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FIFA World Cup 2006 Germany: An opportunity for union revitalisation?

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FIFA WORLD CUP 2006
GERMANY: AN OPPORTUNITY FOR UNION REVITALISATION?

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ABSTRACT
Given their global dimension and centrality to late modern capitalist development mega sports events like the Olympics and the FIFA World Cup can provide space for public discussion about the impact of globalisation and the opportunity for union revitalisation.

This paper examines the activities of selected German unions and civil society organisations, both in the lead up to and during the FIFA World Cup in Germany 2006, in order to determine the extent to which unions were able to utilise such opportunities for long-term strategic gains.

Following an overview of the development and growth of mega sports events and the specifics of the German industrial situation, the actions of selected German unions are assessed; using union revitalisation categories as a tool, for examining the strategic processes used by these unions and to point to some areas of future potential.

As this assessment shows, attempts by German unions to use the World Cup for long-term strategic gains were exceptional, rather than the general practice. In part this can be attributed to the time-frame in which the World Cup was held; the underdeveloped nature of the union revitalisation debate in Germany at the time and the specifics of the German union situation. At the same time, the power of the interest groups involved in mega sports events, the complexity of the relationships, and the level of resources needed by unions to conduct strategic campaigns and political action should not be underestimated.
FIFA World Cup 2006 Germany: An opportunity for union revitalisation?

Wilfried Schwetz
Donna McGuire

This paper arose from the research project on mega sports events as an opportunity for union revitalisation which is being conducted by the alumni of the masters programme of the Global Labour University (GLU) under the direction of Steve Davies from Cardiff University. We would like to thank Steve for his advice and helpful feedback during the research and editing process.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 1
METHODOLOGY.................................................................................................................. 2

PART I: WORLD SPORTS EVENTS ............................................................................. 3
1. Development in sports and growth of world sports events as big business .................. 3
2. Sports and Marketing ............................................................................................... 4
3. FIFA and the FIFA World Cup 2006 in Germany ............................................... 5

PART II: WORLD SPORTS EVENTS AND TRADE UNION REVITALISATION .. 7
1. The crisis of German unionism ............................................................................... 7
2. The international debate on union revitalisation ................................................. 9
3. World sports events as an ‘opportunity structure’ for union revitalisation ........... 9

PART III: UNION ACTIVITIES AND THE FIFA WORLD CUP 2006 ............. 12
1. Hospitality - Gewerkschaft Nahrung-Genuss-Gaststätten (NGG) ..................... 12
   1.1 “Wir arbeiten, damit die ganze Welt feiern kann” ........................................ 12
   1.2 Collective agreements ....................................................................................... 13
2. Retail Industry - ver.di .......................................................................................... 14
   2.1 Deregulation of Opening Hours .................................................................... 14
   2.2 Working conditions in the sportswear industry ............................................ 15
4. Sportswear Industry – IG Metall, IG BCE and ver.di ........................................ 17
   4.1 Ver.di .................................................................................................................. 18
   4.2 IG Metall ............................................................................................................ 19
   4.3 Involvement of GUFs ....................................................................................... 20
5. Construction – IG Bauen Agrar Umwelt .............................................................. 20
6. The DGB .................................................................................................................. 21

PART IV: SUCCESSES AND POTENTIAL OPPORTUNITIES ....................... 24
1. Organising ............................................................................................................... 24
2. Political action ....................................................................................................... 25
3. Coalition building and international solidarity .................................................... 25
4. Labour Management partnerships ........................................................................ 27
5. Organisational change .......................................................................................... 27
6. Other critical factors .............................................................................................. 27
   6.1 Role of the national union federation .............................................................. 27
   6.2 Attention: Nationalism, surveillance and reduction of civil rights .................. 28

PART V: CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 30

REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................... 31
INTRODUCTION

Over the past few decades a transformation in world sport can be observed. The formation of a sports-media-business alliance has transformed professional sports and supported the growth of mega sports events such as the Olympics and the football World Cup.

Given their global dimension and centrality to late modern capitalist development (Horne and Manzenreiter 2006), these events provide political space and opportunities for unions and social justice groups to publicly discuss the impacts of globalisation and challenge the current neo-liberal discourse. They can also provide opportunities for unions to ‘revitalise’: by rebuilding their organisational strength and strengthening collaboration between unions and with NGO’s; nationally as well as internationally.

Following an overview of the development and growth of mega sports events this paper examines the activities of selected German unions and civil society organisations¹, both in the lead up to and during the FIFA World Cup in Germany 2006, in order to determine the extent to which unions were able to utilise such opportunities. In the study we concentrate on the following industries and unions, which we judge as most impacted by the World Cup: construction (IG BAU); hospitality (NGG); retail and security services (ver.di); sportswear (IG Metall, ver.di, IG BCE), and the DGB as the union federation. Other general topics covered include ‘civil rights and surveillance’ and ‘nationalism and racism’.

¹Such civil society organisations include developmental organisations, churches and social justice organisations.
METHODOLOGY

This is not designed to be an in-depth investigation but rather a 'snap-shot' of German union activities in the lead up to and during the World Cup 2006. The findings are based predominantly on in-depth interviews with key people in unions and civil society organisations: one from the NGG, two from ver.di, two from IG Metall, one from IG BAU, two from the DGB and one from DGB-Bildungswerk (DGB Education Centre) as well as two activists from the German division of the Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC). It should be noted that the number of interviews was limited by the relatively short time frame in which the research was conducted and also the difficulty of obtaining interviews with the relevant trade unionists and their understandable reluctance to discuss internal decision making processes. An earlier literature review (media, magazines, Internet) has revealed that many campaigning website pages no longer exist and there appears to be little discussion in other media about union strategies during this period. These findings are assessed within the framework of the German industrial relations system (characterised by declining union density and enterprise bargaining coverage) and the international union revitalisation discussion, with a specific focus on the extent to which unions were able to utilise strategic opportunities presented by the World Cup. We try to distinguish between attempts to use the event to gain some form of short-term 'windfall profits' and attempts to establish long-term and sustainable improvements of union power.

In assessing the approaches used by German unions we utilise the following elements identified, by Hurd et al (2003) and similarly Frege and Kelly (2003), as essential for trade union revitalisation: organising; political action; coalition building; labour-management partnerships; organisational change; and international solidarity. In adapting this typology for the study, we examine which approaches were used by German unions and to which extent they were influenced by the specifics of German industrial relations.

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2 See reference list for further details of interviews.
3 Unfortunately, detailed data on union membership figures and collective bargaining coverage within each sector is not easily available and would require substantial additional research. Therefore we situate the cases within the general context of union decline in Germany rather than explicitly linking differences in union approaches to differences in union density and collective bargaining coverage.
PART I: WORLD SPORTS EVENTS

1. Development in sports and growth of world sports events as big business

A driving cause behind the commercialisation and transformation of sport has been the development of new technologies of mass media (such as satellite television) which have created a global audience for events like the Olympics and the World Cup (Horne and Manzenreiter 2006:6). Thus, world sports events are in themselves an expression of globalisation and have developed in line with it. This applies not only to the economic sphere around the marketing of world sports events, but also to the media construction of these events as a form of ‘global village’, with sometimes billions of people watching ‘live’ the Olympic games or the World Cup. (Roche 2006: 32).

A sports event can be described as a planned and unique performance with high emotional ‘value’, which offers opportunities for business in terms of advertising and/or selling products. Such an event does not simply happen - it must be created. To make it compatible with business interests the sports contest needs some conditioning. It must be attractive to spectators, which is achieved through dramatisation and ‘emotionalisation’ of the game (i.e. through innovative rules which create suspense). It must be commercialised through media presence (TV) and economisation (sponsoring). Finally, it must be professionalized to guarantee high standards of event-management and sports presentation (Schmidt 2006).

The transformation of sports meetings into sports events is not limited to a specific sport or only to professional sports. It can also be observed in leisure or fun sports. To different degrees all of these types of sporting events are surrounded by the commercial interests of sponsors, presenters and suppliers. However, from the mass of sports events some major sports events stand out; these can be described as mega or world sports events. Maurice Roche (2000:1) describes mega-events as “large-scale cultural (...) events, which have a dramatic character, mass popular appeal and international significance”. Two defining features of mega-events are their high impact on the host city, region or nation (through their sheer size) and their ability to attract widespread media coverage: no mass-media, no mega-event.

The most prominent of these mega or world sports events are the Olympics and the FIFA World Cup but other events of increasing relevance include the Pan-American Games, the Commonwealth Games and the Rugby World Cup. According to Horne and Manzenreiter (2006: 3) such mega sports events are growing in size and “have been largely developed by undemocratic organisations,

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This ‘global village’ concept can be identified in current Olympic policy discourse and interpreted as an illustration of cultural standardisation; for example, through the global spread of sports consumption and indirectly through the marketing of global brands and the spread of consumer culture (Roche 2006: 32).
often with anarchic decision-making and lack of transparency, and more often in the interests of global flows than local communities (ibid 18).

2. Sports and Marketing

The so-called ‘magic triangle’, composed of event-organiser, media and business (see graph Schmidt 2006: 49), is interconnected by specialised agencies (e.g. Sportfive, IMG) which deal with sports rights or develop marketing and sponsoring concepts. Together, all of these participants form a symbiosis in which each party has its own interests and goals but are nonetheless dependent on each other.

The event organiser, together with the competitors, produces the sport event (designed to entertain the spectators) and the companies use the event as a platform to communicate their advertising message; on-the-spot and via the media. Without media presence, predominantly TV broadcasting, the value of a sports event for companies is much lower and therefore companies tend to make their sponsoring dependent on relevant TV coverage. The media play a double function: both as sponsors of the event through the purchase of broadcasting rights and as essential ‘multiplicators’ through the spread of communicative and advertising messages. With the sale of advertising time TV stations refinance their purchase of broadcasting rights. The role of the spectators is also highly relevant in this symbiotic process: they must be interested in watching the sports event, as their interest or indifference has a major impact on the communicative and financial success of the ‘magic triangle’ (Schmidt 2006: 49f, Rohlmann and Schewe 2005).

Companies are interested in being engaged in sports events because they want to create and develop their brand - to transform it from an abstract image into a concrete offer. This is done through a combination of sponsoring of sports events and/ or athletes and merchandising - selling their products. These ‘below-the-line’ forms of marketing (so called because people don’t recognise them as advertising) are accompanied by ordinary advertising to make them effective. In addition, to make the sports engagement even more striking, companies often purchase supplier/service rights and even add licensing and full-usage rights (e.g. copyright). Combined, these strategies form an integrated marketing concept (Rohlmann and Schewe 2005) which can be extremely complex and difficult to trace.

Sports sponsoring has proved very successful for producers of ‘branded’ products, in terms of increased publicity and developing a positive image; especially for companies trying to enter a market. It can also have other benefits such as increasing the turn-over of stock and the value of share prices.5

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5 E.g. the Danish Carlsberg brewery increased its turn-over substantially through sponsoring of the UEFA European Cup (Röttgermann 2005) and a study of the German public bank NordLB claims a positive linkage between stock prices and sports sponsoring (NordLB research 2004).
The copyright owners of the sports event trade-mark have also profited enormously from the growth of mega-sports events: for the Olympics this is the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and for the World Cup it is Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). In particular, the sale of television and sponsoring rights, have provided high revenues for both organisations with positive impacts for their functional body in terms of expansion, income and expenditure (Horne and Manzenreiter 2006, Preuss 2004).

3. **FIFA and the FIFA World Cup 2006 in Germany**

In terms of spectators and marketing possibilities the Football World Cup ranks first; ahead of the Olympics and the Rugby World Cup. In Germany the World Cup is considered of even higher interest due to the dominance of the national primary football league, Bundesliga - the so-called "Deutschland-Effekt" (Germany effect).

FIFA (which is based in Zurich/Switzerland) does not play an operative role in staging the World Cup. It assigns the organisation of the event to the national football federation of the country which wins the bidding process. However, it retains control over licenses and broadcasting rights, which are sold with the help of its own subsidiaries or global trade-mark agencies. 

The national football federation of the ‘winning’ country establishes a World Cup Organising Committee (WCOC) whose task is to build the infrastructure and to plan and conduct the World Cup contests. In the case of the World Cup 2006 (WC 2006) this was the Deutscher Fußball Bund (DFB). FIFA provides a grant to the WCOC and the organising committee receives all revenues from the ticket sales. The national WCOC also has the right to select six ‘national partners’ as sponsors. However, these national partners are only second-class sponsors as they have limited rights. The top-class sponsors are the FIFA partners, which have increased in number over the years. For the WC 2006 there were 15 of these ‘partners’ (see Table: ‘FIFA World Cup Partners 1990-2006, Horn and Manzenreiter: 2006). These sponsors have the exclusive right to be associated with the FIFA World Cup, they can use the FIFA WC logo, are present in the stadium and in all FIFA publications, get the best places for advertisements and have a substantial contingent of VIP-tickets. In addition, the cities of the sports venues receive marketing rights which give them the opportunity for PR-activities aimed at the global audience.

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6 Until they went bankrupt this was undertaken by: International Sports and Leisure (ISL) and KirchMedia
7 No surprise that, given a price about 12.9 Million Euro, their acquisition for the World Cup 2006 has been described as difficult and that the companies which eventually bought the rights packet included former or current state companies or companies strongly dependant on political goodwill: Postbank (former state owned postal bank), Deutsche Bahn (state owned railway), Oddset (state owned sports lottery), EnBW (big electricity corporation)
8 Adidas, Anheuser-Busch (Beer and malt beverages), Avaya (Communication network), Coca-Cola, Continental, Deutsche Telekom, Emirates Airline, Fujifilm, Gillette, Hyundai, MasterCard, McDonald’s, Philips, Toshiba, Yahoo!
FIFA benefited enormously from the huge interest of business in the 2006 World Cup, the subsequent open price spiral for TV and sponsoring rights and also from licences for merchandising. In its 2006 financial report FIFA reported event-related revenues for the 2003-2006 period of about 2.986 billion CHF; 1.66 billion alone from TV rights for the 2006 World Cup and 714 million from marketing rights (FIFA Financial Report 2006). Licences for merchandising also represented a major source of revenue during the World Cup 2006, with FIFA reporting revenue from merchandising licences of 93 Million CHF (FIFA Financial Report 2006).

In 2002, the exclusive merchandising rights for the European market were bought by EM.TV & Merchandising AG (Warner Brothers had the licence for all markets outside Europe and Japan). KarstadtQuelle (department stores and distant sales) became its exclusive distribution partner in Germany. Both companies also hold shares in the sports TV channel DSF which facilitated the promotion of fan merchandise.

Revenues from the sale of fan jerseys of the national teams go to the national football association and its supplier. For the 2006 World Cup this was the German-based sportswear MNC adidas; which is also a FIFA partner and therefore a major sponsor. This made adidas one of the main target for unions and NGOs in the lead-up to the World Cup.

It is not within the capacity of this paper to provide a complete breakdown of the marketing, licensing and sponsorship arrangements of the 2006 World Cup but the above examples provide a glimpse of the complexity of the inter-relationships between marketing, media and sponsorship arrangements and the way the various organisations and companies ‘play the ball to each other’.

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9 2006 FIFA WORLD CUP REVENUE (in CHF MILLION)
Revenue in 2003-2006 period: 2,858
TV broadcasting rights: 1,660
• USA: 176
• Europe: 751
• Rest of the World: 733
Marketing rights: 714
Hospitality rights: 260
Licensing rights: 92
Accommodation and ticketing: 31
Other: 22
Profit share Organising Committee 2006 FIFA World Cup: 79
PART II: WORLD SPORTS EVENTS AND TRADE UNION REVITALISATION

1. The crisis of German unionism

The German industrial relations situation differs to other countries, mainly in terms of the deeper integration and recognition of unions in society and state. The German industrial relations system is built traditionally on two pillars: a social partnership of trade unions and employers’ associations which negotiate collective agreements; and co-determination rights at the company level which are exercised through works councils and supervisory boards (which only exist in bigger companies). The state doesn’t intervene in the autonomous negotiations of unions and employer associations, both of which are also involved in ‘self-administration’ of social security and vocational training (Turner and Hurd 2001).

This system has worked for a long period but is now in dissolution. The challenge for unions is compounded by the impact of German re-unification and the growth of decentralised bargaining (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2006).

Employers are increasingly hostile towards trade unions and growing numbers try to remain free from union influence or co-determination - particularly in Germany’s growing service sector. Increasing numbers of companies are leaving or refusing to join employers’ associations, preferring to negotiate outside national agreements (Deeg, 2005). There has been a continuous fall in the number of works councils representing workers in firms, collective bargaining coverage, union membership and union density. The following figures provide some insights into the scale of the decline in union power:

- DGB union membership dropped from approximately 12 million members in 1991, after the re-unification of Germany and absorption of the membership of the GDR trade union federation FDGB (8 million members before re-unification), to 6.44 million in 2007 (DGB 2008).

- Union density in West-Germany fell from 31.2% in 1990 to an estimated 21.2% in 2004, while in East-Germany union density declined from 50.1% in 1991, after re-unification, to 17.8% in 2004 (Biebeler and Lesch 2006). For 2006 union density for the whole of Germany is estimated to be about 18% (IW 2008).

- Workers covered by collective agreements of DGB unions fell from 67.3% in 2000 to 54% in 2006 (Hans-Böckler-Foundation, Datenkarte Deutschland 2002, 2007).

- The number of workers represented by works councils declined from 70.6% in 2000 to 51.1% in 2006 (ibid.).
At the third British-German Trade Union Forum in 2004 Jürgen Hoffmann (2004: 4f) summarised the German situation:

*Skilled male blue-collar workers form the homogeneous core of union membership – white-collar workers, young people, migrants, service-sector employees are at best organised weakly – often not at all. These statistics reveal that the structure of union membership at the start of the 21st Century corresponds to Germany’s labour market during the 1960s.*

The decline in union membership and density has been compounded by German reunification which, according to Hoffman (ibid), provoked a further crisis for German unions:

*After reunification unions had to build up a costly infrastructure in the eastern federal states from scratch. While immediately after the reunification they did experience an initial large and rapid increase in membership in the former GDR, this was succeeded almost immediately by an equally dramatic decline as workers found their expectations frustrated by economic difficulties and job losses.*

The way in which the DGB and its affiliates treated former East German unions was also problematic. In particular, the (ideological) decision not to integrate lower-ranked FDGB officers and the wholesale imposition of West-German concepts is now regarded by union researchers as a “giant mistake”. Both factors led to the disappearance of the very special East-German union culture which in turn contributed to the estrangement between DGB unions and East German workers (Kailitz 2008).

While the impact of reunification should not be underestimated, the contemporary problems in German union density should also be seen as the result of long-term structural deficits in overall union membership. The growth in membership from 1970 to 1980 and its maintenance until 1990 covered these deficits. However, this growth was due to intensified unionisation of manual workers - a group with decreasing importance (in terms of membership numbers). The structural changes in the labour force have not been reproduced in the structure of union membership. Company size is also a major factor in Germany, due to the role of works councils. There is a positive relation between the size of a company and the existence of works councils; both of which correlate positively with union density. Conversely, smaller companies lead to fewer works councils and lower union density.
2. The international debate on union revitalisation

The internal German debate on union decline and revitalisation, takes place against the background of a well developed international discussion. In Germany this debate started very slowly with a low intensity and was initially dominated by structural explanations. It is only recently that actor-oriented approaches, which explain union decline not only as a result of a changed union environment but also in terms of trade unions’ own actions, have been included.

As part of this debate, some union practitioners and academics have looked specifically to new tactics used by U.S. unions, for example the *Justice for Janitors campaign* (e.g. Dribbusch 1998) and the United Steelworkers (USW) Continental campaign (Greven 2001). However, others, such as Meyer (2002) have taken a broader look at the U.S. experience. Behrens (2002), who has referred frequently to the use of aggressive organising campaigns by U.S. unions, sees the low intensity of organising efforts in German trade unions as progressively more inappropriate in the increasingly hostile industrial environment. Behrens et al (2003: 39) claim that German unions have become over reliant on their institutional arrangements at the expense of their “capacity for autonomous action and organisational independence”, and they call for a renewal of unions’ social movement character.

However, after a slow start the German discussion about union revitalisation and the adoption of new strategies has gained speed; particularly in the services union ver.di where attempts to adopt US-style campaigning and organising tactics have been started. Examples include the corporate campaign against the German-based multinational discounter chain ‘Lidl’ and the security industry of Hamburg (Schreieder 2007, Bremme 2007, Lange 2007). The academic discussion has also become more pronounced (AG Strategic Unionism 2008, WSI Mitteilungen 1/2008, Mitbestimmung 12/2007).

3. World sports events as an ‘opportunity structure’ for union revitalisation

The current discussion about working conditions in the sportswear and sports equipment industry in relation to major sporting events, appears relatively new. A quick overview of the topic in newspapers, magazines and the Internet gives the

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15 In the international trade union literature one strand of explanations identify the reasons for union decline as a changed and union hostile environment (for a good overview see Dore: 2004; Gstötter-Hofer: 2005). Briefly summarized this includes:

- Restructuring of firms and establishment of global production networks; increased power of Transnational Corporations (TNC’s)
- Shift of national regulatory competences to the supranational level
- Transformation of the welfare state into a competing state
- Privatisation of state companies and public services
- Neo-liberal hegemony with it’s free trade dogma in state and media
- Social cultural change, new management and union avoidance strategies
- Political marginalisation and anti-union legislation
- Production of uncertainty and fear through changed labour market and welfare policy and increase of precarious work
impression that the Olympics in Athens 2004 was the first world sports event in which this topic has been addressed in a highly visible way (see action coalition: www.fairolympics.org).

However, as mentioned above, mega or world sports events are, in themselves, a strong expression of globalisation of the world economy: characterised by strong involvement of Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) as suppliers and sponsors, and raising issues of trade regulation, migration, and social and union rights. Not only do such events present an opportunity for public discussion about the impacts of globalisation and current free trade dogma; it can be argued (following Heery and Adler 2004: 57), that they also provide an ‘opportunity structure’ for union revitalisation: for organised labour to re-build its organisations and strengthen collaboration between unions and with Non-Government Organisations (NGOs); nationally as well as internationally.

The long lead time between the decision about the world sports event location and the start of the event provides the opportunity for carefully planned activities. The time for strategic planning is important; as this is likely to make the difference between short-term ‘wind-fall’ gains, resulting from the extra vulnerability of employers during preparation and staging of the event, and long-term and sustainable improvements in wages, working conditions, union membership and union power. This is where strategic campaigning and leverage building could be utilised. Leverage occurs when unions identify and use weak points of a company to apply pressure to achieve industrial aims. It is frequently an alternative for traditional union action such as strikes, which have, under the current conditions of open markets and deregulation of the economy, frequently lost their effectiveness.

Complex global events like the World Cup and the Olympics provide many opportunities for strategic campaigning and leverage. For example, to press for higher labour standards and trade union rights in the home country and in world market factories, in accordance with ILO conventions. Targets of such campaigns could include event organisers as well as sponsors and contractors. Sponsoring companies invest a lot of money in mega sports events with the aim of making significant gains in ‘positive image’ formation. This image vulnerability could provide an ideal lever for unions, especially where conflicts already exist with such companies. Interrupting this image formation process could be used as a ‘leverage’ by unions to force sponsoring companies to improve working conditions in their own workplaces and in the workplaces of their supply chain; or to guarantee the right to organise. Event organisers also rely heavily on the positive image of the mega sports event. Unions could therefore directly target them to guarantee high labour standards and union rights in the contracts and licences they issue. In addition, the intense political activity surrounding such events provides opportunities for unions to engage in further political action to pressure event organisers to take care of working conditions. Finally, as the licensees of merchandising products and contracting companies themselves are also dependent (to different degrees) on a good public image, this provides additional
leverage points for union action. As part of a wider and global effort of the labour movement, such actions could strengthen collaboration with NGOs, unions in other countries and with the Global Union Federations (GUFs); which are routinely underdeveloped.
PART III: UNION ACTIVITIES AND THE FIFA WORLD CUP 2006

1. Hospitality - Gewerkschaft Nahrung-Genuss-Gaststätten (NGG)

In the lead-up to and during the World Cup the beverage and hospitality union NGG focused its activity on the hospitality sector and to a lesser degree on food and beverage, as these were the areas most affected. The major activities were fights for collective agreements and a general image and public awareness campaign: “Wir arbeiten, damit die ganze Welt feiern kann” (we work, so that the whole world can celebrate).

1.1 “Wir arbeiten, damit die ganze Welt feiern kann”

This campaign, which started in April 2006, consisted of an extensive professional poster campaign, accompanied by a telephone hotline where workers could get legal advice about their rights as workers and regulations in collective agreements.

In Germany work in the hospitality industry, which includes hotels, restaurants and bars, is a low-wage job characterised by partial to extreme exploitation and a high degree of black work or “moonlighting”. The NGG estimates that in addition to the 700,000 workplaces with social security, an extra 100,000 workers are employed illegally; paid out of ‘black’ cashboxes. Furthermore, there is an unbroken trend to outsource complete service sectors to sub-contractors, (e.g. cleaning in hotels), and transform full-time jobs into part-time or ‘mini-jobs’ which are not fully integrated into the social security system (at the social security system’s expense). Sub-contractors often “treat their moonlighting workers like slaves” (einigkeit 2/2006) and the employers take no responsibility for this.

The “Wir arbeiten” campaign was deliberately not planned as a membership-recruitment strategy, because the NGG assessed the employment effects of the World Cup as only temporary. Rather, it aimed to promote the union as a competent partner for workers and to raise public and political awareness about the bad working conditions in the hospitality industry and urgent need for legal regulation, including minimum wage legislation and control of the black economy and illegal employment (NGG: 2007). Further initiatives included local press conferences and information desks located in the cities where World Cup games were held in order to inform the public about NGG demands.

Together with ver.di, the NGG has initiated a broad campaign for minimum-wage legislation in Germany, as neither union is able to guarantee living wages in the low-wage service sectors. The “Wir arbeiten”-campaign was intended to bring this topic forward and also to push the employer association to start negotiations for a collective agreement against illegal employment; which they had so far refused (NGG: 2007).
In practice, the World Cup hotline was only rarely used by workers. A fact which the NGG union officer (NGG: 2007), attributed to the reasonably good money that workers in bars and at the public viewing places had earned (with the inclusion of tips) and their casual positions, which made them less interested in issues like standard working hours and legal regulations.

### 1.2 Collective agreements

The NGG experienced more success in its fight for collective agreements. The collective agreement situation in the hospitality sector before the 2006 World Cup was critical for the union. For years the employer association DEHOGA had refused to negotiate in 10 out of the 18 regions. However, in the lead-up to the World Cup the NGG succeeded in negotiating agreements in Berlin-Brandenburg, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Bayern and Baden-Württemberg. This success was attributed to the climate of the World Cup and the willingness of union members to take action during the event (einigkeit 2/2006).

A further success, also clearly related to the World Cup, was the conclusion of a collective agreement package (following some warning strikes) with Coca Cola, one of the main FIFA partners (sponsor) and the exclusive supplier of soft-drinks for the World Cup. However, this success story was not repeated with McDonalds the other major FIFA partner (sponsor) relevant to the hospitality sector. The NGG membership magazine ‘einigkeit’ (2/2006) reported the breakdown of the collective agreement with McDonalds; however, no special or concentrated activities or campaign against the company were started. Such a campaign would have required a completely different approach, with considerable advanced planning and strategic research. Unlike the situation in Coca Cola where workers are concentrated in relatively well organised factories with a history of collective agreements, workers in McDonalds are predominantly employed on a casual basis and the company is well known for its union busting stance (for more on this see Royle: 2000, 2002a, 2002b).

For workers in hotels the situation was assessed as “normal mode” with the NGG only attempting to reinforce the collective agreement where they were already unionised (NGG: 2007). Special organising activities were not started and no attempt was made to put pressure on the WC OC to take responsibility for ensuring normal working conditions in the large hotel chains contracted for the World Cup.
2. Retail Industry - ver.di

2.1 Deregulation of Opening Hours

The claim that the retail industry would benefit from the World Cup through additional spending by tourists and a higher consumption level by the general population, was taken up by employers and government as an argument for further deregulation (i.e. extension) of shop opening hours.11

Shop opening hours had already been the target of deregulation for two decades; with step-by-step extension of opening hours and legislative exceptions, which had weakened the law as a protection of shop assistants and their families. The World Cup was used to take a further step towards the goal of abolishing the rest of the regulation.

The first attack on restrictions of shop opening hours came during the lead up to the Confederations Cup in 2005, with state governments issuing directives to completely suspend the law during the Cup. According to the responsible ver.di officer (ver.di a.: 2008), German politics (and the big retail corporations) wanted to present Germany as a “cosmopolitan country” to the global audience: in other words as a modern service-society where shops are always opened. Opponents were denounced as ‘old fashioned, querulous and disloyal’12.

Ver.di viewed these and former attempts to suspend the law as illegal and consequently pursued legal means to stop the directives and protect the interests of its members (ver.di: 2008). However, specific characteristics of the German law (which cannot be described here in detail) and the unwillingness of the judges to deal with this issue led to the failure of all attempts on the juridical field. In the view of the ver.di officer (ver.di a.: 2008) there was a big coalition against such lawsuits from politics, economy and the courts (the complete history of deregulation, including the law-breaking efforts of state governments, can be found on a website of the Technical University Dresden13).

The on-going battle against further extension of shop opening hours culminated in the lead-up to the World Cup in 2006. This fight was in the centre of ver.di’s efforts in the retail industry that year and it did succeed in ‘marking out territory’14 in some legislation. On the other hand, the mobilisation of members around this issue, outside of company assemblies, was hardly overwhelming. The ver.di officer (ver.di a: 2008) attributed this to threats by employers of massive

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11 Until recently the legislation about shop opening hours was a national legislation, i.e. opening hours were regulated for the whole country. During an extensive legislative reform of the relationship between the federal states and the federal republic, the competence of regulating the shop opening hours was shifted to the federal states. This opportunity was taken up by the states to introduce new legislation on shop opening hours in the lead up to the World Cup.

12 Actually the German quote was somewhat stronger, denouncing opponents as ‘high-treasurers’ but does not translate easily into English.

13 see http://www.tu-dresden.de/jfoeffl4/OeRimWWW/OeRAktuell.html

14 Again the interpretation of the original statement by the union officer does not translate easily into English, it refers to the scent marks used to mark out territory.
workplace reductions without longer opening hours and, finally, a degree of acceptance of the employer arguments by workers.

The exception to this situation was in the state of Bavaria where, until now, no further legislation to extend shop-opening hours has been introduced. This can be attributed to ver.di’s collaboration with churches and other social groups within the particular historical political context in Bavaria. In Bavaria churches (in particular the Catholic Church) have a strong position and standing within the community. This was a major factor in the mobilisation of a wide coalition of ver.di and other social groups, including craft associations, churches and, in particular, the Catholic workers’ movement (Katholische Arbeitnehmer Bewegung KAB), and its success in preventing further deregulation (ver.di a: 2008). This context does not exist in the same manner in other areas of Germany, especially in traditionally protestant areas. However, the reasons for this cannot be elaborated within the limitations of this paper.

Following the success of this collaboration ver.di has attempted to strengthen and intensify these alliances. One example is its efforts to extend and strengthen the recently founded “Alliance for the free Sunday”; an idea originating from Austrian civil society groups which is designed to make clear to the public and to all organisations “dealing with people” (e.g. fire-fighters, sports clubs, churches etc.) what the destruction of the free Sunday will mean for them and the whole society (ver.di a: 2008).

2.2 Working conditions in the sportswear industry

Ver.di’s main activity regarding working conditions in the sportswear industry during and in the lead-up to the World Cup was conducted through its membership of Aktion Saubere Kleidung, the German organisation of the Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC) and is covered in the section on Sportswear below.


The World Cup created a high demand for security staff and ver.di was well placed to take action around this topic. By 2006 Department 13 (special services) of the ver.di district, Hamburg, had already started an organising campaign in the security industry; in collaboration with UNI (Union Network International - Property Services) and the U.S.-based Service Employees International Union (SEIU). The campaign was an attempt to organise members in the low-waged security industry and to introduce U.S.-style organising campaigns into German unionism. It followed a number of similar initiatives by ver.di Hamburg to promote the U.S.-organising model and shift German unionism from a service and representational orientation to an active, conflict-orientated, social movement style of unionism. These initiatives included seminars about ‘organising’, held in collaboration with the Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, academics from Cornell University and union officers from several U.S. unions.

One of the major global players in the global security industry is Securitas, a Swedish based MNC. The SEIU had succeeded some years before in negotiating a
collective agreement with Securitas and was keen to help ver.di Hamburg to set up another initiative to target the international security industry. As part of its assistance the SEIU sent a researcher and experienced lead organiser. For ver.di it was important to make progress in negotiating a new collective agreement (with better conditions) with the employer association – this had failed in past years – and to organise members in this low-wage and poorly unionised industry, neglected by the union for so long. The campaign followed the usual ‘textbook’ organising strategies, including research, organising and coalition building with community groups, so as to target management and works councils of the contracting companies of security services (verdi b: 2008).

When the national contract to guard all World Cup facilities (including stadiums, hotels and public viewing areas) was obtained by Securitas, ver.di subsequently introduced the World Cup topic into negotiations with the employer association and the management of Securitas. The union also promoted the topic in all public campaign events and media interviews (such as the ver.di press conference featuring security personal with faces covered by theatre masks, which achieved high publicity). The poor working conditions suffered by security workers in terms of long hours and low payment were highlighted and also the risk aspect of expecting over-worked personnel to guarantee security. In the assessment of the responsible ver.di officer (ver.di b.: 2008), the World Cup topic played a major role in eventually achieving a new collective agreement in the security industry. (Interview verdi b: 2008, Sicherheitsnadel 8/2006 and 9/2006).

There were further ideas within department 13 of ver.di Hamburg about how to use the World Cup topic in the organising campaign but the topic was taken up too late to utilise its potential. Verdi leafleted against low-wage jobs around the public viewing location Heiligengeistfeld and there were other ideas, for example, to start a campaign for a minimum wage of about 10 Euro in the lead up to the World Cup and to enlist the support of football sports stars and football clubs to help lobby the DFB (WC OC) to guarantee decent standards in its contracts with suppliers and contractors. Such systematic targeting of DFB/ WC OC and contractors would have had high potential for workers in the services sector but the ideas were confined to a single department in ver.di and did not spread within the larger organisation (ver.di b.: 2008).

However, the lessons learned from the World Cup in Germany are being transferred. In 2007 the ver.di officer participated in a fact-finding meeting about the security sector organised by UNI-Africa, with a special focus on the World Cup 2010 in South Africa and the security MNC, G4S. The ongoing violation of workers’ rights and labour standards by G4S has resulted in a demand by unions for its exclusion from contract-awarding for mega sports events, unless it guarantees decent labour standards. This topic was discussed in meetings with FIFA representatives at the proposed venues of the football games (ver.di b: 2008).
4. **Sportswear Industry – IG Metall, IG BCE and ver.di**

While working conditions in the manufacture of sportswear was a major issue in the lead-up to and during the World Cup, union action should be seen in the context of a declining textile industry and the specifics of union representation in this sector.

The German textile industry has almost disappeared. The workforce has declined from approximately 400,000 workers in 1970 to about 40,000 today. Ninety-five per cent of the clothes sold on the German market are now produced abroad and only a small but excellent production of technical textiles remains. This is organised by IG Metall following the merger of the smaller Textile and Garment union (IG Textil und Bekleidung) into the larger union in 1998.

As a result of a similar merger, workers in two of the major German-based sportswear MNCS, adidas and Puma, are covered by IG BCE: the chemical and energy union. Due to their roots in the manufacture of sports shoes both corporations were originally covered by the small leather union, Gewerkschaft Leder, which merged in 1997 with IG Bergbau und Energie (IGBE) and IG Chemie, Papier, Keramik (IGCPK) to become the new IG Bergbau, Chemie, Energie (IGBCE).

The retail sector, which deals with the merchandising of sportswear, is covered by ver.di.

Union campaigning in the sportswear industry was mostly carried out in collaboration with Kampagne für saubere Kleidung, the German division of the international Clean Clothes Campaign (in this text referred as CCC): a coalition of 20 predominately faith-based organisations, including Christliche Initiative Romero (CIR), Inkota Netzwerk (Inkota), Vamos and Südwind. From the trade union side IG Metall, ver.di and DGB Bildungswerk (the educational arm of the DGB) are members, however IG BCE is not.

IGBCE tends not to collaborate with NGOs and its conservative self-understanding, characterised by a pronounced social partnership and co-management approach to union organising, restricts the reach and efficiency of trade union activities against adidas and Puma. In former years protests held in the city of Herzogenaurach (where the headquarters of both adidas and Puma are located) against bad working conditions at adidas suppliers were countered by leaflets from the adidas works council, which referred to the company’s Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) standards (Interview CIR: 2007).

Most of the activity against adidas and Puma during the World Cup was carried out by NGOs. CIR, Inkota and Vamos are routinely working on the sportswear topic and target sportswear corporations. Their goal is to make these MNCs responsible for violations of workers’ rights and bad working conditions in the factories of their suppliers and press them to make changes in their business.

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15 Textile companies which tried to maintain or start clothes production in Germany were ‘de-listed’ by retailers and finally left the market (e.g. Steilmann, which went into bankruptcy). For numbers see: Gesamtverband der deutschen Textil- und Modeindustrie e.V.
practice. They do this mainly through protest cards and emails: the focus is on influencing consumers, reinforced through media reports or, in the case of Vamos, developing teaching materials for schools and encouraging sports clubs and schools to engage in the fight for fair working conditions in sportswear production. CCC is also present at shareholder meetings and tries to lobby for improvements through negotiations. However, the results in this respect are disappointing so far, as reports on the CIR and Inkota websites show (www.inkota.de, www.ci-romero.de, www.vamos-muenster.de).

The other three labour organisations collaborate to a different extent and with different roles within the CCC coalition. DGB Bildungswerk offers mainly technical support through its educational infrastructure and organisation of conferences and seminars. However, the North-South-Network of DGB Bildungswerk also collaborates directly with CCC projects in developing countries and with other European unions and developmental NGO’S (DGB Bildungswerk: 2007).

4.1 Ver.di

Ver.di’s engagement with the CCC stems from its two-fold approach to improving conditions in the retail sector: firstly through its trade union work and secondly through closer engagement with NGOs.

As in many other countries, the German retail sector is characterised by low wages, an increasing share of casual work and poor working conditions, caused predominantly by the strong competition for market share. Low union density and increasingly union-hostile employers in the sector has led to a growing number of retailers without union members or works councils (Bormann/Deckwirth/Teepe 2005). In an attempt to reverse this trend and bring about improvements in union power and working conditions, some groups within ver.di have introduced U.S.-style campaigning techniques; including alliances with NGO’s and civil society organisations working on global social justice and environmental issues. A major campaign topic is the ‘low-price philosophy’ of discounters and its consequences for society and workers: pressure on suppliers to reduce prices, declining working conditions of shop assistants, undermining of better standards in other companies, shifting of social security payments to the state, and finally, environmental damages16.

In 2006 ver.di held a big congress with CCC on the topic of working conditions in the textile industry, which brought together actors along the supply chain (producer, commerce, union and consumer). Within the activities of CCC ver.di also facilitated contacts between social justice groups such as CI Romero and Inkota and workers and works councils within the retail industry: including KarstadtQuelle, as the exclusive distributor of merchandising articles for the World Cup (CIR: 2007, ver.di b 2008).

An activist from CI Romero (2007) reported that not only works councillors but also shop assistants frequently participated in CCC seminars. He described the

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16 Collaboration efforts with NGOs include joint studies about discounters (e.g. Bormann/Deckwirth/Teepe 2005).
ideal development of CCC World Cup campaign activities as follows: as a result of CCC campaign activities customers start to ask shop assistants about social standards in the production of merchandise; normally the shop assistants know nothing about this so they ask their supervisor or the works council, with the result that working conditions become a general topic in the company. This concept of linking the producers with the distributors is also followed by TIE Germany (the German section of the network Transnationals Education Exchange which is also member of CCC) and seems to have some further potential.

4.2 IG Metall

The collaboration of IG Metall as the union representing the German textile industry with CCC is very close and according to representatives of CIR and Inkota all activities of CCC are carried out together (CIR: 2007).

One example of this close collaboration is the pilot project relating to Hess Natur. This company sells ecological clothes but had not paid attention to the social standards of its suppliers, even though its customers are sensitive to these issues. IG Metall helped CCC to successfully negotiate a Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) agreement with Hess Natur, of a very high level (the best in Germany until now, according to CIR, CIR: 2007). In general CCC only becomes involved in CSR projects of the very highest level, especially with respect to participation of workers and their unions. Reviews of standards through private rating agencies instead of union surveillance are refused. IG Metall helps by mediating contacts with the foreign production facilities of German textile companies. As mentioned above, there is still a small textile industry in Germany and some parts continue to be produced in Germany. In most of these cases IG Metall is present in the company and can therefore help to organise contacts.

However, the level of IG Metall’s involvement in campaigns against textile and garment MNCs should not be overstated: it is limited by the decline of the textile industry in Germany. Parallel to this decline the union structures have also gradually fallen away and, with some time lag, this is reflected in the head office. The textile department within IG Metall is very small with an equally small budget (reflecting union leadership priorities in other larger industries). Also, within IG Metall, there is a clear division between national and international work: all activities involving foreign partners or the GUFs are organised via the international department while the ‘national’ textile department acts only within the framework of the CCC. It does not start its own activities and does not target companies by itself. The IG Metall representative in CCC, who is also responsible for women’s issues within the union, sees her role as spreading information, distributing scientific studies, finding activists and, most importantly, educating members about the situation in the global textile industry (IG Metall a.: 2008). Consequently, IG Metall did not organise any of its own events during the “Sports Summer 2006”; all events were run by the CCC coalition. Although there was a reasonable interest from union members they tended to be involved as single

17 see http://handel.bawue.verdi.de/internationales/exchains
activists with an interest in the topic, rather than in any systematic way (Inkota: 2008).

Another factor to consider is IG Metall’s past tendency to favour political lobbying over campaigning. According to an IG Metall officer from the international department (IG Metall b.: 2008), the union’s priority in this sector since the merger with the textile union in 1998, has been lobbying for social clauses in trade agreements. For instance, IG Metall was engaged in the Enquete Commission of the German Parliament on globalisation and continues to lobby the German government to demand that the European Commission makes this part of European trade policy. Unfortunately, there seems to be little progress in this area and instead of labour clauses, ‘soft law’ like Codes of Conduct (CoC), the UN Global Compact or OECD guide lines for MNCs are promoted. The officer said the activities of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) in this field (e.g. the round table on Codes of Conduct) had also bound up a lot of IG Metall work capacity. These activities are regarded by many as a ‘gigantic play ground’ without positive results.

4.3 Involvement of GUFs

Both CIR and Inkota reported a strong involvement of the GUF’s in all CCC campaigns, not only in sportswear but also in the current campaign against discounters (Inkota and CIR 2007). The GUFs collaborate at all levels with NGOs and also with IG Metall, although they tend to work more in the background and are not so present in the public. They support the activities predominantly through service work like translations and preparation of actions. In respect of systematic targeting of the big players and brands in sportswear there was little evidence during the World Cup of strong efforts to organise along the supply chain of MNCs or strategic targeting of the event organisers or their sponsors.

5. Construction – IG Bauen Agrar Umwelt

Construction is one of the main industries affected by a mega sports event. The huge dimensions of construction work, high financial investment and strict time limits put intense pressure on working conditions, wage levels and the use of migrant labour. After Germany won the bid to hold the World Cup in 2006 most of the football venues were rebuilt or upgraded to meet the standards required by FIFA.

However, according to the responsible officer (IG BAU: 2008) IG BAU made no special attempts to target the construction companies or to organise the World Cup construction sites in any strategic way. Nor did they initiate any contacts or negotiations with the DFB/WC OC to have decent labour standards included in the contract process. IG BAU took action when specific problems occurred, predominantly when the workers of subcontractors (of the main contractors) were betrayed or exploited. In this case the union acted as usual: the general contractor was made accountable for the misuse of workers by its subcontractors and the union tried to get the workers paid or to stop the unjust working
conditions. This was the case at two construction sites where migrant workers, mostly from Romania, were not paid by the subcontractor. Thus, in his view, the union’s actions during the World Cup were a reaction to existing problems rather than the result of any strategic planning.

To successfully target the event organisers or the construction companies, the planning process would have needed to start during the critical time - around 2001/2 - when negotiations for construction contracts took place. After that, it was no longer possible to have a real influence on the setting of labour standards in the contracts. According to the IG BAU officer (2008), the general situation for big construction sites is that large construction companies win contracts by handing in calculations based on “fantasy numbers” which later have to be realised by the subcontractors. How they reach the required low prices is the business of the subcontractor and normally this is done by wage-dumping strategies or other forms of exploitation (illegal work of migrants, non-payment of promised wages, unpaid overtime etc.).

However, 2001/2 was a “chaotic” time for IG BAU due to a deep crisis in the construction industry and other major problems and the union was not prepared for this kind of strategic action. It also lacked the organisational structure and manpower needed (IG BAU: 2008). The organisational structure of IG BAU at that time was geared towards targeting single construction companies in a fairly traditional way and not towards using indirect pressure, such as targeting the clients (those purchasing or issuing the construction services). There have been some attempts in the past to use mega construction works for organising, such as a permanent union representation on the gigantic construction site Potsdamer Platz in Berlin, and in property services on airports but these attempts were exceptions.

However, there is some evidence of a move in that direction. IG BAU has recently started to talk to churches, which are major clients for construction and cleaning contracts, about the need to ensure good labour standards.

6. The DGB

DGB activities during the World Cup were composed of three elements: promoting multiculturalism and countering racism and right-extremism; providing information and advice on working conditions; and protecting the rights of football fans in the workplace.

The DGB saw itself as obliged to promote multiculturalism and counter racist and extreme nationalistic attitudes which might emerge during the World Cup. Proposals for activities were elaborated and discussed with the Ministry of Interior and some of them were taken up (DGB b: 2008).

However, its main focus was provision of information and advice for workers most affected by the World Cup (waiters, cleaners, security staff etc.) Some DGB regions

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18 Actually the German statement was somewhat stronger, more literally ‘wage-betrayal’ but the term does not translate easily.
and some unions as well, also directed formal requests to their federal state governments about how to cope with or prevent extraordinary demands and pressure on workers. The DGB established a national telephone ‘hotline’ (supported by the NGG) which workers could call to get advice about legal and contract-related issues: what employers are allowed to demand, the rights of workers, the collective agreement regulations etc. They also established a special website which provided work-related information in the form of an extensive catalogue of FAQs (Frequently Asked Questions). However, contrary to expectations, the hotline was not widely used by workers, in part probably due to its lack of advertising and promotion, and also the very late start of the planning process. With an earlier start, as one DGB officer assessed it, much more could have been done and the topic would had been worth pursuing more intensively (DGB a: 2007, DGB b: 2008).

The hotline and website activities were accompanied by an ‘image and service’ campaign with the slogan “WM Helfer 2006” (WC volunteer 2006), designed to publicly recognise all those who contributed to the success of the WC and provide advice to volunteers about personal insurance against accidents etc. The DGB had wanted to discuss (and solve) the insurance problem of volunteers with the World Cup organisers (DFB) but this initiative had not raised any interest (DGB b: 2008).

The final element of DGB’s World Cup activity was legal advice for workers in non-affected areas, such as the rights of fans to watch TV at the workplace and other such questions (DGB b: 2008).

Issues of inner security, surveillance, privacy policy, and civil rights were not addressed. As an organisation the DGB was split between the differing positions of its affiliated unions (the police union GdP, for example, regarded surveillance and control as necessary for security) and therefore made no statements on these topics (DGB b: 2008).

Neither the DGB nor any affiliated unions formulated demands regarding labour standards to put to the DFB/ WC OC as preconditions for appointing contractors. This issue was discussed but rejected by the DGB and union officials as there was a general assessment that such demands could not be maintained or enforced. The threat of being publicly denounced as a ‘complainer’ and forced into awkward retreat was considered too high (interview DGB b.: 2008). Thus, no demands regarding minimum wages, coverage of collective agreements or freedom of association were addressed in the lead up to the World Cup. Nor did the affiliated unions see any real opportunities to recruit members during the event or to successfully organise areas with low union density (DGB b: 2008).

This assessment by the DGB and its affiliated unions should be seen in the context of strong efforts by government and the media (both mainstream and tabloid) to create a ‘patriotic hype’, in which the whole population was amalgamated into the “Deutsche Volk” (German people). Although it was claimed to represent a ‘modern’, ‘tolerant’ and ‘light’ version of patriotism, it finally resulted in some
rather negative and bizarre behaviour such as spectators dressing in Prussian uniforms of the pre-WWI period with capes from the current German flag in black-red-gold – even though the German Kaiserreich at that time was feudal and undemocratic with a black-white-red flag.
PART IV: SUCCESSES AND POTENTIAL OPPORTUNITIES

Given the time period in which the World Cup was held in Germany and the level of the union revitalization debate at the time it would be unfair to assume that German unions had either the intention or capacity to use this event for ‘revitalization’. However, these categories provide a useful tool of analysis for examining the strategic processes used by unions in their approach to the World cup, and point to some areas of future potential.

1. Organising

Security was one of the few sectors where a union (or at least one section) strategically addressed the issue of working conditions during the 2006 World Cup. Department 13 of ver.di Hamburg integrated the World Cup topic into their organising campaign and directly targeted Securitas, as the exclusive contractor for security service for the event. This was part of a long-term strategy to introduce new strategies into ver.di and no doubt contributed to the union’s success in negotiating a new collective agreement with the employer association, after years of failure in this area. Unfortunately, further strategic gains were limited by the late start to the campaign and its confinement to only one section of ver.di.

The NGG, on the other hand, assessed the recruitment potential of the World Cup as low and concentrated more on offering advice to workers and campaigning to raise public awareness about the need for regulation in the hospitality structure. While their assessment may have been right in regards to casual work in pubs and public viewing areas, this overlooked the possibility of concentrated recruiting and organising in the larger catering companies and hotel chains. These would have been vulnerable to any action which threatened their public image. They did achieve some important gains in negotiating collective agreements, especially with one of the FIFA partners (and major sponsor) Coca Cola but overlooked the chance to systematically target other major contractors and sponsors relevant to the industry, such as McDonalds.

Despite the importance of the construction industry during such an event, for IG BAU it was ‘business as usual’ on World Cup construction sites; with the union solving problems as they arose rather than strategically organising around issues of worker exploitation. As mentioned earlier, in the critical time frame when World Cup construction contracts were awarded and construction began, the union revitalisation discussion had not reached Germany and the union lacked the necessary awareness and structural capacity needed for such strategies.

However, there is evidence that IG BAU is in the process of transforming itself into a campaigning and participatory union (“Mitmachgewerkschaft”), the declared aim of the union leadership, and is adopting more strategic approaches to improving labour standards in the construction industry. The union is increasingly
interested in targeting event organisers as clients of construction work and in using opportunities like mega sports events for concentrated efforts. The activities of South African unions in respect to the FIFA World Cup 2010 are being followed with interest (IG BAU: 2008).

2. Political action

Political action here refers both to direct targeting of the event organiser and, more indirectly, through activities in the political arena aimed at politicians and governments. There was little evidence of strategic attempts by unions to pressure the World Cup Organising Committee to guarantee labour standards in the contracts they issued for supplies, services, construction etc. (apart from the unsuccessful attempt by the DGB to pressure the WC OC to solve the insurance issue for volunteers). One could speculate that such a strategy would have had a good possibility of success, especially in the construction industry. Of particular relevance for the construction industry would have been the ‘political’ demand that the WC OC prove that the prices in contract bids were realistic – or whether they could only be met through wage dumping, illegal work and other forms of exploitation. On the other hand, the powerful nature of international construction companies and the wide-spread use of subcontracting and migrant labour would have made this a difficult task for a union, requiring intensive preparation, long-term strategic research, support by the union federation DGB, and a strong international dimension.

Ver.di’s legal battle against efforts by politicians and companies to further deregulate shop openings hours during the World Cup, could certainly be categorised as political action. However, in the face of the concentrated will of its opponents this was largely unsuccessful, except in the state of Bavaria where a broad coalition with churches and other social groups succeeded in preventing further deregulation: thus demonstrating the effectiveness of coalition building as a means of increasing political power. Here the importance of the particular historical political context of this coalition should not be underestimated. The role played by churches, especially the partly left-catholic KAB (Katholische Arbeiterbewegung) in mobilising support in Bavaria would not necessarily have been able to be replicated in other areas.

3. Coalition building and international solidarity

There is evidence of significant coalition building and international solidarity between unions GUFs and NGOs in both the sportswear and security sectors.

In the security sector, international solidarity with UNI and the SEIU played a strong role in terms of organisational support and transfer of knowledge. In this sense it contributed to the capacity of Department 13 (Verdi Hamburg) to utilise the World Cup topic potential to achieve a new collective agreement. While not all possibilities were exploited, unions are using the lessons learned during the World Cup 2006 to help target other global security industry players seeking contracts for security services at future world sports events.
In the sportswear sector coalition building played a major role. In fact the World Cup related activities of ver.di (retail section) IG Metall and the DGB were conducted almost exclusively through membership of the German coalition of CCC. While the level of collaboration varied, the independent actions of unions within the coalition were relatively invisible. Their role consisted mainly of promoting the issues within their own membership, facilitating contacts with works councils and providing technical and organisational support. GUF’s played an important role but again this was largely in the background. Union members tended to be engaged as individual activists with an interest in the topic, rather than in any strategic way.

ver.di’s collaboration with the CCC can be seen as part of an ongoing strategy to adopt new U.S.-style organising and campaigning strategies in the retail sector. Its existing campaign targeting the ‘low price philosophy’ of discounters fit well with the current discounter campaign of the GUFs and CCC’s focus on linking consumers with the working conditions of producers and distributors. Both shop assistants and workers in world market factories share to some degree the same problems of poor working conditions and low wages, and also frequently lack the right to organise. Further strong potential for coalition building and international solidarity exists in this area.

IG Metall’s collaboration with the CCC, on the other hand, appears related more to the disappearing textile industry in Germany and subsequent lack of resources made available for organising and campaigning in this sector. IG Metall does what it can, where it still has influence, but the majority of its work in the textile sector is carried out through its work with the GUFs and NGOs.

If one considers the general orientation and policy of IG Metall, discussed in union related media like Labournet (www.labournet.de) or Express, its general orientation seems to be predominantly at the national level with globalisation and internationalism of minor relevance; despite all rhetoric. The union seems a long way from developing any real “alert-system” regarding the threats of globalisation and most international activities, where they exist, appear ad-hoc rather than strategically planned. This may explain why, once collective agreements for the remaining textile industry are negotiated, the topic “textiles” tends to sink “out of mind” within the organisation.

Some see the close collaboration of unions and NGOs in this sector as a new form of union work. Certainly the CCC assesses the activities in the lead up to the WC as a success. The issue of poor working conditions in the production of sportswear was well promoted, attracted strong public interest, and became a topic of concern for consumers. It also became an important topic for adidas and Puma, despite the lack of engagement by IGBCE; with the corporations no longer able to hide behind the claim that this issue is not their business.

However, it also raises general questions about what can be realistically expected of unions where the relevant industry they represent is almost non-existent in their own country. One can not overlook the impact which the disappearance of
the textile industry in Germany had on the capacity and willingness of IG Metall to act in this field during the World Cup. Under these conditions organising of solidarity for textile workers becomes more a task for all German unions; in particular it would seems to be a natural task for the union federation.

4. **Labour Management partnerships**

Labour-management partnerships are frequently regarded with some scepticism as a union revitalisation strategy and, at the least, must be based on unions having a strong capacity for industrial action (Heery 2002). The only possibility (and justification) for partnership with companies during the 2006 World Cup would have been for unions to support selected companies in the contract bidding process, in exchange for improved labour standards and/or ‘neutrality’ of the company in union organising attempts. Such a strategy was not used by German unions and would have required the capacity for unions to put real industrial pressure on companies which refused such an agreement.

5. **Organisational change**

This is a necessary and ongoing process for unions if they are to build a base for successful campaigning and organising. In respect to organising around mega sports events, a reasonably prepared campaign would need extensive strategic research and well considered plans for integrating the findings into long-term strategies. At the least, this would require establishment of a special campaigning unit with sufficient investment of resources, in terms of money and staff. Up until now German unions have not developed such capacities.

6. **Other critical factors**

6.1 **Role of the national union federation**

The role of trade union federations is to coordinate activities of their affiliate unions, to support them with organisational work and represent their interests at a national level.

It is clear that the DGB felt challenged to do something about the World Cup but in the end this was limited to some organisational support, public image raising and worker advice. As mentioned earlier, one task it could have undertaken was to speak on behalf of its affiliates, to government bodies and event organisers about issues of relevance for workers and for the general public; including labour standards and civil rights.

However, one must take into consideration that the actions of the DGB, whose status and authority amongst its affiliates has been declining since the 1950s (Hyman 2001), is restricted by the conflicts, tensions and different political orientations of its affiliated unions. These conflicts are related to different union positions regarding deregulation of labour relations and deep changes to Germany’s social security system. This in turn has affected the relationship of some unions to their traditional political party - the Social Democratic Party (SPD).
which engineered these changes. Tensions culminated during protests by social movement groups and unionists against the so-called “Agenda 2010” deregulation programme of SPD-Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in 2004, which finally ended in the de-mobilisation of protests (Rixinger/Sauerborn 2004:11). This did nothing to improve the credibility of unions in East-Germany (Kailitz 2008).

The DGB’s lack of stronger demands on the topic of regulating labour standards during the World Cup can be attributed, in part, to the sceptical assessment of success by affiliated unions; just as its lack of focus on civil rights was affected by the political orientation of the police union. This raises questions about the role which a union federation can really play in mobilising during a mega sports event. On the other hand, a much earlier and more intensive discussion by the DGB and its affiliated unions about the opportunities for joined activities during the World Cup could have resulted in a different assessment.

6.2 Attention: Nationalism, surveillance and reduction of civil rights

While mega sports events provide an opportunity structure for unions they also present a number of threats to union action, including nationalism and patriotic demands. Furthermore, they provide an opportunity for employers and the state to reduce labour regulation, shrink civil rights and increase surveillance.

If unions are to utilise the opportunities provided by mega sports events, they must find ways to counter the construction of a nationalistic climate, in which union demands or critiques can be denounced as unpatriotic and union action framed as a threat to national security. Trade unions of the host country are frequently confronted with the “demand” not to strike during or in the lead up to a major sports event. This applies in particular to the construction industry when extensive construction work is required. Also, the level of nationalism encouraged before and during the event generally works in the interest of economic and political elites. It is not only the issue of racism which makes it important that unions try to counter this emotion. In a nationalistic climate it is easy to denounce trade unions as disturbers of the national unity, to separate unions from the ‘people’ and define union activities as directed against the national interest. Unfortunately the promotion of a country as open, liberal and hospitable, does not, in reality, constitute a contradiction to the rise of nationalistic emotions.

Unions must also find ways to counter the growing tendency for state authorities to use mega sports events to intensify surveillance through police or secret services and to restrict civil rights under the label of the “war on terrorism”. When state authorities restrict civil rights and political freedom this generally has a negative impact on the capacity of trade unions and their members to take political and industrial action.

It is imperative therefore, for unions to engage in intensive discussion about the threats that exist in taking industrial action around mega sports events and to
renew their political mandate as organisations which stand for freedom and democratic standards. In general, if unions allow the reduction of standards for single events like the World Cup there is a very real possibility that they will have problems trying to raise them again later: this applies as much to civil rights as it does to labour standards and other regulations designed to protect working people and their families.
PART V: CONCLUSION
As the above assessment shows, attempts by German unions to use the World Cup for long-term strategic gains were exceptional, rather than the general practice. Few unions saw any real opportunities to recruit members during the event or to successfully organise areas with low union density. One notable exception was the security sector where department 13 of ver.di Hamburg strategically used the World Cup topic as additional leverage for organising members and negotiating a new collective agreement with a global security corporation. There was some political action and significant coalition building between unions and NGOs in the sportswear sector, which has potential for future international campaigning and solidarity action related to sports events. However, most benefits, where they occurred, were of a ‘wind-fall’ nature, related more to the vulnerability of employers during the event, than the result of strategic planning. To some degree, this reflects the time-frame in which the World Cup was held and the specifics of the German union situation. The discussion about union decline and the need for revitalisation strategies came late to Germany and was not widespread during the lead up to the World Cup. Despite the global nature of the event and its importance for capital, few unions in Germany had developed sufficient awareness and strategic capacity needed to use the World Cup as an opportunity to systematically improve labour standards and build organisational strength. While these events present enormous opportunities for unions one should not underestimate the power of the interest groups involved or the complexity of the business-media-event organiser relationships. The level of strategic research, creative planning and resources needed to use them as an opportunity for union revitalisation would be substantial.
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