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Working Paper
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LIS Working Paper Series, No. 342

Provided in Cooperation with:
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS)

Suggested Citation: Hölsch, Katja; Kraus, Margit (2003) : Poverty alleviation and the degree of centralisation in European schemes of social assistance, LIS Working Paper Series, No. 342, Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), Luxembourg

This Version is available at:
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Poverty Alleviation and the Degree of Centralisation in European Schemes of Social Assistance

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March 2003
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Acknowledgements: The authors thank Gerhard Wagenhals, Ulrich Scheurle (University of Hohenheim, Stuttgart) and Robert Schwager (University of Göttingen) for helpful comments. Financial support from the Fritz-Thyssen-Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.
Abstract

In this paper, the relationship between the degree of centralisation and the distributive outcomes in European schemes of social assistance is investigated. For this purpose, a scheme of classification suitable for grouping the EU15 schemes according to features related to centralisation is established by using cluster analysis and an indicator for centralisation is developed by employing multidimensional scaling. Subsequently, on the basis of LIS data the effectiveness and efficiency in reducing poverty through social assistance payments are calculated using several measures of poverty for five selected EU systems and the linkage of their distributive impacts to the degree of centralisation is examined. Concerning effectiveness in poverty alleviation, the results provide some evidence that extremely centralised systems are more effective with regard to redistribution than extremely decentralised schemes. However, for systems with a medium degree of centralisation, the hypothesis that greater decentralisation leads to more effectiveness is not supported. With respect to efficiency, no support is lent to the hypothesis that a higher degree of decentralisation is accompanied by a better distributive efficiency. Rather, the results seem to suggest that systems with a medium degree of decentralisation do better than either extremely centralised or extremely decentralised systems.

JEL: I32, I38, H53
Keywords: Social Assistance, Classification, Centralisation, Poverty, Redistribution

1 Introduction

The interest in means-tested social assistance has grown considerably when rising unemployment rates in Europe in the first half of the 1990s caused a higher number of social assistance recipients (EUROSTAT and European Commission, 2000; Puide and Minas 2001: 41 f.). Social assistance is closely connected to other transfer payments because the end of eligibility for other transfers such as unemployment assistance often leads to eligibility for social assistance as a last safety net in social security systems. Thus, with growing numbers of unemployed social assistance has also gained importance. But how can social assistance be defined? An unambiguous international
definition for social assistance does not exist (Eardley et al., 1996a), so we have to accept a definition here which suits our purposes. Eardley et al. (1996a) suggest a categorisation which comprises the following three types of social assistance: (1) **general assistance** which provides all or almost all people below a specified minimum income with cash benefits, (2) **categorical assistance** which includes cash benefits for specific groups like the unemployed, and (3) **tied assistance** which covers specific goods or services in kind or cash like housing benefits. In the present paper, when mentioning social assistance we refer to Eardley’s category 1 (general assistance). With respect to the category of tied assistance, “aid in special circumstances” for Germany and “local assistance services” in Italy are included for reasons of data commensurability between LIS and the Eardley expenditure data (no category 3 benefits are listed in Eardley for Finland and France, while for the UK category 3 benefits – free school meals and council tax credit – had to be excluded for reasons of data availability). In addition, we analyse the influence of housing benefits which are also included in the third category. Category 2 benefits are excluded for several reasons. The main point is that the intention of this study is to focus on the “last safety net” for which all individuals below a certain income level are eligible, irrespective of age, health condition, family status and working history. Additionally, the benefits included in category 2 are quite different across the countries considered, reaching from unemployment assistance, disability working allowance to veteran’s pensions. Since the population groups covered differ widely from country to country, the results obtained would be hardly comparable. For an analysis covering means-tested benefits as a whole we refer to e.g. Sainsbury and Morissens (2002).
Heikkilä et al. (2001) name two key objectives of social assistance in an international context: social assistance should prevent from extreme material deprivation as well as social exclusion and marginalisation in order to maintain the integration of the affected persons. Poverty alleviation therefore can be considered as one of the major goals of social assistance schemes. In view of the increasing importance of social assistance in the presence of rising long term unemployment, the question arises how effective social assistance programs are in achieving their goals of alleviating poverty and insecurity of existence.

Until the seminal contribution of Esping-Anderson (1990), most empirical work on distributive impacts of welfare programs had relied on comparing the amount of social security expenditures with their distributive outcomes. However, in view of the manifold nature of social assistance regulations, the size of the social assistance budget alone is unlikely to explain the multifaceted distributive impacts the systems produce. In particular, issues of conditions for eligibility, duration of benefits and the degree of centralisation of the administrative set-ups have been held responsible for differences in the distributive impacts the systems produce.

In the present paper, we focus on the investigation of the relationship between the degree of centralisation in European schemes of social assistance and their success in achieving the goal of relieving poverty. For this purpose, we start by presenting the most frequently discussed hypotheses concerning the relationship between centralisation of social security systems and distributive outcomes in socio-economic literature in section 2. Subsequently, in section 3 some of the major characteristics
relating to issues of centralisation in European schemes of social assistance are summarised and a set of indicators suitable for operationalising these features for quantitative analysis is introduced. Employing these indicators as input variables, several cluster analyses are conducted to classify the European schemes of social assistance according to their similarity with respect to aspects of centralisation, and an indicator of centralisation is developed by means of multidimensional scaling techniques. In section 4, after defining and explaining the concepts of distributive effectiveness and efficiency, an empirical analysis of the impact of social assistance benefits on income poverty in five selected EU countries is presented. On the basis of Luxembourg Income Study data the effectiveness and efficiency in reducing poverty are calculated for various measures of poverty. In section 5, the linkage between the differences in centralisation and the distributive outcomes is investigated, and the hypotheses presented in section 2 are discussed in the light of these results.

2 Poverty Reduction and the Degree of Centralisation: Some Hypotheses

In socio-economic literature, the differences in distributive effectiveness and efficiency of social transfer systems found in empirical investigations have been discussed at length and various arguments have been put forward with respect to their possible causes. With regard to the special case of social assistance, there are important differences between countries in the way they organise the administration and deliver social assistance benefits. These differences concern the degree of centralisation, the extent of family obligations, the toughness of means-testing and the extent to which
benefits are a legal entitlement (Eardley et al., 1996a). In the present paper, we focus on the relationship of the distributive impacts and the degree of centralisation in systems of social assistance.

Concerning the issue of centralised versus decentralised systems, as an argument in favour of decentralised systems, the point has been made that because of informational asymmetries, decentralised systems are more efficient in allocating benefits to those in need (Schwager, 1996, 1997). In order to allocate benefits efficiently, the legal authority must be able to distinguish between the poor and the less poor applicants. For this purpose, knowledge of individual characteristics of single cases is necessary. It is natural to assume that local authorities are better informed which citizens are truly in need and are more familiar with social control mechanisms within the community than the central state, even if the central government sends employees on the location in order to collect the information required. Especially in the presence of means tests, which are common in systems of social assistance, a lower degree of centralisation should therefore enable a better directed allocation of benefits to those in need. Accordingly, poverty reduction should be accomplished more efficiently in more decentralised systems.

Conversely, it has been argued that decentralised decisions on social security programs can cause problems because of a migration externality (Oates, 1968, 1972; Pauly, 1973; Wildasin, 1991, 1994): a local authority granting higher benefit levels than other authorities tends to attract benefit recipients from other regions. This leads to a reduction of tax burdens in those other regions and an overburdening of the more
generous region’s fiscal budget, which in turn will eventually force it to cut benefit levels as well. Because of this migration externality, the degree of redistribution will be inefficiently low when judged from a welfare theoretical perspective. The hypothesis is thus that more centralised systems are more effective with regard to redistribution. In addition, more decentralised systems, especially when combined with notable discretionary powers of local authorities, may produce higher levels of stigma for social assistance applicants. This, in turn, may cause reduced take-up of social assistance by eligible people, thereby reducing the system’s effectiveness in the amelioration of poverty (Eardley et al. 1996a, Ditch et al. 1997). Finally, the point has been made that more centralised systems produce more favourable results for socially disadvantaged groups since they are more likely to withstand the opposition of the better-off lobby groups (Bryson, 1994).

In summary, from the arguments just presented there are two sets of hypotheses that ought to be examined with regard to the relationship of redistribution and the degree of centralisation: the first concerns the issue whether more centralised systems concur with more redistribution, whereas the second relates to the hypothesis that more decentralised systems are more efficient in redistribution.

3 European Schemes of Social Assistance and Their Degree of Centralisation

3.1 Features of Centralisation in EU Social Assistance Schemes
To examine the relationship between distributive impacts and the degree of centralisation, we develop a system of classification suitable for grouping the systems into several classes according to specific features relating to centralisation. While in socio-economic literature several attempts have been made to classify welfare states in general (Esping-Anderson, 1990; Korpi and Palme, 1998; Castles and Mitchell, 1992; Kangas, 1994), only a few studies focused on the systems of social assistance specifically, the most notable being Gough et al. (1997). To our knowledge, however, no study has employed quantitative methods for the development of classifications nor did any investigation focus on attributes relating to centralisation.

To form the basis for an empirical investigation of the hypotheses mentioned above, the administrative settings, regulations concerning funding liabilities, and decision responsibilities of the European schemes of social assistance in the EU15 countries except for Luxembourg, which had to be excluded for reasons of data availability, are investigated. Drawing on Eardley et al. (1996a, 1996b) and Gough et al. (1997), the main characteristics of the schemes investigated may be briefly summarised as follows (all information refers to the reporting year of 1995).

In Austria, social assistance is the sole responsibility of the provinces. Rules of eligibility as well as benefit levels vary across them. In general, there are no uniform procedures, and granting of claims is highly discretionary. District authorities have further discretionary power: even if there are provincial regulations, these rules tend to provide only a broad framework within which district authorities are free to operate.
There are no national benefit rates, but due to provincial settings there are nine different benefit levels.

In Belgium, funding of social assistance is provided half by national tax revenue and half by the municipalities. All minimum benefits have a national statutory framework. However, in some cases financial pressure on the poorer local authorities with the highest number of claimants has resulted in geographical inequalities in the treatment of applicants.

In Denmark the overall policy responsibility for social assistance lies with the central government. It is administrated by the municipalities which have to operate within the guidelines set by the central government. Rates of social assistance have been fixed nationally. Municipalities retain an important element of discretion concerning specific one-off expenditure payments, but discretion has been reduced steadily with an increasing number of central directives on eligibility and benefit levels.

In Finland, social assistance is administrated by municipal offices within general guidelines for conditions of eligibility set by the central government. Since the early 1990s, pressure from increasing unemployment has led to the abolition of many of the normative directives, leading to greater municipal discretion and increasing variation of treatment. As a result, in some locations there are more rigid enforcement and compliance procedures. Benefit levels are set nationally for two geographical categories according to cost of living, which differed by 4.4 percent in 1993.
In France, the principal assistance benefit for people of working age, the “Revenu Minimum d’Insertion” (RMI), is nationally regulated and mostly funded from the central state. Supplementary benefits for invalids etc. which are partly financed by contributions are delivered by local authorities. Theoretically benefits are not subject to administrative discretion and there is no variation in the amounts paid between the regions with the exception of overseas departments.

In Germany, social assistance is funded to 75 percent by municipalities and to 25 percent by the central government. Policy responsibility is held at the federal level, but the implementation is delegated to the Länder. Those in turn can delegate part of the administration to the district and municipal authorities, who have some discretionary powers. Benefit rates are set by the Länder within a narrow band fixed by federal law.

In Greece, there is no general, comprehensive scheme of social assistance but rather a number of categorical social assistance type provisions, which are characterised by fragmentation. There is no set of common criteria applying to the provision of benefits. Policy responsibility for most of the schemes is exercised at a central level. Implementation is exercised at a regional level by the Prefectures.

In Ireland, national regulations set by the central government apply to all social assistance schemes, although local authorities have a limited degree of discretionary power. Rates of payments are set nationally by parliamentary decisions.
In Italy, there is no national system of social assistance, but only particular national means-tested programs for older and disabled people, coupled with local assistance schemes. The regions are permitted but not required to establish general frameworks for social assistance, and the extent to which they do varies markedly. Almost all benefits are administrated locally and there are substantial variations between regions.

In the Netherlands, social assistance is funded to 80 percent by the central government. Regulations are set nationally, and policy responsibility is held by the central state. Administration is on a municipal basis exercised by social welfare departments. Benefits are standard national rates linked to the net minimum wage. New legislation that gives greater discretion came into effect in 1996.

In Portugal, no general system of social assistance existed in 1995. Instead, there are certain categorical benefits that resemble what is generally accepted to be social assistance (e.g. for invalids, elderly and orphans). For these categorical benefits, all rates are set nationally and administration is carried out by regional authorities.

In Spain, apart from a number of categorical benefits for specific groups (unemployed, elderly, invalids) there is a general minimum income scheme which is available to people of working age but is implemented in different ways by different regions. Regions set their own social assistance levels and benefit rates vary substantially between them.
In **Sweden**, most of the expenditures on social assistance is funded by local authorities. Social assistance is a general right to support, but the scheme is administered at a local level. Guidelines for the conditions of entitlement are set by the central government, but the responsibility for the interpretation and delivery of benefits remains with the municipality. There are nationally recommended standard rates, but actual rates may be quite different in different areas.

In the **UK**, social assistance is an integrated, nationally funded scheme with common rules of eligibility and common levels of payments. The basic framework of social assistance is regulated by national law. The administration is largely carried out by the central government and through the Benefits Agency (BA) via its district offices. There is no discretionary of geographical variation in normal benefit rates in the UK.

### 3.2 A Classification of EU Social Assistance Schemes According to Centralisation

From the characterisation above it may be inferred that the main differences relate to the funding shares of the various federal levels, the assignment of formal decision competencies and the degree of uniformity of benefit levels over the nation state. Accordingly, using data from MISSOC (1995) and Eardley et al. (1996b), for the purpose of investigation we introduce a set of three indicators designed to depict the following features of social assistance schemes relating to centralisation:¹
An indicator for funding liabilities: This indicator is designed to capture the degree to which social assistance expenditures are financed by the central government, by regional authorities or federal states, or by the local authorities.

An indicator for formal decision responsibilities: This indicator is constructed on the basis of information on the federal level at which basic-rate benefits are established (central government, federal states or regional authorities, local authorities).

An indicator for regional differences in benefit levels: This indicator is designed to account for the degree to which benefit levels actually vary between regions.

It should be noted that in the list of these indicators one important dimension relating to the degree of centralisation is not directly considered: no account is taken of the extent of discretionary powers of local authorities in the application of social assistance guidelines. While direct consideration of this dimension would be highly desirable, no sensible operationalisation in the form of a quantitative indicator seems to be possible.

In considering the actual regional variation of benefits levels, at least some of the possible effects are taken into account.

In establishing classifications of welfare systems, quantitative methods have rarely been employed. This is mainly due to the fact that statistical inference is impeded by the small number of observations that do not permit any sensible regression analysis. Instead, several heuristic and semi-quantitative investigations have been conducted. However, with all purely qualitative assessments there is the danger of misjudging class assignments by overvaluing highly conspicuous features on the cost of less obtrusive traits. A quantitative analysis of class assignments is therefore highly desirable.
As Kangas (1994) and Gough (2001) have suggested, cluster analysis may be the method of choice to determine class assignments in cases where regression analysis must be ruled out for lack of observations. Cluster analysis is a descriptive instrument of explorative data analysis designed to identify "natural groupings" of cases by simultaneously comparing multiple characteristics depicted by a set of input variables (Johnson and Wichern, 2002). To this end, measures of distances for the values of the input variables are computed. Subsequently, grouping algorithms are employed to classify the cases into groups. Basically, hierarchical and partitioning algorithms may be distinguished. **Hierarchical clustering methods** proceed by a series of successive mergers, starting with individual objects and grouping them according to their similarities.\(^2\) **Partitioning clustering methods** start from an initial partition of cases into groups and subsequently reassign the cases on the basis of their distance to cluster means.

While the results of partitioning cluster analyses are commonly reported by means of a cluster assignment table, the results of hierarchical cluster analyses can best be graphically displayed by so-called dendrograms (Johnson and Wichern, 2002). In those tree diagrams, the clusters are represented by branches that merge together when junctions of clusters occur. The positions of these mergers along the distance axis indicate the level of the aggregate distance measure at which the cases are grouped together: Mergers close to the left-hand side of the diagram indicate that the respective countries are very similar, whereas mergers close to the right point to considerable dissimilarities. Accordingly, with respect to the case list on the left hand side of the diagram cases are listed according to their similarity: Countries exhibiting very similar
characteristics are listed close to each other, whereas more differing countries are listed further apart. Consequently, from the successive junctions of the branches, groupings and sub-groupings exhibiting different levels of homogeneity may be identified.

As cluster analysis is a tool of descriptive statistics, sources of error and variation are not formally considered. To check for the stability of the results, various clustering methods based on different distance measures and grouping algorithms should be conducted. In the present investigation, average linkage, Ward linkage and median linkage with quadratic Euclidean distances as well as average linkage with Minkowski(1) distances are run. Additionally, the partitioning k-means clustering was run to identify three, four and five clusters respectively. Since in cluster analysis different scales of measurement may greatly affect the results, all variables are normalised to the range of [0;1]. The analyses are conducted for the EU15 countries with the exception of Luxembourg who had to be excluded for reasons of data availability. As the reporting year, also for reasons of data availability with respect to the complementary empirical investigation presented in section 4 the year 1995 is chosen.

Figure 1 shows the dendrogram resulting when the Ward linkage is applied.
With respect to their degree of centralisation we may distinguish three broad categories of systems (apart from Greece and Portugal, where no nationwide system of social assistance existed in the reporting year 1995):

- The first group showing a comparatively high degree of decentralisation comprises Germany, Sweden, Spain, Italy and Austria. In these countries, benefits are funded by municipalities, benefit levels are established by regional or local authorities and vary across regions.
- In the second group, we find Belgium, Denmark, France and Finland. In these countries, benefit levels are set by the central government and are largely uniform across regions. Funding, however, is provided by regional or local authorities.
- The third group, which features the highest degree of centralisation, consists of Ireland, the United Kingdom, closely followed by the Netherlands. In these countries, benefit levels are established by the central government and are absolutely uniform across regions. In addition, benefits are funded (almost) completely by the central state.

Apart from a few minor changes of position within the first group, the obtained classifications prove valid for all clustering methods employed.

For k-means clustering, again a pre-determined number of three, four and five clusters are chosen. The results are given in table 1 below:

< place table 1 here >
With three clusters predetermined, we find the exact three major groups obtained by the hierarchical clustering approach described above. With four clusters predetermined, the second cluster is split in two subgroups comprising Spain, Italy and Austria, and Germany and Sweden, respectively. Finally, with five clusters predetermined two subgroups are identified within the group of comparatively centralised countries, corresponding to the subgroups obtained by the hierarchical clustering approach.

3.3 An Indicator of Centralisation for EU Social Assistance Schemes

The clear-cut results obtained by the cluster analyses suggest that an attempt may be justified to construct an indicator of centralisation by employing the above mentioned variables as an input for methods of multidimensional scaling (MDS). The primary objective of MDS is to project the original multidimensional data into a co-ordinate system of less dimensions, such that any distortion through the reduction in dimensionality is minimised. Specifically, MDS techniques deal with the problem of finding a representation of the $N$ cases investigated in few dimensions for a set of observed distances between every pair of the cases, such that the inter-item proximities match the original distances as closely as possible. If the actual magnitudes of the original distances are used to obtain the lower dimensional representation, the method is called **metric MDS**. In the case of ordinal data it is also possible to arrange the $N$ cases using only the rank orders of the original distances but not their magnitudes. This method is referred to as **non-metric MDS**.
MDS techniques are calculated by various methods of algorithms that differ with respect to the distance measures employed and the loss function to be minimised. The loss function is defined with respect to a numerical measure of closeness to the original distances, which is called STRESS (STandardised REsidual Sum of Squares). Several measures relating to STRESS were proposed that differ mainly with respect to the manner deviations of proximities and original distances are introduced. The most common measures are STRESS(1) and STRESS(2) as defined by Kruskal and SSTRESS as defined by Takane, Young et al. In general, STRESS values below 0.05 are considered as a good, values below 0.025 as an excellent goodness of fit.

For the present investigation, since part of the variables cannot be considered as metric in a strict sense, non-metric MDS is employed. Results are calculated by means of two different algorithms, ALSCAL and PROXSCAL, and in each case two different measures of distance, Euclidean distance and Minkowski(1) distance are used. Since MDS is chosen for the purpose of developing an indicator of centralisation, a reduction of dimensionality to one dimension is predetermined. The results of the four MDS techniques employed are listed in table 2 below:

<place table 2 here>

As can be seen in table 2, the results of the MDS analyses correspond to the classification obtained by the cluster analyses described above. In all cases, the STRESS figures obtained indicate a good to excellent goodness of fit.
The figures given in table 2 show the highest degree of centralisation for Ireland and the UK, followed closely by the Netherlands. In the upper middle group with a notable distance we find Belgium, Denmark, France and Finland which also constitute a separate group in the results of cluster analyses, followed by Germany, Sweden, Austria, Italy and Spain. Finally, Greece and Portugal with no nationwide system of social assistance in 1995 are listed at the bottom of the scale. With the exception of a single shift in rank orders between Belgium and Denmark/France in the ALSCAL-Minkowski(1) scale, all scales exhibit identical ranking of the systems.

4 Impacts of Social Assistance Payments on Poverty: Empirical Analysis

4.1 Analysis of Poverty Reduction: Effectiveness and Efficiency

We now turn to the empirical analysis of poverty reduction through social assistance payments. When analysing impacts of social transfers on poverty, the investigation is often limited to measuring the poverty of post-transfer income distributions. As Castles and Mitchell (1992) have pointed out, this approach does not do justice to the problem of assessing the effectiveness of social transfers with respect to poverty reduction. Especially when pre-transfer poverty varies greatly, a mere comparison of post-transfer poverty may yield a badly misleading image, as post-transfer poverty tells nothing about the magnitude by which the initial poverty has been reduced. Rather, the initial, pre-transfer poverty must be taken into account. As a consequence, the appropriate measure for assessing the effectiveness of poverty reduction is the percentage reduction of the
poverty measure considered due to the payment of social assistance benefits, which is commonly referred to as the redistribution effect.

Effectiveness, however, is only one relevant dimension when comparing poverty reduction across social transfer systems in different countries. As a rule, we observe that the shares of social assistance expenditures in GDP vary substantially between the countries considered. Poverty reduction should therefore be judged in the light of the total amount of expenditure spent in social transfers, an issue relating to the notion of distributive efficiency. A commonly adopted approach to measure efficiency in this context has been suggested by Beckerman (1979a, 1979b). This approach is based on the aggregate poverty gap, which is the sum of the individual income shortfalls from the poverty line, and is thus limited to one poverty measure. As we want to enlarge our investigation to different measures of poverty which are often used in poverty analysis we suggest a set of measures of distributive efficiency that are constructed as follows. Dividing the redistribution effect of the respective poverty measure by the share of social assistance expenditure in GDP, we obtain a measure of distributive efficiency that expresses the amount of poverty reduction achieved by investing one percent of GDP in social assistance expenditure.¹⁰

One issue of interpretation concerning the idea of efficiency in the present context should be noted. Analysis of distributive efficiency deals with the question which income groups are beneficiaries of the social transfer payments. Distributive efficiency must therefore be distinguished from administrative efficiency, which deals with the question which share of the transfers actually reaches the recipients, rather than getting
lost in the administrative process. Likewise, distributive efficiency has to be distinguished from allocative efficiency. In the latter case, adverse effects of social transfers on labour supply, savings behaviour and the trade off between equality and efficiency in general are the main areas of concern. We caution that distributive efficiency is an efficiency measure in the classical sense of relating outcome (poverty reduction) to input (social assistance expenditures) and tells nothing about the quality of social assistance schemes with respect to Pareto efficiency or other welfare economic concepts.

4.2 Data and Methodological Issues

The impact of social assistance benefits on poverty in selected European countries are analysed on the basis of Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) data. The LIS database is a collection of harmonised household income surveys which permit comparative studies for different countries. The LIS data set used is wave IV which refers to 1994/95. For these years, the usable data refer to France, Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom and Finland.

The relevant definition for disposable income (dpi) used here is the yearly disposable income as defined by LIS, net of pensions. Furthermore, we apply the concept of equivalent household income. This concept makes it possible to compare households of different sizes by dividing household income by the equivalent number of household members which is calculated applying an equivalence scale. Thus, economies of scale due to fixed costs in household consumption are taken into account.
The notion of poverty has manifold faces and can be captured by different concepts. We limit our analysis to a relative definition of income poverty: a unit of analysis is poor if its income lies below a certain percentage of median adjusted disposable income. We apply a poverty threshold of 50 percent of median equivalent income (referred to as median in the following) which is commonly used in empirical research. As this percentage of the median is a relatively arbitrary choice, for comparison we also apply an additional poverty line of 60 percent of the median to check for the stability of the results. The following discussion of the results refers to the poverty threshold of 50 percent of the median; the results for the 60 percent of the median threshold are mentioned only if the resulting rank order of countries is affected.

When capturing poverty, two different aspects are of interest: first the incidence and second the intensity of poverty. The incidence of poverty deals with the question how many poor we find in a population, whereas the intensity of poverty points out how far the income of the poor is below the minimum threshold for the particular society.

As has been noted throughout the literature, different measures of poverty may assess a given income distribution differently. Accordingly, in order to obtain a reasonable picture, four different poverty measures are applied. Most common is the headcount ratio which is a measure of the incidence of poverty as it gives the share of poor in the considered population. The headcount ratio is reported for the sake of completeness because it is the most popular measure of poverty. However, we caution that this measure is of limited value when judging the impacts of benefits on poverty alleviation
since it does not evaluate the extent to which incomes fall below the poverty line in the pre- and post-transfer situation. This aspect is taken into account by the three other measures used, the poverty gap ratio (PGR), the measure FGT2 and the Sen index of poverty, which focus on the intensity of poverty. The PGR is based on the aggregate poverty gap which is the sum of the individual income shortfalls from the poverty line. The PGR gives the ratio of the actual aggregate poverty gap of the analysed income distribution and the maximum aggregate poverty gap that would result if all incomes were zero. The third measure employed is FGT2 which implies a higher sensitivity to high poverty gaps than the other mentioned measures as it gives the average squared normalised poverty gap.\textsuperscript{19} Finally, the poverty index of Sen (1976) is applied. It captures not only the incidence and intensity but also the inequality of the income distribution of the poor.

To take differences in social assistance budgets into account, apart from the redistribution effect as a measure of effectiveness the corresponding figures for distributive efficiency as defined in section 4.1 are calculated. Unfortunately, reliable data on social assistance expenditures suitable for inter-country comparisons are unavailable for the reporting year of 1995.\textsuperscript{20} Accordingly, data provided by Gough et al. (1997) referring to the reporting year of 1992 are employed. Consequently, we caution that the efficiency figures calculated are not to be taken as an exact measure of distributive efficiency but rather as an indicator variable that points to the relative efficiency of the social assistance schemes considered.
In most countries, housing benefits are granted as a supplement to social assistance payments. However, since the degree of integration of housing benefits with social assistance as well as housing costs varies across countries, excluding housing benefits from the analysis may distort comparisons (Gough et al., 1997: 20). Accordingly, to complete the picture, impacts on poverty of social assistance plus housing benefits are also calculated for the poverty line of 50 percent of the median and compared to the results obtained for social assistance payments alone.

4.3 Results on Distributive Effectiveness and Efficiency

To analyse the impact of social assistance on poverty, the four measures presented above are calculated for disposable income and disposable income less social assistance\(^{21}\) for each country. As we intend to investigate the influence of social assistance on poverty, we apply the poverty line calculated for disposable income also for disposable income less social assistance. In order to compare the effects of social assistance in the different countries, the percentage reduction of the values of the applied measures for disposable income less social assistance to disposable income is computed. The results obtained are shown in figure 2 a to 2 d:

\[< \text{place Figure 2 a and 2 b here}>\]

\[< \text{place Figure 2 c and 2 d here}>\]
The diagrams show that in the UK social assistance has clearly the strongest impact on poverty values for all measures investigated. The rank positions of the other countries depend on the poverty measure applied: the PGR, FGT2 and the Sen index all give an unambiguous ranking with Germany showing the second highest reduction numbers, followed by France, Finland and last Italy. The headcount ratio gives a different picture with Finland on the second best place followed by Germany, France and Italy. Since the headcount ratio is the only measure that takes into account merely the incidence but not the intensity of poverty, it may be inferred from these results that the French and German systems are more effective in the reduction of intense poverty than the Finish system.

The results described above take only account of the percentage reduction of poverty after social assistance. They neglect the fact that this poverty reduction is obtained at different expenditure levels for this transfer. Changing the focus from distributive effectiveness to efficiency of social assistance by dividing the percentage reduction as defined above by the share of social assistance expenditures in GDP, we obtain the results displayed in figure 3 a to 3 d:

< place Figure 3 a and 3 b here >

< place Figure 3 c and 3 d here >

We find that taking the social assistance budget into account considerably changes the rank positions of the countries, depending on the measure applied.
The PGR, FGT2 and the Sen index yield quite similar results. France, who took the third position with respect to effectiveness performs best for efficiency which reflects its low expenditures for social assistance. Germany holds the fourth, Italy the last position. The second rank is held by Finland followed the UK for the PGR and the Sen index, FGT2 places the UK on second position and Finland on third. However, we caution that the efficiency numbers for Finland, the UK and Germany are close together for all of these three measures. For the sake of completeness, we add that efficiency calculations based on the headcount ratio show different ranks for the countries: in this case, Finland clearly performs best, while France, who holds the best position for the other applied measures, has the second best result followed by the UK, Germany and Italy. As in the case of effectiveness, the vastly diverging results for Finland (top position with headcount ratio, third position with FGT2) leads one to suppose that the Finish system places more importance to reducing poverty incidence than e.g. the French system.

When applying the alternative poverty line of 60 percent of the median, we find different results for FGT2 and the headcount ratio. The results for FGT2 show interchanged rank positions of Finland (second best now) and the UK who falls back to the third place when compared with results for the 50 percent median poverty line. With respect to the headcount ratio Italy and Germany switch places which means that Germany is least efficient when judged with reference to the 60 percent of median threshold. These variations in the rank orders are quite understandable, since the efficiency numbers calculated with a threshold of half of the median are also quite close together for these countries.
To summarise, it is clear that when taking the size of the social assistance budget into account, the distributive impacts yield a very different picture. In particular, considering the UK, the impressive results with respect to effectiveness cannot compensate for the comparatively high social assistance budget. By contrast, especially the French system with its lower expenditures for social assistance improves its position when compared to the calculations for effectiveness. Germany cannot hold its second position for efficiency and falls back on the fourth rank. Finland’s performance strongly depends on the measure applied: as in the case of effectiveness results for the headcount ratio are considerably better than the figures obtained for PGR, FGT2 and the Sen Index. With regard to Italy, efficiency figures are the lowest with all measures except for the headcount ratio with a poverty line of 60 percent of the median, pointing to the fact that the low level of social expenditure cannot compensate for the weak results in distributive effectiveness.

The results of the calculations carried out for social assistance with and without housing benefits\textsuperscript{23} are shown in direct comparison in table 3 and 4.

\begin{center}
< place Table 3 here >
\end{center}

\begin{center}
< place Table 4 here >
\end{center}

As expected, the effectiveness figures are generally higher because an additional transfer is included in the present calculations. With regard to the rank order, the only change observable is the switching of positions of France and Germany for all measures
applied.\textsuperscript{24} This is probably due to the considerable difference in recipient numbers for these benefits in the two countries: while in France 8.8 percent of the population receive housing benefits and 1.1 percent social assistance benefits, in Germany 2.8 percent are recipients of housing benefits and 4.5 percent receive social assistance (Eardley et al., 1996a). Consequently, effectiveness figures in France are improved a lot more by adding housing benefits than this is the case for Germany.

Considering the results for distributive efficiency, rank positions remain unchanged in comparison to the case without housing benefits for the headcount ratio, the PGR and the Sen index. By contrast, with respect to FGT2, the UK and Germany change places. The better performance in efficiency of Germany may be explained by the low additional expenditures for housing assistance, especially when comparing them to the costs for housing benefits in the UK, whose expenditures are six times as high as those in Germany. But we also have to remark, that the efficiency numbers for the UK and Germany do not differ greatly. France can clearly hold the top position for all applied measures.

To summarise, the effectiveness and efficiency indicators based on FGT2, the poverty gap ratio and the Sen index yield quite similar rankings of the countries considered. The most remarkable differences appear for the headcount ratio, which only records if someone is poor or not independently of the severity of poverty. Thus, it is a very simple measure which does not register if a poor receives social assistance but stays under the poverty line despite he or she could improve his/her situation. The other
applied measures all include these differences and are therefore more appropriate to reflect the situation of the poor in a society.

5 Reduction of Poverty and the Degree of Centralisation: An Evaluation

The results just presented offer some interesting evidence with respect to the hypotheses on the relationship between the degree of centralisation of social assistance schemes and their impact on poverty alleviation. Let us first turn to the relationship between centralisation and the extent to which redistribution occurs. The relevant figure is the percentage reduction of initial poverty by means of social assistance, i.e. the effectiveness of redistribution. As the figures in table 3 show, the rank order for all effectiveness measures with the exception of the headcount ratio is UK, Germany, France, Finland and Italy, with the UK achieving the highest and Italy the lowest effectiveness. When comparing these results to the conclusions drawn from the cluster analyses and MDS, the following picture appears. The UK, who has clearly the most centralised system within the five countries considered here, also achieves the highest figure with regard to effectiveness. Conversely, Italy, who has the most decentralised system, just as clearly exhibits the lowest effectiveness. The remaining countries are listed quite closely together in the MDS scales, while in cluster analyses Germany is found in a more decentralised group than Finland and France. Accordingly, with respect to the hypothesis to be examined there is some evidence that extremely centralised countries are more effective with regard to redistribution than extremely decentralised countries. However, for systems with a medium degree of centralisation (Germany, Finland, and France), the results do not seem to support the hypothesis that greater
centralisation leads to more effectiveness, since Germany, who has the most
decentralised system of the three, has clearly the highest effectiveness figures for all
measures except for the headcount ratio.

Concerning efficiency, the picture is more complicated. It may be stated that with all
measures except for the headcount ratio with a poverty line of 60 percent of the median,
the most decentralised system Italy takes the last position in the efficiency ranking. Two
countries with a medium degree of centralisation, Finland and France seem to do better
with regard to efficiency than either extremely centralised or extremely decentralised
systems. This applies for all measures except for FGT2, where the extremely centralised
system of the UK performs better than Finland. Moreover, comparing France with the
more decentralised German system, with all measures investigated the French system
performs more efficiently than the German system. Accordingly, no support seems lent
to the hypothesis that a higher degree of decentralisation is accompanied by a better
distributive efficiency. Rather, the results seem to suggest that systems with a medium
degree of decentralisation do better with regard to efficiency than either extremely
centralised or extremely decentralised systems.

A different picture with regard to effectiveness and efficiency might result if additional
means-tested transfers as included in Eardley’s category 2 (categorical assistance) were
considered. To investigate possible changes we calculate the effectiveness and
efficiency figures of one of the most important category 2 transfers, means-tested
unemployment assistance. Data on these transfers are available in the LIS dataset for
Finland and Germany. The calculations show that effectiveness and efficiency of
unemployment assistance are higher in Germany for all poverty measures except for the headcount ratio. When comparing these findings with the results on social assistance we find that for unemployment assistance the rank order is the same for all measures of effectiveness. With respect to efficiency, however, for unemployment assistance Germany surpasses Finland as a result of its lower expenditure level. So we caution that including categorical means-tested benefits might yield a different picture.

We also wish to caution that in interpreting these results it must be borne in mind that there are other differences in the set-up of the social assistance schemes which may influence their effectiveness and efficiency in redistribution. In particular, differences in regulations concerning degrees of coverage, conditions for eligibility and the like may cause differences in redistributive effects that are only indirectly related to the degree of centralisation, if at all.

6 Conclusion

In this paper, the linkage between social assistance arrangements in the European Union, their degree of centralisation and poverty effectiveness and efficiency was examined. After presenting some prominent hypotheses on this relationship and briefly summarising the main aspects relating to centralisation in European schemes of social assistance, a set of indicators was introduced for the purpose of operationalising characteristics of centralisation for quantitative analyses. Subsequently, to classify the European schemes of social assistance according to their degree of centralisation, these
indicators were used as input variables in several methods of cluster analyses and multidimensional scaling. By means of cluster analyses, we identified three broad categories of countries exhibiting a high, medium and comparatively low degree of centralisation, respectively. Apart from Greece and Portugal, where no nationwide system of social assistance existed in 1995, UK, Ireland and the Netherlands were classified as highly centralised, Belgium, Denmark, France and Finland as medium centralised and the remaining countries as comparatively highly decentralised. Employing the indicators as input variables for multidimensional scaling, a scaling of countries according to their degree of centralisation was developed that concurs with the classification obtained through cluster analyses.

Subsequently, for five selected European countries an empirical analysis of poverty effectiveness and efficiency using several measures of poverty was carried out. Concerning effectiveness, the results showed the highest influence of social assistance for the UK, whereas the Italian social assistance scheme does not perform well in reducing poverty. When taking the expenditures for social assistance benefits into account, we observe a different picture: the UK falls back to the third position for most of the poverty measures applied. Italy remains on one of the last positions, whereas France occupies the top position for three out of four poverty measures now. If housing benefits are included, France can also hold its first place for efficiency despite of the comparably high budget for housing benefits.

Finally, in the light of the results from classifications and empirical analysis the relationship between the systems’ degree of centralisation and their success in
alleviating poverty was evaluated. Concerning effectiveness in poverty alleviation, the results provide some evidence that extremely centralised systems are more effective with regard to redistribution than extremely decentralised schemes. However, for systems with a medium degree of centralisation, the hypothesis that greater decentralisation leads to more effectiveness is not supported. With respect to efficiency, no support is lent to the hypothesis that a higher degree of decentralisation is accompanied by a better distributive efficiency. Rather, the results seem to suggest that systems with a medium degree of decentralisation do better than either extremely centralised or extremely decentralised systems.

We have to remark here that there are other goals of social assistance schemes besides reducing poverty. One other important objective is reducing inequality. The issue of social exclusion is perhaps even more important as it is related to the presence of long-term unemployment, welfare dependency and increasing social division. When interpreting results on redistributive effectiveness and efficiency, a complementary investigation of social mobility and social exclusion is therefore highly desirable.
Appendix A: Indicators for Classification According to Degree of Centralisation

The following indicators are used as input variables for the cluster analyses concerning the degree of centralisation:

1. An indicator for funding liability:
   This indicator captures the degree to which social assistance expenditures are financed by the central government, by regional authorities/federal state or by local authorities. For this purpose, three partial indicators are constructed that recorded the percentage to which expenditures are funded by the central government (I1), by regional authorities/federal states (I2) or by local authorities (I3). The overall indicator (I) is calculated according to the formula $I = (3*I_1 + 2*I_2 + I_3)/6$.

2. An indicator for formal decision responsibility:
   This indicator reflects the federal level (central government, federal states or regional authorities, local authorities) at which basic-rate benefits are established. Using information from MISSOC (1995), countries are classified into five categories and assigned the integer values 1 to 5, depending on whether there was no nation wide system at all (1) or regular benefit levels were established by local authorities (2), regional authorities or federal states (3), local or regional authorities were bounded through nationwide coordination (4) or benefit levels were established by the central government (5).
3. **An indicator for regional differences in benefit levels:**

   This indicator captures the degree to which benefit levels actually vary between regions. Data on the percentage variation are given in MISSOC (1995) for all countries with the exception of Finland and Sweden, where benefit levels differ regionally according to costs of living. For these two countries, data refer to the information given in Eardley et al. 1996b.

   The values of the indicator variables, normalised to \([0,1]\), are given in the table below. Countries are listed in descending order.

   < place table A1 here >
Appendix B: Results for Poverty Line 60 Percent of Median

<place Table B1 here>

<place Table B2 here>
Appendix C: Results for unemployment assistance

<place Table C1 here>
References


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1 For further details on the indicators we refer to Appendix A.

2 Strictly speaking, this only applies for the so-called agglomerative hierarchical clustering methods. The less common divisive methods proceed by starting from a single group and successively assigning the cases to subgroups according to their dissimilarity.

3 For technical details on these measures, see Johnson/Wichern (2002).
Since the Ward algorithm is based on the presence of differences in variances, which are cancelled out by the more common z-standardisation, the [0;1] standardisation is preferred.

Cf. Johnson/Wichern (2002). This variant of MDS is also known as principal component analysis.

For a formal definition of these measures we refer to Johnson/Wichern (2002).

Results for metric MDS have also been calculated as an experiment for comparison. While different absolute values of the indicator resulted, rank orders obtained by nonmetric MDS proved stable in the case of metric MDS as well.


Cf. e.g. Morris/Preston (1986), EUROSTAT/European Commission (2000) and EUROSTAT (2000a, 2000b) where poverty measures were calculated for post-transfer income.

More specifically, the figure obtained is a measure of average efficiency. Of course, for issues of interpretation the possibility must be considered that poverty reduction may be subject to increasing marginal costs.

For more information on the LIS data see http://www.lisproject.org and e.g. Smeeding (2002).

The equivalence scale employed here is the square root of the household size. Cf. e.g. Buhmann et al. (1988), Biewen (2000: 3f.), Atkinson/Rainwater/Smeeding (1995: 18ff.) for further information on equivalence scales.

For concepts of poverty see e.g. Scheurle (1991) or Förster (1994) and for more information about other possibilities of defining a poverty line see e.g. Hagenaars (1986).

See e.g. Förster (2000: 66) or Krämer (1997: 12) who state that 50 percent of median is a standard threshold.

This poverty line is used by EUROSTAT, see e.g. EUROSTAT (2000b).

The detailed results for the poverty line of 60 percent of the median are included in Appendix B.

For more information about the measures applied see e.g. Foster et al. (1984), Seidl (1988) or Hagenaars (1986).

FGT2 is a special case of the Foster/Greer/Thorbecke family of measures which is characterised by a parameter $\alpha$ that indicates the sensitivity in the lowest income regions: $\alpha=0$ is the headcount ratio, $\alpha=1$ is the PGR and $\alpha=2$ indicates the highest sensibility in the lowest income regions of these three measures.

Data provided by regularly published EUROSTAT statistics do not include the category of social assistance as defined by MISSOC, but only a subcategory named „social exclusion“ which is not congruent with the notion of social assistance used here. In MISSOC, by contrast, data on social assistance expenditure are unavailable for Italy, while for some of the remaining countries only estimates referring to different reporting years are provided.
Social assistance is represented by the LIS variable v25s1 which corresponds to general social assistance as defined by the first Eardley category described in the Introduction except for Italy and Germany where the category ‘other tied assistance’ is also included in the variable. In France there are included the RMI (first Eardley category) plus cash benefits of the ‘aide sociale’ which cannot be separated from the RMI.

As noted above, as suitable data on social assistance expenditures are unavailable for the reporting year of 1995, the data provided by Gough et al. (1997) referring to the reporting year of 1992 had to be employed. Specifically, the data provided under the category [1]: General assistance in Gough et al. (1997) were employed for calculations on social assistance alone with the exception of Italy and Germany where we also had to include category [4]: Other tied assistance. For calculations including housing benefits expenditures listed in category [3]: Housing assistance were added. Cf. Gough et al. (1997: 25). We have to note here that the French expenditures given for the first category correspond to the RMI and not to ‘aide sociale’ which is also included in our variable. This leads to a slight overestimation of the French efficiency figures which might not be serious as the ‘aide sociale’ consists rather of benefits in kind and services (which are not included in the variable) as of cash benefits (which are included) (Eardley et al., 1996b: 145).

This means that the effectiveness and efficiency figures are calculated on the basis of disposable income less the sum of social assistance and housing benefits and the expenditure figures for social assistance and housing benefits as indicated in table 3 and 4.
Unfortunately, data on the budget for housing benefits are not available for Finland. If they were available and included, it is likely that the ranking for efficiency would differ a little bit from the one we present here.

Detailed figures are given in Appendix C.

Since no data on unemployment assistance expenditure for Finland are included in Gough et al. (1997), in calculating the efficiency figures expenditure data from EUROSTAT (2003) have been used (in Finland, no means-tested unemployment assistance existed up to 1993). As, unlike the Eardley data, these data refer to 1995, we refrain from presenting summary statistics of the combined effects for social assistance and unemployment assistance.

This aspect was analysed in Hölsch/Kraus (2002) who stated that a medium degree of centralisation is connected with better results in terms of efficiency.
Figure 1: Dendrogram for classification of social assistance schemes according to centralisation degree (Ward Method, Quadratic Euclidian Distance)
Table 1:  K-means cluster analysis for classification of social assistance schemes according to centralisation degree

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<th>5 Clusters</th>
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Figure 2 a: Percentage reduction headcount ratio

Source: LIS, own calculations.
Figure 2 b:  Percentage reduction PGR

Source: LIS, own calculations.
Figure 2 c: Percentage reduction FGT2

Source: LIS, own calculations.
Figure 2 d: Percentage reduction Sen index

Source: LIS, own calculations.
Figure 3 a: Efficiency values headcount ratio

Source: LIS, own calculations.
Figure 3 b: Efficiency values PGR

Source: LIS, own calculations.
Figure 3 c: Efficiency values FGT2

Source: LIS, own calculations.
Figure 3 d: Efficiency values Sen index

Source: LIS, own calculations.
Table 3: Effectiveness measures for social assistance and housing benefits (poverty line half median)

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<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>Germany</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Finland</th>
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<td>10.13</td>
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dpi: disposable income
Source: LIS, own calculations.
* The variable including housing benefits is not available for Italy in the LIS dataset, since only a few Italian regions provide specific housing benefits mainly for elderly people.
Table 4: Efficiency measures for social assistance and housing benefits (poverty line half median)

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<td>6.33</td>
<td>9.20</td>
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<td>76.14</td>
<td>6.18</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>20.98</td>
<td>25.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dpi – (social assistance + housing benefits)</td>
<td>33.87</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17.58</td>
<td>17.62</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

dpi: disposable income
Source: LIS, own calculations.
*Expenditures for housing benefits are not available for Finland in Gough et al. (1997).
Table A1: Values of indicator variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>indicator for funding liability</th>
<th>indicator for formal decision responsibility</th>
<th>indicator for regional differences in benefit levels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>1,00 B</td>
<td>1,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1,00 DK</td>
<td>1,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>0,93 F</td>
<td>1,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>0,67 FI</td>
<td>1,00 IR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>0,67 IR</td>
<td>1,00 NL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>0,67 NL</td>
<td>1,00 UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>0,65 UK</td>
<td>1,00 D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>0,61 D</td>
<td>0,75 FI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>0,42 SE</td>
<td>0,75 I</td>
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<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>0,33 A</td>
<td>0,50 E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>0,33 E</td>
<td>0,50 SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>0,33 I</td>
<td>0,50 A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EL</td>
<td>0,00 EL</td>
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<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>0,00 P</td>
<td>0,00 P</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table B1: Poverty reduction figures for a poverty line of 60 percent of median

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Finland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Headcount ratio</strong></td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>14.15</td>
<td>8.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PGR</strong></td>
<td>10.62</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>16.31</td>
<td>45.80</td>
<td>9.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FGT2</strong></td>
<td>19.05</td>
<td>4.43</td>
<td>26.69</td>
<td>59.54</td>
<td>9.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sen index</strong></td>
<td>10.92</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>16.06</td>
<td>42.38</td>
<td>9.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LIS, own calculations.
Table B2: Poverty efficiency figures for a poverty line of 60 percent of median

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Finland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Headcount ratio</strong></td>
<td>8.27</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>5.66</td>
<td>22.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PGR</strong></td>
<td>53.10</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>11.65</td>
<td>18.32</td>
<td>24.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FGT2</strong></td>
<td>95.25</td>
<td>7.38</td>
<td>19.07</td>
<td>23.82</td>
<td>24.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sen index</strong></td>
<td>54.59</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>11.47</td>
<td>16.95</td>
<td>23.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LIS, own calculations.
Table C1: Poverty effectiveness and efficiency figures for a poverty line of 50 percent of median

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
<th>Efficiency</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headcount ratio</td>
<td>15.25</td>
<td>16.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGR</td>
<td>27.41</td>
<td>21.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGT2</td>
<td>35.28</td>
<td>24.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sen index</td>
<td>26.40</td>
<td>20.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LIS, own calculations.