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Housing and the Residential Integration of Immigrants in Luxembourg and the EU-15

Joel S. Fetzer
August 2010
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We have a lot of [immigrants in public housing], but they’re mixed in [with everyone else] and accepted by the [native] population. . . . We’ve only had good experiences with our model [of social housing].

Robert Conrad (2008), manager of public housing program for Luxembourg City

If immigrants or ethnic minorities succeed economically by achieving a high income or level of occupational prestige, they may nevertheless find themselves shunted into ghettos or excluded from mainstream society because of their national origins or appearance. In the perhaps the most well-known contemporary case, many urban African Americans suffer from “hypersegregation” and risk harassment from whites or the police if they attempt to live in more “exclusive” neighborhoods (Massey and Denton 1993; Goodnough 2009). For Europe, ethnic segregation certainly exists but does not appear to be increasing for the continent as a whole (Musterd and van Kempen 2009). So how well are immigrants integrated into Luxembourg’s metropolitan areas? The chapter begins to answer this question by describing the Grand Duchy’s urban setting.

Public and Private Housing

Overall, Luxembourg’s housing market offers residents relatively high quality construction but suffers from limited supply and high cost. Though 66 percent of
the middle- or upper-class owned their homes in 2006, only 34 percent of the working-class could afford to do so (Département du logement 2009b). Such figures are not surprising given that in Luxembourg City in 2009-2010, the mean purchase price of an apartment was €4,205 per square meter (i.e., €336,400 or about US$445,000 for a typical, 80 m² flat; Observatoire de l’Habitat 2010). Although 88 percent of the respondents in a 2005 poll claimed they would like to live in a suburban, single-family house (“pavillon”), 75 percent of those interviewed nonetheless rated their current type of home as satisfactory compared to 9 percent ambivalent and 16 percent unsatisfied. In contrast, only 56 percent of residents were content with the location of their dwelling. To the extent that their actual home differed from this single-family ideal, moreover, interviewees’ level of dissatisfaction climbed. Only 39 percent of high-rise-apartment dwellers reported happiness with their housing (Département du logement 2009a). Even for some Luxembourgish citizens, the price of residing in the Grand Duchy has become so exorbitant that an increasing number (perhaps reaching around 1 percent of all nationals in the workforce) have chosen to live just outside its borders in the Grande Région and commute to work every day. Such a choice appears especially likely to allow such “native frontaliers” to buy their own home (Ministère du Logement 2010). In bordering regions of Germany, for example, prices might be half what they are in Luxembourg. So many relatively affluent Luxembourgers have bought property there that the attendant price increases are driving native Germans out of the market and provoking government efforts to restrict property sales to citizens of the Grand Duchy (Coutinho 2008). And in Trier, Germany, developers have recently built new shopping centers that cater disproportionately to such Luxembourgish “frontaliers” (Lorig 2008).

For its part, the Grand Duchy’s government recognizes the challenges residents face in finding affordable housing and offers a broad array of assistance for citizens and legal immigrants who have lived in the Grand Duchy for at least three years. At the most basic level, individuals with incomes below 2.5 times the essentially subsistence-level “Guaranteed Minimum Income/RMG” may receive rental assistance of up to €1,368/month (Département du logement 2010). For current or future home owners, the state also provides financial assistance to build a new home or to buy or renovate existing housing (Département du logement 2009c).

Within Luxembourg City, the manager of that commune’s housing assistance program, Robert Conrad (2008) reports that as of September of 2008, 1,115 renter-groups (i.e., individuals or families) lived in social housing and that the city itself owned 561 of those dwellings. In other words, only around two percent of the commune’s residents lived in public housing, a statistic he describes as “very few.” Conrad attributes this low figure not to a lack of demand but rather to his office’s being “very restrictive with the criteria” for obtaining such housing:

We only take care of the people who really have no chance in the private [housing] market. . . . If we took care, for example, of [all] the people who don’t
have the minimum income [RMG], the figure could reach, as in France, 20 per-
cent, 25 percent of the population.

In order to qualify for social housing, one must be a legal resident and have
lived in the city for at least three years. The actual rent that one would pay for
social housing depends on the size and comfort level of the dwelling, the com-
position of one’s family, and one’s income; in 2008, the mean rent for social
housing in the commune was €316/month for low-income persons and €339/month for disabled or elderly residents. The rationale for charging rent
partly as a proportion of one’s income is to motivate higher-earners to leave
public housing and make room for poorer residents who need it more; as one’s
income rises, the rent for social housing could exceed that for housing in the
private sector, eliminating the motivation to stay in a government-subsidized
dwelling. At the other end of the scale, the minimum rent would be nine percent
of the RMG, or about €103/month in 2009 for an adult living alone (Conrad
2008; Meyer 2008; Social Assistance bureau 2008; Assefisc 2009).

In contrast with large urban areas in bordering countries, the commune gen-
erally does not build new social housing but rather places recipients in older
structures, often just before the buildings are torn down and replaced with non-
social dwellings. Although the very exclusive Belair neighborhood, for example,
contains state-funded housing for the elderly, it does not host any buildings for
low-income residents because the cost of housing is too high. Historically, social
housing in Luxembourg City dates to post-WWII efforts to help people who had
lost their homes in the war. According to Conrad (2008), the city did not pre-
viously have a large working-class population.

In Luxembourg City, immigrants are no more likely to reside in public
housing than natives are. Local administrators report that conflicts among dif-
ferent nationalities in social housing are not “very serious.” No deaths have re-
sulted, and no “buildings [have been] burned down.” In contrast with France,
Luxembourg has very few Muslim immigrants living in public housing, just a
few ex-Yugoslavians who might have prayer rugs or their shoes outside their
door. No one has complained about Muslim residents ritually slaughtering ani-
mals in public housing or engaging in other “provocative” behavior (Conrad
2008; Meyer 2008; Social Assistance bureau 2008).

On the whole, Luxembourg City’s Social Assistance bureau seems to take a
“tough love” approach to their clients, trying to move them into the private
housing market if at all possible, especially if their incomes rise, and applying
the criteria for aide relatively strictly. The authorities do not hesitate to evict
residents who fail to follow the rules or pay the rent (Conrad 2008). Even the
layout of Luxembourg City’s main social housing office gives this impression;
the area where clients or potential recipients wait to speak with a social worker
is a kind of restricted alcove, not much bigger than a library cubicle, that might
induce discomfort in claustrophobic individuals (personal observation).

Residential Integration in Luxembourg
Studying the residential segregation of immigrants is both theoretical and politically important. Segregation in housing itself represents a form of poor integration of immigrants and also constitutes one indicator of a failed immigration policy. Ethnic isolation may in turn produce or exacerbate other problems, such as low political and social participation (Krummacher 2002), low occupational mobility (see Musterd 2007), high unemployment (Saltman 1991), low income (Saltman 1991; Massey and Denton 1993:118-125; Keels 2008), low levels of education (Saltman 1991; Massey and Denton 1993:141-142; Keels 2008), and perhaps even ethno-nationalist or religious extremism (Peach 1992; Fassmann 2002; Krummacher 2002; but see Drever 2004), crime (Massey and Denton 1993:137-139) and violence (Lagrange 2009). According to the “spatial mismatch theory,” for example, segregation increases unemployment of ethnic minorities because they are forced to live so far away from potential places of employment (Kain 1992).

At least in Luxembourg City, the largest urban area, public housing does not appear to produce significant residential segregation. According to the Social Assistance bureau’s Robert Conrad (2008), “We don’t have [large public housing] buildings with only foreigners.” The city lacks the many large, H.L.M.-style public housing complexes common in France. Instead, the typical building might house three or so families. One structure might contain three Luxembourgish families or three immigrant families, but similar dwelling are all not located in the same neighborhood, next to other houses that are also all-native or all-immigrant. “We have social housing in [almost] all the neighborhoods” of Luxembourg City. Still, in the outer areas of the city, where a disproportionate number of older natives live, no social housing exists, perhaps because of a lack of demand. Though some neighborhoods, such as near the central train station (La Gare) have a higher proportion of immigrants than others, the residents of social housing in such areas are not disproportionately foreign-born. In Luxembourg City, “We don’t really have immigrant neighborhoods” like those in surrounding EU countries or even like the historic “Little Italy” in Dudelange; (Conrad 2008; Meyer 2008; see also Schenk et al. 2007).

The housing authorities have tried to avoid concentrations of immigrants in public housing because “the more you have a concentration, the more crime . . . and social problems you have. . . . We have spread foreigners throughout the territory and tried to integrate them at the local level, in the different clubs and in the schools.” The Social Assistance bureau has also consciously avoided massive public housing complexes: “We try not to create a society that is closed to foreigners, but to let them participate in [normal] social life.” Although some potential or actual neighbors may complain about the location of public housing, their voices do not win out, and “We try to integrate” immigrants and recipients of state housing aid into the dominant society (Conrad 2008; Coutinho 2008).

If American-style “ghettos” and French-style “banlieues” do not exist in Luxembourg, nationality, class, and place of residence remain correlated (Schenk et al. 2008). Labor leader and native Luxembourger Jean-Claude Red-
Housing and Residential Distribution of Immigrants

In 2008, for example, recalls his segregated hometown of the late 1950s and early ’60s:

I spent my childhood here at Esch-sur-Alzette, and I didn’t have any Italian [friends]. . . . I played in a neighborhood where there were only Luxembourgers, and I wouldn’t go into the other neighborhoods. There was no open conflict, but even so, there was a certain tension.

Yet Luxembourg of the 21st century seems much more integrated. Perhaps because the government never built suburban public housing projects specifically for immigrants, Luxembourgish neighborhoods tend to be relatively heterogeneous on class and nationality (Coutinho 2008). Even within a particular neighborhood, one can see affluent, native Luxembourgers in one block and then working-class Portuguese immigrants in an adjoining block (Lorig 2008). Where few or no immigrants from a particular nationality live in a given district, the cause is more likely to be their comparatively low income rather than ethnic discrimination by realtors or landlords. Still, German researchers Joelle Coutinho and Philipp Lorig (2008) caution that one should not confuse tolerance with openness to immigrants; during their own field work, they found that immigrants viewed native Luxembourgers as relatively hard to approach and to get to know personally. And particular regions (e.g., greater Esch) or settings (e.g., discos) and certain subgroups of the population (youth on the French border and EU civil servants) evidence segregation by nationality (Lorig 2008).

Although cases of Luxembourgish realtors or landlords discriminating against Cape Verdian potential home-buyers or tenants certainly exist (A 2008), the Grand Duchy’s urban landscape is a far cry from Parisian banlieues such as Dreux (Tribalat 1999). Still, the Grand Duchy’s capital and largest city still shows evidence of “minor segregation processes” by class and nationality. As Meyers and Willems (2008:103) report, “Social inequalities [in Luxembourg City] are being reproduced and show their effect [Niederschlag] in the spatial distribution of the population.” Data from 2003 on the proportion of immigrants in the various neighborhoods (quartiers) shows that the percentage of noncitizens of any nationality varies from a low of about 31 in relatively affluent Cents to around 77 in the much more working-class, red-light district of the Gare. The percentage of non-EU immigrants (generally the least advantaged among the foreign-born) likewise ranges from a little less than four in Cents to around 17 in the Gare. In general, working-class Portuguese immigrants are more likely to live in Luxembourg City’s deep valley neighborhoods such as Eich, while middle- or upper-class native Luxembourgers and other non-Portuguese EU nationals are overrepresented in such posh plateau districts as Limpertsberg (Meyers and Willems 2008:108-111; see also Schenk et al. 2007; 2008).

Causes of Residential Integration in European Union
Probably because “there are no systematic data on segregation in European cities” (Musterd 2005; see also Musterd and van Kempen 2009), relatively few scholars have attempted cross-national comparisons of the residential segregation of immigrants or other ethnic minorities. Those who do include Peach (1992), Musterd (2005), Arabaci (2007), Johnston, Poulsen and Forrest (2007), and Musterd and Fullaondo 2008. The hypotheses section below will therefore draw on these trans-national studies as well as on the more typical, one-country or even one-city investigations.

![Residential Integration of Racial and Ethnic Minorities by Country](image)

**Figure 5.1.** Degree of Residential Integration of Ethnic and Racial Minorities in Urban Areas of EU-15 Member States (European Social Survey 2002).

Although no cross-nationally comparable census data appear to be available, the 2002 European Social Survey Data does contain a question that may allow one to measure relative levels of segregation by country. The data summarized
in Figure 5.1 include only information for native-born, non-ethnic/racial minorities who live in small cities or larger metropolitan areas. The resulting ranking in Figure 5.1 seems roughly comparable to that of European and American urban areas in Musterd’s (2005; see also Phillips and Karn 1991; Musterd and van Kempen 2009; but see Peach 1996, 1998, 2007) census-based results. As the graph demonstrates, Luxembourg’s urban areas seem the least ethnically segregated out of any country in the EU-15 and considerably more integrated than those in neighboring Germany, Belgium, France, and especially the Netherlands. The United Kingdom appears to suffer from the most ethnically segregated neighborhoods in Western Europe.

In contrast to relevant pan-national research, the empirical literature on the causes of domestic, cross-regional variations in residential segregation is vast. Hypotheses from these earlier studies usually fall into economic, immigration-related, cultural, political, housing or urban infrastructure-related, prejudice-related, or demographic groupings. Relevant economic interpretations focus on labor market conditions, including the unemployment rate (Fong 1996; Martin 2007:60-61), immigrants’ occupational mobility (Martin 2007:92), structural changes in the economy, including in mean income (Fong 1996; Martin 2007:60-61); the mean income of a metropolitan area (Martin 2007:60-61), the income of immigrants or ethnic minorities (Blauw 1991; Huttman 1991a; Saltman 1991; van Kempen and van Weesep 1997; Freeman 2000; Musterd and van Kempen 2009; see also Farley 1995; but see Peach 1992; Hårsman and Quigley 1995; Peach 1996), the cost of housing, together with an increase in the price over time (Fong 1996; see also Farley 1995), economic inequality, as measured by Gini index and as an effect of redistributive welfare policies (Musterd 2005; Arabaci 2007; Martin 2007:60-62), and how globalized the country is (Musterd and van Kempen 2009).

Immigration-related theories about what causes the variation observed in Figure 5.1 use such variables as an increase in the immigration rate (Becker 1971:78-81), how long-standing immigration in general or the migration of a particular group is (Blauw 1991; Peach 1996; Murdie and Borgegård 1998; Musterd and van Kempen 2009; but see Lorig 2008), and the proportion of the urban or total population that is foreign-born (Johnston, Poulsen and Forrest 2004, 2007; Martin 2007). More cultural explanations concentrate on whether a country has adopted an assimilationist or multicultural immigrant policy (Musterd 2005), whether the immigrants and natives are culturally similar (Blauw 1991; Musterd 2005), and on immigrants’ or ethnic minorities’ choices based on their own ethnicity and culture (Huttman 1991a; Saltman 1991; Murdie and Borgegård 1998; Peach 1998; Freeman 2000; but see Massey and Denton 1993:88-96). Politically, residential integration might stem from the political party in power, mediated by governmental policies (Becker 1971:81-83; Blauw 1991; Huttman 1991b; see also Ireland 2008; Musterd and van Kempen 2009), the degree of local voting for noncitizens (Musterd 2005), or the type of welfare regime (Arabaci 2007, 2008; see also Esping-Andersen 1990).

Other scholars look more at housing conditions or the urban infrastructure. The proportion of vacant rental properties or dwellings in general (Blauw 1991)
or the degree of urban renewal (Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik 1977; Blanc 1991; Huttman 1991b; Saltman 1991; Skifter Andersen 2002; Arabaci 2008) might influence integration. The size or extent of the public transportation system (Musterd 2005), the proportion of housing that is publicly aided (Blauw 1991; Huttman 1991a; Musterd 2005; Arabaci 2008; but see Musterd and Fullaondo 2008) or owner-occupied (van Kempen and van Weesep 1997; Martin 2007:69; Arabaci 2008; Musterd and van Kempen 2009), and immigrants’ or natives’ household type or mean size of household (Blauw 1991; Härsman and Quigley 1995), perhaps as a proxy for the birth rate of immigrants (Blauw 1991) or death rate of natives (Blauw 1991), could also help determine levels of residential segregation.

Prejudice-related factors include the risk of xenophobic violence (Phillips and Karn 1991) and the racial prejudice of or discrimination by natives or the dominant ethnic group (Pascal 1967; Becker 1971:160; Blauw 1991; Huttman 1991a; Saltman 1991; Freeman 2000; Johnston, Poulson, and Forrest 2004; Musterd and van Kempen 2009). Finally, some demographic causes could be immigrants or ethnic minorities’ (Fong 1996) or natives’ average level of education (Martin 2007:60-61; see also Becker 1971:58), population density (see Johnston, Poulson, and Forrest 2004; Musterd 2005; Arabaci 2007; Martin 2007), and the proportion of immigrants who are women (Arapoglou and Sayas 2009).

If one tests these hypotheses against available data, perhaps the majority do not receive confirmation. The upward mobility of immigrants (at least with a sample of eight countries), Gini index, ratio of natives’ to immigrants’ income, 2000 Luxembourg Income Study data for non-college-graduate immigrants, the average per capita income in 2003, and income change in 2003 all fail to achieve statistical significance. Urban renewal as measured by the number of EU projects from 1994-1999 (European Commission 1999) per capita of urban population, anti-immigration attitudes (percent wanting to expel all foreigners), mean voting for the far right, socialist control of the parliament, degree of local voting according to MIPEX (2006), and the 2002 reported years of education for natives from ESS do not matter either. Globalization as measured by the 2002 or closest year Eurostat degree of inward- and outward-foreign direct investment intensity divided by the GDP is not sig, and nor does the extent of non-use of the public transportation system (percent journeys to work by car in the largest city in the country according to Eurostat from around 2002).

Despite the many scholars who offer such an explanation, immigrants’ or ethnic minorities’ own residential preferences do not seem to affect their actual levels of segregation. If one uses 2002 European Social Survey data by self-reported “ethnic minorities” on whether they want their “ideal living environment” to have “many ethnic or racial minorities,” this factor is not significantly correlated with the integration score (r = .142, p = .659, n = 12; Italy and Portugal were excluded because the cross-sectional sample size was below 15). One should also emphasize that the vast majority of ethnic minorities do not want to live in a segregated neighborhood; the maximum proportion of such pro-segregation minorities is 20.1 percent in Spain, whereas the minimum is 0 percent in Ireland.
If we simplify the different welfare regimes to Esping-Andersen’s (1990:74) original three and eliminate the UK, which may or may not belong to the liberal category, the effect of being a socialist-democratic regime versus a corporatist one (default category) is not sig (r = -.333, p = .266, n = 13); social-democratic welfare states nonetheless have a mean integration score of -.136, while corporatist ones average .031. The proportion of noncitizens who are women according to Eurostat, generally from around 2002, does not have any influence either, at least at the restricted observed range of 44 to 53 percent.

**Figure 5.2.** Relationship between 1985-2005 Mean Growth in GDP and Immigrants’ Degree of Residential Integration.

Certain economic variables, however, do seem to affect overall levels of residential integration. In particular, the average economic growth rate from 1985 to 2005 is significant (r = .552, p = .050, n = 13; see Figure 5.2), suggesting that prosperous countries are better able to create ethnically integrated
Chapter 5

neighborhoods. Related economic measures likewise achieve or almost achieve statistical significance: the 2002 percent growth in GDP according to the World Bank ($r = .479$, $p = .083$, $n = 14$ unless otherwise noted), the national unemployment rate ($r = .413$, $p = .142$), 2003 GDP/capita ($r = -.415$, $p = .140$). Though housing costs as an increase in the percentage of disposable income are not quite significant ($r = -.420$, $p = .135$), a rise in the mean price using a purchasing power standard substantially hinders integration ($r = -.501$, $p = .068$).

![Effect of Public Housing on Residential Integration of Immigrants](image)

**Figure 5.3.** Relationship between Proportion of Housing Stock that is Public Rental Dwellings and Immigrants’ Degree of Residential Integration.

Related housing or urban-infrastructure variables also help determine levels of integration. Although public housing programs might in the short run aid indigent immigrants, in the long run social housing appears to reduce their chances of living in an ethnically mixed neighborhood. If one eliminates the UK,
an outlier likely because of its minimal welfare state, the proportion of social
protection spending that goes toward public housing is not significant \( (r = 0.035,\ p = 0.911,\ n = 13) \). Yet if one instead uses the proportion of all dwellings in 2004
or the most recent earlier year available that were social rental properties (Federcasa 2006:66), the negative effect of public housing becomes overwhelming
\( (r = -0.650,\ p = 0.016,\ n = 13) \); see Figure 5.3). In contrast, a high vacancy rate for
conventional dwellings in the early 2000s (Federcasa 2006:63) increases resi-
dential integration of immigrants \( (r = 0.556,\ p = 0.060,\ n = 12) \), as does the per-
centage of dwellings that is owner-occupied \( (r = 0.483,\ p = 0.080) \). Though the num-
ber of persons in natives’ household has no influence, immigrants’ mean
household size does \( (r = 0.620,\ p = 0.018) \); see Figure 5.4). In EU member states
where immigrants’ households are larger, neighborhoods are correspondingly
more integrated, perhaps because family immigration is more likely to produce
residential integration than is the migration of single adults. Or perhaps natives
find it harder to segregate larger families than individuals.

**Effect of Household Size of Immigrants on Residential Integration of Immigrants**
Increases in the proportion of culturally similar immigrants, as measured by the percentage of newcomers who belong to the majority’s religion, seem to produce similarly pro-integration results ($r = .469$, $p = .090$). If one measures this variable by the percentage of immigrants from outside the EU, however, the correlation is not quite significant ($r = .427$, $p = .128$). Truly objective measures of the degree of pro-multicultural policy are hard to find. But if one employs the mean level of opposition to the idea that everyone in the country should share the same customs and traditions from the 2002 European Social Survey and includes only native-born, majority-group respondents, this variable has no effect at all ($r = -.110$, $p = .707$). In contrast, a parallel analysis based on Lisa Vanha-la’a (2004) measure of immigration-related pro-multicultural policies (reported in Banting et al. 2006) shows that this factor has a strongly negative effect ($r = -.621$, $p = .018$; see Figure 5.5). Despite its basis in ethnic tolerance, then, multicultural as opposed to assimilationist policies appear to be associated with if they do not actually produce residential segregation of the foreign-born.
Cross-national data on hate crimes in the EU are not really comparable because of different definitions of such offences and non-uniform degrees of under-reporting; researchers have not yet determined whether high hate-crime scores indicate a large risk of being victimized, a low level of reporting, or (more likely) some undefined mixture of both. Nonetheless, a naïve analysis of 2001-2004 RAXEN data (EUMC 2005:154) does not produce any statistically significant relationship between residential integration and the supposed risk of such crimes occurring ($r = -.263, p = .434, n = 11$). If one instead uses the 2001-2003 percent increase in hate crime reports (EUMC 2005:160) for reliable-data countries that reported all three years and if one eliminates Ireland, which appears to be an outlier because of the relatively rapid influx of immigrants and the pending 2004 open borders policy with the new EU-25 states of Eastern Europe, the correlation becomes both statistically and substantively significant ($r = -.811$,
p = .050, n = 6; see Figure 5.6). As in the United States (Massey and Denton 1993:17-82), then, violence and the threat of violence seem to be helping to create and maintain ethnic segregation.

![Figure 5.6](image)

**Figure 5.6.** Relationship between 2001-2003 Percent Increase in RAXEN’s Risk of ‘Racist Crimes’ and Immigrants’ Degree of Residential Integration.

Finally, a few demographic and immigration-related variables may affect integration as well. Population density as measured by residents per km\(^2\) almost reaches traditional levels of statistical significance (r = -.421, p = .134). If one instead uses 2003 UN data on the percent of the national population that lives in urban areas, the relationship is not significant at all (r = -.050, p = .866). How long-standing a country’s immigration flows are does matter, with more long-standing states more likely to segregate immigrants (r = -.572, p = .033; mean integration score = .038 for recent countries of immigration but -.281 for long-standing ones). Data from Eurostat in 2003 on the percentage of the population
composed of noncitizens likewise show that greater proportions of immigrants are associated with less segregation ($r = .546, p = .043$; see Figure 5.7).

**Figure 5.7.** Relationship between 2003 Percentage of Noncitizens and Immigrants’ Degree of Residential Integration.

To summarize, we now know better which factors seem to be correlated with higher levels of residential integration of immigrants in Western Europe (see Table 5.1). Strictly political and demographic variables appear to have no influence on such integration. In contrast, economic (a high growth rate, stable housing costs), cultural (religiously similar immigrants and assimilationist policies), immigration- (recent immigration and a high proportion of immigrants in the population), housing- (high vacancy and owner-occupied rates, large immigrant households, and little public housing) and prejudice-related (stable or decreasing levels of xenophobic violence) ones do seem to set the stage for successful integration of immigrants into local neighborhoods.
### TABLE 5.1
Correlates of Average Level of Residential Integration of Immigrants in the EU-15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictors</th>
<th>Correlation</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Economic</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP Growth Rate 1985-2005</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth Rate 2002</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in Housing Cost PPD’d</td>
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<td>Immigrants’ Income as Proportion of Natives’</td>
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<td>-.650**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Housing Budget</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natives’ Household Size</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Renewal</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Transportation</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prejudice-Related</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in Reported Risk of Hate Crimes</td>
<td>-.811**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Reported Risk of Hate Crimes  0
Xenophobic Attitudes  0

Demographic
Urbanicity  0
Natives’ Education  0
Women Immigrants  0
Population Density  0

Notes: Data represent Pearson’s r for correlation between 2002 European Social Survey-based Integration Score and the predictor variable in question. Pearson’s r varies from 1.0 to -1.0, with a positive number indicating that the two factors rise together, and a negative sign showing that one variable rises at the same time that the other one falls.
*p < .10   **p < .05   0 = not significant at .10
Note

1. The mean by country of a 1-3 scale of how many “people of a minority race or ethnic group” reside in the respondents’ “living area” was weighted by natives’ mean degree of overestimation of minorities’ presence from a separate question on what percentage of the national population was composed of immigrants (see Dangschat 2002). Finally, the “integration score” represents the unstandardized residual of an OLS regression of the weighted 1-3 point scale on the percentage of valid respondents in the sample who claimed to belong to an “ethnic or racial minority.” Essentially, the integration score measures neighborhood ethnic diversity after correcting for respondents’ perception bias and controlling for the objective number of ethnic minorities in the country.

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Print, Archival, Media, and Internet Sources

Chapter 5


Chapter 5


Chapter 5


Housing and Residential Distribution of Immigrants


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