficient to establish this for \( v = p^* \). We consider two cases. First, suppose that the expected utility of consumer \( p^* \) is non-negative. Suppose that this consumer buys the product from firm 1 with probability \( q \) at an average price conditional on buying of \( p_{ave} \). Then

\[
q(p^* - p_{ave}) - \eta(\lambda - 1)q(1 - q)(p^* + p_{ave}) \geq 0,
\]

which yields

\[
q \geq 1 - \frac{p^* - p_{ave}}{\eta(\lambda - 1)(p^* + p_{ave})}.
\]

In order for the firm to make no loss when the average price is \( p_{ave} \), the average cost at which it sells must be no greater than \( p_{ave} \). Supposing that the firm sells for cost levels on the interval \([c_L, c'_L] \), we must therefore have \((c_L + c'_L)/2 \leq p_{ave}\). Noting that \( c'_L = c_L + q/d \) and rearranging gives

\[
q \leq 1 - 2d(p^* - p_{ave}). \quad (38)
\]

For \( d \) sufficiently large, \( q \) cannot simultaneously satisfy the above two inequalities for any \( p_{ave} < p^* \).

Second, suppose that the expected utility of consumer \( p^* \) is negative. Any consumer with valuation \( v < p^* \) thus have a negative expected utility of buying from firm 1; these consumers, thus, strictly prefer going to firm 2 and not buying. This completes the proof that firm 1 cannot profitably sell to any consumer with \( v \leq p^* \).

The above implies that there is a positive measure of consumers with \( v > p^* \) on whom firm 1 would not make losses if they went to firm 1. Note that since \( E[p] < p^* \), such a consumer must
be buying with probability less than 1 for firm 1 not to make losses. Take such a consumer, and suppose that she buys the product with probability $q$ at an average price conditional on buying of $p_{ave}$. We next show that for a sufficiently large $d$, any such consumer strictly prefers firm 2’s offer of a deterministic $p^*$. We do this by showing that if a consumer with $v > p^*$ prefers firm 1’s price distribution, then firm 1 makes losses on the consumer. That the consumer prefers firm 1’s distribution implies

$$q(v - p_{ave}) - \eta(\lambda - 1)q(1 - q)(v + p_{ave}) \geq v - p^*,$$

which in turn leads to

$$q \geq 1 - \frac{(v - p_{ave}) - (v - p^*)/q}{\eta(\lambda - 1)(v + p_{ave})} > 1 - \frac{p^* - p_{ave}}{\eta(\lambda - 1)(p^* + p_{ave})}.$$

This implies that for a sufficiently large $d$, $q$ violates Inequality 38, with the inequality going strictly the other way, for any $p_{ave}$ satisfying $c_L \leq p_{ave} < p^*$, so that firm 1 makes expected losses on this consumer for any $p_{ave} \geq c_L$.

This completes the proof that there is no equilibrium in which one firm chooses a stochastic price distribution.

Clearly, if both firms choose deterministic price distributions, their price must equal $p^*$. To complete the proof, we show that for a sufficiently large $d$, this is indeed an equilibrium. Suppose firm 2 sets the deterministic price $p^*$. If firm 1 does the same, it gets zero expected profits. To show that firm 1 has no profitable deviation, we show that it cannot attract any consumer from firm 2 and make strictly positive profits on the consumer. Consider first consumers with $v \leq p^*$. These consumers get an expected utility of zero from going to firm 2. We have shown above that firm 1 cannot make positive profits on a consumer with $v < p^*$ such that the consumer’s expected utility is non-negative. Hence, firm 1 cannot profitably attract these consumers.

Now consider consumers with $v > p^*$. Clearly, firm 1 cannot profitably attract these consumers in a way that leads them to buy with probability one. And we have shown above that firm 1 cannot profitably attract these consumers and have them buy with probability less than one. This completes the proof. □
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