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Social Stratification and Political Articulation: Why Attitudinal Class Differences Vary Across Countries

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SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AND POLITICAL ARTICULATION: WHY ATTITUDINAL CLASS DIFFERENCES VARY ACROSS COUNTRIES

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Abstract

Class differences in attitudes towards redistribution are compared across European countries. Two main competing hypotheses are tested, using scatterplots and multi-level modelling. The first is that class differences in attitudes are affected mainly by real class stratification, so that class differences tend to be larger where class differences in incomes and living standards are larger. The second is that such attitudes are affected mainly by class articulation and organisation; that is, the articulation of class issues in political programs and debates and trade union density. The analysis builds on data from the 2002 round of the European Social Survey, data from the Luxembourg Income Study and from the Comparative Manifesto Data Set.

Results show that both stronger unions and more attention to class issues by parties independently strengthen the class-attitude link. Large income differences are instead typically associated with small class variance in attitudes: class differences in attitudes tend to be larger in countries with little inequality. The negative correlation between the degree of inequality and the strength of the class-attitudes link persists even after controlling for various measures of political articulation.
Introduction

The link between social stratification and values, attitudes and aspirations is complex. The distribution matrix that make up the stratification order can be assumed to affect the subjective states of mind among actors who are differently placed in this matrix. As put by Breen & Rottman, this constitutes a formidable challenge to contemporary class analysis: “one of linking a material basis (differential rewards) to differential forms of consciousness” (Breen and Rottman 1995: 466).

In this chapter, we raise a very specific issue related to this link: why do we find small class differences in attitudes towards redistribution in some countries and large differences in other countries? As repeatedly shown in comparative research, class differences in attitudes tend to be large in some national contexts but quite small in others (Gallie 1983; Wright 1985; Wright 1997; Svallfors 2006; Edlund 2007 forthcoming). But why do such variations occur?

Virtually all previous research on this particular issue is based on comparisons of only a few countries, most often comparisons of two to four strategically chosen cases. Such comparisons are often valuable, because they allow rich interpretations based on deep knowledge on the particular national contexts at hand. At the same time, they do not allow suggested explanations to be explicitly modelled and tested. In this way, suspicions may always arise about whether interpretations are sound, and whether they apply beyond the specific national cases. Additionally, there are a few large-N studies on class voting that explicitly model interactions between class and national context.\(^1\) While we will draw on this literature, party choice and redistribution attitudes are very different entities, the implications of which we will return to in time.

In this chapter, then, we take a broader approach compared to past comparative research on class and attitudes. We use data from fifteen West European countries to test two specific hypotheses about why class differences in attitudes differ
across countries. The first one holds that country differences are driven by variation in real social stratification. This hypothesis predicts that class differences in attitudes grow as the actual material stratification between people becomes more pronounced. Our second hypothesis concerns political articulation. It predicts that class differences grow larger where intermediary organisations such as political parties and trade unions provide citizens with more arguments concerning class-redistributive issues. Let us discuss these predictions in turn.

The first hypothesis argues that the crucial contextual feature is how societies distribute and redistribute risks and resources. In countries where institutions such as wage-setting systems or welfare states distribute goods and burdens in a more egalitarian way, we would then expect class differences to be smaller. Put crudely, those with a strong market position have less to lose and those with a weak market position have less to gain from further redistribution in more egalitarian systems, compared to more inegalitarian ones. Hence, we would expect class differences in attitudes towards (re)distribution to be smaller under such circumstances.

This hypothesis has been highly influential within the literature on class voting. For example, an oft-cited comparative study found that the correlation between class and voting decreased in most Western countries between the 1960s and the 1980s (Franklin et al. 1992). Interestingly, while this constituted a near-universal trend, the decrease occurred at rather different historical phases in different countries. The major explanation offered – but not explicitly tested – centred on the extent to which social conflicts over (for instance) scarce resources had actually been “resolved.” Such conflict resolution, it was argued, affects both political parties (who begin to put non-redistributive issues on the agenda) and individual citizens (who begin to develop class-inconsistent preferences).
An implication of this argument is that the country variation in the timing and extent of a decrease in class voting can be explained by class conflicts getting resolved at different points in time, in different ways, and to a different extent, in various countries. A further implication is that at a given point in time one would expect larger class differences in countries with more inequality. It is this cross-sectional implication hypothesis we examine here, albeit for the case of attitudes towards redistribution rather than party choice.

Such investigations are needed, not least as the authors themselves did not explicitly test this part of their argument. In fact, they argued that “it is important that scholars address themselves to evaluating the major hypothesis that has emerged […] that the decline of cleavage politics required the prior resolution of those social conflicts which had been embodied in pre-existing social cleavages.” (van der Eijk et al. 1992: 430). In an attempt to test this argument, Nieuwbeerta and Ulte (1999) modelled temporal and cross-sectional variation in class voting across twenty countries and fifty years. Their analysis did not support the hypothesis, since they found no significant effect of income differences on the link between a dichotomized class measure and left voting.

These studies are all concerned with voting rather than attitudes. In relation to class and attitudes it is hard to judge the viability of an interest-driven model on the basis of past research. One the one hand, there is firm support for the general contention that the impact of economic self-interest on citizens’ political choices increases as economic stakes become larger and more visible (Sears and Funk 1991). On the other hand, our specific hypothesis has not fared so well in small-N country comparisons. Class differences in attitudes are, for example, fairly large in comparatively egalitarian Sweden, and fairly small in the US, where real class differences are substantially larger than in Sweden (Wright 1997: Ch. 14-16; Svallfors 2006). Edlund (2007 forthcoming) shows that class differences in attitudes are clearly larger in egalitarian Norway and
Sweden than in inegalitarian US and Canada. These findings, however, emanate from a fairly restricted number of countries. Our intention here is to test the hypothesis with respect to attitudes on a larger set of countries, controlling for other factors of importance.

Our second main hypothesis holds that class differences in attitudes grow larger where class issues are more clearly articulated in the political and organisational arenas. According to this line of argument, it is not the realities in the form of class differentials in risks and resources that foster attitudinal class differences. Rather, it is the social interpretations of the stratification order that are on offer, which make class differences small in some contexts and large in others. Where intermediate organizations provide citizens with more arguments and information about redistributive issues, citizens are more likely to discover their own position in the stratification system, and more likely to develop attitudes consistent with that position.

The articulation hypothesis can be derived from a strand of thought in political science, in which it has been emphasized that relationships between social cleavages and political alignments will generally not arise without the assistance of organized group mobilization at the intermediate level provided by parties and interest organizations (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Sartori 1990). As a general proposition, this is not very controversial nowadays. One should note, however, that most of the evidence again comes from comparative research on class voting. Empirically, it has been shown that especially the degree of polarization in the party system is an important contextual feature. Where polarization along the left-right axis is large, class differences in party choice grow larger (Oskarson 2005; Knutsen 2007 forthcoming), and ideological voting becomes widespread (Granberg and Holmberg 1988; van der Eijk et al. 1996). One of the questions we raise here is whether such findings apply also to the class-attitudes link.
Actually, there are several reasons why we should not automatically extrapolate findings on voting to attitudinal class differences. First, it is less obvious that citizens are in dire need of political articulation in the case of attitudes. Political parties package a very large number of issue positions, packages in which redistribution issues are only one of many components. Voters – many of which are not politically attentive – therefore need intermediary politicisation to make them “discover” the class aspect of their own interests as well as the parties that might best represent them. While this need exists also in the case of redistribution attitudes it may be less crucial as such attitudes concern a more limited and more clearly defined object than “party packages”. Therefore, it may well be easier for citizens to develop attitudes consistent with their class interests, even in the absence of strong political articulation of those interests. That class effects on redistribution attitudes have not weakened over time in spite of the erosion of class as a source of general political conflict provides seems to sustain this argument (Svallfors 2006).

A second case in point has to do with the notion that party polarisation is the crucial feature of political articulation. Party differences are obviously necessary for the ability of classes to express their differing preferences through the vote, regardless of how informed they are. When it comes to attitudes, however, choices are provided by survey items whose very design guarantee that everybody has a good and equal opportunity to express very different opinions on (for instance) redistribution. Still, it is potentially important that citizens are aware and informed of their interests. For this reason, we will not only rely on polarisation as a measure of articulation, but also consider the general extent to which class issues are politicised.

Here it is important to note that political articulation is not only provided by political parties. Trade unions are also important in articulating a specific position in the stratification order with identities, attitudes and political choices. Like all interest
organizations, unions provide their (actual and potential) members with a sense of (a) who they are and where friend and foe can be found; (b) what their interests are and what might be the best ways to defend these interests. Unions are organized on an occupational or even class-encompassing ground, so they tend to promote identities and interests connected to work, and downplay alternative identities and cleavages. Furthermore, previous research on class voting indicates that higher union density may be linked to higher levels of class voting (Nieuwbeerta and Ultee 1999). For all these reasons, we will focus not only on political parties but also trade unions in testing the articulation hypothesis. We expect higher levels of union organisation to correspond with larger class differences in attitudes.

To summarise: the articulation hypothesis rests on a social constructivist framework in which interpretations are fragile and have to be derived through a process in which organised interests, such as political parties and trade unions, play a paramount role (cf. Gallie 1983; Sartori 1990; Hall 1997). This is a stark contrast to the hypothesis that real class stratification inflates class differences in attitudes, which clearly rests on theories according to which individuals are able to correctly judge their material self-interest, and will form subjective states (norms, attitudes, aspirations etc) accordingly (Melzer and Richard 1981; cf. Iversen and Soskice 2001). In our context, the latter may be referred to as the conflict resolution hypothesis, since it basically argues that more egalitarian societies have solved basic conflicts around redistribution, which makes issues related to class less salient.

Data and methods: combining micro and macro data

In order to analyse the issue at hand, both micro-level and macro-level data are essential. Micro-level data are necessary to establish national variations in individual-level
correlations between class position and attitudes. Macro-level data are necessary to establish whether these variations may be explained by indicators of class stratification and class articulation.

The micro-level data used in the chapter derives from the first round of the European Social Survey (ESS), conducted in 2002/3 [www.europeansocialsurvey.org]. The data set analysed here comes from fifteen West European countries. This data set has a number of qualities that makes it the most suitable one for our purposes, since it contains:

- data for a sufficiently large number of respondents (app. 2000 for each country) from a sufficiently large number of countries to model the relationship we are interested in
- the occupational data that are necessary to construct the class variable in a consistent way across countries
- relevant attitudinal items to construct the dependent variable

The independent variable of interest here – class – is indicated as the well-known Erikson-Goldthorpe (EG) class schema. The perspective underlying this schema views classes as constituted by employment relations (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992: Ch. 2; Goldthorpe 2000; Svallfors 2006: Ch. 2). According to this perspective, classes are aggregations of positions within labour markets and production units, and can be operationalised through a combination of occupation title and employment status. This class schema has been the subject of numerous evaluations focussing on both its construct validity and its criterion validity. In general such evaluations tend to confirm the validity of the class schema on both counts. That is, classes thus defined tend to differ in terms of important social outcomes (Marshall 1988; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992; Evans 1999; Marshall et al. 1997; Breen 2004; Svallfors 2006), as well as in terms of
the employment relations they are supposed to reflect (Evans 1992; Evans and Mills 1998a; 1998b).

The EG schema exists in several versions; in this chapter, the occupational codes are recoded into six classes: unskilled workers, skilled workers, routine non-manual employees, service class II (lower level controllers and administrators), service class I (higher level controllers and administrators), and the self-employed. In transforming the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO88 COM) – that all ESS country data sets use – into EG classes, we have (with some minor exceptions) used the official ESS recoding schemas (Leiulfsrud et al. 2005). Details on recoding criteria and decisions are found in Appendix 1.

In constructing the dependent variable, we are looking for attitudinal items that cover potentially relevant class issues. That is, we are looking for issues that relate to (re)distribution of basic and/or marketable resources, through political intervention or other organized action. Such items are, unfortunately, quite rare in the ESS data. However, two Likert-type statements are clearly relevant for our purposes, since they ask about measures to reduce inequality. They may be seen as tapping a general redistributivist orientation, and they emphasise the importance of organised action to counter inequalities:

- The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels
- Employees need strong trade unions to protect their working conditions and wages

When summarised the two items form a reasonably reliable index of attitudes towards (action in order to achieve) redistribution. This index has been set so as to vary between 0 and 10, with higher values indicating stronger support for redistributive measures. This index will be the dependent variable in the analyses that follow, and class differences in values on this index and their variations between countries is the main explanandum for our analysis.
The next methods question that needs to be tackled is how best to indicate and summarise class differences. A number of alternatives arise and decisions need to be taken. One is whether we are mainly interested in mapping variation or in mapping differences in estimates; that is, whether standardised or unstandardised coefficients are of main interest. Here, we would argue that both are in fact interesting to analyse, so we will use different measures in the first descriptive parts of the chapter.

A second question is which individual-level factors to control for when comparing class differences across countries. Here we want to emphasise that it is essential to control only for factors that are clearly exogenous to both attitudes and class relations, factors that only affect the demographic composition of classes. Hence, we control throughout the analyses for the age and gender composition. Controlling for factors that could act as mechanisms linking class position to attitudes (for example, monetary resources), or for factors that have a dubious causal relation to attitudes (for example, voting intentions) would confound the analysis. That is especially true when one analyses comparative data, since any country differences in the ways, say, class and voting are linked would affect estimates in a way as to obscure the relationship we are interested in targeting here.

In trying to explain country differences in the class-attitudes nexus, we have used a number of macro-indicators. When it comes to indicators of real stratification we have relied on two main kinds of data sources. One is comparative data on income distribution, collected and reported by the Luxembourg Income Study, and the World Bank. A number of different measures on income inequality has been applied, as reported in Appendix 2 and adjacent to the analyses. A second source is the ESS itself, where values for different classes on indicators in the data of income levels and unemployment have been calculated and then added to the data set as macro-indicators (see further Appendix 2).
Indicators of political articulation have been sought mainly in the Comparative Manifestos data set (Budge et al. 2001). This data set indexes the program contents in election manifestos for a number of Western countries for all elections from 1945. As described in Appendix 2, a number of different measures of political articulation of different socio-economic and socio-cultural themes were created and tested in our analyses. The two measures that we will finally display findings for are

- The share of program contents among all political parties that deal with socio-economic (that is, redistributive) issues
- The degree of polarisation between the dominant left-wing party and the dominant right-wing party in the socio-economic/redistributive dimension

These data are averages for the time period 1960-98, in order to create a sufficiently large number of observations for all countries (choosing the time period 1980-98 yields indistinguishable results from the ones presented).

Further, we have used data on trade union density in order to indicate the level of class organisation (see Appendix 2). Here we have made use of the most recent observations (ca year 2000), but results are virtually identical when averages for the period 1980-2000 are used.

The methods and analytical sequence that we apply in the chapter are as follows: We begin by establishing the relationship between class positions and redistributive attitudes in the various countries, using alternative measures (as discussed above). Second, we describe the relationships between these class differences and selected macro-indicators at the aggregate (country-)level in a series of scatterplots. This provides an overview on possible macro-level factors of importance.

Third, we apply multi-level modelling in order to test the cross-level interactions between class, attitudes and selected macro-indicators. As discussed in
greater detail below, multilevel modelling is the appropriate statistical technique for simultaneously estimating the impact of micro- and macro-level indicators on the dependent variable.

**National variations in class differences: establishing the *explanandum***

Can we actually find any substantial differences across countries in the strength of the class-attitudes nexus? In Table 1, we find a set of coefficients showing different aspects of the relationship, when the redistributive index is regressed on a set of dummy variables for class (as described in the data section), holding gender and age constant.

| Table 1 about here |

As discussed in the methods section, it is not immediately obvious which measures that best capture the relationship between class and attitudes. Hence Table 1 displays a set of different measures, which as it turns out yields substantively similar results. The first column displays the Beta values for class, which is a measure of how large a proportion of the variance in the dependent variable is attributable to variation among class categories. The second column shows the unstandardised B-coefficients for service class I (with unskilled workers as the reference category). For a majority of the countries, this is a measure of the largest difference between class categories, while in a few countries the lowest index values are found among the self-employed. The last column takes the total attitude spread among class categories into account, and simply displays the sums of the absolute values for all B-coefficients in the equation.

As shown in the table, we do indeed find substantial differences among the countries in the extent to which attitudes to redistribution differ among class positions. We find that class differences are fairly large in the North-Western parts of Europe, while they are fairly small in the Central and Southern regions. Finland, Belgium and
Britain are characterised by particularly large class differences, while the opposite is true for Spain, Portugal and Greece.

The index values for unskilled workers and service class I in each country are plotted in Figure 1 (ordered from the largest to the smallest gap between classes). The figure makes it clear that country variation is found both among workers and among the higher salariat. Variation is thus found both “at the bottom” and “at the top” of the class structure. Furthermore, it is not the case that class differences vary with the aggregate mean. For example, high aggregate means are found both in Finland and Belgium, which display large class differences, and in Portugal and Greece, which display small class differences.

What is the relation between these class differences in attitudes and class stratification and class articulation? As discussed above, we may think of two quite distinct scenarios. One is that class differences are large where real differences in resources are large; the other is that class differences are large where class is clearly politically articulated. Even a cursory glance at Table 1 suggests that there may be problems with the first explanation, since the comparatively egalitarian Nordic countries are all found in the upper half of the table, indicating fairly large class differences in attitudes in these countries.

This is also born out by the scatterplot provided in Figure 2. This shows, at the aggregate country level, the relation between income differences, expressed as Gini coefficients for disposable incomes, and class variance in attitudes, expressed as the beta values from Table 1. As shown here, large income differences are typically associated with small class variance and vice versa, even if the association is quite weak and several clear outliers are present. Other possible measures of the income spread, such as the 90/10 percentile quota, or the share going to the top 20 percent of the income
distribution divided by the bottom 20 per cent, show basically the same pattern, but even lower Rs. The same goes for more direct measures of the class distribution of resources and risks, calculated from the ESS data themselves. The association here is even weaker, but still shows a negative correlation between inequality and the strength of the class-attitudes association (analyses can be provided on request).

Figure 2 about here

What about the relation between political articulation and the class-attitudes nexus? In Figure 3, we find Beta values regressed onto the share of political programs that deal with redistributive/socio-economic issues, which can be seen as an indication of the extent to which class-relevant issues are articulated and debated in the political arena.

We find a clear and positive correlation displayed in Figure 3. Countries where redistributive issues are at the fore also tend to be countries where we find clear and strong class differences in attitudes. The extreme outlier status of Belgium should be noted. Here, political programs tend to be preoccupied with the ethno-linguistic division of the country (Flandern vs Vallonia) to such an extent that socio-economic redistributive issues are ‘crowded out’ from the programs. In spite of this, Belgium has one of the strongest class-attitudes correlations of all countries. If Belgium is left out of the analysis, R² increases (astonishingly) to 0.63.

Figure 3 about here

Figure 4 tells a similar story. Here total articulation of socio-economic issues has been replaced by the degree of polarisation in such issues between the dominant left-wing and the dominant right-wing party (as explained in Appendix 2). The same pattern as in the previous figure appears: where left-right polarisation is large, class attitude variance tends to be large. Again, the outlier status of Belgium should be noted, which follows automatically from the fact that comparatively little is said about redistributive issues in the political programs in this country. If Belgium is excluded R² for the equation
increases to 0.31. But it should also be noted that other countries, such as Finland, are also far off the regression line, and that $R^2$ for the equation in Figure 4 is thus considerably lower than in Figure 3.

**Figure 4 about here**

In Figure 5, the political program variables are replaced by union density. Here we find an even stronger correlation ($r=0.73$). Higher union density is clearly related with larger class variance in attitudes. Also at this point an evident outlier is detected: Britain. This is interesting because Britain has a long and at times militant trade union history, but has experienced substantial shrinkage of the unionised parts of the workforce in the recent quarter-century. It might therefore be argued that the current union density in Britain underestimates the lingering impact of trade union organisation in earlier periods. If Britain is excluded from the equation $R^2$ increases to an amazing 0.71.

**Figure 5 about here**

The findings so far indicate that political articulation works in the expected direction, so that a higher level of class relevant issues in the political arena and a higher level of class organization tend to correlate with larger class differences in attitudes. Inequality on the other hand – that is, real stratification – has a feeble and mostly opposite effect from the one posited at the beginning.

These findings are, however, fragile as they rest on the plotting of only 15 country cases. As shown by the comments on conspicuous outliers, the inclusion or exclusion of single cases makes a substantial difference for results. The results are therefore so far only indicative – which is why we now need to turn to analyses of individuals in contexts through multilevel modelling to further explore the relationship.
Explaining national variations in class differences

We will now analyse a series of multi-level models using the redistribution attitude index as the dependent variable. The independent variables are dummies derived from the class schema, together with a number of contextual cross-level interaction terms testing our predictions about how political articulation and economic stratification affect the impact of class. We also continue to control for age and gender.

A crucial feature of our data is that individuals are clustered within countries. Individuals from the same country naturally share common experiences that make them similar to each other, but different from citizens of other countries, both in terms of the dependent variable, and in terms of effects of independent variables. Multilevel models capture such context variation by reparameterizing the intercepts and b-coefficients of standard regression into country-level equations. These equations contain (1) a “grand mean” in the intercept or b-coefficient, (2) any specified systematic context variables that may affect intercepts/b-coefficients, and (3) a contextual error term allowing for country-level random error in intercepts/b-coefficients (Hox 2002).

For a number of reasons, multilevel modelling is a more suitable method than standard regression for analyzing context-clustered data. First, it simultaneously accommodates systematic contextual main effects and interactions, together with random error at the country level. Thus, the procedure gives a fuller and arguably more realistic picture of contextual effects, and in turn less biased estimates.

Moreover, multilevel models allow us to test how well models explain not only variation between individuals as in standard regression but also country differences in the dependent variables and in effects of individual-level variables. Finally, it allows us to gauge whether there is significant country variation to be explained in the first place, again either in the dependent variable or in effects of individual-level variables.
A more technical argument for multilevel modelling is that standard regression tends to give biased standard errors for clustered data. Specifically, standard regression underestimates standard errors in situations where the “intra-class correlation” is positive, i.e. where cases from a context are more similar to each other than to cases from other contexts. Standard regression assumes that all cases from one context are unique and independent, although in reality they are to some extent “duplicates” of each other. This leads to an overestimation of the extent of independent information contained in the data, and an underestimation of standard errors. In contrast, multilevel modelling incorporates contextual dependencies into its very design and therefore provides accurate standard errors and significance tests.

A limitation inherent in our data is that we only have access to 15 countries. While several studies illustrate that this can be enough to reach statistically significant and substantively interesting multilevel results (Esser 2005; Jæger 2006; Scheepers and Grotenhuis 2005; Steenbergen and Jones 2002), it places a constraint on how many contextual factors and interactions one can consider. We have taken the following precautions to limit this number. First, we use only one contextual variable (GINI) to tap income inequality in countries; this variable correlates strongly with a number of alternative measures. Second, while political class articulation is represented by three variables as reported above, we avoid including them simultaneously except when absolutely necessary. Third, we collapse certain categories in the EG class schema that are largely similar with respect to redistribution support; this applies to the skilled/unskilled workers distinction. Fourth, because modelling all conceivable interactions between the remaining five class categories and the four contextual measures would exhaust our data, we concentrate on certain contrasts. Specifically, for reasons explained below, we focus on differences between workers and service class I, and on differences between routine-nonmanuals and service class I.10
We now turn to Table 2 which contains results from several “random intercepts-random coefficients” models. These are multi-level models which, in addition to variation at the individual level 1, also model level 2 variation in the dependent variable (random intercepts), as well as level 2 variation in the magnitude of effects of individual-level variables (random coefficients).

Table 2 about here

Model 1 is a baseline model containing only class variables together with age and gender. The reason that the latter two are included right from the beginning, rather than running a more “empty” baseline model, is that we subsequently want to investigate how much variation in class effects can be explained by our contextual variables, over and above compositional differences between countries.

Model 1 tells us three things. First, its fixed part again shows there is a significant average impact of class. Workers hold the most positive attitudes towards redistribution compared to service class I (1.15), with routine non-manuals (.91), service class II (.57), and the self-employed (.16) to follow in descending order. Second, this being a random-intercepts model, it also gauges the contextual variation in attitudes across countries, through the explicit estimation of how much the intercepts vary across countries; specifically, the model estimates a standard deviation of .65 in the magnitude of the intercepts, once the individual-level variables have been taken into account. Third, this being a random-coefficients model, the random part also contains estimates of the variation in the impact of class. Specifically, the standard deviations of the worker effect, the routine-nonmanual effect, and the self-employment effect are all significantly larger than zero. More exactly, the working class coefficient has a standard deviation of .26, whereas the routine-manual effect varies by .21, and the self-employment effect by .27.

In contrast, the standard deviation of the service class II effect is a modest and non-significant .07. Thus, although there is a significant overall difference in attitudes
between the two service classes in Europe (0.57), the magnitude of this specific class difference does not vary much across countries. It therefore makes sense to exclude it from the subsequent analyses shown in Table 2. Moreover, we exclude from Table 2 analyses of variation in the effects of the self-employment dummy. This is clearly not because of any lack of country variation, but rather because we found that our macro variables were generally unable to explain this particular variation in class effects. What remains to be explained, then, is country variation in differences between workers and service class I, and between routine-nonmanuals and service class I. It is important to bear in mind that the conclusions and arguments advanced below pertain to these particular contrasts in the EG class schema.

When discussing subsequent models we are interested in whether the class effect variations in Model 1 can be reduced by introducing systematic crosslevel interactions that let individual-level class effects vary with contextual stratification and articulations measures. Models 1-9 are all variations on this theme. Specifically, models 2-4 focus on explaining country differences in working class effects. Model 2 shows that contextual income distribution as measured by the GINI coefficient interacts significantly with the working class effect. For each step upwards along the GINI scale, indicating greater income inequality, the working class effect is predicted to decrease by -.03. This is of course totally at odds with the conflict resolution hypothesis, which predicts that greater income inequality enhances the chances that classes come to different conclusions on the desirability of redistribution. In the concluding discussion we will suggest a tentative explanation of this somewhat counter-intuitive finding.

Model 2 also reveals a significant interaction effect of total party articulation of class issues. Consistent with expectations, the working class effect is predicted to increase by .02 for every additional percentage of election manifesto space that is devoted to class issues. Finally, looking at the random part of Model 2, one notices that the
standard deviation of the working class effect has dropped from .26 (in Model 1) to .18. That is, the two cross-level interactions account for roughly one-third of the country variation in working class-service class/self-employed contrast. Finally, in addition to this interaction with class, one should also note that income inequality has a main effect on attitudes, with support for further redistribution being stronger in more unequal countries (.08).

Models 3 and 4 are identical to Model 2 except that Model 3 uses union density as the articulation measure, whereas Model 4 uses “major” party polarisation. The results confirm the suppressing impact of income inequality. With respect to articulation Model 3 shows that union density interacts in the expected way with the working class effect (.008). Apparently not only parties but also trade unions are effective in the formation of class differences, with stronger unions making the working class stand out more in an attitudinal sense. Model 4, on the other hand, reveals that party polarisation in class issues does not significantly affect class differences in attitudes, controlling for the other variables. This casts doubt on the bivariate macro correlation presented in Figure 4. However, this finding was explained by the theoretical discussion, which gave rise to the suspicion that party polarisation matters mainly for class differences in voting, but not for class differences in attitudes. Moreover, because of this finding, and because party polarisation turns out to have insignificant effects on all other class effects as well, we will subsequently spare the reader models containing party polarisation. (Results are available on request.)

Models 5-6 explain country differences in routine non-manual effects. Thus, unlike the previous models they highlight country variation in attitude differences inside the large middle class. Model 5 reveals that actual income inequality does not matter much for the internal middle class conflict, as evidenced by a non-significant routine nonmanual*Gini coefficient. That is, the conflict resolution hypothesis about social
stratification fails again. In contrast, the overall level of class issue articulation in election manifests apparently affects not only workers, but also routine nonmanuals (.03). Model 6 underlines the importance of political articulation by showing that also union density can explain class differences inside the middle class (.01).

Models 7-8 focus simultaneously on the working class- and the routine non-manual effect respectively. Thus, the model specification is more complete here, although with only fifteen countries we are arguably approaching the upper limit of the number of contextual variables the data can accommodate. Model 7 confirms that income inequality increases attitude differences mainly between workers and service class I, but not between the latter group and routine non-manuals. However, the model also confirms that greater party articulation of class politics has a positive impact on both the working class coefficient (.03), and on attitude differences inside the middle class (.04). Model 8 continues to underscore the importance of unions for creating class differences in support for redistribution. Here we discover that greater unionization affects also intra-middle class differences between routine nonmanuals and service class I (.01).

Finally, Model 9 includes all the crossthe interactions of importance so far. This is a valuable analysis as several contextual variables correlate. Particularly total party class articulation and union density are strongly related (r=.58; n=15). Thus, in order to be more certain that both parties and unions make non-spurious direct contributions to the class-attitude link we now examine their impact under control for each other. The downside of the model is that even more multicollinearity is introduced at the same time as we only have 15 contexts at level 2. Therefore, even substantively important cross-level interactions may not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Still, such an analysis is of sufficient interest. Our hypotheses arguably receive support if the estimates of controlled interactions are similar to ones revealed by the less inclusive
models. Of course, they receive even more support if they are statistically significant with only 15 cases at level 2.

Model 9 indeed reveals a pattern similar to that uncovered by the less complete model specifications. Three of the five cross-level interactions are statistically significant. This applies to the impact of unionization on both the worker and the routine non-manual contrast respectively, as well as to the impact of party articulation on the routine non-manual contrast. The remaining two cross-level interactions approach significance, and reach substantive magnitudes close to those obtained with simpler specifications. This clearly applies both to the impact of income inequality (-02; p=.14), and to some extent to the impact of party articulation (.01; p=.28), on the working class effects.

Finally, the random part of Model 9 suggests that these five cross-level interactions, taken together, do a good job in reducing the country variation in class effects found in the base model. For example, the base-model standard deviation in the worker effect was .26, but is now reduced to .11, which amounts to an explained variance of 58 percent. Similarly, the base-model standard deviation in the routine non-manual effect was .21, but is now reduced to a non-significant .05, which amounts to an explained variance of 75 percent.

As a summary of the multilevel results, figures 6 a and b gives an illustration of the extent to which our chosen macro-variables explain country variation in the class-attitudes nexus. For each country, they compare the estimated level 2 residual variation in the impact of class in the empty baseline model (Model 1) with the residual variation of the most complete specification of cross-level interactions (Model 9). Specifically, Figure 6a illustrates this comparison for the impact of the worker-service class I contrast, whereas Figure 6b focuses on the routine-nonmanual-service class I contrast. In both
figures, black bars represent deviations from the “grand mean” of the Model 1 whereas grey bars represent corresponding deviations from the regression line in Model 9.

Figures 6 a and b about here

The grey bars are generally smaller than the black bars. This is an alternative illustration of the fact that the residual standard deviation in class effects is reduced once we introduce measures of stratification and articulation into the statistical model. For instance, looking at Figure 6a one sees that stratification and articulation measures indeed bring most countries closer to the regression line. However, for worker effects there are some notable differences in the extent to which this occurs. Cases such as Spain, Finland, Greece, Portugal, and Sweden are arguably the most satisfactory ones as their working class effects deviate substantially form the “grand mean” in the base model, but whereas they are very close to the predicted effect value once stratification and articulation are taken into account. Conversely, Britain and Belgium are not as satisfactory as they stand at some distance from the regression line, even once stratification and articulation are included. To be specific, the attitudinal difference between workers and service class I in these countries are larger than what is suggested by their stratification and articulation levels.

Figure 6b – which highlights routine-nonmanual effects – tells a simpler story. While there was substantial initial variation around the grand mean of the base model, there is no significant variation at all around the regression line of Model 9. (In several cases, the deviations from Model 9 predictions are so small that one can hardly spot the grey bars). Cases such as Germany, Denmark, Finland, Greece, and Sweden, are arguably the most satisfying here. These are all countries with much larger – or smaller – than average differences between routine-nonmanuals and the service class. However, in all these cases the initial deviations become understandable once the level of social stratification and political articulation are included as explanatory factors.
Conclusion

In conclusion, what do these results reveal about why class differences in attitudes to redistribution differ among countries? First, they confirm the suspicion raised – but not sufficiently tested – by small-N studies that class politics matter greatly for the extent to which we find attitudinal class differences in different countries. More than this, we have seen that both unions and parties are instrumental in this regard: results suggest that both stronger unions and more attention to class issues by parties independently strengthen the class-attitude link. Taken together, such results illustrate how variable and fragile the links between material stratification and political consciousness are. That this is the case for the links between stratification and voting has been known for some time. But we now feel more certain that this is the case also for the more limited – and more easily calculated – redistribution attitudes.

Unlike research on voting, however, our research on attitudes finds that party polarisation in class politics is of little importance. This is a clear difference compared to series of voting studies that have found party polarisation to increase the impact of class on the vote (van der Eijk et al. 1996; Oskarson 2005; Knutsen 2007 forthcoming). As previously discussed, the explanation may be that voters need differences between parties to express class-based preferences, no matter how informed they are on class issues. In contrast, for survey respondents expressing attitudes polarisation is less crucial as the differences between alternatives are ensured by the very design of the survey. The implication is that researchers trying to explain country differences in the effects of stratification on attitudes are well-advised to focus on the total amount of arguments available to citizens in the political debate, rather than differences between political actors per se.
An important question here is why political articulation by parties and trade unions is so important in forging the class-attitudes nexus. Here we should note that “(t)ying one's class position to attitudes and values regarding the social causes of inequality and the potential of redistribution is a fairly complex mental exercise” (Svallfors 2006: 166). Organised interests such as political parties and trade unions help people make this mental connection and in doing so they help forging a stronger class-attitudes nexus.

An interesting development of the analyses in this chapter would be to chart not only the strength of trade unions but also that of other organised interests and analyse their impact on the class-attitudes link. Two obvious candidates here would be (a) the strength of employer organisations and professional organisations for the higher salariat and (b) the strength of religious organisations, such as churches. The hypotheses in this regard would be that strong employer and professional organisations would forge a stronger “upper middle-class consciousness” among the higher salariat, which would tend to make the class-attitudes link stronger. Strong churches, on the other hand, should be expected to counteract political articulation of class due to their class-encompassing appeal, which would then tend to make the class-attitudes link weaker.11

Of course there are limits to the social construction of reality as conducted by various organised interests. There has to be something to articulate; that is, if all real class differences actually disappeared the class-attitudes nexus would in all likelihood also disappear. But short of a complete eradication of real class differences – which needless to say is not an approaching stage anywhere – political articulation will, we contend, continue to play a paramount role in forging the class-attitudes nexus.

A second main finding is that a negative correlation between the degree of inequality and the strength of the class-attitudes link persists even after controlling for various measures of political articulation. Hence, it is not the case that this negative
correlation is simply a result of political articulation of class being more widespread in comparatively egalitarian societies. In sharp contrast to the conflict resolution hypothesis that we started with, our findings show that it is not the case that increased inequality strengthens class-attitude links. On the contrary, class differences in attitudes tend to be larger in countries with little inequality.

We propose a policy-feedback interpretation of this finding. From such a vantage point, public policies are thought to teach actors “interpretive lessons” about the lenses through which politics should and should not be approached (Pierson 1993; Rothstein 1998; Mettler and Soss 2004; Svalfors 2007 forthcoming). More specifically, our interpretation begins with the observation that low levels of inequality are typically intertwined with encompassing welfare and labour market policies. Such policies, in turn, constitute focal points for citizens’ political thinking: they affect the extent to which citizens think about inequality and redistribution as political responsibilities in the first place. Encompassing and tangible redistributive policies bring redistributive issues to the fore of political thinking and debate among citizens and intermediary organizations (Edlund 2007 forthcoming). Moreover they tend to have a self-reinforcing effect on citizens as well as on intermediary organizations. The more class-redistribution that is achieved through public policy, the more unprivileged citizens and their political representatives think about remaining inequalities. Furthermore, in groups with stronger market positions highly redistributive institutions tend to promote resistance against further redistribution. In combination, these two policy feedback mechanisms may ensure that class differences in attitudes towards redistribution remain large in egalitarian societies, and that they are in fact larger than in more inegalitarian societies.

In relation to the existing scholarship on variations in the class-attitudes link, which we note is based mainly on small-N strategic samples of countries, a few observations should be made. The first is that our analyses mainly confirm the
findings/interpretations from these previous studies, on a larger sample of countries and using adequate statistical techniques. Second, the variation between countries in the class-attitudes nexus is substantially reduced by bringing in the macro-indicators chosen for the analyses. This indicates that a large amount of variation in the class-attitudes nexus between countries actually is due to differences in income distributions and political articulation which the measures were intended to capture. Third, some country variation remains after taking our macro-indicators into account when it comes to differences in attitudes between service class I and the working class. So there is clearly still room both for bringing in additional macro-indicators of the kind we have suggested, and for detailed historic-institutional work trying to explain specific country patterns. Such analyses could take results such as ours as a starting-point and focus on conspicuous country “outliers”.

There is also plenty of room for other improvements and extensions of the kind of analyses we have applied in this chapter. For example, as we have noted, the dependent variable we have used in the paper is rather weak and chosen largely on pragmatic grounds. So the analyses should be applied to other data sets in order to see whether results hold up when alternative attitude indicators are used. Useful data sets in this regard could be found in modules of the International Social Survey Program that deal with class-pertinent issues.

In the long run, as enough relevant data sets become available, the analyses could be extended to take dynamics into account. In a cross-sectional analysis such as this one, it is for example impossible to firmly decide whether political articulation really drives class differences in attitudes, or if class differences in attitudes (stemming from whatever primordial reason) drive political articulation. In an analysis based on time-series one could at least get some grip on which changes tend to precede which, and test whether the causal assumptions we have made make sense in a dynamic perspective.
Notwithstanding the inherent limitations of our analyses, we contend that they strongly support arguments about the importance of institutions and class politics. It is not the case that comparatively egalitarian capitalist societies and encompassing welfare states have bid class conflicts farewell. In fact, for reasons spelled out above, it is exactly here we find the sharpest attitudinal differences among classes. Thinking that encompassing welfare policies will eliminate class differences in attitudes seems to be a delusion not unlike the expectation to quench one’s thirst by drinking from the ocean.
Appendices

Appendix 1: The Class variable

The class variable is based on the occupation of the individual. Individuals who are not currently working are classified according to their most recent occupation (if any). Individuals who have never worked but whose spouse works or has worked are classified according their spouses’ occupations. In recoding occupations into classes, the recoding schemes in the official European Social Survey report has been applied (Leiulfstrød et al. 2005). These recoding schemes exist in two versions (the original designed by Harry Ganzeboom and a modified version by Ivano Bison). We chose to apply the Bison version, but this has no discernible impact on results.

In aggregating the 11-class class schema that results from the ESS recoding schemes into the six-class version used here decisions have to be made about how to allocate (a) the group denoted as “IIIb” in the EG schema; that is, lower-level routine non-manual occupations; (b) supervisors of workers. Supervisors can either be classified as “skilled workers” or as “routine non-manuals”, and group IIIb can either be classified as “unskilled workers” or “routine non-manuals”. The theoretical rationale behind the class schema gives no clear guidance on this. After testing the different alternatives to see if they differed substantially in their effects on attitudes it was found that differences were small but that the alternative to collapse group IIIb with the other Routine non-manuals and supervisors with the other skilled workers yielded somewhat larger class differences in attitudes. It should be emphasised that comparisons between countries are not affected at all by the decisions on how to collapse categories.

A final note on class recodings concerns the Norwegian data, where the self-employed have not been asked about their occupation. For Norway, all self-employed
have therefore been coded as such, while for other countries some of the self-employed are found in the service class according to the logic of the class schema. This has hardly affected results in any substantive sense.

Appendix 2: Macro-data

A number of data sources and indicators have supplied macro-data for our analyses:

- Luxembourg Income Study & World Bank

Data on income differences in the different countries have mostly been taken from the Luxembourg Income Study, which provide comparable income data for a large set of industrialised countries (www.lisproject.org). Portugal is not included in these data; hence we have used data provided by the World Bank for this country. The measures we have used are for disposable incomes and include

- Gini coefficients
- the 90/10 percentile ratio
- income share for top 20/ income share for bottom 20 percent ratio

- European Social Survey

The LIS and World Bank data provide global measures of inequality, which are not necessarily reflections of income differences between classes (even though it could safely be assumed that large global inequalities coincide with large class differences in incomes). In addition, we have therefore estimated aggregated country levels for a number of indicators from the European Social Survey itself, as reported by respondents, and used these as macro-indicators. They include:

- differences in disposable incomes between classes
- differences in unemployment experiences between classes

Since these measures provide essentially similar results, as reported in the text, only the Gini coefficients have been used in the reported tables and diagrams.
Comparative Manifestos Data Set

The manifesto dataset is based on a classification of the smallest significant units (“quasi-sentences”) of each election manifesto on a number of themes (56 categories distributed amongst 7 policy areas). The proportion of the manifestos (i.e. the relative total number of quasi-sentences) dedicated to each of the themes was then calculated. The different dimensions in this analysis have been constructed by merging multiple categories as follows:

I. Socio-economic dimension “left-wing themes”: per403 (“Market Regulation”) + per404 (“Economic Planning”) + per405 (“Corporatism”) + per412 (“Controlled Economy”) + per413 (“Nationalisation”) + per503 (“Social Justice”) + per504 (“Welfare State Expansion”) + per701 (“Labour Groups: Positive”)

II. Socio-economic dimension “right-wing themes”: per401 (“Free Enterprise”) + per402 (“Incentives”) + per414 (“Economic Orthodoxy”) + per505 (“Welfare State Limitation”) + per702 (“Labour Groups: Negative”) + per704 (“Middle Class and Professional Groups”)

III. Socio-cultural dimension “left-wing themes”: per 201 (“Freedom and Human Rights”) + per602 (“National Way of Life: Negative”) + per604 (“Traditional Morality: Negative”) + per607 (“Multiculturalism: Positive”) + per705 (“Underprivileged Minority Groups”) + per706 (“Non-Economic Demographic Groups”)


For a detailed account of the contents of each category, see Budge et al (2001: App III).

By adding or subtracting these four theme groups, a large number of possible measures can be constructed. The two that we finally use and report in the analyses are:
-the share of program content in each country that deals with socio-economic issues (that is, \( I + II \))

-the difference between the dominant left-wing party and the dominant right-wing party in the balance between left-wing and right wing themes in the socio-economic dimension (that is, \( I - II \) for each party)

Deciding which are the dominant right-wing and the dominant left-wing party is quite easy in many cases but more complicated in other cases. In the less clear-cut cases averages between two or more political parties have sometimes been used. Table A1 provides information about which parties that have been chosen in the 15 countries.

### Table A1 about here

- Trade union density data

Finally, information on trade union density has been used, using unpublished data supplied by Anders Kjellberg at the National Institute for Working Life. These data are an extended and updated version of the data in Kjellberg (2001: Table 1-2). They indicate the percentage of the employed population outside agriculture that are members of a trade union. Kjellberg’s data cover the period from 1980 for five-year intervals (except for Portugal, where they cover the years 1980, 1990, and 1997, and Greece, where the time series is 1985, 1991, 1995, and 1999). Since results for our analyses using the average figures are virtually identical to using only the latest observation, we chose to use the latest observation (in most cases, year 2000).
Acknowledgement: The authors thank The Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation and the Swedish Council for Working Life and Social Research for funding the research program “The Political Sociology of the Welfare State”. We thank Anders Kjellberg for providing unpublished data on union density, Håkon Leiulfsrud and Ivano Bison for constructing and sending us occupational recoding schemes, Lars Brännström for useful methodological advice, and Richard Breen, Clem Brooks, Jonas Edlund, Robert Erikson, Mikael Hjerm, Evelyn Huber, Steffen Mau, Maria Oskarson, Jens Rydgren, John Stephens, Michael Tåhlin and Ben Veghte for constructive comments.

Notes

\(^1\) Still, even in the area of class voting, which is a more thoroughly researched area compared to the problem of class and attitudes, it is nevertheless uncommon to explicitly model competing explanations as we do in this paper. In a recent overview, Knutsen (2007 forthcoming: xx) even lamented that “Few of the studies of class voting try to explain changes in class voting over time or to explain differences between countries. In fact, very little is known of the causes of cross-national differences in the level of class voting or the causes of changes in class voting over time within countries.”

\(^2\) The authors discussed several vehicles of conflict resolution. While these included political equality and institutionalized minority protection in the decision process, they also regarded diminishing economic group differences achieved by class-redistributive policies as crucial.

\(^3\) Data for important macro-indicators are not available for the East-Central European countries or for Luxembourg. The French data do not contain occupational codings at a sufficiently detailed level. ESS data from the 2004 round do not contain the dependent variables that are necessary to analyse our question.

\(^4\) This is not the place to debate the various pros and cons of different ways to conceptualise and indicate class. For extended recent discussions, see (Wright 2005; Svallfors 2006: Ch. 2).
A third statement that judged from its face value taps the same dimension – *The less that government intervenes in the economy, the better it is for [country] –* turns out to have very low correlations with the other two items. This is probably because it does not point to any specific intervention or measure. Hence it has not been included in the measure.

For the whole fifteen-country sample, the correlation (Pearson’s R) between the two items is 0.32, yielding a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.48. The inter-item correlation varies from 0.22 (Belgium) to 0.37 (Sweden). The reliability is definitely on the low side, but not strikingly bad for a two-item index. As discussed in note 10 results are similar, but not identical, when each of the two components in the index are used separately.

It should be noted, however, that the class-attitudes association barely changes at all by controlling for age and gender.

The Beta values is achieved by the following procedure, adapted from Wright (1997: 458). First we estimate the OLS regression with five dummy variables for class, age as a metric variable, and a dummy for gender. We then construct a new summed variable for class, which is the sum of the unstandardised coefficients multiplied with each of the class dummy variables. This variable is then substituted for the original set of class dummy variables in the equation and a new equation estimated. The Beta value for this new variable is reported in Table 1. One should note that for a bivariate analysis the Beta value is equal to the multiple correlation coefficient (“R”) in an OLS regression.

The curiously “non-ideological” character of the Finnish political debate has been noted by analysts (Kroll et al. 2000) and this is probably what we see reflected in the position of Finland in Figure 4 compared to Figure 3.

Several analyses will relate unionization to class effects on the index, which of course includes attitudes towards unions as one its constituent parts. Therefore, one may wonder to what degree the union item is in fact driving our results. Separate analyses that employ the two sub-items respectively as dependent variables reveal a more complex pattern than that. For routine non-manual class effects, we find largely the same interaction pattern for both items. Thus, it is not the case that the union item is driving our results entirely. For working class effects, however, we found an exception to the rule: while working class effects on the union item grow with stronger unionization, this is not true for working class effects on the redistribution item. Still, we did find that greater total party attention to class issues significantly increased
the effect of the working class dummy. This means that also the redistribution item yields quite some meaningful information about working class attitudes.

11. It should be noted that this is a different argument from the one that posits that the degree of religious diversity would affect the class-attitudes nexus, something that Nieuwbeerta and Ultee show affect levels of class voting (Nieuwbeerta and Ultee 1999). Our argument focusses levels of religious influence.

12. To give but one single example that results may differ between different data sets, one could note that Britain’s class differences are larger comparatively speaking for the attitude index we use here than for ISSP data pertaining to similar issues. Svallfors (2006: Ch. 4-5) reports results that indicate that class differences are clearly larger in Sweden than in Britain, using a variety of different attitude measures. In contrast, our analysis here shows class differences to be fairly similar in Sweden and Britain – in fact slightly larger in Britain (cf. Table 1).

13. Such as The Role of Government module, conducted in 1996 and 2006, and the Social Inequality module, fielded in 1992 and 1999. ISSP data sets before 1990 contain too few countries and do not have occupational codings that are detailed enough to be of much use for this particular problem.
References


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Gender and Age are held constant. Reference category: unskilled workers.
Data source: ESS 2002.

a) the absolute value is the numerical value without regard to its sign.
Table 2: Random intercepts–random coefficients multi-level models of attitudes towards redistribution (two levels; maximum likelihood estimation)

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<td>Worker x GINI</td>
<td>-.03*</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.04***</td>
<td>-.03**</td>
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<td>Worker x Total party articulation of redistribution</td>
<td>.02*</td>
<td>.008***</td>
<td>-.0004</td>
<td>.03**</td>
<td>.01***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Worker x Union density</td>
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<td>Worker x Major party polarisation</td>
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<td>Routine non-manual x GINI</td>
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<td>Routine non-manual x Total party articulation of redistribution</td>
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<td>Routine non-manual x Union density</td>
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<td>Routine non-manual x Major party polarisation</td>
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<td><strong>Random Part:</strong></td>
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<td>Residual standard deviation at level 1 (SD of e_i)</td>
<td>1.94***</td>
<td>1.94***</td>
<td>1.94***</td>
<td>1.93***</td>
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<td>Standard deviation of intercepts at level 2 (SD of u_0)</td>
<td>.65***</td>
<td>.52***</td>
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<td>Standard deviation of self-employment slopes at level 2 (SD of u_0self)</td>
<td>.27***</td>
<td>.26***</td>
<td>.28***</td>
<td>.27***</td>
<td>.26***</td>
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<td>.25***</td>
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<td>Standard deviation of service class 2 slopes at level 2 (SD of u_0class2)</td>
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<td>Standard deviation of routine non-manual slopes at level 2 (SD of u_0nonman)</td>
<td>.21***</td>
<td>.22***</td>
<td>.22***</td>
<td>.22***</td>
<td>.14***</td>
<td>.09***</td>
<td>.12***</td>
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<td>Standard deviation of worker slopes at level 2 (SD of u_0worker)</td>
<td>.26***</td>
<td>.18***</td>
<td>.14***</td>
<td>.20***</td>
<td>.27***</td>
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<td>.16***</td>
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<td>-2LogLikelihood</td>
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<td>102,508</td>
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<td>102,442</td>
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*Comment: 24,663 respondents; 15 countries
*p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
Figure 1: Index values among Service Class I and Unskilled workers
Figure 2: Income inequality and Class Differences in Attitudes

\[ y = -0.006x + 0.393 \]

\[ R^2 = 0.1627 \]
Figure 3: Political articulation of socio-economic issues and Class Differences in Attitudes

\[ y = 0.0075x + 0.0178 \]

\[ R^2 = 0.3342 \]
Figure 4: Left-right polarisation and Class Differences in Attitudes

\[
y = 0.0027x + 0.1583 \\
R^2 = 0.1783
\]
Figure 5: Union density and Class Differences in Attitudes

\[ y = 0.0023x + 0.1175 \]

\[ R^2 = 0.5374 \]
Figure 6a: Unexplained country variation in worker effects

Figure 6b: Unexplained country variation in routine-nonmanual effects
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Dominant left-wing party</th>
<th>Dominant right-wing party</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>SPÖ (Socialists)</td>
<td>ÖVP (Christian Democrats)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>PSB-BSP; SP; PS (Socialists – average)</td>
<td>PSC-CVP; CVP; PSC (Christian people's party –average)</td>
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<td>Denmark</td>
<td>SD (Social Democrats)</td>
<td>KF (Conservatives)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>SSDP (Social Democrats)</td>
<td>KK (National Coalition)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>SPD (Social Democrats)</td>
<td>CDU-CSU (Christian Democrats)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Conservatives</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>PASOK (Socialists)</td>
<td>ND (New Democrats)</td>
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<td>Ireland</td>
<td>LP (Labour)</td>
<td>Fianna Fail</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
<td>PCI-PDS (Communists); PSI (Socialists) (average)</td>
<td>PPI-DC (Christian Democrats)</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>PvDA (Labour)</td>
<td>VVD (Liberals)</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
<td>DNA (Labour)</td>
<td>H (Conservatives)</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
<td>PSP (Socialists)</td>
<td>PSD (Social Democrats)</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
<td>PSOE (Socialists)</td>
<td>UCD (Democratic Centre); PDP (Popular Democratic Party) (average)</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
<td>SAP (Social Democrats)</td>
<td>M (Conservatives)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>SPS-PSS (Social Democrats)</td>
<td>FDP-PRD (Radical Democrats)</td>
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